ML20031D604

Subpoena Directed to G Betourne for 810619 Deposition on Facility.Bayshore Strategic Training Range Risk Assessment Study

ML20031D604
Person / Time
Site:	Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date:	05/21/1981
From:	Grossman H Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
To:	Betourne G AIR FORCE, DEPT. OF
Shared Package
ML20031D553	List: ML20031D551 ML20031D568 ML20031D572 ML20031D585 ML20031D586 ML20031D587 ML20031D589 ML20031D590 ML20031D592 ML20031D597 ML20031D603 ML20031D604 ML20031D612 ML20031D616 ML20031D621 ML20031D623 ML20031D625 ML20031D632 ML20031D642
References
ISSUANCES-OLA, NUDOCS 8110130537
Download: ML20031D604 (2)

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4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA C-NUCLEAR REGULATCRY CCMMISSION ATCMIC SAFETI AND LICENSING 30ARD

!afere Administrative Judges:

Herbert Gr:ssman, Chairman Dr. Oscar H. Paris Frederick J. Shen

)

In the Matter ef:

)

)

Cccket No. 50-155 CLA CONSUMER POWER CCMPAliY

).

(Spent Fuel Pcol

)

Expansion)

(Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant)

)

)

May 21, 1981 SUSPOENA 70:

Major 2et urne AF/SaiB c/o Direct:r of Civil Law, Air Force Judge Adyccate General Recm SE-125 The Pentagon Washingten, C. C.

20320 YOU ARE. HERE3Y CCFFANDED to apoear at the law offices of Isham, Lincoln & Eeale, Suite 325, 1120 Cannecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.

20036 en June Ig,1981. ec 10:C0 a.m. and thereafter each consecutive wrk day at the same time and place, befers a certified short-hand reporter and Notary Public authorized to adminster caths by the laws of the District of Columbia, fer the purpose of giving evidence and testifying in a decositicn concerning the Big Rock Point Plant - Sayshore Strategic T.-aining Range risk assessment study, attached as Attachment 1 to this subccena.

i

!8110130537 811dO5 PDR ADOCK 05000155 T

PDR

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V You are further advised that en motien made pr motly, and in any event at er before June 19, 1981, and on notice to the party at whose instance this subccena was issued, the C: mission may (1) quasn er modify t.9e subpoena if it is unreasonable er requires evidenca net relevant to any matter in issue, or (2) candition denial of the motien en just and reasonable ter :s.

FCR TctC ATCMIC SAFETf SHD LICENSING SOARD e

v b &m =

Herbert Grossman, Chairman ACHINISTRATIVE JUDGE Dated at Sethesda, Maryland this 21st day of May 1981.

,This subpoena was issued en the a;:plicaticn of Censumers Power Ccmpany, its attorneys, Joseph Gallo and Philip Steptoe, Isham, Lincoln & Seale, Suite 325, 1120 Cannecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, O.C.

2C036 I hereby acknowledge that I have been served by hand with a copy of the foregoing Subpoena this 1st day of June, 1981, i

{

3ary F. 3decurne, Major, USA.?

-.jy.

I.

1 v

I i 9 JAN 1920 1

l

ir. Es1h Kantor Division oC Site Safety and Extirancent.21 ?.n:1 i.;

United Ftatus ::ucle r negulaterf Ce:mic.!!c.n Ganhington, DC 20555 Dcar Mr. Kantor Reference your c nversation.cn 4 recor'c cr 1970 with Lt Col Stoddard of this Directorato.

The follouin~ rc. pen 9:

to your roe;uest for en updated anelynis of th' rie::n ssnociated uir.h an accident bet'.; con an aircrnft en th's ::

s C00/G01 (Baynhere) lou level training r0 to, and ti..:. Dig nc-h Point iluclear Pouer Ple.nt.

!:0 C2AF has cerformed the anal.rsis bared on curreror. av.silable data and a moro conservative treat:.cnt of th!- e :mr.-".s nt -

probabilities.

The hoy factc which cmacge frca this cnalyc.'.a arc:

(a)~ Ohe probability of a crash in a nacticri. mile I

cruare caciccing the power plant is Ice: the.n one ia a hu vh:cd

=illion per year,.and l

(b)

Even though the updated ost:1..: ate ic baued en a r. ora concer/stivo nothodology, the data thcaselves do not cuggcet any appreciable change in the risk to the po,4cr p.'. ant.

Notuithstanding the above, numercus actions have Nt a taken to a.ssure the 5 Julv.1979 inadvertent everflight c.f the power plant does not racccur.

An 13 July 1979 Scr?tegic Air

~

Cent:snd uccanijo requires those npocific inctritetion.1 and acticns bo tal:en by ai.rcrews and radar.bo=b scoring nite

.ucrsonnel:

s.

e...

L.

?.. w- :

(a)

Scoring site"p'crsonnel will urovidn' radar verning

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'to aircrous if the aircraf t deviaten 3 miles tre, centerlino,

'and

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Aircreus will take pocir.ive actio'as.tc return to

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,ce n t.c eline.

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Chis messcge further recuiren aircreu miccien planning cr.pnasic to insure th,2t all aircrew pernennel are attare cf

, potential crculce areas while 'the aircraft is operating near s

the necicar facility.

'~he abovo :eccage '. tith added information was upplied to.v.r.

Richard Silver, Oivision cf Operating nesc<: ors, nucioar Regulatery Co mission with cur 30 Jul 70 letter.

We hope the above information wi'1 be of assistance to you, and will hcip satisfv nv rem.airenents that have devel.cped in this regard.

Sincerely, 31s=ed' DAVID L. NICHOLS, Col, USAF 1 Atch Deputy Director for Operations Risk Analysis, 2 Jan SC and Training g

Directorate of Operations and Training s.

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site as 2 K.',.3CRCS.

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=

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Crash at specific point - assu=es the crash will take Place during cne point on the 430 NM low altitude cute.

~

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C 6.

Crash at 33fg Rcek -

~

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- +

I.-

7.

