ML20032D118

Transmittal of Addl Info in Support of Previous Motions for Postponement & Setting Dates of Prehearing Conference. Related Correspondence

ML20032D118
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	11/02/1981
From:	Ellis J Citizens Association for Sound Energy
To:
References
NUDOCS 8111130402
Download: ML20032D118 (83)

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UNITED STATES 07 AMERICA DCCKETE0

• NUCLEAR REQUIATORY CNMISSION USNRr mara s TEE ATONIC SAF m AND LICENSIE1 BQ W

'81 NOV -5 P2:16 s

In the Matter of l

l Docket Bos.O g SECRETA b.

and $OS tC APPLICATIO= OF TECA8 LffILITIES l

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UNITS fl AED #2 (CPSES) j D

g p.ANSMITIAL OF ADDITIONAL INFCRMATION Op hg-T O p CASE (Citir.cas Association for Sound Energy) hereby files.thishits gD f,

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of Additional Information.n support cf its gevious motions for postponyent S

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s cnd setting of dates for pre-hearing conference.

l CASE submits herewith the Octobdr 20, 1981 Ninth Report by the Cocmittee s

on Government Operations of the H6use of Representatives ^, niich ctates on page N

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8, paragraphs 1 and 2:

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"...as indicated in the NRC responses to Chairman Moffett's written questions, two of those reactors (allegedly delayed)(Zimmer and Comanche Peak) have admitT,edly slipped additional months in construction schedules.

"In fact, the NRC believes the projected' del'ys for Zimmer and Comanche a

Peak vill be eliminated altogether'by the utilities' forthcoming revisions In atsver to Chairman Moffett's Augdst 17 interrogatories, in their schedules.

the NRC stated that its own staff predictions of completion dates for those plants shovs they vill suffer no delay from the licensing process."

(Emphases added.)

"This report indicates two things which have direct bearing on these proceedings:

J then-(1) The NRC Staff knew on or before August 17 that, not only was 4

- ' projected completion date 9f December 1981 incorrect, but the June 1902 m

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'W Oi projected date vas also inc.orrect since it would still have resulted in It'is also rdasonable to assume that the Applicants a four-month delay.

House Report No.97-277, Envircreent, Energy, and Natural Resources' Subcommittee.

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also knew this.

(2) "...the Co=mittee found that the utilities themselves in come cases bear the responsibility for having delayed those very proceedings about which they complain. As NRC officials have had several occasions to warn industry officials, delays by the utilities themceives in resolving outstanding safety questions and the industry tendency to misstate con-struction completion schedules, as documented in this report, delay the NRC licensing proceeding.

" Finally, the Committee has found that the magnitude of whatever delay can be attributed to the NRC--even inciuding the time taken to resolve significant safety issues such as seismic threat and emergency. planning

--is a en11 fraction of the delay caused by utility errors, management problems and marketplace realities such as capital acquisition."

House Report, page k1',

paragraphs T and 6 A -

We are also attaching copies of excerpts from CASE's 1/2/81 Brief and the transcript of the cross-examination of Dallas P.cVer & Light Co. vitness Max Tanner in the' Dallas and Austin 1980 DP&L rate hearings (Attachments A, B and C hereto -- see especially pages 7 through 11 of Attachment B and pages 5 and 6 of Attachment C). We realize that normally rate case information would not pertain to these proceedings; however, we are including this since it deals specifically with the NRC Caseload Forecast Panel's 10/23/80 projection for a fuel load date for Unit 1 of Ccnanche Peak of December 1982 (aithough the Applicants projected December 1981)...

DP&L chose not to present this information regarding the Panel's projection

?,o the regulatory authorities in the rate hearings, even though CASE deliberately provided them with the opportunity to present it.

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CASE is transmitting this additional information at this time in ecupliance with the Board's directive that all parties keep them informed of changing circumstances bearing on these proceedings.

Respectfully submitted, c

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[s.)JuanitaEllis, President CASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy) 1426 S. Polk Dallas, TX 75224 214/946-9446 214/941-12n, work,"usuany Tuesdays and Fridaysonly(however,Itiillbeworking

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CASE ATTACHMENT A - Page 1 of 4 c,

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From CASE's A

in 1980 DP&L Rate Hearings, Docket No'. 3460, Application of Dallas Power &

Co. for a Rate Increase. Before Public Utility Co=iasion of Texas

i VII. Information which DP&L chose to omit from its testimony indicates that the Ccapany will continue to have to rely on oil and gas, and that the realization of its prir.ary justification for its construction program will continue to be delayed, with Iasultant increased costs.

. g/y, On October 23, 1980, the. Nuclear Regulatory C mmission (NRC) Caseload i

Forecast Panel stated that although the owners of the Ccuanche Peak nuclear

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plant (which include DP&L) believe they will be ready to load fuel and get

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their operating license for Ccnanche Peak in December 1981, the NRC C,aseload sf, -

Forecast Panel thinks that it will be December 1932. In i.he Dallas hearings, sg]

a CASE inquired as t6 whether or not DP&L's vitnesses intended'to amend their

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'J testimony to reflect that fact (Dallas transcript, pages h, line 23, through 44

...n t 5, line 5). DP&L Attorney Mr. Wooldridge replied that they did not intend

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to amend their direct testimony (Dal'las Transcript, page 5, lines 6 through 9).

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Cross-examination of DP&L's witnesses revealed that the Company still W

believes it will meet the December 1981 fuel load date and that the first unit ll:

of Comanche Peak vill go on line in 1982 (Tanner Cross-Examination, page 19,

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lines 17 through 20, Dallas Transcript; Dallas Transcript,,pages h9, line 16,

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'.l through 50, line 19; CASE Exhibit T-2; Austin Transcript, page 67, line 9,

.j through page 8, line 16), although the NBC's projection is otherwise.

Should thg_ NRC's projection be accurate, rather than DP&L's, it vill result

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in another double-barrelled shot at the ratepayers:

increased construction

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m costs for Cccanche Peak and continuing higher fuel costs because of continuing.

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use of oil and gas (Dallas Transcript, Tanner cioss-examination', page 19, line'

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13, through page 20, line 3; Dallas Trariscript, Tanner cross-examination, page

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.m 54, lines 5 through 11; Austin Transcript, Tanner cross-examination, pages 41,-

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CASE ATTACHMENT A - Page 2 cf 4 line 15, through 42, line 11, and pages 83, line 25, through 84, line 13).

Clearly this important piece of information should have been made available to the regulatory authorities br P'

'. because of the possible impact which this might have on reccanmendatiom

^ be made in these proceedings. It dis-P turbs CASE very much the.t DP6eL g to come forward with this information in a frank and candid manner, even though CASE deliberately gave them an opening to do so (Dallas transcript, pages 4, line 23, through~ 5, line 5). 'inis infor-mation should have been supplied as a supplement or at least mentioned by DPEL Q,'!'

to the regulatory authorities rather than leaving it to tflis Intervenor to point it out.

In CASE's cross-examination of PUC Staff witness Mr. Child, he stated that this infermation vould have an effect on his recct:mendations and/or his analyses, that his infonnation was based on what' the Company and all other sources had supplied, that he would use any available source that he felt reasonable and

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professional, and that such information would be considered as a matter of course in his analyses (Child cross-examination, Austin Transcript, pages 777, line 11, througn page 779, line 19). And in CASE's cross-examination of PUC Staff witness Mr. Lee, he stated that he was not aware of the NRC Caseload Y

Forecast Panel s projection, that if their projection were correct and the first unit of Comanche Peak didn't go into commercial operation as assuined by l

DP86L that the cost of the plant would undoubtedly go up, that he would definitely',

vant to review information such as that; he indicated that part of his reviev i

was an analysis to see if the project is really p*eded, that he reviewed each J'

e project individually with regard to the d511ars per kilowatt installed cost Ji

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CASE AlTACIDd3fT A - Page 3 cf 4 as compared to what it might be if they generated that same amount of energy on gas or oil, to see it it's a beneficial project; that he then would make a determination yes or no; that if he made a yes determination, then those particu-lar dollars that are included in CWIP vould be evaluated by other FUC staff C

ar Personnel to determine how much CWIP should be included in rate base to maintain '

r the Ccampany's financial integrity; that if he made a no detemination, those f

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S particular projects would be excluded from CWIP and would not be considered by the other PUC staff personnel regarding the amount of CWIP to include in g,*:

the rate base (Lee Cross Enmination, Austin Transcript, pages 855, line 6, through 860, line 9).

It is ver) obvious from the preceding that the information regarding the NRC Caseload Forecast Panea projection is vitally important to this particular 4

rate case. CASE is aware of the possibility that bringing out this information may actually risk having the amount of CWIP included in the rate base increased because of the increased cost of Ccananche Peak and because it vill be longer than anticipated before the first unit comes on line. PUC Staff witness Bruce Fairchild in the 1979 DP&L rate case (Docket 2572) actually changed his testimony in mid-streas due to a change in what he perce!ved tne in-service date to be for Ccxnanche P$~ak. We assume that DP&L is also aware of this possibility.

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This: raises the question of why DP&L chose deliberately not to bring this vital

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piece of information to the attention of the regulatory authorities. CASE 4

knows why ve are villing to risk an increase in the amount of CWIP included 1'

in the; mte base -- it is because, quite simply, we are more interested in

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!I bringing out the truth and facts than in making a particular point in.this

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CASE ATTACHMENT A - Paga 4 of 4 rate case. We do not know for a fact what DP&L's motives vere in this matter (although we have our own opinion); ve can only say for certain that they chose to deliberately not bring this to the attention of the regulatory authorities in this rate case. However, we do believe that tne regulatory authorities have the right and the responsibility to ascertain exactly why DP&L chose this course; we urge that they exercise this right and responsibility and that the i

reasons be made part of the record in these proceedings.

If the NRC's projection is correct, and the first unit o, f Comanche Peak

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does not come on line until 1983 (rather than 1932 as the Company projects),

the costs of the plant will go up, the very high costs of construction with

,CWIP in the rate base vill continue longer than had been anticipated and vill accelerate, DP&L vill continue to have to rely on gas and oil _vith acccunpanying high fuel costsg and the ratepayers vill be hit in the pocketbook again -- and a6ain -- and again (see item VI, page 14, of this pleading), primarily to finance the construction of a plant which was suppsed to have already been in operation according to the Company's 1974 projections and tceir assertions to the regulatory authorities when the Comanche Peak plant vac first proposed as bein6 absolutely necessary to supply electricity in 1980.

(Could tnis ce why DP&L chose not to advise the fbgulatory authorities of the NRC Caselcad Forecast Panel's projection *l) 9 0

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CASE ATTACH EiT B -- Pag 2 1 of 11 1

COCMET 5:U.*

• 3 E.1 PROD. L UTIL F.'.C. 3. r;V4 5 4 W.m.E

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DALLAS POWER AND L'IGHT COMPANY 3

APPLICATION FOR RATE CHANGE SUBMITTED TO THE CITY OF DALLAS 4

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10 MASTER INDEX OF PROCEEDINGS AND EXHIBITS r * #I 1l C'

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k M a 15 Proceedings had November 24, 1980, November 25, 1980, November 26, 1980 16 aj 17 e

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STANLEY. H Ammis. Rice. LANGromo & ASSOCIATES REstsTERED PRortssoNAL REPowrEns DALLAS. TEXAS 75201

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CASE ATTACHMENT B -- Page 2 of 11 1

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.P.R _O.C.E E_.D _I_ _N.. G.S 3

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Novmanber 24, 1980 6

Examination of Max Tanner 7

Direct Examinat, ion by Mr. Engelland-----

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7----

12 Cross Examination by Mr.. Gay- ---------- " 7 7--- 7--

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Cross Examination by: Ms. Batchelor-------- 7 33 Cross Examination by Mrs. Ellis----------- ---- 45 f

9 Crosis Examination by.Mr.

Sparks---------- -------- 7, 56 114 I

Questions by.the Examinar---.

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E.

Patterson

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Examination of W.

11 Direct Examination by Mr. Wooldridge-- ----- 7 7--- 77; 122 12 Cross Exaministion by Ms. S immon s --------- 7---- ----. 122 Cross Examin ation by Mrs.

Ellis--------- ------- --- --

130 13 Cros s Examin ation by,Ms.

Batchelor--------------- -- - 151 Crt)s s Examination by Mr. Spark s---------- ------------. 164 14 Redirect Examination by Mr. Wooldridge--- -----------

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a Recross Examination by Mrs. E lli s--------- -- r----f-

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15 Questions by the Examiner---------

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I 16 Examination of Charles E.

Olson 17 Direct Examination by Mr. Engelland- *--------- - --------. 199 Crpps Examination by Mr. Joyne r---- '---- ------- -- --. 200 i

la Cross Examination by Mrs.

Ellis.---------------------

. 211 Cross Examination by Ms. Batchelor-------- r------ --. 219 l

19 Cross Examination by Mr. Sparks-------------- r---

7 226 -

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.2 s.r-20 November 25, 1980 Ce+-A.~' A-f (de n W-21 Questions y th e Ex am ne r------ --------------------. 281 22 Examination of Joe D.

Karney i

as Direct Examination by Mr. Wooldridge----- --?-

7 v71 284 Cross Examination by Mr.

Joyner----------------- --

285 i

34 Cross Examination by Mrs. Ellis --------- --- -- 7-- 7 :

297 p

Cross Examinatl.on by Ms. Batchelor--- -- -.- --- ---- - --- i 312' 26 Cross Examination by Mr.

Sparks--------- ----- --.

31.8 Questions by the Examinar--- ----- ------ -- ----- -- 77.

340 STANLEY, HARRIS MK"E.1.ANGFORO & ASSOCIATES REGtSTERED PROFESSIONAL REsmOsWTERS l

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CASE ATTACHMENT B -- Pagi"4 of 1111

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Index of Proceedinga

Continusd 1

O Page 2

3 Ex==inatlon of Thomas L. Baker 353 Direct Examination by Mr. Wooldridge-----r---- ------.

4 357 Cros s 15xamin ation by Mr.

Gay------------ --- ------- ---.

413 Cros s Examination by Mrs.

Ellis---------- --------- 7 5

451 Cross Examination by Ms. Batchelor------- - -- -------- r.

469 Cros s Examination by Mr. Sparks--------------------- - -..

6 488 Questions by the Examiner------------------------ ---.

7 November 26, 1980 8

Examination _ of Philip K. Brown 9

492 Direct Examination by Mr. Sparks ----------- -- - ---.

493 10 Cross Examination by Ms. S immo n s ------ -------------.

523 Cros s Examination by Mrs.

Ellis------------- --- ---.

545 Cross Examination by Ms. Batchelor-------- 7-------

549 12-Cros s Examination by Mr. Wooldridge-------- --- r-- - 7.'

12 Ex==4 nation of Larry N. Patterson_

13 554 Dirbct Examination by Mr.

Sparks--------- -- ---- --.

556 Cros s Examination by Ms. S immons-------- ---- -- - -- - 7 558

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14 cross Examination by Mrs.

Ellis-----...

559 15 Cross Examination by Ms. B a tch e l o r -------------------- i is Examination of Robert A.

McKnight_

564 Direct Examination by Mr. Spark s-----

566 17 Crop,a Examinatio.n by Mrs'. E lli s ------ ------ ------- ---

567 Cros s Examination by Mr. Engelland--------------

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19 Examination of John E. Schaefer, l

571 Direct Examination by Mr. S p a r k s -- - - - --- - - - - -- -- -.

572 20 Cross Examination by Ms. S immo n s - -- ----------- -----.

573 Cross Examination by Mrs. E l l i s --- - -- ----- ------ --- --

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STANLEY HARRIS. RICE. LANGFORD & ASSOCIATES REGISTERED PROFEsseON AL REPORTERS DALLAS. TEXAS 752Of 7-,

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CASE ATIACHMENT B -- Pag 2 h of 11 iig i

1 INDEX 2

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3 EEElEllE i

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DP&L Exhibit Description Page j

Number Marked 5

1 Company's rate filing package 3

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2 Notices sent out in connection 3

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' with the rate case j

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City Staff Exhibit No.

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Exhibit sponsored by Mr. Tanner 91 10 in Docket 1526 11 2

Exhibit prepared by.Mr. Tanner 91 in Docket 2572 12 3

Prepared testimony of Philip K.

491 j

U Brown.

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Prepared testimony of Larry N.

491 Patterson 15 5

Prepared testimony of John E.

491 le Schaefer 17 6

Prepared testimony o.f 491

. Robert A. McKnight g

19 21 22 23 24 8

O STANLEY. H ARRAS. RICE. LANGFORD & As9OCIATES REGISTERED PROFEssaON AL REPORTERS DALLAS. TEXAS 75.101 s

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DALLAS POWER AND LIGHT C'OMPANY o

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APPL-ICATION FOR RATE CHANGE p

.. S U B M I T..T E D TO THE CITY OF' DALLAS 4

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7 APPEARANCES:

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MR. THOMAS Z.

JAMES

'9 THE EXAMINER 10 DALLAS POWER AND M11 LIGHT COMPANY Mr. Al Engelland J,=

Mr. Robert A.

Wooldridge MJ12 Luce sn es For the Applicant MR. GALEN M.

SPARKS M14 Q

15 Assistant City.

Attorney-for 'the City of ballas MS. PAM O'BRIEN 17

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18 Assistant to'the Hearing Examiner 19 -

MRS. JUANITA. ELLIS President, CASE MR. GEOFFREY GAY MR. ROGER JOYNER 22 MS. FAITH SIMMONS t

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EorrACORN

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KIM IS A TCllELOR 1

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For CCEE

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REGesTERED PnortsscNAL REPowTsms D ALL AS. TEX AS 75201

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?S CASE A'PPArmat'

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.2 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS HAD ON THE 24TH DA 3

OF NOVEMBER, A.D., 1980, IN THE DALLAS CITY, HALL,,

4 ROP)M 6E SOUTH, CITY OF DALLAS, COUNTY OF 5

DALLAS, STATE OF TEXAS, AT 9:00 O', CLOCK A.M.

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STANLev. HAmmes Mscr. LANGFORD ar ASSOCIATES Rec.ssTERro Paortssaowat Repewevres N

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CASI' ATTACHMENT B -- Paae 7 of 11., h ', ' '

1 For-tho.cpplicant.

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2 MR. WOOLDRIDGE:

Bob Wooldridge and'Al 3

Enteli~aix[for Da.llas Power & Light Company.

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THE EXAMINER:

For ACORNS.

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5 MR. GAY:. Ge'o f f r ey. Gay, assis,Uing-me hill be,;

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Faith Simmons and Roger Joyner.

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for the.itizens Associa.

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THE EXAMINER:

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'8 tion for Sound Ener'gy.

9 MRS. ELLIS:

Juanita Ellis, presidenti of j

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11 THE EXAMINER:

The r'e.-is.a third inted venor z.3 4

A 12 group who's not represented yet, the Citizens..COnlitior

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for Economic Energy.

Mrs. Ellis, I under' stand $ at 6.6 b.

4 14 Ms. Nim Batchelor will be here.

e-15 MS. E L t.I S :

Yes, uh-huh, she call'ed has.-terda,y

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Representing the city ',s ta.f f.-

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MR. SPARKS:

Galen. Sparks, assisEa.nt -city l i 19 attorney.

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20 THE EXAMINER:

At this time I.would 1ike to j

.I si entertain any motions or other information in advance f

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of proceeding that may be appropriate to the case.

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Mr. Examiner; we' would..l.hNN-;to gr,)

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+y inquire if the DP&L witnesse,s plan to' amend Deii'.r:

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~84 u,g testimony to reflect the fact that on October 23p.h1Sb0) < b.

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CASE ATTACHMENT B -'- Page 8 of 11' S, h o.Q i 1

the NRC case load foreca'st panel stated that although.,

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2 DP&L bel,ieves,they will be ready to load, fuel,and hay ( ]',

3' their operating license for Comanche Peak Decoghir'.of, '.[:

.f 1981., the NRC case load forecast panel thinks.that.itl,:

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Vill-be December, 1982.

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8 MR. WOOLDRIDGE:

Mr. Examiner,'we do not r

7 plan or intend to amend our direct testidlony.

I 'el f) 8 think'that would be proper for cross-examination, m.p

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10 THE EXAMINER:

Are there any o.t!her motions os

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11 information that may be pertinent to ba considdreid' 1

12 before we proceed?

l a: motion I

MR. GAY:

.Mr.

Examiner, thi's isnt s

'h but simply a statement of protest from ACORN that we t

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4 15 don't consider this proceeding a PURPA proceeding ~,

.d 18 it's PURPA as has been f ormulated stu, der federal law.

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Our conception of that statute is thtt s u f f ic ien.t 17 M

public notice is to be provided for any.PURPA pro ;

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ceedings contemplated to allow the parties, p rior,i to 18 20 the proceeding or certainly right at the time of 81 intervention, to understand the full dynamics of PURP,A 9

considerations.

In particular, reference to your lettor !!

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of November lith and to the,testimonp' filed by the thispreviousFrihty #k company in response to tha't letter

.iT' which ACORN objects to.

To us, that doesn't comply; e,

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That looks like around '83,. 84 period.

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'A'nd "why is it that yon. cst 13cted $130.million7 i

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Well, I looked at our projections an,d,they -

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ranged right around that number.

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0 Does that $130 million contemplate construc.

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7 tion for Forest' Grove, which you pick up - :

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A, Yes.

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0 If'you deferred ' Fo ze s t:. Grove.* until l'9 8 7,

I 10 does that mean tha.t you would defer cohstruction-t

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11 until 1987 or you would defer contemplating-it onfline?

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We deferred the construction.

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You giv.s the

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.,--q 14 kW cost for' Comanche Peak.

Is'that' based on'.a 1591

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ai 15 or a 1982 inservice date?

16 A.

That's based on a 1982 inservice"d' ate.

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Are you,famili,ar, Mr. Tanner, with.tih.NRC ru 18 review team's s ta tenie n t that C'omanche Peak Unit No. 1

..A hj 19 should not come on line until 1983?

i:.1 20 A.

I read that in the newspaper, yes.

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If we could expect that to be a truism, I n.<,

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, 2a know it's a hypothetical for the company to assume that p4 gs 23 but assume if you would that the plant, C'omanche " Peak', _

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cannot come on line until 1983. Wos121 you expect tilat', - y' 25 delay dnd the rate of inflation in the nexts couple of,*

STANLry. HAmmis. RICE. L.ANorono & ASSOCIATES REGISTERED PRoFESSONAL REroRTams

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CASE ATTACHMENT B -- Paga 10 of 134 9-q G

What about natural gas?

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. Gas and o'il.

Well, gas units.

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In the consideration that yotta have given to

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this, has there bden discussion just among the people' I

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r Texas Utilities.systemwide

~ (j 6

at DP&L or has this been a

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'7 discussion or review or how has that code about?

I I've disc $ssed it with my counterparts at elII 8

A.

.,3 9

the other op'erating companies.

The fuel alternatives pg

$?

10 and their economics and their availability.

Rvi 11 G

okay.

Are there any kind of studies or M

i-

.[1 12 reports or any information at all available as to what t,

went*into these discus'sions and any documentation at

• 4, 13

..r.g 14 all available on that?

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13 A.

No.

p?

