Text

Reply to Parties Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law on Emergency Planning Issues.Certificate of Svc Encl
	ML20030D754
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	08/31/1981
From:	Zahler R; METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
To:	; Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
	NUDOCS 8109160094
	Download: ML20030D754 (65)
	v • d • e

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Lic 8/31/81 UNITED STATES O" AMERICA L

NUCLEAR REGULATOR 1 COMMISSION 1

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD in the Matter of

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Docket No. 50-289

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EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ISSUES SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE George F.

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Lic 8/31/81 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of

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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY

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Docket No. 50-289

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(Three Mile Island Nuclear

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Station, Unit No. 1)

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LICENSEE'S REPLY FINDINGS ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ISSUES SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE Grorge F.

Trowbridge Robert E.

Zahler Delissa A.

Ridgway Counsel for Licensee I

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l TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I.

P r e l im i n a r y S t a t ein e n t................................... 1 II.

Reply Findings..........................................

4 A.

Introduction.......................................

4 B.

FEMA's Interim Findings and Determinations........ 10 i

C.

Municipal-Level Emergency Preparedness............ 18 D.

School Evacuation Procedures......................

26 l

i E.

Evac ua tion Time Es tima te.......................... 3 6 F.

Agriculture and Livestock.........................

48 G.

Licensee's Staffing of its Emergency Operations Facility..........................................

50 Appendix A Appendix B I

Lic 8/31/81 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE AT,OMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of

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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY

)

Docket No. 50-289

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(Restart)

(Three Mile Island Nuclemr

)

Station, Unit No. 1)

)

LICENSEE'S REPLY FINDINGS ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ISSUES I.

PRELIMitNARY STATEMENT Pursuant to the schedule established by the Board in its Memorandum and Order of August 19, 1981, Licensee submits its reply to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on emergency preparedness issues filed by the other parties on August 13, 1981.

Licensee undertook in its initial filing on emergency preparedness issues to catalogue the considerable hearing testimony and documentary evidence introduced on these issues.

A review of those findings proposed by other parties contrary to the position urged by Licensee reveals that, for

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the most part, the arguments were anticipated by Licensee and there is no need for further response.

In a few areas, Licensee believes that additonal comment is necessary to more clearly elucidate the positions of the parties and to more sharply identify the relevant evidence of record.

The following sections of thic reply provide this additional conment in six broad categories that address major points of disagreement between the parties.

While Licensee has not undertaken to check each record citation offered by the opposing parties in their findings, we have found that many of the citations are inaccurate.

This includes cases where the transcript testimony does not support the position being urged in the finding, as well as cases where the cited testimony is taken out of context or represents the early views of FEMA witnesses that were later updated after submission of the revised state and county plans and after the June 2 test exercise was conducted.1 In the sections that follow, Licensee has noted some of the significant inaccuracies in record citations.

Since Licensee is relying on its initial 1

For example, the Combined Intervenors cite the initial testimony of the FEMA witnesses on the need for substitute local emergency management coordinators, CI PF 109-12, without acknowledging that FEMA later changed its position.

Lic PF 64; Staff PF 51.

Similarly, the Combined Intervenors cite FEMA testimony that the York County plan should be revised to reflect that York County will rely on PEMA for accident assessment, CI PF 116, and then claim that the plan has not been so cevised, CI PF 115, when in fact it has been changed as requested by FEMA.

See Board Ex. 5, at SS VII.A and VII.B.1, pp. 8-9. _ _.

i filing for many of the emergency preparedness issues, our

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fail ure to note inaccuracies in record citations for those matters should not be construed as an indication that the opposing parties' citations are accurate.

To the contrary, where the findings proposed by the opposing parties are inconsistent with those suggested by Licensee, we believe a contributing factor to this difference is the liberties the opposing parties have taken with the record.

To assist the Board in its review of the contentions, Licensee has supplemen-ted the index of contentions accompanying its initial filing by including parallel columns that index where the NRC Staff and the Combined Intervenors address the various contentions.

This table is attached hereto as Appendix A.

Licensee notes one further preliminary matter.

In the sections that follow, Licensee responds to findings proposed by the Commonwealth in the areas of municipal plans, school plans, and the emergency operations facility.

he remaining parts of the Commonwealth's findings deal with new or modified emergency preparedness commitments by the Commonwealth.

These include commitments with respect to:

(a) distribution of dosimetry, PA PF 76; (b) training of emergency response personnel, PA PF 80; (c) distribution of potassium iodide, PA PF 86; (d) distribu-tion of public education information to the resident and transient populations, PA PF 94, 102; (e) development of detailed access control procedures, PA PF 105; and (f) four other " miscellaneous" commitments, PA PF 111-20..

While Licensee has no doubt that these new or modified commitments will improve the level of emergency preparedness around TMI, we also believe that the record, as summarized in the proposed findings submitted by Licensee and the NRC Staff, demonstrates that even without these additional commitments the level of emergency preparedness around TMI is adequate.

Be-cause of this, and tycause we see no reason to treat these Commonwealth commitments any differently than those commitments included in the Commonwealth's emergency response plan, Licensee opposes the Commonwealth's suggestion tnat these additional commitments be singled out for special NRC Staff review and certification to the Commission.

There simply is no factual or logical basis for co trea'cing these commitments.

II.

REPLY FIFDINGS A.

Introduction 1.

Proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on cmergency preparedness issues were filed by Licensee,2 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Combined Intervenors,4 2

" Licensee's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Emergency Preparedness Issues", dated August 13, 1981 (hereinafter cited as Lic PF).

3

" Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Emergency Planning Issues", dated August 13, 1981 (hereinafter cited as PA PF).

4

" Combined Intervenors' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the Emergency Planning for Three Mile Island Unit One, in the Form of a Partial Initial Decision, dated August 13, 1981 (hereinafter cited as CI PF). -. -.

ECNP,5 the Aamod ts,6 and the NRC Staf f.7 Only Licensee and the NRC Staff addressed all of the intervenor contentions in their proposed findings.

Where the other parties have not provided findings on certain contentions, the Board finds this failure to be a default.

See 10 C.F.R.

S 2.754(b); Memorandum and 5

" Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Emergency Planning Issues", dated August 13, 1981 (hereinafter cited as ECNP PF).

6 "Intervenor Aamodt Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Emergency P.lanning Contention 1 ( Aamodt Contention 4 -

Notification)", dated August 13, 1981 (hereinafter cited as Aamodt (Notification) PF); "Intervenor Aamodt Findings of Fact on Emergency Planning Contention 2 ( Aamodt Contention 5 -

tavestock)" dated August 13, 1981 (hereinaf ter cited as Aamodt (Livestock) PF).

7 "NRC Staff Pruposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Emergency Planning", dated August 12, 1981 (hereinafter cited as Staff PF).

8 No findings by any intervenor were filed with respect to the following emergency planning contentions:

ANGRY Contentions 3(C)(1), 3(C)(2), 4(D), 4(E), 4(G), 4(I), 4(J) and 5(H); ECNP Contentions 7, 8, 9, 11 and 12; Newberry Contentions 14(B) (part on school children transportation), 14(C) (part on Chamber of Commerce notification), 14(Y) and 14(FF); and Sholly Contentions 17(A), 17(B) and 18.

In addition, while the Combined Intervenors submitted some type of finding on the other admitted contentions, in many instances the finding does not support the contention, but rather deals with an issue wholly different than that identified in the contention.

See, e.g.,

CI PF 201-06 (which address the merits of sheltering rather than the claims of Contentions EP-4(H), EP-5(B) and EP-5(E) that appropriate criteria fsr various protective action options have not been developed); CI PF 279-85 (which totally fail to support Contentions EP-14(U), EP-14(NN) and EP-16(N) on consideration of contingencies); CI PF 286-93 (which do not even address listed Contention EP-4(B) and which otherwise fail to support Contentions EP-6(D) and EPel4(W)).

In order to appreciate the wide sweep of issues for which the intervenors are in default, we have attached as Appendix B hereto a listing by subject matter of those contentions for which no intervenor findings were submitted. __ _,

i Order on Prehearing Conference of May 13, 1980, dated May 22, 1980, at 12; Memorandum and Order on Schedule and Format for Proposed Findings, dated April 22, 1981, at 2.

2.

In its findings, ECNP purports to adopt the findings j

submitted by the Combined Intervenors and that portion of the Commonwealth's findings relating to legal standards, except to the extent such findings " contradict" those separately filed by 4

ECNP.

See EJN2 PF 2-3.

This approach is unacceptable to the Board, since without further specification by ECNP, the Coard has no means for determining which " adopted" findings ECNP views as " contradicting" those findings separately filed by ECNP.'

i 3.

The Board has reviewed the findings separately filed by ECNP and rejects all of them.

There are substantial gaps in the logic ECNP uses in reasoning from the factual record cited by it to the broad general conclusions proffered as proposed findings.

We find that the ECNP conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole.

In addition, ECNP's proposed findings are totally unfocused and fail to address or identify any 6dmitted contention.

4.

The ECNP findings also include a request that the record be reopened to consider a document almost two years old.

9 ECNP's claim that it is preserving its rights to participate as a full party in any appeals relating to emergency planniag issues, see ECNP PF 4, is belied by the fact that neither ECNP i

nor the Combined Intervenors filed any findings on 5 of the 7 4

ECNP emergency planning contentions.

See n.8, supra..--. -. -.- --.-- _.----. -... - _,.