Crash at 31g Rock during a year's activity.',

9

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE crrice cr inc cnner cr cisvr d

UNITED STATES AlO FcOCC 2

WAS H I N GTO N. O.C. 20330 C

h jW Cg &

G A*t 9mn g y..y 'p..

a y

7 /1-9/

ti Mr. James H. Campbell, President 1

Consu.T.::s Power / Company 212 W Michigan Avenue j

Jacksc.7, Michigan 49201

• g Dear Mr. Camobell

,:)

j Reference is made to your letter of 12 April 1971.

We were Q

grateful for the opportunity to discuss with Consumers Pcwer 4

representatives the Air Force proposals concerning low

~j altitude training routes in the Bayshore area.

We feel 5

that the 6 April 1971 conference resulted in a much better i

understanding of the Bayshcre situation; we hope that it 3

increased your appreciation of the complex operations

'd involved as well as the urgent requirement to recpen a training route in that area.

.y

.c e

l'j In response to your recuest for an analysis of the risks which would be involved in reopening the route based on the t

.j proposed new bomb run corridor centerline, located approxi-

'G mately 5.5 nautical miles east. of the Big Rock Point Power Plant, HQ USAF has performed an analysis of several facters, i -

The analysis is based on Strategic Air Ccemand experience in low altitude trainihg operations on all icw level routes dur-3 ing the years 1963-1970, including the 7 January 1971 B-52

-3 crash in Lake Michigan.

.4 5

The following key facts emerged from this ac.s'.ysis (based on g

the proposed interim corridor, a 4.0 nautical mile buffer N

zone either side of conterline, and the number of Bayshore p]

low altitude bomb rt:ns - about 22')0 - anticipated during, a one-year period):

b ld a.

The probability that a 3-52 will stray frem the

'j bomb run corridor and overfly any part of an area enclosed

s by a 1.5 nautical =ile radius circle centered on the Big

?

Rock Point Plant is calculated ac 1.2 x 10-6, or about one

~

N in a million.

aag b.

The probability that, during an operational year, 4

anv B-52 will deviate from the corridor, overf1v a part of"the three nautical mile diameter circle centered on the lj.D

~

l plant, and crash within that circle is less than 1.5 in ten da;o 1

' "fT. '* ' mi.efa Wyf*? " ". g xR

(,. * '-

m

.,,J' ** ^37 Q " ~ l

' } W f - W T-* D Q +&'."

>\\ tf

/

billion.

The probability that cuch a crech within the cir:10 would result in damage to the plant or injury to the employees is, of course, much smaller.

.mU The analysis indicates that the risks to the Big Rock Point 4

Power Plant, based on resumotion of training on the interim route, are estremely small.

As I art sure you, appreciate, it is imperative that we provide low altitude training for our crews in order to insure that I

they are highly qualified at all times to accomplish their

]

wartime mission.

The availability of a low altitude training i

route in the Great Lakes area is vital to this preparedness j

program; the use of Bayshore, for reasons briefed in detail at the ti April conference, is the mos t practical methed of

-]

meeting this urgent requirement.

Until we can move the Bayshore scoring facility to a new locatien, the interim j

route - which misses your plant by 5.5 miles - is the only

,a one in this area available to us.

In view of our urgent training requirement and the extremely small risk to your J.

power clant, we plan to initiate training flights on this alternate route in the near future.

We trust our analysis i

will reassure ycu of the minimal risk to ycur property and 1;

personnel and provide you a basis for reaching an agreement j

with your insurers.

1 Sincerely y

p. -

]

i c,

\\.

1 Atch JA.E.51.. CA:?27, COL, USAP PJ.sk Analysis (AF/OA Memo, dep. Chief, Strategic Divisic=

26 April 1971) j Directcrate cf 0;:eratic:s

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a M

AF/OA 26 April 1971

..p

/v)

MDIORANDUM FOR COLONEL CLARK

?

.I SU3 JECT:

Bayshore "Te=porary Route" 3-52/FB-111 Risk Analysis d

1.

Referance y,our request for an analysis of the proposed 4

"te=porary. route" at the sayshore R35 site with respect to

-j the chance of endangering the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant.

4

. Major points of relevance and calculations are provided belew 2

. in a step by step sequence.

Our understanding is that the j

te=porary track will be located about 5.5 =iles fren the plant

.f at the closest point.

Further, there will be an 8-=ile corride f

(4 =iles on each side of the desired track) with the corridor j

edge tangent to a one-and-one-half =ile circle about the plant.

(

Aircraft will approach the corridor li=its only if they are f-having difficulty locating the target (s) which are on or very

.4 near the center of the corridor.

If this should happen, the

" lost" aircraft will be directed back towArd the center by the f

RSS site.

Only in the case of a ce=nunications failure would

($

the RSS site fail to order a " lost" aircraft back to the cente:

3 of the corridor, and a ec==unication redundancy of three radios 4

exists at both the R3S site and on each' aircraft.

..3 2.

The analysis will proceed along the following lines :

s-.

..m

'3 Steo 1.

Scoring data frc= 3ayshore low level bo=b runs

-j for the year 1970 will be exa=ined to deter =ine the frequency

.y of gross errors which could require a redirection by the R35 23 site The data will be ex= 'ned to see if'it is reasonable s

to expect all aircraft with good ce==unications to be kept vithin the new corridor li=its.

7

p

.i; Steo 2.

Since off-track errors could be si=ultaneously

.]

acco=panied by a ce==unication breakdown which would prevent g;

redirection of aircraft back to the center of the corridor,

'M data on ce=nunications failure will be ex= i ned to deter =ine

'2 a probability of ec==unic'ations outage.

,-Q 4

z Steo 3.

Data on navigation errors will next be exa=ined l{

to deter =ine.the probability Sf a navigation error of such a 1y

.=agnitude to cause " overflight" of a one-and-one-half =ile M

circle about the nuclear plant.

g p

+:

.-.2 l

m m m 7..w.m

.y. - m W.~. y '

..s

• v rw

.'% ~ W ' ~ 9. ~"r

9.-

.j Steo 4.

The probability that both a communicatiens g

error anc a navigation overflight ' error will occur on the same flight will then be c,mputed by corbining the probabil-

.M ities of Step 2 and Step 3.

,i 9

Sten 5.

Data on all crashes on similar low level d

missions w:.11 be examined and the probability of a crash on any Icw level bc 5 run will be computed.

