ML20032C635
| ML20032C635 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 10/21/1981 |
| From: | Lundvall A BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8111100674 | |
| Download: ML20032C635 (26) | |
Text
.
B ALTIMORE G AS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY P.O. B O X 1475 B A LTIM O R E. M A R Y L A N D 21203 nV k
ARTHUR E. LUN DVALL.JR.
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/ TkT Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Director Docket Nos. 50-317 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 50-318 Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406
Dear Mr. Haynes:
In response to your request of December 24, 1980, the medical and radio-logical exercise of the Calvert Cliffs Emergency Response Plan will be conducted on November 17, 1981 from 3:00 am until 8:00 pm.
The State of Maryland and three counties surrounding the plant will participate in the exercise.
Enclosed are the exercise objectives and the scenario.
Should any questions arise, please do not hesitate to contact us.
The individual coordinating the exercise is Mr. S. E. Jones, Jr., Supervisor of Training (301-269-4798).
I Sincerely,
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A. E.' Lundvgll, Jr.
Vice President - Supply enclosures:
(1) gEgr.cJse Object.ives, BG&E (2)* EkefcksMob}ectivesi State of Maryland (3) ScenggG&E only)
Mr. Brian K. Grimbsk Ui$ctor cc:
Dr. Robert J. Bores Mr. David Rohrer AEL/SEJ/ksw 8111100674 811021 n
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Enclosure (1) page 1 of 4 CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PL%T EMERCENCY RESPONSE EXERCISE I.
Exercise Objectives aal Guidelines The following exercise objectives and guidelines have been jointly developed by the State of Maryland, Calvert County, Dorchester County, St. Mary's County, and the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BG&E). They will be used in conjunction with the inte-grated exercise of the State of Maryland Radiological Emergency 1
Plan and the Calvert Cliffs Emergency Response Plan on i
l-November 17, 1981.
l A.
Exercise Objectives 1
1.
For the BG&E (licensee) Emergency Response Organization:
a.
Demonstrate proficiency in classifying the emergency.
b.
Demonstrate efficient and effective notification and l
alerting procedures and methods.
1 c.
Demonstate the ability of the Organization to 1
maintain command control.
d.
Demonstrate precise and clear transfer of respon-i-
sibilities from the oasite emergency organization to i
the corporate Recovery Organization.
f e.
Demonstrate the ability to correctly station personnel.
f.
Demonstrate reliable and effective use of emergency communications equipment and communications procedures.
4 g.
Demonstrate the capability to evaluate and produce accurate _and timely public information releases.
4 4
1 k.
Enclosure (1) page 2 of 4 CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY RESPOSSE EXERCISE h.
Demonstrate the ability to provide adequate medical care for an injured and contaminated person.
2.
State and Counties - as defined in enclosure (2).
B.
Exercise Guidelines To define the " extent of play" by the exercise participants and meet the exercise objectives, the following exercise guidelines have been developed:
1.
The exercise will be conducted on November 17, 1981.
2.
The exercise will commence with a postulated excessive leak rate necessitating a declaration of a Notification of an Unusual Event and escalate through the four emer-gency action levels to a General Emergency.
3.
The postulated accident conditions will result in a simulated radiological release which necessitates the consideration of protective actions for the general public.
Meteorological conditions will be varied once during the exercise so all three surrounding counties are involved in the exercise.
4.
Exercise participants will perform, as appropriate, radio-logical monitoring, dose assessment, and ingestion pathway sampling activities.
5.
Radiological monitoring field teams will be dispatched for the purpose of testing response time, communications, moni-toring procedures, und sampling procedures.
Sample
Enclosure (1) page 3 of 4 CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLAhT EMCRGENCY RESPONSE EXERCISE counting techniques will be demonstrated, although simulated readings, provided by observers, will be reported.
Each radiological monitoring field team will be accom-panied by 2 controllec/ observer throughout the exercise.
6.
All onsite and offsite emergency response facilities, will be manned and will perform their prescribed functions.
7.
The Media Center in Prince Frederick will be manned and will perform its prescribed function. Members of the precs will be invited to observe the exercise.
Exercise press releases will be made to the media.
8.
