ML20030D667
| ML20030D667 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07105461 |
| Issue date: | 08/07/1981 |
| From: | Box W, Klima B, Seagren R OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20030D663 | List: |
| References | |
| ORNL-5147, ORNL-5147-R01, ORNL-5147-R1, NUDOCS 8109140326 | |
| Download: ML20030D667 (100) | |
Text
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Safety Analysis Report for
$Pw f[f k gj Packaging (SARP) of the dj;jpk Oak Ridge National Laboratory
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Printed in the United States of America. Available from National Technical Information Service U.S. Department of Commerce 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 NTIS price codes-Printed Copy: A06 Microfiche A01 This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the U nited States G overnment nor any agency thereof, nor any of their etnployees, makes any warramy, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or p,rocess d:sclosed, or represc9ts that its use would not inf ringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by t. ade nartie, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily r.0nstitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or avoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herem do not necessarity state or reflect those el the United StatesGovernment or any agency thereof.
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CAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY OPERATED BY UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION hdCLEAR DlylSION Post OFFICE BOX X OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE 37830 August 7,1981 TO:
Distribution Report No.:
ORNL-5147/R1 Classification: Unclassified Author (s);
W. D. Box et al.
Subject:
Safety Analysis Report for Packcaina (SARP) of the Ook Ridae l
National Laboratory TRU Curium Shippina Container l
l I
Please correct your copy (ies) of the subject report by affixing the revised versions of the following pages: 1, 2, 3, 4, 25, 30, 32, 41, 53,9, W, 83, and 84. Apologies are extended to the reader for any inconvenience in this matter.
l W. N. Drewery, SupervTsor l
Laboratory Records Department i
information Division l
WND:jre
/t Attachments (Wf) l cc: Master File ORNL-5147/R1
1 l
i I
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page AllSTR ACT...
I 1.
INTRODUCTION I
1.1 Description of TRU Curium Shipping Container.
2 1.2 Contents of Package..
5 2.
STRUCTURAL EVAL.UATION 2.1 Niechanical Properties of N1aterials.
5 2.2 General Standards for AL Packages.
5 2.2.1 Reactions between materials of construction and package contents.
5 2.2.2 Closure........
. 7 2.2.3 Lifting devices...
7 2.2.4 Tie-down devices 16 2.3 Standards for Type 11 and I.arge-Quantity Packaging....
25 2.3.1 Load resistance.
26 2.3.2 External pressure......
. 27 3.
CON 1PLIANCE WITil STANDARDS FOR NORN1AL CONDITIONS i
OF TRANSPORT.
28 3.1 Ileat 28 l
3.2 Cold 30 l
3.3 Pressure 30 l
3.4 Vibration..
30
(
3.5 Water Spray 30 l
3.6 Free Drop.
. 31 j
3.7 Penetration 31 t
i 3.8 Compression....
31 l
4.
CON 1PLIANCE WIfli STANDARDS FOR llYPOfflETICAL 1
ACCIDENT CON D.TIONS.....
32 4.1 Free Drop.
33 4.1.1 Impact on side
.. 33 4.1.2 Impact on top flange.
33 4.1.3 Impact on top rorner..
4.2 Punct ure..
. 38 4.3 Thermal Evaluation.....
39 4.3.1 Thermal properties of materials...
39 4.3.2 Thermal accident analysis...
39 4.4 Water Immersion...
41 lit
r j
iv 5.
CO NT A I N M E NT...................
.................... 41 5.1 Containment Boundaries...
................. 41 5.2 Specia!-Form Shipments.........
.................................. 41 5.3 Containment Requirements for Normal Conditions of Transport............. 46 5.4 Containment Requirements During the flypothetical Accident.
46 47 6.
CRITICAll1Y,
7.
SillEl. DING EVALUATION........
48 8.
QU ALITY ASSUR ANCE...........
....... 48 8.1 Fabrication. Inspection, and Acceptance Tests.....................
48 8.2 Operating Procedures and Routine inspection....................
. 48 8.3 Periodic Maintenance and Inspection..............
