ML20031B366

Statement of Contentions Re Application for CP Extension & Motions to Suppl Contentions Re OL Application.Several Significant Matters Affecting Health & Safety Must Be Considered in CP Extension Hearing.W/Certificate of Svc

ML20031B366
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	09/24/1981
From:	SHOREHAM OPPONENTS COALITION, TWOMEY, LATHAM & SHEA
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20031B363	List: ML20031B362 ML20031B364 ML20031B366
References
ISSUANCES-CP, NUDOCS 8110010284
Download: ML20031B366 (47)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:.- 1.$, %f a '95 j UNITED STATES OF AMERICA h NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j

q BEFORE Tile ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

@I ?.$ In.the Matter of ) Ti ) Long Island Lighting Company ) Docket No. 50-322

)

(Shoreham NucI;;r Power ) p.. Station, Unit ;) ) CP .,y. V, '[.: [ SHOREHAM OPPONENTS COALITION'S STATEMENT T OF CONTENTIONS PURSUANT TO 10 CFR SECTION a l3 f 4 2.714, WITH RESPECT TO THE APPLICATION FO A CONSTRUCTION PERMIT EXTENSION N CMt;T3 \\

2

• M MOTION PURSUANT TO 10 CFR SECTION 2.714 TO SUPPLEMENT I

3EE 2 31981,' * ~2 Y CONTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE APPLICATION FOR AN OPERATING LICENSE p om.e vag 'c? 4 fal:Ur & Sch [ y 3 tog ,s. INTRODUCTION cn d E. '.0 On November 26, 1980, the Long Island Lighting Company ("LILCO") requested that the Nuclear Regulatory s Commission ("NRC") extend the completion date in the .'k(. . permit,.for the. construction of the Shoreham Nuclear j. . Power Station, Unit 1, from Deceiaber 31, 1980 to March 4l s - - 5 ") 31, 1983. On December 31, 1980 and January 23, 1981, the Shoreham Opponents Coalition (" SOC") requested the NRC to conduct a hearing on LILCO's application for a construction permit ("CP") extension pursuant to Section 189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended ("AEA"). In the same petition, SOC requested that the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ("NRR") institute 8110010284 81092'$ PDR ADOCK 05000322 O PDR E

T' proceedings, pursuant to 10 CPR Section 2.206, to consider suspending or revoking the CP, or reissuing the ) permit with certain conditions (SOC Petition of. January 23, 1981, p.1). j On June 17, 1981, SOC instituted litigation against the NRC in the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, and District Court (E.D.N.Y. ) challenging the NRC's failure to grant SOC a hearing on the application for a CP extension and the NRC's additional failure to rule on SOC's petition under 10 CPR Section 2.206. On July 22, 1981, the Commission granted SOC's request for a hearing under Section 189(a) of the AEA

• subject to the petitioner advancing at least one litigable contention" and directed that an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ("ASLB") be convened to consider and rule on SOC's contentions.

Soon thereafter this Board was given responsibility for the construction permit extension hearing in addition to the operating license application. On June 26, 1981, the Director of NRR decided not to suspend LILCO's CP for the Shoreham facility, and relegated all other issues raised by SOC in its January 23, 1981 petition to the ASLB for disposition in either the hearing on LILCO's request for a CP extension or the j u;:oming hearing on the application for an operating Itcense (DD-81-9, pp. 2, 5). ~2 l -%.y-,ee. w.

'i @e 3 In its petition, dated January 21, 1981, SOC j ':i outlined a number of matters which it believes must be 'j %j addressed in connection with the request for a CP L 7) l extension or, minimally, as early as possible prior to ij the operating license review, in proceedings under 10 CFR Section 2.206. E B Q 1. 8 SOC'S STATEMENT OF CONTENTIONS PURSUANT TO 10 CFR SECTION 2.714 WITH RESPECT TO LILCO'S APPLICATION FOR AN EXTENSION 'IO THE SHOREHAM CONSTRUCTION PERMIT "y .Is SOC contends that several significant matters .I affecting health and safety must be considered in .l deciding whether to extend the Shoreham construction permit. When the construction of a nuclear facility is not h'h 4'complet'ied'by the date prescribed in a construction )r . _ permit, "the construction permit shall expire, and all F rights thereunder be forfeited, unless upon good cause shown, the Commission extends the completion date." AEA Section 185. See also 10 CFR Section 50.55(b). In determining the scope of " good cause" and what matters are to be considered in a hearing on an application for a CP extension, the ASLB must look at MM

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!.iN y the " totality of the circumstances," and invoke a -j[ l .qf " common sense" approach. Northern Indiana Public j } L I Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear 1), 4' I p. L ALAB-619, 12 NRC 558, CCH Nuclear Regulation Reports, ${ ,]s l para. 30,544, pp. 29,623-24 (1980). The Board and, ultimately, the Commission, are to be " guided by the If cons'iderations which govern the issuance of initial I licenses or construction permits to the extent T Sb y.} practicable and appropriate." 10 CPR Section.50.91. o As the Atomic Safety. and Licensing Appeal Board 5, 25 ("ASLAB") has made clear, SOC and the ASLB are not jj

• k restricted in their exploratic.a of thc " good cause" for jg 3

extending LILCO's CP to an examination of the reasons h for delay alleged by LILCO. Northern Indiana Public g 3, service Co., supra, at p. 29,625. In the NIPSCO case j, the ASLAB analyzed the standard for litigability [it established in earlier ASLAB decisions. The ASLAB had

?

3 go-j previously held that intervenors in construction permit

} !)jl) extension hearings r y, "could litigate only those safety or environ- ~ mental issues which both (1) arose from the reasons assigned in justification of the request for a construction permit extension; and (2) could not, consistent with the protection of the interests of intervenors or the public interest, ' appropriately abide the event of the environmental review facility operating license hearing.'" Ibid, citing Indiana and Michigan Electric Co. (Donald C. Cook, Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-129, 6 AEC 414 (1973). ' f

t a 4! M: if 20 .:s

TS The Appeal Board rejected arguments by staff and

}94g applicant that intervenors can be told to withold yf .c concerns, such as site suitability contentions,, until ].) the operating license stage has arrived. The Board }bd recognized that some issues must be explored early in j&', the process, rather then later, "following a substantial [?j.,

n..

additional monetary investment." Ibid. .3 '/4. ...'i Ultimately, the Board went on to hold that it would 'i 3 not allow consideration of those issues which were ./ unrelated to the utility's alleged reasons for delay in , ). construction in the construction permit extension G g r proceedings. But it did so only because in that case

24

[jf the parties had access to another remedy, i.e., that the I issues in question were appropriate for consideration in $i w .Il a proceeding under 10 CFR Section 2.206. 3' It is at this point that the critical difference ',{ g). between the NIPSCO and the Shoreham cases arises. The 3 U v,

Direc~ tor of :NRR has already refused under 10 CFR Section I

.. c ..,y w. (O .i2.206 to deal with any of the issues raised by SOC in 4-1 Its petition of January 23, 1981. In his decision of June 26, 1981 (DD-81-9), p. 5, the Director held that i "To the extent SOC has raised matters which require resolution before an extension of the construction permit is granted or before an operating license is issoed, these matters will be given appropriate consideration in those proceedings. I do not find further consideration of these matters appropriate at this time under 10 CPR 2.206."

• v

. _, 7,, 3,- gl $y. Since the Director has already indicated his view g- 'g t that Section 2.206 proceedings are unavailable to SOC, .j then under the Appeal Board's holding in the NIPSCO case, those issues which cannot abide until the

i 1

operating license review should be explored now, in the i.' !- hearing on the construction permit extension, rather Q 4 than later after LILCO has spent an additional several h n hundred million dollars.* [.ji f! h STATEMENT OF CONTENTIONS ff i '.1 G 't 1. Evaluation of Potential Accidents and Corrective 13 Measures g. On December 1, -1971, the NRC'a predecessor (the 2. AEC) published (36 Fed. Reg. 22851) a proposed Annex to 7 p 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix D, classifying potential 8 nuclear plant accidents into nine categories. Class 9 "3 ~ accidents were rather loosely de2ined as those involving i " sequences of postulated successive failures more severe l than those postulated for the design basis for protective systems and engineered safety features"-- t

• LILCO's most recent cost projections indicate that it will have to spend in the vicinity of $500 Million to complete tne Shoreham facility; that figure does not include the costs of debt.

It is critical that there matters be resolved prior to any further significant j expenditures on construction.

• l

.A i r8 ^ ^}- Ji .m that is, accidents beyond the designed capacity of the (( c 4 plant's safety systems to control. In shorthand, these ti8 Class 9 accidents, which include significant fuel damage t( or core melt events, are sometimes termed " accidents f ?

. (:

beyond the design basis." The proposed Annex conceded l 9 that "[t] heir consequences could be severe," but took the position that they need not be considered in environmental analyses under the National Environmental w Policy Act ("NEPA") because "the probability of their i .j i . occurrence is so small that their environmental risk is ) extremely low." Since the issuance of the proposed .g 3L {. Annex, NRC environmental statements, including the Final w ^' h Environmental impact Statement for the Shoreham, Unit 1, ][j P-CP and the Shoreham FSAR, have not discussed the if Es consequences of a Class 9 accident at Shoreham from a .h l !U safety standpoint. In fact, because of the supposed Q improbability of Class 9 accidents, nuclear plants-- ..9 ~..,. 40 including Shoreham--are not designed to guard against l + e-their. occurrence. It is important to note that the g: ~ * ' environmental aspect of these' questions is not unrelated ~ to the safety aspect. The NRC has read NEPA to require not only the analysis of environmental consequences (e.g., potential radiation release from an accident) to determine what those consequences are, but also the "tak[ing] [of] appropriate measures to mitigate or eliminate" those consequences. Offshore Power Systems, l ~7-O m -* v

$l 3 z -n CLI .s-9, 10 N.R.C. 257, 261 (1979). As to Class 9 d .5 accidents, however, this inquiry has never been j a undertaken for Shoreham. Hence, there are two major {j unresolved issues concerning Class 9 accidents which f,( have not been considered for the Shoreham nuclear 'y 7 facility from either a safety or an environmental (NEPA) ..E standpoint: --How probable is a Class 9 accident at Shoreham, and what can be done (including design modifications) to reduce that possibility? 4 --What would be the consequences of a Class 9 accident at Shoreham, and what can be done 2 (including design modifications) to reduce or .i mitigate those consequences? The exclusion of Class 9 accident considerations has in the past few years been based on two premises: ff (G first, the " low probability" statement in the proposed .id Annex to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, and second, the numerical .,g

n estimate of the overall risk of reactor accidents in the h

h "Rasmussen Report" (WASH-1400). Statement of Interim .!? Policy, 45 Fed. Reg. 40101, 40102 (1979). Like most bk documents, the Shoreham FES (in Section 7) deals with [g . m.. ~f* Class 9 accidents only by restating the conclusion anr.,unced in 1971 in the proposed Annex and briefly referring to the quantitative asialysis in WAsit-1400. However, in January 1979, the NRC formally concluded that NRC does not regard as reliable the [ WASH-1400] numerical estimate of the overall risk of reactor 8-I ,..--w-er ov 7 y-.-

y 3 Z s.

