ML20031F297
| ML20031F297 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 10/13/1981 |
| From: | Dignan T, Gad R Maine Yankee, ROPES & GRAY |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OLA, NUDOCS 8110190501 | |
| Download: ML20031F297 (23) | |
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00CMETED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0h.ISSION
'85 isi15 ' I:20 P
be.' ore the p tr'- " f.-ry n.~t ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
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(
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In the Matter of
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MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-309-OLA
.)
(Spent Fuel Compaction)
('...ine Yankee Atomic Power Station) )
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)
APPLICANT'S RESPONSE TO THE AMENDED CONTENTIONS OF THE STATE OF MAINE A prehearing conference was held in the above-captioned matter on August 11, 1981.
At the conclusion of that conference the State of Maine (Maine) was given an opportunity "to redraft its contentions to more nearly meet the Commission's require-i ment for specificity and basis."
Prehearing Conference Order at 2 (Aug. 24, 1981).
Maine has now filed " Amended Contentions".
As contemplated by the Prehearing Confsrence Order, the Appli-cant hereby responds as to the admissibility of these amended contentions.
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CONTENTION 1 Introductory Commeni Contention 1 is presented in a fashion which makes a response difficult to compose.
It begins on Page 1 with a paragraph headed " CONTENTION NO. 1" which states that one or more major federal actions are involved here which require the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), "because".
This is followed by four lettered paragraphs a-d which on a first read-ing we assumed were bases for " CONTENTION NO.
1".
- However, these four lettered paragraphs are thea followed by four bases each of which is entitled " BASIS FOR CONTENTION" and numbered la-ld.
Some edification as to what was intended may be gleaned from the letter of October 5, 1981, to the Commission's Secretary which is less a filing letter than a brief.
Therein after stating that Maine has " changed the format of the amended contentions" to " avoid.
. confusion on the part of the Licensing Board and the Licensee", Maine goes on to say:
"We would like to add a brief explanation of Contention No. 1, however.
This conten-tion asserts that the Commission is required to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement with regard to the proposed spent fuel storage methods in accordance with the National Environ-mental Policy Act of 1969 and Commission regula-tions.
Four reasons, identified as contentions la through ld, are given for Contention No. 1 i
and four separate basis statements are jncluded.
Thus contention 1 should be regarded in fact as.
four co-tentions, each 'subcontention' capable cf stana.ng on its own:
each subcontention j
specifies a reason why an EIS must be filed in this case."
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We still are not clear whether we have been presented with five contentions vix. 1, la, lb, 1c and ld or only 4 viz. la-1d.
In any event, we respond to these contentions in two parts below.
It is first argued that the state of the law with respect to on-site spent fuel storage license amendments has advanced to the point that it is time to rule as a matter of law that no EIS is required in such cases.
Second, we argue that even if an "EIS contention" can be entertained in proceedings of this nature, Maine has not stated such a contention.
A.
Contention That An EIS Should Be Prepared In Connection With A License Amendment To Permit Expan-l sion Of Spent Fuel Storage Capacity Should Be Excluded As A Matter of Law Applicant readily concedes that the proposition in the head-note has yet to be adopted in any adjudicator / decision in the NRC.
However;, its adoption is long overdue.
On March 31, 1981, an Appeal Board noted the fact that to date no spent fuel pool expansion at any facility had been found to be a major federal action.
Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant),
ALAB-636, 13 NRC 312, 324 (1981).
Nor has such a finding entered in any proceedings since.1 In addition, the Commission has issued As of August, 1979, 39 expansion applications had been approved and in each case it was found that the environmental impact "was negligible", NUREG-0575 at ES-5 s
NUREG-0575 the Generic Environmental Statement on Handling and Storage of Spent Light Water Reactor Fuels which leaves open only " specific environmental and safety issues for individual licensing action".
46 Fed. Reg. 14507 (Feb. 27, 1981).2 The Commission's Rules of Practice permit this Board to take official notice, inter alia, "of any technical or scientific fact within the knowledge of the Commission as an expert body".