. %(CAss) is it correct that the Si 16 0

Is it ghe current si 17 currgn(t DP&L projection,is that the first unit of the fay 18 Comanche Peak plant will have constructios completed c

19 ' suf ficiently to load fuel in December, 19817 6

t 20 A.

That's correct.

21 4

All right.

I think Mr.. Gay mentioned the 22 NRC hase load foNecast panel's decision on the October-1

..]

83 23rd wherein they projected that the..first uniti. in the

~

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24 Comanche Peak plant would have construction completed J

25-sufficiently to load fuel in December of 1982.

~

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'I STANLEY. H ARme#. RICE. LANGPORD 8t ASSOCIATES

'A REGISTERED PRortsstoNAL REPORTERS D AT.L. AM. TF.M AS 71201

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CASE ATTiCHMENT B -- PaB3 11 of Q O i

~1 Did I undsrstand from your" ans.wer that you 2

are not really thoroughly familiar with th'at. decision?

3

' A.

I am not.

And I don't know it's a decision

~

.g on their part.

I read in the paper that that was their

.]

f opinion after visiting the plant.

5 0

Well, their projection, then... You have not l

discussed this or really looked into it'any further 7

than just reading it in the paper?

a t

I di'scussed with our folks who have the 9

A..

i,.

construction responsibility, the construction managemer t,..

10 and they tell me that their schedu'le is still '81 and i

11 0

^g they.have identified the items to be completed and 12 their best estimate at th'e current time is 19.81.

j 13 0-14 uncertainties associated with A

There are

' t.

building a nuclear plant, as we are all familiar with, 15 and 4,t may have to be delayed, but.our current.schedul o

16 17 is 1981.

i 0

And these would be people with TUGCO?

18 19' A.

That's correct.

g How long after'the fuel is loaded for Unit 1 20 of the Comanche Peak plant is the unit expected to come 21 22 on line?

It would be producing 'some electridity 'shorthyg A.

after the fuel was loaded and low power testing.

We'r\\d/

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l 19 20 21 1

22

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24 25 I

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h HICKMAN-KENNEDY REPOR7'NG SERVICE INC.

h 7800 SHOAL CREEK BOULEVARD. SUITE 346-WEST

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CASE ATTACIIMENT C -- Pagd of 6

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TABLE OI' CONTEMTG i

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.Nh 2

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~

Page 3 1 EDINGS - december 8, 1980 4

PRESENTATION ON BEHi\\LF OF APPLICANT 21 5

MAX H.

TANNER, JR.

Direct (Engelland) 21 I

6!

Cross (Blanchard) 22

'( l' Cross (Sparks) 23 Cross (Simmonc) 5 0l '!

l Cross (Ellis) U 62 l

8ll Clarifying (Holman) 80 i

Further Cross (Ellis) 80 9i

-w 1

p 10 ll LUNCHEON l

RECESS 102 AFTERNOON SESSION 103 11;j l

MAX H.

TANNER, JR.

Cross (continued) 104 12

{

WAYNE E.

PATTERSON Direct (Wooldridge) 163 j

Cross ( Bla n ch a'rd )

165 13 l

Cross (Simmons) 193.'

~~'

14 '!

.T~

Cross (Ellis) 200 i

15}'

CHARLES E.

OLSON Direct (Engelland) 211 ' ;-

16 EVENING REQESS 213 17 r\\

CV 18 19 20-21 22 23 u

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HICKMAN-XENNEDY REPORTING SERVICE INC.

7800 SHOAL CREEK BOULEVARD. SUITE 345 WEST

('U$T!?) TC Y A 9 75 7C,7

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CASE ATIACEMENT C -- Pag? 5 of $

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• a croud O/

Tannc. -

l That's what the hearing is for.

1 i

2 MR. HOLMAN:

Mr. Tanner, do you know which

~

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witness will speak to the matters on these pages?

i i

4 Are you a good starting point?

1 g

5 THE WITNESS:

I'm probably a' good starting 6

point.

i i

7 MR. HOLMAN:

Go ahead, Ms. El.lis.

[

MS. ELLIS:

Thank you.

9 Q

In regard to this sheet,that I have just given 10 you, again, this is from the operating license hearing.

k 11 Is that correct?

i i

12 A

'That's what it says up at the top there.

I 13 0

All right.

I wobld like to talk with you just l-l 14 a moment.

It states here for 1982 operation and then l

15 underneath, 1984 operation for the Comanche. Peak-plant.

. l-16 Nre you familiar with what has happened with 17 the CASE,41oad forecast panel of the Nuclear Regulatory

,c 18 Commission which on October 23rd stated that although Texas Otilities in this instance, said 19 the company, 20 that they believed that the fuel would be ready to load 21 and the operating licenses will be ready to be obt'ained j.

22 for the first unit in December 1981, that the N RC / 'N' I.

i 23 Load Forecast Panel has projected that'it will be i,

7 24 December 1982 before they are ready to load the fuel f

25 for Comanche Peak Unit l?

h HICKM AN-KENNEDY REPORTING SEi1VICE INC.

7800 SHOAL CREEK BOULEVARD. SUITE 346-WEST

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h Tannc, @S{ g g C -- Pag 2 6 of 6 __ 68 y

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The Company's current schedule, current plans,.

,f' O

2 is'to load fuel in lats 1981. There are a lot of t,>

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. l:

s' 3

uncertainties in nuclear power plant construction.

i 4

That is our current plan.

5 I further understand that this nuclear body

\\

6 visited the plant and indicated that they thought,it j

7 night be different.

They also said it might be 8

possible for us to make this and they encouraged us to 9

continue on our s c h e.d u l e, and that's what we are doing.

{

l h-10 Q

Right.

'But based on their findings, they l

l

thought it would be December 1982 rather than December l

i 12 1981.

Is that correct?

13 A

I did not read w' hat they specifically found.

a l_

14 I talked to our folks there.

They have one opinion; we 4

l 15 have another.

They encouraged us to continue on ours Y

[

16 and that's what we're going to do.

i 17 Q

<4All right.

In regard to the capacity factor E

(q 18 listed here for Unit 1 of Comanche Peak, it's listed'as 19 29' percent for 1982 and for 1984 it's listed as 53 l

20 percent.

Could you give me an. estimation of what the 21 future capacity factors would be following the operations?.

22 Are you talking about, for instance--let me back-track i

f 23 a little.

Are you, talking about on the first one, o n e.

1 24

~

unit having come on line?

25 A

That's correct.

I h( HICKMAN-KENNEDY REPORTING SER 7800 SHOAL CREEK BOULEVARD. SUITfDM FT357

• )*

(

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOLKET!?

USNRC BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of 1

'81 NOV -5 P2:16 APPLICATION OF TEXAS UTILITIES 1

Docket Nos. 50-445 A NW GENERATING COMPANY,'ET AL. FOR AN 1

andgg4gg OPERATING LICENSE FOR COMANCHE 1

BRA C PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION X

UNITS #1 AND #2 (CPSES)

I I

CERTIFICATE OF SEEVICE By my signature below, I hereby certify that true and correct. copies of CASE's Transmittal of Additional Information have been sent to the names listed below this 2nd q.or hovember 1981, by First Class mail locally and by Express Mail where indiched by *.

o Administrative Judge Marshall E. Miller David J.

ei?cer, Esq.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Assistan Attuney General Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Environmental Protection Division W2shington. D. C.

20555 P. O. Box 12548 Capitol Station Austin, TX 7$711 o Dr. Kenneth A. McCollen t

. Dean Division of Engineering, G. Marshall Gilmore, Esq.

drchitectureandTechnologY 1060 W. Pipeline ' Road Oklahoma State University Nurst, Texas 7f453 Stillwater, Oklahoma 7h074 Dr. Richard Cole, Member ^

Atomic Safety and Licensing o

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Board Panel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 Washington, D. C.

20555

• Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Debsvoise & Liberman Appeal Panel 1200 - 17th St., N. W.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20036 Washington, D. C.

20555

• Marj orie Ulman Ro,thschild, Esq.

Docketing and Service Section Office of Executi,ye Legal Director Office of the Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 washington, D. C.

20555 i

ces Homer Schmidt - Texas Utilities d ,c~,, N j lN, '.)

pYrs.)JuanitaEllis, President CASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy) l

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BY THE

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the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS J ACK brook 8, T exas, Cuerman L LI FOUNT AIN. North Carolina FR ANK IlORTON. New York D A NTE H F ASCELI. }Lrida Ja>HN N ERLENilORN Illinois BENJ AMIN S ROSENTil AL, New York PLARENCE J BROWN. Ohk I ( >N FUQU A. Florida PAUL N M(C I A IS K E'.. J a.. Ca lif ornia JtiH N e llNYERS. Ja Mleblgan TitOMASS KINDN ESS, Ohio d ' A RIil8S Ci >LLINS. Illinois Ri >H ERT S W A LKER, Pennsytranta JOH N L HE RTa >N. California M F ALI>WELL BUTLER. Virginia Gl.EN N ENG LISH. Oklahoma LY LE WILLI AMS. Ohio ELLIOTT 11 LEVIT AS Georgia

.h PEL DECK ARD. Indiana D AVlD W EV A N S. I ndl.' as WILLI AM F CLINGER, JL, Pennsylvar.la Tt >B Y MOFFETT Con'.ect.icot RAYMONDJ McGR ATH, New York IIENRY A WAXMAN Calif ortia ll A1. DAUU. Nebraska F' 4 8YD J FITHI AN. Indiana Ja >HN IllLER Indiana TEli WEISS New Yo.k W ENDELL B AILEY. Missourt "I K E SY N A R. 'talahoma LAWitENCE J DEN ARDIS Connecticut EUGENE V ATKIN SON. Pennsylvanta J UDIi GREGG New Ilampahlte STEl'H EN L N E AL. North Ca rolina MICH AEL G OXLEY Ohio IHiUG 11 ARN ARIL J b Georria PETER A PEY5FR. New Y0ik B A RN E Y FR AN K. M a ssachusetts H A Ri >LD W ASHINGTa >N. Illinois TOM L A NTOS. Calif ornia W!tuaw M J ow r a, General Come!

Joux E M oom s. Fraf A dminsa f rator Eturn W H r w Drasos Fen 6or Counsel JUHS M I)C MC 4%

ll6 mort t y 6taf Director E N vinos u rN T. E M RG Y, AND N ATURAI. R1; SOURCES SURCOM MITTEE TOBY M m F F ETT Co nnecticu t.

C hairsm an F1 (>YD J FITHI AN. Indiana J(>EL DECK ARD. Indiana MIK E SYN AR Oklaboma Ji >H N HILER. India na Tr >M LANTiis Calif ornia JFISD GREGG. New Hampshire EUGENE V. ATKINSON. Pennsylvania MICII AEL G OXLEY. Ohio B A R N EY FR A NK. M ainachusetts EX OFFICIO J ACK BROOKS Texas FR ANK HORTON. New York inh % R Gau ow AT. Fraf Director BannT H a r. t n Senior Counsel

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL J

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Horst or Rrrarszmnvzs, g

Washington. D.C., October 2D,1981.

g Hon. THOMAS P. O'Ntru, J r.,

g Speaker cf the House of Representatives, TVash ington. D.C.

DF.AR b. bPEAKrn : Br direction of the Committee on Government Operations, I submit he'rewith the committee's ninth report to the 97th Congress. The committee's report is based on a study made by its Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources Subconunittee.

Jaca Bnoons, Chainaan.

<m>

i CONTENTS 1

Pare 1

I. Introduction _ _ _ _ _ _.. _ _ _ __ ___.._____._____________.._...____

3 A. History of investigation _.

4 B. Summary of report and conclusions._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

5 II. N RC heens o g " delay". _ _ _

8 A. The "c ost" of "dela 7 B. Mc Guire _ _ _ _ _

11 16 C. Zimmer.

2J D. The true source of delay 25 E. Comanche Peak.

26 F. Diablo Canyon....

h1 The N RC response to industry claims of delay _ _ _ _..

30 31

4. Immediate effectiveness.

__z...

32 B. Limiting intervenors_ _

35 C. Interm, beensing_.

37 D. The real delay: dhopmg safety progra 40 IV. Findmgs and conclusions. _ _

45 t

V. Re cctr. men aations. _ _...... _ _... _ _ _ _.. _ _ _ _ _ _.. _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

VIEWS

• ~

AddAions! views of Hon. John Hiler. Hon. Paul N. _\\fcCloskey, Jr., Hon.

^,

Thomas N. Kmdnen, lion. Lyle Williams, Hon. Wtlham F. Clinger, Jr.,

Hon. Raymond J. McGrath, Hon. IIal Daub, Hon. Judd Gregg, and 46 Hon. Micnael G. Oxley _ _ _ _

53 Additional views of Hon. Raymon d J. Mc Grath_ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.. _ _ _

4 54 p,

ad dit:vnal vn.ws of H on. Toby M oi.ett _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _....

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Union Calendar No.176 97mu CoNGESS HOI.~SE OF REPRESENTATIVES Rzrorr ist Session No.97-277 I

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LICENSING SPEEDUP, SAFETY DELAY NRC OVERSIGHT l

Octosta 20, if61.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

)

Mr. Baoons from the Committee on Government Operations, submitted the following NINTH REPORT y

together with ADDITIONAL VIEWS

=

g BASED ON A STUDY BY TITE ENTIRoN3fENT. ENERGY, AND NATURAL aEsocncEs srnccM3f1TTEE j

1 1

On October 7,1941. the Committee on Government Operations ap-p4 c.nd adopted a report entitled " Licensing Speedup. Safety 4'

Delay. NRC Oversight." The chairman was directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the IIouse.

I I. INTRODUCTION Catchwords are a key element in public policy debates. Particular words and phrases gain sudden currency with all who discuss an issue.

When accurate, such shorthand, evocative words expedite discussion.

When inaccurate, they distort public debate by misleading it.

^

For nearly a year, the most prominent catchword in the ever-vigorous national debate over nuclear power has been " delay. ' Utilities inve~ tine in nuclear power and their supporters have energetically y-marshaled fact sheets and economic analyses to support their conten-tion that tse nation's nuclear industrv hac been deloved needlessiv by f

the oppressive regulations and procedures of the Nticlear Regula' tory (1) h w

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Comm:+ ion. The NRC has b.wn specifically and repeatedly charged with delayme the operations of thirteen new nuclear plants.2 If valid, the charge M needle 33 delay t-an economic:dly *rious one.

Th numbers utilized in the debate have inquently shifted. but the est of tielav-ticu rer advanced bv the nuclear indwtry have been consistently larce and frichtenme to electncity can3uiners. As an example, an American Nuclear Enercy Council report dated Febru-ary lo.1981 and submitted to the House Appropriations Subcommit-tee on Energy and Water DeveSpment stated :

While detailed ricures srn not yet available for each of the impacted plante, a conserva h e estimate of t.he averace costs L

incurral for each of the 13 impacte i plants would be in the rance of 9% million per plant gr month. Since the im-parted planto have anumulated a total delay of N months.

the current coste of delay would be between $2.7 and $3.6 billion.2 In March. the wileepread mdu-trv claims of delav had ballooned to Ion mont hs. as nyted by the NItC to the Concres.2* The industrT cam pa en t o cw met the pubhc and governmental authonties of this problem entiured t hrouchout the spnne.- One example was a May 1.

19-1 ;etter -ent fnin htmchou+ Eircine Corporation to Vice-Pr.~ident George Bu: h. Secretary of State Alexander Hair. Council of Econo:nic Adviser 3 Chairman Murray Weidenbaum and others.

htinchou+ told the V ke-President that :

The NRC program for licensme nuclear 3wer plants in the U S.i3 ' irtually at a standstill. Only 3 fu 1 power operat-inc licen* have IJen issued over the paet 2 yean and a total of W mom he dolay is 1+ine proiected bv the utilities for 10 W(,lans o a:t mc oporatinc heen*. at an btimated additional bilhon."

Confronted witi

'.arce-o f - ch 4: ant ial ccm to mn<umers. t he NR< ' i-csn a c umi-: of m t :atim tn spoed t he lit en-inc of new nudear plant 3. It ion.c. + r NRC Alfted per-onnel and rear-

+

ranced it. orior:t,

owar : the been-me ztfort and away f rom other NRC pwrrre An. ne th-procram-comparat m !y &cmphasized were a nun,bor of safetv-related procran s that had been civen greater

~

empha-i-sr, e t he Three M:le I J,a n i acci ient m Mare.1M9.'

1 T **tt m on y

• +fe e ha H o u s*

A pp ro p!!n tle m S u ten tn m !t * ** 60 rterry and water De r e i t rnent s n '* lI '*!Lls P'..

f *-re th+ N u --le n t E n uiato-t Pe m m t a

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.-t a t o r fo-1942.mN_ lear ReJu:at. ry nm m :esion. P a rt 4 f c re the Su

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47 -

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M on t h l v Stat =Re

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Id. a* 9f 7 8 See. eg N u ".en n ies W ** k ApM: 9 1.441 a t 14

• = ne t t e r from C G H u r:ba r' W e s tin g h o u se E.*ct M r <'o rre ra t t on to v!ce-Presid en t G*or; a Buer May. 14, a Th we N Rc tq.a w e re d, r. n ec '

• be S

• ctrrn!!!**tr ru+1e b ea-ing o r. J u ne 14 19 M Hea rtn es on N Rc 6 &*minc 5t**M.

t* fore the Su wmrtitte+ or En r!rna m ent. I:nergy a re*

Na tural Resourne-cf the t irnmit tee on Govert ment i *pera tionn $ 7 th Congress 1st session.

at 4 i tereina f t e-H ea -i n r,

• As the m o< t alcm fica n t r uc en t a ccider t in the m mercial Ind ustrv to date the a cci dont at ut it r.f t h e T h r** M ua Isla nd f acility I ra r H n trisburg Penneviranta on March 24 1979.

• ault ed in ettenstre studr and recen menda ttor.

for naw steps to insure safety at operatin e n uclea r-im * *rp:n n t s S** ' *Th ree MU+ l ela n d A R e pe. ta the C o m m t eolon ers and to the Pubb Ynlume - N urles-R enig h rt i orr rri sat ot Sparta! Inquiry G rou p i bere-v

. N ure nm ~ NRC Actier, Pla n? N uclear Regulatory Com-inaf t*-

the Rornr tn R e ps misaton. Aprii Iww i hereinafter TMI actior. Plan).

IM 3

The NRC speedup of the licensing of new reactors also entailed a rance of actions and propmed actions intended to curb the imle of citizen-intervenors in the licensing process. Those NRC steps are taken based on the general theory. widely espoused by the nuclear industry, that intervenors are the principal cause of the alleged lelav in licensing ne v reactors and in +he overall problems afflicting today's nuclear power industry.'

A. Hurmnr or Ixvr.srIorrION Them highly-publicized industry charges of delay and the resultant NRC speedup etTort triggered the subcommittee inquiry which led to this report. The Subconunit. tee on Environment, Energy and Natural Remurres. chaired by Rep. Toby MorTett (D-Conn.). first began in-vestigatine the impact on nucher safety of the, NR.C licensing speed-up proposals in March 1951.

While investigating a major water spill that occurred in the con-tainment building of the Indian Point reactor near New York City, the Subcommittee discovered that the NRC's ongoing preventative in-spection program was being threatened with the loss of manpower to the licensing speedup. That information greatly concerned the Sub-committee, since it came in tandem with revelationc that the NRC inspection program already was in dire condition. Less than two-thirds of the NRC's routine inspection program for currently operating re-actors was actually being performed. The diversion of inspection per-sonnel to licensing could be expected to weaken an already debilitated inspection program.'

That investigation led to a June 12 report by the full Government Operations Committee. The Committee concluded, among other find-ings.that:

A major strengthening of the NRC inspection program should be accomplished. That strengthenmg furthermore should be a condition of the further licensing of nuclear reac-tors for commercial operation in this country.'

Given its fmdings about the weakness of existing NRC inspection program. the Committee in that June le report recommended:

That the NRC not divert manpower currently involved in the inspection and enforcement functions to the efTort to ex-padite licensine of new plants. The Committee specifically in-the Subcommittee on Environment. Energy and structs Natural Resources to continue its oversight of the NRC in I

this regard.*

On June 14. the Subcommittee pursued the question of the impact on nuclear sa fety of the licensing epeedup. A public hearine was held and testimony was received from the Commissionerc of the Nuclear Regu-latory Commission, led by then-Chairman Joseph Hendrie." Subse-

• Appropria tions Hearinen. supra note 1. at 135. passim.

T i nspecting o pera tin g Nuclear Powerplants ; Mbortcomings in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Fourth Report of the Committee on Government operations. H. Rept. No.

9

44. J une 12.19 81, a t 20-23.

(

' Id.. a t 4 R 28 Hea rtnra Comminaloner Jcbn Ahearce was the onlv rnember of the NRC absent at the Jane 18 hearing At that time only four of the five Commisalon seats were filled.

l P5-?68 C

-9

-m.-,

i

g'%

4 quent to that hearing, the Subcommittee soucht and obtained additional information from the NRC relevant to this question,includ-ing a series of written questions posed by Chairman AfofTett and by Subcommittee Member Jack Hiler (R-Ind.). This report is based on the hearings lefore the Subcommittee and the materials submitted to the Subcommittee."

B. SUMM ARY OF Rriorer AND CoNCIESloNS Based on the subcommittee ineuiry and its own review of the record, the Committee has concluded that'the claims of NRC delav of the operation of new nuclear powerplants in this country have been grossly exaggerated. Far fewer new powerplants will be delaved by the NRC s licensing proceedings than has been claimed in rece'nt months by the industry and its supporters. The cost of any such delays will be dm-matically smaller than repeatedly suggested. Aforeover, to place that potential cost in perspective, any possible cost to utilities (and ulti-mately to their consumers) of delays in licensing will certainly not match,let alone exceed, the cost of a single major accident such as that at Three Mile island."

Moreover, the record indica tes that where licensing " delay" has transpired in part because of the NRC's licensing proceedmgs and the involvement of public interrenom. there has been a countervailing public benefit. Namely, in some cases the licensing pmcess and the consequent delay have msulted in tangible " fixes" in the plants which improve the guarantees of their safety once placed in operation."

In other cases, where the necessity for the; additional measures imposed on the utilities by the NRC hearmg process remains bitterly contested, it is still a matter of dispute whether the public safety has mdeed been enhanced by the hearing process " Even in those caws. nowever, the Committee has found that the hearing process has contributed an intangible but important benefit : an increase in public awareness and confidence in the ultimate licensing decision.

5 That benefit is of particular importance to the nuclear industry.

The future of nuclear power depends upon the achievement of adequate 4

public acceptance of this unique and controvenial technology. NRC hearine proc (dures afiord citizens an opportunity to raise apprehen-T sions and have their contentions dealt with in a lecal, governmentally sanctioned forum. Even where the citizen contentions are ultimately dismissed, those proceedines ofter the industry its best hope that it will

(

achieve the neewary public acceptance locally and nationally for it to su rvi ve."

\\

Chapter II of this report deta.ils the Committee findines shout the alleged delay of nuclear plant operation by NRC proceedines. Rv ex-aminine the specific cases that have been reprewnted by the industry as examples of delay, the Committee has found that those claims am in moet cases inaccurate. Each of the plants at iwe am discussed in Chapter II.

I [.