1

~

'.1 Step 6.

Next the probability that a crash will occur T

in any m:.le' of a icw level bomb run will be computed.

si Sten 7.

The probability that any individual berb run

. ~e will end in a crash in the circle of concern will next be j

computed.

.)

4 Step 8.

Finally, the risk of a crash in the circle

.j sometime during the next year's operation will be computed 7

using an estimated number of bcmb runs of 2200 at the

<j Bayshore R35.

a i

3.

The analv. sis follows:

4 Step 1.

Based en 1654 scored bomb runs at Bayshore during d

the period 1 January 19 70 to 31 Dece ber 19 70, the circular 3

errors scored by radar indic' ate that the average off-track

'3 distance, that is.the distance from the. desired berb track to the actual aircraft track, was far less than one-half mile.

(The precise figure, while it was used in the g

analysis, is classified because it indice.tes SAC 's bo=bing q-accuracy.)

There were no borbing errors outside of the t.j buffer zene, set at nine miles on the right of the track

]

and four miles to the lef t during 19 70.

Only three berb

.m scores shewed a circular error greater than five miles, d

none were beycnd six-and-one-half miles.

Although 9

actual off-track distances for these gross error bomb "j

scores were not recorded, since both range and deflection d

errors are nor= ally assumed equal, we can esti= ate that no "off-track distances were greater than four-and-one-half ciles.

.~

Beebers are directed back toward tN ' desired track and

' are given an " abort" score whenever they approach the corridor limits.

There were 13 such aborts during 1970 at Bayshore.

g. :,.

~

~

2 s.

~-

~

)

]

i y.r.;

K-7,- - "",,37 m}.GV ny. 3..f{(.rr ~ 3 7 9 * ~.W..= m.y-a 9y 7 ' ' W. l

\\

g i

U.

Although the smaller, four miles on both sides, corridor may result in a slight increase in aborts it is reasonable, based j O.

on the above-data, to assume that no ove=flishes of the one-i and-one-half mile circle will occur so long as bomber /RES I

cocmunications are intact.

1 Steo 2.

,During 1970 with a total of 1834 sorties, we 2

experienced 1 cem=unication outage of the type which could have result'ed in a bcmber being outside the buffer cone had

]

navigation also been faulty.

In general, this situation vould a

be corrected. because if the communication outage were discovere G

early enough, as it most likely would be, the bomber would j

break off the run and not make the attack.

Howe,ver, asse.ing j

no such breakoff, the probability of a ce=menication outage

]

is co=puted frem the above:

8 1

-4 1

1 P

=.0005556 = 5.556 x 10

=

h 1

-1834 3

f Steo 3.

'In the case of a coc=unications failure, even if

(

the B-52 did not break off, climb and leave the area, the probability of a navigational error of such a magnitude as to cause overflight of the,one-and-one half mile circle is small.

Navigational errors are asse.ed to be nor= ally distributed d

about the desired becb track.

Although navigational data, as gj such, are not recorded for Bayshore cissions, applicable data i

from Operational Read'iness Inspections (ORIs) are available.

j On these inspections it is the usual practice to. check air-p crews ove.: unfa=iliar terrain and against unfamiliar R35 sites.

g (Bayshore flights have a large repeatability' factor and hence d

navigation should be better).

On 498 ORIs with flight profiles i

similar to those at Bayshore, two flights recorded navigational

.)

errors of over four miles.

This suggests.a no:=al distribution 2

=

' e. - (X-5. 5) 2 1

with a = 1.399.

Using this lj N(X,c) 2

E a] 2r 2a

~

lj distributien to represent off-course navigation errors at l

4 Bayshore, the chance, P2, that an aircraft will overfly

?

- the circle, given a cocmunication outage,.is given by:

2

~

l1

.y 3

3 *.

\\.

yo

,, G.

4 3

cM= M M = %M M ~

--m ;. n.,* m r. - n mg..

, y :=. m y ' m e gn - ~-.

l 3

+ 1.5 l

N (X,e)dx P

=

2

- 1.5 aS or s

-3

.]

P

~

23

.00212 - 2.12 x 10

.3 s

a.

i)

Sten 4.

Thus, with the new buffer cone of four miles and 1

operational procedures already estiblished, the probability

.'i of overflight, P3, is given by:

a

?

?'3 P

xP

=

a 1

2

3

.:p 8

e "j

or i

1 (5.56 x 10-4) x- (2.12 x 10- 3 )'

P

=-

.m 3

6

• 1.18 x 10-6

/-

=

a

.1 s

That is to say that the chance of an overflight for any be=b j'. 3 m at 3ayshore will.be about one in a million.

Steo 5.

Assu:P a i

2 ec unication outage and a navigational j

error of such rer;: le that an overflight of the one-and-one-f$

half mile circ /e 4;.

mading the power plant does in fact l

~

I occur it is pot.::ible g exa=ine the chances that on that flight

- a crash in the circle will occur.

Based on historical data of

.'h low level crashes for flights of tiiis type, we ce=pute first

'j the probability.that a crash will occur while on a low level l fj bomb run.

p N

,g The probability of as crash, P4, is cocputed si= ply by '

taking the ratio 'f the nu=ber of crashes on all icw level

'. -J be=b runs over several years',t, o the total number of bcmb runs j [

of the type being considered here.

.There have been six crashes j

4 3

a.

?

l % &.

Wf q,e &.

.e*"

f

~

j

• g

7 1

.'l).

including the recent unfortunate accident in Lake Michigan.

'I There have been a total o.( 426,078 bcmb runs giving a value 4

of 5

.r i

-5 6

1.4 x 10 2

P4 f

426,078

~

]

.u That is, th'ere are only about 14 chances out of one million that any low level bcmb run will in fact end in a crash.

3 Q

~

i Steo 6.

The average range for this type of flighe is 430 K.

j per low level run.

Hence the probability, P5, that a crash 3

will occur in any given mile is

,1 5

P

-8

=

4 3.275 x 10 i

P

=

=

B 5

430 p

.)

Steo 7.