Medical facilities at Calvert Memorial Hospital will be i
tested through the evacuation of a simulated injured Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant worker for treatment and decontam-ination. Monitoring and decontamination actions and procedures will be demonstrated at the receiving hospital.
9.
The postulated accident conditions will warrant the assembly and evacuation of non-essential site personnel.
The plant emergency alarm will be sounded and personnel assembled and evacuated.
10.
Participation by BG&E onsite personnel directly involved in responding to an caergency shall be carried out to the fullest extent possible, including the deployment of radiological monitoring teams, emergency maintenance teams, and other emergency workers.
Enclosure (1) page 4 of 4 CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLAW EMERGENCY RESPONSE EXERCISE 11.
Exercise participants will include the following organizations:
a.
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company:
1.
Site Emergency Organization 2.
Recovery Organization b.
All State and County key and support agencies necessary to demonstrate the actions in enclosure (2).
c.
Calvert Memorial Hospital d.
Solomons Volunteer Rescue Squad.
Active participation in the exercise will only be required of the above listed organizations.
If the exercise scenario requires that any other organizations and/or officials be contacted, they shall be contacted for the purpose of check-ing communications only. All federal responses to an emergency will not be demonstrated or simulated.
Enclosure (2) page 1 of 15 ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT 1 NOTIFICATION A Were notification messages accurately and quickly disseminated vertically / horizontally?
Rating B Were they verified according to procedures?
Rating C Were officials / organizations with immediate response notified first according to procedures?
Rating 2 COMMUNICATIONS A Were outgoing / incoming messages handled accurately?
Rating B Were outgoing / incoming messages handled quickly? Did preoccupation with logging impede message routing?
Rating C Did internal message distribution system provide the quick routing of important messages?
Rating D Uas word " exercise" used at the beginning and end of all incoming or outgoing messages?
Rating E Was the communication system with all coordinating centers and field elements adequate?
Rating F Were communicators familiar with the assignments?
Rating G Were adequate quantities of accident report forms on hand at each location? Was this notification received and fanned out?
Rating H Were telephone listings complete and up-to-date?
Rating 3 DIRECTION AND CONTROL A Was there continuous " coordination" among the players?
Did they " communicate" freely and actively with each other in a cooperative / joint effort either with or without prompting by the official in charge?
Rating
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page 2 of 15 4
B Were all players kept constantly informed of efforts as.they occurred (either through briefings or announcements or both)?
Rating C Were decision makers kept constantly irformed?
Rating D Were maps and visual display boards kept up-to-date and effectively utilized?
i Rating E Did the coordinating center operate in a efficient manner with a minimum of noise and confusion?
Rating F Did the coordinating center have an effective means of security, both internally and externally?
Rating G Did the coordinating center handle requests for assist-ance quickly by identifying existing resources or if i
-none were on hand, in making their need known quickly I
to other centers?
Rating H Were procedures adequate?
Pating I Were center personnel and decision makers familiar with plans and procedures and were they followed?
Rating J Did shift changes / change of personnel occur with a minimum of confusion and were replacements adecuately briefed?
Rating K In the final analysis, did the coordinating center significantly " control" the outside situation so as to mitigate its.effect?
Rating L Were liaison personnel from other organizations kept informed and effectively used?
Rating M Did liaison personnel perform effectively?
Rating N Did plans / procedures call for line-of-succession of key positions? Were replacements familiar with respon-sibilities if they had to assume a key position unexpectedly?
Rating
page 3 of 15 0
Were all access control' points, Mass Care Centere and emergency workers kept informed of the accident s stus, the actions that were being taken and locations where school children and evacuees were being taken, (if applicable)?
Rating P
Was information coming back to the control center on when and where access control points were established, when Mass Care Centers were opened and staffed?
In other words,
was information on all other activities outside the center flowing back into the center?
Rating Q
Were provisions made for Federal Support (FRMAP) adequate (communication, housing, feeding, transportation, etc.)?
Rating i
L
4 page l cf 15-ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT (TECHMICAL)-
,1 ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT-CENTER OPERATIONS 1.Was center quickly made operational?
l Rating i
2 Did center have operational equipment on hand (maps, calculators, charts, overlay 3, calculation l'
sheets, the REP and stationary supplies) on hand?
-Rating 3 Here key center personnel familiar. with technical data and procedures?