......... 48 9.
APPEN DINES.....
................ 49 9.1 Drawings..........
51
.... 55 9.2 Approval Documents.
9.3 Computer Programs to Calculate Corner Drop Daeleration Forces...
71 9.4 Operating and inspection Procedures.
....... 81
- 10. REFERENCES...
. 91 l
l
1 1
l SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FOR PACKAGING (SARP)
OF Tile OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY TRU CURIUM SillPPING CONTAINER I
l W. D. Box, B. B. Klima, R. D. Seagren, j
L. B. Shappert, and G. A. Aramayo l
ABSTRACT An analytical evaluation of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Transuranium (TRU) Curium Shipping Container was made to demonstrate its compliance with the regulations governing offsite shipment of packages containing radioactive material. The evaluation encompassed five primary categories: structural integrity, thermal resistance, radiation shielding, nuclear criticality safety, and quality assurance. The results of the evaluation show that the container complies with the applicable regulations.
1.
INTRODUCTION When a package is to be used in offsite shipment of radioactive or fissile material, it is subject to regulations governing its structural integrity, heat dissipation capabilities, shielding ability, nuclear criticality safety, and quality assurance. The safety standards for the packaging i
of such material are set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 71,' and DOE Manual Chapter 0529.* To secure approval for shipment, it must be shown, either by testing or i
by experimental or computational methods, that the package complies with the regulations. The Oak Ridge National I aboratory (ORNL) TRU Curium Shipping Container was evaluated to l
determine whether it complies with the applicable regulations. The methods used and the results of the evaluation are reported here.
The TRU Curium Shipping Container is illustrated in Fig. 1.1. Three of the shipping containers that have been fabricated are in service at ORNL (ORNL Shipping Cask Nos.
4S2-209, -210, and -213). The Department of Transportation (DOT) assigned Special Permit Number $461 to this container. A certificate of compliance (Sect. 9.2) has been issued, and approval of this Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) by the Department of Energy (DOE) will complete the requirements of the certificate. The IAEA Certificate of Competent Authority is also in Sect. 9.2. The cask is intended to be used to transport isotopes of americium, curium, berkelium, californium, einsteinium, fermium, and plutonium in the form of metal, oxide, chloride, or other salt.
(
The cask consists of a 30-in.-tall,29-in.-wide cylinder with a 6-in.-diam internal cavity that is 8-in. deep (Fig.1.1). The shielding consists of approximately I in oflead and 9-3/4-in. of Blackburn limonite concre'e. The cask has a bolted-in-place top plug that is protected by a bolted-down cover plate. The cover-plate nuts are secured by a seallockwire.The TR U Curium Shipping Co ntainer w eighs 2640 lb. In the normal mode of shipment, the carrier is mounted on a specialskid that permits forklift handling. The combined weight of tiie container and the skid is 2F00 lb.
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Fig.1.1 TRU Curium Shipping Container.
Computational procedures were used to evaluate the TRU Curium Shipping Container and to determine that it meets the requirements for offsite transportation of radioactive materials.
The results of this analysis, which are presented here, show that the cask complies with the regulations. In addition to the evaluation, this SARP contains operating and inspection procedures.
1.?
D ription of TRU Curium Shipping Container A detailed cross section of the TRU Curium Shipping Container is shown in Fig.1.2. The outer shell sides and bottom are 3/8-in.-thick 304L stainless steel. The outside diameter of the shell is 29 in., and the height is 30-7/ 8 in. The top of the outer shell is 1/4-in.-thick 304L stainless steel. The inner cavity shell, which is fabricated from 1/4-in.-thick 304L stainless steel plate, is 8-1/4 in. It' by 19-1l4 in. deep and is recessed from the top by a 1-3/8-in.-deep offset. The inr.r cavity in which the radioactive or fissile material package is placed for shipment has a diameter of 6 in, and height of 8 in. and is currounded by 7/8-in.-thick lead contained in a pocket of 1/4-in.-thick stainless steel. The lead was cast in place through two I-in.-diam pour holes in the bottom of the inner shell. These holes were welded shut after filling was complete. Twelve L-shaped reinforcement rods were welded to the inside of the outer shell. In addition to the L-reinforcement, two cylinders of 6-by 6-in.,10-gage wire mesh
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Fig.1.2 Cross section of TRU Curium Shipping Container (all dimensions are in inches).
l reinforcement were used in the body of the concrete. The annulus between the outer and the inner shcIl was filled with limonite concrete that was added through two 4-in.-diam pour holes located in the bottom of the outer shell. These holes vere welded shut after filling was complete.