Assuming independence between navigation errors

.j and probability of crash, the probability, P., that, given 3

no warning mechanism for redirection within tha c m idor, 5

a crash will occur within the circle is -

9 d

-8 1.5

/2.25 - x2 2 x 3.275 x 10 P

=

3 6

a /2Tr

-1.5 "0

1 3

G

~

M t

]

.exp (x - 5.5) d* d7 y

2 2e g

5 3

1~5 5

~

2 (x-5.5

~

%.8678 x 10 2 25 - x

,xp

=

-1.5 3 914-E v

~

d f

s 5

?

)}

.y ~ n-.y,, m :.q(w. 3 6

-Q;.' '--" ym-v ~w.n. <.-. yg 1.v.e. - : ~ '

4 1

a The integral in the above expression was evaluated by a

.v graphical method giving the result:

g

,e 4

-10 1.225 x 10 p

e

=

0 6

4 1

The total probability, P7, that any aircraft will crash

~in the circle is giva.n then by, j

.A N

m 3

P p

x p

=

7 1

6 9

x, (5.556 x 10-4) x (1.225 x 10-10) j 1

a 6.68 x 10-14 1

=

?

d, y

This calculation' neglects the fact that many crashes could

.y occur in the circle and not cause damage to the plant.

In addition, it is a conservative number since crews in trouble 3

can be expected to take some evasive action to avoid built-up 9

areas or buildings.

Using these conservitive nt=bers we can j

predict that there is less than one chance in ten trillion that j

any particular aircraf t will crash in the circle.

=

s e

j Steo 8.

Since we 'esti= ate 2200 low level runs at Baychore j

using the te=porary route in.~.he next year we can cocpute the j

. total risk:

A 3

,(6.68 x 10-14) x (2.2 x 10 )

3

-10 r

s Risk

~

1.47 x 10

=

=

e 1

3 3.

Su=imary.

j in a.

Based on data for the year 1970, the Air Force can

'j assure t' hat flights with co==unications intact will not appreaen j

eloser to the power plant char ene-and-one-half miles.

y j

.=

t 6

p J

4 m

s

((

N M,7 j'_< '

157

"~

tY m MV

• SN-b-

9

?

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---

1 e-.-

sass 2ms=====ummuasswnzss

=

UNCLASSIFIED mm..

,a=

=3=::ssnes==-

t 9

pent AGON TELECCPMUNICATIONS CENTER mR8733 MCM = 7919c/19254 TCM = 791991914 C'OSN

=

RTTUZYUw RUWTFxA3440 Iggtgog-UUUU--RUSAHQA.

i 7MR UUUUU R 1819081 JUL 79 CH HO SAC OFFUTT AFB NE//00T//

TO A In 4467//C0/00N//

RUCVAAA/SAF E'A R K50 AL E AF S L A// COTCA/ CCTN/ COTS //

RFFIAAA/15AF MARCH AFM 41/,/00TOA/COTN//

turV A A A/lCEVG BAPK50 ALE (~ _'

• / CC/RS//

RUF A HCA/hc US AF % ASH OC//XCOTSg ZEN /HQ SAC nF:UTT AFB NE//IGFF//

a uMJ nF A/ 43 5 W ANDERSON AFS. GUAP//XHT//

AtlWJGFA/3 AO ANDER SCN AFB, GUAM //XPT//

R UWT AEA/473 5 STS CARSWELL AFR, TX//XPT//

BT UNCLAS i

SURJ :

nVERFLIGHT OF NUCLE AR PCWER PLANT.

\\/

1.'

THE Cuca FNTLY PUBLISFE0 IR 6CC/601 (SAYSHORE STR) LOW LEV EL RCUTE MANEUVFD AR E A.

WESTERN ROUNDARY, REFLECTS A RESTRICTION 3NM FACM CFNTERLINF.

THIS REST 2tCTION WAS INPCSEO TO INSURE THAT LOW LEVFL T* AINING FLIGH,TS WCULO REWAIN AT LE AST 1.5 SILES FRCM THE BIG ROCX DDINT NUCLE AR POW ER PLANT.

AS AN CUTGROWTH OF A 1971 AGREEMENT R ETWEEN CONSUPERS FOWER CCMPANY ANO US AF. A RESTRICTION W AS DESIGNE0 TO I N SUR E AN ACECU AT E SAFETY HARGIN FOR SCTH FLANT AND AIFCRAFT l

OPc2ATIONS.

2.

RFCENTLY AN AIRCRAFT ACCCMPLISHING LCW LEVEL ACTIVITY AT B AY S HO P.E STR FLEW OI2FCTLY CV ER THE PLANT.

THIS OV8RFLIGHT CCCURREO EVEN-THOUGH SITE PGRSONNEL NOTIFIED THE CREW TPAT THE WESTERN CORRIDOR LIMIT H40 REFH EXCEEDEO AND THAT CVERFLIGHT CF THE PL ANT WAS I MMI NENT.

THE SERIOUSNESS OF THIS INCIDENT WAS COM80VNDEO RY THE

~

sACT THAT INSTRUCTOR PERSCNNFL WEFE ON BOARD THE AIRCRAFT.

3.

SEC AUSE OF THE SAF =T0Y IMPLICATIONS INHER ENT IN THI S ACTION AND THE SERIOUS CCNSECUENCES CF JURTHER OVERFLIGHTS OF THE PLANT, THE 80LLOWING PROCEDURES WILL EE IMDLEMENTED WITH RECEIDT OF THIS MESSAGE 5.

WHcN IN ATSCRIST CAOSSES THE WESTERN CURR ICCR CF THE ROUTE BETWEE N

l P,CI"TS W ANO X.

THE PERSONNEL AT SAYSFCRE ST* WILL TAKE THE FCLLCWING l

ACTIONS:

III NOTIFY,THE A l tCRAFT EY CALL SIGN THAT ALL SCCRING HAS SEEN C:)

i i

tV i

l 32,..,

====32 pane 01 181908Z JUL 79 UNCL A SSI F IED

=

4 1

1

)

e l

j b.

Based on his torical communication outages and navi_sra'-

tional experience, the chance of an overflight is conservatively g

estimated to be about 1.18 x 10-6 or about one chance in one w

million.

4 k

c.

