ML20032C006
| ML20032C006 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 10/30/1981 |
| From: | Davidson D CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO. |
| To: | Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8111060604 | |
| Download: ML20032C006 (37) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. ) + i l 1 ~ THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMIN ATING COMPANY F 0 BOX 5000 n CLEVELAND. OHlo 44101 e TELEPHONE (216) 622-9800 e ILLUMINATING BLDG e $5 PUBLIC SOUAGE Scrying The Best Location in the Nation Daiwyn R. Davidson VICE PRf SIDENT SYSTE U ENGINEmrNG AND CONSTRUCilON October 30, 1981 to ^dD@At NOVO 51981* g Mr. Robert L. Tedesco .f Assistant Director for _ulcensing comissem '/ Division of Licensing b ,h U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission O'> \\f Washington, D. C. 20555 \\ M N Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket Nos. 50 440; 50-441 Response to Request for Additional Information - Geotechnical Engineering
Dear Mr. Tedesco:
This letter and its attachment is submitted to provide draft responses to additional questions raised by Mr. Jacob Phillip, NRC, at the site visit of September 30, 1981 These respon-ses are in addition to those provided in regard to your letter dated June 30, 1981 on geotechnical engineering. It is our intention to incorporate these responses in a sub-sequent amendment to our Final Safety Analysis Report. Very truly yours, &/ A Dalwyn R. Davidson Vice President System Engineerirq and Construction DRD: dip Attachment cc: G. Charnoff, Esq. M. D. Houston NRC Resident Inspector o\\ o 0111060604 811030 $g .PDR ADOCK 05000440 PDR i
e e 241.1 In Section 2.4.5.5.1.4, you have stated that widespread slumping (2.4.5.5.1.4) of the upper bluff materials (which includes the locustrine (2.5.5.2) deposits) is. caused by groundwater seepage and frost action. (RSP) Demonstrate how this fact has been incorporated in the stability analysis (Section 2.5.5.2) conducted to determine the amount of j bluff recession which can occur before the emergency service water pumphouse becomes endangered. In this connection, indicate, in Figure 2.5-174, the location of the groundwater table used in the analysis. The staff requires that the stability of sliding wedges, for both the static and seismic case, within the lacustrine deposits, be investigated, utilizing methods such as the Morgenstern-Price method of analysis.
Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Sections 2.5.5.1,'2.5.5.2, Table 2.5-49, Figure 2.5-174, and new Figure 2.5-175. i I
241.2 Figure 2.4-72 is purported to show piezometric devices installed (2.4.13.5.3.d) through each of the building mats of the auxiliary buildings, the control complex, the intermediate building and the radwaste building, to measure the hydrostatic uplift pressure acting under these structures. However, the tip of the only piezometer shown on the figure is founded in relatively impermeable Class B fill. Is this an error in the figure? If not, discuss the function of the pief.ometer in the context of measuring the hydrostatic uplift pressures acting under the structures during the life of the plant, or otherwise define its purpose.
Response
Yes, the wrong figure was referenced. A new Figure 2.4-76 will be added to the FSAR and will be referenced in Section 2.4.13.5.3.d in lieu of Figure 2.4-72. The frequencies for monitoring the uplift pressures beneath t building mats have also been added to this Section.
241.3 Provide single grain size distribution plots for each of the (2.4.13.5.5.C following materials, showing the lower and upper bounds (range) .4.b) of the distribution. (2.5.4.5.2) a) Class A fill during conatruction (one plot each for construction materials from the Bestone and R. W. Sidley Quarries). b) Class B fill during construction. c) Upper till. d) Lower till.
Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Sections 2.5.4.2.1.1, 2.5.4.5.2, 2.5.4.5.3, and new. Figures 2.5-179 through 2.3-183.
i l l 241.5 Provide a summary of field density and moisture tests obtained (2.5.4.5.2) for quality control during construction of Class A and Class B fill. The results may be presented as a statistical distribution plot showing low, high and average values. This would help the staff to conclude that suitable compaction has been obtained.
Response
The response to this questien is provided in revised Sections 2.5.4.5.2, 2.5.4.5.3, and new Figures 2.5-184 through 2.5.-186. 4
4 241.7 Provide construction details of the settlement monitoring points. (2.5.4.13.4) Update the time vs. settlement plots for all Category 1 structures where settlements are being monitored. Discuss any deviations from anticipated settlements assumed in the analysis and design of these structures and components. Evaluate all deviations for their impact on the design and construction of these structures and components.
