ML20031D260
| ML20031D260 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 10/05/1981 |
| From: | Miller D MILLER, D.S., SENSIBLE MAINE POWER |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20031D261 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OLA, NUDOCS 8110130189 | |
| Download: ML20031D260 (17) | |
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1 O(#gg UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSI w
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v Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of
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Docket No. 50-309 OLA
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MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMP UY,
)
(To Increase and Modify
)
(Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station), )
Spent Fuel Pool Storage
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Applicant. )
and SW tems; Co f } % -
INTERVENOR'S SPECIFIC CONTENTIONS E
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Introduction
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ss This proceeding was initiated by Maine Yankee Atorlicj Power. s \\.
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Company, (" Applicant"), by application filed September 18, 1979.
Applicant seeks approval of operating license amendments which would allow it to increase and modify the amount, duration and methods of high-level radioactive waste storage at its Wiscasset, Maine, nuclear facility.
More specifically Applicant seeks:
(1)
To increase the amount of high-level radioactive waste to be stored in l',s spent fuel pool to a volume of 2,551 spent fuel as-semblies, or more than eight times the amount for which said pool was designed and upon which basis the original approval was granted; f
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and (2) To maintain such increased storage for at least the 35-5 year license term of the facility, rather than the temporary storage I/t of lesser amounts for which said pool was designed and upon which G
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basis said original approval was granted. I In further specificity, Applicant proposes to increase the amount of waste fuel to be stored in its spent fuel pool by:
(1)
"Reracking", or storing spent fuel assemblies closer to-gether in a new and denser racking configuration; l
)
(2)
"Pinpacking", or asserting additional spent fuel rods or I
pins into CEA and guide tube openings, yielding a denser packing of pins within each bundle or assembly; and (3)
Using the spent fuel laydown area for spent fuel storage.2
~
Pursuant to notice of Applicant's propecea amendments published i
in the Federal Register, Sensible Maine Power, ("SMP"), a naine ci-tizens' group, petitioned in a timely manner for leave to intervene and was granted same.
SMP filed 14 specific contentions on April 28, 1980, nine of which were subsequently recommended by NRC Staff Coun-sel as acceptable for hearing.
After delays not immediately material to the presentation of the instant contentions, the State of Maine, previously a participant in an "interected state" status, sought a l
rore active role, and on July 27, 1981, SMP and Maine filed Specific Contentions.
At a Special Prehearing Conference on August 11, 1981, I
SMP was granted Intervenor's status,3 but not Maine, on an asserted I There is in fact no existing assurance that these wastes will ever be removed from the site; stated otherwise, there is no existing assurance that the long-term nuclear waste storage here sought by j
Applicant is not the request for this country's first permanent nuclear waste dump.
2Such use of this area would - by Applicant's own admission - great-ly diminish, if not in fact altogether negative, Applicant 's capa-bility to prepare spent fuel for shipmen offsite.
30n the basis of SMP's SpecificContention No. S.
Although consider-able redrawing and renumbering of contentions has been effected here-in, this item has been kept unchanged for simplicity of reference. _ _ _ _ - -.
l basis of having failed to state one good coni untion.
After various scheduling changes, this Board granted SMi> and Maine leave to file amended Specific Contentions on or before October 5,1981.
Procedural Considerations At least two matters of procedural import must be recognized before presenting SMP's Specific Contentions: First, as of the date of this filing, Applicant has not yet submitted all necessary infor-mation requested by the NRC Staff, ("Staf f"), concerning the pro-posed scheme;b and, second, the Staff has not yet prepared either its Safety Evaluation Report or its evaluation of the environmental im-pact of Applicant's proposed modifications.E Thus SMP is burdened to propound these Specific Contentions without complete and specific ~ information from Applicant and Staff.
SMP therefor asserts the right to amend these contentions, as neces-sary and without further showing, to conform to such new, differing or additional information as Staff and Applicant may subsequently present.