Ihe inner cavity is closed with a plug of concrete and lead cast in a shell built from 1/4 in.-thick 304L stainless steel plate. The steel shell was first filled with lead to a depth of I in. and then filled with limonite concrete. After the limonite concrete had cured. the top plate i
was welded on the plug.
The gasket that makes a seal between the top flange of the plug and the body is made of 1/16-in.-thick Neoprene. The flange and gasket are held to the body by eight 1/ 2-in. x 13 NC-2 nuts on studs. The plug is lifted by a 3/8-in.-diam 304L stainless steel bail.
The top flange and bail of the plug are protected by a 1/4-in.-thick 304L stainless steel plate coser that is held to the top of the container by six I!2-in. x 13 NC-2 nuts on studs.
When the plug is secure and the cover is in place. the six nuts are safeguarded from accidental removal by a seal lockwire.
There are four lifting-tie down devices (Fig. 2.2-2.5) welded to the top side of the container body.
Each desice has two I-in.-diam bars for use in lifting and/ or tying down the cask.
Figure 1.3 shows the carrier mounted on its skid.
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Fig. l.3 Skid for TRU Curium Shipping Container.
5 1.2 Contents of the Package The TRU Curium Shipping Container will be used to transport any isotope of plutonium, americium, curium, berkelium, californium, and fermium in the form of metal, oxide, chloride, or other salt. Any of these isotopes can be alpha or beta emitters, may fission spontaneously, or have a fission cross section. The maximum quantity of '"'Pu, 242"'Am, 2c,245,247,Cm, I
and/or '"Cf shipped will be 10 g. The maximum quantity of *"Cf shipped will not exceed 3 g.
The remaining isotopes will be limited by heat (500 Btu /hr) or source strength such that the external dose rate will not exceed the levels specified in the DOT regulations. The container, with its contents, is rated Fissile Class I.
Tbc contents will be singly or doubly encapsulated, as described in Sect. 5, in a welded container. or in special form containers which may occasionally be placed within another container for handiing purposes. The package may be shipped by any commercial surface transportation system.
2.
STRUCTURAL EVALUATION Three TRU Curium Shipping Containers have been fabricated for use at ORNL. Two were constructed in 1967; the third was constructed in 1970. The package complies with the structural requirements of the regulations (see Sects. 2-4). The calculations, test results, and engineering logic presented in the following sections demonstrate compliance with these performance criteria. The effects of both normal transport and specified accident conditions on the structural integrity of the package are considered.
l 2.1 Mechanical Properties of Materials I
I The mechanical properties of 304L stainless steel and limonite concrete are summarized in Table 2.1.
l 2.2 General Standards for All Packages l
The general standards for all packages include an evaluation of the following: (1)the
. chemical and galvanic reactions between the materials of construction and the intended package contents; (2) the method used for closure; (3) the cask-lifting devices; (4) the lid-lifting devices; and (5) the tie-down devices used in securing the package to the trailer.
2.2.1 Reactions between materials of construction and package contents The container is const acted, as shown in the as-built drawing (see Fig.1.1 and Sect. 9.1),
of type 304L stain!ss steel,' limonite concrete, and lead. No evidence of any significant chemical, galvanic, or other reaction between these materials has been noted; additionally, past experience has not revealed any indication of reactions between these materials of construction and the intended package contents. Even if the contents were shipped in the chloride form, they would be welded into a primary container capable of withstanding the action of chloride and thus present no reaction problem to the cask materials.
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Table 2.1.