ECNP PF 11.

We reject this request.

ECNP, as the party seeking to reopen the record, bears a heavy burden.

Its motion must be both timely presented and addressed to a significant issue.

Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit No. 1), ALAB-462, 7 N.R.C.

320, 338 (1978).

Where the motion is untimely without good cause, the party has an aven greater burden:

it must demonstrate not merely that the issue is significant but, as well, that the matter is of such gravity that the public interest demands further explora-tion.

Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2), ALAB-486, 8 N.R.C. 9e 21 (1978).10 In addition, ECNP must establish that the evidence it wishes to proffer is of such magnitude that it would cause us to alter the result we reach in this Recommended Decision.

Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-227, 8 A.E.C. 416, 418 (1974).

5.

The NRC Staff filed a response to the ECNP request opposing reopening the record.11 Licensee argued its opposi-tion to the request in its reply findings on emergency 10 We note that ECNP's legal representatives in this proceed-ing were the party moving to reopen to record on emergency planning issues in the TMI-2 proceeding.

Thus, they are well aware of the showing necessary to reopen the record, and their failure to address any of the relevant considera-tions ic particularly telling.

11 Although ECNP did not provide a copy of the uacument it desires to move into evidence, the NRC Staff in their opposi-tion included copies of the relevant pages from the September 28, 1979 memorandum.. -.

preparedness issues.

As those parties observe, the ECNP request to reopen the record fails to address any of the relevar t considerations.

6.

It is beyond question that the request is very late.

ECNP offers no reason, let alone good cause, for its failure to bring the presence of the September 1979 memorandum to the Board's attention during the course of the hearings.12 We are thus not here presented with the more usual case of "new" evidence -- i.e., some fact or change in circumst&nce occurring af ter the close of the evidentiary record.

7.

Nor has ECCP established that the evidence it wishes to proffer addresses a significant issue not previously considered by th2 Board.

To the contrary, the Board has heard considerable testimony on the IPA Protective Action Guides

(" PAG's").

See Lic PF 97-100, 279-313; Staff PF 64-67, 191-200.

Significantly, ECNP is in default on these issues, cince neither it nor the Combined Intervenors filed any proposed findings on the two ECNP contentions relating to PAG's.

The Board has little patience for requests to reopen the record when the party making the request has not even filed proposed findings on the related evidence of record.

12 ECNP states that a "recent communication" has brought the September 1979 memorandum to its attention.

ECNP PF 11.

That fact is not sufficient reason for reopening the record.

Parties to an adjudicatory hearing are under an obligation to use their best ef forts to discover relevant informatioli and present it to the Board in accordance with the hearing schedule.

In this in-stance, ECNP has failed to adhere to this principle. -.

8.

Finally, ECNP has not demonstrated that the result we reach here would ba different if we had reopened the record to

-consider the September 1979 memorandum.

Construed in a light most favorable to ECNP, the memorandum evidences the views of certain NRC Staf f members about potential problems they perceived in the PAG concept.

Subsequent to this memorandum, the Commission issued new emergency preparednc6s regulations l

l whien instruct that guidelines for the choice of protective acticas during an emergency, consistent with federal guidance

-- presumably including the EPA PAG's -- be adopted for use during a emerge. 3(.

10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(10).

The NRC Staff also issued a revision to NUREG-0654 in November 1980 suggest-ing the use of the EPA PAG's.

Staff Ex. 7, at 60, 61 (criteria J.7 and J.9).

We sre thus unpersuaded that consideration of the Septemb;r 1979 memoraadum would have altered our decision on the PAG issue.

For these reasons, we decline to reopen the record as requested by ECHP.

9.

The Aamodts filed two sets of proposed findings relating to emergency preparedness issues.

We have reviewed those findings relating to Aamodt Contention EP-1 on notifica-tion and find for the most part that the proposed findings do not address Contention EP-1.

In addition we find that the proposed findings are not supported by substantial evidenc in the record.

Compare Aamodt (Notification) PF 2-13 with Lic PF 145-51, 154-72, 199-203 and Staff PF 104-08, 111-22, 138-40.

We therefore reject these Aamodt findings.

With respect to the.

Aamodts' proposed findings on livestock, we address that matter is Sect. ion I t. ?, infra.

B.

FEMA's Interim Findings and Determinations 10.

In their proposed findings, the Combined Intervenors launch a broadside attack on the interim findings and determin-ations rendered by FEMA in this proceeding.

See CI PF 20, 26-29, 35, 40-61.

They urge the Board to find that it is

" unable to place any weight on Mr. Dickey's testimony on findings and determinations" and that "(n]o presumptive weight can be accorded FEMA's findings and determinations in this proceeding."

CI PF 60, 61.

The Board has reviewed the testimon; offered by FEMA's Mr. Dicke*/, has considered the arguments advanced by the Combined Intervenors, and concludes that the objections raised by the Combined Intervenors are unwarranted.

11.

The Combined Intervenors argue that FEMA's favorable findings and determinati'ons., as presented by Mr. Dickey; are not based on substantial evidence, inadequately identify the reasoning process used by FEMA to reach its ultimate finding, and are otherwise arbitrary and capricious.

E.g.,

CI PF 57, 60.

Underlying this position is Combined Intervenors' view that it is somehow inappropriate or unacceptable for Mr.

Dickey to exercise professional judgment in making FEMA's overall conclusion that offsite emergency preparedness around TMI is adequate.

See CI PF 49-55.

These arguments evidence a misunderstanding both of the process used by FEMA in making its t

1 findings and determinations and of the legal principles that constrain agency decisionmakere, 12.

Contrary to Combined Intervenors' claim, see CI PF 49, all the decisionmaking is not vested solely in Mr. Dickey.

At the regional level, the interagency Regional Assistance Cammittee ("RAC") provides an element-by-element comparison between the offsite plans and NUREG-0654.

See Lic PF 27; Staff PF 369.

This evaluation is in evidence.

Staff Ex. 23, at III-l to III-29; Staff Ex. 21 (update).

In making FEMA's overall finding, Mr. Dickey both considered and was constrained by th'e conclusions reported in the RAC evaluation.

Tr. at 22526, 22536, 22542-43, 22563-64, 22583 (Dickey).

Moreover, since the RAC evaluation is in evidence, the Board has available to it the underlying data used by FEMA in reaching its overall finding.

This RAC evaluation identifies, in part, the reasoning used by FEMA in reaching its overall finding.

13.

At the headquarter's level, both Mr. Jaske and Mr.

Dickey, and their technical staffs, reviewed the available information in developing FEMA's overall finding.

Tr. at 22509, 22564 (Dickey).

In making that overall finding there 13 Thus, to the extent Combined Intervenors argue that no discretion was exercised by anyone other than Mr. Dickey, see CI PF 54, they are factually inaccurate.

Indeed, the Com-bir.ed Intervenors explicitly recognize that the FEMA na-tional office technical staff also reviewed the state and county plcns and provided input to Mr. Jaske and Mr. Dickey.

CI PF 48.

Since Mr. Jaske participated in the final review, the Board has considered his background qualifications, see Statement of Professional Qualifications of Robert T. Jaske, ff. 2r. 22508, and the general agency expertise possessed by...

l io no doubt that profosaional judgmsnt was exercieed in assessing the significance of existing " deficiencies" in the offsite plans.

See Lic PF 27; CI PF 50-55.

This fact does not, however, render the FEMA finding suspect.

14.

Combined Intervenors' citation to Baltimore & O.R.R.

v. Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R.,

393 U.S.

87 (1968), is inapposite to the situation presented by FEMA's overall finding.

That case, and a whole litany of similar decisions, hold that when en agency exercises its expertise to resolve an issue, it must do so in a manner that discloses to a reviewing court the reasoning underlying its exercise of agency expertise.

E.g.,

Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S.

156, 167-69 (1962); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 84-95 (1943).

This is necessary so that the reviewing court can determine for itself whether the exercise of expertise constituted an abuse of discretion.14 Here, the record fully discloses the manner in which FEMA. exercised its discretion.

The deficiencies noted (continued)

FEMA, as well as Mr. Dickey's qualifications, in assessing FEMA's overall finding.

On this basis we reject Combined Intervenors' claim that FEMA's overall find:

1 is suspect because of Mr. Dickey's lack of qualifications.

Moreover, if the Combined Intervenors intended to challenge the qualifica-tions of Mr. Dickey to sponsor the FEMA finding, that should have been done through voir dire -- a proc =uute of ten used by the Combined Intervenors -- rather than in proposed findings.

14 It is sigr*ficant to recognize that in such circumstances the reviewing court does not substitute its judgment or exper-tise for that of the agency.

To the contrary, a reviewing court is limited to determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion by the agency.

E.g.,

Bowman Transportation, Inc. v.

Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 r.S. 281, 285-286 (1974);

a Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.

402, 416 (1971)..

by FEMA in both the plans and test exercise of the offsite egencies have been carefully documented.

See Staff Ex. 18; Staff Ex. 23, at III-l to III-29; Staff Ex. 21 (update); Staff Ex. 20.

Intervenors had a full opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Dickey about these noted deficiencies and establish as a matter of record their position that the deficiencies were of such magnitude as to preclude a favorable FEMA finding.

Th '

NRC Staff in its proposed findings of fact has analyzed the record ma-arial for the Board and provided an evaluation of the noted deficiencies against the 16 planning standards included in the Commission's emergency preparedness regulations.

See Staff PF 371, n.100.