{

k s accidents,.and the proposed Annex has now been officially withd:rawn. Consequently, the theoretical 4 basis on which the exclusion of Class 9 accident considerations rested no longer' exists. Nor is there a practica.. basis for that exclusion. The NRC Staf f has formally concluded that the THI-2 accident 'Jas a Class 9 accident.* We now V.aow that Class 9 accidents can and do happen. Af ter an exhaustive review of the origins of the NRC's Class 9 Accident Policy, as well as new info?mation on the subject, the President ' uncil on Environmental Quality ("CEQ") has conclud . hat the exclusion of Class 9 accidents frot co.., '. 4 tion in i licensing proceedings is "without crc-2ble scientific support." (Sea attached CEQ 1etters dated March 20, 1980 and AucJst 12, 1980.) Moreover, CEQ has concluded that the NRC has no " legal justification" for falling to e,on, sider, Class 9 accidents in environmehtal reviews. The CEQ determined that the NRC should not only require '-r consideration of Class 9 accidents in future environmental statements, but also supplement existing statements in this regard. In a March 20, 1980 letter _ 'In Re Public Service Electri: Gas O., Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit *-

C Docket No. 50-272, NRC Staff Response To Board Qtascion Number 4, Regardinng The Occurrence of A Class 9 Accident At TMI, August 25, 1979.

1 t p _ _ _ _.. ---w+--e~> ewrm " ' ~"" * '

1

3),

i 4 d t ti l to NRC Chairman Ahearne, CEQ Chairman Speth stated-4 "The results of our review of impact statements prepared by the NRC for nuclea~r 'j power reactors are very disturbing. The cascussion in these statements of potential r accidents and their environmental impacts was (j found to be largely perfunctory, remarkably g standardized, and uniformative to.the 9 public... [V} irtually every EIS contains essentially identical, ' boiler-plate' language i written in an unvarying format., The typical _EIS does not consider or analyze the g 3 possibility of a major accident even though it 3 is these ' class 9' accidents which have led to a the greatest public concern. Moreover, for -h _those accidents which are typically discussed in an EIS, the potential. impacts on human .g g health and tne environment are presented in a cursory and inadequate manner with little vg g attention to public understanding." j The old Shoreham EIS typifies these problems. In m I addition, a great deal of critical knowledge has been )' acquired regarding severe reactor accidents since the first CP for'Shoreham was issued. This information must be discussed either in a new EIS on the CP extension k, application or in a supplement to the Final EIS on the f-original CP application. Significantly, CEO has already ?.;f ? held this to be the NRC's minimum obligation under NEPA when the Commission reviews an application for a construction permit extension. (See attached letter from CEO to the Illinois Attorney General, dated August 12, 1980.)*

• In his March 20, 1980 letter to the NRC, CEQ's Chairman concluded as follows: (footnote continued on next page) 1 A

,y

t i 4 'Neither the Applicant's FSAR nor Staf f's SER or . t-I Pinal Shoreham EIS evaluate the probability or 3 l j. consequences of a Class 9 accident at Shoreham. r.i n Accordingly, before any extension of the Shoreham CP can

1. 4 be granted, SOC contends that Applicant and Staff must

'l 4 evaluate: 2+ l 1) The probability of a Class 9 accident occurring j at Shoteham and what measures can be taken (including design modifications) to reduce that i 7 probability? h

4..

2) The consequences of a Class 9 accident 3 occurrence at Shoreham, and what measures can j( be~taken (including design modifications) to reduce or mitigate those consequences? j,.- - ll:: r .J "We believe that the new policy should be I based on the sensible approach of discussing the enviromental and other consequences of the v _ full rarge of accidents that might occur at jf nuclear reactors, including accidents now classified as Class 9. This should include core melt events. In addition, EIS's should t present the best estimates of the likelihood of such events. In order to comply with the disclosure requirements of NEPA, the NRC i. g. should include in the analyses the likely 1 g range of environmental and other consequer.ces 2 from severe and other accidents.... g, ~*We also urge the Commission to broaden its range of variables (e.g., radiation r* pathways) in determining accident im3 acts, and expand its discussions in EIS's of t.ie impacts of nuclear accidents on human health, the natural environment and local economies. Site specific treatment of data should be substituted for 'boilerplate' assessment of accident initiating events and potential impacts, and EIS's should be comprehensible to non-technical members of the public." l l t l

r. 5 2. Liquid Pathway Impacts ..,s Two of the potential unvironmental and safety conesquences of a nuclear accident are the releases of 5 I radiation by the " ale pathway" (i.e., into the 3 atmosphere, where wind can carry '-) and the " liquid pathway" (i.e., into groundwater whic can contaminate .(

t rivers and streams).

Eicher " pathway" can lead to x 4 public exposure to uncontrolled releases of radiation 7 4 from an accident. In aldition to the complete exclusion .j-of Class 9 accidents, a.nother major deficiency in the Shoreham Final EIS on the CP as well an other J. environmental and safety review documents is the lack of j 1 g any specific discussion of the impact on the " liquid pathway" from a sericu's accident or potential corrective measures for such an accident. As with the now-rejected '/ Class 9 accident exclusion policy, the failure f adequately to consider liquid pathway accident impacts i ^ 2 and corrective measares has been severely criticized for { some time, and has been an unresolved issue since .p - ~ '7s . liUREG-0410 was iss'.Jed. This has particular significance for Shoreham in view of the hydrogeological characteristics of Long Island.

• "he f allure to.onsider liquid pathway accident impacts and c' rretet'ive measures steins in large part f rom o

the accident analysis in the "Rasmunnen Report," i -1 [,

' - ~ ^- at Si 69.

f

'{ WASH-1400, which stated that the " effects of contamination on water supplies have not been considered .;h

y.

in detail" because of a broad assumption that streams t; 1 and rivers would be Jontaminated for "only a short -} ry time." (Main Report, pp. 76, 134.) No detailed T 9 analysis was offered to support thin conclusion. The y l potential economic and safety effects of major liquid .it; pathway contamination from stro'ntium-90 and other 3-i isotopes are very large, and the' cursory treatment of /?w water contamination in WASH-1400 is a major flaw. This i is particularly true of potential liquid pathway ?$T contamination from core melt releases, which (perhaps 'lu because of a lack of direct experience and the 'i, ~ ill-defined parameters of interaction between a molten ij core and the surroundf.; soil and water table) WASH-1400 ~j did not evaluate with the same care given to the more 5 readily observable effecte of air pathway accident ?[ radiation releases.* The Department of the Interior di. agreed with the E WASH-1400 assumptions and conclusions concerning liquid pathway accident impacts, and in 1977 recommended 4 additional study of the problem, including the effects

• Risk Assessment Re' view Group, Hinutes of Meeting Five,

p. 57.

+ -,,.c m-ee.-

== __ c ,y 2 ,n 9 ..,P 1 'I of variations in hydrogeological conditiona between si 1 . t. 5 differe.nt nuclear plant sites' 'Roth the goneral [ ,g g. inadequacy 'of NRC accident assessments and the specific + _, ?

J l:

liquid ' pathway deficiency appear from the NRC Staf f's ({ s I ?' 1978 " Description cf Problem" in NRC Task Action Plan 12 A-33: ~ ...e "In 1971, 6 :.e ACC determined that, [. f t consistent with NEPA, the nnvironmental +- assessments of requests for construction permits and opsrating licenses should include ' 1. 1 be ? consideration ef the possible inpacts from accidents... "The approach in these assessments, ~ tvpically is limited to preparation of a .}-- two-page narrreive summarLthat qualitatively .li] describes accident probab1Aities and the rationale foe including that accident risks are IcJ and a cae-page table that provides numerical estimates of consequences of various categories of accidents (including Class 9 3. events). The Ipproach to developing these

'l.

consequence e; smates also involves a largely simplistic ano fysis; ~ minor adjustments are /1 made.from cas< tr case (basically to account for variation-i- power level, exclusion boundary dist. v.e and population density). .These numerici. estimates are also limited tg

h air pathway cr. equences.

f' i: ^ "The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of the Interior (DOI) expressed the need for an impreved treatment of accident risks and an expansion of the 5t ff assessments to include quantitative -{' estimate of Class 9 accidents. ?!.. . 14 f1 3.- - ,w J '~s s

..h ~ r .g "... Af ter extended discussions, the NRC "j Staff reiterated its 1973 commitment to update j. the standard assumptions in the proposed Annex

l A.

As a precursor to this updata, the Staff committed to an extension of the WASH-1400 1 study to' include a more in-depth evaluationn i of Class 3-8 accidents and to further explore j the significance of variations in site and ) plant design characteristics. The Department of the Interior has routinely suggested that more attention be given to the site risks ')s I associated with liquid pathway. In mid-1977, 3) DOI and NRC Staft met to discuss the DOI's generic concerns. DOI was informed of the 'V Staff's programs to augment the generic 4 studies in NASH-1400, but no commitments were 8 3 made to revise the current'aoproach (which, as hoted above, includes no discussion on the 'd impacts of acc2 dental releases to the liquid jj pathway). [ Emphasis added.] j it subsequently, the NRC accepted the Department of i Interior suggestions and instituted a research program iw at Sandia Laboratories. The Sandia study results were [ released in draft form to the NRC in January 1980.* ..'I l The differences between the radiation effects of air pathway releases and liquid pathway releases are significant. While liquid pathway releases may have i. i b-less'immediately obvious effects, their long-term k{h J effects can be serious, and bot.'s the liquid pathway dispersal mechanisms and the dominant liquid pathways themselves are more complex than their air-pathway counterparts. Importantly, intordiction or prevention of liquid pathway releases at the source is often

• Sandia Study (Draf t) for USNRC, "Effect of Liquid Pathways on Consequences of Core Melt Accidents, lanuary, 1980."