Mechanical properties of 304L stainless steel and limonite concrete i
Stainless steel Limonite Symbol 304L concrete l
Static properties 3a Tensile yield stress, a
30 x 10 Y
psi 36 Allowable shear stress, t
15 x 10 a
psi Ultimate shear strength, T
61,000 psi 6d Young's modulus, psi 30 x 10 Poisson's ratio u
0.3 0
i Weight density, 1b/in.3 y
0.29 0.101 9.6 x 10-6 Thermal expansion a
coefficient, per *F Dynamic Properties 4
Specific energy, s min 10 x 10 4
in.-lb/in.3 s max 26 x 10 0
Yield stress, psi o
61.2 x 10 g
" International Nickel Company, Inc., Mechanical and Physical Properties of Austenitic Chromium-Nickel Stainless Steel at Ambient Temperatures, 1963.
l 6
l Tensile yield stress x 50%.
k.B.Shappert, Cask Designers Guide, ORNL/NSIC-68 (February 1970),
dB. B. Klima and L. B. Shappert, The TRU Ten-Ton Californium l
Shipping Container, ORNL/TM-3505 (November 1971).
Based on minimum ratio of yield / ultimate values for bolts as indicated in Table 5.1 and on minimum tensile strength of 95,000 psi, p.55 in D. D. Cannon's Structural Analysis of Shipping Casks, vol. 12, Energy Absorption Characteristics of Stainless Steel Bolts Under Impact Loadinj, ORNL-1312, vol. 12 (May 1972).
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l 2.2.2 Closure The inner cavity is sealed with the Neoprene gasketed plug and eight 1/2-in. nuts on studs.
l The plug is protected by a cover secured by six I/2-in. nuts on studs. These nuts and studs l
are mcaufactured with mating holes so that a seal wire must be broken before the nuts can be l
removed from the studs. The package can thus be equipped with a positise closure that will prevent madvertent opening.
2.2.3 Lifting devices If there is a system of lifting devices that is a structural part of the package, the I
regulations stipulate that this system must be capable of supporting three times the weight of the loaded package without generating stress in any material of the package in excess of its yield strength. In addition, each lifting device which is a structural part of the packaging shall be so designed that failure of the device under excessive load would not impair the containment or shielding properties of the packaging.
Plug-lifting evaluation. The bail on the plug is not strong enough to lift the package; therefore, a cover is provided that prevents this part from being used fcr that purpose. Use is denied by a lockwire and seal. Analysis of the plug-lifting device, based on three times the weight of the plug, is given below. The plug-lifting mechanism is a bail constructed from a 3/8-in.-diam steel rod shaped like an inverted "U" and welded upside down at each end to the top of the plug.
The stress (S,) in the lifting bail is determined as follows:
3W 3(81)
~
0.1107
{g).
= 2194 l'u.-in. -',
where S = stress as if it were a straight beam, Ib/in.2, W = weight of plug,81 lb, i
l A = cross-sectional area of 3/8-in.-diam rod,0.2208 in.2 l
l The value of S is corrected to account for the curvature in the bail using factors k, and k, j
from R. J. Roark's formulas for curved beams.'
l The stress (S,) on the outside fibers is So = koS = 0.91 (2194)
(2)
= 1997 psi (<30,000 psi).
j
8 where k, = 0.91 at an R/c value of 8.0, R = radius of curvature measured to centroid of section, c = radius of rod.
The stress (S.) on the inside fibers is S = k,S = 1.10(2194) i 3)
= 2413 psi (<30,000 psi),
where l
k, = 1.10 at an R/c value of 8.0.
i Therefore, the metal of the lifting bail is adequate to lift the plug.
II' eld between plug and pheg-lifting bail. The nominal thickness of the required weld may i
be calculated as follows:
l 3W 243 t = Lr (2.35)(15,000)
=
g4)
= 0.01 in. (<0.375 in.),
where t = nominal weld thickness, in.,
E = the plug weight,81 lb, L = weld length,2.35 in.,
r = allowable shear stress,15,000 psi.