Thus, both this Board and any reviewing body have a clear record for determining whether FEMA abused its discretion in concluding that the state of offsite emergency preparedness around TMI is adequate.

After reviewing the noted deficiencies and con-sidering the whole of the record compiled on emergency pre-paredness, the Board does not believe that FEMA abused its discretion in concluding that, if there was an emergency at TMI, the of f site response would be adequate to protect the health and safety of the public.

E.g., Lic PF 38-31.

In making this finding we are influenced primarily by two factors.

First, the Commission's regulations direct that the NRC base its conclusions on a review of the FEMA findings and determina-tions, see 10 C.F.R.

S 50.54(s)(3), and treat those findings as establishing a rebuttable presumption of adequacy in any NRC.

licensing process.

10 C.F.R. S 50.47(a)(2).15 These regula-tions clearly evidence the intent of the Commission not to cubstitute its judgment for the expert judgment of a sister agency charged by presidential directive with responsibility for assessing the adequacy of offsite emergency preparedness around nuclear power plants.

See Exec. Order No. 12148, 3 C.F.R.

12148 (1980), reprinted ja 50 U.S.C. S 2251, at 1620 (Supp. III 1979); President's Remarks Announcing Actions in Response to the Report of the Commission on the Accident at 15 Combined Intervenors argue that since FEMA's interim find-ings and determinations were not made pursuant to 44 C.F.R.

Part 350, but rather were rendered pursuant to the Memoran-dum of Understanding between FEMA and NRC, they are not en-titled to the rebuttable presumption described in 10 C.F.R.

S 50.47(a)(2).

CI PF 44.

We note initially that section 50.47 (a)(2) draws no distinction between FEMA findings rendered pursuant to 44 C.F.R. Part 350 or the FEMA /NRC Memorandum of Understanding.

Mr. Dickey assured us that the substantive review given to the offsite plans is similar regardless of the procedure followed by FEMA.

Tr. at 22528 (Dickey).

Combined Intervenors also appear to draw a distinction between the language used in 10 C.F.R. SS 50.47(a)(2) and 59.54 (s)(3), and attach some significance to the claim that the

" review process for operating licensees includes interim findings made under the FEMA /NRC MOU."

CI PF 44.

Since the Memorandum of Understanding also covers near-term operating license applications, 3ee Board Ex. 12, we see no significance to Combined Intervenor's' last observation.

With respect to the difference in language in the two cited sections of the regulations, the short answer is that section 50.54(s)(3) doec not deal with a contested adjudicatory proceeding and therefore one would not expect to find reference to a rebuttable presumption.

On the other hand, section 50.47(a)(2) is clear in referring to any NRC licensing proceeding.

If the Commis-sion had intended to limit the rebuttable presumption only to operating licensee proceedings, it would have said so.

We taerefore reject Combined Intervenors' position that no rebut-table presumption should be attached to FEMA's interim findings and determinations in this proceeding.

Three Mile Island, 15 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 2202 (December i

7, 1979); Board Ex. 12.

Second, the expertise and discretion being exercised by FEMA in assessing the overall adequacy of offsite emergency plans is precisely the type of judgment for which the Supreme Court has held that complete factual support in the record is neither possible nor required.

FCC v.

Nat'onal Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S.

775, 814 (1978); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 637 F.2d 62, 71 (2d Cir. 1980); Association of National Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1162-63 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.

denied, 100 S.

Ct. 3011 (1980); see generally 3 K.

Davis, Administrative Law Treatise S 14:28 (2d ed. 1980).16 16.

Combined Intervenors also assert that the standards used by FEMA in developing its findings and determinations are not consistent with the Commission's regulations.17 See CI FF 16 in American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1966), Judge Leventhal writing for the court of appeals sitting en banc noted that there are certain

" issue [s] involvTng expert opinions and forecasts, which cannot be decisively resolved by testimony.

It is the kind of issue where a month of experience will be worth a year of hearings."

The Board believes this position accurately describes the agency opinion rendered by FEMA in this proceeding.

17 Additionally, Combined Intervenors allege that the NRC Staff has not. assessed the adequacy of the offsite plans against the Commission's regulations or the criteria in NUREG-0654.

CI PP 20.

What the testimony actually indicates is that the NRC Staff has relied primarily upon the FEMA review, but has itself participated in parts of that review and has assessed the overall adequacy of emergency preparedness around TMI.

See Tr. at 22883, 22924; NRC Staff Position on Emergency Preparedness for TMI-1, ff. Tr. 22881; Lic PF 25. _.

20, 27-29, 59.

This claim is based on a misrepresentation of Mr. Dickey's testimony.

Mr. Dickey testified that none of the l

'16 planning standards was " totally unmet" by the ' tate and county plans, Tr. at 22544 (Dickey), and therefore what is I

required is an exercise of professional judgment to determine whether the noted deficiencies are so significant as to preclude a finding that the offsite plans are adequate and capable of being implemented.18 Tr. at 22545, 22546 (Dickey).

Combined Intervenors urge a contrary view of Mr. Dickey's position by paraphrasing his testimony as indicating that "not meeting any particular combination of standards in the NRC rules would not, in itself, be sufficient reason for FEMA to withhold a finding of overall adequacy."

CI PF 20 (emphasis added).

Two citations to the transcript are identified as f

record support (Tr. at 22579, 22667); the first citation is wholly irrelevant to the issue, and the second citation refers to "no single item" as indicating inadequacy, which in context we understand to refer to the numerous evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654.19 As to those criteria, there is agreement that 1

18 The Combined Intervenors apparently do not dispute that the bottom line is whether "the state of emergency preparedness

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provide (s] reasonable assurance that appropriate protec-tive measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency * * *."

Compare 10 C.F.R.

S 50.54 (s)(2) with CI PF 31 ("What we are seeking here is that the emergency planning systems perform their function of protecting the population at risk").

19 At proposed finding 27, the Combined Intervenors quote the operative sentence from Mr. Dickey's testimony.

Combined Intervenors also contrast this testimony with an earlier ;

-,-,. - ~,, - - _,,,, _ _ - - - -,, -

-,., -. - - _. - - _ - ~ - -..

cbsolute compliance is not required.

Thus, we do not believe it is a challenge to the Commission's emergency preparedness regulations for FEMA to exercise its expertise and conclude that the existing deficiencies in state and county planning are not so great as to preclude an overall finding of adequacy.

17.

With respect to the defici.acies noted by FEMA, the Combined Intervenors set out a listing of some of those daficiencies, see CI PF 68-74, but do not inform the Board of what conclusions they would urge us to draw from the listing.

Suffice it to say that FEMA characterized these deficiencies as essentially minor and easily correctable.

See Lic PF 28; Staff PF 371.

The Combined Intervenors offer no reason for us to question this characterization.20 FEMA also concluded that, notwithstanding these deficiencies, the offsite plans are cdequate and capable of being implemented.

Id.

We would only (continued) statement by Mr. Dickey that "any deficiency is a lack of compliance, a total lack of compliance with 0654."

Tr. at 22657.

However, it is clear that the deficiency Mr. Dickey was referring to is an deficiency in the siren alerting system being installed by Licensee to comply with the Commission's prompt notification requirements.

Thus, we see no conflict in the testimony.

20 One purpose of the FEMA review, cspecially that conducted in connection with the test exercise, is to recommend areas for improvement.

There would be little purpose served by test exercises if the observers did not identify such areas for improvement.

Many of the deficiencies noted by FEMA are of this ilk.

The existence of such areas for improvement certainly comes as no surprise to the Board, and, contrary to the position urged by the Combined Intervenors, offers no basis for finding the offsite plans inadequate.,

cdd that in many respects the Combined Intervenors inaccurately paraphrase or otherwise take out of context many of the deficiencies noted by FEMA.21 18.

In summary, we find that FEMA, both at the regional cnd national levels, has made a careful review and evaluation of state and local emergency preparedness around TMI.

FEMA properly concluded that offsite plans are adequate and capable of being implemented.

This finding is supported by the record and does not represent an abuse of discretion by FEMA.

Accordingly, we treat FEMA's interim findings and determina-tions' as establishing a rebuttable presumption of adequacy.22 C.

Municipal-Level Emergency Preparedness 19.

Both the Commonwealth and the Combined Intervenors urge the Board to require further development of written emergency plans at the municipal level.

PA PF S1-59; CI PF 79-85.

The Commonwealth does not believe that this effort need be completet' prior to restart; rather, the Commonwealth seeks a status report on the progress being made in developing muni-cipal plans as of January 1, 1982.

PA PF 59.

The Combined 21 For example, we do not view item CI PF 69(A) as a defi-ciency; items CI PF 71(C), 71(F), 71(H), 74(A) and 74(D) are not accurate restatements of the FEMA position; and items 71(A), 71(D), and 71(O) are out of context or are limited to only a single political subdivision.

22 We note that even had the Board not treated FEMA's interim findings and determinations as creating a rebuttable presumption of adequacy, our resolution of the emergency preparedness issues would not have been altered.

See generally Lic PF Section II; Staff PF Section II. -

Intervenors apparently believe that written municipal plans should be completed prior to restart.

See CI PF 81.

While the Board does not Joubt the desirability of having written municipal plans -- and we are encouraged to see that Licensee,

the Commonwealth and the county emergency management coordi-nators are all assisting in the effort to develop such plans, see PA PF 59 '-- we conclude that the present level of planning is adequate and additional written plans, although desirable, are not necessary to provide reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will be protected.

