ML20032C265
| ML20032C265 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 10/29/1981 |
| From: | Falk K WISCONSIN'S ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8111090568 | |
| Download: ML20032C265 (9) | |
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POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 6
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Operating License Amendment (Steam Generator Tube Sleeving Ptogram)
DECADE'S MOTION TO COMPEL ANSWER TO FIRST INTERROGATORIES The intervenor Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. ("Decad e"), hereby noves the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boa r d ("Bo a r d")
in the a b ov e --c a p t i o n e d matter, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 5 2.7 4 0 ( f),
for an order compelling an answer by the Licensee to the questions propounded in the Decade's First Interrogatories and Rcquest f or Production of Documents On the Sleeving Demoi.stration Program, dated October 23, 1981, for the reasons set forth below.
I INTERROGATORIES 1 to 4 Uature of Interrogatories Interrogatories 1 to 4 sought facts f rc m the Licensee related to the measures being taken to minimize reactor vessel embrittlement at Point Beach Nuclear Plant and any study being
/ f done as to the interrelation =: hip between those measures and degrading steam generator tubes.
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Descriptiop of the Objection The "Licenree's Response to Decade's First Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents on the Sleeving uemonstration Program," dated October 27, 1981, objects to Part A of the interrogatories, relating to the interrelationship between steam generator tube degradation, including the demonstration sleeving program, and reactor vessel embrittlement.
According to the Licensee, " reactor vessel embrittlement is in no way related to the sleeving of steam generator tubes, and is thus totally beyond the scope of the proceeding."
Id., at 2.0 For the fcllowing reasons, the objection should be overturned.
Reasons for Overrulino Objection dnder the Commission's rules:
" Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject mattter involved in the proceeding [and are related] only to those matters in controversy Phich have been identified by th.e Commission 91 the presiding of ficer * *
"It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the hearing if the information sought aplears reasonable calculated in lead in tha discovery of admissible evidence."
Eng 10 C.F.R. 52.740(b)(1) and (2). [ Emphasis added.]
1/
Licensee also cbjects to certain other interrogatories as being outside of the specific contentions made in the Decade's original Petition, but agrees to answer in the interest in an open discovery process. Id., at 2, 4, 8, and 11. The Decade vould note, in passing, that the Board has estaolishcd a broad contention to use as the basis of discovery, and therefore these objections are not uell taken.
Memorandum and Order, dated October 13, 1981, at 8 to 9.
4 4
The matters in controversy which have been identified by the Board are:
" Wisconsin Electric Power Company has not demonstrated that Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, will operate.
as sately with its degraded steam generator tubes sleeved as it would if they were required to be plugged."
Ega Memorandum and Order, dated October 13, 1981, at 1..
Subsequently the Board amended the contantion to read:
"Wisconsn Electric Power Company has not demonstrated that its sleeving program for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2,
can be conducted without endangering the health and saf ety of the public and will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations."
Hem Transcript, at p.164.
k The Board went on, in its Order, to explain that this simplified contention "will provide Decade latitude for discovery in rational areas concerning saf ety ef f ects."
Sna, Memorandum o
and Order, suora, at 9.
Thus, it should be clear, that the Licensee's objection is to be jtidged against an extremely expansive, not a narrow, standard that the Decade must meet to justify its discovery request.
For tne following reasons, the reactor vessel embrittlement issue,is relevant to the proceeding on steam generator tube degradation within the requirements for discovery.
Contentions 3, 4 and 5, as well as Contention 7, show that sleeving may impair the integrity.of. steam gennrator tubes, and do so to an extent worse.han from plugging.
Reputable, independent scientists have concluded that a loss-of-coolant-accident may cause degraded or impaired steam generator tube's in a pressurized water reactor to rupture,
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resulting in substantial in-leakage of heat energy from the seconaary side to the depressurized primary side.
This, in turn, may result in suf ficiently serious steam binding as to " reduce the [rerlood rates] to, values so low that 'the core would not be adequately cooled."
Report to the American Physical Society by the Study Group on Light Water Reactor Safety, 47 Review g Modern Physics (Supp. 1), Summer 1975, at p. S-91.
The American Physical Society Study Group goes on in its report to note that "the core thermal behavior in'the reflood period represents a most critical problem araa in the thermal history of the core."
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at S-91.
Not only are there serious questions of simple cooling prcolems due to inadequate reflood rates, but also those low reflood rates may create " substantial thermal shocks" on the " structural behavior" of the core as well i
f rom embrittled fuel cladding.
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a t S-9 0 Those additional loadings may cause " brittle cladding failure."
Id., at S-91.
If the accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant taught anything, it showed that majcr catastrophic events can be propagated by the interaction of widely separated components in a nuclear plant.
E_e3 Report of the President's Commission on the Accide*nt at Three Mile Island, Da Need fwt Change (1979).
Thus, actions that may appear unrelated to steam generator tubes can play a major role in the safety of a nuclear plant, especially if, as here, they af fect the cooling requirements of the core that tube failures can exacerbate.