The 3/8-in. weld is thus adequate. Hence, the bail and its weld to the plug are capable of meeting the requirements of supporting three times their weight without generating stresses in excess of the yield stress.
Cask-lifting esaluation. Maximum stresses in the combit ation lifting and tie-down cars are calculated for the most severe lifting condition. This condition would exist if the cask-skid combination were lifted from only one of the four tie-down devices, as shown in Fig. 2.1.
Normally, two of the four are used for lifting purposes, which results in the cask-skid combination being lifted at an angle of about 47* with the vertical. For calculational purposes, it is also assumed that the center of mass is at the geometric center of the cask.
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The lifting tie-down device is shown in Figs. 2.2-2.5. A general?
load may be applied l
via cables or shackle to either solid shaft that connects the two tie-down ears. These shafts are l
of the same diameter as the holes in the ears se that the load is distributed uniformly in the l
loaded portion of the perimeter of the hole. The sum of the distributed uniform load shown in Fig. 2.6 is equal to one-half the load applied at the half point of the connecting 1-in.-diam shaft. The mathematical model of the tie-down, shown in Fig. 2.7, is idealized as a straight beam of length equal to the diameter of the hole and loaded by a uniform load. It is assumed that the boundaries of the beam are constrained.
Summation of the forces in the y-direction in Fig. 2.1 gives
[ F = 0 }, positive direction; (5) y therefore, P = 3W (6) so that the force P', shown in Fig. 2.7. is equal to 3W P, = P (7)
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Fig. 2.5 Tie-down device, Sect. "B-H".
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12 24 Fig. 2.6 Tie-down load model.
Fig. 2.7 Mathematical model of tie-down load.
t 13 The maximum bending moment in the ring segment occurs at the edges; the magnitude is equal to P'L 3E(1.5)
" TT " 2(24)
(h)
= 263 in-lb.
The bending stresses for the straight beam are:
Me (263)(0.5) ob "* l "
0.42 (9)
= 312.5 psi.
The bending stresses in the corresponding curved beam shown in Fig 2.6 are equal to o = kob = k(312.5) psi.
(10) c The factor k takes into consideration the shifting of the neutral axis as well as the parabolic distribution of stresses in the cross section of the curved beam. For the beam under consideration:
k = 0.67 for the tension side, and k = 1.80 for the compression side.'
It follows that the stress in the outside fiber is 733 psi and in the inside fiber it is 1969 psi.
l The maximum shear strain occurs at the clamped end of the beam. From straight-beam i
theory, the shear strain in the vicinity of the neutral axis is equal to V
(11) r=A a
where n = cross section of shear factor.
For a rectangular cross section, P' } I 3 9(2800)
I" (T/ I[\\3] " S(1.69)
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(12)
= 1864 psi.
t J
14 where A is the gross cross section at the locatioa of maximum shear. The str:sses at the welds of the tie-down to cask interface are calculated on the basis of the free-bady diagram shown in Fig. 2.8. From this diagram, it follows that 3(2800). 47 P,, = =3 W sin 47=
2 (13)
= 3072 lb.
3W 3(2800) cos 47 V=
cos 47
=
2
= 2864 lb.
M = P" [2.0 + (0.5 cos 47 )).- V[2.0 + (0.5 sin 47 )]
(15)
= 3072(2.34) - 2864(2.37) = 401 in.-lb.
ORNLDWG, 79-13248 A
' L') ~
M
= P"
)
I i
V
. <J -
B Fig. 2.81.oads at welds between tie-down and cask body.
15 Maximum stresses at the weld, assuming the ear behaves like a cantilever beam, a'e given by the expression P Mc c=-+.
(16)
A I
where A is the net area of the weld at the point of minimum area and A = 2[(0.707)(t.)(0.5)]
(17) 2
= 5.66 in The parameter I is the net second moment of the weld pattern, calculated at the minimum section area of the wel.i. The gross / is calculated in Fig. 2.9 and is equal to 72.05 in.*; the net value of Iis equal to I = (0.707)(72.05) = 50.94 in' (l8)
ORNIOWG. 79-13249 CASK WALL s LUG n
I I'
gr WELD g
i!