SMP'S SPECIFIC CONTENTIONS 1
Any and all actions by the Staff and any and all actions by the Commission, in treating and deciding Applicant's proposed amendments, constitute " major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" as to which an Environment Impact Statement is required under 42 USC 84332.
bSMP Counsel respectfully directs the attention of this Board to recent Staff-Applicant correspondence, attached as "SMP Exhibit 1",
and demonstrating the Applicant's failures to furnish requested in-formation in a.imely manner.
DIt should also be noted that, in the interests of enhancing and im-proving its contenticns, SMP has pursued informal discovery upon both Staff and Applicant, essentially to no avail.
Documentation can be furnished upon this point, if requested.
Incorporating by reference the applicable contentions set forth more extensively below,6 such Statement should consider the environ-mental impacts of:
(a)
Applicant's proposed "d/r/c schemo"7 leading to critical-ity within the spent fuel pool and to radioactive emissions in excess of regulatory limits and alara; (b)
The occurrence of a fuel handling accident within.Appli cant's d/r/c scheeme leading to the release of radioactive en1ssions in excess of regulatory limits and alara;
'c)
A loss of coolant from the spent fuel pool leading to an exothermic reaction within the pool and to heat and radioactive emissions in excess of regulatory limits and alara; (d)
Insufficiency or inadequacy of the spent fuel pool cool-ing system, short of criticality, to maintain the spent fuel pool and its contents within regulatory limits or alara in terms of heat and radioactive emissions; (e)
The totality of the weight, mass and volume of radioac-tive waste sought to be stored under Applicant's d/r/c schame, being more than eight times the amount of spent fuel for which this pool was destgned and upon which basis it was approved; and (f)
Heat and radioactive emissions originating with materials deterioration and technical failures from storing a significantly 6While the Commission's rules of practice and procedure may favor a policy of "each contention standing alone", Intervonor respect-fu13y urges that, for purposes of manageable length and comprehen-sion, this form of reference be permitted.
I This short form of reference to Applicant's proposed " disassembly /
reassembly /corapaction scheme" is used and intended by SMP counsel to include both "pinpacking" and "reracking" together; where appro-priate, these latter terms will be separated.,
greater amount of fuel over a much longer period - that is, more than eight times the amount originally approved over at least a 35-year period, rather than much less fuel on a temporary basis.
Also favoring preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement is Applicant's proposed use of the spent fuel laydown area for stor-age of spent fuel, which use would diminish if not in fact negative Applicant's capability of preparing spent fuel for shipment offsite; last, a number of environmentally preferable alternatives exist, consideration of which is required by 42 USC 84332(2)(C)(111).
For these reasons, both individually and cumulatively, an Environmental Impact Statement, prepared pursuant to 42 USC 84332 (2)(C) and Part 51 of the Commission's Regulations, is required for the proposed modifications.
2 On the basis of prematurity, the instant application is procedurally defective as to parts, in that Applicant has not shown the need for immediate approval of all such parts.
More particular-ly and upon its own estimates, Applicant has at least six years' storage capacity without approval of any of its proposed amendments; assuming the grant of Applicant's amendment upon reracking,0 Appli-l l
cant would have adequate storage capacity until at least 1996, or l
for at least another fifteen years.
Thus application for amendments upon pinpacking and the utilization of the spent fuel laydown area for storage purposes is at this juncture unnecessary and untimely.9 l
OIntervenor does not by this statement intend to concede or compro-mise any rights to challenge, whether legally or factually, Appli-cant's proposed amendment for reracking.
9SMP anticipates pursuing motions practice upon these points, and frames this Contention, at least in part, to obviate defenses sound-ing in waiver,- estoppel, or a failure to plead.
-9
4 3.
(a)
Applicant has not adequately identified, described or analyzed the specific operating procedures to govern its pro-posed d/r/c scheme.
Applicant has not shown that public health and safety will not be endangered by its pursuit of said scheme.
(b)
Such statement of procedures should include a thor-ough and detailed uescription of management, personnel and technical practices, including guidelines concerning the hiring, testing, training and supervision of all personnel to be engaged in the d/r/c scheme.