71 i

u Infra. cbapter II.

u Infra. chapter II.

gf 8 Infru, chapter IV.

-o a

5 Chapter III recites in some detail the actions taken by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under pneure from the mdustry and its supporteni to expedite licensing. This Chapter also reviews the Com-mitue's findmgs on the wiMom of many of these actions.

Chapter III also details the tn>ubling slippage in many safety 3

programs at the NRC. The disturbing fact is that many non-licensmg programs danxtly related to safeguarding the public health and safety from harm from nuclear accidents have been delayal, deferred or neglected, in s>me cases for years. That situation has not improved while the NRC and its critics have focused on licensing delay and l

speedup. Thi:, Chapter ab.o analyzes the near-and long-term safety implicatiore of this lack of adequate NRC attention to entical safety pn> grams.

Chapter IV presmts the conclu:> ions of the Commit; x.

Chapter V itemizes the Comnattee recommendations tp the Nuclear Regulat ory Commi# ion. There rrcommendations are made in the

('onunitteis capacuy % the pnneipal oversight Committee of the IIouse of Reprrsentative harmg junsdietton over the Nuclear Regu-latory Conunission.

IL NRC LICENSING "DELAF' Persistent clauns that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is de-laymg licensing have fostered a broad public assumption that there an numerous plants already phpically ready to go and standing idle sole r becau-e of the NRC i

NI; less a figure in the nationi energy atTairs than Secretary of En-ergy James Edwards has labored under the assumption that for months now there have hen a numbr of tinushed plant: standing idle while awaiting licensing. Ile told the press in June, just prior to the subcommittee hearing, that the NRC's dilatory licensing had pre-vented "six or eight nuclear plants ready to go on line" from beginning ope rat ion. "

That pervash e a3-umption ha.- been and remains false, as the sub-emranittee hearine and NIa iprmiuced documents disclose. Through-out the time of the subcommuter mvestication and consideration of this report. from June 1>1 thn:uch September 19s1, there has been only one r.ew nu, lear plant phywally ready for initial fuel loading an 1 operation m the entire United States that has been delayed in beginninc opersion by the NRU licensine process. That xyle plant that has una n aabl. '~n delaved during this period is Unit 1 of the Diablo Canyon site near San Luis ()Lispo. California."

The poculiar statu, of the Diablo Canyon site is appan nt to the daily nowspaper reader. At the time of the connideration of this re-pon, that site romained one of the rnost controversial nuclear power Ie= A nrelen Times wire t*

Bn ton Globe. June & 1981. e t 7 That does not appear na r rice.

to be rhe onle con troversial view of the secretary regarding the dl!!icu1rtes confronting n uclea r power Ed w a rd s w as critte! zed tr, his own home state. South Carohna. for remarks in June I b1tha: a t tribut*<t the opposit!on to n acies r po wer in this muntry to " subversive elements " Recreta rr Ed warde segreeted tha t "?t is absolutely essen tial to get rid of these st rid en t voices. somehou get rid of the 17.1981. at 16C ; June 21.1981, at 2B. roadblocks." accordinr to the orangeburg (L C.)

Times & Democrat The State. June

" nearings, at 9.

f w _ _ -._

6 sites in the nation's experience " The complicated is3uem surrounding the delay in operating that plant clearly go far beyond arguments about the NRC 3 ethetenev and its speed of pr iceeding. Those special issues are dealt with later in this chapter.

The impression that many nuclear plants already are standing idle has in part been nuttured by the monthly reports from the NRC to a llouse Appropnations Subconututtee. Those repon begun in No-vember 1tmo, have been subnu*ted each month since " Each report has meluded a list of potentially unpacted" plants, that is, those plants imolved in contested proceedings which might t,e finished during Itml or 1932 and prior to the completion of a required NRC hearing." That monthly hst luis var ed in composition slightly during that period, but had for noist of 1931 included the folh> wing ten re-actors. l >iablo Canyon 1, l>iablo Canyon 2, Sununer 1 Un South Caroluta), San Onof re 2 (in California),31cGuite 1 (in North Caro-lina), Suquehanna 1 iin Pennsylvania b Zitumer 1 (in Ohio h Shore-htun 1 ( on Ising 1.sland. New York), Cornanche Peak 1 (in Texas) and Waterford 3 i in Iwuisiana).

To place those nut J. rs in context., it should be noted that while the industry a.nd the N RC were prvdictmg in early 1951 that as many as eleven to thirteen reactors would lac delayed by the NItC liceniing proccas, a total of 30 plante were in some stage of constructmn during that time.2" Some 33 of tho-e plants are projected to be completed by the end of 1983. Thus the vast majority of plants nearing construc-tion completion have not leen projected to be delayed by the N RC li-censing process.

The most pessimistic of those NRC monthly reports, transmitted in

.lanuary 1951, indicated that the NRC antacipated as much as 79 reactor-months of delays bnt ween physical completion of eleven plante on the list and the completion of the licensine process for tht w plants. Yet that total of possible delay was ba+d only on projected times of completion for those plants. None of those plants was then comphste..r had experienenl act ual <ielay. Since last,lanua ry, only I)iablo l' nit 1. a3 just noted, Ints 1 en comple:ted and has experienced actual delay in full-power licensmg after comphwion of conc ruction.

The usa of projectol completion dates. parucularly thow provided by the utilities them+1vea, haa proved highly mislea<hng, as the sub-sequent mont hly reports have disch+d. "Slippu.ce" in the anticipa.ted con <truction dates for nuclear phtnts luts l=en endemic for year. As thc NRC itmlf noted in its 31ay 29.1931 star tts report to Congms> :

The present licensing scholules for phuita projected bv u t ilitie3 to le completed in 1941 and 1952 are given in Tahie 1.

The potential delays letween the const ruction comph tion and projeed i+uance of a full power lic n* are premnted baml on the applicanti expecial const ruct ion completion

" see, eg Wa shington Post. Sept. IfL lbl. Wall Street Journal, Sept 16.1W1 ; New York Times Sept.16.1981

• nea rings at M 1

• It abould be noted that the Monthly Statue Re; orts clearly indhate that a large num-ber of nen tiuclea r riants will be completed d uring Il# 1-R3 which ha ve not been contented by intervenors and subjected to a bearing Those could not by definition have been delayed t y t he hea ring process r Ree, e g. M ay Statua Report. In hen rings. at N1

'u "8 ta tu s of Nuclear Power Piant U nlt a,"

NRC ot' ice of Management and Program Analysis. J uly 31.198i.

" J anuary Status report.

7 date. The applicants' estimated completion dates have his-torically proven optimistic, that is, earlier than actual con-struction dates, and therefore their use may overstate the delav.'*

{

That observation has been amply borne out. Slippage in the antic-ipated construction completion dates for the plants purportedly i

being delayed by the licensing proces has now largely eliminated t.he so-called delay.2+ Projected delay has dropped from 1M months to 23 months oc lees.2" In a March le letter, the NRC noted that there had been slippage l

in the completion dates for Zimmer and for San Onofre 2.25 In its May 3tatus report, slippage on the Susquehunna completion date reduced the projected delay from a full year to two months ' In the June re-2 port the NRC noted that the utilities applying for licenses for Shore-liam and for Sununer had revised their prediction about construction completion by four months and three months, respective!x. That com-pletely ehminated the projected delay for Shoreham and reduced the Sunauer anticipated delay to t wo months 27 In its July repo.. the N RC noted that Southern California Edison and the other ut ' :es app!ying for the San Unofre 2 license had again pushe.1 back tneir on-truction completion date. this time reducing t hat projecteil ielay f rorn elcht to four month," And the NRC con-tirIned what It ha.i revealed to the cubcommittee on.Iune 15. that Ihike Power Company had experienced engineering problems and had not been ab:e to meet its projected completion date." That reactor, once hsted for 13 months of delay iiue to the NRC. and frequently cited in ('oneresuonal deliberations as a prime example of the prob-lem of NRC delar. had in fact not been delaved at all by the NRC hearing proces in' moving to f ull power operation.8 It its Augmt repon. the NHC stated that the Cincinnati Gas &

El vtre Company. owner of the Zimmer facility.had informed us *Lat onetruction - prese ntiv reveral months an 1. t nerefore the e stb..ated delav will be less behim ischeu than the cun ent pr op aion of eich* mt hs. A rJvised sched-uie i3 to be nup! hed by tin applica:it in September 1951.*

That report Dtr 1 (ne name infor: r:on about the Com.nche Ptai<

a

.1' b ng keuil Ie.'d r ((

! it 2 ( irIn T a' mg l'om r'any.82

's ep" ai noted hat P.mtic (ia-a Ele.-t rie had pro-The Aqast r

, cl. O ; if. n.at;on to the N RC uw catmg the the Lhab}o Canyon Unit 1 lat

.ad ' + n later t han prenou-ly r(ported to the NRC

. a p!r,

rN lil 'li:2 !!nat i Ia. :.etl 3elay }:y t }:

"e On t Ili."

• • M a r St a t us repo rt.

• The phenomennn of ex tensive m14 pai;* in. un 3 c r M.n senedules 4 u st Mm't.d to t hose

(

on the leia3 ed ' list s;h ; n.:e at otar u.i t -

hn; u n co n te u t ed n' t e, mnerms tne ind u m, ryw ;a* cha racter of the prot ;*m ntLer exan 0;ee in rece n t months include the Loah+ ar.j Sea t rook plants See s ta t u n re p. rt>

• • A u ru s s ta t u s re p rt a letter f rom NRC Chairman J ce*pb M. He drie to suterommittee Chidrmt Tom Bevin M a r 12. I W 1. a t 4

• Hea rtnrs. at 23

"" J une stat us report. at 2.

• J ul; ut at us report, at 4

• • H en rings. a t F 12.

• J uly =ta t u s repo rt, a t 4 a nernst v = 'u s repnet at 7 r

n' i d. a t 7 -6 as t a. at A-4 No.

u s

8 Primarily as a consequence of all those slippages, the Augur NRC report to Congrem indica t er a total projected delay of 42 reactor-months idown from 79) atfecting eight reactors (down from eleven)."

31oreover, as indicated in the 3 RU responses to Chairman 31otiett's written questions. t wo of tho-e reactors ( Zunmer and Comanche Peak) have adunttedly shpped additional months in construction schedules.

In fact, the NRC believes the projected delays for Zimmer and Co-manche Peak will be eliminated altogether by the utilities' forthcom-ing revisions in t he.ir schalules. In an.swer to Chairman 31otTett's August 17 interrogatories, the NRC stated that its own starI predic-tions of completion dates for those plants shows they will suffer no delay from the licen3ing proce-. That stati analvsis also suggests that the anticipated delay for the Summer plant will be one month rather than the t wo months projected by the utility.'"

Finally, two of the n maining " delayed" reactors are at the Diablo Canton site. Those t wo nuctors alone acenunt fw 15 mont hs of pro-jectal delay. The unique situa. tion at the lhablo Canyon site hae al-readv heen mentioned. If Comanche Peak. Zinoner and Diablo are removed fr m t;.is hst of projected delay 3. it i-apparer t that ti.e ex-pansive list of delayed plante touted by the indust ry early in 19s1 dwindhe to a mere four tractors wit h a total of only eight reactor-mont hs of delav."

Each of thod plants with projected <b lays ostensibl NRC licensing process is examined in further detail m,v caused by the this cha'pter.

The Conunittee has found that there is good reason to question the assertion that the N RC and intervenni< roles in the history of licensing those plants has been the primary cause of any delay in their beginning operations. Assuming arguendo. hom er. tfiat at least four reactors will eventually le delaved by the NR(' licensing pnicess for a total of eight reactorfmont hs. It bea'r, n ot in e a t ti.is juncture that t iut t d ra-matic reduction in the projected delay in new nuclear licenws results in an equally dramatic reduction in the ominouc consumer cost figures diwminated by utilitie-and italmtry asmeiatione earlier this year.

A. Tu r

"( i,q",,r "Da a r' The allegation < regardinc the co-t of licensing holdups h d the De-partment of Energ'y to begin e<timating the potential cost in April 1941. Its monthlv estimates beca me a feature of the NRC's monthly stat us report. TiIe I H )E tigure3 ha ve demonst rated t wo fact s : fi rst. t he oricinal cost e4 mlates att ributed liy niany utilitie-and inquri rv group 3 to licenwinc delay were inherently intlated by the counting of capital ca rrving costs second, they were exaggerated by the overstatement of t he numbere of reactor-month-of delay described above and by other co-t assertions regularly reiected by DOE."

The q mstion of how to tabulate the co-t of the purported licensing delar became cont roversin! ca rly m Ur 1 when NRC Commissioner Peter Bradford challenced the ' double countine acpects of the cost figures being relied upon by the imiustry and its supporters. At one

" 14 at table 1

"* Id. a t t a ble *.

r d. n ' ta ble '

• • M on t hly st a t u s report a Ma y 1991 ~ A ugust 19E1. a ttachmenta

).

9' poin t Bradford. a former state utility commis~ioner, ancrily wrote to the A ppropriations subconanittee that + rc<pured someone "economi-caHy dliterate" to accept the inductry reckonine of the coct of licensing delavr l

The gist of the argument wa3 over whether the carrymg coe+ of t he utiht.e-ms e.stment in their reactors (an be counted as a "cos ' of delay. Secretary Edward, stated in Februarv that such carrying costs, or "t he cost to al.+ri, t he u n pruluet i ve ex pen +" can he counted as a coct of the delav." That in. a utuitt with moner invested in a nuclear

~

i plant must pay inter 3t and capitall o-t3 on that inve3tment. Edwards.

the American Nuclear Enerev Couni :} and individual utilities con-te:aled that thcm were therefcire costs of delay." Bridford and others pomteil ou-however, that the utthty would be paying thow capital carryinc costs on the+ roa or im esunents in any case-whether the 4

reactors were runninc or not. It u of course true that an operating mact or generate, addit:onal rev nuec from the sale of power. There-fore commancement of operatmn improves the current cash-flow pos-t u r e of a ut.1:t ami obtainme a heen+ are of financ:a! unportance to the ut. hts Att r: hut me capa ai arr,:nc crwis +)ely to N en-ing delay howe s et.13 m slea,lme to the extent it succests they would not hav-i.4 n i n c u r re.1 i c fi e i n e d el a v.

The I)eparment of Enercv fo% rd the inductry mct :ocic in its m:tial A prd report. then quickly and rep-atedly disavowed that cost accounnne m its May and -ub-e<p:ent :er,ns. T()E in May succinctly aated the accurate w ay to stabli-r t he co-t of whatever licensme driay might occur :

Un!ike the A pri! rq ort thic m n n t h'c repon does not in-c!ude e-timates of the capital carryinc costs that are incurred Jurine the dein v. The+ coa-ar" not "on-idered <i: rect loss incurr< d as a recub of the delar.

The coct of delav m te a n ope *n tit.c licenw a ft.I a p:,* ~ phy-ica'!y com-s n! ++ - eq ual to :

The total co-

• w et tire uti t v s v--t,

< or sv-tems if the un;t io- + ' t o w '1 d '! wo'lld int ;r to 48t!-fv its cus c

tomorc' r nJrcy t+quiremer *. harel on the do!ayJd !icens-j ir:c sc!.ed ule.

inuc Ti.+ t o+ a ! co-t.- o f -a t i t ',.c tis ca rn" e n arev req u i re-a i f t h.' '. e n + h a d he.'

s e.1 wLen p' a nt was r

I com p e te."

l >OEi Mav wt im a te alreadv d we r ir rr

'a ll y from the e-

.d. ' "v - l J orted ' im l e, o f ea r} v 19* i Nat!?'

• JU R 92-3 bi)) ion f~. ~.

i ti n rr a ln ; a te <, s. I N ) E t,e cce d + !. r <,

• t ci el <.: t!<

hon - p re"a il-

[(f

!<'la r ro 4 *in! - toi+ no mnr"ikit D' ~ ni llion f.'T the eleven j "

F m wH t r. c e.

+i Tlayc Wh i:e !! + C

-t rv

" wi -icnifi-V*

at s

irhed - ea rl e r coet e-t i*m t it m u,wl t o to ce n in M a y t h a t ile "oct woub: t'm tr. nea rly $1.21,iHinn."

8' A M mprin ? cn s hea rinru at 963

L1 a t 15 A -I %

I d a

• 15'1 % 135.

• • M a y sta t u s re p.e. doe a tta chtn en t, a t 1 - 2.

• Id i

h-A

ERRATA SHEET Page 10, paragraph four should read:

" delay was $608 million." 44/

I i

)

i r

i

10 Accepting the DOE analysis as more likely to be valid, subcom-mittee Chairman Motiett placed the DOE cost figures in perspective at the June 18 hearing:

I want to, in concluding this session, go bed to the matter of cost to the consumer for all this supposed delay. We now have DOE figures coming in each month on the likely cost of all this projected delay, and you k>ok at those figures in tha.t May 29 report, they suggest the cost of the delay will be less than $1 billion S955 million, which is less, as I understand it, than t.he cleanup for Three Mile Island."

Chainnan MotTett's reference to the TMI cleanup is even more apt now tJum it was in June. Active Congressional consideration is now being given to rvquests by GPU the utility that owns TMI, for federal financial assistance to clean up and restore that damaged nuclear reactor. The cost estimates for that task'have soared well over the billion-dollar mark, with no guarantee they have reached thei' ceiling. It s apparent that the consumers in Pennsylvania and nearby i

states will pay larce portions of those cmts, and it is possible that U.S. taxpayers will also be saddled with part of that enormous ex-pense." If the nuclear industry's candid concern is to protect con-sumers from unnecessarv expense related to the nuclear eneration of electricity, it would be well-advised to recognize that wnen viewed in penpective, the grvater economic thrvat to consumers is from design defects and utilitx errors that result in accidents--not from the com-parativelv minor'ests of administrative delay.

Since the June hearing in which Chairman MotTett referred to the Mar DOE cost estimates. thee e3timates have necessarily cone down, reflecting the progressive admission by the utilities that their construc-tion completion dates had been wrong and had exaggerated the delay.

As a result, the Aucust DOE cost projection for anticipated licensing g

delay wa< SM million." That cost too will be further reduced in the next DOE report to reflect he announced revision in the Zimmer and Comanche Peak construction completion datec.

Once acain if the two reactors at Diablo Canvon are factored cut ac a special ca-e and the previonely-predicted delav-for Zimmer and Comanche Frak are eliminated. current NRC proje-;one chow oniv eicht rea ct o r-m on t hs of delav on four reactors. Using the DOE analyeis. that amounts to Slsih million in delay costs " That figure is le s than a tenth of the $2 billion to $3 billion 'icates widely used e

Fy the industry ac a tactic throuchout the earF part of 1951.

Baseu on the N RCi experience with indust v exacceration of the W

lencth and coct of delays suppou dly att ributabie to t he NRC licensing process. the Commissioners teetifyinc lefore the cubcommittee warned againct Congressional reliance on the validity of the public statements being made about licensing delay. An obvioudt exasperated Conunis-sinner Bradford emphatically stated. with reference to the May 29 report and its table of plants projected to sufTer delays :

9 as Henrings. at 71.

• A mong the bille introduced on the question of Federal amnistance for the cleanup of TMI in il R 2512. Introduced Mar 12.194i, by Rep Allen E Ertel (&Pa_).

" Aurust status report. doe attachment, at 1.

?

• Id.. a t ta bie 2.

e,

@ts M

.rt

t t.

I 11 This is just a best estimate, as the chairman iRendrie] has said. The numbers are w ritten in sand and they will change.

And yet ifs beiac used as an invitation to the Congress to change legislation that will remain on the statute books

{

and etiect the licensing process for years to come, long after the number < themselves have proven to be completely erro-neous--well. not erroneous, but good faith ef' orts. To use t

this chart, or this type o f chart, as the basis for legislation.on interim licensing authority] seems to me to be terribly falla-cious. You have to understand that when we look back on this chari a year from now. it's going to be seen that the delaved plants ivere neither delayed nor for that matter were they plants. The costs are not costs. The months are not months.

And the completion dates are not real completion dates. A year from now there will not,in any of these tabhs turn out to be a single numL. worth relying on. a single column of numbers worth relyinc on for purposes of legislation that

{.

will afTect the regulatorv process for years to come."

The findinc3 detailed above and that summarv statement by Com-missioner Bradford demonstrate that the overall extent and' cost of NRC licensing delay has been exageerated in the nuclear debate dur-ing the past year. The subcornmittee investigation also included a case-by-case examination of those plants recurrently listed as likely to be delayed by the NRC licensing process.

Scrutiny of each of those cases casts serious doubt on the contention that it is t'he NRC hearing and licensing process which is to blame for those delay ' which continue to be projected and which might actually occur. The dance of this chapter reviews the major facts regarding th licensi-timetable of these plants. Those facts suggest that the utilities themselves and problems inherent in today's marketplace have leen the nmjor murce of delays in commencing operation at these

~

4 nuclear powerplants.

B. McGnar The first plant projected tc be completed and to begin sutTering delay f rom the N RC hearing and licensing process in 1951 was McGuire_

Owned and operated by Duke Power Company.the McGuire station is Imated near Charlotte. North Carolina. The Westinghouse-designed reactor was slated to be completed in January 1941. Based on that f

anticipated con-truction completion date. the normal NRC hearing procss had moved forward and Duke was issued a fuelloading zero-1 -

pmver testine license for McGuire in a timelv fashion. on.Tanuary 23.

19' 1. However. the design of the McGuire plant is an n(ypical one that s

1 M;p has i+come controversial in the wake of the Three Mile Island acci-dent. That atypical decien and the questions raised about its safety p"

resulted in the reopening of hearings on the McGuire plant in Febru-7 arr 1941."

With Duke Power predicting that the reactor wauld be physically ready to go in,lanuary and with a new hearing just beginnmg. it did iI appear in early 1981 that substantial licensing delay would occur for

• Hearings. af 52-53

• ' See, e g.. Cnarlotte (N C. ) observer. Feb. 20.1981. at 1.

6-P5-268

- 61

-3

12 McGuire. Duke Power officials wrote to Rep. Ike Andrews (D-N.C.)

in Fobruary to complain about the posture of the licensing proceed-

~

ings. The Duke memorandum stated :

Construction of Unit No. I has been completed and the NRC issued a zero-power license on.Tanuary 23. 1991. The Com-pany has completed fuel loading and testing is on-going.

S evertheless. because of the regulatorv uncertainties sur-rounding the evoh-ing NRC pohcies and because of pro-tracte1 r eedincs with intervenors there is no assurance that final NRC app-

,1 will be received so that this 1180 megawatt unit can be in operat ion in time to meet the s

anticipated denomd for electricity during the summer of 1981.

McGuire Nuclear Station. in a matter of weeks. will be n adv to produce ekvtricity. This electricity is neede,d and it will be very expensive to c<msumers not to operate thew facilities."

Dukt warned of the high cost of delay. including capital costs. and urged among other hing' that Memla is of the Appropriations Com-mittee he lohhind that the Reagan Administration be pressed to ap-point a new NRC Commissioner and that the "immediate etTectiveness" rule he reinstated to allow full power operation without Commission-level review of the licensing decision."

T,he hearingt that reopened in February focused prirnai ly on two i

-mes: the safety of the particular containment design at McGuire end the adequacy of the emergency evacuation plans to protect citiz'ns liv ng in Charlotte. 5 miles outside the 10-mile-radius emergency plar i

ni-zone.