The final report was released in August of 1981.

possible if adequate design and control measures are j taken. Because of the overall failure to consider 'h$ liquid pathway releases, however, and also because this

f;

,y[p kind of interdiction is usually not possible with air Jg pathway releases, appropriate liquid pathway 4 interdiction design and control measures have been ru examined inadequately or.not at all for Shoreham. The attached table drawn from the 1980 draft Sandia study, summarizes some of these significant air / liquid pathway f,.i u differences. After considering the air / liquid pathway /.' K.} l differences, the Sandia authors drew the following }g pertinent conclusions. - "The most probable [ WASH-1400) meltdown S .j* categories result in the largest releases to the hydrosphere," i.e., liquid pathway releases.

• This is generally not true of air pathway i

releases. .y, 4 - "Significant amounts of radioactivity j* are generally expected to be released to the hydrosphere during any meltdown accident" 4 - "the Sandia calculations indicate that .[ i "if inttrdictive measures are not taken, then 4 the 11guld pathways can perhaps cortribute significantly to the risk of a core meltdown accident." 1 Thus, a nuclear accident at Shoreham would have a significant potential for liquid oathway.2dioactive contamination and lethal radiation dosages to members of s the public. In particular, in any core melt accident j (Class 9), massive quantities of radioactive materials may leach into the Long Island grountlwater and eventually migrate into Long Island sound. / .c . i l

"$3 ?$' i

q i

These evaluations (Class 9 accident and liquid -t* pathways analyses) should be undertaken before continued a construction forecloses, or renders financially or otherwise impracticable, approximate design modifications and corrective measures. Changes to the Shoreham site 'and plant should be made to recognize the facts that Class 9 accidents do happen, that liquid ~ pathway releases are a potentially serious risk, and that emergency response may be inef fective in Suffolk County. Safety devices which may prevent or delay the impacts of serious accidents, including Class events, should be implemented now (these include, for instance, reactor ccr.tainment venting systems which reduce explosive pressures while filterir.q out radioactivity; additional systems to flood runawra reactor cores with cooling water; and " core catchers' to contain a meltin.; core for several days). Preventiv.3 measures should be implemented. An evaluation of the effects of liquid pathway interdiction (both close to the source and farther along the pathways to human population exposure) for the Shoreham site should be conducted as soon as possible using the models employed in the Sandia study. A design of liquid pathway interdiction systems and the resulting safety improvements should be devel" ped and implemented, for Shoreham.,

• fl, f

9 ; J DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ATHOSPilERIC -[ [, AND HYDROSPHERIC PATHWAYS ,l 't (From Draft Sandia Study, Table 1.1)*

• g j.

.1 I> ATMOSPHERIC RELEASES HYDROSPHERIC RELEASES l SOURCE Atmosphere Primarily Melt debris: Primarily -p more volatile radio-less volatile radio-M nuclides (I, Cs, i aclides ( Ru, Sr, ';l y Te,...). (~a,....). DISPERSAL Population reached Population usually [$ rapidly (hours). reached slowly (months &.7 to centuries 1cnger). All radionuclides move Eact, radionuclide moves '/ essentially together; through the ground at l deposition mechanisms its o<n rater each differ only for the radionuclide moves lh-noble gases. through the surface p waterbodies with its own set of interactions. PAHTWAYS Primarily inhalation Primarily ingestion -@3 and external (ground). (drinking water, aquatic food) and external d (shorelines). Dominant pathways are so-dominant pathways ) relatively simple. at. very complex. j Populations are Populations are not ,., s.?c.. straightforward obvious. i;

g.,.

• g HE7LTH EFFECTS Acute, latent and chronic. Primarily chronic.

INTERDICTION Sources not possible Sources often possible. Pathways possible Pathways possible.

• The same table appears at p.19 of the final report.

-16(a)- I m c

) .e. 3 + 3 3. Siting Contentions. .) SOC contends that operating.a nuclear power plant ,'y at the Shoreham site endang'srs,public. health and safety because the population density and distribution, the {

D topography, and the configuration of transportation

'p corridors would'make prompt evacuation of Eastern Long ?,h Island virtually impossible during unfavorable weather . _?; conditions. The Commissicn's regulations (10 CFR Section 50.35(a)) require that tne licensing board make .(( a finding that "taking into consideration the site '(i 1 T. criteria contained in Part 100, the proposed faciity can 4-be constructed and operated at the pronosed location .p without undue risk to the health and cafety of the

• k public before issuing a construction permit."

( Em'phasis 4lt s s s,- added.) Pursuant to 10 CFR Section 50.>1, this consideration would also govern the extension of a r construction permit. If a site is not adequate under_ !3 g, relevant criteria, construction should not be allowed to f

g...

so forward. Thus, consideration o,f this issue "ould not be deferred until the operating license review. The accident at Three Mile Island has sensitized r t the Commission to the importance of siting. In NUREG-0642, the ACRS bluntly stated that Class 9 accidents "should be considered in deelding on the future approach to siting, to reactor design, and to y emergency measures." -ta-

..,}

n b

I The NRC' Staf f acknowl' edges in NUREG-0396 that a ..TN ten-mile radius is not the furthest extent of the area ,? threatened by plume exposure in the event of a " Class 9" j i accident. The Commission recently directed its Staff to ..] prepare new siting criteria which could be used as a .k.g g basis for proposed rule-making on the issue of plant

j location.

In response, the Staff published NUREG-0625 .f; 9 in August, 1979. In NUREG-0625, the Staf f acknowledged

j i

that the risk of accidents including " Class 9" accidents 3 1 is so high that the consequences of such accidents ,j, should be considered in the siting decision. See is si NUREG-0625, page 42. The report recommends that a ']m D4 minimum radius for an emergency planning zone would be i !?! ",} ten miles and that the actual-emergency planning zone .'.;j 9 l around a given plant should be determined by the relationship of topography, transportation corridors and ]f population. In any case, the emergency planning zone f,f should be'. capable of being evacuated promptly. See ~) h NUREG-0625, page 48. The report also acknowledges that ? the consequences of a " Class 9" accident are not limited } to the emergency planning zone but extend to an area twenty miles in radius. Population density within this large area must be considered in the siting decision. See NUREG-0625, pages 48-50. The report follows up this I

f. f e

~:f recommendation with a subsequent recommendation j

.n specifying that permitees avoid siten with 4

characteristics that require compensatory, unique design

.x features.

See NUREG-0625, page 57. The report' ').) explicitly states as a premise that { Although site acceptability is established during the construction permit review, substantive c'd' ];g l new information could require re-opening the issue _ f. of site acceptability any time during the plant life. (emphasis added) SOC contends that the Commission's recent '( , acknowledgement that siting is a neensary camponent of t) " defense in depth" is precisely the kind of "new it information" which should be taken into consideration. SOC contends that Long Island residents living east (f. 4 of Shoreham are trapped in an area f rom which they can ,j 2 only be evacuated by traveling closer 'o the plant. The

j 2

capacity of the roads seving the are. does not permit

p "relatively prompt evacuation".

During the summer, a ',h4 ? large seasonal population strains the. road capacity even "[, ?) under non-emergency conditions. 'During the winter, ^- ? 7.iji. storms and snow accumulation frequent ly reduce road j capacity to a point that makes prompt evacuation impossible. LILCO admits in the January, 1979 version of the FSAR that it would take eighty minutes to notify and evacuate only the people living within a two-mile l I radius of the plant. See Revision 15 of the PSAR dated January, 1979, figure 13.3.5-3. ! ?

ai r. 1 l 2 i ?. NUREG-0625 also recomends that soil characteristics at the site of a nuclear power plant be such that it ?.Y would be possible to isolate a melted core before h a, . radioactive m=terial escapes in~1 rge amounts into the ll[{ acquifer. See NUREG-0625, page 53. The task force N L envisions plants being locate'd on soil permitting only a i slow rate of groundwater movement. This makes it possible to take interdictive~ measures before I groundwater transport contaminates large amounts of i ground and surface water. In contrast, Long Island soil and subsoil is extremely porous and permits rapid ground' water transport. In summary, both 'the Commission and Staff have recognized as a result of the accident at Three Mila Island, that " Class 9" accidents are possible and that siting must play a role in preventing such accidents from cauring widee.. read harm. To license Shoreham, with its unfavorable site characteristics, would constitute a u, {; distressin'g willingness 'to "grsndf ather" plants now ~ ~ under construction even though the Come 1sion recognizes the importance of siting in protecting public health and safety. It is essential that this issuer be addressed at the CP extension stage and not at the operating license t stage. As the appeal board put it in Northern Indiana

m g)i )

c Public Service Company (Bailey Generating Station, y!

c l Nucle'ar.1) ALAB-619, 12 NRC 558, November 20, 1980:

1. [

(

J[W]e are unimpressed with the argument of.the if i . applicant and the Staff that petitioners can .M.l appropriately be told to eithold their site yl suitabilty contentions until the operating i j license stage has arrived. It does no .,jl disservice to the concept of a two-step -r;]. licensing process to conclude that in J., circumstances such as those at bar, that ]5., suggestion offends reason (emphasis added). Manttestly, it there currently exists substantial cause to believe thnt the... site is'unacceptabis, now is the time to explore the matter further-rather than years hence ,p when, following a substantial additional ?4 monetary investment, the facility is nearing completion at that site. 3 y The language of the Appeal Board is quite relevant @1 to Shoreham, where the utility expects to expend another j $500- Million on construction, exclusive of interest h charges. 3 c 4 LILCO's Financial Oualifications d'j SOC contends that LILCO has not demonstrated that _i .l J@ it is. financially qualified to complete the construction ~ , u.; g,( .of.the Shorehtm plant as required by 42 USC Section ty - N.b - '2232(a), 10 CFR Section 50.33(f); 50.40; 50.91; and Part h J.f 50, Appendix C. Section 50.33(f) requires an Applicant t to provide infnrmation sufficient to demonstrate to the Commission that it either has, or has reasonable .iq assurance of obtaining, funds necessary to meet 'j construction costs and fuel cyc2. costs. I 9 i