For any given Bayshore low level bomb run the chance

]

of crash in the one-and-one-half mile circle surrounding the

1. ]

power plant is t:uch less than one in ten tr.illion (.668 x 10-13),

d.

The risk for an entire yeart s operation should be 4

more than about one-and-one-half in ten billion (1.47 x 10 g- ).

Q y

4.

Although the data bare from which these calculations are q

made is not large, there is sufficient confidence in their 4

accuracy to obs erve that even with the "te=porary route" the

]

chance for damage to the nuclear plant from SAC low level ti training flights is extre_:ely low.

.2 W}

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"j'-

a RI HARD J. CA._

3 Operations Analyst d

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P/3 8 DE?ARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

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scamouamuns usins wrAns Aim rencz wasuinates. o.c.

.q 3 0 J'JL 1979 Mr. Richard Silver Division of operating Reactors United States Nuclear Regulatory hg"....;....

i'

'J 0

Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 NUO.iAR Z N' g j

Dear Mr. Silver Reference your ccnversation en 26 July 1979 with Lt Col Stoddard of this Directorate.

This responds to your recuest for flight cperations infer =atien and corrective actions taken in regard to overflight of the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant.

On 5 July 197' 9, a Strategic Air Cc==and (SAC) 3-52 aircraft overflew 'the Big Roch Point, MI, Nuclear Power Plant.

SAC has taken action to preclude a repeat of such incidents.

Corrective actions for both flight crews and operations planners are contained in paragraph three of the attached message (Atch 1).

The main point of the revised procedures is that, if an overflight situation should start to develop whatever the reasen, the flight crew and the ground-based radar bc=b scoring (RSS) personnel will terminate all activities that could interfere with aircraft navigation, and all participants will take i= mediate action to creclude overflight of the nuclear power plant.

In effect, first priority is given to avoiding an overflight incident.

Several regulations apply to low level flight operations and their ecmbined effect is to define and limit the areas and conditions under which such activities may be conducted.

Air Force Regulation 60-16, General Flight Rules, paragraph 5-10, Lew Altitude operations, ays:

"All fixed-wing aircraft operating point-to-int below 1,500 feet AGL (above g:cund level) within airspace under FAA jurisdiction must fly on military low altitude training routes."

This applies directly to SAC flying operations.

Flight Information Publication (FLIP), Area Planning - Military Training Routes (AP/13), provides crews and planners with the necessary information for use of 7he routes.

Paragraph III states:

"All IR, VR, and SR = cute seg=ents on which flight below 1,500' AGL is permitted shall be aligned so that the route perimeter is clear of nuclear pcwer plants (NPP S). "

Chapter 1 of the AP/13 provides the precise route descriptions in'ter=s of turning points, altitudes to be 4

Q/

w Q O T)}f E, 'ac s

or

%4

,qotoG5 c vt c

s

O flown, and corridor widths.

Chapter 5 contains a listing of the gecgraphical locations of all American nuclee jewer plants, with accuracy to the nearest nautical mile.

Finally, the FLIP AP/1B includes a separate planning chart which shows the plot of the various nuclear pcwer plants and their prox 4-4ty to the published icw altitude training routes.

All military training routes listed in FLIP AP/13 have been developed in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration guidelines and procedures.

We hope that the above information will be of assistance to you, and will help you satisfy any require =ents that have developed as a result of the incident.

FOR THE CEIIF OF STAFF 1 Atch EQ SAC / DOT Esg, 181908Z Jul 79 M-NCASTER, col, USAF m

Asst Dep Dir for qperatiens & Training Dir of cpe n tiens & Pe=M,ess e

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v.a === = e-ma nr,== s se.n na..

t PENTAGCN TELECCFMUNIC ATIONS CENTER TFDHINATEn AND THAT AV AB'O RT HAS EEEN AWARDEO. THE !i!TE WILL TFRM IN AT E At.L THREAT SIGNAL EMMISIONS, RUT WI LL CONT,1 NUE TO T RACK WITH THE BOHe SCCSING RACAP.

AIRCP AFT ADVISE THE AIRCP EW THAT THE AloCRAFT WAS EX'ITFD THE CORRIDO g

(71 AND THAT Crt: Tint!FO FL IGHT CN THE S AFE HE ACING WILL RESULT IN OVER.-

FLIC.HT OF DASSING IN THE VICINITY OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT.

(31 15 TH: AIRC2 AFT CONTINUES WITHOUT A HEADING ALTERATION, BAY-p SHO:E STR PF?.50MMEL WILL PE-ADVISE THE AIRCREW THAT C o*1T I NUED FLI nN THF SauF HFADING WILL RESULT I N OV ER FL IGHT OR 8ASSING IN THE p.

VICINI Y CF A ittlCL E A % COWER PLANT.-

9.

PRIOR TO FACH SCHEDULFO FISSION ON IR 600/601, FACM AIRCREW W

.8E BRIE:En DN r RRIDO: RE ST*.ICTIONE ANO THE PROCEOURE S CUTLIN ED !

p, PARAGRAPH 3A 20VE.

RT ACTI A 00RE SSEE S g

001 XCP i

INCCR MATI ON A002ESSEES 001 XCCO

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UNITED STATis

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t.-

WAhlNGToN. O. C. 2CS55

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MEMORANCUM FOR:

Richard O. Silver, Project Manage., ORS 2, COR FROM:

Falk Kantor, Site Analyst, AAB (On Detail to SEP)

SUSJECT:

ADJUSTMENT TO MILITARY TT.AINING ROUTE IN THE VICINITY OF THE SIG ROCK POINT PLANT On January 4,1980, the U.S. Air Force requested permission frem the FAA to adjust the military training route (IR-600/601) which is located 6.6 mi.les (=easured to the centerline of the route) northeast of the Sig Rock Point Plant.

In a telephone conversation on February 5,1980, I was infomed by Mr. Lee Schuldt of the FAA/ Minneapolis ARTCC that per-mission has been granted.

The centerline of the adjusted route will pass approximately 12 miles west of the plant at its closest point of approach. Although other a;ency approvals are required before the change becomes effective, Lt. Col. James Scherer of the Strategic Air Corm:and located at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana (the unit with operational

('

control of the route) has informed me that no problems are anticipated a

now that FAA approval has been received.