The containment buildine houses the reactor. It i< the key barrier blocking the release of radioactivity into the environment in the event of an accident which permits radioactivity to escape the wactor itself.

One of the crucinl requirements of any nuclear plant design is guar-anteeine containment building integrity during any accidents that could occur at t hfit site.

In mo<t contamment buihlings. t. hick conenve walls reinforced with steel are used to re-iet explo<ione a nd prevent radioactive releases. The atypic il containment at McGuire. however. has thin steel walls only an inch thick at their thicke4 point.'"

The cent ral question rai+d by the NRC about the McGuire-type containment -mce the Three Mile I-laad accident is whether it could withstand the kuul and magnitude of explosion that occurred at TMI during that March 1979 accident. TMI experienced a " hydrogen bu rn' of a magnitude greater than the experts had predicted would occu r. That explosion created pres <ures on the containment walls at TMI of -ome 24 pounds per -quare inch (psi)." Accordine to soma analv-es t he t hin < teel wall-of ice contaimnente coubl not wb h-tand h yd r oce n bu rn e x plo-ion o f t hat magnitude." If that w > re t rue, a

then an exact el> eat of the TMI accident woubl restilt in an exp?o<iori Approp-tations hearings at 276-273.

• Id.. at 2 73.

• • S u pr a note 47 : McG nr-P ant Final Safety Analysta Reprt, chapter 3

, g Rogotic b en r t a u pra n ot e 5. a t ro' 2 pa rt.. p 499. see a nno. S u reg 060e, 6: s,e.

ir Iri vestiga tion a t 1 -, 4 7 ss F o a f ull.n a uls aia of the hs1 ocen b u rn problem in the=e con tain m en t s, see the NIu ' record of t he hq uoy n h 1 and 2 unu licennes NRC rmcket Nom 54-327 _nd 56-32R

a

~ ' ""

7- -

I I

^

13 rupturmg the containment and certainly releasing radioactive con-tanunation to the environment.

The NIiC first began raising questions about the adequacy of the j

ice cont:unme n t in the Sequoyah cow. The Sequoyah reactorw are i

located near Chattanooga. Tenneswe and operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TV A). Both the first two units at Sequoyah have l

been beenwd since TMI but. only after TVA studied the hydrogen burn problem and arrived at technical " fixes" which sati3fied the NRC that the: had 'tdequately compensated for the coinparative u raknew of the ice containment to at least begin operation.83

(.

j The renewed hearine. on McGuire in early 1951 heard contention <

fnun a citizens' group in North Carnhna that the technical fixe 3 pnw powd by I > uke to meet the pro! : ems of the it e containment were not adequate. Thew interrenor-averted their belief that the McGuire containment coubl be breached and radmactivit y irksed." Both the censme board and the NRC Conunissoner3 dnided by. Tune 1951 t hat the I) uke solution to t he by 1rogen burn problem wa3 adeq ua t e pernor ope rat ion at least for t he pn sent. just a3 they had (iecided to for Sequoyah The N RC t hereforo gianted a low-power licenw in early June and authorized a full-pow er bean 3r on. Tune 29.1941."

N e ve rt h e l e-3. the gravity of the Conuni-sioni concern over t he hyilrogen l> urn problem at M cG uire was underscored at the 3ulcom-mittee hearmg by t hen-Chairn.an IIendrie and by Conanissioner

=

Vvtor t hhnnky m this colh>quy :

Mr I)nor.n. Wa,n't the is-ur raised by interrenom [at Me (iu n-rub-tan W!y t he same as the i+ue nosed concerning the Smp o3 nh phmt, which is now in operation f Mr I bwur. Wen certa mly to the extent that hyd rogon cont rol. t he sa fety aspect-of cont rol of potential hydrogen t h containment was an i+ue in the hoa ring i

sequoyah plant f Mr I)nu nn. Wa-it resolved. t i M r. IInomr. We allon el Unit 1 to ope rat e There

- a research progr:un t hat is goinc on in connection with t he hy Iroce cont rol matter. and then is a import due from t I,.h t ph agnini albout the etal of.IanuarV.

Mr. t hu m v. Mr lirewr. if I coubl add to that. I wouldn't like to leave you with the nupre-smn that the hydrogen issue u one that - fully re-olved. In t he ca'eu where we have ap-w< liare attached conditions provml operation of the plants rmpurmg. a-the chairman pointed out further work and, for i

that mattm iequirine that the question be brought back be-fore t he ('omno" inn not year."

If I) uke had actually met its annonneed timorable for being ready 7

to e neiate elm t ocity at McGuire. the inton enori and the N R C's undermandable concern over the by hocen burn problem would have co<t t he utihty *nn" five mor th-of dehiy in bocinning operation. That L

u muld have been cubstantially less thar. t he 13 months predicted by t he in lo-t ry in early 1941, amt it is quite arguable that the mag-

" Id u Supra rm t e 4 '

S' J ult sta t um reeort

" n eg rings. a t 54.

E

=

' " ^ -

14 nitude of the safety concern more than justified such a five-month delay to reach an acceptable solution.

However, the fact is that Duke did not meet its announced schedule.

Although the Commissioners of the NRC themselves did not discover the fact until June,1951-five months after Duke we projected to be tendy to generate electricity at McGuirrDuke throuchout the spring of 1951 encountered techmcal engineering problems which kept them from "coing critical" with the reactor." That meant that ther literally could not utilize the license the NRC had granted them, as'the NRC Commissioners confirmed to the sukommittee on June IS:

M*. GIttssar.

in the cace of McGuire, which was one of the two remainine plants that you listed. it seems to me that that has been listed as an impacted plant incorrectly. As it turns out the plant has run into technical problems and I don't believe it could have operated had it ben licensed some months ago. So I don't think that plant Mr. Morvrrr. That McGuire plant is really the first plant to be completed on this + called delay list : icn't that correct !

Mr. GitixsxT. I don't think it's ready to go at this point.

The Diablo Canyon plant, as far as I know. is a plant which is completed and is standinc idle. I would not put McGuire in that catecory.

We had a meeting on the McGuire plant in connection with grantine authorization for low-power operation. and the report from our Office of Inspection En-forcement was that the plant, in cetting ready for openttion, had nm into a variety of problems which have kept them o< cupied in clearine tho* up, that the plant. in fact, is not ready to go. It hasn't been ready to go over the lact couple of months.

Mr. Morrrrr. But at McGuire thev're hollering for an in-terim full power license. isn't that richt ?

Mr. Giusexr. Well. we're in the procees of deciding on a full power licence at this point. They had requested Mr. Morvrrr But mv underctandinc is ther haven't been able to efTectively uce the fuel loadine and lowl ower testing p

licen* ther a!readv bate : isn't that richt ?

Mr. Gri.ixsxr. I'm not sure v here ther are today.

Mr. Morrrrr. Let me ask Chairman Hendrie what his view is on that.

Mr. Hrstmit. Back around the beginnine of the rear. as a product of the hearine which wac coine on on McGuire, the licencine board authorized fuel loading critically and zero power phymes teetmc. that is. nuclear operatmn without sen-siblo heat to any decree from the core.

The plant bac not fully uced that authority, ac a matter of fact, and has been carryinc out a *riec of refurbiching opera-tions on come equipment. thince they found late in the startup r Id., at bio.

A

~

v 4

x 1 o.

4 proce+..+. t hey. indeed, has e not used, so far as I know, the full authorit wh:ch thev almadv have.

Then lam w eek. about thenl in reviewing the licensing board decision on McGuire. the Commission decided that it coubl -ee no reason w hv their existing authoritv. in fact.

a could not t-extended tn' include the npercent operation that we have u% as a etepping poin: on all of the caws that have com-throuch recently, so we cranted that. But i* didn't add

a. to their situatis:h cince ther weren't there anywav.

nc Mr Morrrrr. But this i; a plant that is being' held up all the t we l can -av from *::v own exnerience in NRC mark-2 p-are! # forth al a clas;i3 case of NRC delay. You know.

its sor: n' v.%,hio pipe!ine of the nuclear inciustry. in the

+ n so t!at t :at pip-hne w as aiwayc uced ac the example of we needed an E n e rgv Mobilization Board. McGuim w h;.

[

ke+ t - conune back at us n' the example of a plant that has b+wn -tailed by N RC reculations."

a f

I, a s :.c as ie**, mm.m. of whv tne NRC Conuniwonm were

' !n ff *r' lied of t he ~ta!:is of !!1at plant.

3 n o' d,+

1-

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91.. i t ti;s E

fa< - a r.

now

-ar *:at un-t hat rov. lation t< ti sub-onuuittee d'-

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h ad !=-. n q wifir-dly a n.} T -

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.g a'lt}:o' at M c G '1;'k [t Ic of in t e reS* :n 'h&t rPCard that

+ u ns 't* ing u rsu cessful." ur ng the fuei-loacling ve rs am he NRC. I)se was preng bo-

~^

• nt ) ! \\ au I2nr *

["3 T. tP<l :

foN *'m j o nc:ng *=,ani for a ld: :nna authodt > tC CO tC 3.5 percent 7 mwpp, 9 fin M:li k ';;e.\\ I 4,

.Na fe' s are' I,iNnc:nC board consI'i' ng I ):i K" ~ ! ! '4 - T. c - ;1 [> J '. 'a t ' o r; re i e.1 e tl

• Du ke f :< ft)r an :ncMise IO e

n..

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4

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" Ir eide NRC. M ay 19.1991. at 1.

• Id

• Hearings passia

. ~. - - -

p

i 16 C. Z1nuta T he Zunmer piant lies on +i.e banks of t he Olao Iliver some 40 miles en,t of s ':nonnati, (lino. T4 facility t-owned by ('mcinnati (ia Ele, t ra Co:npany < ('(i & E i and har 1 en under const ruction sno 1972. T:.e Zinauer reactor 13 an -lo niegawatt General Ehetnc 1 xhng wat, r reactor. The plant was dedigned by Margent & Lun iy enguicers. un expenenced an hitect enemeer tinn in the nuclear indus-t rT. an 1 con 3 ruction has been d:reeted by the llenrv J. Katwr Co."

I hen t }Ie Cons! MNt it >n pe "In :' for El unief W a :- Issued on OCI4h ivr 27 l'472. U nc.!1Halk (iai i Ein t r e predicted a f ue! ion.iing < iatr date (in wi

!.4 s e!

.t n.. t D >!

a? = 3Hld t(> !T IInisned and Uj tra-1 i

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t.. ;ai tem me cat. irgu m fJun 2

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n Onlied int N IM[ :n A uguSI 1?-1 t hat ti.c3 were toan mn. c a et v mi con.piet ton late m 3-ptene er.1 to retin t f ur imr s.1ppare tig > r. on< i e

• n,n wi.niuie. The Nluf exp.ets Z;mn;e: to i m:npl. tn: :-) A u gut. I n a t t i e ca r est."

in 1 I ai ' Inet."ne [7iallt M I l'e Itibiy to !_Ng.n irji+ra!!On I f < 'iat. late

a:r-an 4 w; ave t se: unt i inantw;e a, e,ng a3 the c7 o

r ut :1 t) ;.

eten n < aihi ana 2-t on bne.

()n J + f ace of it. Zmaer app-ars to le a 4

-w caw of prolonged proceed nc and d :lic Jt v go:nc operat.ona:. Not - 1rprameh, Zmr mer lov Itas re]>eatedly i'cen cited to the Congres, as an

- ance Of NRC delay 1:ap-dtne tlie (>perat tun (>f a n< e led new enercy -ource.

But th. suinum.ttee inve-ticat u.: reseak t wo nm:staL:ai, ler ons rega rd11t;- ZlIDIlle r : fi!'3t. the dt ia y-in rea.4.:nc < >:i3t ruct < >n n niple-

< rai t '

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uor. becun Januarv 11 IM1 and cont:nuine in the t;rne of this report.

conarnmc 1

t h. Nlw hae vernial the accuracy of many allecanorr i

detioent ast ru :o. work and dt,co cred additmnal examples on its own." A, a on-aurnee. the NRC has deman le.: and CG & E has i

acrml to a rui~ tant:a1 rance of corre, m e actions inMumne t!.e hirinc j

. personnel onsite. reettneturine of manac-ment. ticht-of add.tiona' ened cont rol over con-t rucmn coi t ractor H.' J. Kum. and rein-pet tion and reworkinc of a 1arce number of construcuon jois?

The fu' xtent of the N16' - mdinc-havr not i-- :nad nu! e at

'he ti ne of th:s mport. The N RC rep r: - anticit'an 4 n.a.ie fina:

d t hat re!<

and n Ira-ed t o t he Du t u lu ring ( kts elier 1 M1. he, e

b 'aI' ?I e nt of.Iu' CU "si c}i t h t i". E. ve r. b - ie fe: re.1 'im is t i* h -

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< orrt rm tion d t') E *' I ruI ' f' f aure of Inate rial [ds 1

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Q w

9 IS Amonc the startling allecations in thoce arTidavits is the following:

stated that he was aware of several incidents in which buckets of water were dumped on Q.'C inspectors hy

^

craft personnel. He felt that these meident' represented har-of Q >C inepectors by construction personnel and assment said that he believed they were reported to Kaiser manage-ment. He stated that he was not aware of any action having been taken by Kaiser mncerning this problem."

Again. in another affidavit :

Mr. - - informed he was aware of at least twelve occa-sions dureg his tenure at Zimmer when construction workers poured bucget< of water en Q U in-pecton. IIe con tin urd g

that this occurred to both Mrc.

and Mr.

while they were conducting inspections in the contaiment building.

M r.

remarked the Q r porennel were of the opinion that water was thrown on these two individua!- since they were conscientious Q r inspector 3 who refused to accept in-ferior and non-conform;ng work by cra ft personnel."

After detailinc additional experiences at Zimmer indicating falsifi-cation of wrld iri-por tion rop,,rt que3rionable inspection and report-ing procciiur"- and intimidation of in3pectors by Kaiser managernent, the latter ailiant conRuded iat "the Q A program and general work-man 3 hip at 7.immer were the worst he had observed at the tive or six nu. lear power site, he ha< worked at.' That afliant continued to be employed at another o irar powerplant since leaving Zimmer in 1950."

In yet another sworn a d !avit to NRC invosticatore this spring.

stated that while ho workod at the Zimmer site.

Quality Assurance (Q A i was ine a cinunick" to keep the job goinc and the monev rominc v. IIe ir.dicated that a major p rob!"n was tho voidinc nf Q r in-necto~ r:oncon formance repom t NCR, by Kai-"r manac. nent wit hout any.iuctifica-tion or explanation and estimated that approximatoly 20 to 24 NCPJs prepared by him wore -. voided.

- stated that bo wor!.i often be -or t out to rein' poet an item he had rejo vd. oven thouch no corrective work had been performed crated t ha-overall work at t h-Zimmer sit" is sloppy and rrmunted " cident-which va!vos ructed shut.

w-re w olded into syctem. deep::+ NPR'c havine b~n written and one incident in wi ich a pipo. or. w!.ich con-truction wac welding a can na pluc. hal :',%" of rn.1 in'ide and on which work -on mm d despi % -omm-nt concerninc it.

Th a t a fE a n t a ho mntinn~d to be ph t a fter lea vinc Zimmer."

"m pioved at a r,ot h-r nuclear power A-etartiinc a' tho* allecations a re. they are not nove! for the

(

Zimmer cite. Beginning in Febr :ary 1970. al!rgation: have recurrcntly

' Id

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i 19 l

been raised by site and former site personnel about the lax construction practices and the harassment of anv emplovees who attempted to alert hicher-ups to problems or to correct construction deficiencies. Such

,j allegations were suflicient to attract the interest of General Accounting i

OlFee investigators in late 1976 and have resulted in stop work orders in 1978 and 1979 to force correction of identified problems." In late

}

1990, a former private inspector at the Zimmer site. Mr. Thomas A pple-gate, persistently alleged to the NRC, Congressional and other au-thorities that the faulty construction practices at Zimmer were being accompanied by extensive related crimmal activity."

Specifically he alleged that pmper welding being followed. that weld inspectwns were not bom, procedures were not g properly done and could not be relied upon and that welders at the Zimmer site were convertinc the weldrod and other construction materials to their own uws-making various articles such as beltbuckles with the materials and selline them for private gain." Mr. Applegate's whistleblowing i

eventually resulted in an unusual order from the Orlice of Personnel Managenient to the NRC to reopen its investigation of Zimmer and of

{

his allegations." That renewed investication was then becun Janu-arv 10. as noted above. and resulted in the additional allegations exem-plified by the excerpts quoted from aflidavits of other former Zimmer l

employees.

The Committee intends to continue its oversight of the NRC's on-going investigation into construction practices at Zimmer. At the time of this report,it appears that sienificant progress is finally being made j

in identifying and correcting these lonptanding problems.

Based on the findines of NRC investigators in the NRC's Recion III (Chicago) office, the NRC sent CG & E an Immediate Action Let-ter on April S.1981. That leuer set forth an extensive series of initial findines and remedial actions to be taken bv CG & E to correct con-struction deficiencies. Among the major NitC findings indicated by that enforcement letter and subsequently agreed to by CG & E:

I~nacceptable welds in structural steel have been found.

Structural welds were painted before inspection, preclud-ing proper visual incpection.

Some beams have been installed but do not show up on de-sign drawings.

There are questions about whether some welds were made with improper or unacceptable weld rod.

Non-3tandard techniques were used to radiographically ex-amine welde.

i Crucial documents indicatinc the source. quality and han-dling of important construction materials do not exist or have been improperly altered.

i Electrical cables have leen improperly mixed and the

" tray, w'ich hold them and are intended to protect them from fire and other hazards have in some cases been over-loaded and improperly inspacted.

• Sutra note 67

• Let t er f rom J a me* Keppler. NRC Regtoo III. to leute A. Clark, oournment A c-cent: t tHty Project. June 15.1981.

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Nonconformance (fmdings that some aspect of construc-

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undocumented. ignored, and even voided without corrective i

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action having been taken.

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concomitant changes in the design drawing."

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is inherenth speculative to state the consequences of such ex-

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tensive construction deficiencies. It is accurate, nevertheless, based on

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. U the NRC enforcement documents m the Zunmer case to sugcest that

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.,""V such critical safety areas as fire prevention. physical strength and in-i '

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tegrity of the piant's construction, and the ability to make rapid and J

appropriate repairs to the facility in emergency situations all could be jeopardized by these type < of deficiencies."

1

'j; As a result of these initial findings, the NRC's April A.1951 Immedi-

6. m 1

ate Action Letter to CG & E called for these a,nd other remedial ac-

.gs:

4 tions :

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3 CG & E was to increase the size and experti-e of its onsite

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. %,.;y stafL part.icularly in radiography and non-destructive test-

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Ing, welding ele'etrical design a'nd cono ruction and other

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.c.o CG & E was to take action by April 1.1 1941 to assure the 3O independence of the quality assurance program at Zimmer f..

from the construction program.

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.i.f)p CG & E was to perform 100 percent reinspection of all

.,4 quality control inspections conducted by d df contra'ctors after the date of the IAL.

' Kaiser and other 1

i 1O" All Q.'C inspection procedures were to be reviewed and d

revised by qualified design engineers independent of the con-

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struction organization.

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The review and alter ' ion of exictmg quality control rec-A'-

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of CG & E.

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report s written bv contractore d'

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Negotiatione 1+ tween CG & E and the NRC over how to co about M

<olving t he identified construction problems at Zimmer have continued g,?

C t h rough t he summer of 1941. but CG & E has clearly conunitted to

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e r.J and becun a eries of step-responsn e to thoce demands for remedial

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action." Additional inte-tication and testinc of exiatinc construetion

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the Zimmer -ite ha ve continued. Additional remmlia' l action may at be f,, f if : / $ ;'.

required. And Region III Director James Keppler has pledged

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Recion III is sati3fied with the adequacy of const ruction." "*

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oublicly.nat "the Zimmer facility wil! not be allowed to operate until

.9 Mer-r W i M '.

In the Con mittee view. that pledro goes t o t he heart of the NRC e

'4 i '.

n sponsibility. A< the Cornmit t ee has had occasior. to obcerve in

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NRC tmmediate action letter to eo & E. Apr 7.19RI. and CG & E letter to NRC. Aug T.=

01.19El.

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• Zimmer af!'ida rtta. supra. note 65

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" Keppler letter, supra, note G1.

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a 21 previous NRC oversight reports, the muidate of the NRC since its creation by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 is to insure that the commercia.1 generation of naclear power is consistent with the public health and safety." Its task is not the promotion of an ex-panded nuclear industrf no matter the risk to the public and the en-3 virunment." The facts brought to light by the subcommittee investi-gation to date regarding Zimmer show th'at the NRC focus with re-spect to that plant must im on its ultimate safety. Emphasis on the expedition of its licensing is singularly misguided at a time when sig-(

nificant questions about its safety and the adequacy of its construction n.>mam out.st a nd mg.

Like the 3IcGuire cam the Zimmer case will prove to be one where tile industry claim of delay caused by the NRC was a mirage. 3 fore-over, in the Zimmer case, the facts clearly indicate th' t the five and a

a half years of timetable slippage to dateI--and the likely additional slippage based on the extensive construction problems just discussed-arv the responsibility of the utility and its contractors, not that of

~

the NRC." The Zimmer case stan is clearly for the proposition that it is misguided both for the NRC and fo'r the Congress to empha-g size NRC sFedu of licensing in a case where the preservation of the public health unt safety are the true issues at stake.

As Commissioner Gilinsky properly warned the subcommittee:

It is a mistake to put too much pressure on this agency to crank out licenses. The people here are human, they respond to such pressures. The fact is. as a result, priorities shift, and in some undefmable way there is less attention given to certain E

safety matters that I rhaps ought to havo more attention given to them."

Commissioner Gilinskv alx3 rvminded the subcommittee pointedly of another indication of 'the shortsightedness of pressure to rush out licenses :

One of the reasons we have had problems with some of the L

plants that we are dealing with now is that they also went l-through the licensing system at a time when there was a lot of pressure to crank out [ construction] licenses, when there were complaints of delavs, and so on.

The plants that we aie talking about in granting operating licenses, many of them were caught in a crunch on construc-tion permits'back in the early 1970's. It is just not a good thing, it is not a wise thing.1 think it is a terrible mistake for the nuclear industry to put too much pressure on this agency to grant licenses quickly."

The Zinuner case historv is a regrettable confirmation of Mr.

Gilinsky's observation. Although the NRC at last appears to be j

grappling effectively with the construction deficiencies at Zimmer,it is doing so belatedly and only Ircause of extended pressure from j

• Energy H entga nt r a tion Act of 1974 ruhlte Law 93-438. 68 Sta t. 1233, 42 U.S.C l

kec. b ol at seg ; I n s pectin g, suprn note 7 : Evaluating. supra note 74.

l w Energy Reorganirattor Act of 1974. wupra, note 69.

'l nearings 8t Appendit. S h8Wer llII attachmeDt.

I riors.at(F i

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22 individua.ls out.,ide the Conunission. The momentum within the agency to press ahead with construction at the site and toward licensing the plant made the Conunis< ion less responsive than it should have teen to the repeated signals of extensive problems at the, site. Far from being an examp e of NRC delay in licensing, Zimmer in retrospect may l

stand as a vivid example of industry haste toward commencing opera-tion of a defective facility.