See generally Lic PF 452-61.

20.

A thread running throughout the Commonwealth's proposed findings in this area is its view that FEMA found a need for written municipal plans.23 There is nct record support for this claim and it does not properly characterize the FEMA position.

In many instances, both the Commonwealth and the Combined Intervenors urge us to make findings on the need for municipal plans based on bits and pieces of testimony clearly taken out of context.

There is little question but that throughout the record various witnesses identified the absence of a complete set of municipal plans as a deficiency that should be corrected.

It is to this testimony that we are referred by the Commonwealth and the Combined Intervencrs.

23

See, e.g., PA PF 51 (FEMA's concerns about the absence of written municipal plans or implementing procedures);. PA :P 53 (FEMA's call for written municipal plans).

1 _.

But, in every such instance, it was the bottom line conclusion i

of hhese witnesses that the absence of such municipal plans did not render the state or county plans inadequate or make such plans incapable of being implemented.

21.

FEMA's Mr. Dickey testified that the absence of a full set of written municipal-level plans had not precluded FEMA from making an overall finding of adequacy.

Tr. at 22686 (Dickey).

And Mr. Bath from 7EMA's regional level -- whose testimony is continually cited as supporting the need for l

written municipal plans -- when asked whether the lack of municipal plans for York County rendered the plans inadequate under the planning standards, responded, "No, not necessarily."

Tr. at 22469 (Bath).

This testimony is consistent with FEMA's i

written evaluations of the offsite plans -- also continually cited by the Commonwealth and the Combined Intervenors -- which establish that, while the absence of written municipal plans may create deficiencies, FEMA is confident that the planning done to date is adequate to assure that appropriate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological i

emergency at TMI.

Staff Ex. 18; see also 11 24-25, infra.

22.

Similarly, the testimony offered by PEMA's Mr. Belser also confirms that adequate emergency response will occur even in the absence of a complete set of written municipal plans.

Mr. Belser, testifying on the basis of his first-hand observa-tion of emergency response personnel.and agencies at the municipal level, Tr. at 20910 (Belser), stated:

"I found that.,,

more often than not you talk to many people out there (at the municipal level] and they know what to do, and they did it well during the Three Mile Island incident."

Tr. at 20910 (Belser).

While Mr. Belser, like all other - tnesses, favored developing written municipal plans, his view was that such " plans" might be a standard operating proceb're, or a piece of paper which outlines in fairly simplistic form various local responsi-bilities; Mr.

Belser did not believe the written plan had to be formal.

Tr.

at 20910-11 (Belser).

Mr. Curry, the York County emergency management coordinator, likewise stated that

~

the absence of written plans at the municipal level does not indicate that emergency response at the local level will be inadequate.

Tr.

at 20908 (Curry).

23.

In order to confirm for ourselves that the absence of a complete set of written municipal-level plans is not so cignificant as to put into doubt the adequacy of offsite planning, the Board has inquired into the specific responsi-bilities that have been assigned to the municipalities to determine whether those responsibilities can in fact be implemented.

The Commonwealth identifies five specific areas where it believes written municipal plans are needed to assure that the assigned responsibilities will be discharged properly.

PA PF 54.

We address each area below.

24.

The Commonwealth first suggests a need for written plans that document the location of pick-up points for resi-dents without private transportation.

PA PF 55.

While the -

l Commonwealth cites Mr. Bath's testimony in Attachment 3 to FEMA's Interim Findings and Determinations, ff. Tr. 22350, at i

'page 4, it curiously ignores FEMA's conclusion on page 5 that, even without a complete set of written municipal plans that lists the des?.gnated pick-up points, " York County can utilize its Resource Manual, supporting municipal plans and the

[ Parsons, Brinckerhoff] study to effectively evacuate persons without transportation, even with the present transportation plan, Annex K."

See also Lic PF 354; Staff PF 253.24 25.

The second area identified by the Commonwealth relates to the transportation needs of invalids, homebounds and mobility-impaired persons with special needs.

PA PF 56.

In support of its view that written municipal plans are necessary to properly discharge these responsibilities, the Commonwealth cites primarily from the FEMA testimony presented prior to the most recent revision of the county emergency plans.

By contrast, the updated FEMA testimony based on FEMA's review of the current state of emergency preparedness indicates that, for the municipal plans already developed, lists of homebounds end invalids are available, see Attachment 3 to FEMA's Interim Findings and Determinations, ff. 22350, at item 6, and for those municipalities without written plans, there exist lists 24 The Commonwealth also selectively cites transcript pages 22468 and 22470 of Mr. Bath's testimony, but ignores his testimony at the bottom of 22469, indicating that the lack of written municipal plans does not render the existing planning inadequate. _ _ -

i l

of homebounds and invalids maintained by local fire departments or similar service groups.

Tr. at 22384-85 (Bath); see also

.Lic PF 379-81; Staff PF 280-82.

In such circumstances, the Board is confident that protective measures can and will be taken for homebounds and invalids notwithstanding the absence of written municipal plans.

26.

While the Commonwealth lists identifying necessary traffic control points as a third area of municipal responsi-bility, see PA PF 54, 58, our review of the emergency plans indicates that primary responsibility for identifying traffic control points is shared jointly by the Pennsylvania State Police, PennDOT and the risk counties.

See, e.g.,

Pa. Ex.

2(a), at SS VII.A.18.a, b& e, VII.A.21.a, VII.B.l.1, pp. 23, 24-25, 26; Board Ex. 5, at S VI.B.13 and Annex E, pp. 7 and E-1 to E-3.

Mr. Belser from PEMA further indicated that, in response to Licensee's evacuation time study, PEMA, the State Police and the risk counties were undertaking an additional review of traffic control points to ensure that the important bottlenecks would be manned.25 Tr. at 20943, 20973 (Belser).

Thus, the Board finds that state and county planners have identified traffic control points -- subject to the ongoing 25 It is true that Mr. Belser's oral testimony refers to identification of traffic control points alternatively as

" municipal", " county", and " regional" responsibilities.

In context, and considering the written emergency plans, we view the reference to municipal responsibility as either loose language or an unrecognized misstatement.

review which we see as part of the continuing process of emergency planning -- and there is no need that this effort be doplicated in written municipal plans.

27.

The fourth area where the Commonwealth identified a need for written municipal plans relates to route alerting as a supplement to Licensee's prampt alerting system.

PA PF 57.

In this regard, the Commonwealth reads NUREG-0654, Appendix 3, S B.2.c, as recommending that "the route alerting system must be capable of assuring 100% coverage of the plume exposure pathway EPZ within 45 minutes of notification of a general emergency to the county."

PA PF 57.

This is untrue.

The NUREG-0654 criterion explicitly states that special arrange-

ments, i.e.,

route alerting, must be made to assure that "the population who may not have received the initial notification within the entire plume exposure EPZ" is notified within 45 minutes.

Staff Ex. 7 at p. 3-3.

Thus, rather than recom-mending a totally redundar,t, back-up system -- as erroneously construed by the Commonwealth -- NUREG-0654 only suggests that supplemental means of notification be developed for those areas not covered by Licensee's siren system.

Since Licensee has designed its siren aystem to provide 100 percent coverage of the plume exposure pathway EPZ, see Lic PF 177; Staff PF 123, 127, there may well be no need for any route alerting.

See Lic PF 184-87; Staff PF 129-30.

In any event, the Board believes it premature to require that municipal plans include detailed procedures for supplementary route alerting when it is highly._-

likely that the sirens will provide 100 percent coverage.

If there ars areas not adequately covered by the sirens, there will be thw enough to develop route alerting procedures for those limited areas at a later date.

28.

The last area listed by the Commonwealth as a municipal responsi~oility is the identification of available and unmet equipment and personnel resources.

PF PF 58.

While municipalities are responsible for reporting their needs to the county, it is the emergency management coordinators at the county level who are responsible for coordinating this informa-tion and documenting 'vailable and unmet resources countywide in the county emergency response plans.

Tr. at 20934 (Curry);

see, e.g.,

Board Ex. 5, at Annex L.

Mr. Curry testified that in York County existing information on resource shortfalls was adequate for planning purposes, Tr. at 20935 (Curry), but he was in the process of going back to the municipal coordinators to update the information in light of the revised county plan.

Tr. at 20935-36 (Curry).

In short, this is clearly a situation where t%=re is little or no need for written municipal plans.

Even though it is necessary to obtain information from muni-cipal sources -- which is being done -- the matter is ade-quately handled at the county level through the formal county plans.

29.

While the Board encourages the further development of written municipal plans, we find for the reasons just stated that the present level of planning at the municipal level is l

adequate to support restart of TMI.

See generally Lic PF 453-61.

-D.

School Evacuation Procedures 30.

Proposed findings on school issues were filed by the Staff, Licensee, the Commonwealth, and the Combined Interve-nors.

See Staff PF 260-68; Lic PF 362-70; PA PF 60-66; CI PF 86, 331-43.

The Ccmmonwealth and the Combined Intervenors urge the Board to require the preparation of written school evac-uation plans, at the school district level, prior to restart.26 PA PF 66; CI PF 86, 540, 558, 565(c).

.'he Commonwealth asserts four general bases for such a requirement:

the need for the pre-emergency identification of schools to be evacuated, the need for plans to include a designation of host schools and the routes to host schools, the need for the pre-emergency identi-fication of resources available to effect the evacuation of school children, and the need for coordinated procedures for making decisions on the closing and evacuation of schools.