___lating l
4 If key technical center personnel bec&da inoperative for any reason, did their replacements have familiarity with technical data and procedures?
Rating 5 If center itself became inoperative for any reason, were there plans for an alternate center location with minimum cormunications equipment available? Was relocation thereto-accomplished efficiently with minimum loss of control?
Rating 6 Here calculations timely and results plotted quickly?
Rating i
7 Was outside assistance (i.e., DOE) when provided integrated-into centers overall operation?
Rating 2
i 8 Once calculation demonstrated a need or potential need for intiating one or more protective actions or protective l
actions were recommended by the utility, was this information quickly and accurately passed to decision makers?
Rating 9 Did decision makers consider not only recommended protective actions but other factors as well, such as impediments to their successful implementation (such as blizzards, traffic impediments,etc.)?
Rating 4
10 Uas there continuous and close interfaces at all times between the center and the decision makers?
Rating i -
i 11 Here. organizations with support functions familiar with i
technical assignments, integrated in the overall center operations and effectively used?
Rating d
. -. - - -.. -.. ~ - -
page 5 of 15 ACCIDENT ASSESSNENT (FIELD MONITORING TEAMS) 1 Did team members operationally check equipment provided.
to them prior to departure?
Rating 2
Were team members familiar with use of the equipment, field monitoring procedures, and what was required of them?
Rating 3
Did each team have up-to-date plume and/or ingestion zone maps?
Rating 4
Were team members properly briefed on their assignments and updated on the status of the accident prior to departure?
Rating 5
Were teams provided with accident updates while performing field missions?
Rating 6
Was each team member and support personnel (drivers, guides, pilots) provided with the necessary dostmeters, TLD, radiction exposure record, KI, and protective clothing prior to departure.
t 7
Did each team member and support personnel, upon completion of their field assignment, check in at a designated radiation exposure control center to be checked for contamination?
Was their vehicle and equipment checked also?
Rating 8
Did each team member have familiarity with all available ccm.aunications equipment and standard communications procedures?
Rating 9
Was each team member familiar with the responsibility of the other so that each could adequately perform any task at any time?
Rating 10 Were field teams organized in shifts?
Rating 11 Were there provisions for team member replacements in the event one or more members could not function for any reason?
Did these replacements have knowledge of what was required of them?
Rating 12 Were spare parts (bulbs, batteries, fuses) tools and monitoring equipment on hand for each item?
Rating
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page 6 of 15 13 In the final analysis, did each team know what it was doing and did perform its missions adequately?
Rating t
PUBLIC INFORMATION 1
Were news media announcements coordinated between State /
Local / Utility officials prior to releases at all times?
Rating 2
Were news media announcements accurate and were they couched in concise and easily - understood language?
Rating 3
Was there a close and continuing interface between the public information effort and the operations effort to ensure accuracy and currency of facts.
Rating 4
Was the EBS system effectively utilized to keep the public continually informed?
Rating 5
Was it clear who initiated EBS messages in the content of the messages?
Rating 6
Were sirens utilized to alert the public to tune in the applicable EBS station for information and instructions?
Rating 7
Were other then EBS news media outlets utilized to keep the public informed (hot-lines or rumor control, news-papers, TV and other radio stations?)
Rating 8
Did all plume zone county and state PIO's hrte representatives at the utilities news med'.a enter?
Rating 9
In the final analysis, was the entire private / local /
state public information effort in kceping the public informed through EBS and other means an efficient and coordinated affair?
Rating
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page 7 of 15 TOOD/ WATER / MILK / LIVESTOCK FEED CONTROL 1
Were maps available depicting locations where sampling would be acc~omplished?
Rating 2
Were sample results plotted on I.P.C.C. status maps?
Rating 3
Were state and local public information and operational channels effectively utilized to disseminate information and directives on those not fit for comsumption?
Rating 4
Once the use of food, water, railk and/or livestock feed were proscribed and were realistic plans made to obtain uncomtaminated substitutes?
Rating 5
Were the procedures for collecting samples followed?
Rating 6
Was the collection and analysis process accomplished in a timely manner?
Rating 7
Were-personnel responsible for the collection, t ra ns-portation and analysis of sample familiar with established procedures so that samples collected were representative of actual deposition and vegiatation?