As noted by SOC in its " Petition to Institute Proceedings" (pp. 11-16, January 23, 1961), testimony given by LILCO's Senior Vice President *inance (Thomas O'Brien) underscored the company's direr financial condition as the basis for its unpra.cedented rate request of $228 million (PSC Case 27774). fir. O'Brien testified that the drain of Shoreham's construction expenditures on LILCO's cash flow was endangering the Company's ability to provide adequat.e service (Case 27774; Tr. 891) and that the failure to provide adequate rate relief could plac the financial position of the I company in jeopardy (Case 27774; Tr. 892). Mr. O'Brien i even admitted that the Company's cash flow position during 1981 would be "far from satisfactory...even if the full amount of rate relief which the Company is seeking is granted." (Case 27774 Tr. 892.) The Company was precluded from asking for a greater amount of rate re12=f in 1980 since "that would have placed too much of an increased burden on consumers." (Case 27774: Tr. 893.) On May 26, 1981 (Opinion and Order 81-9), - the PSC granted LILCO S183.1 Million of its original $228 million request--a substantial sum, but significantly less than the Company desired. Since that date, the Company's financial position and its ability to cover. e ~ e--, ,-g Y g

i construction and fuel cycle costs have been furtner undermined by at least the following factors: a) In July of 1981, LILCO announead yet another delay in Shoreham's fuel load date an:1 its total cost, from. lay of 1982 (at $2.2 billinn) to September of 1982 (at $2.5 billion). The Company's tenuous yet serious financial situation as described by Mr. O'Brien assumed the Company's ability to meet the earlier schedule and lower cost. b) The current monthly project reports prepared by the Company reveal that the Company is overruning its 1981 expenditures at an annual rate of about $35 million and that it is experieneing serfeus delays in remaining design work, construction and material deliveries. These factors are jeopardizing even th September 1982 fuel load date and $2.5 billion project cost. c) L;aCO's uranium supplier, Rokum Resources Corp., will be unable to deliver uranium to LILCO as provided by contract. LILCO has in f act commenced foreclosure action against Bokum in order to try to recover LILCO's $77 million investment in the Company. Before any extension of the Shoreham const ruction permit can be granted, SOC contends that LILCO must provide detailed financial informatfiin sufficient to demonstrate its present ability to cover remaining ---

construction and fuel cycle costs. Should LILCO's ability be contingent upon the granting of further rate relief by the PSC, LILCO aust detail the nature, timing and magnitude of such relief and it a hesis for concluding that such relief will be granted. II. MOTION PURSUANT TO 10 CFR SECTION 2.714 TO SUPPLEMENT CONTENTIONS WI'NI RESPECT TO THE APPLICATION FOR AN OPERATING LICENSE As noted at pages 2-6 abovs, the Director of NRR, in his June 26, 1981 decision, relegated each of the issues raised in SOC's January 23, 1981 Petition to Institute Proceedings to the ASLR fer disposition in either the CP or OL proceedings. A number of issues raised by SOC in that Petition dealt with issues related to ihe accident at TMI l' nit 2 (sea Petition at pp. 21-30). These specific TMI-related issues were raised by SOC since it was SOC's belief that neither an j exter.sion of the Shoreham CP nor the issuance of an OL should be granted without an examination of those issues and their satisfactory resolution by this Board. Rather than await the submission of those issues and their litigation in the OL proceeding, certain TMI-related issues were raised pursuant to 10 CPR 2.206 and the - - - - - -

l l T-- c. '? l 9 1 l. .g guidance'of the ALAB in Bailly (li NitC 558) so that they .gi could be resolved at the earliest possible time in the if. e 70 Shoreham proceeding. Such early resolution would permit 44 y ~ .4' the Board's determination of those insues to be implemented before further substantial construction

Pj m

expenditures were made by tne Company and well within f;1 }} the Company's projected licensing schedule and fuel load

3 5.

date. y

4 SOC continues to believe that the earliest possible

.{ resolution of the TMI-related contentions identified 'I 0 below is essential for the integrity of t'.e licensing' JI s A review of the Shoreham plant. Unfortunately, the .3 Director of NRR's delay in addressing the issues raised jf, in SOC's January 23, 1981 Petition has effectively y ? foreclosed a determination of these issues substantially si t before the anticipated commencement of. the OL hearings in early 1982. Accordingly., SOC asks.this Board to rule as expeditiously as possible on the admissibility of these i TMI-related contentions listed below for litigation in, the earliest phase of the OL hearings in Docket No. 50-322. Should those hearings be further delayed beyond an early 1982 commencement date, SOC requests that the Board schedule hearings on these TMI-related contentions together with those contentions admitted by the Board in the hearings on the CP extension. "? -.

,A $h 5 ':) ru 1. Interim Reliability Evaluation Program

\\ ;

The NRC s fety review of the Shoreham plant has i l'3 )) Jely been based on design basis accidents and the y J single failure criterion. The NRC Staf f's review of TMI-2 used this same generic approach but did not detect the accident sequence, magnitude of core damage or types y! of systems which were used to mitigate the TMI-2 [/E accident. The TMI Action Plan (Item II.C.1) identifies ,l.) the need f.or an improved systems-oriented approach to i{ safety review. This approach, called an Interim

[y.

A Reliability Evaluation Program (IREP) uses probabilistic @k risk assessment techniques to find risk-dominant 7; sequences, considers multiple failures and assesses the (( K reliabili'.y of systems which may be called on to [ 9 mitigate an accident but are not normally considered as j ? ECCS (e.g., Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system, RCIC), in order to recommend necessary plant-specific safety j$ improvements. Shorehnm has at had an IREP analysis. Intervenors + contend that without a thorough plant-specific IREP there is no assurance the Shoreham plant sa fety review has considered the necessary high-rink accident sequences to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 50.46. e 'f ~ m

Eb 'M 92 -[?. 3 The accident at Three Mile Island, Unit 2 (TMI-2) ~ jl

5 demonstrated that. serious react r core damage accidsnts

~ 3re a possibility and that consideration core ji x,- I degradation and melting beyond the design basis /J ~ l accidents set forth in Chapter 7 of the ER and Chapter g 1 15 of the FSAR should be conducted.* Such evaluation of ik s.q the.so-called " Class Nine" accidents singularly and hh i l cumulatively has not been conducted for Shoreham. $.4 e Further, the issuance of cn Operating license may j. 1: foreclose or preclude the modification of the Shoreham jj facility to accommodate the additional safety features, fp both preventive and mitigative, which have the potential l }2 for significant risk reduction. These additional safety x l features include items such as filtered vented } A l containment, molten core retention devices, and (* groundwater interdiction measures. The design of Shoreham does not provide protection against Class Nine f;f A accidents. There is no basis for concluding that such

j 7

accidents are not credible..Indeed, the Staff has E conceded that the accident at TMI'-2 Calls within that classification. The need for plant-specific assessment of accident probabilities, including Class 111ne events, at all U.S. reactors has been recoqnized following

• NUREG-0600, NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident, Vol.

1, U.S. IJuclear Regulatory commission, wasnington, D.C., May 1980, page II-1..

c / l TMI-2 accident by a number of groups, including the ) f+ NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards ( ACRS).* 9 4 In response, the 7ntegrated Reliability Evaluation ) I Program (IREP) has now been instituted by the 3: l Probabilistic Analysis Staff of the NRC. IREP has as O i its charter the evaluation of the probabilities of 3 accident sequences leading to core meltdown and (to a limited extent) the assessment of the consequences associated with the specific sequences for each U.S. operating reactor. Techniques developed by the Staff in the Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400 (i.e., event-tree and fault-tree techniques, accident radioactive release 1 4 categorization), are being used on the individual clants in conjunction with data compiled in WASH-1400 and in data collection projects bequn since its release. Intervenors contend that the Shoreham Applicant should perform simplified system reliability analysis prior to the Operating License for the following key plant-specific systems: Suberiticality systems, reactor core isolation cooling system, ECCS injection and recirculation systems, safety features actuation systems, and auxiliary systems upon which these depend N

• Letter, Plesset, Milton S., ACRS Chairman, to Ahearne, John F., NRC Chairman, entitled, " ACRS Report on Near Term Operating License Items from Draft 3 of NUREG-0600," dated March 11, 1980, NRC Newn Rolesse 80-56.

r e f -

,i i 3 f 3 p s

a

\\ a .T t ) (alternating and direct current, compressed air, }j l W \\ essential service water or cooling systems, and heating, j@i i ' ventilation and air conditioning systems). These 1.' ]M( ' analyses should use event-tree and fault-tree logic n techniques to identity design weaknesses and possible -p 4 system modifications that would be made to improve the f 4., capability and reliability of the above systems under 1, Various transient and LOCA events. Particular emphasis .f) N. should be given to determining potential failures that could result from human errors, com.non causes, single .j, 4 point vulnerabilities, and test and maintenance outages. 3 3 Further, Intervenors contend that neither the Applicant . <y, d nor the NRC Staff has presented an accurate assessment, a both singularly and cumulatively, of the plant-specific i; 4 and site-specific accident -isks posed by operation of b

7, Shoreham, contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR

] 51.20(a), 51.20(d), and 50.47. Therefore, there is not .,Ij reasonable.. assurance that Shoreham can be operated l yg - m;. , jgi. without6 endangering the health and safety of the public. 6,. ... 4. N.. :sa.pr . fh,Ly..: m., i . i. b I

• 'e }

1

• a

?

.} 2. Systems Interaction ij $31a The TMI-2 accident showed how non-safety systems

j 1,n can interact with safety systems to cause or exacerbate j'y

. :*I. i. an accident'. Systems Interaction (SI) has also been /f; the subject of an Unresolved Safety Issue (USI A-17).* l The TMI Action Plan (NUREG-0660, Item II.C.3) described T 1 approaches for analysis of 'ystems interaction on plants 'I s s either(complete ( or very near completion. The Shereham 3 design has not been subject to an SI analysis. Until l{ such an analysis is completed for Shoreham and reviewd by the NRC Staf f, there is no assurance that the necessary interactions, f ailure combinations and r accident sequences have been considered in assassing the ability of the systems design to meet IG CFR 50.45. l 3. Documentation of Deviations l e- . m.,, e m.,_ h... .- > rb y : :- :; - 7 a m;>.a. hp- -.M(S$2heShoreham.fa,cilitygdue..toits.long; licensing b "'"heffod isbasical19^of"19b esign'and, /dninany 3 instances, was reviewed by the Staff against guides and standards which no longer are used by the Staff. Indeed, the Standard Review Plan, NUREG-75/087, was first published in 1975. Neither LILCO in the FSAR nor the