Under this general rubric, we review the various concerns about school planning expressed in the proposed findings of the l

Commonwealth and the Combined Intervenors.

26 Contrary to the Commonwealth's assertion, see PA PF 60, there are only fifteen school districts which lie wholly or part within the TMI plume exposure pathway EPZ; West Shore School District lies partly in York County and partly in Cum-berland County, and thus may have been counted twice by t'.e Commonwea ?.th.

See Board Ex. 5, at 0-4; Board Ex. 6, at L-5; Board 51. 7, at L-1; Board Ex. 8, at G-5 to G-6; Board Ex.

9, at G-2.

Similarly, contrary to the Commonwealth's assertion, three school districts, not two, have completed written evacua-tion plans.

See Lic PF 367. -- _,

[

'~

l 31.

Contrary to the implication of PA PF 62, the current j

county plans (with the exception of the Dauphin county plan) include complete listings of the schools to be evacuated should an evacuation be ordered as a result of an incident at TMI.27 See Board Ex. 5, at 0-4; Board Ex. 7, at L-4; Board Ex. 8, at G-4; Board Ex. 9, at G-4.

Licensee's evacuation time estimate study (which has been provided to the five risk county emer-gency management coordinators and is acknowledged in all five county plans) also contains a complete listing of the individual schools within the TMI plume exposure pathway EPZ, 12yadding those in Dauphin County.28 See Lic Ex. 52, at 16-24, Tr. at 17924 (Rogan); Lic PF 264.

32.

For reasons identified in Lic PF 217-18, the Board rejects the concept -- advanced by the Commonwealth and the Combined Intervenors -- that evacuation plans must be developed for schools which are located outside the TMI plume exposure pathway EPZ, but have some students residing within the EPZ.

See PA PF 60; CI PF 86.

Such children are safe at their 27 The Dauphin county plan does include a listing of the affected school districts.

See Board Ex.

6, at L-5.

28 The Board notes that Dauphin County is the most advanced of the five risk counties with respect to the state of school planning.

All three of the completed plans for districts within the TMI plume exposure pathway EPZ are for school districts in Dauphin County.

See Lic PF 367; Board Ex. 6, at L-5.

29 The Commonwealth also suggests that schools may " straddle" the EPZ.

PA PF 60.

There is no evidence whatsoever that any school actually lies partly within and partly outside the plume exposure pathway EPZ and, in any event, the schools to 1

cchools outside the EPZ, and would be prevented by access control from returning to the EPZ if an evacuation were ordered.

To the extent that school officials may decide to evacuate schools beyond the TMI plume exposure pathway EPZ in the event of an actual emergency, that is of course their i

prerogative; logically, they would first evacuate the schools actually in the risk area before turning their attention and resources to the evacuation of schools beyond the risk area.

It is sufficient for our purposes, however, to note that the evacuation of schools beyond the plume exposure pathway EPZ is not now contemplated (see 1 31, supra), and is neither required by the Commission's emergency planning regulations nor recom-mended by NUREG-0654.

33.

The Combined Intervenors also assert generally that ovacuation plans must be prepared for parochial and private echools, day care centers, and nursery schools within the TMI plume exposure pathway EPZ.

CI PF 86.

The parties to the proceeding stipulated that Pennsylvania law provides that where busing is provided for public school students, busing must also be provided for those pupils who regularly attend non-public kindergarten, elementary and high schools not operated for profit.

Tr. at 17695-96, 18035 (Straube/Bradford); see also Tr. at 17449-51 (Rogan).

The only county-specific evidence on (continued) be evacuated in the event of an evacuation order already have been designated.

See 1 31, supra. - _ _

i the evacuation of private / parochial schools was the testimony of the York County League of Women Voters ("LWV"), which sug-gested that there were major problems with the evacuation of private / parochial schools.

However, as one of the LWV wit-nesses admitted, there is only one private / parochial school within the York County area at risk, and the public school district within which that school lies recognizes its responsi-bility to evacuate that school.

See Staff PP 264.

Further, Licensee's evacuation time estimate study establishes that tnere are sufficient buses to evacuate all schools (public and non-public) within the TMI plume exposure pathway EPZ.

Tr. at 17447-49 (Pcdwal/Rogan/ Schaufler); Tr. at 17458-59 (Schaufler).30 34.

There is no indication whatsoever in the plans of the five risk counties and the Commonwealth that day care centers cud nursery schools are to be evacuated as units in the event of an evacuation ceder; to the contrary, Licensee's experts 30 Combined Intervenors rely on the LWV study for the propo-sition that there is a serious shortage of buses for school children in York County.

CI PF 343.

In addition to our gen-eral reluctance to accord much weight to the LWV study, see Lic PF 79-83; Staff PF 261-66, it is clear from the cross-ex-amination of LWV witnesses that the table on page 13a of their testimony includes more than 21,500 students not within the TMI plume exposure pathway EPZ --

i.e.,

all of the students in the Northern, Eastern, Dover, West York and Suburban school districts, and mary of the students in the West Shore and Central school districte do not attend schools within the EPZ.

Tr. at 21531-35 (Miller).

The LWV table is thus ser-iously misleading and does not establish that there is any shortage of buses. 4 e

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cesumed -- for purposes of preparing the evacuation time esti-

)

mate study -- that, should an evacuation be ordered, children at such facilities either would be turned over to their parents or other responsible individuals, or would evacuate with the respective operators of the facilities.

Tr. at 17444-45.

This in a reasonable concept of operations, and is in accordance with general everyday practices of parents and babysitters; that is, parents routinely make pre-arrangements with their babysitters as to actions to be taken for their children's care in an emergency.

See generally Tr. at 20874-75 (Curry).

One would expect that such arrangements are even more the norm for organized institutions such as day care centers and nursery schools (as opposed to individual private babysitters).

35.

The Commonwealth alleges that school planning must recognize host schools / centers and the routes to the host schools / centers.

The Combined Intervenors further allege that parents have not been informed where school children would go in an evacuation, and that the information is not included in the public information pamphlets or in the EBS announcements.

PA PF 63; CI PF 86.

In light of this alleged omission, the Combined Intervenors propose that the York County brochure be revised to advise parents of the reception sites for school children.

CI PF 560.

However, the county-level " master plans" for schools already indicate that host schools / centers have been designated for each of the schools within the TMI plume.

1 l

exposure pathway EPZ.31 See Board Ex. 5, at 0-4; Board Ex.

G, at L-5; Board Ex.

7, at L-4; Board Ex. 8, at G-4; Board Ex. 9, at G-4.

Moreover, contrary to the Combined Intervenors' assertions, these destinations are included in the specific prepared EBS announcements developed by the five risk counties for broadcast in the event an evacuation is ordered while school is in session.

Further, though the Board knows of no reason why parents need know the routes that school buses will take to the host schools / centers, that information also is specified in the EBS announcements for York, Dauphin and Lebanon Counties.

See Board Ex. 5, at F-13 to F-14; Board Ex.

6, at D-12 to D-13; Board Ex. 7, at D-9; Board Ex. 8, at F-ll to !:-12; Board Ex. 9, at F-9.

36.

The Ccmbined Intervenors also would have the Board find that there is a general lack of correlation between host echools/ centers that school children would be evacuated to, and the reception centers to which their parents would go.

CI PF 86.

However, contrary to the Intervenors' assertion, the Com-monwealth and the counties have considered the need for such a correlation, and have generally coordinated the points to which 31 While the information in school plans, once completed, must of course be consistent with that in the county-level " master plans," our immediate concern is that the schools to be evac-uated have been designated and correlated with host schools /

centers, and that a determination has been made that sufficient resources are available to effect a school evacuation.

Since we are satisfied that these functions have been performed, we do not require that such information be duplicated, prior to restart, in school district plans.

students would be evacuated with the public evacuation routes and the reception centers to which their parents would be directed, so that parents need not travel far out of their way to pick up their student children.

See generally Tr. at Sg 20913-18 (Belser/Wertz/ Curry).

37.

The Combined Intervenors also erroneously assert that

" York County has not yet coordinated with school districts" as to whether, in the event an evacuation is ordered, school children should be held at school for pick up by their parents or should be bused outside the plume exposure pathway EPZ.

CI PF 335.

This assertion is plainly contradicted by all the evidence on this point in the proceeding.

See, e.g.,

Staff PP 267; Board Ex. 5, at 0-2 to 0-3.

38.

Similarly, the Combined Intervenors would have the Board observe that FEMA disapproves of Dauphin County's alleged policy of transporting school children home during a " condition yellow" (alert).

CI PF 332.

However, the Intervenors have failed to note that the Dauphin County plan has been revised to be wholly consonant with FEMA's recommendations on this point, and FEMA has approved the current Dauphin County policy.

See Staff PF 268; Lic PF 364-65.

39.

The Combined Intervenors further propose that the Board note that the Superintendent of the West Shore School District in Cumberland and York Counties testified that he has not received information on sheltering children.

CI PF 86.

This is a gross distortion of the Superintendent's statements..

a

The testimony which the Intervenors cite was based on a quotation from the LWV notes of an interview with him, and reflected the Superintendent's misperception of the extent of the sheltering his schools might be required to provide -- a nisperception possibly fostered by the inexperienced LWV interviewer.

In fact, the Superintendent subsequently ampli-fled the cited statement to make it clear that the schools could indeed provide sheltering of school children for a period of some hours, if necessary, and that he has received guidance on such sheltering.