10 CFR $ 2.743(1).
We submit that after at least 39 out of 39 applications for spent fuel pool expansion have been approved with a finding that the environmenr,a1 impact "was negligible",
note 2, supra, cne can safely say it is a " technical or scientific 2 The fact that an LWR spent fuel pool expansion produces only negligible environmental impacts is not surprising, but rather is exactly what one ought to expect on a priori analysis.
A spent fuel pool expansion involves three categories of work:
(1) existing fuel racks are replaced with now fuel racks, (2) the spent fuel assemblies already in the pool are moved from one rack to another, and (3) additional fuel is added to the pool, leading, presumably, to a larger spent fuel inventory than what might otherwise be expected to occur.
The first two items are not qualitatively different than operations that already routinely occur in the operation of a spent fuel pool; the environmental impacts of htudling spent fuel are well-known and are routinely minimal.
While the addition of fuel might be thought at first glance to be a fertile source of impacts, it must be remembered that the pool was originally designed to handle an inventory of relatively freshly-discharged fuel, and to deal with the impacts of freshly-discharged fuel.
The actual marginal significance of the enlargement is the existence of a larger inventory of older fuel, which, given the nature of spent LWR reactor fuel, presents the least of all impacts.
Thus, from the perspective of the technical and scientific realities of which this agency was its own expertise, the observation that a spent fuel pool expansion produces only i
negligible environmental impacts comes, not as a surprise, but rather as what is obvious. t L
fact within the knowledge of the Commission as an expert body" that expanding the capacity of a spent fuel pool has a negligible environmental impact.
To require this fact be relitigated for another 100 applications may assure full employment for the nuclear bar, but it is difficult to see any other legitimate purpose that would be served.
And if it be a fact that the difference in the environmental impact of the pool is expanded is negligible as compared to the pool as it now exists,3 then it follows as night follows day that the proposed action (whether or not "maj or") is
- t one which is "significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."
NEPA $ 102(2)(C).
And if that is so, no EIS is required.
We are aware of no precedent that says that a Licensing Board may not utilize official notice in deciding the admissi-bility of contentions.
This is not an argument that the Licensing Board should engage in deciding contentions on their merits at this juncture.
- See, e.g., Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Statlon, Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542 (1980).
It is an argument to the effect that a Licensing Boari need not allow a contention which requires the reinvention of 3 It is only this difference that must be assessed - not the effects attributable to the spent fuel pool itself.
Public Service Electric and Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-o50, 14 NRC -, 2 CCH Nuclear Reg. Rep. 1 30,608 at n.24 (July 17, 1981). -
the wheel in every licensing case.4 We respectfully suggest that the Licensing Board should rule that contentions to the effect that an EIS must be prepared in connection with license amendments to expand spent fuel pools should be excluded as a matter of law and thst it should refer that ruling to tne Appeal Board (and ultimately to the Commission) under 10 CFR $ 2.730(f).
At the very least, the Board should not permit the admission of the contention absent a documented showing b; Maine through a qualified authority that a genlune issue exists as required by the Appeal Board in Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-654, 14 NRC __,
2 CCH Nuclear Reg. Rep. 1 30,623 (Sept. 11, 1981).
B.
Even Assuming That A Viable Contention To The Effect That An EIS Is Required Can Be Made The Maine Contention Or Contentions Does Not Do It In as much as no " basis" is set ou'v ns such for "CCNTEN-TION NO. 1" and given the statement quoted earlier that Conten-tion 1 is "in fact" four contentions, we deal with it as such.
Contention la Contention la is that an EIS is required because:
4 Nothing in Allens Creek would require, for example, the admis-sion of a contention asserting (and dependent upon
- c. finding that) the sun will rise in the west.
Such a contention must be rejected on the basis that the Board takes judicial notice -
that the sun rises in the east, in which case the contention fails as a matter of law. - -
"a.