D. Tut Turt Sot ncz or DELAY The Zinuner and other cases examined provide insight into the true nature of the nuelaar indu3try's timetable problems. Cnforeeeen dif*i-culties in managing this complex and sophisticated technology, un-anticipated problcm3 in raisine the neccesary capital for such enor-mous construction projects, and plain old mispkes by utility manage-ment are the real reens for construction stretchouts, no matter how attractive it might be to -capegoat the NRC and its processes for larging construction schedules."

The subcommittee examination of the other cases on the prevalent

' 3t of " delayed" plants provides ample documentation of tho-e true of delay in beginning new nuclear powerplant operations. As au 6 m i ', noced, the pewimistic early 1991 indu3try claims of up to 90 rea mr-months of delay cau3ed by the NRC have largely evaporated."

l The currant projection in3tead stands at 1.5 months for the two Diablo Canyon reactors and a total of eight months for four other reactors.

A look at the history of tho-e other four mactor' reveals the com-paratively small impact of the anticipated NhC-indaced delay.

The four reactors pegged for eight month 3 of NRC licensing delay have shpped a combined total of 1Ta months from their initial target dates for completion since receiving their construction permite." Sum-mer ha3 slrtady shpped 49 months and i-anticipated by the NRC to dip an addinonal month P San Onofre 2 has slipped 6 months:"

Suspiehanna ha.- 3 lipped 3r, month;." and M ator ford ; ha-slipped 40 ruonths from it, origina! f uel load date when it r1ceived a con-struction permit." Thus the NRC delays of one month, four months, two months and one month. resp-ctively, are hardly the major reason those plants did not co on line whon first predicted by their utilitas.

A clocer look at the historv of each of tho+ four reactors reveals other reasons for thoce exte'nsive slippaces. The Summer plant in South Carolina wa< issued a constmetion permit in March 1973. with an anticipated 'ael load date of October 1977 According to NRC records, the first revision of that uhedule by the utihty came on No-ve mbe r 12,1974. That revision deferred the'FLD (fm I' loading date) by thireen month. The reasons given by the utility were financial conciderations and a chance in the utility judcment about power needs for its systemswlearly legitimate reasons, but not ones at-tributable to the NRC. After that initial schedule revision South

• • Hea rtnirn. at A ppend11. answer 2B, attachment.

• Supra, chapter II.

earings. at Append 11. a nswer 2B attachment.

" I d.

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23 i

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Carolina Electric & Gas Company delayed its timetable six more tinm c in 1977, 1979. three times in 1940 and once in January 1991.

No n a-on3 weir odi< ially providnl to the NRC for those slippages.""

San Onofre has had a'similar history of timetabh. slippage. Granted j

a con-t ruct mn permit by the N RC for Unit 2 in October 1973. South-eni California Edison and its partners predicted a fuel load date of February 1979. That date w a3 tir3t revised barely a vear later, bv six months 'to retleet the utility's obtaming of a perinit i>y the Calif $rnia Coastal Conunission. A month later another four-month slip was an-nounced with no reason provided the NRC In 1975, labor difficulties g

for an additional slippage of two we re announced as the reason m o n t h 3. Two more revi-ions m 1930 and one in 1941 totaled the 25 month, in shppace for U nit 2.*

Sumuchanna I nit 1 track-the experience of the other units. That n m t or, being built by Penn<vlvania Power & Light, was granted a con 3t ruction penmt in November 1973 and was projected for comple-t ion by May 1979. The ne xt year. in 1974 that whedule slipped by a i

f uH vea r, ba,cd on t he ut iht y's reaves mont of it s load foncast for i

t he relevant fut m e t une perald. t he 1950%. Acain in 1979 and in 1980 I

t he -chedule sHpped wit hout rea-on3 00icially advanced to the NRC =

l F nally, t he Waterford plant owned I v Ionisiana Power & Light.

ihsp ays a sinular nistorv of reenrrent suppaces. It con-truction per-nur w as is-ued in November 1974 with a utility prediction of fuel hwhne hv Jmn 1979. That prediction was inunediatelv revised bv two mont h-to reflect t he lenct hy antit ruct procemiings required prior to the obtain!nc of the conrtruction pertnit. Then in February 1976. the utiht v announced 1 i rnonth-of 311ppace in t, schedule. baMd on a re-rvahlat mn of is const ruction 3chedule to one that was more "realis-h ta as the utility conceded to the NRC. Again in 1978 the utility

-hmrdas ded. h -ix mont!r notine once more that that n.fb tel1 h

' cah e ie a nd preci'c" con <t nn tion sched ule. In.Tanuary 19'1 a more tho -hed u le shpped anot h"r tive mon t h3. with no traron 00icially p ro e n h.d hv t he N PC.""

I i t h. hulk of the rea-an-citen for dip-k That brmf res mu show-ti in u" hv t h.

i % then -eh - ar. not the faub of the NIM' N ote-i i

e o ' m :nnon e

n. ca u+ - n a-m,. cer, ral reevaluat ion bv ut ihties in

'h.

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1971 u n tned u n,1 v af ter the A rab nil e nha rco- -o f j

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. n, rm ne,1-Fuen m prohh.m-labor dimeultie-rnd

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U -t ret chont canie-fr.r t he-e

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that wr u d. t h..

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m not 1.een uni p I in - i:.

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. f r. 'i r r. n t d.ppam for -imihn ma rket place rea-E

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mia, adinciv on the unbtrvi

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t l m b n l. tie da m cc. ee 1 hv market place realit ies nL on.1. ', r eam o f t he N ln a r,. t he r..-on t ho-e plants are not

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r } honM nuer has, hren. proi.s t d to be dela ved 1 v t he N RC o

I ne non nam plant on Lonc Idard i-an illnetrative' additional etu.;m Th. Shoreluun plant. owned by Inne Island Lichting Com-pany. was granted a con <truction permit in 1973 with a projected

• I d.

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24 const ruction completion date for the 820 megawatt reactor of 1977.'"

Slippage and cost overruns in the Shoreham construction program have been the norm ever since. LLeo's current official projected com-pletion date is September 1982, fi e years late.'" One attorney testify-mg before the Subcononittee o i Environment, Energy and Natural Itemurces on July 2,1980, al out problems at the Shoreham plant noted :

The Shoreham plant is located on the north fork of Long Island, about 60 miles from New York City. It has the dubi-ous distinction of being the most expensive nuclear power-plant per kilowatt ever constructed in the world.

There was a calculation done recently which predicted that the barrel-of-oil equivalent cost was roughly $70, which may be an invitation to the Arabs to raise the price again.

This is the only plant that I am aware of where the pro-jected cost of the plant is rising at a rate faster than the money that is being invested to complete the plant.

The cost of the bhoreham plant has risen from $271 million to i:2.2 billion. Three months a-o there was a $600 million cost increase casually announced I>y the Ieng Island Lighting Co.

There is a i.!25 million rate increase which is cur-rently pendmg to finance in large part the accelerated con-struction of the Shoreham plant,"'

I' hat pattern of cost increases and delayed timetables has con-tinued during the past year. In October 1950, Lilco was again asking the rate commission for a $145 million rate increase. The Public Serv-ice Commission statI,in opposing that size rate increase, asserted that Lileds announced completion date could % given no credibility. ' 2" Citizens' groups opposmg the plant at that time stated the plant could not be completed prior to 1934 and would cost nearly $3 billion.*

While Long Island Lighting still contends plant completion can late 1952 or early 1933, it conceded in Julv 1931 that the occur by cost wil'1 be at least $2.19 $11 ion rather than the $2.2' billion claimed during the previous year."

Lilco's difliculties in nmeting it, construction whedules ant' its c m t overruns appear to be t rapping the utility in a vicious circle. The slip-page and cost increams have reduced it.s eununge, steering mvestors That in turn makes it more diflicult to obtain the necesarv capital to maintain construction at the desired pace resulting in mor'e away.

ilelavs and eventual cast increa%.:' At this juncture, it is cb>ar that far b>m delaying the plant-a3 t he.ndustry claimed through most of 1>1-the NIR"s licensing proces3 will be rmly and waiting on the ut ilit v to complete const ruct ion, a3 with McGuire and the other caws eXaln Wed.

W NLolear Power Plante const ruct1..n S tat un Ret. ort, da ta as of Dec. 31. I MO. N u clea r Recula tory Corn mission. Nu reg *h30. voi 4. A pru 1>1 ; a rticle t>y Ant hony Parts!. " nard T: men for Nuclear Power." New York T' mea Sumlay magadne. at 36.

'

• J uly sta tus report, a t b 6 Limit a tio n s on Intervenora in Licensing Proceedings

'"' nen ttrige on N RC overnight it.e Subcommittee on Environment. Energy and Natural Resources of the Committee tie'o ra oli Guernment operations, 96th Cong.,2d iness. at 92.

" N ew York Times. Oct. 22.1980. at U2.

• I d.

"* W all Street Journai. July 31.1981. at 1.

n2 New York Times. supra, uote 100.

N

l 23 E. CouAxcirE PEAK One more plant not vet discussed in this Chapter was on the indus-try-touted lists of NRC delav but now is not expected to be delaved bybuift 4 the licensing pmcess. That is the Comanche Peak facility bein by Texas Utilities Generating Company. When the Comanch Peak H

H construction permit was issued in December 1974, its projected fuel load date was June 1979."2 Since that time, some 30 months of slip-j

+

page have already occurred based on the utility's odicial claim that construction willb complete December 1981. As already noted, the j

NRC expects another twelve months of slippage to be announced by I

the utility, making total slippage at least 42 months and eliminating any pmjected NRC delay."*

A brief look at the Comanche Peak history discloses a sadly famil-int saga of construction, financial and safety problems. Texas Gen-erating's schedule has already been altered four times, beginning in 4

1976, again in 1977, in late i979 and in 1980. In 1977, " rescheduled commercial operation" was given as a reason. No official reason was reported to the NRC for the other schedule revisions."*

NRC documents on Comanche Peak show far more than those cryptic entries, hov.ever. Comanche Peak has been plagued by con-struction roblems reminiscent of the Marble Hill and Zimmer dif-

~

aulty welding practices resulted in the rewelding of some 60 ficulties, percent of the safety-related welds at one point in the construction."'

Poor quality concrete with excessive "honeycombing" (hole and por-ousness in the concrete that weaken it) have equired extensive re-I work. In one instance, concrete of unknown and untested quality was poured on the dome of the containment building without prop'er in-spection."' NRC inspectors discovered that Brown & Root, the build-ing contractor, had excessivelv blasted with dynamite and "over-broken" the bedrock around the foundation perimeter."' The bedrock was intended to be the solid foundation for the containment and the e

reactor. That construction error require additional grouting and con-crete work to repair and resolidifv the foundation."*

A particularly troublesome an'd costly construction error was made 1

by Texas Generating and its contractors at the Comanche Peak site in early 1979. Simply put, a major misreading of the design for Unit 2 resulted in the support structures for the reactor being built in the wrong place."' It should be noted that this costly and ultimately time-

,e consummg error hv the utility and its contractors occurred on IJnit 2, i

not on Unit 1. It is the latter unit which the industry has alleged was being delayed by the NRC. The realities of nuclear powerplant con-struction, however, are that major additional workloads on the build-

/

ing contractors, design engineers and top management of the utility-from whatever part of the overall project-inevitably contribute to the total construction burden and difliculty of meeting time and cost I

enrings. at Appendix. answer 2n attachment.

m un'This discussion of the Comanche Peak case comes from NRC Inspection and Enforce-

n.,.

ocuments in that licensing case. NRC docket No. 50--445 and 50-446.

ment m Id.

m Id.

m Id.

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4

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26 tion error,in March 1979: schedules as this case demonstrates. The It had been determined that the reactor vessel support shoes, their ventilation duct work, and the surrounding rein-forcingsteel had been rotated forty-five degrees from the cor-rect position through a design error. As a result of the error, the reactor vessel would not match the vessel support feet nor would the piping system to.the other reactor loop com-ponents."

Major design and construction changes were of course required to correct the error. Not only did new structums have to be built so that '

the reactor could fit into place and all the piping would fit, it was also necessary to build additional su actor in the right places. Again,pport structures to support the re-as the NRC described the process laterin March 1979:

The reactor veseel concrete support structum is misoriented appmzimately forty-five degrees. By design, the reinforcing steel, which supports the reactor vessel support plates,is of a greater design strength than the reinforemg steel which is beneath the unsupported reactor vessel nozzles. Therefore, j

there will be a loss of shear strength in those areas where the concrete base for the steel support plates are to b3 relocated.

1 i

Hence, the design repairs have centered on the placement of i

additional shear reinforcement in the areas where the steel support plates are to be relocated.122 I

In addition to causin direct delays in construction this misalign-ment error has fueled the ardor of those citizens living near the C

Comanche Peak site who have intervened in the case because they have some doubt about the competence of the utility and its con-tractors.522 In sum the Committee review of those plants other than Diablo

}

Canyon w,hich the industry has claimed were being delaved by the1 NRC shows either that they are not being delay ed by the N'RC or that i

any delav is minimal, particularly in comparison to the extensive de-j lays attributable to the utilities th'emselves and to the nuclear market-place. Diablo Canyon's two units stand as the one example worthy of j

some further examination where the NRC can be said to be the source 1

of " delay." The bases for that NRC delay, however, are far from spu-i rious, as the Committee review shows.

1 i

F. Dunto Carow At the time of this report, ITiablo Canyon Unit I has just been granted a low-power operating license by the NRC and is expected to l

go into operation withm a matter of weeks. Tims the projected licens-mg delay of 11 months may well be reduced to some 6 months. The j

m id.

m Id.

the contes e uth T x I to in IIea [be o b

ve sts a oves a o Subcommittee of the nouse Energy and commerce Committee. 96th Cong. 2d seas.

c4

L.

27 otlicially-projected date for the NitC fulbpower licensing decision for both Units 1 and 2 remains February 19H2. If t'aat date holds true, the licen6ng delay for t how units. as oreviously noted, will probably be 6 and 4 months, respectiveiv."2 Whatever the eventual magnitude of the NRC-induced delay at that

~

site, there will have twen two cardinal reasons for that delay : the seis-mic question at the Diablo site and the problem of >ost-T'MI altera-h tions to the plant. Pacific Gas & Electric, the utility t iat owns Diablo, has complained bitterly in hublic tnat both holdups have been unfair j

and unnecessary to PG &

and w its consumers."' Its complaints have been echoed widely by the industry and its supporters."'

Before examining the facts regarding those two sources of delay,it is unportant to recite the same basic licensing history already described for t be ot her reactors on t he "delav" list. At the time Diablo 1 received its consruction permit in April 1965, its projected fuel loading date was April 1972. That date slipped three times in'1974, once in 1975, once in 1976, once in 1977, twice in 1978, once in 1980 and again in 191. The total slippage in the plaat timetable has been 105 months, l

of which only 11 months is bein,; attributed to the licensing process l

delav."'

Tiie reasons for the other 94 months of delav included wildcat strikes by elect ricians disgruntled by the utility's decision to bring in a second

-hift rather than pay overtime, a pipefitters'. strike, and retooling of certain major generation coniponent.s such as the turbines and the main con dense r."'

Unit 2 was given a construction permit in November 1970 with a fuel load date of November 1974. That date slipped for many of the same reasons as Diablo 1, and because of electrical installation prob-lems. It slipped twice in 1974. once in 1975, once in 1970, once in 1977, thcee times in 197x, and t wme in 1940. Total slippage for Diablo 2 has been 83 months, of which only 4 are being attributed to the NRC licensing delav."'

That recital de not convey the core reas>n that Diablo has be-l bot h the mo<t delayed and arguably the most cont roversial nu-come I

clear powerplant in the count ry. That renam is the reismic issue. The center of t he debate over the sa fet v and the operability of Diablo has l

'. een t he f act t hat it i-h>cated jukt t hree miles from'a major carth-l oual n fault, the Hosgri fault."* That h>e ition has been the root cause for the sustained opposition to the plant's cqwration both by citizens' n

grw.ps and by t he current Governor of California.. Terry Rmwn. PG &

E's ethrts to allay the NRC's and public's concerns over the seismic j

danger have leen the major reason the utility has been slower in con-l structing the plant and slower in fending oli challencing htigation i

than it ever anticipated.

l l

The embstrassing fact for PG & E is that they did not know about the earthquake fault's proximity to the Diablo site when they u en rin gs, at Appendiz, r.nswe-2n a t tachment

• Fe dehnte between Rep roby M off *t t and M alcolm F u rtiu sh, general counjel.

PG A E M cNeu-Lehrer Report, July 8,1981.

d t"x a ns we 2B attachment.

I*

nEs at Ap

• Id.

"In the matter af Po & E (Diablo Canyon). Nuclear Regulatory Commlauton Docket No 54-275, 50-823, ALAL-644, June 18,198t.

(

b a

~___?_" ? " ~ Y_~ "_T f' '_ _ _ _

' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

23 brea n const ruct ion. Since the entire Pacific rini is an area of sonie eart hquakes. t he l'e w as originally designed to nieet concern ovet a

c: rain le 'l of seismic tbreat. The existence of the llougri fault, how-ever, wa3 not known to the utilit y in 19e becanv the fault lies off-shmt, under the Pacific, and t he ut.ility had not discovered it. By the time it was divovered, in 1971. "const ruction war appn>ved and well underway. ' m While PG & E niight have noide the decision to abandon that site if it luul known of t he lloseri fault earlier, it de-cided to stand by its investment and seek design changes which the NItC would consider capahle of withstanding thia enhanced seismic q

t h rtal.

2 The design and effectuation of suc.h changes necessarily required

'?

time. They provokal challenges from citizen interrenors who con-sidered them inadequate. Thow challenge,s were not resolved until

/

September 1979, when a licen-ine hoard decided that PG & E% fault analvs:s wa.s correct and the design chanen made to compensate for r

the lhescri faulti potential had been adeqpate n.I nst t h ree weeks later, a major (0.5 to 6.0 on the Richter scale) earthquake hit the Im-

=

t perial Valley. Instrument readings from t ha( ea rt hq ua ke beca me 7

available in early 19so. The intervenors in t he I)h.blo ca.+ petitioned Jr t he licensing appeal Inard to erunine that data. since the imperial Valley quake had been near enough to I)iablo to be of relevance and since ther contended that the data di-credited some of PG & E9 a.s sumptioris regarding the danger of earthquake, to the I)iablo site.

=

The appeal board granted that reques-t, taking t he new evidence on t he vismic issue and studying tiu question exhau tively.*

()n June 16. 981, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board issued a highly detailed impressively reasoned 180-page decision on the wismic question at I )ia blo. '" Its conchision wa-that the step-taken by PG & E to strengthen the I)iablo (inyon phint to meet t he threat of t he Ilo+ri fa ult were a Jequate to protect the health and safety of the public. That decision cleared away the major obstacle to t he operation of I)iablo ('an von..N evert he h,+. Gm ernor Brown and certain of the citizen interrenon has e expressed continuing disagree-ment u 't h that judctnent and have -tated their intention to thirsue this ruat ter fort her, powihly by court action challenging the NRC licensing d eci sion."*

It i< t hemfon undeniable that re olutio, of t he seismic question f }lIYHig}l the SN lia rl'-illE llrocee }ul< alelayed and Inav yet further delay that pla n t 's ope ra t ion. It is equally apparent, however. that that iplHIon is not a t riVkal <>ne. As the }icen<ing aD}ca} IsoarsI Riated in its ober opinion. "Neismologv i< an evolving vience."" The eX-port opinion-otTend to t he licen-ing board < from hichiv-credentiahwl scienti-t-ditTored fact ually and indemen nllv?" As Ilr. IIarold Lewis, a prominent nuclear phywici<t. a st rong suppm ter of nuclear power.

• T 4. a t 3.

un Id m ld. penetm

• Td. a t 3: r Licensing non rd Proceedine-

~4 26 in sar 433i

• Id. pp 6 &

W.d. pa nntm

• see e g. letter f rom coun.e! for Gor Jerry Brown to Chairman Pahadino. Rert 15, 1951..

28* AI.A B-444 at 11. purra note 129

• Id. at 11 fr

\\W_____-__-__-

t 6

a

y.

p 29 and a member of the President's Nuclear Safety Oversight Commit-tre nventiv miil. "the *iemic issue at Diablo Canvon is a real issue, unlike mnie other ie. sues that have ten raised in 'that connection, it is a very real one.

i Neitfier this Committee nor the Congress is in a position to make an expert determination nbout the mcolution of so <erious a technicr.1 issue as whether a stmeture at Diablo Canyon can withstand a poten-i tial earthquake and protect the public from a release of radiation.

That i-quite properly the NRC's job. What is highly mgnttabte in the current context is that the NRC and the Congnss are leing subtly 7

persuaded that msolution of such vital safetv questions may not be acceptable if the time newled for that msofution interferei with a utility's const ruction timetable."o The Committee rejects that view

j and urces the NRC to cont.nue the proper and full explorstion of i

such uniquely important safety questions through its licensing proms.

The second complaint advanced in recent months by the owners of A

Diablo Canvon regarding the delav in its operation has len the m-quirement for technical " fixes" called for by the NRC in the wake of its analvsis of the TMI accident."2 As the worst accident in the comme rcial nuclea r I ower indust rv."2 the TMI accident in March 1979 j

necessanly provoked thorouchcoine reasse+mente of a host of safety 6

and de-icn que-tions by t he nuclear industry and the NRC. That

{

rea.etuent rwultal in. amonc other things, the T311 " Action Plan" wluch cal!ed upon utilities to niake a number of changes in their phy.qcal plants and in their procedures to solve problems identified oy t he TMI experience."'

Diablo ran wn had the mi-fortune of being caught in the flux of regulatory change provoked by T3fl. since construc2 ion was larcely finished at the t.ime of that accident. Its officials have since argued that it u e unfair for I riablo to tw forced to make the alterations sug-cetted the TMI "lessonc ! earned" prior tn becinnine operation.

They c< nmnded that since they were near borinning operation at the time of t b TMI accident. they chould have been allowed to commence i

operation; and make the required re<rofits while alree.dy in opera-t ion '" Ti. ic in larce part what reactore altradv in operation at the time of the TMI accident were allowed to do, with the exception of the Babemk & Wilcox-manufactured reactors cimilar to the TMI-2 unit.

Both factual and policy reatonc ercule the <uperficial plancibilitt of that PG & E contention. Fist of a!!. ne recited above. PG & E had clipped its Diablo 1 schedule by C2 mor

, prior to the TMI accident.

Ita <chedule clipped 25 montl.- after that "5 Furthermore. since the ceicmic xue was not recohwl bv the ante, ale hoard until. Tune of this year. and the required TVT modificationc wem beine made while the

-eiemic inne continued in lirication. the companv's contentinnc that thoen modificationc held them up prior to that date ic only valid if the

- ei cm i o iccue ic ignored.188 W T ra r.* - 'pt of N u cle a r Ra f at, ove.1ch t Com rw t ee m e.*Pi t w e etin r+on D c. June 4.