See Staff PF 262; Lic PF 80; Tr. at 21572-74 (Nentzel).

40.

The Commonwealth proposes that the Board find that cdditional school district planning is necessary, prior to restart, to identify resources available to effect a school evacuation.

PA PF 64.

The Combined Intervenots allege that there is a " serious shortage" of buses in York County.

CI PF 343.

However, there is extensive expert testimony to the effect that _nere are enough buses to evacuate all students within the rMI plume exposure pathway EPZ in the event an e'vacuation is ordered; a comprehensive analysis and correlation of risk school enrollments and available school buses support-ing that testimony is documented in Licensee's evacuation time estimate study.

See, e.g., Tr. at 17457-59 (Schaufler).

The York County Emergency Management Coordinator explicitly testified that York County has sufficient resources to evacuate the York County schools within the TMI plume exposure pathway EPZ.

Tr.

at 20851 (Curry).

See also Lic PF 262; Staff PF 176.

52.

Accordingly, the Board finds that the assumptions made by Parsons, Brinckerhoff in preparing their evacuation time study are appropriate and are generally consistent with the offsite emergency plans.

Any differences between the study and the plans have been identified and do not significantly effect the validity of the~ time estimates or the usefulness of the study.

53.

The Combined Intervenors also allege that, contrary to the guidance of NUREG~0654, not all of the assumptions were stated in the Parsons, Brinckerhoff study.

CI PF 231-33.

This claim both misconstrues the guidance in NUREG-0654 and distorts the restimony of record.

Appendix 4 to NUREG-0654 provides in relevant part (Staff Ex. 7, Appendix 4, S I.B, at p. 4-2):

(continued) times higher than the adverse weather scenario concidered by Parsons, Brinckerhoff, CI PF 241, without noting that Li-censee's consultants considered the rain scenario and con-cluded it would not produce higher time estimates.

Lic PF 260, n.59; Staff PF 176, n.36.

The Combined Intervenors also question whether fog should have been considered as the adverse weather scenario.

CI PF 241.

Since the record indi-cates that in the TMI area heavy fog, meaning visibility less than one-quarter mile, occurs about.4 percent of the time,

(

Tr. at 16414-15 (Riethle), we do not believe the fog scenario to be of much significance..

l l

l B.

General Assumptions All assumptions used in the analysis shall be provided.

The assumptions shall include such things as automobile occupancy factors, method of determining roadway capacities, and method of estimating populations.

[ Emphasis added.]

It is abundantly clear from a review of the evacuation time study that Licensee's consultants have done a superb job of identifying their general assumptions, such as automobile occupancy factors, roadway capacities and population estimates.

See Lic. Ex. 52, at 1-59.

With respect to the more amorphous assumptions that were the subject of intervenors' cross-exam-i ination, the Board believes Licensee's consultants did a professional and credible job of identifying those assumptions in their study report.

This finding is based on our view --

which we believe to be an accepted truism -- that it is physically impossible to identify all assumptions, accepting the broad definition of assumptions used by the Combined l

Intervenors.

Moreover, our review of transcript pages 17907-08, relied upon by intervenors in CI PF 232, shows that i

Licensee's consultants believed they had described all their assumptions in the study report, although they recognized that during the course of cross-examination they had expanded upon some of the assumptions.

Mr. Rogan was of the view that the delivery of the study to the state and county planners, plus-the conversations he has had with those people, were adequate to convey the assumptions underlying the Parsons, Brinckerhoff L m

study.

Tr. at ~7908 (Rogan).

The Board concludes that the assumptions hasa been adequately identified.

54.

With respect to the particular assumptions challenged by the combined Intervenors, we make two broad observations.

First, in almost all instances, the Combined Intervenors simply ignore the testimony by Licensee's consultants and others that, in the context of the entire study, the particular assumptions identified by intervenors are not significant.

Second, in many cases, the record citations do not support the findings proposed by intervenors.

Below we briefly review the most significant of the assumptions challenged by the Combined Intervenors.

(a)

Panic (CI PF 234-35).

Mr. Podwal testified that, based on his historical review of disasters and evacuations, there tends to be cooperation and tends not to be panic.

Tr.

6 at 17638 (Podwal).

This is consistent with a broad range of tcstimony the Board has received from other witnesses.

See Lic PF 229-40; Staff PF 202-29.

( b)

Evacuation of institutions and individuals outside the EPZ (CI PF 236-37, 248-53).

The Combined Intervenors argue that schools beyond the EPZ might be evacuated which might add to traffic on the egress routes and might alter the distribu-tion of buses to move the school children.

We already have 36 Parsons, Brinckerhoff has an extensive library on evacua-tions that has been reviewed by Mr. Podwal and his staff.

Tr.

at 17487 (Podwal)..

addressed the issue of evacuating schools beyond the EPZ, see 1 32, supra, and we do not believe it is a significant factor.

The Combined Intervenors also assert that people from 10 to 20 miles out might self-evacuate causing problems with the evac-uation of the closer-in population.

We also have reviewed this claim previously and, in view of the upgraded public education program, have rejected the proposition that significant numbers of people outside the EPZ would self-evacuate.

See Lic PF 237-40; Staff PF 206-09.

Even if such self-evacuation did occur, it was the view of Licensee's experts that it would not significantly increase the time it takes for people inside the EPZ to cross the EPZ boundary.

See Tr. at 17544, 17546, 17583, 17627 (Podwal).

(c)

Weather and other meteorological considerations (CI PF 238-47).

The Combined Intervenors initially cite NUREG-0654 for the proposition that the study should have given " consider-ation to meteorological conditions in choosing the sectors de-lineated."

CI PF 238.

The guidance actually suggested is:

"Where meteorological conditions such as dominant wind direc-tions, warrant speciEl consideration, an additional sub-area may need to be defined and a separate estimate made for this case."

Staff Ex. 7, at p. 4-44 The Commonwealth is not pro-posing to evacuate by sectors, CI PF 238, precisely because the wind is variable at TMI with no dominant direction.

Therefore, the NUREG-0654 guidance does not require definition of an additional sub-area.

I I l

l l

With respect to whether snow, rain or fog is the appropriate adverse weather condition, see CI PF 239-41, we previously have addressed that issue, see n.35, supra, and find the choice of snow appropriate for the TMI area.

Intervenors also question what would happen in cases of severe flooding, heavy snowfall blocking feeder rou'.es, or rush hour.

CI PF 242, 246, 247.

In each instance, Licensee's consultants stated that such events are contingencies that are best considered by cmergency response personnel when the specific situation arises.

See Tr. at 17622-23 (Schaufler); 17623-24 (Podwal);

17553-S4 (Schaufler/ Pod 1).

The Board agrees with this assessment.

(d)

Road blockage due to accidents, lack of gasoline or construction and maintenance activities (CI PF 256(a), (c) and 13)).

Generally, Licensee's witnesses testified that these contingencies were not ignored but are best considered during the actual emergency because the impacts are location specific.

See Tr. at 17540-44, 17624-26 (Schaufler/Podwal), 17678 (Podwal).

Moreover, they testified that the time necessary to put gas in the car was included in the minimum preparation time of 20 minutes.

Tr. at 17634 (Podwal), 17636 (Rogan).

Potential accidents were considered, and it was determined 37 This conclusion is similarly true with respect to the Com-bined Intervenors' concern, CI PP 256(e), about special large congregations of people.

See Tr. at 17678 (Podwal); see also Tr. at 17571-74 (Podwal/Rogan).

that, since roads would be used in their normal, two-way mode, l

cmergency vehicles would have access to disabled cars and there

-would be sufficient room for the traffic to temporarily pass around suc.h vehicles.

Tr. at 17541-42 (Schaufler), 17626 (Podwal); see also Lic PF 343-46 and n.71.

(e)

Decontaminaticn of vehicles (CI PF 256(b)).

Contrary to the claim of the Combined Intervenors, the study did not assume there was no need to decuntaminate vehicles, but rather concluded that if decontamination points were even a small distance beyond the EPZ, it would not affect the time to evacuate.

Tr. at 17628 (Podwal); see also Tr. at 19191 (Urbanik).

In fact, the decontamination points are all more than 10 miles from the EPZ boundary.

See Lic PF 409-10; Staff PF 306-07.

55.

The Board finds that the assumptions challenged by the Combined Intervenors are appropriate for a study like that performed by Parsons, Brinckerhoff.

The assumptions made either have reasonable support in the factual record,. are not likely to significantly impact the overall time estimates, or are necessary simplifying assumptions without which it would not be possible to even perform the study.

56.

The Co'abined Intervenors' second major attack on the evacuation time study was the lack of any commitment to update the study.

CI PF 229.

We reject this claim, since the Commonwealth's emergency response plan clearly assigns this responsibility to the Pennsylvania State Police and PennDOT.

47-

_y,

See Pa. Ex. 2(a), at SS VII.A.18.e and VII.A.21.a, pp. 23, 24-25.

There is no doubt that the Pennsylvania agencies have the expertise to update the Parsons, Brinckerhoff study.

Tr.

j at 17925-26 (Podwal).

57.

The combined Intervenors' final point on the evac-uation time study relates to the manner in which the study will be used.

CI PF 260-62.

While it is not clear from the pro-1 posed findings what it is intervenors would urge us to con-clude, suffice it to say that the Commonwealth and the counties intend to use the study both as an aid in their continuing planning and as a decisionmaking tool during emergencies.