Was care taken in handling the samples after collection to insure that further contamination did not occur.
Rating
Page 8 of 15 ACCESS CONTROL 1
Did access control personnel check all emergency workers going into controlled areas for dosimeters, TLD's, radio communications and radiation exposure records?
Rating 2
Were access control personnel provided with necessary dosimeters, TLD's, radiation exposure records, communication, KI and accident update prior to departure on their mission?
Rating 3
Were access control point personnel provided with periodic updates on the status of the accident and other information on where school children and othe r evacuees were taken?
Rating 4
Were access control points established so as to realistically " control" access into restricted areas?
(vere there a substantial number of gaps)?
Rating 5
Were plans / procedures flexible enough so that persons with compelling reasons could re-enter controlled areas under certain circumstances (example - going back home to get children)?
Rating
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page 9 of 15 TAKE 5tte. LIER 1
When the protective action of "take shelter" was recommended or directed, for particular areas, was it adequately broadcasted over the EBS?
Were other means of disseminating the recccmendation or directive utilized (such as mobile public address systems)?
Rating 2
Were the boundaries of "take shelter" areas couched in terms easily recognizable to the public, such as well-known roads and geographical land marks?
Rating
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EVACUATION Page 10 of 15 1
When the protective action of " evacuation" was recommended or directed, for particular areas, was it adequately broad-casted over the EBS?
Were other means of disseminating the recommendation or directive utilized (such as mobile public address systems)?
Rating 2
Were the boundaries of " evacuation" areas couched in terms easily recognizable to the public, such as well-known roads and gecgraphical land marks?
Rating 3
Were arrangements made for " collecting" evacuees who did not have their own transportation?
Rating 4
Were special arrangements made for " collecting" handicapped evacuees or other individuals with special transportation requirements?
hating 5
were arrangements made and carried out to monitor evacuees for radiological contamination at appropriate centers with special attention to those with a higher probability of contamination?
Rating 6
Were -arrangements made to inform evacuees who had used their own vehicles and who had not recorted to evacuation centers where they could go to have themselves and their vehicles checked for possible contamination?
Rating 7
Were the instructions provided to the public prior to evacuation on what steps should be taken prior to evacuating one's home or apartment adequate? (electricity, water, pets, etc.)
Rating i
page 11 of 15 MASS CARE 1
Were the evacuation centers properly staffed for the registration.and feeding of evacuees?
Rating 2
Were arrangements adequate for sleeping?
Rating 3
Were provisions made for the special needs of the handicapped or very elderly?
Rating 4
Did the center staff effectively utilize evacuees in.
handling the many necessary tasks?
Rating 5
Were evacuees kept up-to-date on the status of the accident?
Rating 6
Was there a means provided for the location of an evacuee by a friend or relative and was the public made aware of this?
Rating 7
Were the centers properly equipped with or were plans in place to provide for food, toilet paper, soap, towels, etc. -for a protracted period of time?
Rating 8
Were each center equipped or were plans in place for providing radio communications?
Rating l
page 12 of 15 EMERGEilCY MEDICAL SERVICES 1 Were EMS personnel familiar with procedures for handling contaminated patients?
Rating 2 Did EMS personnel (ambulance teams) have monitoring equip-ment on hand and were they familiar with their operation?
Rating 3 Did EMS personnel know what to do to quickly decontaminate a patient who was contaminated with radiation, if decontam-ination was possible and necessary?
Rating 4 Did EMS personnel know what to do to protect themselves before contamination and what to do to themselves, their vehicles and equipment after contamination?
Rating 5 Did the nearest hospital have procedures and equipment for handling contaminated patients?
Rating
RE-ENTRY page 13 of 15 1
Was the decision to initiate "re-entry" made according to procedures, i.e., were radiation and contamination levels, along'with the economic impact of an evacuation properly evaluated?
Rating 2
If a limited re-entry ws; recomme'ded (e.g. males over 40 years of age); did he public announcements put the risks and benefits associated with a limited re-entry in proper perspective?
Rating 3
When full re-entry was recommended, were all media methods utilized to their fullest?
Rating 4
Was transportation adequate for those returning from evacuation centers?
Rating 5
Were provisions made for special problems which would occur if the area had been evacuated for an extended period.,
e.g.,
stocking stores with fresh supplies of food and clothing, adequate supplies of fuel oil, gasoline, supplies of cash at banks, provisions for pickup of spoiled food, etc.?