• NUREG-0606, Unresolved Safety Issues Summary (Aqua Book), U.S. NRC, (published quarterly). -

f* i.) 4 ) il l 1 Staff in the SER has systematically described the .j (':( standards against which Shoreham has been reviewed and the basis for and acceptablility of any deviations from -current regulatory practices. This void in the record l]# is t acceptable, particularly since the Board must }' make findings based upon the applicable regulatory requirements. The TMI-2 accident documented the need for documentation of deviations. A major contribution ' factor in the THI-2 accident was that the plant had not been required by the NRC Staff to bo in compliance with the then-current regulatory practices.1/ The TMI-2 accident also demonstrated that post-Staff practices were not suitably conservative to protect the health and safety of the public. The Kemeny Commission,2/ the Rogovin Special Inquiry,3/ Congresn,4/ and the Commission in a recent proposed rulemaking5/ have all ib";;.y. ...a. x n -s ..t. !*%4is.ch,qsy$NkSh'f'!*.m ith'eyaksienbe 'of an,(automat-ic indication 'I' 5h r.) 4%eac t' ion,y A.gulatory Guide 1147 t:ontr'ib.McProoled t tp of th4 pliant 'with-tih'e auxiliary .p. - feedwater system completely disabled. 2/ Kemeny Report, pp. 20, 53, & 65-66. 3/ Rogovin Report, vol. 2, p. 21. 4/ Publ. L. No. 96-295 Section 110. 5/ 45 Fed. Reg. 67099 (1980). y y-w e -

3 1 recognized the need for such documentation.6/ Joint i y intervenors contend that the NRC Staff has (i) failed to d ;! w require LILCO to document in the FSAR where the Shoreham ' d:3 ~ 0 design, structures and components do not conform with [ ' ( current regulatory practices (i.e., Regulatory Guides, 3 ! Branch Technical Positions, and Standard Review Plans) ') .and the basis for and acceptability of those deviations, }} and (ii) f ailed to set forth in the Safety Evalur.1on T g. ? Report the standards against which Shoreham hac been . reviewed and the basis for any deviations approved by j. the Staff from conformance with current regulatory .[ y. practices. Absent such documentation, there is no basis' for any Board finding that a level of safety equivalent to current regulatory practices does, in J,t Sf; fact, exist as required by 10 CFR 50.34b, 50.57, and ?. 50.109.

)k

.2 Nh;i, '[cr.dfgr.bef;p;tcheggy-y c,t hj kb T.d'ifAdtycumentap 9fhe@vAa ~ , ;wwas recogni. zed;,fgg,gj9ta.ff?,n.eed:;byJAen'C. Rusche. NRC g6M)p.@c ons procedures for Shoreham e agd j..gF ai-INDifect'dO?6f-?Rehetor*'Rigu'liffidn,P in nTett'dr dated 4 A-w <- i 1 Septenber 20, 1976. O l' ? t L 'y

b

b ..s o g

)

l III. CONCLUSION 5 b .s SOC respectfully requests the Board to admit Jr. Contentions 1-4 listed in Part I above for litigation in j the proceedings on the extension of the Shoreham r construction permit. SOC further requests that the ' Board admit the three contentions identified in Part II J 2 above for litigatio.4 in the earliest phase of the OL proceedings (Docket 50-322), ce, should those proceedings be delayed, for. litigation together with those. issues admitted in the CT proceedings. As set forth in Part I ' bove, SOC believes that its a contentions on the CP extension should be litigated. In order to avoid subsequent conflicts with the Board's i task during discovery and other OL review proceedings, L SOC further requests the Board to rule now on the admissibility in the OL proceeding of those contentions ~ particularized above, which are found by the Board to be $3 ~. ' c", %':: ~ ?:.. ) ~ ^ l? -. [J.g SoSf.likig'Eble[ in. thy CP ex., er$, ion -hearin_gs. t 'k. ..*.tkflJ.W..:.ht..:,,.'.,ip..:. y.; i&tp :.y '.?. x Respectfully submitted, TWOMEY, LATHAM & SCHMITT 33 West.9econd Street P.O. Box 398 Riverhead, N.Y. 11901 Dated: September 24, 1981 ! l um-

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT /l COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENT AL QUALITY i 722 JACKSON PLAct N W l WASH 6NGToN o C 20006 March 20, 1980 y i1 The Honorable John Ahearne .h Chairman d i Nuclear Regulatory Comission Vashington, D.C. 20555 .j }y J3,

Dear Chairman Ahearne:

Section 204(3) of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) directs the y Council on Environmental Quality "to review and appraise the various programs and activfries of the Tederal Government... for the purpose of determining }' the extent, to which such programs and activitics are contributing to the achievement of the policy [of NEPA)...." Last year, as part of the Council's overall effort to meet this responsibility, the Council initiated a study of / the' Nuclear Regulatory Comission's regulations and policy on the environmental y analysis of possible nuclear accidents under NEPA. This letter contains the y conclusic_ns of our study. We were assisted in this review by the Environmental Law Institute, which has prepared for us a report entitled "NRC's Environmental 1 n Analysis of Nuclear Accidents: Is It Adequate?", which I am providing to the s Comission with this letter. The Council believes the report constitutes an accurate and important assessment of the NRC's regulations and policy on the . f, analysis of nuclear accidents in environmental impact statements. The results of our review of impact statements prepared by the NRC for nuclear ..} power reactors are very disturbing. The discussion in these statements of .y potential accidents and their environmental impacts was found to be largely 3 perfunctory, remarkably standardized, and uninformative to the public. Despite . )' the broad diversity of size, desirn, and locetion of the nuclear reactors licensed by the Commission. over the years, virtually every EIS centains 1 essentially identical, "boilerplate" language written in an unvarying fornat. 6%sy "The typical EIS.does not consider or analyze the possibility of a major accident g 2 -,;rf[,... :.gr$$$ghj Qs',tha5.ny'Clasjs.9" acdidents' whic h. ev onmentalsharm and whic(E typice}}y discussed in an EIS eateat eny have 1ed. to the greatest public concern. y/ .S;W'30k850 h{a 1 hhi r, .ht impacts onNtim, dents. E$ health @anddhe' environment. are% presented in a , the .'poten, 5;. W cur'sory and inadequate manner with little attention to public understanding. Each EIS relies on the NRC accident analysis policy, which has remained l essentially unchanged and in interim form since 1971, asserting that "c o rr e,ct manufacture, design, operation and quality assurance" vill provide "a high i degree of protection" against the occurrence of postulated accidents. A limited range of accidents with varying consequences are discussed. Estimates of materials released from such accidents, or " release fractions," are provided. However, based on the conclusion that it is highly improbable that serious accidents will occur, the policy prohibits.the discussion of certain severe accidents, the Class 9 even,ts.

vuPE o s

%* 0 c l0 3u $3 S } .n

4 -.jg ~Q ~ 3 The accident analysis in the EIS for the Three !!Ile Island Nuclear Station, ,] Units 1 and 2 (THI), exemplifies the deficiencies of such a narrow approach ..j to uajor accidents. Not a single scenario for a class 9 accident is pro-a vided in the TMI EIS, yet as attested to by Commission staff, a Class 9 l accident occurred at TMI on thrch 28, 1979. The reported releases of radio-activity from this accident have been lov, but the TMI EIS failed to consider 5 the range of possibilities suggested by the accident. j !.c Typically, public comments, including those of other federal agencies, on the j inadequac:es of accident analyses in Draf t EISs receive NRC responses which i;i simply reiterate the 1971 " interim" accident policy. For example, the N*.C 'g response to a Department of Interior comment on the TMI EIS was as follows: l l "The Interior Department suggests tha* a specific study of the conrequences of a class 9 accident at Three Mile Island, Unit No. 2 upon the Susquehanna River should be made. The [NRC] y staff disagrees with this view. A general discussion of Clats 9 accidents has been given in the Reactor Safety Study.... The staff believes, in view of the remote possibility of occur-rence of a Class 9 event, that the environmental risk of such an event is acceptably lov, and that reneric discussion of these events are adequate." ? The past failure to discuss the consequences of the full range of potential accidents and their effects undermines the basic purposes of the National Environmental Policy Act to inform the public and other agencies fully of the potential consequences of federal proposals and to provide a basis for informed decisions. Over the years the public and federal aFencies have repeatedly requested the AEC and NRC to consider the severe consequences of nuclear accidents in the context of the Commission's environmental licensing reviews. These requests for full disclosure have been consistently rejected during this period, this Commission's September 14, 1979, decision in offshore power Svstems being a conspicuous and encouraginF exception. Given the increacing public concern regarding nuclear safety and the need to improve public confidence in nucitar rer,ulation, we believe the time is ripe for the ..Co.mcis.sion to.dypart.p.harply_ from the. inherit ed policy in favor of a new TZ

• approa.ch'.stres. sing.',1ull:end..c.:ndid idisc'.ussion 'of accident risks.

y7 <.>.+.~ v.,- +. > w.g.: ~ v: [??, ,Th'e'. Council's.assessm'eriilof.the Condission's statutory obligations to discuss M f0119"th'e"ehWr'o'ninchtaDffects of ~hUclear ' accidents, including Class 9 accidents, is set forth in the attachment to this letter. Based on our review, we do not believe that the Commission's prior legal justification for severely limiting the discussion of nuclear accidents and their consequences in IISs is any longer sustainable, assuming it ever was. For both legal and policy reasons, we believe that the Commission cust move quickly to revise its policy on accident analysis in EISs. A completely new policy, treferably involving a rejection of the existing accident classification system, should be adopted. For these reasons, we connend the Commission for the important steps it has recently taken toward revising its policy in this

n i 3 1 .f 1109, 1112 (D,C. Cir., 1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 942 (1972); Public Service Co. of New Harashire v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 582 F.2d y 77 (1st Cir., 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046. A decision to extend