Response
I f The reaponse to this question is provided in revised Section 2.5.4.13.4 and new Section 2.5.4.13.5. Also, see revised Figures 2.5-162, 2.5-171, 2.5-172(2 sheets), 2.5-173(5 sheets), and new Figures 2.5-173(Sheet 6), 2.5-173a and b, and 2.5-178. A e i l I I I l l l i l l I
2. Above the lacustrine / upper till contact, a minimum two-foot wide vertical Class A fill zone was placed along the structure walls up to three feet below finished plant grade. 3. To monitor the effectiveness of the Class A fill drainage provisions throughout *.he life of the plant, piezometers are installed in the Class B backfill zone at approximately 15 feet from the main plant structures. Cne olezometer is installed at each of the four sides of the plant and is placed three feet above the Class A fill. 4. Special provisions were included in the construction drawings and specifications, and strict quality control was exercised during construction, to ensure the integrity of the Class A fill drainage provisions. In particular, care was exercised to see that the two-foot wide Class A fill zones along the structure walls and lacustrine slopes adhered to the minimum requirements and were not contaminated with other materials. The pertinent permeability properties of the Class A fill materials placed were tested and ' documented during construction. 5. Where pipelines penetrated the Class A fill, they were completely enveloped with relatively impervious Class B fill at two locations (per pipeline) to produce an effective water stop. c. Porous Concrete Pipe The 12-inch (inside diameter) porous concrete pipe conforms to ASTM C 654-73. The aggregate used to manufacture the pipe is similar in size to that used in the porous concrete blanket to provide uniform voids. The layout of the pipe is shown on Figure 2.4-68. 2.4-69
d. Hydrostatic Pressure Under Foundation Mats To measure the hydrostatic uplift pressure acting under the safety clasc buildings, piezometers have been installed through each of the building mats of the auxiliary buildings, control complex, intermediate building, and radwaste building. The pressure monitoring piezometers are open standpipe type and pneumatic type. The bases for selecting these devices are primarily because of their long-term reliability and durability (49) Details of the piezometer installations are shown in Figure 2.4-76. Piezometer measurements will be taken at the following frequencies to monitor system operation: d 'E 4 Fuel load to 5 years after Commercial Operation Unit Quarterly basis 1 i No. 1. 6 Semiannual basis - 5 years after Commercial Operation Unit I to decommissioning of Plant (Units 1 and 2). e. Radioactivity The possibility of release of radioactive material from plant buildings i to the pressure relief underdrain system has been considered. Postulated i mechanisms include: (1) the transport of radioactive liquid from sumps to the underdrain system by leakage through small cracks in the samp liners and floors; (2) the onset of a seismic event resulting in the simultaneous failure of one Seismic Category I radioactive waste tank and cracking of a Seismic Category I safety class building, resulting in release of radioactive material to the underdrain system. It is considered highly improbable for significant cracks to develop in a Seismic Category I building and Seismic Category I radioactive waste tank. In order to continuously monitor and detect significant amounts of radioactive concentrations discharging from the underdrain system, as a result of the postulated event, radiation monitors are located inside 2.4-79
each of the two gravity discharge system manholes at the north end of the Unit No. I heater bay, at the point where the service underdrain pump effluent discharges into the gravity drain system. Each radiation monitor is an inline-type liquid monitor mounted directly on the lischarge pipe header. Details of the radiation monitor are discussed in Section 11.5. l I 2.4-79a
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I,1 an t Undert, rain System ...<..m... . y,,ay =... .N'uclear Island Piezometer Locations Figure 2.4-76 (gal Drawing No. D-746-009)
areas outside of building lines. Minimum and maximum density tests were performed for each 4,500 cubic yards of fill placed, and in-place density and grain size distribution tests for each 150 cubic yards or once per lift, whichever was more frequent. However, in confined areas, where the volume of each lift was less than 50 cubic yards, in place density tests were performed once every third lift or every 50 cubic yards, whichever was more frequent. The maximum and minimum density standards used to compute the relative density of each in-place density test were the averages of the 15 most recent maximum and minimum density tests performed prior to the in place density test. However, if a maximum and minimum density test was performed on an in-place c4 density test sample, then that single determination of maximum and minimum density was used to compute the relative density of the in place density test. b Through the end of July, 1981, approximately 437,000 cubic yards of s. 5 safety-related Class A fill have been placed, and approximately 6,170 y i in-place density tests and grain size distribution tests have been performed, i \\. The gradation range of the Class A fill which has been placed is shown in y Figures 2.5-181 and 2.5-182. A summary of' field density tests obtained