The proposed reracking and pin compaction storage methods significantly increase both the probability of occurrence of a release of radi-ation or radioactive materials into the environ-ment and the environmental consequences of such a release in the event of a total or partial loss of coolant at the spent fuel pool;"
The bases set out for this contention recite that two categories of accidents could initiate a total or partial loss of coolant at the spent fuel pool at Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station (MYAPS).
The first category is a group of Class 9 accidents.
Class 9 acci-dents need not be considered in this spent fuel pool proceeding at least absent a Staff decision that unique circumstances exist.
Public Service'Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2),
CLI-80-8, 11 NRC 433 (1980); Public Service Electric and Gas Co.
(Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-588, 11 NRC 533, 537 (1980).
The second category of accidents:
" consists of accidents that directly impact on the spent fuel pool resulting in a breach of the spent fuel pool and a rapid release of pool coolant.
These accidents include sabotage, an airplane accident, a missile, an earthquake, an accident involving the fuel transfer tube, and the drop of a heavy object such as a shipping cask."
All of these accident scenarios involving the integrity of the design of the spent fuel pool itself were dealt with at the operating license stage and cannot be relitigated in a license amendment proceeding.
See Northe;rn States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-455, 7 NRC 41, 46 N.4 (1978).
Accord Port (3nd General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263, 266 n.6 (1979; Public Service - - - - - -. -
Electric and Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1),
ALAB-650, 14 NRC __, 2 CCH Nuclear Reg. Rep. 5 30,608 at'n.24 (July 17, 1981).
Indeed, one Appeal Board has squarely held that no EIS is required predicated on harm to the environment from a gross loss of water from the spent fuel pool because such an event is only a remote and speculative possibility.
ALAB-650, supra at nn. 29, 31.
Finally, we note one statement in the statement of bases for Contention la which is included to hopefully shoehorn this contention in and is just plain wrong.
Maine says:
"The probability of the occurrence of such risks is increased by both the proposed reracking and pin compaction because the denser configuration of spent fuel assemblies proposed by the applicant will decrease natural convection cooling in the event of a loss of coolant accident, causing both old and new fuel rods to heat up to the point of austained oxidation and an exo-thermic reactior."
]
This is false.
All of the accidents in either category described by Maine are triggered by forces outside the spent fuel pool.
Filling the spent fuel pool with more spent fuel does not increase the probabilities of the accidents and thus the risk one iota.
Contention lb Contention lb is that an EIS is required because: 1
"b.
Pin compaction is a new technology that has never been licensed by the NRC; its imple,
mentation at Maine Yankee involves unknown safety and environmental risks; and, if approved, it would establish precedent for future appli-cations to the NRC by other utilities in need of expanded spent fuel storage;"
The basis set forth in this contention is nothing more than an expansion of the contention itself which stripped of rhetoric I
means that an EIS is required anytime anything new is done.
This is not so.
An EIS is required when there is contemplated a major federal action significantly affecting the human environ-ment.
Whether the action involves new technology or.not is irrele-vant.5 Contention lc Contention 1c is that an EIS is required because:
"c.
The use of the cask laydown area will prevent or.significantly impede the removal of spent fuel from the existing spent fuel pool during the period of licensed opera-tions and also upon cessation of commercial operations of the plant; and" The. basis stated for Contention le is:
"By use of the cask laydown area for spent l
fuel storage, Maine Yankee will lose its t
ability to remove spent fuel from the pool.
The cask laydown area is necessary to permit
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placement of a shipping cask in the pool to remove. spent fuel for such purposes as removal 5 It may also be observed that pin compaction is not a "new technology _.that has never been licensed by the NRC;" pin compaction.is nothing more than removing and inserting spent fuel pins from and into fuel assemblies, operations that have-often been= performed at various other reactors.
_g_
of defective spent fuel rods and removal of spent fuel for alternative interim storage and for long-term storage or disposal.
Maine Yankee proposes to use the cask laydown area for storage of spent fuel when there is no other space in the pool to store fuel or to place a shipping cask.
However, an accident involving the reactor or the fuel transfer tube may prevent replacing the fuel in the reactor as anticipated by the licensee.