-s F
=
O I
b2* /0 in.
h2
- O in-bi*IkIn.
9 in.
h a i
C 4/in.
=
i
= h(b hf-b h))
l 3
NEUTRAL I
i 2
c.
- AXIS f}
-E I = 71. 05 d
~
l c
i 1
EIN I) 1 5
l{l,h jN o
=
I
_Z i
==.
?:-
y
- e =.!
w k
+ bi =
Fig. 2.9 Moment of inertia diagrain for weld pattern.
16 1 rom Eq. (16), it follows that the tensile stresses at the weld pattern at point A, l'ig. 2.8, are:
3072 + (401)(4.5 )
o = 5.66 50.94 (39)
= 578 psi.
The peak shear stress at the weld pattern is equal to i
l V 3 2864 r=a
=-
A 2 5.66 (2ti) l
= 759 psi.
Therefore, it has been shown that the available welds that attach the tie-down device to the cask shell are adequate to support the proposed load equal to three times the combined weight of the cask. and skid, it has also been shown that one tie-down device by itself is l-adequate to support the 3W load.
l The shear stresses at the pins are calculated as follo...;:
V 3W 3(2800)
==
(21)
T =- = 2 A 2(0.7854)
A where A is the gross shear area of the pin,0.7854 in.2,and r = 53 48 (22)
T his value is also smaller than the allowable shear stress.
2.2.4 Tie-down devices The regulations require that if there is a system of tic-down devices which is a structural part of the package, this system must be capable of withstanding a static force applied to the center of gravity of the package with (1) a vertical component of two times the weight (21Y) of the package and its contents, (2) a horizontal component along the direction of travel of ten times the weight (10W) of the package and its c
- nts, and (3) a horizontal component n the
'ransverse direction of five times the weight ($
' the package and its contents This applied
- oad shall not generate stresses in any matttial of the package in excess of the yield strength of l
that material. In addition, any tie-down device that is a structural part of the package must be designed so that failure of the device under excessive load will not impair the ability of the l
package to meet other requirements of the regulations.
The cask is tied down to its skid by four cables that run between the lower trunnion bar (see Fig. 2.2) and the skid. It is attached to the vehicle by four cables that run between the
(
upper trunnion bar and the tie-down points on the bed of the vehicle. The analysis of the tie-down point on the cask is given below.
i 17 To demonstrate the adequacy of the tie-downs, it will be demonstrated that: (1) the tie down of the Curium carrier to the skid is adequate, and (2) the tie down of the cask-skid combination to the truck is also adequate.
&aluation of requirements stated in Sect. 2.2.4.
For the general case of any angle 0 of the tie-down angle (measured from the vertical, Fig. 2.10), the forward cables go in compressions and therefore do not sustain any load. The stationary potential energy of the system is used to solve for the redundant forces. This is a general analysis for either cask to skid or a combination of cask to skid to vehicle. The only variation is in the numcrical values assigned to the variables.
When the cables that undergo slack are removed the system becomes overspecified. This problem is easily solved by superimposing the loads that lie in the horizontal plane to the vertical load case. The results are also given for a general angle 6 with the vertical axis.
Let + force be tension in cables l
l EF = 0-x t23)
R' + R - R' - R' = 10W.
2 x
where superscripts denote cable number and subscripts denote component orientation (see Figs.
l 2.10 and 2.11).
EF = 0-y (24) 3 2
- R + R + R' - R'y = 5W.
E F, = 0 t 1R + R' + R' + R' = 2W j
For a typical cable, n, the components of force along the axis system are given by the j
expressions i
l R" = RQy cos 45*
(26) l and R" = R"y sin 45*
(27) g where R"xy s the resultant force of the cables in the xy plane. In this expression, the angle of i
45 is chosen because it represents the angle that is fixed by the physical dimensions of the cask-skid combination.