Lt. Col. Scherer estimates that the adjustmerit to training route IR-600/601 will be published on May 15, 1980.

~

Falk Kantor, Site Analyst Acciderit Analysis Branch l

Division of Site Safety and l

Environmental Analysis cc:

R. W. Houston n

L. Ziemann i.

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IR ROUU i ossigned altitude until possing AR. Aircrews will not accept on Dit:

Twr (300) 1360 42'16'55"N 92*42'01 altitude lower than 2600' MSL from AG to AA.

Add: Twr (300) 1780 42'01'59"N 96'46'07' e

8 (6) Centerline between the following points is depiud as o 7.5 Add: Twr (275) 1975 41 '40'13"N 92'25'31'

{1{"

NM orc: E to F. H to I, K to L. M to N, Q fo R,5 to T, U to V, W to Add: Twr (404) 1535 40*M 39"N 93'45*27' s

X, Y to Z AC to AD, AG to AH, AJ to AK, AM to AN, AGI to AP, Add: Twr (200) 1284 40'45'53"N 93

• 19'36' '

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AQ to AR, AR to 8C,31 to AS, A5 to AT, AZ to BA, and 8A to $8.

ONC F.18, Edition 4. Jun 79 (7) Aircrews flying IR 599 should be espedolly vigilant between 41'47'00"N/97'02'00"W and 41'56'03"N/96*36'00"W due to Add: Twr (600)

IM7 41 ' 39'56"H 91 '54'24' l possible traffic on VR.510; between 41'49'30"N/ 91 *51'00"W Dit:

Twr (400) 1113 40'41'33"N 91 '23'23' and 41'46'00"N/95'27'30"W due to traffic on VR.511: between Add: Twr (307) 1367 e2'16'54"N 92'42'23'

(

40*23'00"N/93*46'00"W ond 39'41'30"N/93*51'30"W due to Add: Twr (298) 1258 42'09'58"N 92'30'47'

(

traffic on $R.616 and SR.617. "See and Avoid" is the method for Dit:

Twr (315) 1253 42'32'15"N 92' 27'49' g

soporation of troffic between IR.599 and VR.510 and VR.511.

Add: Twr (4381 1888 42'34'56"N 92'26'35' Scheduling is the methH of MAR 5A between IR.599 and SR.616 ONC G-20, Edition 4,Jun 79 and 3R.617.

(8) Aircrews should be noec'olly vigilant of VFR helicopter traffic D!t:

Twr (310) 1343 39'44'33"N 94'15'17' l

on the IR.599 Alternate Entr/ between AY and 88. Traffic con be Md: Twr (264) 1143 39 '35'47"N 93

• 50'03' I

noected from 800' to 1500' AGL between these points.

Add: Twr (200; 1200 39'M'30"N 91'14'30' j

(9) Aircrews using IR.599 Alternate Entry during daylight hours Md: Twr (229) 1474 40

• 37'35"N 91 ' 31'42' will make the following broadcast of AX on 308.8 or 314 3; "8ever Dam, this is (toctical coil sign) on IR.599 Alternate Entry.

IR-600 Point AY ETA is...... " This broodenst is o helicopter advisory only. Aircrews shall not accept ATC type instructions from 8ever ORIGINATING ACT!YlTY:

1 CEVG/RSDet, 8erkad' ole AF8, Dom.

71110 AUTOVON 781-4070/4125.

SCHEDULING ACTIVITY: Eighth AF/ DOTS, Barksdale AF8,

(/

nSFCon 50A of on rou d t e esto uni A IA (41'01'00"N/94*21'C0"W).

71110 AUTOVON 7813917.

HOURS OF OPERATION: Continuous.

(11) Aircrews should be ower s of a 313' AGL tower at PMSV CONTACTS: Wurtsmith (342.5),

K.I.

So nyer (344.

41'21'18 N/92*03'Co"W between AE and AF.

Plattsburgh (239.81.

I (12) Aircrews should be especially vigilant of civil circraft traffic of t

and near the following uncharted orpts:

RuUTE DESCRIPT10M:

(A) 40'45'12 'N 93*44'00"W; (B) 40*43'24"N 93*48'12"W; (C)8 40*M'12"N 93'43'54"W; (D) 40*48'30"N 93'34'06" W; (E1 Altitude Data Pt Fac/ Rad /Dist Lat/Long l

40'08'36"N 93'54'00"W; (F) 40'41'42"N 93'42'00"W:JG)

Crc.u A-UYB TACAN 46'21.9'N 79

• 25.4 39'53'34"N 93'51'48"W; IH) 39*48'24"N 92'03'30"W: (i) et FL 210 oe on s

t 39*57'36"N 92*l3'48"W; (J) 39'59'12"N 92'06'30"W; (K)

I 40*07'54"N 92'05'42"W; (L) 40*22'12"N 91'57'42"W; (M) odn.ned at FL 210 40'24'24"N 91'56'18"W; 'N) 40*38*12"N 91'48'48"W; (O) direct to 8 UY8 020/21 46

• 43.0'N 79

• 20.0 41'23'06"N 92*10'48"W; (P) 41'45'00"N 92*11'00"W.

hn ducend diew Aircrews must be owere of low flying aircraft throughot the route to cross C UYB 020/46 47 ' 07.0'N 79 ' 14.0 and noecially near orpt operations oreos.

4100 MSL (13) Call signs:

g,,,,, t g,,,,d

o. Mobile Site Deep River Bomb Plot. 300.6.

ducend to crus D UY8 010/53 C' 15.0'N 79 ' 25.0'

b. Remote Site 8etheny Bomb Plot. 258.2.

ot 40 M5L

,g (14) The route duignator for flight plan filing will depe 4 on the toen at 40 M5L e.ircute TAS to be flown. Aircrews will file the following.

dirw to E Y58 057/47

&*09.0'N 79'56.0' I

TAS Then turn rk,h* ond ducend to crou Primary Entry / Exit a

350.420 0BH 238/006 IR.599 DSM 080/018 -

(Primary Entry Point) F Y58 053/M 47'09.0'N 80'03.0' 420 500 08H 238/006 FIR 599 DSMC80/018 at 35 MSL l

Prirnery Ent*y/All Exis hn within SFC 8 35 t

350.420 08H 238/006 IR.599 LMN 088/058 M5L direct to G YS8 020/45

&

• 22.0'N 80

• 35.0'

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420 500 08H 238/006 FIR.599 LMN 088/058 Nn within Alt Entry / Primary Exit 5FC 835 MSL 350.420 STL 247/088 IR.599A DSM 080/018 direci to H YTS 230/50 O'56.0'N 82* 10.0' 420 500 STL 247/088 FIR 599A DSM 080/0l8 Nn within I

FSS*', WitW. F10 NM Radius:

[F][,MSL I YT5236/54 4'M0'N 82'20.0' 6HK, L8F, GRI, HLC, OMA, RSL, MCW, 05M. OTM, C!D, MKC.