Under these circumstances the use of the cask laydown area for spent fuel storage will result in an irreversible and irretrievable commit-ment of resources that requires the prepara-tion of an Environmental Impact Statement in accordance with NEPA and 10 CFR Part 51."
(Emphasis supplied.)
The key to this contention is the portion of the basis set out above with emphasis.
The concept is that when the cask lay-down area has been filled up with fuel rejected from the core for some purpose, there will be an accident in the reactor which will preclude reloading that fuel back in the vessel.
We are not let in on the secret of how an accident will occur in the empty-of-fuel reactor vessel which will forever preclude reloading the fuel back into the vessel.
There is no basis for this contention; it should be rejected.
Contention ld Contention ld is that an EIS is required because:
"d.
As a result of proposed license amendments, there will be significantly increased amounts of spent fuel stored at Maine Yankee on a long-term or permanent basis in the event'that there is no available means of safely storing or disposing of the increased spent fuel off-site at the expiration of Maine Yankee's operating license in 2008."
The basis for Contention ld is stated to be: W
=-e e-'Ts i,4 e
"No environmental impact statement has been prepared for Maine Yankee evaluating how the spent fuel generated by the plant's operations will be stored or disposed of following the expiration of the operating license in 2008.
The Commission is presently conducting a generic proceeding (the so-called ' Waste Confidence' proceedings) to determine its degree of confidence that there is reasonable assurance that there will be safe off-site disposal or storage methods available to Maine Yankee and other nuclear power plants when their respective operating licenses expire.
See 44 F.R. 61372 (October 25, 1979).
Unless such proceedings are completed prior to the issuance of the proposed license amendments with a determination of reason-able assurance of the availability of off-site storage or disposal by 2008 for Maine Yankee, a site-specific environmental impact statement must be prepared for the proposed license amendments addressing how the increased spent fuel to be stored on-site at Maine Yankee as a result of commercial operations will be stored or disposed of after the operating license expires."
Safety and environmental issues arising from the hypothesis that spent fuel will remain on a nuclear power plant site after expiration of the operating license are precluded from considera-tion in individual license amendment proceedings by virtue of the existence of the rulemaking.
Public Service Electric and
_ Gas Co. (Salem N, clear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-650, 14 NRC
, 2 CCH Nuclear Reg. Rep. 1 30,608 at Page 29,924 (July 17, 1981); Id., LBP-80-10, 11 NRJ 537, 338 (1980).
See also Virginia Electric and Power Company (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-584, 11 NRC 451, 464-65 (1980).
-lb-3 --
Contention No. 2 Contention No. 2 is:
"The proposed license amendments to permit reracking and pin compaction significantly increase both the probability of occurrence of a release of radiation or radioactive materials into the environment and the environmental consequences of such a release in the event of a total or partial loss of coolant at the spent fuel pool.
The licensee has failed to demonstrate, as required by the Atomic Energy Act and 10 CFR, Part 50, that there is reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will not be endangered by these risks."
Maine states that the basis for Contention No. 2 is the same as the basis for Contention la.
Contention 1: was a con-tention that an EIS should be prepared; Contention 2 is a safety issue as we understand it.
In any event, the argument is that the contemplated expansion will somehow increase the prob' ability of various Class 9 accidents either at the reactor (preventing pool access and allowing gradual evaporation of water) or causing rupture of the pool (thus a gross loss of water).
As we have already pointed out, Class 9 accidents may not be considered in this proceeding.
CLI-80-8, supra; ALAb-588, supra.
In addition, what is really being questioned is the design of the reactor and pool itself which has already been passed upon at the OL stage and may not be litigated here again.
And finally, we are given not even a glimmer of the theory of how more fuel in the pool can increase the probability of an accident at the reactor, or such things as sabotage, airplane crashes, earth-quakes or ndss_le impacts or the drop of a shipping cask. - -
Contention No. 3 "The proposed use of the cask laydown area for spent fuel storage will prevent or signifi-cantly impede the removal of spent fuel from the existing pool during the period of licensed operations and also upon cessation of commercial operations of the plant.