(c)
The need for said specific operating procedures is especially critical where insufficiently trained, untrained, un-qualified or improperly supervised personnel have been engaged in potentially hazardous activities in spent fuel handling in the past:
E.g., " Inspection 50-309/80-04" revealed the following failures in Applicant's operation of its spent fuel pool: February 11, 1980 --
worker knoclyed into pool; February 18, 1980 -- improper positioning of spent fuel assembly; February 20, 1980 - inadvertent removal of CEA from fuel assembly.
(d)
Applicant's failure to furnish the above-described information in a timely manner (1) Prohibits or obstructs the Staff from a proper discharge of its obligations under NEPA, and (ii) Un-reasonably prejudices Intervenor in the formulation and preparation of Specific Contentions to the point of working a denial of due process against Intervenor and its members.
4.
Neither Applicant nor Staff has sufficently analyzed or considered certain reasonable and environmentally preferable alter-natives to Applicant's proposed amendments.
Alternatives (a)-(g).
would avoid or obviate the risks and consequences to the public health safety and welfare, and to the environment, as set forth in these Contentions; alternatives (h)-(j) would postpone the need for Applicant 's proposed amendments.
These alternatives are:
(a)
The construction of another, new or additional spent fuel pool onsite; (b)
The physical expansion or enlargement of the existing spent fuel pool; (c)
The construction of a new spent fuel pool offsite; (d)
The contracting out or transshipment of spent fuel for storage at another power plant, or commercial or government-owned spent fuel storage facility, current information from the Commission indicating that the same will be available by 1984; (e)
The development of alternative onsite storage methods, including storage in dry casks, caissons, vaults or concrete can-nisters, either alone or within containment structures;10 (f)
The conversion of the facility enabling it to burn coal, oil, gas or other non-nuclear fuel; (g)
Closing or shutting down the facility when the spent fuel pool reaches the currently-approved storage level and drawing power from: (1) Existing hydroelectric capacity currently available from flydro-Quebec ; (ii) liydroelectric sources under development at exist-ing damsites within the State of Maine and availble by 1987; and l
(iii) Purchase of power from the Point Lepreau nuclear facility in New Brunswick, Canada, a nuclear generating station of about 1,000 megawatts capacity due on line in late 1982; f
10Applicant's site measures at least 740 acres, or an area one ard l
one-sixth miles square.
I l
(h)
Derating the facility, that is, reducin6 plant output and thereby reducing the generation of opent fuel; II (1)
Extending fuel burnup times and thereby retarding the rate of generating spent fuel; and (j)
Surrendering all or part of the spent fuel currently stored subject to reprocessing for military weapons purposes.
S.
Applicant has failed to demonstrate that occupational exposures resulting from its proposed d/r/c scheme will be kept witn HRC regulatory limts or alara.
Workers will receive more than allowable dosages from increased handling of denser fuel assemblics.
This contention refers to the handling of normal as well as leaking or damaged fuel pins during diassembly and reassembly, and to the end of the licensed period, 2008.
6.
(a)
Neither Applicant nor Staff has adequately consid-ered, analyzed or dernonstrated that the liquid and gaseous radioac-tive emissions likely to result from the proposed d/r/c scheme, or adverse environmental effects from the same, will be kept within regulatory limits, including alara.
Harmful radioactive emissions most likely to occur are Iodine 131, Cesium 137, Strontium 90 and Tritium.
(b)
Neither Applicant nor Staff has adequately consid-dered, analyzed or demonstrated that additional heat cuissions like-ly to be discharged in the vicinity of the plant will be within regulatory limits, alare, or justifiable on a cost-benefit basis.
II Intervenor intends by this part of thiu Contention to include fuel assemblies not yet fully expended which may have been trans-ferred to the spent fuel pool, yet which retain some useful life for fuel purposes.
_e-
(c)
These emissions are rendered more likely by the significantly increased handling and rehandling of spent fuel, the higher and denser concentrations of spent fuel handled, and the greater decay heat generated by the spent fuel. as handled, stored and compacted under Applicant's proposed amendments.
7 Applicant's proposals do not ensure that spent fuel pool conditions will be maintained within regulatory or design limits in the event of a Class 9 or other extreme accident in the main reac_
tor.
In support of basis and credibility in this Contention, SMP cites the Three Mile Island incjdent.