[

~ the NIPSCO construction permit and thereby allow the construction of g. Bailly-1, would be a major federal action necessitating compliance with g f. NEPA's requirement for an LIS review. 40 CFR 551502.3 and 1508.18; j Minnesota PIRG v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir.,1974). In this case the 1.3 NRC could adopt its prior EIS or portions thereof and issue a supplement (( to that EIS to disclose the significant new information discussed above. p 3,$ 40 CFR 5 51506.3 and 1502.9(c). Tae Cour.cil's new NEPA regulations provide at 40 CFR 61502.9(c) (1979) lj that

y

.e "(c) Agencies: Y Y' E (1) Shall prepare supplecen'.a to either draf t or final impact .j statements if: 3 (i) The agency makes substantial changes in the proposed j action that are relevant to environmental conceras; or J (ii) There are significant new circumstances or information, relevant to environmental concerna, bearing on the proposed action or j its impacts." 4 In'Essex Countv " reservation Association v._/ampbeP which was decided 'h prior to the adoption of the Council's new regulations, the Second j Circuit affirmed a district court's order directing the Federal highway q Administration to prepare a supplemental EIS on significant new circum- 'j stances involving a moratorium on certain highway extension work. The Q moratorium purportedly called into question the need for other highway 3 construction at issue in the case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, stating: i a ".. '. the [ district] court held that a supplemental EIS had to be prepared in order to effectuate the basic aims of NEPA which favor j disclosurd of all relevant factors affecting agency decisions. See .j Monroe County Conservation Council. Inc. v. Velpe, 472 F.2d 6%, J g g..; .697+(2d 41r.. 1972). We are inclined to agre. with this judgment. -j Mi Thile we.cannot determine with certainty what the ultimate environmental M5,' f 7 5 effects lof 'theiie new. circumstances) will be, it would seem to h$.,,. .ao:onagitute the. type.,s.f..,'.significga,ew.information...concerning lanl action's environmental aspects 0 that makes. a supplemental EIS necessary. 23 CFR 5771.15. Such a supplemental statement, whict. receives the same type of public comment and exposure as an original EIS, is likely to facilitate the ' complete awareness on the part of the actor of the environmental consequences of his action....' d Nationel Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir., 1971), mandated by NT.PA." Essex County Preservation Associatinn v. Campbell, 536 F.2d 956, 8 ERC 2356, 2159 (1st Cir., 1976). The Court went on tn hold that: "In view of the fact that the reconstruction prsject at issue here is not yet completed and that certain agency decisions may ' remain

4 4 .1 3 [ citation omitted) we cannet say it was improper for 'l open to revision ' the district court to require appellees to prerarc and circulate a $[ supplemental EIS...." Id. 1 In the past the Council has advised agencies to prepare supplemental EISs in order to fulfill the NEPA mandate identified by the Court of 5 Appeals in the Esr,ex County case, i.e., that agencies vist be aware of Q the potential consequences of their actions and that agencies such as 't the NRC should weigh all of their decisions in light of signt!!eant new I]f Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FrC, data and developments. denied 384 U.S. 941 (1966); 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir., 1965), cert. Hudson River Fishermen's Association v. FPC, 498 F.2d 827, 832-33 (2d . I, This should be done only after preparation of a supple-Cir., 1974). in interpreting 40 C R mental EIS. As stated by the Second Circuit 51500.11 of the Council's former guidelines: 5 Although an EIS may be supplemented, the critical agency decision ? must, of course, be made af ter the supplement has been circulated, considered and discussed in the light of alternatives, not before. Otherwise the process becomes a useless ritual, defeating the g NRDC v. purpose of NEPA, and rather making a mockery of it. $g 524 F.2d 79, 92 (2d Cir., 1975).

Callavay, J)i Conclusion Consideration of the significant new information relating to the environ-

.t mental consequences of severe reactor accidents might indicate, amor.; j other things, the need to modify plant design, select an alternative 3 site, implement certain emergency preparedness measures, or reconsider a y It is essential, therefore, that this construer. ion permit altogether. infor=ation be discussed in a supplemental CIS and considered prior to T the NRC's critical decision on the extension of the Bailly-1 construction Q 2t permit. i 5 3 6 ky u (C%7.L ' $(.:c. v 4

?f EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT COUNCIL CN ENVl9CNMENT At, QU ALITY m JACMsoN PLACE. N W wAsesNGioN o c rom g. R ?5., - j.j MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN .Q THROUGH: Foster Knight, Acting General Counsel 3 FROM: John Shea, Counsel

SUBJECT:

The Feed To Supple t NRC's'EIS On the Bailly-1 Reactor 3{ {i Construction Permit 3 On May 27; 1980, the Attorney General of the State of Illinois wrote to .j the Council concerning the application of the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") to a decision by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission "y ("NRC") on a request for an extension of the construction permit for the },} Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1 ("Bailly-1").

4. 5

Background

The final environmental impact statement on the construction permit for Bailly-1 was issued in February 1973. The initial construction permit g for Bailly-1 was issued on May 1, 1974. Since that time, virtually no ? construction has taken place and the construction permit has expired. U Pursuant to the intent of the Atomic Energy Act, unless the permit is 'y extended by order of the NRC, the Northern Indiana Public Service Company ("NIPSC0") vill forfeit all rights to construct Bailly-1 (Section 185 of 3 the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended 42 U.S.C. 52235). A 1. The Attorney General's Letter. Y The Attorney General identified a number of developments and items of information which are relevant to environmental concerns and the NRC's ).- decision to allow the construction of Bailly-l. Several of these items t.s . ;g.,4m. vers discussed;at.. length:4n.tha, Council?a, letter and attachment to the ? MC' NRCPdatediMarch'20,%1980&b These include:- pp 7.%; ggf -f.Mr,Jty.y.v. .9: ;,y'1teactor Safety Study i. isiuancMofpASH-1400F.:The. (October F %xi.. hjd P'"g~ Es FeNialualion'by' H! Lewis' Risk Assessment Reviev 97 an Croup in NUREC/CR-0400 (1978). 2. The accident at Three Mile Island and the subsequent studies of the event, including the Report by the President's Commission on The Accident At Three Mile Island and the report of the Special Inquiry Group to the NRC. 3. The Council's release of the report by the Environmental Law Institute entitled, NRC's Environmental Analysis of Nuclear Accidents: Is it Adequate?

2 l One other related deve~opment discussed in the Attorney General's letter

• involves a memorandum to Daniel R. Muller, Acting Director of the NRC's Division of Site Safety and Environmental Analysis, from R.

Wayne Houston, Chief of the NRC's Accident Analysis Branch, DSE, con-cerning the development of siting criteria.for nuc1 car reactors. That j memorandum indicates that the Bailly-1 facility failed to meet all six of the proposed siting criteria contained in the report of the NRC's Siting Policy Task Force (NUREG-0625) (1979). l 2. CEQ's Letter of March 20, 1980, to the NRC Concerning Accident Analysis. In our letter of March 20th, we told the NRC that its long-standing approach tc> accident analysis in EISs was inadequate to meet the full disclosure requirements of NEPA. We also stated that all future EISs would have to include an accident analysis which fulfilled the requirements indicated in our letter and discussed further in the ELI report. We went on to say that the NRC should perform supplemental accident analyses for operating nuclear reactors giving highest priority to high risk reactors, particularly those near densely populated areas or reactors wit,h unique features having a greater potential for accidents.. 3. The NRC's Recent Statement of Interim Policy Concerning Accident Analysis. On June 13, 1980, the NRC published kn Interim Policy for the consideration of severe reactor accidents in EISs. 45 Fed. Reg. 40101. The statement of policy announced the withdrawal of the old classification system for nuclear accidents and set forth the Commission's direction that NRC EISs " include considerations of the site specific environmental impacts attributable to accident sequences that lead to releases of radiation and/or radioactive materials, including sequences that can result in inadequate cooling of reactor fuel and to aciting of the reactor core." I_d. In carrying out this policy, the NRC steff was instructed to consider relevant site features associated with accident risks, including population density. The staff was also directed to " consider the likelihood that substantive changes in plant design features which may compensate further W(4-4 "WW. "M " '.3*JM 8'**"*i""' " 'S '*d **8 foryadverse isite: featuresraay be more" easily incorporated in plants when n 'The Legal Issues I!nder'NEI A As with its other actions and decisions, the ERC's responsibilities under the Atomic Energy Act regarding its decision on MIPSCO's applice-tion for an extension of the construction permit are supplemented by the NEPA. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committec, Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d

• Thisinemorandum focusses only on the developments cited by the Attorney General's office that are national in scope.

Several other developments referred to in the Illinois letter, which are more of a local nature, may be appropriate for discussion and consideration in a supplement to the Bailly-1 CIS, depending upon their significance. These " local" developments include (1) the drawdown of water during plant construction fron the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore and Cowles Bog, (2) increases in plant costs, and (3) decreases in the need for power.

• ?

, u; 3 g* e .4 considered and discussed in the light of alternatives, not before. ) Otherwise, the process becomes a usele purpose of NEPA, and rather making a mss ritual, defeating the ockery of it." NRDC v. _Callawav,'524'F.2d 79, 92 (2d Cir.,~ 1975). fbk In summary, the Council has concluded that the NRC should prepare and circulate a supplement to the EIS on the Bailly-1 construction permit h, I-prior to rendering a decision on the pending request for a permit extension. The NRC must also issue a record of its new decision in f, compliance with 40 CFR 51505.2. 'R f By a copy of this letter, we are providing our conclusions on this issue 'I to the NRC and NIPSCO. ]

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Sincerely, E i: l 2 CUS SPETH s. ( Chairman 2 Enclosure 1 j cc: Members of the Coenission President of NIPSCO 'I i ~ ~ l' 's e e l{h.=.: s). h o. * . b . sp. ~ ' &z$_. 5qv.. Y.5$. y.f*,,QWy,,k)lh.*.k'~~"i \\

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.? 1 EXECOTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENT AL QU ALITY if m JACMSON PLACE. N W T3 i f; wAsammon. o. c. accas August 12, 1980 e ',. B ~ Honorable Tyrone C. Fahner

T Attorney General State of Illinois f

lo Chicago, Ill. 60601 5, l 'y

Dear Attorney General Fahner:

jg! The Council has reviewed your office's letter, dated May 27, 1980, regarding the application of the National Environmental Policy Act y ("NEPA") to the future decisions concerning the Bailly Generating 34 Station, Nuclear-1 ("anilly-1"). if ii. Our review of the matter indicates that the initial construction permit b.j for Bailly-1 was issued on-May 1,1974. Since that time virtually no 1.j construction has taken place, and the construction permit has expired. A3 Pursuant to the intent of the Atomic Energy Act, unless the permit is 12 extended by order of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC"), the Y Northern Indiana Public Service Company ("N1PSC0") will forfeit all .it rights to construct Bailly-1. ~.4 Your office ha' suggested that there have been certain significant new G7 developments since the final EIS on Bailly-l's construction permit was if issued in 1973, such as: ) ,h 1. The issuance of WASH-1400, The Reactor Safety Study (October. p j 1975) and its reevaluation by H. Lewis' Risk Assessment Review i,1 Croup in NUREG/CR-OiM (1978). lh8 2. The accident at Th..e Mile Island and the subsequent studies of the accident, including the Report by the President's Commission y; LThe Accident At Three Mile Island, and the report of the Special Inquiry Group to the Nucicar Regulatory Commission. ~ .,4>lg'.5s ' s +n.:. &..:*^w(M+.8*4%(,W %.4 +. ..- w m W v - "The highly conservative assumptions and calculations legitimately used for safety evaluations are not suitable for environmental risk evaluation, because the probability of occurrence is so low for the unfavorable combinations of circumstances used. For this reason, Class 8 events are to be evaluated realistically, and vill have consequences predicted in this way that are far less severe than those given for the same events in Safety Analysis Reports, using conservative evaluations. M i