19E' n t <T

• surrat'o**e124.1 C sn en w 124

't en ri-a n o tes T T 74 ac+1nn c.1e* enpra note 5

• E nr re note 124.

"8 Hea rtn re a t Appendit. answer 2B stf achttent.

" Supra. cha pter II.

__m_-

- - - - - = -

30 Finally, the Atomic Energy Act clearly calls for a determination by the NRC at the time of ismine an operating licence that operation of a reactor is consistent with the public health and safety." The NRC must make that de. termination based on its knowledge about safety questions at each point in time when it makes the licensine deci-rion. It cannot responsibly shut its eves to new and valuable informa-tion related to safety. To do so would be in etTeet to grandfather-in all nuclear Acihtied to the standards by which reactors were licensed in the earlieet days of the industry. This runs counter both to sound pub-lic policy and to the actual regulatory h:-tory of the nuclear indus-try."" The owners of Diablo may have hen ilhtarred in the sitine of their plant and the tuning of the TMI o : dent, but that happenstance does not alte-the NRC's proper regulatory responsibility to impse upon PG & E and all other op ruting beense applicants thme recuire-ments which it believes to be necessarv in the interest of Safet y at any

~

~

point in time when the licensing deci<.ifm is madd.

III. TIIE NRC RESPONSE TO INICSTRY CLAIMS OF DELAY The Committee analysis in Chapter II -how-that nuclear industrv claims of licensing delay by the NRC are not -uppu1ed by the facts.

Neverthele.. in re-pon-e to t ho+ :relu-t ry claim, and a%ciated politi-cal pre,-u rec, the NRC ha< taker a considerable rance of actions eliminate this larcely hypothetical within the past eich: :onthe to problem. The subconunittee inte-tigation and the Committee rvview of the record suggests two un fortunate concluciom about tho-e NRC vtione firet. -ome are at heet a waste of reculatorv et[ ort and at worst are mi;cuided for policy reau.n-: second. n h de devot ing con <iderable stal[ a nd f)tIi('kal ellerEle5 t d) I}le fem >llit iIl o f an e Xaccerat e:l problem, critical NN

-afet v jirocraill-if tt'llitline it 4 in4pection procrain and a nundier of l'ost-TMI <afety iriit tativ ~. reniain 1+hirid schedule.

The adminictrative eter; taken bv the NRC to deal with licencing

'delar" have been detailed before the Concre-on.everal occasions.

inclu'line the June 1- 'ul, corn mit tre hearinz." The bulk of tho<e action, can be -ummarized :n+r t wo healince : effort-to trirn time from the hearine proce" by limitinc the pro. edural richte of citizen-

!ntervenevr-and t he latitiltle of t}le li.Tn'ille } 'na rt }' then14P} ve' in addre-mg health and cafety que-tion; and a decicion by the Com-mi"ioner= to reduce their own role in the licensinc proces< prior to r

{+rmit t ine reactor opFTafion.

In addition to thoue t wo catecoriec of admini't rative actione, the NI[ has fitade olle iTulior leck-lative reconHhendation to 4pred }icen4-inc. On M arch tlie NIlr t i anariiitteil t,1 ('onet e-s a pr,ir,-al for NRC authoritt to crant interim lou -power licen+ to permit operation of reactori ptior to the conclu-ion of hearincu involvinc inter'.enor alle-cations of health and eafety problems at the react o rs."

Atornte rnerge Act of 1954, 64 St at 919 42 r SC sec 2011 et seg

• See eg es nluating. pupra t'ote 74 a t 17 2R

• Hen t!nce n' 4 9 a* Letter from NRC Chairman Hendrie to Speaker Thesans P O'Netu. Jr. Mar 15.1941.

l+

r j.

s

~

i I

31 It is not clear at the time of this report whether these steps will in fact expedite licenws, in part because, as demonstrated in Chapter II, i

i the purported cases of reactors delayed by the licensing process for which these remedies are ap >ropriate are largely industry fiction."2 The hard truth for the nuc car industry is that the overwhelming majoritv of any future delav in placing new reactors on line will be f

L I

cauwd by factors having ni> thing to do with the NRC heanng and licensing process.

J A. IMMEDINrE ErrEcrivzxtss a

/

It It is apparent that some time sevings have been achieved, and have o

been reflected in the most current NRC estimates of delay, by the NRC

-decision tn cunail the Commissioners' role in licensing reactor opera-tion. What the Commission has decided to do is to revert to a modified versmn of its practice prior to the Three 31ile Island accident. That practice, known as the "immediate etTectiveness" rule, meant that the five Commissioners of the NRC did not themselves pass judgment on the safety and operability of a new reactor prior to its going on line."'

Once the licensing board (composed of two scientists and one lawyer who sit as a three-judge panel in the trial-type licensing hearing) renders a favorable decision, the reactor could go on line. Review by the Commissioners came later. While the Commissioners in theory could have shut a reactor down after it began operation if they dis-agreed with the licensing board, that has never happened."'

The major studies of the Three Mile Island accident uniformly recommended that that practice be abandoned and that the Com-missioners themselves be more activelv involved in the fundamental decision of when a reactor is safe and' ready for licensed operation."'

The NRC accepted that reconunendation and the Commissioners have voted directiv on all five new licenses issued since the TMI accident before allowing operstion to begin.'"

In adopting a modified version of the immediate etiectiveness rule earlier this year in rvsponse to the industry pressuir over delav, the NRC announced that it unticipates some two to three months of time savings in beginning reactor operations in the typical case."' In so doine, however. the NRC has explicitly turned its back on one of the major recommendatione to arise from the TMI accident.

The Committee cannot state with certainty that there is a safety

~

~

cost to that reduction in the Commissions' role in licensing. In the Committee view, however, that step does tend to undermine public conridence in the credibility of the NRC as a regulatory body and lesens public confidence in the safety of the nuclear industrv-both u n fort un ate results. It does so because it rives the impression of a tv-turn to "busine;s as usual" prior to Three Mile Island and will in many j

58 supra chapter 1r 1

m ll ea rt n ca. a t 5--6 g

l W In fact, the NRC has never shut down an operating reactor that a utility actively sought t o k++p t ri operation see evaluattnr *Unra note 74. a t 50-51.

i see. e r. Rogmin Report. surrr note 5. at 13R No th nna 2 niid 'ntler I tre f om NRC Dhnirman Joseph nendrie to subcommittee Chairman Tom Ber1U.

i 1

E F m g g-.g.(

b N

i s c. w.

I:

).

3

~

32 quarters be seen as a signal of returning complacency in the NRC and the industry about nuclear safety. It also does so because it adds to an already widespread impn% ion that the NRC pnresses are a sham. The likelihood that the Conunissioners will actually vote to shut down a plant already in operation absent a disastrous accident is unsupported by NRC history. Many in the public nmy understand-ably conclude that the Commissioners in fact have no say at all in licensing.2" B. Luttrixo Irrrnvr. sons Those observations apply with gnater force to the NRC's steps with n spect to limiting interrenod rights in hearings. Subcommittee investigations have disch> sed that the NRC on several occasions has attempted to liniit intervenors' right 3 in the licensing process. A few of t he mory than 20 treent NRC proposals to curb intervenors and the hearing process include :

Raising the threshohl for admission into hearings of various contentions made by interrenors:

Limiting t.he nunder of interrogatories parties may file in the hearings:

Peeinitting orsl milings on written motiorts:

Restricting citizens' rights to diwover infonnation and expert opinions hehl by the NRC staff.

Despite a broad range of actions to limit the powers of interrenors, the NLC never has effectivelv demonstrated that the interrenors and the contentions they rai* nn the source of delays or t.he other prob-i leme in the industrv."" Sadly, the NRC appears to t urn on intervenors and -capegoat thein for the industrv's ills as rapidly and as unrea-sonably as the industry itvlf tries to scapegoat the NRC The attack on the role of interrenors in the licensing process gen-e rally boils down to t wo related a.+ert ion < : first that int errenors, typiJally calumnied by the indust ry as crazies of one stripe or another,"' rai+ frivolou, objections and t hereby needles-ly prolong the licensing procers:

• wond that then is no safety benefit to the whole pnwess of allowing citizens to intervene and raise safety objec-tions to t.he licensine of a nuclear plant."" Many in the indust ry and its supporters are frank in their preference for a licensmg procedure that places complete t rust in a panel of experts and denies t he public any role at all in determining the safety of nuclear reacton.":

Yet t he testimony of knowledgeable individuals f amiliar wit h the act ual contributions of interrenors to nuclear safet v is diametricaliv counter to that view. For example. Mr. Alan Rant hal, Chainna'n of the NHC's Atonne Safety and Licen4ine Appeal Board, recently tohl the President's Nuclear Safety Oversicht Committee Intervenors in adjudicatory pn cec 41ings do make a sub-stantial enntribution to safety. ()ver the years there have u' That is in large part t he precia, pubile perception w hleb the Rugovin inquiry 6ug.

gested should t e a voided. supra note.. a t 112 -114 u* Interrenor llearings supra note 107.

]A propr1Atlons hearings. supra note 1.

• Id

• NsoC testimony. supra note 139.

N

.I r

33 been substantial at+acks coming from various quarters into

~

the contribution that is made hv interrenont Indeed, much

~f~

of the aswrtion heard from many quarters t: hat operating licensing proceedings contribute little to the safety or the preservation of environme.ntal values rests upon the premise e'

)

that few, if any, intervenore arv able to make any contri-Q bution to the ventilation of safety and environmental issues.

An apneal b<mrd in 1973 categ'orically rejected that argu-O ment. [The River Bend pweeding reported at 7AEC222.]

In my judgment, that rejection seven years ago holds true today."'

Mr. Rosenthal's experience includes nine years of involvement with the licensing process at the NRC and its predecessor, the Atomic Ener gy Comnussion. Mr. Rosenthal went on to give a graphic example of the ability of intervenord to contribute to the resolution of safety issues even when they do not have the technical resources to compete with the NRC stafT or the industry lawyers :

k I would cite simply one exsmple and that is one derived

(

from the Prairie Island operating license proceeding wherv i

an mtervenor raised an issue with respect to the integrity of the facility's steam generator tubes. And while the intervenor l'

d;dn't itself have the resources to push forwanl on that issue,

[d the adjudicatory board in that mstance an appeal board, U

proceeded with It itself and the outcorne was a rather signifi-HB cant change in the water chemistry of the facility and also in steam generator tube design.

I would submit that that was a significant contribution to sa fety.*

At the subcommit tee hea rin g, the Commissioners were asked whether the hearings demanded by intervenors had materially a f-I fected the actual safety of plants o' the public health and welfare."

r c -

Chairman Hendrie's answer subinitted for the record disclosed two pertinent facts. First. tho NRC statT's tvview of recent licensing his-tory indicates that intervenor-induced hearings have not presented unproductive roadblocks to the issuance of operating licenses. Of the last eleven licenses granted (going back to June 1977), only three were even required to litigate intervenor contentions." The other eicht were not challenged by interrenorn requiring hearings. Second of thoce three interrenor-caused hearings two cases resulted in signifi-cant conditions being added to the ope-ating licenses to address safety and environmental concerns: at Nonh Anna I in Virginia and at th'e McGuire plant in North Carolina."'

At the subcommittee hearing. Rep. Eugene Atkinson (D-Pa.) re-l flected on the importance of intervenor participation in licensing cases with which he is familiar:

M r. A rx1x so x.

. according to the information we have-taking them one at a time-the Consumer Power Co., Mid-

• Id., a t 71 -7 2.

• I d.

'* H ea rin gs, a t 87-68.

u 11. a t M.

• • Id. a t 69 f

. s.

-l womm-mm---

E

y

(

34 land plant, the intervenors claimed the utility's quality as-suran be true, In the case of Seabrook,intervenors preaed for an evacua-tion plan. TMI proved the need ror such plans. In the North-ern States' Prairie Island plant, the intervenors guestioned

~ later the integrity of steam generating pipes. The utility agreed and upgraded the,se pipes. Virginia Electric's North Anna plant, the intervenors questioned the integrity of the generator turbine. The turbine manufacturer late; changed the turbine design.

I was thinking that there has been some input on the part of these people hat has teen helpfulMr. Htmut. I thick as a general prop participation in the nuclear licensing pr > cess is something that is mandated in the Atomic Energy, Act and that the agency supports. I don't have any argument with the propo-sition.iss As other expert witnesses have consistently testified, interrenors h hearing with the potential of raising safety questions etiectn eiy m t e process are a key element in a safe licensing system. Robert Lazo.Vice Chairman of the NRC's Atomic Saferv and Licensine Board Panel, has pointed out that utilities and the NRC stati both'ilo their safety analysis better because they know that unanswered safety pr hearing:

I think we all understand if we are told that down the road there is a speed trap. That even if it is not manned the day we go by,we'll probably drive a little mon slowly.The back pressu to the stati, but it applies to the applicants as well, and to their vendor locau* in preparing to file an application for an operating license. they know that it is very likely that there will be an < pemting lice.nse hearing."'

succests that where the role of inter-Indeed, crvdible testimony t

venors has not been effective' in improvine the safety of new reac ors, of wrongheaded resistance of the NRC stati and the d

utility to positions advanced by the interrenors. Commissioner Bra -

it may be because ford gave a tellingexample -

Take another example of something that did not ever result in any change in the liceneine process. although we all now wish.I think.that it had. and that is emergency planning.

There were a number of context, in which citizen croups tried to raise emergency planning bnfore Three-Mile Island.

They argual repeatedly that an emergency plan should be required as a precondition to the operation of t.he plant.Now input has ever made a ditTerence on the licensing process. that

• Id. a t 1%16.

• NSoC supra note 139, at 59 e

i sum

b

.V4 i

as L

issue won't show up because they got turned down every time, I

but if you ask the question differently, that is, do we wish-

.(

was that citizen input potentially useful, and should it make a difTerence-the answer would have to be yes, and, in retro-spect we are now nquiring just what they asked for, and it would be better if we had required i' ooner."'

gj -

Once again, the Committee cannot assert with certainty that them

~ '

will be a safety impact from any one of the particular proposals being

]!

considered or placed in motion by the NRC to restrict intervenors' n

rights m licensing proceedings. The Committee is compelled to ob-serve, on the basis of the reord before it, that the NRC has not sub-o stantiated the need for such efforts to restrict the hearing process and it has not demonstrated that safety will not be impinged by so doing.

j Beyond the safety questions posed by those fact.s, the Committee again must observe that recent NRC actions and proposals for restrict-mg mtervenors may damage public confidence in the agency and in the integrity and fairness of its proceedings. When questioned by Cludr-man 3fotiett on thepossible damage of these proposals to public confi-dence in the NRC, Commissioner Bradford said :

Air. BRADN)RD. I Rgree that the measures the Commission 6 acually taken in the course of the htst few monthe shou;d not have ari adverse efTect on public participation in our hear-ings. We have put some much more hair-raising measures out for comment than we have actually enacted.

I think perhaps your commerit about public perception would draw its justi8 cation from the fact that all of the meas-ures that have gone out for comment have leaned in one direc-tion. There are measures that I at least would like to take in the direction of more etTective public participation-and we've discussed them before. They would include interrenor funding, they might well include an Oflice of Public Counsel.

~

that sort of thing which we have not been considering and I

have not been putting out for comment.

If there's a one-sidedness,it comes not frorn the actions we have actually taken. I agree with the chairman, that those are not adverse to public participation. But from the fact that the entire rance of options we have been considering over the last i

few months leans all one way, and there are definitelv im-provements to be made on the other side in our hearing proc-j esses as wall."2 i

C. Ix rrnnr Tartmo j

The final maior proposal advocatod hv the NRP durine the past few I

monthe to exnedito licensinrr is new statutory authority to permit in-totirn licensing of plants where the hearine prc.cese is still oncoing but t he plant ic nbrsically ready for operatio.. That proposal nonains i

nendine before the Concrees at the time of this ronort."' The NRC Conuniaioners hnve consistentiv supported a verv Timited version of such an interim licensing power, more limited than current legisla-

'a To. at 35.

m Hea rinra a t 17.

l m H R. 2330 ( H.R. 4255). Nuclear R egula to ry Commisston, heal year 19R2-A3.

)

m eenm m

36 k

t ove propo<a ls. The N RC has reconunended that -uch heenses be hmited to low-power, probably five percent level, operatwn."' Com-mirsioner Gihnskt such authority be'made explicitly nondelegable to the NRC staff andalso remain verted in the Conomssmners themselves."

Nevert heles. the record before the Committee suggests that the NRC again failed to substantiate the need for even a umited interim licen,ing authority lefore proposing it. Nor has the Commission ade-quately addressed the question of whether public confidence in the process. if not safety itself, will be damaged by creating interim li-censing authority.

Bared on the subcomnuttee findings detailed in Chapter II. it is dificult to identifv a reactor which is likelv to benefit from this un-precedented "" li5en<ing power. The varin proposab for interim us operatmg heenses all contemphite pnneding-which u ouhl themselves take at b ast some time before a Conunission deci-ion to grant the in terim license. Given the extremely short projected delays for those few-plants that might in fact be delayed by an NRC licensmg hearing. the interim licen-e proce" luobably i

3-full power licenses for t hore phmt-w ouhl oh-tr uct rather than expedite 2

the decision on full-power operation for UnitL for the I)iablo Canton case, of use in tha t case eit her."5before the interim licene.e coubt even begin

-o that it is unlikely to beI will probaidy occur i

There is t hus no clee r uv ror this proposed new interim licensing authorir v. Yet. as NRC L

onuni 3ioners themselves have stated, here too then is a substantial rck of undermining public confidence in th j

N RC by endorsing the interim operation concept. Herinnine operation e

of a doc-not increase the likelihoodreactor while concerned citizens continue to litigate its safety o

a< a fair one free of a predetermined resuh, a3that t ho<e citizene will see the process subconunittee in t his colkiquy :

Conunissioner Gilinsky

-aid to the Mr. Ilrun. What I am askinc is, if everybody still knows there is goinc to bo a hearing. you are stdl going to be pre pared for public scrutiny in a hearing. The question is: Has-the that would have atiected the public health and welfare ?hearinc mat M r. G IU N AK r.

if it is a hearinc after theI thmk it becomec a different hearing ha' to engace in, from t he pointfact. It iu not 'omething that one

[utilityh in a serious of view of the applicant ope rate t he plant.

way to get a 1 cense or get approval to Mr. Hun. You are sayinc that the NRC would be afTected by the fact that it is already in operation ?

Mr. Gruxsx v. I t hink t he proc ~ would be aifected. I think the public would regard the proce-rather ditierently than it

' ' He.irle let ter to 03em supra note 150

• Hen r!nes. a t C7 N w hile i n t e ri rr. opera t i ng n ot horit t w as t e m pora ril t cren ted in the A tomic E n e rgy Act of 1954 af ter the oil emt a rgo fn I!*73 that n o t hority man more st rie?ly limi t ed it requir d a finding of actual ne-evt for eow er ba mt ori In orifer to permir in terim rt ni to* onerg tton re erte 919. 41 U S C see That en eartMen in a gh + n recion A ct A Sta t

• Supra. Chapter II 2011 et beq. a t sechuta u t ho rit y has e x pired A tornic Energy 192 N

a o

37

,i does now. It 13 just ditierent to run a hearing about whether you are gomg to run a plant after you decided to run it, or I

build it, or whatever.'"

l Regrettably, Conunissioner Bradford noted, the detriniental impact of an action such a:, this will endure long after the disappearance of

(

the supposeu aihnent for which this cure ts suggested."

(

D. Tut Rut Dr.n.u : Surri.so SArrry Paocants The subconunittee investigation show3 that most of the NRC pro-poal., t a remedy the purported licensing delay are largely unnece sary.

Thev may in some cases be ininucal to nuclear safety and they likelv w tll'be damagmg to the pubhc faith in the N RC as a genuine ch'ampio'n of t N pubhc health and sa fety. The eubconmuttee investigation reveals a far greater related problem : while the NRC has been devoting con-sideraole manpower, resources and bureaucratic energy to the resolu-tion of the purported pn>blem of heensmg delay,it:> attention to crucial rafety progranu, has lagged.

The NRC conceded m response to questions posed by Chairman 31otIctt that a large number of safety-related program 3. some growing out of the TMI experience have slipped behind schedule.2" One major 3et of safety-related projects now behind schedule are me.ded m the 'TM l Action Plan." That plan constitutts the principal Conunission re3pon~ to the 1-s3ons learned f ann the traumatic acci-dent at TMI-1.m In th" NRC's words, the Action Plan includes tho>e steps :

judced necessary by the NRC to correct or improve the reg-ulations and operation of nuclear facilities bawd on studies and mvestications followmc the TMI accident. These ac-t u,ns eov..r t he broad areas 'of : !a) operational safety, ( b) sitmc and desien. 4 e i emercency preparedness and radiation e rlec t 3 e d i pract me-arul procedures, and (e) NRC policy.

orcanuation an i management."

Multiple aspects of the TMI Action Plan are now behind sched-u!e. In fact. a. lune 1s-1 internal NI C ins estication disch:ws that the entim N H(' fol;ow t hrouci. t o the irssons learned from TM1 is badly m ii13arra;. The N H(' Inspector and Auditor concluded :

Generally speaking, although,omons of the Action Plan aIT [*rin g inlj ilen. ente (1. pr(>gres3 laf lmen slow in Ingny gtygg lheC3nW (if a }ack < >f niana kelikent at tention to tile in;} f}emen.

tat ion of t ne plan Inunednitely following the accid nt at T!.ree M t!r 1s!and and durine the development of the Action Phu N RC put < >nsidemble t un and effort into identifyinc ine~ needed in the reculatory process. No ot her procram withm the acen v lad a hic; er nrmrity. ()n the basis of our n> vie w. however. w e do not h lieve the same commitment

• nas Mors at87 M i

i ~ 1.1 a

.O j

i

• neartLc4 at A ppend!r areweri 1

' nc%r r Ian 5 urec 66m' nupra note 5 Hea ring's a t Appen d:L anrwer 1.

I' I.

e Q %

4 5

Y 38 exists within the agency to imph inent the Action Plan as existed to prepan it The acene seems to he unplementing T311 requirement.- t b rouch t he norinal hu-mess rout ine ; corne lheenSeeS seelil f(b I*e Gile 5II(InlIlC Ibe V3ll!" U i l" I ' #II N'"'d faith etTorts. in view of NIM "s changine sehe<lules and n' quirements; priorities sceni to he gettine con fused ; and no One seems to he Teill} V nlallacing 'Pr C8 H OilIlating NR(% i f-f(>rts, ds t]Inc gOes } V alid flW nlenlor es (Pf I IP 300 PnI D come ch,uded hv more c u rre n t problems. the need for an 7

orcanizational st ructure that wdl ensure continued imple-nient at irin of t he Action I'lan htvonir-Inore 1:n portant."

Perhaps t he inoet ih-t orbmg -pecific re s clat ion of that internal audit of the N H("< response to the Thn e 3!de I-land an eb.nt is that during the last year the (fomnuxuon has not effectiveh t racked the irnplementat ion of new post -TM I reym reinent -

I'tiht m-have of courw 1-en apprad of t he ir<po renmnts by oflicial N H(' recuhit ory puhh ations. Sot all recidations a:e applicaide to all operatine re-actor. howe ver. given t he va r:at ion m reactor desen and con-t ruet ion.

