ML20031C183

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Discusses Change 19 to OL to Permit Use of Pu Enriched Fuel Assemblies in Excess of Present 50 Kg Limit.Change Could Signal Trend Towards All Pu Enriched Core & Should Not Be Permitted W/O re-evaluation of Fission Product Inventory
ML20031C183
Person / Time
Site: Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/18/1970
From: James Shea
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
NUDOCS 8110060612
Download: ML20031C183 (2)


Text

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i.lCENSE AUTHORITY 50-= Cu-Q.

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UNITED STATES et f -.

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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION-(

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ORB #2, DRL FUEL ASSEMBLIZS BIG ROCK POINT - CHANGE No.19

.IHREE Pu0 -UO2 2

Amendment No. 3 (April 1969) authorized Consumers Power Capany to possess 50 kg of plutonium in mixed oxide fuel rods for rradiation As of this date Consumers has used

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in the Big Rock Point core.

1 kg of Pu in the 32 fuel rods irradiated during operating ~ '

about cycle No. 7 (May 1969 to February 1970) and 17.5 kg in the three special EEI Pu0,,-UO fuel bundles. Ccasumers Power Company could, 9

if they chose, Yabricate and insert into the core four.or five more, mixed oxide fuct assemblics simila~r to the EEI bundles without violating the operating license or the revised technical specifications.

However, any further increase in the use of plutonium enriched fuel would necessitate a change to the cperating license to permit possession of plutonium in excess of the present limit of 50 kg, and could signal Such a change a definite trend towards cn all plutonium enriched core.

should not be permitted without a comprehensive re-evaluation of the core fission product inventory that necessarily accompanies a shif t to plutonium enrichment and longer fuel exposure (greater than 20,000 It may be necessary to adjust radiation dose

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MWD /T fuel depletion).

calculational methods to more accurately account for particle releases,'

impose new operating restrictions, or allow for. engineered safety features.

If the variety.of fuel rods per bundic and the dependence on burnable poison is to increase or be extt.ded to full cores, the consequences of fuel rod assembly errors should be evaluated. Assembly and inspection Such complex fuel arrangements can be procedures should be reviewed.

justified for a small number of bundles such as the three EEI bundles, for general assembly, line acceptance,more investigation is required.

but threshold of failure, 265 cals/gm for PuO -UO,, fuel rods, 2

The prompt is accepted on a temporary basis based on the 1imited SPERT IV tests performed to date. Any increase above this level should consider whether local vaporization perturbations (energy release) are large This uncertainty, enough to destroy the clad and disperse the fuel.

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unless coprecipitation of Pu0,, and L'O, is employed in preparation of the fuel mix, may necessitat:: a conschatively low value for the

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prompt failure threshold.

SPERT tests with particles as large as 200-500 microus would be valuable.

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