The licensee has failed to demonstrate, as required by the Atomic Energy Act and 10 CFR Part 50, that ~here is reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will I
not be endangerLd by use of the cask laydown l
area for spent fuel stcrage."
It is stated that the basis of Contention No. 3 is the basis for Contention lc.
As discussed above with respect to the environ-mental version of this contention, we are given no " basis" for how an empty-of-fuel reactor will have an accident that will forever preclude reloading the fuel which has been rejected to the cask laydown area into the reactor vessel.
Such an acci-dent would have te be nuclear in nature 6 and we simply are at a loss to explain how one has a nuclear accident in a vessel with no fuel in it.
Contention No. 4 Contention No. 4 is:
" Hearings on the proposed license amendments should be deferred until the completion of the so-called ' Waste Confidence' proceedings.
Alternatively the record in these proceedings must support a determination that there is reasonable assurance that the additional spent fuel to be stored at Maine Yankee as a result of the proposed amendments can be safely stored at the existing spent fuel pool until it can be disposed of or removed off-site."
6 A non-nuclear occurrence such as would simply bend a support or something else in the vessel could be fixed in short order and, thus, is not of the nature contemplated by Maine. --
It has been squarely held that a proceeding of this nature should not be deferred pending completion of the Waste Confidence Rulemaking and also that there should be no cons deration of storage beyond the operating license period or ultimate disposal.
Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Unita 1 & 2), ALAB-584, 11 NRC 451, 464-65 (1980); Public Service Electric and Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1),
ALAB-650, 14 NRC __,, 2 CCH Nuclear Reg. Rep. 1 30,608 at Page 29,924 (July 17, 1981); Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263, 267 (1979); Northern States Power Co. (Prairjo Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2),
ALAB-455, 7 NRC 41, 51 (1978).
Contention No. 5 Contention No. 5 is:
"Neither the licensee nor the staff has analyzed the environmental or public health and safety implications of environmentally 1
preferable, safer and feasible alternatives to the proposed license amendments.
The adoption of one or more alternatives would avoid or reduce threats to the environment and to the public health and safety identi-fled in these Amended Contentions."
i l
The specific alternatives which Maine wants discussed are the fo31owing:
"a.
the use of the following alternate on-site passive storage methods:
dry storage in casks, vaults, caissons, and concrete canisters, either alone or within concrete buildings; b.
construction c f a new spent fuel pool on-site which is functionally independent - _
and physically separate from the reactor i
and the existing spent fuel pool; c.
transshipment of spent fuel for storage away from the reactor site to an existing storage area, such as at another nuclear power facility, a commercial spent fuel storage facility, or a governmental spent fuel storage facility; d.
development of a new, away from reactor storage facility by the licensee, either alone or in conjunction with other interested parties, including the federal gcVernment; e.
use of alternate nuclear fuel or burn-up procedures so as to reduce the amount of i
spent fuel generated."
The contention should be excluded.
As noted earlier, the environmental effects arising from fuel pool capacity expansion have 39 out of 39 times been found to be negligible.
NRC has no obligation to explore alternatives unless they are environ-mentally superior.
Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-584, 11 NRC 451 (1980);
Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-458, 7 NRC 155, 162 (1978).
If the environmental effect of the proposed action is negligible, it is difficult to see how any case can be made that an alternative is essentially superior; and NRC has no obligation to try.
Duke Power Co.'(Amendment to Materials License SNM-1773), ALAB-651, 14 NRC
, 2 CCH Nuclear Reg. Rep. 1 30,613 (Aug. 10, 1981).
In addition, it is to be noted that the statement of bases does nothing more than repeat and repeat the view that alternatives must be explored.
We are given no specific reasons as-to why further inquiry is merited..
as to any or all of them in this case.
Thus, there is no valid contention.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 551-54 (1978); Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v.
NRC, 598 F.2d 1221 (1st Cir. 1979).
In particular, it also should be noted that alternative "e" is an attempt to relitigate the issue of whether it is acceptable for MYAPS to burn up 40 year's worth of fuel.