Point Beach Nuclear Plant is cne of the 20 older pressurized water reactors jn this country suffering from worrisome reactor j
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San Memorandum from L.
C.
Shao(Engineering Branch DOR) to D.
G.
Eisenhut(DOR Assistant Director), d.ated September 14, 1977, re Reactor Vessels with Marginal Toughness Properties.
In addition to and apart from the particular safety problems created by plants suffering from marginal vessel fracture toughness is tne potentially compounding problems on cther plant components created by measures intended to retard embrittlement.
One such proposed ameliorative measure is " changing the core design to reduce the vessel fluence * *
- 1.e. lower the neutron production in elements nearest the pressure vessel wall * * *."
Sag Memorandum from T.
J.
Walker (Engineeting Branch DOE) to S.
S.
Pawlicki(Chiet, Engineering Branch DOE), dated April 7, 1981, re Minutes of PWR Owner's Group Meeting With NRC on March 31, 1981, at p. 2.
That is say, higher neutron emitting elements may be relocated away f rom the perimeter to the center of the core and visa-versa.
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"Because the possibility of failure of nuclear reactor pressure vessels * *
- is remote, the design of nuclear facilities does not provide protection against reactor vessel failure. Prevention of reactor vessel failure depends primarily on maintaining the reactor vessel material fracture toughness at levels that will resist brittle fracture during plant operation.
At service times and operating conditions typical of current operating plants, reactor vessel fracture toughness properties provide adequate margins of cafeif against vessel failure; however, as plants accumulate more and more service time, neutron irradation reduces the material fracture toughness and initial safety margins.
frg Resolution nf IJ1e Reactor Vessel Materials Toughness Safety Issue, !!UREG-0744, at p. A-1.
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I It necessarily follows that this reconfiguration of the core r.sy result in greater heat and neutron bombardment in the center of tne core incurred in an attempt to reduce irradiation of the outer wall of the reactor along the beltline and will result in entirely different peaking characteristics.
In turn, this
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implies that tie cooling requirenents in the center of the' core will be higher, and, hence, lower reflood rates due to tube failures will be more severe in their co n s eq u'e n c e s.
It also
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implies that the fuel cladding may be subject.to greater embrittlement whica can suffer from the thermal shock exacerbated by tuce failures during LOCA.
l Recalling the low standard required to justify a discovery request, it is clear that these potential interactive effects as between measures intended to reduce reactor vessel embrittlement and the severity of accidents following from tube failures during a LOCA are worthy of further investigation.
At the same time, it should be emphasized that this does not mean tnat the safety of plants with embrittled vessel walls will l
be collaterally attacked, but rather only that the interactive l
ef f ects will be considered of measueres intended to ameliorate that erab rittlement.
l Whether these poten.tial areas of concern are subsequently born out at trial is an entirely separate issue which has no i
bearing on the instant motion to compel discovery.
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-1 II INTERROGATORIES 6, 8, 11, 12 and 14 Nature of the Interrogatories Interrogatories 6, 8,
11, 12, 14 ask the Licensee to describe any study, analysis or consideration given to a variety of concerns relating to sleeving at Point Beach Nuclear Plant.
Description of_ Failure to Respond The Licensee's response to these interrogatories refers to sly filed with the Board where c'.;ations in the documents prev these concerns are described, but is completely silent on whether any other documents or information exists on these subjects which have not been submitted for the record.
Reasons for Compelliiig Response The Commission's rules provide that an answer to a discovery request may be compelled not only to overrule an objection but if the deponant "f ails to respond".
. San 10 C.F.R. S 2.7 4 0 ( f).
It may be that there are no further documents or information bearing on the, interrogatories than those cited in the Licensee's answer.
But, on the face of the filing, it is impossible to draw such a conclusion.
Parties are entitled to responsive answers to interrogatories and the Licensee should be compelled to state whether or not there are any other documents or information than those already cited, and, if there are, to complete it.s answer.
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III CONCLUSION For the foregoing
- reasons, the Motion to Compel Answer to First Interrogatories should be granted.
th DATED at Madison, Wisconsin, this 29 day of October, 19 9 '..
WISCONSIN' S EINIRONMENTAL DECADE, INC.
By KATHLEEN M. FALK Director of Legal Affairs 114 North Carroll Street Suite 208 Madison, Wisconsin 53703 (608) 251-7020 O
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 00);pr ?
j I certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing document will be served this day by depositing ccgergryf 4hp4clhe in the first class mails, postage pre-paid ano correctly addressed, or by personal service, upon the f ollowing:0F SECR!I%.
OFFIC-DOCKEIftgERVL.
Peter B.
Bloch, Chairman Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 Dr. Hugh {. Paxton 1229 -41s Street Los Alamos, Neu I4exico 87544 Dr. Jerry R. Kline Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.
S.
tiuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 Docketing & Service U.
S.
11uclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 fir. Richard Bachmann Office of Executive Legal Director U.
S.
11uclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 fir. Bruce W.
Churchill Shaw Pittman Potts and Toubridge 1800 14 Street 11.W.
Uashington, D.
C.
20036 Dated:
e d