for 1 quality control during the placement of Class A fill is shown in Figure 2.5-184. Reasons why 47 relative density tests of Class A fill are documented below the 75% minimum specified are as follows: (a) certain areas after recompaction were visually accepted by the Resident Geotechnical Engineer k (RGE), with no further tests taken (b) scattered isolated failing tests were \\y-N accepted by the RGE because all surrounding density tests were satisfactory; [ and (c) some tests were taken in non-safety related fill used for laydown j areas and as backfill around non-safety pipe. A total of 181 laboratory constant-head permeability tests have been performed on material removed from the fill with the lowest coefficient of permeability -2 ~ obtainec being 2.16 x 10 cm/sec and the average 1.69 x 10 cm/sec. Also, 51 in place falling head permeability tests have been performed with the -3 lowest coefficient of permeability obtained being 9.45 x 10 cm/sec and the -2 average 3.77 x 10 cr./ s ec. The minimum required coefficient of permeability is 2 x 10 cm/sec. I f 2.5-150 l l l l
i Based on U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service ( }, the Class A fill which was placed is a suitable filtering medium for drainage of the lower till and most of the upper till materials. The SCS method reduces the stringency of the filtering requirements when the base materials exhibit plasticity. Approximately one-third of the grain size distribution tests on the upper till showed results which are finer than that recommended for filtering by Class A fill. However, as described in Section 2.5.4.6.3, the k seepage from the upper and lower till strata are negligible and undetectable. }{ Therefore, filtering of these strata are not required. Class A fill is 4 generally not a good filtering medium for Lacustrine soil. Therefore, a minimum three feet wide filter zone of Class B fill is placed between the Class A fill and the Lacustrine soil, as shown on Figure 2.5-151. This Class B fill filter zone is restricted such that at least 15 percent of the particles are retained on the No. 200 sieve. 2.5.4.5.3 Class B Fill Class B fill was used for nonload bearing backfill around Seismic Category I structures as shown in Figure 2.5-151, and consists of lower till soil which was removed and stockpiled during plant excavation. A typical compaction curve is shown in Figure 2.5-156. The maximum dry density (ASTM D 1557) has been found to range from 128.6 to 137.5 pounds per cubic foot and the optimum moisture content from 7.4 to 13.0 percent. Class B fill is compacted to not less than 92 percent of the maximum dry density, at a moisture content not less than three percentage points below nor four percentage points above the optimum moisture content. Through the end of July, 1981, approximately 286,000 cubic yards of Class B fill have been placed and approximately 380 in place density tests have been performed. The gradation range of the Class B L fill which has been placed is shown in Figure 2.5-183. A summary of field S< density and moisture tests taken for quality control during placement of the sy l Class B fill is shown in Figurer 2.5-185 and 2.5-186. Reasons for 11 of the 4 density tests being recorded below the 92% minimum specified are that some were in isolated areas surrounded by fill with pascing tests, and other tests were takea in non-load bearing backfill areas. 2.5-150a l lC
2.5.4.5.4 Field Testing of Backfill An onsite testing laboratory was established to perform all field testing. A defined Quality Assurance Program and approved procedures were implemented to assure that proper testing methods, procedures and equipment were used in field testing. i l l 2.5-150b
2.5.4.8.3 Lacustrine Sediments An analysis of the liquefaction potential of the lacustrine sediments was conducted because certain Seismic Category I pipes are founded within this stratum. The analysis was conducted in accordance with the simplified procedure by Seed and Idriss( } The analysis conservatively assumed thr.t the lacustrine materials would behave as a poorly graded fine sand, whereas, these materials are predominantly silts and clays which would uave a greater resistance to liquefaction. Based on the SSE of Intensity VII (Section 2.5.2.6), the corresponding horizontal acceleration at the ground surface is 0.13g(2) However, an acceleration of 0.15g was used in the analysis for conservatism. Intensity VII is equivalent to a magnitude of 5.25 according to correlation:; by Nuttli(227) for the eastern United States. The appropriate mean number of cycles, plus one standard deviation, is N =5 c Using the Seed and Idriss approach (226) the relative density required with depth for factors of safety of 1.0 and 1.2 were determined as shown on Figure 2.5-179. Also shown on this figure is the relative density determined for each Standard Penetration Resistance Test blowcount from 65 borings on the site, using the Gibbs and Holtz(229) correlation for sand. This comparison of the in situ relative density with the required relative density, together with the conservatism of the analysis, indicates that liquefaction of any significant portion of the lacustrine deposit will not occur. 2.5-160a