Rating 6
Were news releases worded in such a way to assure the public that, indeed, the danger was over and they were safe to re-enter their homes?
Rating
LAW ENFORCEMENT / CRIME PREVENTION 1
Were there effective procedures for handling apprebar.ded suspects who were contaminated?
Rating l
2 Were law enforcement officials going into controlled areas equipped with monitoring equipment and were they familiar with their use?
Rating 3
Were there plans to have law officers assigned to mass care centers or to stop in for periodic visits?
Rating
page 15 of 15 RADIATION EXPOSURE CONTROL 1
Were all emergency workers provided with T'.D's, dosir.eters,
radiation exposure records, KI and_ccmnunie.itions equipment as appropcLite?
Rating 2
Were all emergency workers, their equipment and vehicles checked for contamination immediately af ter a mission?
Rating 3
Were emergency workers briefed on the accident status and recommended stay times prior to a mission and were they provided with updates during the mission?
Rating.
4 Were emergency personnel effectively rotated so as to prevent.over exposure?
Rating 5
were center personnel responsible for checking out emergency workers or evacuees, their equipment and vehicles familiar with monitoring equipment, monitoring procedures and decontamination procedures?
- Rating 6
Were emergency worker or evacuees doses properly recorded and were approp(riate actions taken in the event of contamination i
e., decontamination or restrictions on any further movement into controlled areas or both)?
Racing 7
Were records regarding contamination levels before and after decontamination kept for emergency workers and '
evacuees and equipment?
Rating 8
Were contaminated wastes in general, (clothes, towels) properly stored for later disposal?
Rating I
9 Was there an adequate supply of road maps and sector /
i zone maps of the EPZ for all emergency workers?
Rating 10 Were available stocks of K1 obtained and transported to pre-selected distribution centers?
Rating i
i 11 Did procedure for obtaining extra supplies of KI include updated names, addresses and 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> phone l
contacts or outlets?
Rating l
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Enclosure (3)
PLANT SCENARIO FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY EXERCISE
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NOVEMBER 17, 1981 I.
GENERAL DESCRIPTION A.
Casualty This exercise will simulate the rupture of several tubes in #1 Steam Generator.
The resultant Loss of Coolant Accident will be
' complicated by simulated faults which will cause #11 High Pressure Safety Injection Pump not to start, #11 Atmospheric Dump Valve (1-CV-3933) and the manual isolation valve for 1-CV-3938 to stick open.
The above combination will result in core damage and a re-lease pathway to the atmosphere.
In order to include iodine inhalation exposures, an unrealistically high elemental iodine release will be simulated during the entire exercise.
B.
Meteorological Conditons Meteorological conditions will be controlled by this scenario.
This will allow the preplanning of both the areas affec'ted by the radioactive plume and the radiation levels inside the plume. The actual meteorological conditions on the day of the exercise will not be used!
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Initially the wind direction will be 050*, which will take the plume south west over Sotterly in St. Mary's County.
At 4:00 p.m.,
the wind will shift counter clockwise to 250 stabilizing about 4:30 p.m.
C.
Duration
,The exercise will commence at 3:20 a.m. and conclude at 8:00 p.m.
After the 3:30 wind shift, Calvert and St. Mary's counties will terminate their EOC operations and critique the exercise as detailed below.
D.
Press Release
.. II
- Prior to the exercise, the Maryland Civil Defense and Disaster Prepared 1.ess Agency's Public Information Office will provide a brief description of the exercise to newspaper., radio, and TV stations in Maryland; especially those in Calvert, Dorchester, and St. Mary's counties.
II.
INITIAL CONDITIONS A.
Plant 1.
Both units are operating at 100% power.
2.
A 100 gpm bottom blowdown is in progress on both steam generators.
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Number 12 High Pressure Safety Inj ection Pump is out-of service for maintenance.
B.
Meteorological 1.
Wind direction is from 050 2.
Wind average band width 7.5 3.
Wind Speed 5
mph 4.
Difference in temperature
+3 at 200 feet III.