Nn within g

UIN, CNU, EMP, COU, VtH, 8RL, MHK, SGF, STL, JLN, RFD, DEC, SFC 8 35 MSL RST, L5E, HRO, CGI direct to J SSM 037/73 C

• 25.0'N 83 '20.0'

\\

Then within i

Obstruct!on Data 5FC 8 35 MSL ONC F.17, Edition 4, Mar 79

'u'" 'i ho.

K ~ 55M 035/69 47'24EH83*2 M 9

Md: Twr (306) 1656 41 '37'00"N 95'16'10"W 3

g Add: Twr (300) 2408 41

• 23'4 i'N 98 '33'10'W dir w to i 55M 342/M '

47'24.0'N 84'55.0" I

Add: Twr (210) 2040 41'34'05"N 97*46'26"W kn within Add: Twr (200) 1340 41 '39'u"N 94

• 19'45"W SFC 8 35 M5L M d: Twr (400) 1554 40'34'24"N 93'56'34"W turn left and Add-Twr (500) 2290 41

• 55'16"N 97'36'20"W d m ndte M 55M 337/M 47'210'N 85'02.0' s

Add: Twr (299)

~1229 41 ' 47'38"N 93

• 14'35"W m n,;,hin

}

Add: Twr (205) 790

' 41 '39'01*N 97'32'37"W SFC 8 35 M5L M d: Twr (299) 1309 41'20'02"N 93'43'M"W continu. descent 1 95 S'

e-

g g IR ROUTES 55M 2/63

1. • 185N 85'08.0'W Regulations governing aircraft operations below 500* AGL must be complied with. Aircraf t will cross the end maneuver crea etto crose N

n 5FC 3 23 M5L (Peint W) of the spearied IFR etHitde (1000 M5tl.

within 8 23 MSL ROUTE WIDTH: 4 M either side et centerline from A to 5: 4NM Crect to Q 15M 318/60

• 04EN S$

• TEW riphi and 2.5 NM leit of centerline from 5 to Ut 4 NM right and J 23 M5L turn left to P $5M 312/54 44*59.7N 82*23SW NM left of centerline from U to V 4 NM sither side of consterline from V to I. Re.cntry: 4 NM eitner side of cenkriine from W1 Then within SFC 8 to AE; 4.NM right and 2.5 NM left of unterline from AE to UI.

23 M5L direct to R SSM 304/4 W48#N 85'18SW Then within $FC 3 Special Operating Procedures:

28 M5L cfimb direct (1) Portiopating circraft separatir.n: Route is designored for 5 15M 77/33 44'26#N 85"4.5'W MAR $A operatiens established by coordinated scheduling,

~-

- m wt vru to cross within 5FC 8 23 MSL

(;7 e-

~

TQN q$--

-' ~ -- =

-Q 04.5 AGL 8 23 MSL

(- :'~^-

direct to T PtN341/31 C07.7N 84*S7#W

" J N3 c--

(R: port possing T to Minneopolis ARTCC on 323.0)

(4) Aircews will contoct North Boy Terminoi Control on 233.4 MHz or i

04 AGL 8 23 M5L 234.4 MHa when cro'ssing the 40 NM orc inbou.:d to North Soy d:uend and turn right TACAN.

Aret)

U PtN 333/26 44*00EN 84*58.Q'W 15i AIrcrews scheduled for odditional runs shell 'nonitor 323.0 on to (Start Moneu,ec the re ent.y route.

I d scend dirut 4 AN PLN 320/3

1. 55#N ES'02SW (6k Aircraft flying command directed contour / terrain following 04 AGL 8 23 M!t altitude may be required to fly at minimum tracking elhtude os IIsted in 1 C8VGR 50 3, for STR scored releases. In no case will G4AGL gV PLN 279/05

1. 40SN 85'15.0'W oircroft P; ce ow command directed cantour/ terrain follewing dirut to No within 04 ACL 8 oltitudes.

20 M5L diree to (7) Route car.urline is depicted as a 7.5 NM radius are bets een (Eno Moneuver Area) W TVC 355/33 45'12SN 85'39#W C te 0, E to F, H to I, J to %, L to M. O to *, T the following points:

iReport pcssing W to

._~

n 293.9 Primary 327.1 to U, W to X, W1 to XI to AA. AS to AC. AD to AE to T1.

Suondary)

FSS's Within 100 NM Radius:

Th:n tum right and s'imb to X TVC 335/33 45'11.0'N 85'15SW PLN, CMX, TVC, MQT. M85, GRO., AUW Nn continue dirnb Obstmetion Data i

direo to ron Y TVC331/43

1. 17.0'N 84*010,w ONC F-18, Editica 4 Jun 79 l

et er above 130 M5L

1. '48K'N 81'35y',W m Twr (400) 1800 c',3518 N 82*44 25 W l

• I ass Z TVC 324/43 45*30.0'N 84'23.0'W Add: Twr (554) - 2054 4 H'10"N 84* F'U"W af FL 200 /or as ouigned g

• e. Entry:

Cross (Er.d Moneuver Area) W1 TVC 355/3345'12#N 85*39'#W IR 601 of 20 M5L Nn tum right and t ORIGINATING ACTIVITY:

1 CEVG/RSDR, Sorksdale AFB, CA dlmb to cross XT IVC 335/35 45'11.0'N 85'515'W M110 AUTOVON 7814070.

at 40 MSL SCHEDUUNC ACTIVITP. Eighth AF/DCTS, Sorksdal AFS, LA Nn at 40 MSL continue right turn to AA TVC335/42 W17SN 85*59SW 71110 AUTOVON7813917.

