ML20032C821
| ML20032C821 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 10/15/1981 |
| From: | Mcgregor L, Reyes L, Rogers W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20032C815 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-81-16, IEB-81-02, IEB-81-2, NUDOCS 8111110763 | |
| Download: ML20032C821 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000346/1981016
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
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REGION III
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Report No. 50-346/81-16
Docket ho. 50-346
License No. NPF-3
Licensee: b ledo Edison Company
Edison Plaza, 300 Madison Avenue
Toledo, OH 43652
Facility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1
Inspection At:
Oak Harbor, OH
Inspectio1 Conducted: September 1-4, 8-11, 14-15, 21-25, and 28-30, 1981
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Inspectors:
L. A. Reyes
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W. G. Rogers
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Approved By:
L. G. McGrego , Acting Chief
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Reactor Projects Section 2B
Inspection Summary
Inspection on September 1-4, 8-11, 14-15, 21-25, and 28-30, 1981 (Report
No. 50-346/81-16)
Areas Is.;pected: Routine, unannounced inspection of followup of previous
inspection items, Operational Safety Verification, maintenance activities,
Monthly Surveillance Observations, followup on Licensee Event Reports, IE
Bulletin followup and Plant Trip on September 3, 1981. The inspection in-
volved a total of 202 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors incl.uding
59 inspector-hours onsite during offrhifts.
Results: Of the seven areas inspect 2d, no items of noncompliance or
deviations were identified in six areas, one apparent item of noncompliance
was identified in another area (failure to sign Maintenance Work Orders on
completed maintenance activities).
8111110763 811028
PDR ADOCK 05000346
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- T. D. Murray, Station Superintendent
B. Beyer, Assistant Station Superintendent
- S. Quennoz, Assistant Station Superintendent
P. Carr, Maintenance Engineer
- J.
Werner, Administrative Coordinator
D. Miller, Operations Engineer
D. Briden, Chemist and Health Physicist
J. Hickey, Training Supervisor
L. Simon, Operations Supervisor
G. Daft, Operations QA Manager
- J. Greer, QC Supervisor
- Denotes those attending the exit interview on September 22, 1981.
The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees, including
members of the technical, operations, maintenance, I&C, training and
health physics staff.
2.
Followup On Previous Inspection Items
50-346/80-12-01 (Closed) Open Item: Loss of gaitronics during the
April 19, 1980 event.
Procedure SP 1107.09, Instrument AC System
Procedure, was revised to allow the inverters to be supplied from
the DC Bus when the normal feed for the regulated rectifiers from
motor control centers E12A or F12A are to be de-ernegized. The
licensee has upgraded the internal communication system of portable
radios by installing a passive antenna to improve communication at
the frequencies used at the station. The use of fifteen (15) two
channel portable walkie-talkie radios is covered under administrative
memorandum No. 14.
Management review of the April 19, 1980 event
resulted in increased review of abnormal electrical lineup during
outages.
50-346/81-03-06 (Closed) Deviation: Failure to review and alprove
Procedure AD 1805.00 by QA Revision 16.
The procedure was reviewed
and approved 'ay QA on September 4, 1981.
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50-346/81-03-03 (0 pen) Noncompliance: Example, Failure to Update
Control Room Procedures File. During a review of the procedure file
at the auxiliary shutdown panel the inspector found that Procedures
SP 1106.16 and AD 1839.02 were not the latest revision.
3.
Operational Safety Verification
The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable
logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during
the month of September. The inspector verified the operability of
selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified
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proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the
auxiliary building and turbine builling were conducted to observe
plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid
leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance
requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that
the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with
the station security plar.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and
verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
During the
month of September, the inspectar walked down the accessible portions
of the Emergency Diesel Generator No. 2 systems to verify operability.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactise waste system
controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.
During a review of the locked valve log the inspector noticed that both
ECCS room coolers for No. 2 ECCS room were valve out of service.
Cooler
No. 1-1 was isolated on January 25, 1981 and cooler No. 1-2 was isolated
on September 12, 1981. On September 15, 1981 the inspector notified the
licensee that FSAR Section 6.3.6 list the ECCS room coolera as essential
auxiliary equipment to support the ECCS operation during a LOCA. Upon
notification the licensee returned No. 1-1 cooler to service.
The licensee has initiated Deviation Report 81-140 and is working with
the Architect Engineer to determine when in the ECCS actuation mode (in-
jection or recirculation) are the ECCS room coolers required. Repairs
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are underway to return the ccolers to operable status. This item is
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unresolved pending the licerisee submittal of the above mentioned
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information.
(50-346/81-16-02)
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On September 25, 1981 while conducting a plant tour the inspector found
several cracks in the auxiliary building floor drain piping. All cracks
found were adjacent to welds in the piping. The licensee is removing a
section of the pipe for analysis and will conduct repairs once the failure
mechanism is identified. The inspectors will followup the licensee's
corrective action.