l Six settlement monitoring points were established on the diesel generator building in June 1979, shortly after the structural mat was cast. Seven new points were established at a slightly higher elevation in June 1980, and the old points were subsequently abandoned. The monitoring results, shown on Figure 2.5-173a, indicate that the average settlement through September 1981 has been slightly less than one-half inch. At the request of NRC, settlement points were established on the off gas buildings after the structural concrete for these structures had been completed. Four points were establiched within the Unit I structure and three points within the Unit 2 structure. As shown in Figure 2.5-173b, the maximum D' average settlement of these structures during the period from June 1980 M through September 1981, has been about 0.04 inches and 0.12 inches, 4, N respectively. The maximum settlement of any individual monitoring point has been 0.07 inches for Unit I and 0.16 inches for Unit 2. The installation of Safety Class piping between structures began after September, 1977. Based on the building settlement data which is available, it is estimated that differential settlement between adjacent Safety Class structures since that time has been about one-quarter of an inch or less, and very little or no additional differential settlement is anticipated. Based on these minimum dif ferential rettlements there should be no detrimental effects resulting to the piping connections between buildings. 2.5-173b
2.5.4.13.5 Comparison of Actual and Predicted Deformations Figure 2.5-162 shows the anticipated deformation behavior of the Unit I reactor building, as discussed in Section 2.5.4.10.3. The deformation consists of three phases: heave of the shale bearing surface during the following excavation, rapid compression during construction and backfill of the structures and, finally, long-term post-construction consolidation at a very slow rate. The calculated deformation behavior for the reactor building is typical of all of the structures on the site. The computed heave of the shale within the main plant excavation ranged from about 1/2 to 3/4 inch. As discussed in Section 2.5.4.13.2, the actual heave was only about 1/4 to 1/2 inch, except within the area of a bedrock deformation zone which was subsequently excavated. The computed immediate settlement for the auxiliary buildings, radwaste building and control complex was about 1/2 inch in the interior and about 1/4 b inch along the edges of the buildings adjacent to the toe of the plant se excavation. The analysis method, however, did not account for structural D m rigidity of the foundation mats which would tend to decrease the interior settlement and increase the edge settlement. The actual immediate settlement of these structures, as measured at settlement points SP-1, SP-4, and SP-6, plus the disk in the control complex, has been about 1/4 to 3/4 inch, averaging about 1/2 inch, through February,1981. Long-term settlement after completion of construction is expected to be on the order of 1/10 inch. The calculated immediate settlement of the reactor buildings was about 3/4 inch in the interior and 1/3 to 1/2 inch along the edges. Again, the structural rigidity of the mat would tend to increase the settlement of the edges. The actual settlement, as measured at the 16 interior points on the reactor mat, as well as settlement points SP-2 and SP-3, has been about 1/2 to 1 inch through February 1981. Long-term settlement, after completion of construction, is expected to be on the order of an additional' 1/10 inch. 2.5-173c
.. _ ~ _ -. i Based upon the results of the testing and analyses, the following conclusions 1 evolved. The infiltration of silt which occurred in localized areas of the then existing portions of the porous concrete blanket would have a negligible effect on the future performance of the underdrain/ pressure relief system. Laboratory testing confirmed that significant pore pressures cannot build up in even highly contaminated porous concrete. 2.5.5 STABILITY OF SLOPES s l The plant is constructed on an essentially level site and the final grades are similar to the preconstruction grades. All excavations for Seismic Category I plant structures have been backfilled and, hence, there are no man-made slopes which could fail and adversely affect the safety of the plant. The only l natural slopes which could affect the safety of the plant are a bluff along Lake Erie which is described in the following sections. 2.5.5.1 Slope Characteristics A steep bluff which forms the shoreline of Lake Erie is located approximately 300 feet north of the emergency service water pumphouse. The lower portion of this slope is periodically subjected to erosion due to wave action. In addition, some slumping of the upper bluff materials due to groundwater ({Y seepage and frost action has been observed. The resulting estimated average 4 recession rate is two feet per year, as described in Section 2.4.5.5. The bluff is about 45 feet in height and has an average slope inclination of about 2 horizontal to 1 vertical, as shown in Figure 2.5-174. 2.5.5.2 Design Criteria and Analyses Stability analyses have been conducted to determine the amount of bluff recession which can occur before the emergency service water pumphouce would ss become endangered. The subsurface stratigraphy of the bluff was determined y 4 from observations of the exposed bluff slope and from nearby test borings. The stability analyses were conducted using the LEASE-I and LEASE-II computer 2.5-176 l . -. - - _. ~ _, _, _ _,, _. _ _. _.. _ _ _.. _ _ _ _ _, -.. -. _, _.,. -., _. _, _ _, _. _ -. _ -. -.