Neither Applicant nor Staff has shown that in such case the electrical systems, cooling systems and plant personnel will function sufficiently well to ensure the continued safe operation of the spent fuel pool, especially under circumstances where the facility would be evacuated.
Further, and given greater amounts of more densely pa cked fuel, all adverse consequences would be worsened by Applicant's proposed d/r/c scheme, including especially any exothermic reaction of the spent fuel upon loss of coolant.-
8.
Applic_... has not adequately considered or analyzed the likelihood or consequences of a possible loss of cooling capacity o
or function in the spent fuel pool under the conditions presented by its proposed d/r/c scheme.
More particularly, Applicant has not sufficiently considered or analyzed the effects of failures of one or more pumps, heat exchangers, transmission lines, or the loss of ecolant.
Applicant has not sufficiently shown or analyzed the heat and radioactivity likely to be generated in such cases, nor its capability to control the same within regulatory limits.
_9_
- 9. (a) Applicant has not adequately considered or analyzed changes in coolant flow chara:teristics in the spent fuel pool un-der its proposed scheme.
More particularly, Applicant hee not shown that the cooling system will be adequate to prevent " hot spots",
possible boiling, or other uncontrolled high temperature phenomena.
(b)
Applicant has not properly accounted for reduced cooling water flow in its pinpacking scheme, the occurrence of which would lead to localized boiling and increased radiation releases and cccu-pational exposures.
The health and safety of the public and the plant workers is therefore not assured.
The pinpacking scheme increases resistance to cooling water flow.
Four-inch pathways below racks, one-inch openings between racks, and one-eighth-inch gaps between rods and racks allow only limited water movement.
As a result, water within and above the rods may begin to boil.
This boiling may deteriorate the spent fuel cladding more rapidly.
Boiling may also give rise to an in-creased k in the boral-packed configuration.
Applicant has not eff performed calculations, nor hac the NRC Staff properly questioned the Applicant, regarding localized boiling and its consequences.
Calculation have been performed by Applicant only on bulk pool boiling.
10.
Applicant has not demonstrated adequate assurance against materials deterioration or failures in materials integrity resulting from the increased generation of heat and radioactivity in the spent fuel pool as a result of its proposed d/r/c scheme.
The adverse ef--
facts which should be addressed are: (a) Deterioration of fuel clad-..
ding as a result of exposure to increased decay heat and radiation levels during extended periods of fuel storage; (b) Loss of materi-als integrity of storage racks and pool liner as a result of expo-sure to higher levels of radiation over extended periods; and (c)
Deterioration of concrete pool structure as a result of exposure to increased heat over extended periods.
11.
Applicant has not presented sufficient assurances against adverse effects from extreme seismic phenomena upon its modified spent fuel storage.
Such analysis should demonstrate the seismic /
traumatic durability and tolerance of fuel pins, fuel assemblies, storage racks, pool liner and concrete structure under the changed circumstances, specifically, greater weights of more densely packed fuel, different racking configurations, and the implementation of the pinpacking methodology.
Such inquiry and showing by Applicant are especially critical where nearby geophysic faults and seismic phenomena were not fully known, recognized or appreciated until relatively recently -- i.e.,
the "Robinhood Fault", within 500 yards of the facility, was the site of an earthquake registering 4.5 on the Richter Scale in early April, 1979.
This hazard was recognized at a meeting of NRC Commis-sioners, acknowledging an increase in the probability of a seismic event exceeding containment design specifications from I in 10,000 to 1 in 100 probability.
Applicant must show that its proposed d/r/c scheme, including especially new storage racks, changed racking configurations, and pinpacking methodology and mechanisms, are designed to and can with-stand significant seismic phenomena. ---
Last, before any major undertakings which increase the conse-quences of a large seismic event are permitted at this facility, Applicant must undertake a new and more adequate seismic analysis of the plant site, including borings and soundings in an approved manner.
Analycis of fuel movement, friction and related factors should be performed in the light of actual local, or site-specific, conditions, and not by application of a generic standard.
12.
Applicant has not presented adequate assurances that the spent fuel storage systems in its proposed scheme would withstand an aircraft crash into the spent fuel pool from the adjacent Wis-caseet Airport, less than a mile from Applicant's facility.