A1 s ^ 4 .k The occurrences in Class 9 involve. sequences of postulated successive failures more severe than those postulated for the design-basis for y n i protection. systems and engineered safety feature ~s. Their consequences y, t could be severe. However, the probability of their occurrence is so small that their environmenta3 risk is extreme 3y 2ov.... " 3-p Based on anticipated efforts to assure qua31ry of design, manufacture, and operation the directive concluded that " potential accidents in this class are, and vil2 remain sufficiently Q' remote in probability that the envirenzental risk is extremely lov. For these reasons, it is not necessary to discuss them in Applicants' g Environmental Reports." -S j,. The enclosed report demonstrates how tne axisting NRC policy on C3 ass 9 . y.y accidents originated from decisions hast13y made in the early 1970s .t without credible scientific support. The origina3 policy was drafted by AEC staff for the Commission in immediate responss to the decision in 3(! Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee. Inc. v. AEC,_ supra. The staff's .?; probabilities for each class of accidents discusred in the directive "i were not based on the then-existing accident risk assessment studies A prepared by the AEC.* Even if those studies haci been utilized by AEC staff, the conclusions in the directive regarding the consideration of 1', Class 9 events could not have been based on those documents since they failed to estimate probabilities of large nuclear accidents. As a result, the record in support of the policy on necident analysis was .j virtually non-existent. y More recently, another attempt was made to quantify accident probabili-ties for reactors - the Reactor Safety Study, VASH-1400 (October, However, that report was criticized in a reeva3uation by H.P. 'h 1975). Lewis' Risk Assessment Reviev Group initiated by the KRC. q% The Lewis Croup concluded that VASH-1400 did not adequately indicate the fu13 S2 extent of the consequences of reactor accidents; that it failed to emphasize sufficiently the uncertainties involved in the calculation of 14 probability; and that the VASH-1400 bounds of error on the estimates of 'gj accident sequence probabilities were greatly underestimated. N In addition to these uncertainties.critica11aps are present f n the KRC's information 9^( . pertaining to nuclear. accident analysis..Recently. H.V. Lewis, the leader of the Risk Assessment Review Croup, noted that VASH-1400 had at ~ 4A. least identified for the Commission ~'the relative imporYance of various accident types. follow-up research effort.Unfortunately, this had not resulted in the appropriate Quoting from his Group's report, Lewis stated "' Tor example, VASH-1400 concluded that transients, small LOCA [ lost-of-coolant accidents) and human errors are important tributors to overall risk, yet their study is not adequately con-reflected in the priorities of either the research or regulatory groups.' These three items - transients, small loss-of-coolant accidents and human errors - were the central features of the Three Hile Island accident." _ Scientific American (March 1980), p. 64.H.V. Lewis, "The Safety of Tission WASH-740 (March.1957) was the first study carried out by the AEC to assess nuclear power pisnt risk. issued in 1965. An update of VASH-740 was s

5 5

n.g Technical and legal weaknesses in the Policy's foundation, discussed 5h more fully in the ELI report, would of themselves require a change in 39 the'NRC's stand on accident analysis..However, new developments make 3

the need for a policy revision even more compelling. Significant2y, the 4t .M[ NRC staff found that: "the accident at Three Mi3e Island Unit 2 involved a sequence of YE successive f ailures (i.e. small-break loss-of-coolant accident and lyi failure of the emergency core cooling systen) more severe than if,f 3"' 24 those postulated for the design basis of the plant. Therefore, we conc 3ude that _the seefdent at Three Mile Island was a class 9 f event." .s Matter of Public Service Electric and Gas (c'. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station. Unit 1) Docket 50-272, 'NP.C staff

{

response to question no. 4 of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board" at 3 (emphasis added).

Q The President's Corcission on the accident at Three Mile Island made the

.M further finding that y "... the probability of occurrence of an accident like that at 3 3} ,l Three Mile Island was high enough, based on UASH 1400, that since there had been more than 400 reactor years of nuclear power plant

fg operation in the United States, such an accident should have been expected during that period." Report of the President's Comission Q' );

on the Accident at Three Mile Island 32 (1979) (emphasis addedi. ...g Clearly the realities of Three v.ile Island warrant a prompt reexacination 3 of thk Cc:rission's narrow policy on accident analysis. } In the Com:ission's Memorandum and Order dated September Wi

14. 1979 A

(In the Mat ter of Of fshore Power Systems. Docket No. STN 50-437), it determined that the potential consequences of a Class 9 accident at a floating nuclear power plan (TNP) should be considered in the context of hf the Comission's NEPA review of the application to deploy vNPs. d Phile the Cc=ission did not express any definitive views on the need for the )/ environmental consideration of Class 9 accidents at land-based reactors, J it did declare its concern about that question and its intention to .,,Jeexacine.Comission., policy.and,zo complete-the rulemaking begun in ~~ W.497 3dd at"9?"In7so^doing'." the' Concissien held that it was not bound 7 3.. % g.. c. yoliefheyaclc'ide$danalfidif"c[rmullated under the AEC. J#~d ' '.qT M. at 4 t edhhotgNegage free tordecide.ca9the basis of the ,M,t o;r.issic pp)y'vlether the ticensing Board should be allowe kg;d.M. IWo oda consider the environmental consequences of a Class 9 accident at the TNPs which Ofishore proposes to manufacture." I M. at 7. 7he Con =ission recognized that NRC staff had already prepared a report on the environ-mental consequences of a Class 9 accident at an TNP. The Concission's formulation of the issue is most significant. d It deterr.ined that the question before it was whether it wished "to order the Licensing Board to blind itself" to the information in the staff report. Id. at 7. The Con =1ssion concluded that unde" NEPA's full L-

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_ disclosure philosophy the Comiraion "should not refuse to consider in d. F. this case the potential relevance of the NRC (staff report) to the ./$ consideration of Offshore's application...." Id. at 8.

Earlier, (0

the Appeal Board had acknowledged . "jf 1 %}g "that the NEPA mandate to.:.udy the environmental consequences of major federal actions to the fullert extent possible supported a policy of deciding open questions in favor of considering matters 3 of potential environmental significance.

• Id. at 6. citing 8 NRC 194, 220-21 (1978).

.I1 Just as the Comission recognized that it could ni,. Mind its 1.icensing y Board to the available information on Clas> 9 accidents at TNPs, neither Tp should the Comission blind itself to similar information on the conse-if quences of Class 9 accidents at land-based nuclear reactors. The .y potential consequences of a Class 9 accident at either type of facilitv vould be of such a magnitude that they must be given consideration under W NEPA. j.{ n In view of the questionable basis for the NRC's Class 9 policy and the ]3'.4 strong policy of the Atomic Energy Act that the NRC act to protect fully public health and safety, revision of the Comission's policy and ,; l. regulations ought to be undertaken consistent with the provisions of the E Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Under the Act, Congress specifi-I cally determined that the utilization of special nuclear material "must Q be regulated in the national interest and in order to provide for the -} co= mon defense and to protect the health and safety of the public." 42

3 U. S. C. 5 2 012 (d). 1.ikewise, utilization facilities, such as nuclear A,

reactors, have been found by Congress to require regulation to protect j the health and safety of the 3.ub11c.*' 42 l'.S.C. 5 2012(e). t?ith respect 'T to license applications, the Act provides in part that the Comission require the development of such information as is necessary \\ "to enable it to find that the utilization or production of special k nuclear material vill be in accord with the common defense and O security and vill provide adequate protection to the health and [ @E safety of the public.... " 42 U.S.C. 5 2232(a). .s A[. ~ i 3e Comiss1tn.is fut!th'er'autholiSN to require new inforr.ation at any (W time :duringjthe A1feioff an oper.ating\\.lic]ense "to determine whether a 01ce'nse 'should be modified or re'voked.' p:

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.:.s. ~ ~ Id. These provisions are, of course, supplemented by NEPA's requirements. +- Calvert Clif f s' Coordinating Comittee v. AEC. supra at 449 T.2d 1112; 42 U. S. C. 5 an335. Among other requirements NEPA provides that l "it is the continuing responsibility of the Tederal Fovernment use all practical means, consistent with other essential considera-l to tiens of national policy, to approve and coordinate federal plans, sl' functions, programs, and resources to the end that the ration n.ay - 9 ~ x

• 4 (3) attain the. widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation. _ risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences." 42 U.S.C. I 4331 (b)(3) (emphasis added).

The NRC is under a legal obligation to exercise its statutory powers in furtherance.cf these and the other provisions of the Act. Public Service Co. of New Hanpshire v. _ Nuclear Regulatorv Corr.ission, 582 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S.1046. 1; EPA's requirement that federal agencies strive to attain the videst range of beneficial uses of the environment without risk to health or safety or other undesirable or unintended consequences (5101(b)(3)) is equally as rigorous a standard as that created under the Ator,ic Energy Act. I i i i l. w. f'f .,. &;.:( ^f.;: ~ ? 1 6r Y. -@ G':,\\'.:Y,c . i,?.' - w w. !Ys;,'.'&' $f * %g y&&g *&,, k ' .'O.5)* '.).#,5-h V{5 ~k., ?. fhy ~ 4 l

_d ' t. b; ATTACINENT Sp h. This attachment analyzes the adequacy under the existing law of the iW pj present AEC/NRC policy on discussing nuclear accident impacts in environe. ental ;p4 impact. statements. h, NEPA's Mandate' For Full Disclosure Cv' ' ip Ubder'Section102ofNEPAConFresshasdirectedthat h$'}j ". '.. to the fullest extent possible: Jey. 1) }7 2) all agencies of the Federal Covernment shall - (j p3 .t (C) Include in every recommendation or report on pro-4, posals for legislation and other major Tederal 4 3 actions significantly affecting the quality of the .T(: human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on - (i) The environmental impact of the proposed action M f.(k e As recognized by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of .]$ Columbia Circuit, "the sweep of NEPA is extraordinarily broad, compel 11nF consideration of any and all types of environmental impact of federal Ml?pj action." Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission t.49 T.2d 1109, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. Q denied 404 U.S. j%n 942 (1972). p Thus, NEPA requires Tederal agencies to assess more than simply the f.h g probable impa:ts of their proposed actions. Environmental impact statements required by Section 102(2)(C) must, at a minimum, contain .j.[y