That was settled by issuance of the operating licenas and may not be relitigated here.
Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant),
ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263, 266 n.4 (1979); Northern States Power Co.
(Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-455, 7 NRC hl, 46 n.4 (1978).
Finally, it is to be noted that Maine claims that the Atomic Energy Act requires evaluation of alternatives to assure reasonable assurance that the public health and safety is protected.
See Maine Contention at p. 11.
This is not.the law; on the safety side a.'1 an applicant must show is compliance with tne Act and regulations; whether there is a "better" alter-native is irrelevant.
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station), ALAB-161, 6 AEC 1003 (1973).
Contention No. 6 Contention No. 6 is:
"The licensee has not demonstrated any current need for approval of pin compaction in addition to reracking.
Approval of both pin compaction and reracking, rather than approval of just reracking, unnecessarily and unreasonably endangers the public health and safety and the environment because such approval will authorize the licensee to proceed with an experimental and -
technologically untested method of spent fuel storage 14 years in advance of when it is needed."
There is no requirement in the law or regulations that the applicant demonstrate a "need" for a license amendment.
The contention is, therefore, inadmissible.
Contention No. 7 Contention No. 7 is:
"The proposed methods of expanding the spent fuel storage capacity by reracking and pin compaction will not assure that 2-effective will remain below.95."
While there may be an industry practice or regulatory guide i
that the assurance be that keff will be <.95, no regulation of the Commission so requires.
Thus, the contention as phrased i
may not be admitted as it presents no legally cognizable issue.
Contention No. 8 Contention No. 8 is the following:
" Swelling of the rack walls, resulting from boral corrosion, will produce a release of radiation in excess of standards and will prevent removal of spent fuel assembles (sic)."
Neither in the..ontention itself nor the " basis" which follows are we informed (a) exactly what " standards" will be exceeded or (b) how swelling will in fact cause radiation to leak.
The contention as framed is too vague.
Contention No. 9 Contention No. 9 is:.
"There will not be sufficiently unrestricted coolant flows to avoid local boiling when the spent fuel pool is loaded with reracked and pin compacted assemblies."
This is an acceptable contention with an adequately stated basis.
Contention No. 10 Contention No. 10 is:
"The licensee has failed to analyze the consequences of an accidental drop of a shipping cask on the spent fuel on (sic) the pool following reracking and pin compaction."
As one basis, the applicant's answer of June 3, 1981, to staff Question No. 20 is cited.
That answer is no basis for this contention.
It commits the applicant not to move shipping casks over the spent fuel pool until shipping off site becomes feasible and to do the necessary analyses at that time when a cask is selected.
Contention No. 11 Contention No. 11 is:
"The licensee has failed to identify, describe or analyze the specific procedures it intends to use to implement its reracking proposal.
Also the licensee stated that it has not yet developed the procedures it intends to use to implement pin compaction.
Therefore the licensee has not provided reasonable assurance that the proposed storage methods will not endanger the public health and safety and that the licensee will comply with NRC regulations."
It is stated that in order to comply with 10 CPR 20 and 10 CFR 50 the applicant must have these procedures laid out.
We are then given minima that these regulations require.
We are not told for instance why the expansion of the spent fuel pool will require any change in the radiation monitoring program or the quality assurance program (Items f and g on Page 18).
And we are uninformed as to what specific regulation supposedly requires the provision of the information listed in Items a-e on Pages 17-18 of Maine's submission.
These vague assertions of alleged regulatory requirements and bald assertions of needs for changes in monitoring or QC programs hardly put the applicant on notice as to what it must defend against as is required by 10 CFR
$ 2.714.
Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-216, 8 AEC 13, 20 (1974).
Contention No. 12 Contention No. 12 is:
"The proposed methods of expanding the spent fuel storage capacity will not comply with existing NRC regulations and regulatory guides with regard to monitoring procedures."
The entire basis is:
"The licensee has proposed expansion of the spent fuel storage capacity from 953 assemblies to 2,551 assemblies.