The relationship that exists between the total resultant load in the typical cable, n, the resultant force in the xy plane (R"y), and the angle o that exists between this total resultant force (R") and the vertical axis is given by the expression:
rey = R" sin 6 (28)
i-l I8 I
ORNL OWG. 78-17798 Y
f 45 TYP
/
R X' X f
/
( a
/
RY -9 RXY
/
/
R 1
l R
i Iig. 2.10 Schematic of cc.sk tie down.
ORNLDWG. 78 17797 Y
CABLEI f D^
CABLE 4 f
/
kj j -> lO W I /
T Y P -* O~ -
-4 t~
y
~
l CABLE 2 l
CABLE 3 l
i l
Fig. 2.11 Mathematical model of cask tie downs to vehicle.
therefore. substitution of Eq. (28) into Eq. C7) yields:
R" = R" = R" cos 45* sin 6 (29) l where n = 1, 2, 3, or 4 for cables 1, 2, 3, or 4 l
19 and R" = R cos 6 (30) is the vertical component of load in the cable due to a total reactive load equal to R",
Substitution of Eys. (29) and (30) in Eq. (24) yields:
10W R' + R - R - R* =
2 8
cos 45 sin 6
- R' + R + R - R -
(31) 2 d
cos 45 sin 6,
R' + R + R' + R* = 2W 2
~
cos 6 If R is the redundant force, Eq. (31) reduces to:
10W R - R - R* =
- R' = F' 2
cos 45 sin 6 SW 2
d R + R' - R =
~
+ R' = F2 (32) cas 45 sin 6 R + R' + R* = 2W - R' = F2 2
Cos 6 or, in matrix form, 3
1-1-1 R
F' 2
I+1-1 R
F (33)
=
1+
+1 R*
F 2 or 3l F'
1/2 0
1/2 F'
R 1-1-1 3
2 2
1+1-1 F
R
-1/2 1/2 0
F (34)
=
=
R*
I+1+1 2
F 0
-1/2 1/2 F
- hence, R = F' 2
F 10W 2W 2
+=
+
-- - R' 2
2 2 cos 45 sin o 2 cos 6 F'
F 10W SW 2
R-
+
=-
+
+ R' (35) 2 2
2 cos 45 sin e 2 cos 45 sin 6 2
2 F
F SW--
+ - - R' W
R* = - - + 2
=-
2 2 cos 45 sb 6 cose
l l
20 The unit load method is used to solve for the unknowns of the system.
The clongations in cables 2.
3, and 4 -are computed as follows:
clongations = e = (force)[LiEA] = (F)(K), since all the cables have the same length and stiffness characteristics; substitution into Eq. 05) (where F is substituted by R*, R', and R')
yields:
ei = (K) R' 2
e2 =(K) R (36) 3 j
e3 = (K) R e4 = (K) R*
i a
i lhe loads in cables 2, 3, and 4 due to a unit load applied at cable I and all other enernal loads are removed:
ri = 1 r2 = -1 (37) l ri = I r4 = -1 The reduction in length of the first cable [ci = (R')(K)] is equal to X e.r, from Eqs. (35)-(37).
s 10W 10W 2W -- R'
(-1) + K
- 2 cos 45 sin 6
- R' K =
?
+
+
2 cos 45 sin 6 cos 6 (38)
SW SW
~W
+
- R'
(-1)
+ R' (1) + K
- cos 45* cos o cos 6 2 cos 45, sm, 6 i
Solving for R':
+
+ -
(39)
R, ~
-4 cos 45* sin 6 4 cos 6 4 cos 45 sin 6 cos 6 4 cos 45 sin 6 l
where
- = 30', and substitution of Eq. (39) into Eq. (35) gives:
R=
~
+
--W 5W 8
= 4.12 W 4 cos 45' sin 30 cos 30*
.SW W-R' = cos 45.-~.30. + cos 30. - 4.12 W = II.18 W sm (40) 10W SW 3
R = 2 cos 45 sin 30. + 2 cos 45 sin 30* + 4.12 W = - 2.93 W-a-
SW W
R* =, cos 45 sm. 30;; + w,os 30 - 4.12 W = -10.04 W i
21 The signs in cables 3 and 4 are reversed, indicating that the assumption made (+ force er tension in all cables) is not valid.