See Lic PF 256, 263-65.

This is in accord with the applicable regulatory guidance and is acceptable to the Board.

F.

Agriculture and Livestock 58.

Proposed findings on agriculture and livest ( ck issues were filed by Licensee, the Commonwealth, the Combine 3 Inter-venors, the Aamodts and the NRC Staff.

See Lic PF 436-51; PA PF 120; CI PF 190, 424-50; Aamodt (Livestock) PF 1-63; Staff PF 318-29.

We have relied on these proposed findings, plus our independent review of the record, in resolving the various disputes amcng the parties.

Because we have rejected the findings proposed by the Aamodts, we believe it appropriate to set forth our reasons in rejecting those findings.

59.

First, many of the findings are totally unsupported i

by any reference to the record, including many of the findings essential to the argument advanced by the Aamodts.

See, e.g.,

! i

~. _ _.,.. _ - -, _ _.. - -.. -,... _ -., _.. - -. - -... _.

_~,..,_,,.._,__-..,_-_,_m._

1 i

Aamodt (Livestock) PF 9, 22, 61.

In other cases, the record citations either fail to support the proposed finding, see, i

'e.g., Aamodt (Livestock) PF 10, or are taken out of context.

See, e.g., Aamodt (Livestock) PF 24-27.38 60.

Second, the Aamodts have throughout the proceeding mischaracterized and misrepresented the nature of the Depart-ment of Agriculture plan.

Annex B thereto includes a number of short fact sheets covering a broad range of options available to farmers for the protection of their livestock.

See Pa. Ex.

2(a), Appendix 7, Annex B.

While it is apparent that not every farmer will be able to take advantage of all the protactive measures identified in Annex B, the purpose of the fact sheets is to identify the range of available options so that indiv-idual farmers can adapt them to their particular situations.

Thus, it is not true, as asserted in Aamodt (Livestock) PF 9, that the Commonwealth proposes extensive renovations of farm buildings or recommends that farmers take actions "which will necessarily expose [them] to high levels of radiation."

There was much litigation over the number and types of barns 38 It is true that the witnesses originally celected by the Commonwealth to support the Department of Agriculture plan, Drs.

Van Buskirk and Cable, were not the proper people to answer the intervenors' questions.

However, in their findings the Acmodts totally ignore that the Commonwealth subsequently produced Mr.

Robert C.

Furrer, the person primarily responsible for develop-ment and implementation of the Department of Agriculture plEn.

See generally Tr. at 18832-95 (Furrer).

Thus, we find little significance in the fact that Drs. Van Buskirk and Cable were unable to answer certain questions posed to them. _

- _.. ~ _ _ _ _ _.

l available to farmers.

It is unnecessary for us to resolve such disputes since Annex B includes advice en sheltering animals in vcrious types of buildings, ranging from open sheds to more substantial, closed buildings.

See Pa. Ex. 2I,a), Appendix 7, Annex B, at p. 5.

Similarly broad advice is given with respect to ventilation (,id. at 6-7) and feed and water (,id at 7

').

More detailed advice is given for the various types oi livestock.

Id. at 10-22.

The Board was impressed by the resourcefulness of the farmers, veterinarians and county extension agents who testified in this proceeding.

We believe that, with the advice contained in Annex B, the agricultural community around TMI should be able to take adequate measures to protect their livestock.

61.

Third, we note that the Commonwealth has modified their plans so that adequate amounts of KI and dosimetry will be available at the county level, if necessary, to aid farmers in entering the EPZ to care for their animals.

PA PF 120.

This change provides added assurance that adequate protective measures are available to farmers in the event of a radiolog-ical emergency at TMI.

G.

Licensee's Staffing of its Emergency Operations Facility

.62.

The position of the parties on the staffing of Licensee's Near-site Emergency Operations Facility (" EOF")

are.

adequately set forth in their respective proposed findings.

Compare Lic. PF 44-56 with Staff PF 35-43 and PA PF 19-50.

We have accepted the position urged by Licensee because, on balance, we agree with Licensee that it has demonstrated that i

l 1

--r

its overall approach for staffing both its onsite and offsite cmergency response organizations is functionally equivalent to i

'the guidance set forth in NUREG-0654 and NUREG-0696.39 In reaching this conclusion we have been mindful of the views urged by the Commonwealth.

However, we reject the Commonwealth position for two primary reasons.

First, we believe the Commonwealth both misstates the crux of Licensee's position and fails to appreciate the purposes behind the NRC Staff's position.

Second, we have substantial trouble in understanding the Commonwealth pos#. tion, p~rticularly since the Commonwealth a

is unwilling to commit to station its nuclear engineer at Licensee's EOF within one hour.

63.

The Commonwealth perceives Licensee's primary objection to the early arrival of the Emergency Support Direction at the EOF as a concern that this may result in a less senior corporate official in the EOF then in the control room.

PA PF 27.

While this is undoubtedly a concern, it is by 39 The Commonwealth appears to argue that the Emergency Support Director must be at the EOF within one hour as a matter of reg-ulation.

See PA PF 22-24.

This is not correct.

See Lic PF 46 and nn.13-14.

While the Commonwealth points to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, S IV.E.8, and argues that "during an emer-gency" must mean during the first four hours of an emergency, see PA PF 24, this is too rigid a reading of the regulation which specifies no time for staffing the EOF.

Even the NRC guidance only suggests that the EOF be staffed within one hour following declaration of a Site Emergency, which Licensee f Jlly complies with but for the location of the senior corporate manager.

And we Know that the Commission has given approval to a TVA emergency plan that apparently never stations a senior manager at the EOF.

See Tr. at 15490-92 (Grimes).,. _ _

no means Licensee's primary concer:

As we understand Licensee's position, in assessing the onsite management talent

.available to respond to an emergency, Licensee has concluded that the optimum use of its personnel is to station the most

(

senior corporate official, as Emergency Director, in the control room.

The people designated for that post are capable i

of understanding and =sking use of information that is directly available in the control room.

In order to assure that the Emergency Director is not overwhelmed with responsibilities, Licensee has provided the Emergency Director with sufficient staff to ensure that the Emergency Director is not drawn into the minute-by-minute response to the accident.

Given both the manageraent talent available and the location of the Emergency Director in the control room, Licensee believes that, until its primary Emergency Support Director can arrive at the EOF,40 the Emergency Director is best suited to provide protective action recommendations to the Commonwealth.

Licensee therefore opposes designating someone else as interim Emergency Support Director, moving him to the EOF, and charging him with respon-sibility for protective action decisionmaking.

See Lic PF 40 Both the Commonwealth and the NRC Staff point to Licensee's testimony that, besides the two primary Emergency Support Directors, there are others available who could fill that po-sition.

PA PF 27; Staff PF 42.

That is true.

However, it does not resolve the problem before the Board which is whether we should direct Licensee to use those people as an interim Emergency Support Director rather than having the onsite Emergency Director make protective action recommendations.,

-- ~ _.

47-49.

Thus, there certainly is much more behind Licensee's position than mere concern over the relative seniority of its personnel -- although we agree with Licensee's view that it is i

somewhat unrealistic to place the more junior offi:ial offsite, charge him with making protecitve action recomr;endations, and assume he will not be heavily influenced by the senior corpor-ate official onsite in the control room.

64.

The Commonwealth also incorrectly characterizes the NRC Staff position as based on the need to have a senior manager who can speak with authority to other emergency organizations on radiological or operations matters.

PA PF 20.

It is undisputed that Licensee has such an individual -- the onsite Emergency Director.

The dispute is whether that person should during the early hours of an accident be stationed onsite in the control room or offsite in the EOF.

The NRC Staff's generic advice is to station that individual offsite so that he does not get drawn into the details of the onsite response.

See Staff PF 40.

As previously indicated, the Board believes that Licensee has satisfied the NRC Staff's concern in this area by committing to a larger onsite emergency organiza-tion than suggested

.n NUREG-0654.

See 1 63, supra; Lic PF 48, 8

50-51.

65.

With respect to the reasons advanced by the Commonwealth for seeking the early transfer of protective action decisionmaking offsite, we have trouble in understanding the Commonwealth position.

First, given the importance the Commonwealth attaches to Licensee's protective action..

recommendations, we do not understand why the Commonwealth would have us require that those recommendations be made by

)

l someone other than Licensee's primary choice.

Second, given the importance the Commonwealth apparently attaches in face-to-face communications between its nuclear engineer and Licensee's Emergency Support Director, we do not understand why the Commonwealth has not committed to send its nuclear engineer to the EOF within one hour after declaration of a Site Emergency.41 66.

While both Licensee and the Commonwealth see advan-tages in the Commonwealth's nuclear engineer arriving at the EOF quickly, the Commonwealth argues that those purposes will be frustrated if the Emergency Support Director is not also at the EOF.

At the time this theory was advanced during the hearing the Board had trouble understanding the logic behind it and we still do.

Moreover, the Commonwealth is simply incor-rect in citing Mr. Dornsife's testimony that he and the Emergency Support Director both need to be at the EOF so that Mr. Dornsife can provide " input into [the] protective action recommendation prior to it being made by the Licensee," PA PF 37, since Mr. Dornsife later withdrew that comment.

Tr. at 23033-34 (Dornsife).42 And, the Commonwealth is somewhat disingenuous in arguing that the communications limitations of 41 Significantly, we note that the Commonwealth's findings in-cluded further commitments where it deemed them appropriate, but did not make any additional commitments on sending its nuclear engineer to the EOF.