The proposed increase in the number of spent fuel assemblies will result in an increase in the neutron flux of the pool, will increase contamination of the air and water effluents (see Maine Yankee letter to NRC dated February 28, 1980), and will increase the number of racks which are susceptible to corrosion.
The licensee must comply with 10 CFR Parts 20 and 50 with regard to monitoring procedures.
The application does not provide assurance that the licensee will comply with NRC regulations and.that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered.".-
MYAPS has an approved radiation monitoring program.
We are uninformed how expansion of the spent fuel pool will' require any change in the monitoring program.
Assuming it to be a fact that the proposed expansion "will result in an increase in the neutron flux of the pool, will increase contamination, etc.",
all this means is the alarms will go off sooner or more often.
This does not require new monitoring hardware or monitoring procedures.
Contention No. 13 Contention Nce. 15 is:
"The licensee will not ccmply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A in that the licensee has not provided adequate assurance that the proposed modifications to the spent fuel pool assure adequate safety under normal and postulated accident conditions."
The basis is:
" Releases of radiation or radioactive materials from normal and postulated accident conditions previously considered in the Final Safety Analysis Report for the operating license will be increased in probability and consequence as a result of the proposed modifications.
The licensee has not reconsidered such accident conditions in any information submitted to date and thus has not provided adequate assurance that the licensee will meet existing NRC regulations and that the health and safety of the public will-l not be endangered."
As noted earlier, the increase of spent fuel storage capacity will not increase the probability of any accident.
MYAPS had a f
full accident analysis at the time its OL was issued and that is not to be relitigated here.
The probability of an aircraft hitting MYAPS, a given valve failing, a LOCA or anything else, is not changed one iota by this change.
Contention No. 14 Contention No. 14 is the same as the contention already admitted with respect to SMP.
Contention No. 15 Contention No. 15 is:
"The licensee has not provided reasonable assurance that the integrity of the spent fuel pool walls and pool floor will be i
maintained at all times during seismic l
disturbances when fully loaded with l
reracked and pin compacted assemblies."
The applicant is not required to do more than demonstrate that the pool with additional loading still conforms to MYAPS seismic criteria.
There is no requirement that any and all seismic disturbances including those greater than the design basis earth-quake be accounted for as the contention apparently argues.
No objection would be raised to a contention worded:
"The spent fuel pool will when fully loaded not comply with Class I seismic design criteria for MYAPS."
But that is not the contention made.
Contention No. 16 By Contention No. 16 Maine seeks to inject into this proceed-ing a number of so-called generic technical matters by listing them and stating an alleged correction to the spent fuel pool..
1 To begin with, what is to be explored here is not the opera-tion of the spent fuel pool in general but rather the differences which result from the proposed action.
See Public Service Electric and Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1),
ALAB-650, 14 NRC
, 2 CCH Nuclear Reg. Rep. 1 30,608 at n.24 (July 17, 1981).
No attempt has been made to show how these matters have a safety significance insofar as the proposal at hand is concerned as is required by the decision in Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-444, t
6 NRC 760, 768-74 (1977).
CONCLUSION Maine's contentions as stated should all be excluded except for Nos. 9 and 14.
Respectfully submitted, Thomas G. Dignan, Jr.
Thomas G.
Dignan, Jr.
R. K. Gad III R.
K. Gad III Ropes & Gray 225 Franklin Street Boston, MA 02110 (617) 423-6100 Counsel for Applicant October 13, 1981
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i; CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE J:
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{
thereof, postage prepaid, to:
Robert M. Lazo, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr.
Director, Bodega Marine Laboratory University of California P.O. Box 247 Bodega Bay, California 94923 i
Administrative Judge Peter A. Morris Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Henry J. McGurren, Esquire Office of the Executive Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 David Santee Miller, Esquire 213 Morgan Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20001 Rufus E. Brown, Esquire Deputy Attorney General Department of the Attorney General State House - Station #6 Augusta, Maine 04333 l
Thomas G. Dignan, Jr.
Thomas G.
Dignan, Jr.
6
.