Said airport has recently been undergoing a process of enlargement both in volume of traffic handled and in size of aircraft accomodated.
Penetration by the faster and larger aircraft using such air-port into Applicant's spent fuel pool building and pool would exceed the limits.of analyses thus far performed by Applicant..The dura-bility of fuel assemblies, storage racke and pool containment struc-ture should be demonstrated by Apllicant.
The higher volume of more densely packed fuel proposed under Applicant's d/r/c scheme would significantly worsen the consequences of such event.
Applicant must show that radioactive releases in such a case would be kept within regulatory limits.
13.
Applicant has not sufficiently considered or analyzed the consequences of an accident involving tho dropping of a fuel assembly or fuel cask in the pool under the conditions' created by i
its d/r/c scheme.
Given the higher concentration of fuel in the spent fuel pool, such accident is more likely to yield a greater m
-~
1 generation of heat and radioactivity.
Additionally and more particularly, new, empty spent fuel casks weighing at least several tonn each can be carried directly over filled spent fuel racks in use in the pool because Applicant's fuel handling system is without interlocks to prevent the same.
Further, f.pplicant has neither analyzed nor demonstrated the means of protecting against accidents in which dropped spent fuel assemblica or spent fuel caska could be deflected by the edge of the spent fuel' pool and into stored fuel.
Applicant must demonstrate the means of protecting against such accidents, and the capability of controlling harm fram the same in the event they occur; this is especially true where highly concen-trated stored fuel could, upon sufficient impact, achieve criticality.
14.
(a)
Neither Staff nor Applicant has adequately consid-cred or analyzed the long-term health, safety and environmental ef-fects of Applicant's proposed amendments with respect to such periods of time over which the spent fuel pool 10 likely to be used beyond the expiration of Applicant's operating license.
(b)
Further, insofar as Applicant fails to consider the costs of such long-term operation and maintenance of the spent fuel pool beyond the expiration of its license, such failure invalidates all cost-benefit analyses relative to the proposed amendments.
15.
Applicant has not demonstrated any assurance, as required by 10 CFR 850.33(f), that it is financially qualified to decommis.
sion the! plant at the end of. its useful life, including the disposal of the accumulated irradiated nuclear fuel.
The presence of 35 years' worth of irradiated nuclear fuel is '
of great concern to Intervenor and its members.
Applicant's only asset le the Maine Yankee nuclear reactor.
At the end of its use-ful life, sufficient funds must be set aside not only to decommis-sion the nuclear reactor but also te transport and dispose of a large quantity of irradiated nuclear fuel.
The latter aspect, in fact, may well cost more than the former.
Intervonors, in posing this contention, urge a guaranteed financial mechanism for such de-commissioning so that Maine taxpayers will not be burdened with the This is an issue wNich has not becn previously adjudicated expense.
since it was not the previous intention of Applicant, when origin-ally licensed, to store 35 years worth of irradiated nuclear fuel on site.
16.
The Applicant has not demonstrated that the irradiated nuclear fuel pool will not go critical, leading to a major release of radiation and radioactivity.
The health and safety of the public and p3act workers is therefore not assured.
The Applicant's own calculations show that k,ff will be greater than 1 for center-to-center spacing of 10.25 inches, the spacing ad-vocated by Applicant in its July 28, 1981, filing with the Commis-1 sion.
The Applicant's figure of k versus fuel rack nominal spac-eff ing, (Letter froa Applicant to NRC dated September 29, 1980), shows k
approaching a vertical asymptote at center-to-center spacing gff greater than 10.25 inches.
This was.at a time -when Applicant was i
considering storage containers providing center-to-center ~ spacing of 10.5 inches.
However, a more recent filing, ( Applicant's letter to NRC dated-July 28, 1981), indicates that the Applicant will utilize a 10.25 inch -spacing, which the Applican c considers "a-fine tuning of the rack design."
Further, the Intervonor does not believe, based on the sketchy information available to it, that the Appli-cant's computer code correctly models the boral plate pin configur-ation.