-.. =. I programs, which utilize the simplified Bishop circular are method (193,194)and the Morgenstern-Price method (223,224) respectively. For the seismic condition, a seismic coefficient of 0.15 was used for pseudostatic analyses. The groundwater level was taken to be elevation 615' near the emergency f service water pumphouse, exiting the bluff slope at elevation 590'. The soil strength parameters used in the stability analysis were determined based upon CIU triaxial compression tests on the lacustrine and upper till soils which are summarized in Table 2.5-29. Three sets of strength parameters were utilized in the analysis- " lower bound" values equal to the lowest strength envelopes measured, " upper bound" values equal to the highest strength envelopes, and " design" values, which represent intermediate strength envelopes and which are believed to be representative of the actual soil ( strength. These parameters are summarized as follows: i Lacustrine Upper l'ill Analysis Cohesion Friction Angle Cohesion Friction Angle (psf) (degrees) (psf) (degrees) Lower Bound 0 35 0 35 N f, Upper Bound 240 33.5 660 24 Design 240 31 240 31 4 To stablize the bluff slope against wave action and against slumping in the mone of groundwater emergence, a flattened slope with rip-rap slope protection is required. The results of Bishop method stability analyses using the " design" strength parameters and with bluff slope inclinations ranging from 1:1 (horizontal: vertical) to 3:1 are shown on Figure 2.5-174. It was determined in this analysis that a 3:1 slope was required for the minimum desired factors j of safety. For this slope, factors of safety of 1.68 and 1.09 were determined for the static and seismic conditions, respectively. However, the presence of the rock rip-rap slope protection materials were not considered in this analysis, which sould add to the overall stability of the slope. F A parametric study was also conducted using the 3:1 slope and the lower bound and upper bound soil strength paran.eters. For the upper bound analysis, minimum factors of safety of 2.10 and 1.34 were determined for the static and 2.5-177
a seismic conditions, respectively. For the lower bound case, wherein the lacustrine and upper till soils are considered to be cohesionless, the static factor of safety is 1.09, with the critical failure arcs representing shallow, sloughing failure along the slope face below the groundwater level. For deep circles which would influence the crest of the bluff, the minimum static factor of safety found was 1.28. With the addition of seismic forces on a 3:1 unprotected slope, the factor of safety for shallow, sloughing failure was found to be about 0.70. However, all deep failure arcs that daylight more than about 60 feet behind the crest of the bluff were computed to have a factor of" safety of more than 1.00 during seismic loading. Observation of the lacustrine and upper till materials on the bluff face and in excavations on the site indicate that these materials do indeed possess some cohesion. Thus, the lower bound analysis described above is unduly cons 1rvative. In any event, final design of a permanent slope protection system will be initiated if the toe of the bluff encroaches closer than 250 feet to the Emergency Service Water Pumphouse. At this time, the crest of the bluff would be expected to be located about 115 feet (assuming a } 3:1 slope) from the pumphouse. Thus, any failure which might occur during a 6 4 seismic event prior to that time would not extend sufficiently far behind the bluff crest to influence the structure. l A Morgenstern-Price stability analysis was also cenducted on the 3:1 slope, using the design strength parameters. The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 2.5-175 in comparison to the Bishop method results for the same ^ slope. The Morgenstern-Price analysis yielded somewhat higher factors of safety than the Bishop method for failure surfaces passing through the upper till (note that only the most critical failure surfaces are shown out of many trial surfaces). Failure surfaces passing only through the lacustrine stratum were also evaluated, and resulted in considerably higher factors of safety than those also passing through the upper till. Stability analyses have also been conducted on the final slope protection design configuration, which is shown in detail in Figure 2.4-39. The results of this analysis, which incorporated a friction angle of 38 degrees for 2.5-177a