Ab-ent some sy tem for identifyme which utiht ws <hould he doine whi A ta-k< and ah+ut t rackmg -ystem to find out if utdities so m e tun ldyln e M lt }i :1} )lli a!>le ne W recll!a t k'8ns, t !ae N[!I }}as no [Ilar-alef a nt ee that it.- new sa fet y related reqmrements are beinc followed in t he mdu-try. The inte'rnr1 NRF audit found t hat in one case, new trainine tv-q ui reme n t s for licen-ed o[+ra ton. t he NHC did not hn t e a t racki. z Systen1 in ld: Ice hy t })e i f unJili: In<r ileadline. A-a resu}t. utility Fub-Mi it als were niere}V st acke4l III a > < >rner a nd !}u le n d eil>t n(>f f e41,nlefl. Au a :eedt ' N hcl omeials dn! not knou wiach li enece-had sub-norted the res i+d procra ms if any had reonerted more time m to es.n q dy.l" Ach di-a rray rnicht ha ec been to!cr a de if t he utilitie-had a good l t ect :d of et niplia n e, wit hout N H( ' en for cen mnt fadhmup. In the t rainine case. t he indu~t ry coni.: and Amhtor e o&c fourri that a-of t b,n.ake t hat clanu. Tim In-pector n ot \\ ue: -t ' MM deadhne appli-ewe to that p roci a m out of so facuitmr t !.a t were suppo<ed to ru!>tnit reviel traininc pnigramR-- on!V -iX }.'ld J uhinIt t ed Tri i + ! T irocra m e We [ound no ind! e:t t i(M t f liat a n V ai't if >D w:14 ta'k n if > ff dbM 11p on t!io~e who bl n.,t submitted procram-Tuo unmth-a fter the due date we aga; i. la.'ked on t he 'ab vif !}i;- ite'!t :In.l were in for rimd !!: It 19 licen-ee-eti!! a,! le >t -l!.niitts,} T o' } +d J i rocra n l < Ahhouch fo N w up ans bad >-en mai'. the re-ponsble iNI!(') .ii!. l; 91-m,' rp < c i n geil } iy f }m lienn-ee[ I e. i,re gron-e-ancl -!jcge<tn } f ri t hi ;r n ut u: Ige t a'nt t}}at fo}}ow-up let ters he -en t 'I" hat disturhing indication of lin nyee failure to complv with impor tant new NHC safety regulationc has been evident in other important-

• N R F, Implementn tion of tha Th ree \\nla Isla nd A ninn Plan, repo rt to the Com-o... +he t &c < ' In specto r s ul A adh or J une 19 1 a t 2
• 14. a t 7
• 14. a t i t
• Id. a t II.

k s j 9 39 4 areas, as subenmmittee inquiries have shown. The mbcommittee's con-tinuing overscht of the NRC in the area of emergency planning has dia d that neither the April 1.1991 nor the July 1,1991 deadlines for the implementation of new emergency planning and evacuation requirements have been met by the industrv.'" The July 1 deadline for emplacement of sirens to warn atTected cituens of a dangerous nuclear accident was met by only 6 cd T,0 currentiv operating nuclear power-Just a third of' the operatine fac'ilities could claim substan-plants.2" tial panial compliance. Another third had f ailed to take some of basic prehminary step-such as ordering the equipment from the manu-facturer-necessary to comply with the regulation, despite their hav-ine been on notice of the vieadline for eleven months.'" The considerable range of additional requirements impoced in the wake of the Three 3 file Island accident might provide some excuse for this industrv record of f ailure to meet reculatorv deadlines if only the ~ post-T311 r'equiremente were at issue. That is not the case, however. The NRC responses to Chairman 31otTett show that major new require-monts for fir" protection that gre v out of the Browns' Ferry accident still are behind schedule and have not Wr. implemented at some utili-i tiec: ' The Browni F( rry tire i at the nuclear tariiity at 5fus-el Shoals Alabama owr.ed bv the ' Tennessee Vallev Authoritv ) was in 3f arch 1977>. Thus nuclear plants have been in operation f'or six and a half years since that acetdent without the prewribad remedial action for fire protection being taken. The NRC aho conceded that its " equipment qualification" program i

1. hind whedule.t" That procram is mtended to see whetner vital

-a fet equipment can operate in unusual poct-accident conditions. For exampie, in licht of the T311 accident an 1 water spills at Indian Point, Sequoyah and elsewhere, lhe NRC has questioned whether certain actrical wirine can function adrouately while accidentally immerwd m water for mbstantial periods of time. The NRC has already found i that "a :arge portion of nuclear powerplant equipn.ent unportant to 3afety may not be qualified for *rvice in all accident environ-n'.ents."I" The NIT repor ed to th-suleommitme that its procram to evaluate the ra fety n-ed of the oldest nuclear dants-in licht of the overall cafet e learnine of tha last decade-- u l aind schedule.2" Acain, tl.e NRC noted that 'ts "unrselved sa fety issues" procram t i< l-hir.d schadule. That program is moant to identify thoce generic probbne that inay atTect a number of teactors m the industry and for thwh no solution has yet baen devised.* Other caferv-related procrame too have not been completed or have r-mamded l# hind whedule during the r act ten months " As Com-2 missioner Bradford conceded in an unu=ual acency plea for better Concres3ional oversight : ,,r e r f-om Ch ai-c at Wf at . 5 R c Fr at rm m r. Henorte J u n. So 1941 Letter f rom Pt airm a n P3 M a d ir.v t e s 't a t rm a r. M of *' A " gu st. 1W

1. "er f rom Ct.airma n Mafett to Ctai man PaMadtne Ag 20 19si

• Idearttsa. at Ap;endir a nswer 1

- 14.

• I d.
• Id.
• Id.

h [ ) A =a-- e. .w

r 40 3ir. Ihnrono. If the only message we get from the Con-gress is that our primary duty is to licence powerplants and that the deadlines as to unresob ed safety issues, to the Three a Afile Island action plan. to fire protee' tion, and others are somehow deadlines of a secondarv order-it is all right to miss them as long as the deadlines ate met for powerpl' ants-that is going to atiect Seabrook and every other plant in the country. hir. hioFFEI*r. Can we interpret your statement at that point to mean that things are slipping, thee secondary things are slippir.g or are in danger, safety-related things are in danger 1 of. dipping ! = Sir. Baanrono. I think all of the items that I mentioned i have slipped in the last year, and I think probably even in this calendar year. I don't mean to tell vou that any one of thme slippages'in some tangible way undermine safet'y in a specific way in a specific set of powerplants. If one knew that that were happening, one wouldn't allow it to happen. It i3 much more a matter of preserving over a period of years the balance between attention to licensing d eadlines and attention to safetv deadlines. + m-I guess this m0st be somewhere between my 12th and 20th congressional hearing in the last year, and I don't think we have been asked at any of them what our deadlines are on i unresolved safety issues. on the action plan, on equipment I qualification. on fire protection. IInve they slipped in the last vear ? IInve they slipped over the last 4 or.; years ? What is heme done ? What are we going to do to assure that they don't g-shp any more! At virtually very one of tho-e hearings. I have been asked those guestions about specific plants and about plants in general. So that the attention we cet from those u ho oversee what we do is not conducive.in my view.to the kind of halance between licen<ing and rafety that i< conducive to ca fety in the long run. IV. FINDINGS AN1) CONCLUSIONS Ba.wd on the subcommittee over-icht investigation and its review of l tho treord. the committee find, and concludes that :

1. T7a' d< lay 1;i:< Iv to L< <.rja r;< n, rJ hy utilitin in obtaininct operat-for jdt y.viraIIy < < >ns p o to d n ur Ir a r j o rre rpla n ts int.v firi n l

in _1 ll< > n.< o m .vu h uta n tlaIIy r.rii<pir r ata d. f'o nsr aj uo nfly, t/u pu rported <nst to o 11 r-tric;ty r o ox ann rs o f ? ?t is de lay ain lia.v kr, n v eri s ta t, d by la u ndra d< of millions o f clollars. Few plant e will even arcuably be delayed by t he Nuclear I?cgulatory Conuniesion li< ensing proce's Instead of the 13 delayed plante p ro-m jected by the induary and the NRC carlier this year. no more than six plants are even projected to be delayed now. Further clippage in construction completion likely will reduce that numbor. Likewiso. the magnit-ude of the overall delay is dramatically le.,s than repeatedly

• n earin gs. at 64-65.

h 4 3 i L 41 I claimed bv the industrv. Rather than -ome 90 to 104 reactor-months of J ~ 1 licensmg delay, no mo're than 23 and probably fewer than 23 reactor-months e 1 May will be experienced for all NRC-related reasons. The mn m n cost projected in the August N RC report for licenamg ll delay. all plants besidec Diablo Canyon would be 3ome $151.5 mi ion, inste.d of the $2 to $3 bilbon co3t origmally suggested by the mdustry. ven that period of delay is largely connoci of the 15 months of d.ay anticipate 4i to have been borne by the two tractors at the Diablo Canyon 3 te in ('ahfornia. The Conumttee ha3 found that the principal reamn for the proloncation of S RC proceedmgs at that site has been the remlution of the vital safety que.3 tion 3 related to the seismic thtvat at the Diabio sit 4. The Comnattee rejects any suggestion that the res>lunon of the v:tal safety questions related to the reisnac issue constitutes delay. Ctthtie-that wish to avoid lenginv N RC analyses of se18tule condif lonS Would IE Weil-advided 10 avoid sitm[; reactors near 3icnificant eart hquake f aults. There are on!v fou r ot her ca-3 where mode <t de!av may be occa-mon.~i by thr coinpletion of N RC licen,mg proceedind--San Onofre, suspiehanna Sununer and Waterford. The total delay for tho-e phete wdl be eight mont h, or N. The ('onmuttee has found that memficant s.afetv questions rarnn a outstanding at a nunder of suppo+dly delayed phints. As detaus in this report, thore are 3icnificant conet ruct:on deficiencies at Zimnw r that are just now b-mg verified by the N RC. with tvmedial action by the utihty f ar f rom complete : con-truction problems al<o have plagued the Comanche Peak mte : emergency planning and -eismic questions rennon at Inabio t 'anvon and at San ( innf re ; o uestion, about the <t rencth of the containient bu'idme at McGuire neces<itated the hear-mg about winch that utihty pubhcly complained and led to the NRC remu reme nt for f urther et u<iy : doubts that emercency evacuation is f.as b' for the si. naam piant on Lonc 131an,i have not been laid to r e.-t. A !! of t ho-e pro;. lcm-are at the plants whrh the industry has t uted a "delayr.: ana obet ru cted f rom op-rat mn by the NRC. In ad,htion. the Unn ottee ! a3 found thac the utilitiec themselves in sorne cases bea r

• Le n~ pone:F.6, for harme d-lay-d tho-e very pro-r.1:nes about which they ce uplain. As NRC otTicial-havo had several 4c ca-ions tn wam nuius rv afli uale deiave by the utdities ti.emselv+

in resolvine outstandmc Efot y questionc'and the in f u;t rv 'endency to j .mp!etion schedui +. ae documented in thic t vate m nsti tion rpet. delav ti o N m ' licen-ir e prrreedine. Fmally the ( 'on m. it t ee ha, found th tt the macnitude of whatever &lav can be att r%ted to the NRC --e -n inclu ling the time taken to win ac e ant -aferv s ~ -uch ae - +mic threat and emercencv a -mall fiaction of th-biar can-d bv utihtv errori plannmc and u. a rket pl a ce ~ realit ies aich al capital m a n a cr m e n t p robl. s acome: tion. T h r -. f u - w ccr et that the nuclear industry hae attempted to blame the NRC for problems that lie within the industrv and the enerer ma rket p iser. It is a ppa rent that the nuclear industrv has financial nroblems tahr It ic al-o apparent that many fcssifexpe-rienced utdws vom urine into 'he nuclear a rer'a have been troubled by the unmp, etc.1 complexity and novelty c' ch-ar technolocv. ~.. 'l i

t em, 42 It is demonstrable that nuclear plants are takinn longer to build and get on line than anticipated by the utilities. What,has not been demonstrated in anv substantive way hv the mdustry is that those extended schedules are the fault of 'the' NRC its procesws, or citi-zens who raise safety questions as legal interrenors.the alleurd prohkm. of licensing debry

2. The NRC r< x ponn to has bren. mi.squided. Itx actions and proposah may be detrimenial to i

ti-safety over the long term, and they rid undermining publ c con dener in the l'om minion and the licen ina process. s The myriad NRC steps to deal with the purported problems of delay chiefly include three proposals: a rvturn to permitting reactomCommissioners' direct to becin operution without the efforts to trim the hear-practice abandoned after the TMI accident : ing process by restricting the rights of intervenors and the hearing boanls: and a legislative proposal for interim operating license aut horit y. The first propmd directly revemos a major mcommendation that emerced from the Three Mile Island accident by mmovine the five NRC commissioners themselves from the ultimate responsibility for decidine that a reactor and a utility are safe and madv for operation reactor is placed into operation. After-the-fact review, have conceded. lacks public credibility. And lefom that as some Commissionerw as one Commissioner told the subcommittee, that and mlated actions risk turnine the NRC into the kind of " licensing sweatshop" it was before TMI.* The second set of proposals, to trim time from the licensing hearings involving intervenors, is misdirected. The NRC has made no factual demonstration that it has been or is now the role of interrenors that is at fault for the delay now projected for new reactor licenses. Its near-reflexive assault on intervenors appears to be its own effort to find a for the purported problem of licensing delay. Again, the Committee is compelled to reject the notion that the resolution of such scapegoat as seismic i"ues. " hydrogen burn" important safety-related questionsty, eqmpment ado juacy and emergency problems, constructmn quah. planning constitute unwarranted delay. Resolution of thow questions mstead lies at the heart of the NRC's stat utorv misJon. And the record before the Committee shows conclusivelv that the role of intervenors has been important in raising. analyzing and resolving those vital safety questions. The NRC proposal for interim operatine license authority appears to be a remedy without a reamn. At this juncture it appears highly which will be in a licensing ' con-unlikely that there are rny plante Not only struction poeture to benefit from any such intorim authority. is that authority not useful, it is aho det rimental to public confidence in the NHC and the long-term safety of the inductry. Allowine a reactor to be operated while citizens continue to litigate the question of whether the reacter is safe enouch to be operated cannot possibly add to the public conciction that the licensing process is a fair one. The understandable public conclusion from such a procedure will be that the NRC licensing process is a pre-determined sham.

• 11, at 64.

I 0 -1

43 8

1. 1

3. Safety-rclared NRC programa and the inspation of operating rawlear reaetors--the tr tie mitrion of the NRr hare remaint<l behind schedtde at the same time the NRC's attention has been derated to the mppond problem. of licensina delay. The proble m of slippage in safetynlated program.< clearly antedates th, recent debate over li-cerudnc defa ux. quing back in sSnr cases for yea rs.

The' NRC has conceded to the Committee that a large number of im-4 portant safety programs remain behind their targeted schedules for completion. The bare fact is that important, identified inadequ cies in reactor safety have not been remedied by operating ultilities on time and the NR(' has failed to adequately pursue those failures. 3f any of the delaved safety actions sprmg from the lessons of the J Thme hIile Island accident. The record before the Committee suggests l M that the NRC and the utilities' commitment to learn from that severe accident has waned as the memory of the sccident fades. That tendenev j has been exacerbated bv the excesive and unfounded diversion of NRC attention and energy to the question of licensing delay.' 31 ore diwoncertmg than the f ailure of the NRC and the industry to fnllow throuch on T311-rebited actions, however, is the sustained fail-ure to itnplement remedial steps dictated by previous accidents. The f Committee finds it a matter of panicular concern that over six and a half veais after the Browns Ferry fire, the Commission and the in-dustiy have not implemented all th'e fire protection measures called for by that accident. Such sartained delay in safety programs should not be toleratal by the NRC. the Congress or the public. At the same time imponant safety programs have remained behind j schedule. the NR("s inspection procram for operating mactors has Imen found to be seriously deficient. The Committee has already found in prevmuc oversight repons that the inspection program at the NRC is not saticfactorv. The Committee has already concluded that the NRC is not e,mp'leting its inspection procram and cannot assure, the puh!ic of the actual safety of operatine nuclear reactors. Thow conclu<ione need not he reFatni here at lencth. The Committee can only observe that t he reconi does not indicate -icnificant impmve-ment in the N RC inspection pmgram since the hist Committee analys:s. In that mnanl. the Committee notes that the NRC is obliced to resp %d hv Ootober le to previous Committee recommendations by reportine to the Subconunittee on Envirorment. Enercy and Naturd! l Hesaurces on steps beine taken to remedy insnection doficiencies. l

1. Thr vurdnet nf the ndustm; and th, NR( in the matter of allraed

?ir, r,sln e dcTa r; Ia r, n n

• Ler n ir, the beat ;nter,gts of,;fhpp the p,gg;p or the indu.<try.

.b this Cornmittee has 1-en obliged to observe too often in the past, the Nuclea r Reculatorv Commission's <tatutorv nmndste is the pm-tretion of public health and sa fety and sa fecuar line the environment. Itc statutorv mandate does not entail promotion of the nuclear indus-t ry unless t h1t F demonstrably consistent with the public health and sa fety and environmental pmservation. F I "* In spectin g supra note T. 4

___1 44 Il '%t ' r l( #b f) e k'0'[1 b N U} N $1 ll P!5 I Il* }$14 k } $V 5k I ( O If}I a ) g C canhne the been<me delar ha-not retlected w' ell on the NIM"< gra-pabout the need to M of its mission. The NIU ' should not be apolocetic resolve important saf e y ipo+t ion". The N lW simuld not begrudre citi-zens their desire to speak and to be heard on question 3 of safety atfect-H T ing their lives. homes and families.Thoee observations are not in any war dimini-he 7 economic arcuments. It is appan rit that the principal justitication l-J ti u-ed hv both the indu-trv and the NRC for urcine expedited licensing T T bee'n Anancial. The pos-ihle incremental coct to [ E of new reactors has of " delay' has been repeatedly cited and exaccerated as = t for expedi+ine licen-inc Yet the fact before the Conunittee consu me ts a basis i ivsie s u pp< >rt e caution and exhaus-3nccest that genuine eccitann e aiut tive study prior to liceitsing, not ruhhe<l or t runcated pnw eevlingicuch as thr TM1 The cunple fact i-t hat a - m cie nuijor amblent accident co-t s m.nsu mer-a nd t ax payers numy t ime< the cost leciti-mat elv att ribut able t o N I?(' licen<inc hearino and citizen content ions about -a fety problem-interrenors and tha The record More t he ('on umt ter succe-t s that b e have <, int rii.ut ed t o the re<< dution of a num er of a fet t problem-If any one of t ho-e had been left unresohrd by NRC licen-ing proces i an expedited proce-and re-olted in a maior accident. the econom c manife t. folly of euch extiedition w ouH be painfulltof TMI and the utility indus-At the time of thi< report t he owners Federal em ernment to t rv are seekinc financial a.+i-t a nce f rem t he p:$y over one billion dolla r-In co48 ari-inc f rom just one accident at d vocate a nuclear phint. It is therefore particubirit :ll adrised now to athat a potential cauce of an y pe rd bilit t any -teps which incren-e t heover bioked prior to licen-inc. accident coubl be )[i ire < > e r, 9 3 flie Du1)rel jilain}v n > dect i It i-ca}lla}iy ill-titued to J a nt ~ du, lille lt a Ikilm W}KII baskP f d t ie t ot e 1e-4500c0< t o f lit:ific lt: ore ca fet t procram-an 1 t he in-p. erion of reactor-alreadv operatine are Mi>t lH kn e fill!\\ ilul'lt llo't it"l I f t },4 - ne\\t n:a it" a'l'h'lf nt all lC dloWn tailm' a revilt of ant (if flie+ -11litulce- }'r the S I b.}Hitll t } l' Nlb' and E re-poncibilit t t o con-e itienn .enonne the m.lu-trv vil! brai a i f ! + i r f li ?*ll D < ' teel e ff')Ti s of rN'ellt lilont l%. p r-a n t } t a x i >a v e r-fv ir IIu' ( h >llinlkt t ee acaIfi inibt ddherVe t }1at I}te E d el >en d s I 'r f rin c } ie'vt ulil a rt, '> f fim nuclea r loin er < i ne rat ion indu-t rT c term vialtilit V l of pubhc accept ance and confidence on achievinc the 'nece--a rv Lver indo-t rv todar a n, ont em with current pu blic in 9- -a fe r. Few in t o il u'I't t ' f eIIi7Pn i'oll N'iPIICe in l+'a r t o 'M e r. Illil > D i a t t it 1]ih m f (in 3 D} Ti it a maior a-nla arm for t% indu-t rv. t Tm I tion-of t he irdua n over t he na <t feu mo"t h-have not ad-nueh a r n exe r mcht t o be k ate l' t ! lit i.4 have foiled to var <.d t hat ma' tb.. amol-!!b Ut ilit ie - din c com t rv mo d-cienci, s T < orrect 'icni' ant and one-t an alli$ va'naIk'In I an' a' M a rnkn e -v 4I'lli" 1 land experi-h a r#, failetl tai !!1 } $lel1U'n t = NIT in !icht of the Three Mile M clearlv required 1,v t heSix and a half vear> a fter the Browns Ferry fire. not all utilities have fuHv imthmented the new fire protection actione required by a e n ee. i E the le"oni of that maior accident.Yet de-pite thes and other eafetv-related de f_ 2 5 have loudly and inaccura* t ry, nuclent proponent-M m E-r l-

45 becau+ additional plants are not being rushed into operation. In the Commit t ee view this is not the way to convince the public of the industrv's commitment m cafety. As 'many in the industry well know, the nex't n ajor accident could'be the %it. Public accep'tance of the indust rv likely would not survive another TMI. Prevention of that next m'ajor accident should therefore be the principal aim of all in the industry and in the NRC. V. RECOMMENDATIONS Bar>d on the record before it and the above findings and conclusions, l the Committee acting in its oversight capacity makas the following l recom mendations : I

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission should carefully review l

the analysis, findines and conclusions of this Committee Report. With- ) in 60 days, the NRC should nport to the Committee stating the Com-mis 3ioni conclusions regarding this report. The N1(C should specifi-cally address the findines regarding the NRC actions to limit mter-venor participation and licensing board actione in hearings and to reduce the role of the Commissioner-in licensing decisions. In light of the Committee conclusion that interim licensing author-ity does not appear necessarv at this time the NRC should not ad-vocate nor utilize interim licensing authority except in keeping with l its stated position that such licenses should be limited to low-power (five percent) operations. Such authority, if utilized, should not be i delegated to NRC staff but chould be exercised solely by action of the Commissioners in caws where licensing delay in fact occurs.

2. The Nuclear Regulatorv Commission should report to the Com-mittee within 60 days stating.ts timetable for the completion of those sa fet v-related programs listed as havine been delayed or being behind schedule in its response to the Subcommittee on Environment, Energy and Natural Resources.