HOUR $ OF OPERATION:Connnuous, N ""' # M3L e'

direct to AS PtN 274/53 45",8.0'N 85'55SW PMSV CONTACTS:X. I. Sawyer p44.6L Duluth (342.51, Wurtsmith right to AC PLN 279/51 W42SN 85*52.0*W (342.51, Grinam (344.6).,

(

" hen or 40 M51 turn

~

ROUTE DEICRIPTION:

Na at 40 M5L ditur AD PtN 324/40 44*09EN 85'16#W Alt!t:de Data Pt Fac/ Rad /Dist Lat/Lang to Then at 40 Mst t""

rtght to AE PtN 337/37 Wi1#N 85*03.0'W Cross A GR8 031/44 45'10.8'N 87'7,8.0'W Nn continue right turn and descend to 71 PtN 341/32 WO7#N 84'57.Q'W of 170 M5L or as esgn Nn deuend direct (Report possing T to Minneopolis ARICC on 323.0) 8 GR8 310/37 45'10#N 88*02.0'W to cross Nn continue right turn and descend to et 140 M5L Nn at 140 MSL Moneuver Ateal U1 PLN 333/26 44*00.0'N 84'58#W dirut to C GR8 351/34 C09EN 88'19#W cross (Start Na turn right and within 04 AGL 8 20 MSL dexand to r) IMT 199/40 45'11EN 88*26.0'W Nnce vio published route

" ""* " ' ^ '

E IMT 207/38

&l5#N 88'32.0*W For Alternete Entry, use oublished IR.401 Alternate Entry.

d o

at or below 90 M5L TERRAIN FOLLOWING OPERAT10NS:

IFR/vFR terroin ithin published Nn continue dexent following is direct to F IMT 227/37 45*24EH 88'46.0*W p dritude blocks trom F to W. When commeno oirecives produde Then turn right and TP/v{sual contour oceroflons, circrews will maintain the IFR continue descent direct

(

ClHiude for each terrain following route segment, g to cron (Primary TA/

'h_- M&

=h.-

TFR Inanonen Point)

G IMT 236/25 W30#N 88*48SW

-- -%4

- jFY of 38 M5L of known men.mose omstructions witnin the route Wdth, 04 AGL 8 38 MSL Commend directives may require addiNonal obstruction deorance dirut to H IMT 289/27 W58.0'N 88'42#W Fer TF/ visual contour operettons. SAC etrcrews should reference SFC 838 M5L SACA 50 4, Vol I, Figv.e 111, for low level minimum cititudes.

1 96

O'NEILL CONTENTION IIE-2 p

Am/

A.-

'THE CONTENT The application has not ade-quately analyzed the possibility of criticality occurring.in the fuel pool because of the in-creased density of storage with-out a gross distortion of the racks.

B.

MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE TO BE HEARD 1.

The NRC Staff has established the maximum k-effecti"o of less than or equal to 0.95 as the acceptance criterion for criticality analyses for spent fuel pools. (NRC Standard Review Plan, Section 9.1.2; Affidavit of Yong S. Kim, pp. 2-5).

2.

The NRC Staff has established guidance for meeting the 0.95 acceptance criteri n.

(Affidavit of Yong S. Kim, pp.5-7).

3.

The criticality analyses performed by Licensee established a minimal k-effective in accordance with the guidance of the NRC Staff. (Affidavit of Yong S.

Kim, p. 9).

4.

The Licensee's criticality analysis assumes pure.

water as the moderator and uses a temperature of 7.12 F, which gives the largest pool k-effective in ecordance with the guidance of the NRC Staff.

(Affidavit of Yong S. Kim, p. 9).

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i

_- _-. /^)

V 5.

Calculations set forth in the Licensee's criti-cality analysis were performed under the assumption of radial and~ axial infinity; heice, k-infinity is

}

used in the analysis as a conservative component.

(Affidavit of Yony ~, Kim, p.

9).

6.

Licensee's criticality analysis took account of j.-

the var &_ 0s uncertainties associated with mechanical tolerances and the variations in rack can stainless steel composition and fuel enrichment. (Iffidavit of Yong S. Kim, pp. 9-12, paragraphs (d) and (g)).

7.

Licensee's analysis took account of the neutron absorption in stainless steel cans and applicable 4

postulated accidents. (Affidavit of Yong S. Kim, pp. 10-11).

{

8.

The Licensee'r criticality analysis demonstrates that, taking into account material facts one 3

through seven above, the maximum k-effective value for the exp.

' ion of the capacity _of the Big Rock' spent fuel pool is 0.95, and such value meets the i

NRC Scaff's acceptance criterion. (Affidavit of Yong S.

Kim, p. 12).

C.

DISCUSSION Mr. O'Neill's Contention IIE-3 asserts a general r'~)T challenge to the adequacy of the criticality analysis which was

\\.

j 1

.. performed by the Licensee in support of its application for a license amendment to expand the capacity of the Big Rock spent fuel pool.

No specific criticism of the analysis is 4

asserted.

Consequently, the affidavit of Yong S. Kim ad-dresses all pertinent aspects of the criticality analysis in terms of sati.sfying the requirements of the NRC Standr4rd Review Plan and the applicable guidance provided by the NRC Staff.

As the affidavit of Dr. Yong S.

Kim ampli Temonstrates, his analyris meets all applicable NRC requirements.

This I'

conclusion is confirmed by the findings of the NRC Staff in their Safety Evaluation Report (SER) " Relating to the Modifi-cation of the Spent Fuel Storage Pool" for Big Rock Point, dated May 15, 1981.

Section 3.1 of the SER presents the NRC Staff's evaluation of the Licensee's criticality analysis, and Subsection 3.1.2 states that the maximum k-effective for the Big Rock spent fuel pool will not exceed 0.95.

No factual issue has been raised by Mr. O'Neill on his Contention IIE-3 which controverts the facts established in the Affidavit of Dr. Yong S.

Kim, and accordingly, Licensee is entitled to summary disposition of the Contention as a matter of law.

O

_