the rip-rap, are shown below and indicate that the stability of the final design is satisfactory: Factor of Safety Analysis Static Seismic Design 2.33 1.44 Upper Bound 2.49 1.51 Lower Bound 2.12 1.34 Thes-factors of safety are with respect to deep-seated failures. For shallow, sloughing failure the riprap was found to have factors of safety of 1.56 and N 1.16 for static and seismic conditions, respectively. The unprotected 3:1 slope in the upper portion of the lacustrine stratum was found to have factors of f\\ safety for shallow, sloughing failure essentially the same or greater than those shown in the table above, for both static and seismic conditions. The results of the various stability' analyses determined that the toe of the bluff could recede about 200 feet before a potential failure are of the bluff u >uld approach within 40 feet of the emergency service water pumphouse. However, as discussed in Section 2.4.5.5, if the shoreline recedes approximctely 130 feet, protective measures will be initiated. A monitoring program has been established to measure the bluff recession. This program is described in Section 2.4.5.5. l 2.5.5.3 Logs of Borings Boring logs are presented in Appendix 2E. Figure 2.5-53 shows the locations of the borings. 2.5.5.4 Compacted Fill There is no compacted fill associated with the Lake Erie bluff. 2.5-177b
2.5.6 EMBANKMENTS AND DAMS -.:re are no Seismic Category I embankments or dams associated with the Perry Nuclear Power Plant. 2.5-177c
223. Dawson, A.W., 1972, LEASE II, A Computerized System for the Analysis of Slope Stability, Thesis, Department of Civil Engineering, Massachusetts
- N Institute of Technology.
N 224. Morgerstern, N. and Price, V.E., 1965 The Analysis of the Stability of deneral Slip Surface, Geotechnique, Vol. 15, pp. 79-93. 225. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service, 1968, Soil Mechanics Note - 1. 226. Seed, H.B. and Idriss, I.M., 1971, Simplified Procedure for Evaluating Soil Liquefaction Potential, Journal of the Soil Mechanics and Foundations Division, ASCE, Volume 97, No. SM9, Proc. Paper 8371, pp. 1249-1273. 227. Nuttli, O.W., 1979, State-of-the Art for Assessing Earthquake Hazards in the United States, Misc. Paper S-73-1, Report 16, The Relation of Sustained Maximum Ground Acceleration and Velocity to Earthquake Intensity and Magnitude, U.S. Army Waterways Experiment Station, Vick= burg, Mississippi. 228. Seed, H.B., et al., Representation of Irregular Stress Time Histories by Equivalent Uniform Stress Series in Liquefaction Analyses, Report No. EERC75-29, Earthque.ke Engineering Research Center, Berkeley, California, 229. Gibbs, H.J. and Holtz, W.G.,1957, Research on Determining the Density of Sands by Spoon Penetration Sampling, Proceedings, Fourth International Conference on Soil Mechanics and Foundation Engineering, London, England. 2.5-200a
. - ~ k i: i ) Ii-TABLE 2.5-49 MATERIAL PROPERTIES' ADOPTED FOR DESIGN t Saturated .Undrained Shear Unit Weight Shear Strength (p' Strength Stratigraphic y 8 4 sat u Unit (tsf) (Pcf) (tsf) 0.12.+ 6 tan 33.{*) 0.75 Lacostrine 131 O.12 + 6" tan 31* n N[ 0.12+(o tan 31* (2) 0 + tan 35 1.0 Upper Till 130 a i Lower Till 142 0.60 + 6 tan 35* 5.5 n 1 a 130 Chagrin. Shale 152 l l F i I / NOTES: Effectivestressbasis;I=c+6,tanh 1. 7 i. I where: E = Effective cohesion, tsf i I 6 = Effective normal stress, tsf l n I~ L 5 = Effective friction angle, degrees N -2. Strength parameters used for the Lake Erie Bluff Stability Analysis shown l on Figures 2.5-174 and 2.5-175. n < a i i-2.5-271 1 i .~.-~..---..-,.,_._..m.-.,. ..,, _.. ~,... _.. - - -.. _. -. _ - -. -. _.,, -., -.. - -., - -... -
9 lCO-d ~ ~ 5 8O l' ya =w cc o $5 60 / 6. a. ow wd e a: 40 / OM AUXILIARY BUILDING MO.I 58 (SP-1) ooc 20-w Ch. O -O,03' - 0.0 2' o e> .g.O g *._-i ~ r u. g-
- '\\,
= W.'., r- - -.