I f any of those programs are listed as likely m m:..... unumpietely implemented by December 31, 1991 the NRC should dexrib, what actions it is taking to expedite these delaved safrty programs. The NRC should then report in writing to the Subcommittee on Environ-ment. Energy and Natural Resources at the end of each month there-after on the actions taken and the progress being made to expedite and implement these cafety programs. 4

3. The Nuclear Regulatorv Cmm cion should report to the Com-i mittee within 60 davs on the etT<.cs it has taken to ascertain whether those utilities that have not complied with current NRC emergency planning implementation deadlines had good faith reasons for no't complying with the deadlines. The NRC should state what enforce-ment action it plans or has undertaken for those utilities found not to havo a good faith reason for compliance with the emergency planning regulatwns.

j i i

1., ....,4 . i. ~ g% t t .., A[ -v f_ ,' g _A A DDITION AL VIEWS OF IION..iOHN HILER IION. P AUL N. 3b ('L()SK EY,.IR. 11(1N. TIIOM AS N. KINDNES9, HON. LYLE WILLL\\MS. H()S. WILLI AM F. CLINGER.TR., HON. IL\\ YM()ND.i. McGR ATH. H()N. H AL D AUB. HON..WDD GREGG. AND HON. MICHAEL G. OXLEY While we have voted in favor of the report there are several is-nes which we feel have been portrayed inadequatley. inaccurately, and in one case, inappropriately. Findmg nuinber one states correctly that the costs of deh y in licen" ine have Ix.en <>vei<et at <l.14ut. we sliould iint li se si;zht of tlie pt-incil>le that any delay which lead-to inen'ared co,ts for t he consumer snould i,. a ppr oached f r om the -t andp.ont of "w hat an o e ih. to elinonat e thi cause of these ext ra costs F ('ertainly indu-t ry is responsible for some t if t he P NI ra co-Is in va d veil. llou e \\ er. as elect ed < >Ilis iah it IS our r es) Win-eibility to do n hat we can to miniinize the extra costs incurred by ineffi- < h nt barr aw rutic prominra and agency de lay at the federal h> vel Finding nuint -r t u o refer-to tl e aliered prohkm" of heenwing delay. We believe tir NRC has at ted n sponsib!v in approaching this problem of addec as to the consumer due to delay in NRC pro-eeihirer, whet he r t hat <iela v l c 17 m ont hs. '3 tm.t t hs. <,r lii4 im,nt hs. Sh "e t he N R("s juri.whction ih,c-not irach t he pnellem of adds d < osts t trit an t he f ault of itubi-t ry nianacenient. we lielies r t he N R(' pi op-i riy in t et pret t ii it s d ut v in ul. nt :f v in g ativ iinnei e--a n i o-t - -t en.i.iinc f rain agene v j erocedu res. The re is n o. viden< e t o h n hea t e t h e t h e N TM "s i c-pome t o d. t. he . en <ict rin a la i! t o - : fet v. .-t: at .t I! A ,ihi

1!

,2 m l,l n.<.i l g

d. nn in it:al f a 'vgulat oi. Our i ecot, o ndat io". i N4 that th. <RC

,i w' ir e 70 moml.- t v. e ns ta e t h a t t o e v < n m it i >m u ne i h t o n,s ot o lo l a h ! V <,r t i he < < inclu-i, q tib.t an y l, a n :.o in lice ns.: g or U.t e ri en >r l a t red o re-i- < tet t iment al to -a fet'y or t > nidi Mt, . ontidence untii the f act e in-tif v i; me hwinn. i We do not cuhscribe to the fituime (No.1) that the con. met of the indu-t ry aml the N R(' n,av not im in the best int el eet-of t he in..d. or the industrv. As is clear from the <tatements made above. it is <n r i t f opinion t hai t here i-no evidence t hat tb procedores the NRC ha< p' + posed or t he concei n that the indu-t rv has ch s n about licenwing dehn 7 i-a <lve rse t o sa fet y. A concern raised in la,th the healing and the t e1 > ort wa' t he reallo-cation of perwonnel. It ie important to note that N PC ha< realk cated t o li. cnsinc work cert ain oer-onnel who had been diverted f rom -u-b work in the inonediate a tteimath of the Three Mile Ieland incident. This realh> cation was made 1.o+ible in part because t hat work had been completed an.1 in pa r* beca n-e it was c onsidered to be of relativelv (46) 3 k A

i. L 3 4 ( 47 h . l lower priority and not safety-related. The reall.ocations involved no q 3 j e Ofice of Irapection and Enforcement Perwnnel. ~ Another concern expressed in the hearing and report was the pos-sible infringement of intervenor rights under the NRC's new pro-cedural rules. We do not feel that the rights of intervenors have d ] been detrimentally affected by the NRC's procedural changes. (See Appendix A. excerpt from Chairman Hendrie's statement to the Sub- } committee in public hearings on June 18,1981, for the specific text of changes made and proposed.) a Lastly, the lengthy discussion of the Zimmer Plant is inappropri-ntely included in this report. It was never discussed during the hear-ing. To discredit the plant and the company without providing an op-portunity for the company to respond to such allegations is inappro-priate for the Subcommittee, especially in light of the on-going in-vestigations by the NRC. Continued and prolonged delays are not in the best interst of indus-try or the consumer given the substantial cost of those delays to utilities s and their ratepayers. Even using the August DOE cost projections, the antwipated beensing delavs will cost the industry, and ultimately the public. SGoS million. With these significant costs it is important that the N RC minimize licensing delays without sacrificing safety. The NRC's chief concern should be safety. We do not dispute t that. But to take the approach that because the NRC has fallen down ..[ in its eJons to ensure safety it should ignore other problems it may have in its procedurm is short-sighted. l The first nuclear reactor (a demonstration pressurized water reactor) was built and opera:ing in less than four years from the late the Atomic Energy Commission gave its permission for constmetion. Com-pletion of the average reactor today takes anywhere from 12 to 16 years. To imply that it is impossible for the NRC to make any changes that will reduce the time it takes to construct and license a nuclear reactor without affecting safety is short-sighted. The NRC should take a roultifaceted approach to nuclear power that stresses first and fore-a# ' ' i r W moet m fety.but an approach that also recognizes that nuclear power as an energv source should rise and fall on its own merits and not on the innbility of the federal govt rnment to establish procedures that resolve questions on const ruction or licensing in an expeditious manner. I APPENmx A j .gl ncrm r vnow cu unu sN nrsontr's sTATEurNv To rur ENvmonrENT, EN enGY, AND N ATURAL nEsorHCER sFP.CoMMTUrEE JUNE 18,1981 The overall picture is thus one of a licensing process which, aft < r 'm a major dislocation, is returning to greater predictability, and at a L" - con-iderably enhanced level of safety. At the same time, however. the institution of new eafety requirements has raised a number of potential iwues in the contested hearings for both operating licenses and construction permits around the country. Some of these pro-ceedings concern units which vere substantially complete at the time of the Three Mile Island accident, or which' have been completed since then. II - S e-

48 Acconhngiv, we now face a -ituation in which for the fint time a significant mimber of plants will be complete and n ady to operate hearines. We have before the completion of required adiodicatory referred to thew as " impacted plants" and have provided monthly One reports on their status to the Committee on Appropriations. consequence of these monthly reports is a reappraisal by the Com-d mission of licensing schedule projections. These reappraisals have I indicated to the Commission a need for making signihennt improve-ment in the licensing process and have been the basis for the corrective actions which I referred to earlier. Diablo present. there are nine impacted plants on the list : Canyon 1 and 2. Zimmer 1. San Onofre 2. Summer 1, Susquehan At tion. McGuire 1, with a total delay of about 50 months by current estimates. We are meeting on McGuire tomocrow so I should note it may soon come oft the list in anv case.All nine involve contested proceedings. For fi i staf? safety evaluation is essentially complete, ahd for the rema n-finished by the end of ing plants the evaluation is expected to beAugust. For all these plants. fact that the hearing procews has gotten out of phase with construc-tion of the plants due to Three Mile Island. IIavine described the nature of the delays presently being encoun-tered anEtheir causes. I would next like to set forth some of the actions which the Commission has taken and is in the process of taking to remedy these problems. In t'he late winter and early spring of this year. the Commission Licensine comlocted a review of the docket of the Atomic Safety andBoard Pan licensing boards. The Commission held a series of public meetings at which the major elements cf the agencv's licensing pcocess were ex-amined in some detail. The outcome was the issuance on Mar 20,194. of the " Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensine Proceedingsf designed to provide guidance to the Commission's licen<ing boarde in and other procedural devices to prevent using management methodeunnecessary delay in the hearing process. The Conun it was not urging alteration of the existing procedural framework but rather encouragmg boards to avail themselves of tools already in use to varying degrees by difTerent licensing boards.As a matter of general gu ing boards to insure that parties to proceedings, the NRC statT in tions or face sanctions for their failure to do so. Wre specifically, to set and adhere to reasonable the Commission directed the board 3 interventions where appropriate by time schedules : to consolidateto encourage negotiation prior to and designating lead interrenors: during the hearing to resolve contentions settle procedural disputes. and better define ssues : to manage discovery through the use of fewer, more focused interrogatories. and to supervice diccovery directly so as to minimize unneceseart delav: and to hold settlement conferences for the purpose of narrowing or eliminating issues and of achieving reso-lution, wherever possible, of matters in controversy. s

W W 3 L i 3 49 s i The policy statement further provides that licensing boards should make timely ruling on all matters and should do so as early as practi-a, cable where the issue in question is crucial or potentially dispositive. Where Commission guidance is needed, the matter should be referred v to the appeal board or the Commission promptly. The licensing board should also, in the interest of efficiency and expedition, use summarv disposition procedures: require trial briefs prefiled testimony out-lines, and cross-examination plans where appropnate; put opposmg witnesses on the stand at the same time, where doine so can eliminate particular technical issues: and require parties to file proposed find-ines of fact and conclusions of law on issues which they have raised. Finally. the policy statement stresses the Commission's expectation that decisions of licensing boards will not only continue to be fair and thomugh, but also will issue as soon as practicable after the submis-sion of propmed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Having used the policy statement to provide general and specific guidance to the licensing bmrds, the Commission ner adopted rule changes designed to bring greater efficiency and ti:wimess to the licensing process. On May 22. of this year, the Commission issued a final rule amending its procedures recarding the time at which licens-ing boani decisions become etTective. When, formerly. under appendix B to part 2 of the Commis< ion ndes, a licensing board's initial deci-sion authorizing issuance of a construct. ion permit or operating license did not become affective until reviewed by both the appeal board and the Commission, the revised rule eliminates the appeal board from the review of the etiectiveness of the licensing board's decision. The effect is to shorten from about 3 months to about 1 month the span of time durine which the etiectiveness of the decision is automatically staved by the Commission review process. On June 2. the Commission adopted several amendments to the rules of practice. designed to shorten the hearing process without reducine either the overall quality or the fairness of "RC ; ljudica-tory proceedings. First the new rule pennits licensing boards to rule orally on written motione, where formerly they were required to issue written rulings on such motions. Second, the rule prohibits parties from filing answere to objections or to motions for reconsideration with respect to prehearing orders. unless authorized by the licensing board. If a board decides that a motion or an objection has little or no merit on its face, it need not delav the proceedmg by entertaining other parties responses to the motion or objection. In addition. the Commission amended its rules to provide explicitly that the filine of a motion for reconsideration or an objection will not stav the effectiveness of a prehearine order, unless the licensing board @f for' cool caese shown detennines that the decision should be stayed 6 pemling the board's action. The rule change also n vised the time hmits for the filing of pro-j r pmed findings of fact and conclucions of h.w. and eliminated the requirement that motions for summary disposition be submitted no i later than 4.5 davs before the commencement of the hearing. Under the amended rule motions for summarv disposition may be filed at g any time, but boards are directed to reject motions filed just before d, I a Am p

m m E. u d E the hearing or during the heai u g itself. when response to such mo-tions wouhl divert the resources of the partie,s or the board from the hearing itself. The Coinmissmn als, established a 10-day period in which parties ruay file an answer in support of or in opposition to a motion for sununary disposition. U nder existing procedures, individual heens-ing boards had established thme time limits on a case-by-case basis. Finally, among the cornetive actions which are already the sub-ject of final Conumssion ruhs, the Conunisien on May 20 amended its rules to provide that alternativa site contentions will not be considen d in operating licen* reviews. The Conunission has also directed its stati to preimre a proposed rule which would reduce or ehminate requirrments with respect to the financial qualitications requurd of nuclear licensees. In addi-tion, the Commission voted on Junt 2 to solicit public conunent on prop <wd changes in the Iules of practice governing' licensing : ro-ceedings. These changes are designed to incruse the efliciency of the Conunison's hearing pmcess. without depriving participants of substantive or prwedural rights. One such change would require a person petitioning to intervene in an NItC proceeding to set fonh at the outset additional infonna-tion in supimrt of his intervention. The exact Conunission proposai is in the fonn of two alterna-tives. One would require the wouhbbe intervenor to demonstrate the facts on which his contention or contentions are based, and the sources or documents which have been or will be used to establish those facts. This rule change would permit the presiding officers to exclude contentions which are either insutliciently specific or inad-e4piately -upported. The se< ond fonnulation of the pmposed change wouhl r:n* t he thn shold for admitting contentions by trquiring the intervenor to assert facts which, if proved, would be legally suflicient to establish the validit t <if that contention. Another prop <wd rule chan'ge would limit to 50 the number of file on another party in a single intermgatorier which a pant may p roceeding. The proposal woubl pennit the presiding officer to authorize further mterrocatories. however, on a finding that the in-formation sought is es+ntial to the preparation of the case and not ot herwise n asonably uvailable. and also that the re<piening party has not used its first 7,0 interrogatories improvidently. This prolu,ed rule change is analogous to the limits on interrogatories which have e been adopted by mon than 20 Feder al district courts in recent years. Still another proposed nde chance would authorize the boards to require oral responses to motion-to compel diwovery. and to ivquirr the wrvice of dwuments by express nutil. The ConumWon has also taken it munber of internal management desicned to better utih7e existing nwurcos for the timely meas. res "omplet ton of the statI\\ technical reviews. Since early March of this year. stati mendiers of the Otli~e of Nuclear Ilmetor Itegulation and the Ollice of the Executive Legal Director have been on a mandatory overtime work sche lule. Petxonnel luive also been transferred to reac-tor regulation from ot her otlice< wit hm. the agency to assist in review-F, ___ -- 4 ing casework, and some N Illt a+igmnents have been delegated to other + ? +

p i. :. O.. i p -. &. p.s..,. m, 5 J. ..- A&n n . n, u. L-f.y.. 51 tt2P, Z1 4 4rra ..,e, v. i NRC omces In onler to free NHR personnel to perform technical .A?' reviews on licen-ing ca+s. some other project.s of lower priority have , } f. s been dela ved. The na'tional laboratories have been asked to 1+rfonn additional

• b, '..

tec.hnical awistance work in connection with cue mviews. as well as ~ 1.k ' [ ~, 'Ma d noncasework-related assignments. The result will be to make more NRC stati time available for ;nhouse operating license reviews. Alco, >4 1h additional memlers were added to the Atomic Safety and Licensing i I. Board Panel and the Boards in many cases were reconstituted to a minimize schedule conflicts. - - - i = ~_ / ~- We pmject that these steps will msult in immediate benefits in re- - 'oN, '. . i ducing delays in issuing operating licenws for facilities scheduled to . ~.. bn licenwd this vear and next and in permitting the stati to achieve i,..j - 'g1 a review schedule consistent with t he expected completion dates for

• .+

those facilities scheduled to receive operating licenas in fiscal year - e%., -! 17, j p 3. .? The Commission has also forwanled two legislative proposals to -i .; s the Congress with a view to e'.aninating actual or potential delay in .; -Q s the mactor licensing process. The first of them would overturn the ".3' e? principal ad s erse ruling in the recent decision of the I'nited States Court of Appeals for the Di-trict of Cohunbia Circuit in Shony v. L.-l L. , -. X XRF. In that ca+. a t hme-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit ruled- ~ erroneousiv. in our view-that the Commission must hold a prior i Q..

• 3

~ ^^T ifi hearing ori demand from any interected percon lefore it can issue a u., i licena amendment that involves "no significant hazards considera-tion.' This position is cont rarv. we believe. to the intent of Congress, ~ and contradicts consistently applied NHC policy over many years. The Commission has yet to be required to comply with that ,s. ... m ' E. deci< ion. however, as the court's mandate continues to be staved-recently by the decision of the Supreme Court to take r'eview l g' ( ^ m ost t of t he case. I'nless the decision is overturned however, either bv r T.. Congmss or by the Supreme Court. the Sholly decision could requirk D. hearmgs on a number of the eome 100 such amendments issued by 37'1 " s '. - the Commission rach vear. The etTect of such a burden on the Comi Q.s h '" *..c4 ?- - misrionN liceneing pnhe.ss, as well as or other agency activities, would t"~ 4 N be d ra st ic u.' (.A- [' _/ (, y ? '.., (*' L The +eond of t he two legi<lative proposale would amend the A tomic Energy Act to issue an interim low-power license permitting iP9 / " 7.. O, fuel h,ading an 1 low-power operation and testing in advance of the ' h@ '. e ' '. a - - - conduct or completion of any required hearing. Such operation and ?gJ. %.,.~ f N %.- ^ x. tr~ ting would be limited to 5 percent of full power in the Commis-i. sioni proposd. and would require a finding by the Cmr. mission that . i ) C O.

• • W.

L4@7 M gg - such action i-neces<ary in the public interest in order to avoid the s 4 con-eq ue n ces of unnecessary delay in the operation of a completed 7 p.. g. 44.:'- plant. In all other re<pects than the completion of the hearing. the '. + Commission wonH have to find that all applica'.de requirements have e i been met prior to allowine such interim operations. We are plewed to note that provisions on reversal of the Sholly . [' g@- x. 3, $.'r . ). W deci< ion and on interim operating license authority have been in-cluded in recent authorization bill drafte in %th the IIonso and the M ~ yn Senate. The forms of the various provi< ions difier from the Commis-N G~N;./p -p sion's recommendations and you may want to hear the views of the l] 3. g.t.$).A. imhv dual Conoissionen on them. i =* i , p _: g-. :._,_- En. 4.- g.p #, P4-I ~ ', e & gN. ~ l 9.{,, x #ff fg;.. ~ + n~ m --. -1;

== 52 In sum. the Commission is taking a broad range of actions in order to eliminate unnecesauy delay from the licensing process through internal dimipline of the hearing process. better management of agen-cv resources, rule changes, and legislative proposals. Our objective t}1roughout has bwn to increase etliciency witnout impairing the right public partici mtion and to assure that the safety of of efTective l beensed nucher powerplants remains the paramount consideration. I thank you, Afr. Chairman, for allowing me to make this state-ment. JonN Hittn. PArt, N. 3fcCwsurr, Jr. THO11 AS 5. NINDNESS. Lru WIRIAbfS. WItuA31 F. CLINora, Jr. RATMoND d. 3[CURNTH. HAL bAUB. JcDo Garco. AfscnAtt G. On.tr. t + x s

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. RAYMOND J. McGRATH i While it is difficult for me to attest to or deny the overall conclusions of the Environment, Energy and Natural nesources Subcommittee report on Licensing Speedup, Safety Delay : NRC Ovensight, there are numerous outdated and incorrect statements concerning the Long Island Lighting Company and its Shoreham facility in Suffolk Coun-ty, N.Y. Therefore, I must at the very least question the amount of t care that was taken in assembling this document. While it is true that the Shoreham plant construction has been faced with interminable delavs the cause has not b n clearly identi- ~ fied in this report. The Constniction Permit licensing process was the longest in the history of the old Atomic Energy Commission, account-ing for years of delay. In addition. new regulations formulated during and after this licensing process necessitated various backfitting etTorts at Shoreham, an expensive time consuming process. Other plants, that were not exposed to these delavs during this period, such as the Fitz-patrick Plant in New York and Millstone II in Connecticut, were com-pleted in a timely fashion at far lower cost. Finally, the paralysis of the licensing process following TMI made LILCO's licensing e1 Torts that much more difficult, Tha Subcommittee report discusses at some lench the rapid escala-tion of construction costs at Shoreham and its etTect on the company's ability to complete the project. It is a fact that this plant, and others in its genera! ion, have been constructed during one of the most infla-tionary periods in our history and will all be expensive. LILCO is moving ahead to complete the plant as soon as possible, to relieve its total dependency upon foreign oil. Finally. the most telline cause of rising costs has been the regulatory process. If there k a single true horror story within the nuclear indus-try of a plant that was severelv etTected financially as well as schedule wise by the licensing and regulatory process, Shortham surely is the one. Rmioxn J. McGarrn. (53) ) l .s .~ - ~ ~.,,_n_w.

-..)L ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. TOBY MOFFE'IT The Subcommittee on Environment, Energy and Natural Resources approved this report on September 23, 1981. The full Government ()perations Committee a ppros ed the report by voice vote on Octol,er 7. 1991. In the few davs since these subcommittee and committee delib-erations. certain eve'nts have transpired which dramatically corrobo-rate the findings and conclusions of the report. The utihty that owns Diablo Canyon has now reported to the Nu-clear Regulatory Commission that an error in the reading of the design for Diablo Canvon Cait I has resultal in construction mistakes which had not been discovered until the end of September 'aftet Pacific Gr.s & Electric was -ranted an NRC licen+ for low-power oparations at the plant and a[ter Subconunittee approval of this report. The gist of the error is that diagrann for Unit 2 were used in building certain sei3mic supports for Unit 1. Whether the utility or one of its contrac-tor-is re-pon-ible for the error appears to be at issue. What i., certain, however, based on an October 9 PG&E briefing to the NRC, is that enbstantial modifications in the construction of Unit 1 must now be made to conform that plant to it-planne 1 specifications. Fuel loading and operation of the plant have iheref..re beee suspended ur.til thee t orrections can be made. How long that corrective action will take is rot certsin. Tl.e utility at present in predicting one momb. Soine NRC officials sce skeptier.1 of that optimi-tic pre liet h n. W1 itcver the h rath of thie dclav. one p!ain fact c merges. Once again the sa mation is that the S RC has g:.u ted a license for operation whit h cannot be o,ed be<ause the utility ic ;m t re:nh t o it. And the ieas r it i-nat reacc ic be, au3e it-a r one of its cont' rut e ~ made 1. mistas. The NRC and its licensiag pron i ss plainly ar > not to bla.n for this d i c. Wimt r are t!.e interrenors scho ha ve so bit o rly and tr oacic+! q elthis plara 's operation. To licht c.f t he+ faccs. mm < t > is nc, subja t to,pstim t hetL t I6ablo Fanyon ha-in f.e he phy,, allv c.iuplete and de-Qced by tb NRC deliberstion-m e, in. 3ei.,n o ques 'on. The Con;- r n i t ce wp, t. ha-ed on the fact s be fo,. i.c C mmitteo pr ap. r! c con-In.:cl t in t :naonc all the phoo, o, e,. Diablo Can3 on a e the one tilat had the niort < rdible "~ no of m t oal delay -albe.i for a non-tiivial reason. Even that atility chum na-now Leen eerion-lv ero le 1. The thrust of the ri port a nd the g accuruv of its fin lines and conclusions abm.t the industry exageera-tion of NRC-canced delav of nuclear powerplants have thus been 4 rapidly and vividly corroborated. 1 Tony Morret r. (54) O 3 . _ _ _ - _.. _ _ _.. - - - - - -}}