42 While we have had no occasion to question Mr. Dornsife's technical qualifications -- which we regard as high, see PA.-. - -

the Radiologic 1 Line have n at yet been solved, see PA PF 45, since it was Mr. Rogan's test-imony that Licensee had offered to install an additional dedicated phone for the transfer of l

operational information to the Commonwealth, but the l

Commonwealth had not yet responded to that offer.

Tr. at 22089-90 (Rogan).

67.

In summary, while the Board agrees that the transfer of information between Licensee and the Commonwealth is important, we do not believe the adequacy of the means used to transfer such information depends on an Emergency Support Director being 13cated in the EOF.

We therefore reject the position being urged by the Commonwealth.

Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE George F.

Trgwbridge Robert E.

Zahler Delissa A. Ridgway Counsel for Licensee 1800 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C.

20036 (202) 822-1000 Dated :

August 31, 1981 (continued)

PF 32 -- his testimony on the EOF question relates more to organizational theory and industrial management, areas where Mr. Dornsife has no special background or expertise.

Tr. at 23020-21 (Dornsife)..-

APPENDIX A INDEX OF EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS Combined Contention Licensee Staff Intervenors Aamodt EP-1 110-11, 155-56 72, 98 83 2

1 345 i

248 162 ANGRY EP-3(A) 6-7 20 39 (B) 6-7 21 19 (C) (1) 95 58 None (C) (2)99-100 62 None EP-4(A) 345 248 162 (B) 243 167 123 (C) 119-20 77 80 (D) 28

)2 None (E) 111 74 None (F) 370 264 183 (G) i 105-06 69 None (H) 189-90 116 87 (I) 86 53 None (J) 26-27 25 None EP-5(A) 326-27 244 156-57 (B) 192-93 124 89 (C) 56-57 40 55 135-36 67 68' (D) l (E) 190-92 119 88 (F) 363-64 260 180 (G) 345-46 252 162 (H) 364 263 None EP-6(A) 317 231 151 (B) 273 193 132 (C) 250 169 172 (D) 242-43 163 122-23 (E) 327 246 157 (F) 299-300 21 6 144 (G) 346-47 256 163 s

SCUP EP-7 73 46 None EP-8 73 48 tiene

~

EP-9 73-74 52 Nonc EP-10 317 232 151-S2 EP-ll 219 143 None EP-12 167 105 None EP-13 1

310 1

224 146

fw

,wr.-,,, - -

--,w,,,

.,--y,-w,eeve.,---

,_,e,v-we,-.-c,,,.-,-ww

_,---,--,wyy,.

.w_-,we.--,,1w+,,,,,-w,-w.

-e-,r-,,

,-me-nwe-----

+--w

. Combined Contention Licensee Staff Intervenors cwberry EP-14(A) 136-37 89 69-70 l

(B) 138-39, 288 92, 209 70 l

(C) 120,155,273-74, 83,97,193, 80,132-33) l l

300-01,328,370-218,245, 143,157, 371 270 183

(

(D) 251 170 172-73 l

(E) 258-59 178 174 l

(F) 54 38 53-54 (G) 54-55 38 54 (H) 261-62 177

_ 126 142 (I) 300 216 (J) 269-70 188 128-29 (K) 318 235 152 (L) 271-72 190 129 (M) 327-28 246 157 i

(N) 251 170 172 (O) 137-38 89 69 (P)*

163,257-58,259 101,176,178 85,174,174"~

(Q) r120-21 80 80 (R) 262 181 125 (S) 272,318-19 191,235 129,152 (T) 138 8C 69 (U) 213 135 120 j

(V) 277-78 196 134-35 122 (W) 242 161 (X) 266-67 185 128 I

(Y) 154-55 95 None (Z) 319 238 152-53 (7A) 278-79 199 135 (BB) 346 254 163 (CC) 273 195 132 (DD) 202 135 92 (EE) 311 225 148 (FF) 161 100 None (GG) 22 275 36 1

(HH) 202 134 91 (II) 312 229 147 (JJ) 318 233 152 l

(KK) 201_

132 91 l

(LL) 51 ~

4 36 52-53 (MM) 202 134 91 (NN) 212 136

~7 120

~~

(00) 267 186-2 128

~~

EP-15(E) 356-57 257 169-70

There was a typographical error in Licensee's listing of energency planning

(

ccntentions. As a result the contenticn identified as EP-14(C) (in part) i by the NBC Staff at page 178 and by the Ocznbined Intervenors at page 174 of their respective findings should be corrected to EP-14(P) (in part).

. Combined Contention Licensee Staff Inte rvenors wberry EP-16(A) 311-12 227 147 (B) 51 36 52 (C) 252 172 173-74

' ( D ).

259 178 174 (E) 137 91 70 (F) 252-53 174 173 (G) 294 211 140 (H) 295 214 141 (I) 262-63 183 126 (J) 288-89 210 137-38 g) 301 222 143 (L) 310-11 224 146 (M) 139-40 94 71 (N) 213-14 140 120 (0) 301 221 143 (P) 202-03 135 92 (Q) 163-64 103 85 (R) 295 213 1:,0-41 (S) 312 228 147 (T) 279 202 135 iholly EP-17(A) 171-73 108,110, None 112,114 (B) 3 *i 5 273 None EP-18 86,101-02 56,66 None loard 2unstion a 95 59,62 None

APPENDIX B SUBJECT MATTER OF CONTENTIONS NOT ADDRESSED BY INTERVENORS 1.

Licensee Organization and Staffing 4 (D), 4(J) 2.

Accident Classification 3 (C) (1), 3 (C) (2),

4 (I),

7, 8, 9, 18 3.

Initial Notification of Governmental Units 4(E), 4 (G) 4.

Emergency Instructions - Concept of Operations 14 (C), 14(Y) 5.

Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) 14 (FF)

S.

News Releases 12 7.

Definition of EPZ's 17(A) 8.

Ingestion PAG's 11 9.

School Children Transportation 14 (B) 10.

Training

5(H) 11.

Audit & Review of Plans 17(B)

l l

Lic 9/9/81 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of

)

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY

)

Docket No. 50-289

)

(Restart)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear

)

Station, Unit No. 1)

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " Licensee's Reply Findings on Emergency Preparedness Issues", were served upon those persons on the attached Service List by deposit in the United States mail, postage prepaid, this 9th day of September, 1981.

c-tobert E.A ah'ler Dated:

September 9, 1981 I

T UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICE!.3ING BOARD In the Matter of

)

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY

)

Docket No. 50-289

)

(Re start)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear

)

Station, Unit No. 1)

)

SERVICE LIST

Ivan W. Smith, Esquire John A. Levin, Escuire Chainran Assistant Caansel Atanic Safety and Licensing Pennsylvania Public Utility Ccmn'n Board Panel Post Office Box 3265 U.S. Nuclear Pegulatory Carrission Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Washington, D.C.

20555 Karin W. Carter, Esquire

Dr. Walter H. Jordan Assistant Attorney General Atanic Safety and Licensing 505 Executive House Board Panel Post Office Box 2357 881 West Outer Drive Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Cak Ridge, 'Ibnnessee 37830 John E. Minnich

Dr. Linda W. Little Chairran, Dauphin County Board Atanic Safety and Licensing of Ccmnissioners Board Panel Dauphin County Courthouse 5000 Hermitage Drive Front and Market Streets

.Paleigh, North Carolina 27612 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17101 James R. Tourtellette, Escuire Walter W. Cohen, Esauire Office of tne Executive Legal Director Consumer Advocate U. S. Nuclear Reculatory Ccmnission Office of Consumer Advocate Washington, D.C.

20555 14th Floor, Strawberry Square Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17127 l

Docketing and Service Section Office of tne Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccrrission Washington, D.C.

20555 l

Previously served on August 31, 1981; only certificate of service enclosed.

y Jordan D. Cunningham, Escuire Gail B. Phelps

/

Attorney for Newhg Tomship Anti-Nuclear Group Representing York T.M.I. Steering Camnittee 245 West Philadelphia Street Fox, Farr & Cunningham York, Pennsylvania 17404 2320 North Second Street Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17110 William S. Jordan, III, Esquire Attorney for People Against Nuclear Ms. Iouise Eradford Encrgy DII AEERT Har.on & Weiss 315 Peffer Street 1725 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 506 I

Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17102 Washington, D.C.

20006 Attorney General of New Jersey Ri crt Q. Pollard Attn: Thorcas J. Gemine, Esquire 609 Montpelier Street Deputy Attorney General Baltircre, Maryland 21213 l

Division of law - Paxn 316 1100 Raymond Boulevard Chauncey Kepford 3

Newark, New Jersey 07102 Judith H. Johnsnd f

(

hvironmental Coalition on Nuclear j

Ellyn R. Weiss, Esquire Power Attorney for the Union of Concerned 433 Orlando Avenue Scientists State College, Pennsylvania 16801 Har:ron & Weiss 1725 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 506 Marvin I. Lewis Washington, D.C.

20006 6504 Bradford Terrace Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19149 Steven C. Sholly Union of Concerned Scientists Marjorie M. Aamodt 1725 Eye Street N.W., Suite 601 R. D. 5 Washington, D.C.

20006 Coatesville, Pennsylvania 19320 Professor Gary L. Milhollin 1815 Jefferson Street Madison, Wisconsin 53711 l

1 l

l l

u

_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _.

ML20030D754

Text

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