The model shows that the more fuel which is compressed into each storage bin, the lower will be the k due to lesser water 4
eff moderation.
However, less water mod 9 ration may allow neutrons to cacape one storage bin and enter another, or be captured by boron.
The Applicant has not discussed the computer code nor has the NRC sufficiently questioned the Applicant.
It is the intention of the Intervenor to examine the physical assumptions and modelling of the code, without actually examining the detailed program.
Final]y, in evaluating the criticality of the pinpacLea :onfiguration, the Ap-plicant has not taken into account the fissilt Plutonium.
The Pla-tonium cross-section has a different neutron velocity dependence than U-235.
17.
The Applicant has not shown that it is technically quali-I fled to manage the proposed pin storage (pinpacking) operation in a manner which protects the public health and safety, as required by 10 C/R 50.34.
The Applicant has nowhere shown that it has the experience or capability to carry out the proposed pin storage operation as outlined in the amended SAR.
The operation requires disassembling fuel assem-blies, and placing the individual rods in guides called fuel spacer grida (" egg crates").
The crated rods are then placed in individual holders within the pool.
The tolerance between the crates and the storage racks is one-eighth-inch on a side.
Because or
- a. narrow tolerance for both storing pins in crates and storing crated pins in racks, and because of the possibility of deformation in the rods, -
l crates and racks, it is possible that r-ome crates and roos cannot be stored in this configuration.
Applicant has not shown what will be done with those " outcasts".
Further, the acceablies, less the fuel roas, are extremely radio-active and will have to be dispocod of in a federal repository, though r.one is presently sited.
Applicant has not shown any near-term op-tions for handling this highly radioactive waste material.
18.(a) Applicant's proposed scheme significantly worsens the conse-4 quences from a loss of coolant, loss of cooling function, exothermic reaction, or criticality event because of the greater mass of more con-centrated fuel being stored.
(b)
The denser fuel storage configuration of Applicant's pro-posed scheme is highly likely to diminish the time period between loss of cooling function and exothermic reaction in the spent fuel pool, and similarly diminish the amount of time needed to reach criticality, and thus prompt evacuation is a necessity to Applicant's proposals.
(c)
Applicant has not shown, and it must show, that its public warning system and the evacuation plan currently in effect are suffi-cient to protect the safety, health and welfare of persons within the area likely to be adversely affected and requiring prompt evacuation l
when necessary.
4 (d) Demonstrative of Applicant's failure to establish and main-tain a safe and satisfactory warning system, and to manage it safely 4
i and properly, Applicant's siren system sounded several false alarms on or about August 23, 1981, and Applicant failed entirely of its duty to broadcast corrective information by radio ar.d television.
(c)
Applicant's use of a ten mile radius as the basis of its evacuation plan is altogether insuf ficient, a more realistic radius,-- - -. -. - -,- - -. - -
being 25 miles.
Applicant must show that persons within this outer radius would not be significantly adversely af fected in the event of a major radioactive release from the spent fuel pool, especially in view cf the vastly greater amount of more concentrated fuel sought to bestoredunderApplicant'sproposalsl.xdsGW D Wid Santee Miller Counsel for Intervenor SMP 213 Morgan Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
20001 Telephone:(202) 638-0483 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I have served and/or filed the foregoing Specific Contentions by mailing copies of the same, first class regu-lar mail postage prepaid, to the following named persons or offices, and by "next-day-delivery" mail to Applicant 's Counsel, this 5th day of October, 1981 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cman.
Office of Executive Legal Dir.
Docketing & Service Branch U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
Washington, D. C.
20555 Washington, D. C.
20555 (Twenty copies plus original)
Thomas G. Dignan, Jr., Esq.
Robert M. Lazo, Esquire, Chairman Ropes and Gray Atomic Safety & Licensing Board 225 Franklin Street U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Boston, MA 02110 Washington, D. C.
20555 Rufus E. Brown, Esquire Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr.
Dept. of Attorney General Director, Bodega Marine Laboratory Augusta, Maine 04333 University of California P. O. Box 247 Bodega Bay, CA 94923 P6ter A. Morris, Esquire Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 o
David Santee Miller Counsel for Intervenor SMP to_