- u. a.
L -m y $Q M i -w
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+ 0. 0 3' 5ss?E1!!kai$5s8kiitikti$$8siEl$1kg145ss1E111125d5ssillgik;1g l 13 61 19 77 19 78 19 79 19 80 FIGURE 2.5-173 (1 of 6)
100 2 5 20 5 oQ gw > j 60 ,f' O. ow u. $E # REACTOR BUILDING NO.I OE T (SP-2) xo wa g 20-w Q. o - O.O l'- ~ h .-- r d5 0 m wa N u-Q-WjQ -, -= -n + 0.01, x w ; 2 C., y i' ' 'M' \\ .ww <z .' ^ EWa +0.02' o >- u- >= WW u Q CO ,C i I + 0.0 3' ~ l N i t \\,^ + 0.0 4' ~' +0.0 5' f$$'-$$$$h$$ b$5EEb$$hE$$ bb5$$b$$hb$ b$ 5$ $5 b5$ bb5 5 b b 19 77 19 78 19 79 19_g o___ 19 8i FIGURE 2.5-173 (2 of 6)
COO a M 3 80 f oo z DW MU r4" d 60 u. OWW WW OM 40 40 REACTOR BUILDING MO.2 gg (SP-3) / wo ce W 20-n. m O i -0.01' i O -1 -y _3 _H 1 A NO 'm _ i d 3 *o o' ww/r.__ _.. t-t:ffv-p. i J
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- 0. 0 5' t.
/ m +0.06' ^ n + 0 07'- m; + 0.0 8'- - + 0.09' $15A$$5Ik3$N$I$IlkTIk5$ $I$IEEfIks} I$$IlbIIk5$ II$III$Ik2$$ 19 77 19 78 19 79 19 60 l 19 BI FIGURE 2.5-173 (3 of 6)
100 -'M .a = 80 / 3 i >-oa Dw oc o / 60 eJ,A ow w$ 40 S fi / AUXILIARY BUILDING NO.2 wx SP-4) zo wo o 20 cc w A 0 -0.02 A - 0. 0 l e n-ww w-wJ .a ww 0 ( _g -D p a = w- . w 2e M_.M^n., ? s w + 0.01 <x G' 1w oc J O[ H b-m w w + 0. 0 2 - ,ft om -u r. -~ . s,- -f ~~ ^.. ~ ~ F + 0.0 3 ' _.~ ,M +004 h + 0.0 5 - V .,,,/ 3 f + 0.06 l $$}58$IIk$$ II$II$$Ik$$ $$$IlkiIk$$$ $I$Il$$Ik$$ $$$NE$$Ik$${ 19 77 19 78 19 79 19_80 19 81 FIGURE 2.5-173 (4 of 6)
10 0-a 4 l nc / O 80-w ua ~ Dw oc o ><60-so -.J ow o w Ww E5
- RADWASTE BUILDING
>- ac (SP-6) zo wu uoc 20 wo. O - C.OI ,Q - O =y_,, m_ 9 l- + 0.0 l' W T_, _T p ?; ca -p N pw l w w .0,02' _w,",,X / co WJ ,~ 1 5 6A ~D .m ,J f i.,' ,A O y + 0.03'- "I z N i ~~y _v j___ g f w-f ; >- w I3 i. k'_h,P 'd -a t_ t u-o & +0.0 4 ww ww CD q.,e +0.03 U + 0. 0 6' !$$I$$$N??$$5$$$$$$Nhi$Y?lb5$$$5 55E b$b5$555 5$Y5$55$ $5 5bb l 19 79 19 SQ l l 19 81 la 78 19 77 FIGURE 2.5-173 (5 of 6)
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O.04 5 O. O S --- i 80 19 81 l 19 78 gg 79 gg 19 77 FIGURE 2.5-173 (6 of 6)
I00-7 Y m 80 oo MW oo o< mJ ',/ s o. 60 OW /'j w WW wo 40 xz we oo 5 .dlESEL GENERATOR BUILDING 20 a. ~ O O.00 i 0.Ol w g ~ w s,,. t g w 0.02 g E 5g 0.0 3 - ( [ \\ m ~ W O.04 e< ~~< 0.05-0.06 SI}lilffl251!IS$1IIIIIEIMI$$515II1$$NII5AIIIII$$N515AIEIII$$$ 19 79 19 80 19 81 19 19 FIGURE 2.5-173a
I A o.oio-UNIT I (AVERAGEOFI4 POINTS)
- 0.005-d%