SCENARIO EMERGENCY PLANT CONDITION TIME EVENT EXPECTED ACTION NONE 3:30 AM gpm leak begins in NONE
//12 Steam Generator (SG) Radiation
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Monitor indications begin to show
!:sf levels above background.
3:45 AM Alarm on SG Elowdown Rad Investigate Alarm Monitor UNUSUAL 3:50 AM Alarm on Ccndenser Cff Declares Unusual EVENT Gas Rad. Monitor Event.
Samples SG's.
ALERT 6:00 AM Leak rate increases to Declares ALERT 5 gpm.
and starts shutdown Unit 1, Mans ECC.
SITE 9:00 AM Several SG tubes rupture Declares Site EMERGENCY plant trips automatically one pump Emergency, send fails to start.
Release to atmo-monitor teams into sphere still minor.
Dose rate in field.
the plume at the site boundary is 10 mR /hr.
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. ' EMERGENCY-PLANT CONDITION TIME EVENT EXPECTED ACTION SITE-10:15 AM Leak rate into the SG increases ~,
Continues cooldown of EMERGENCY resulting in larger off site plant in order to re-dose rates.
duce primary pressure and thus reduce plant Dose rate'in the center of the leak rate.
plume, at the site boundary, is 50 mR/hr.
State may. issue an Projected dose to the thyroid is advisory to seek o.5 REM.
shelter and await further instructions in Sectors SSW/SW/
WSW/W-1 through 10.
10:30 AM Equipment problems cause a loss Attempt to repair the of cooling to the reactor, affected equipment.
GENERAL EMERGENCY 10:45 AM Core damage. occurs.
Recommends mandatory.
take shelter.
Release rates' increase because of the fuel failure.
Precautionary evacu-ation of pregnant women and children in Sectors SSW/SW/WSW/W-1 through 10.
Projected iodine dose to the thyroid Additionally, the is 1.5 REM.
plant will recommend that the State / County consider evacuation of all personnel out to three (3) miles from the plant.
12:30 PM Core damage continues to increase.
Recommends use of KI by emergency workers required to transit the plume.
Dose rate at the site boundary in the center of the plume is 250 mR/hr.
Projected iodine dose to the thyroid is 6.0 REM.
1:05 PM One person injured while attempting Plant notifies Hospita' to effect repairs to degraded plant and EOC's that a rad-system.
iologically contamin-injury has occured and that transport to the hospital is required.
Transport of injured person by Solomonsvol.
Rescue Squad.
-S-Ef1ERGENCY PLANT CONDITION TIME EVENT EXPECTEDACT101 1:05 PM continued Treatment by Calvert Memorial Hospital in Radiation Emergency Area.
2:00 PM Efforts to isolate leak are unsuccessful.
Reactor core still degrading.
Dose rate at site boundary in the center of the plume is 300mR/hr.
Projected iodine dose rate to tha thyroid is 8.0 REM.
3:00 Pit Plant is still not able to Recommends full reestablish adequate cooling evacuation of Sectors to the reactor core.
SSW/SW/WSW/W-1 through 10.
Dose rate at the site boundary in the center of the plume is 700 mR/hr.
Projected dose to the thyroid is 20 REM.
4:00 PM Wind begins to shift counter-Notifies E0C's and clockwise.
AAC of wind change.
Exercise secures in.Calvert and St. Mary's Counties.
4:30 PM Wind steadies on bearing 2500 Reconnends full evacuation of Sectors NE/ENE/E-7 through 10.
Projected dose rate at Taylor's Island is 500mR/hr.
Projected dose to the thyroid is 20 REM.
6:00 Pil Plant reestablishes cooling to Notifies Dorchester reactor core and begins controlled and State E0C's and cooldown of damaged unit.
AAC of plant status.
6:30 PM Radioactivity release rate has Notifies Counties, decreased substantially.
State, as above.
Dose rate in center of the plume near the plant is 100 mR/hr.
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El!ERGENCY PLANT
'r CONDITION TIME EVENT EXPECTED ACTIO!1
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SITE 7:30 PM Radioactive leak to atmosphere Notifies County and E
El1ERGEllCY completely stopped.
State of change in 5
plant status.
j Dose rate in center of plume on Recomends return to k
Taylor's Island is 50 mR/hr.
evacuated sectors.
[10NE 8:00 PM Exercise is concluded.
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