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adequate information to alert the public and Congress "to all known possible environmental consequences of proposed agency action.' M Enviren-d i. eental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 T. Supp. 749, 759 (E.D. M Ark.'1971) (emphasis in the original).* Indeed, one of NEPA's prominent 'h. ,, g. J' ' .n.w.: h :. .;.,9

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~f;e.y.M $ UiG*fC T 5? ? } g t. .. M-s u - i e M@r,pp< ;p$1NINg;M.4eha3,sr$1'errdubb'v$FrEehWeg V.ft6'P.2d 946.'951'(7th Cir., M t E'- P Ml,pMN v. VQ923);!Ran1v;%,Kleindiensti 4]lJ.,2ddE234;.d36;(2d;Cir.197 eased risk of crime that might result from operation of correctional center and the impacts from "the possible existence of a drug-maintentance program."): Apoalachian Mountain Club v. Erinerar. 394 3 T. Supp. 105, 114 (D. N.H. 1975): NRDC V. Grant. 355 T. Supp. 2P0, ./ -( 286 (E.D. No. Car.1973), Brooks v. Volpe, 350 T. Fupp. 269, 276 i? (W.D. Wash. 1972) aff'd 487 T.2d 134A (9th Cir., 1973) Conservation l _ Council of No. Carolina v. Troehlke 340 T. Supp. 222, 225 (M.D. A No. Car. 1972); Izaak Walton League of Accrica v. Schlesinger, 337 7 T. Supp. 287, 294 at n. 26 (D.D.C.1971); accord, Monroe County Council. Inc. v. Vol e, 472 T.2d 693, 697 (2d Cir.1972). l .. c.

t 2-f 6 features is the requirement that ar. agency acknowledge and consider .k i ' responsible scientific opinion concerning possible adverse environmental f~ affects"' evea where such opinion "la contrary to the official agency position... Committee for Nuclear Responsibiliev. Inc. v. Seaborc, e 149 U.S. App. D.C. 383, 463 F.2d 783, 7E7 (.1971). _ Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 547 F.2d 633, 645 (D.C. Cir.,1976), reversed on other grounds sub aom. Vermont Yankee ?-

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_Kuelear Corporation v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 436 U.S. 519 i (1978).: As indicated by the Second Circuit. the study and "considera-tion of special hazards to the public health, safety and welf are are ] . vital to _anv impact statement, and numerous statements have been over-turned'for their. failure to address these questions." Natural Resources ? Defense' Counell_ v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatorv Commission. 539 F.2d 824, A43 Si. (2nd Cir.,1976), petition for rehearing denied. F.2d . O ERC 1414, vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness sub nom. Allied General Nuclear Services v. Natural Resources Defense Council, M 434 U.S. 1030 (1977) (emphasis in original). 7;f J3. 9 The Council's interpretation of this mandate under NTPA is codified in d,%. i .d[j its regulations, which are binding on all federal agencies. E.O. 11991 g (May 24, 1977); 40 C.F.R. f 1500.3. The regulations contain a special provision for situaticas in which information is incomplete or unavailable: y 3g "k' hen an agency is saluating significant advern effects on tne '7.Q M human environment in an environmental impact :,catement and there s[!. 1 are gaps in relevant information or scientific uncertainty, the agency shall always make clear that such information is lacking or .Q4 that uncertainty exists. W 9 g (a) If the inforr.ation~ relevant to adverse impacts is essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives and is not known and the~overall costs of obtaining it are not exorbitant, the agency shall include the information in the environn ntal f impact statement. (b) If h..f (1) the information relevant to adverse impacts is Q essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives 1 M j g,, and is not known and the overall costs of obtaining ~' ' gig. y dt.are exorbita'nt'or' 6.s - (2) the information relevant to adverse impacts is g ) Q ) important to the decision and the means to obtain it 3; J py 'are not known (e.g., means for obtaining it are i I l-beyond the state of the art). the agency shall veiph the need for the action arainst the risk and severity of possible adverse impacts were the action to ?j proceed in the face of uncertainty. If the agency -Q proceeds, it shall include a vorst case analysis and an indication of the probability or improbability of 1]'y its occurrence." 40 C.F.P. 5 1502. 22 (1c 79). s v.5g 2l e 4

3 area, especially your decision in Offshore Power Systems to hold a public rulemaking and to reexamine hnC policy on the inclusion of asjor accidents in EISs. We are also pleased to note that in the preamble to its prsposed NEPA procedures the Comission has indicated that "this reconsidera61on of policy may result in adoption of different practices with regard to 'vorst case' accidents at nuclear power rearters." 45 Fed. Reg. 13739, 13742 (March 3,1980). We believe that the new policy should be hnsed on the sensib*e approa:h cf l discussing the environmental and other conseque.ncer of the full rante of accidents that might occur at nuclear reactr rs, including accidents now classified as Class 9. This should include core melt even.s. In addition. EISs should present the best estimates of the likelihood of such events. 1 In order to comply with the disclosure requirements of NEPA, the NRC should include in the analyses the likely range of environmental and other conse-quences from severe and other accidents. In describing reactor accidents and their pos:ible effects in impact statements, the h7C should follow l closely the relevant provisions of the Council's NEPA regulations, including the following provision on " worst case" analysis: "If... the information relevant to adverse impacts is important to the decision and the means to obtain it are not knom (e.r.., the means for obtaining it are beyond the state of the art), the agency shall weigh the need for the action rgainst the risk and severity of possible adverse impacts were the action to proceed in the face of uncertainty. If the agency proceeds, it sh.11 include a worst case analysis and an indication of the probabili-ty o-improbability of its occurrence." 40 C.T.R. S 1532.22(b)(1979). The enclosed report suggests eight possible accident scenarios, with certain caveats, for consideration by the Consnission for use in its EISs. They have been selected because they " span the range of likely consequences" of severe nuclear events. We believe that the use of such analyses could improve the Comission's siting, design, licensing and energency plannin; decisions. k We also urge the Comunission to broaden its range of variables (e.g., radia- [ erd: tian.paghueys) tin detaruining accident.-tmpact s, and expand its discussions in IIsa,of 4he impactspf nuclear accidents on. human health, the natural d - ~# "env'itosissent' imo local economiesT ifttMtNc'ifW tWatsient tiif data should be substituted for "boilerplate" assessment of accident initiating events and potential impacts, and EISs should be comprehensible to non-technical members of the public. Finally, the Commission should pursue the approach described here vigorously in order to fulfill to the fullest extent possible the requirements of NEPA and the legitimate public interest in full dise;osure of nuclear plant hazards. The Commission at a minimum should apply the approach described here to pro-ceedings where impact statements have not yet been issued. We also encourage the Commission to consider preparing supplemental accident analyses for plants currently licensed for operation, particularly for thase located near high population centers and those with unique features suggesting higher risk. y m-- - ~ ~m n .-ww

. t.. i 1 I would be pleased to discusa. the Council't. views with you at any time. Please let me know how we can be of assistan:e to you in moving fervard in this important area. Sincert!y, Ct'.C SPETH Chairman Enclosure cc: '! embers of the Com=ission l l o ' b,. 4 m w +- =-_*- w w

f 4 y, /g IINITED STATES OF A*4WICA . '8 % \\., 13. .4 NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO 191SSION ,M ,; ~.' !3l "i' BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND 1.1 CENSING BOAR I c' \\ In the Matter of ) o; ) 'u l LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322 ) (Shoreham Nuclear Power St.af. ton,) CP Unit 1) ) _ CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE [ I hereby certify that copies of "Shoreham Opponents Coalition's Statement of Contentions Pursuant to 10 CPR Section 2.714, with Respect to the Application for A Construction Permit Extention" dated September 24, 1981, and

• Motion Pursuant to 10 CFR Section 2.714 to supplement Contentions with Respact to the Application for an Operating License" dated September 24, 1981, and submitted by the Shoreham Opponents Coalition, in the above captioned proceeding, have been served on the following, by deposit'in the United States mail, first class, this 24th day of September, 1981:

Louis J. Carter, Chairman Ralph Shapiro, Esq. Administrative Judge Cammer and Shapiro 23 Wiltshire Road No. 9 East 40th Street Philadelphia, Pa. 19151 New Ycrk, N.Y. 10016 Mr. Frederick J. Shon, Member W. Taylor Reveley, III, Esq. Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Hunton & Williams U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. 'P.O. Box 1535 Washington, D.C. 20555 Richmond, Va. 23212 Dr. Oscar H. Paris, Member Jerfrey Cohen, Esq. g. p. Atomic Safety &, Lice.nsing Board Deputy Commissioner & Counsel m y.. U.S. Ifuelear Regulatory Cones. New York State Energy Office %'.y. wash,ington,engca " 20S$b < Ip - Agency nldg. 2

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' W.. 1 .. ;.. A*.. Empire State Plaza Albany, N.Y. 12223 General Counsel Long Island Lighting Co. Atomic Safety & T.icensing 250 Old Country Road Ap.'all Hoard Mineola, N.Y. 11501 U.4 Nuclear Regulatory Comm. Waihington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety & Licensing Board N. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conm. Samual J. Chilk, Secretary Washington, D.C. 20555 Dod:oting and Service Station U.A. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. i Howard L. Blau, Esq. Wathington, D.C. 20555 217 Newbridge Road Hicksville, N.Y. 11801 4 6 .o . o oni

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1n if David J. Gilmartin, Esq.

J. P.

• 4cvarro Il Suffolk County Attorney Project Manager, LILCO 9?

Suf folk Co. Dept. of Law P.O. Box 618 [ Veterans Memorial Highway Wading River, N.Y. 11792 't Hauppauge, N.Y. 11787 d. Ener ay Research Group, Inc.

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Patricia Dempsey, Esq. 400-1 Totten Pond Road Asst. County Attorney Waltham, Mass. 02154 t;% Suf folk Co. Dept. of Law Veterans Memorial Highway llornard M. Bordenick

J Hauppauge, N.Y.

11787 c.anunnel for NRC Staff _. j'I 't. c. Nucleat Re.qulatory Comm. MHB Technical Associates Wanhington, D.C. 20555 1723 Hamilton Avenue Suite K Nora 3reiles ?f San Jose, Ca. 95125 SOC Coordinator I.!: 195 I:. Main Street Jeffrey L. Futter Smithtown, N.Y. 11787 6 Long Island Lighting Co. 250 Old Country Road Mineola, N.Y. 11501 . =: ,hk x .}f .,..7., Stephen B. Latham c T-IS l e mm mwe w, ~ - -. -,-}}