-4 u. a ~ o N u' o 5 E O.005 85 b# O.010 'I O.015-0.010-g F-0FF GAS BUILDINGS b o.ooS UNIT 2 g _(AVERAGE OF 3 POINTS) ?" O i. N 'a i y 6 0.005 85 ${o,o,o Y '_J m N O.015-0.0 20 0.025-0.030 $$2515!!k81k!$$killiksi $$$$lE$1E$$$$$$$l5%INElhI$$$$15 FEE $$E l l 19 19 81 19 19 19 80 NOTE: STRUCTURAL C0liCRETE PLACEMENT COMPLETED PRIOP. TO SETTLEMENT MONITORING. FIGURE 2.5-173b
Z E! i t' Y' 101E:/zANGLEOFINCLINATION OF THE BLUFF SLOPE 20 wlTH THE HORIZONTAL SYM80L AVERAGE FAC10R of SAFETY WAX. @-@ SLOPE STATIC DYNANIC* DISTANCE (Ft.) l [o I.S e 1:1 0 73 0.56 Il4 3 STAllt 0 2:I l.32 0.M 86 h,I.0-t 3:1 1.68 1.09 136 DYNAHIC 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 k,= 015 w.p EXISTING TOE OF BLUFF SLOPE FUTURE BLUFF TOE ,.e os (0) MAX. LIMIT OF CRITICAL SLIP SURFACE ,,,,,,, g 3) y GROUNOWATER O] / ,-LEVELS 300't U " ' '/ [ 620 R.D/ s.ni % w %,.--- A ' N...,s., -{\\ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ top of naux n 6:e 0 o g .u mm _p.hs .m) n -N --- a w sci ev N, 1 %"j"g"_' _ - ~ ,;}AN __ ' ) N _ __gginuyzza j mL ~ ~ ' " x._. w s 550 ; TOP 0F BEDit0CK EL. 555 0 3
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6 GAAVEL i SANO i SILT OR CLAY C088t.ES ce,y g ,iN E
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rint U.S. STANDARD SIEVE SIZE No, 5' ih. N. Y 4 'O
- O 200
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C'" iCG r0 .O C. We G004 i GRAIN SIZE Ife MILLIMETERS NOTE: RANGE IS ESTIMATED BASED ON A RANDOM SAMPLING OF APPROXIMATELY 675 TESTS RANGE OF GRAIN SIZE OlSTRIBUTION TEST RESULTS FOR CLASS A FILL (BESTONEQUARRY) FIGURE 2.5-181 ~ _
1 GRAVEL i SANO i i ccansg ,,,g ,ccansgi , g e,y, ,,,,g j SILT OR CLAY C088LES **#'E' 58'6 C64 s s.r wean system ,U.S. STAND ARD $1 EVE SIZE NQ. g ,3g' W y a 0
- C 200
- CC h t.
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Oo E $eC,3 l 7cED,2 O 4$ t E r gm>Z -.ute I ,8>8 g0 S f. g i"=1 4 Mo I l l l l l l l _ l Mo I l l l l l l "8 I STS l l E T F O Eo I l R l E B M U l N ~8 l l l l mo l l l l l l ll uo ll l l l _ 8 5 5 9 3 8 6 8 3 t 6 9 9 2 5 6 2 9 3 7 1 5 1 3 6 4 9 7 5 3 8 4 7 0 2 5 8 g 2 2 2 1 2 1 13 7 2 s 9 9 6 6 5 5 5 4 8 4 3 2 7 3 5 4 2 3 6 5 7 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 5 2 4 5 4 3 3 8 7 0 5 4 i i i 2 o yY jL "o
- o g
ou g 3o+ b 3m{d OmZTj i n_m$mm.Nm# obmco>mg mgC om
- g qm 4m o
o RELATIVE DENSITY, PERCENT O 20 40 60 80 100 620 615 N ~ .,e l. GIO .: o . l, s = W w 605 u. . 'j
- ~
Z O p <t y g ** y J 600 w l 595 l 590 FACTOR OF SAFETY - % ~ FACTOR OF S AF ETY
- 1.0
- 1.2 585 LIQUEFACTION POTENTIAL ANALYSIS OF LACUSTP.INE SEDIMENTS FIGURE 2.5-187
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