(50-346/81-16-03)
4.
Maintenance Activities
Duric. .ne review of the licensee maintenance activities of safety
related systems and components the inspector determined that a serious
breakdown exists in the administrative controls used to implement the
maintenance program. The Maintenance Work Order ($43) system estab-
lished to control the conduct of maintenance is not enforced as per the
requirements of Administrative Procedure AD 1844.00, " maintenance."
This procedure requires that upon completion of maintenance, the
responsible foreman reviews and approves the MWO and forwards it to
the Shif t Supervisor for any testing required.
Once the testing is
completed the shif t supervisor should sign the MWO and forward it to
the maintenance engineer.
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Contrary to this requirement the licensee'is using a verbal notification
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fron. the maintenance foreman to notify the Shift Supervisor of the com-
pletion of maintenance. Subsequent to this verbal notification the Shift
Supervisor is testing the equipment and declaring it operable.
The above mentioned practice has resulted in numerous W0s implemented
during the 1979 and 1980 outages to be shown outstanding when indeed.the
work was completed.
In addition, since the FN0 and work performed is not
routed to Quality Control for review and approval there is no assurance
that the work conducted and the parts used were of the required quality.
This has resulted in the operation of the unit with outstanding Noncon-
formance Reports issued in the parts used or the work conducted.
The below listed tN0s are examplec of systems and components and
the equipment declared operable without the completion of an MWO.
a.
Change out turbocharger drive gear
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MWO 81-2602
Obtain backlash readings
b.
Auxiliary Feedwater System
Suction strainers for auxiliary feedwater pump
MWO IC-572-81 Static "0"
ring pressure switch
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Core Flood System
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MWO 77-2024
Work in valves CFLA and CF1B
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MWO 80-3400
Repair valve CF-30
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Makeup and Purification System
MWO 79-1985
Repair Makeup Pump 1-1
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MWO IC-523-80 Ground between RPS Ch. 3 and VLPM cabinet
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Reactor Coolant Pumps
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Replacement of RCP Seal 1-2-1
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Containment Ventilation System
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MWO C-78-390
Cooling duct for REs 2004 through 2007
Another example of breakdown in the Administrative Controls of the
maintenance program is the implementation of tNO 77-424. This INO
was signed as completed on September 13, 1978. The work covered by
this FNO included the installation of grouted seismic supports on
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the Steam Feedwater Rupture Control System Instrument lines. On
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September 4, 1981 the inspector found that these supports were not
painted or grouted.
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On October 30, 1981 Maintenance Technicians working under FNO 81-3496
-removed the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Rupture disk. No tagging was
performed on the isolable lines that discharge into the drain tank.
Water from the isolable line was spilled on the floor resulting in
an unplanned release of less than two curies of noble gasses. The
Administrative Controls for the conduct of maintenance require that
tagging be conducted prior to the performance of maintenance.
Failure to comply with the requirements of Administrative Procedure
A0 1844.00 " Maintenance" is considered an item of noncompliance.
No additional items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Monthly Surveillance Observation
The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance
testing on the Reactor Protection System Chann+1 No. 3 (ST 5030.02)
and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate
procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting
conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the
affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with
technical rcecifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by
personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any
ceficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and
rnsolved by appropriate management pe sannel.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
RCS Water Balance (ST 5042.02)
AFW No. 2 Morthly Test (ST 5071.01)
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Licensee Event Reports Followup
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and
review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to deter-
mine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective
action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had
been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
80-33
Hydraulic Snubber deficiencies
81-39
Cantainment Personnel Airlock Surveillance Exceeded 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />
81-42
U.:gative pressure door 302 broken latching mechanism
81-46
Unsealed Penetration in safety related firewall
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81-47
Quadrant Power tilt exceeded
81-48
RCS Flow not recorded during deboration
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81-49
RPS channel Intermediate Range Failed High
81-51
BWST Channel 3 level Failed High
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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7.
IE Bulletin Followup
For the IE Bulletins listed below the inspector verified that the
written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin,
that the written response included the information required to be
reported, that the written response included adequate corrective
action commitments based on information presentation in the bulletin
and the licensee's response, that licensee management forwarded copies
of the written response to the appropriate onsite management representa-
Lives, that information discussed in the licensee's written response
was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as
described in the written response.
81-02
Supplement 1 failure of gate valves to close against
differential pressure.
No items of noncompliance or deviation were identified.
8.
Plant Trips
Following the plant trips on September 2, 1981, the inspector
ascertained the status of the reactor and safety systems by observation
of control room indicators and discussions with licensee personnel con-
cerning plant parameters, emergency system status and reactor coolant
chemistry. The inspector verified the establishment of proper com-
munications and reviewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee.
All systems responded as expected, and the plant was returned to
operation on September 3, 1981.
No items t! noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required
in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of non-
compliance, or deviations. The unresolved items disclosed during the
inspection are discussed in Paragraph 3.
10.
Exit Interview
The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the month of September.
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