Since it has been shown that two of the cables go in compression (a condition not usually realistic in cables), the syster will be reduced by the removal of these cables and the loads will be solved in the remaining cab. S.
If R' and R' are each equal.c 7ero, the expressions in Eq. (23) reduce to R' + R = 10W (41) 2 and Eqs. (24) and (25) reduce to 2
- R' + R = 5W_
(42) 2 R' + R = 2W The system is overspecified. Equation (42) is decoupled from Eq. (41) and can be solved independently. Operating in Eq. (41), it follows that after substituting expression (29) into (41),
these equations become:
R'y cos 45 + R cos 45* = 10W 2
y (43) sin 45* = SW
-R sin 45* + R 8
2 y
y or cos 45 cos 45*' 'R' y
~10W ~
- sin 45* sin 45'
.R SW 2
7 and
~R'y cos 45* cos 45*' ~'
'10W j
R y,
- s n 45* sin 45*
SW 2
~ l 1 -
(45) 10W i
cos 45 _ sin 45*
I
=_
2 1
1 SW
_cos 45 sin 45*
10W SW SW (46)
R'Y 2 cos 45*
2 sin 45* 2 cos 45
=
i 2
(47) 10W SW 15W bY 2 sin 45* 2 sin 45* 2 cos 45 1his results in R'xy and R xy in the a v plane for cables I and 2 respectively. These reactions, 2
given in terms of the axial load on the cable, become:
R**
R=
(48) sin 6
22 so that l
l SW R'
2 cos 45* sin 6 (49) l l
Similarly, i
15W 2
R = 2 cos 45 sin 6 (50) i The vertical load on the cables, from F, = 0, is resolved as follows:
Rj + R = 2ty (51) 2 i
if it is assumed that the total vertical load is equally resisted by each cable, Eq. (51) becomes l
l 8
2 R = R = W; (52) 2 and, from Eq. (30), the components of R' and R due to the vertical load only are:
l l.
W R' = R, -
2 l
cos6 -
(53) l The total load on the cables is SW--
+ -W l
R' = 2 cos 4 5 sin 6 cos o
(
2
+
-W (54) 15W R = 2 cos 45* sin 6 cos 6 R = R' = 0.
2 l
For the cases when the loads on the tie-down device are associated with the cask-skid combination to the truck bed, E = 2800 lb. Thus, the loads i', cables I and 2 are:
for 0 = 30' R' = 17,960 lb, R2 = 62,630 lb; i
l for 0 = 45 R' = 17,96d Ib, 2
j R = 45,960 lb; for 0 = 60' R' = 17,030 lb, 2
R = 39,893 lb.
l
23 The bending stresses in the eye (Fig. 2.i2) are calculated using the same model discussed previously in the lifting analysis. For the cask-to-skid case when 0 = 30, these stresses are:
2 2
M = (R )L R (55)
=_
24 24 2
, 0.67)(62630)(0.75) l (0.67)(R ) (0.75)
(
o "'Sid" =
24 (0.18) 24(0.18)
(56)
= 7285 psi.
ORNL DWG. 79-13250 sn
<r U
o a
l
[6 l
j l
q
^
/
/i
//
CASK l
s D't fj
/
l
/
0
/
/
/
/
~
/
/
l l
/
/
/
/
I o
{.-
l
- -3 b
EYE BOLTS ['
SKl0 12.99 in.
28.99 in.
,. l l
27'/
in.
4 e l'2
/
e 14.99 in.
3 28 4_Ir.
Fig. 2.12 Geometry of cask-to-skid tie down.
24 2
(l.80)(R )(0.75), 1.80(7,285)
- nside "
i (24)(0.181) 0.67 (57)
= 19,572 psi.
llending stresses associated with the combination cask-skid to truck-bed cases are minimal, since these cables are attached to the upper car of the lifting device and the cables do not significantly load the curved portion of the eye.a this upper-ear case.
The shear stresses for the cask-to-skid case are also computed using the formulation used in the cask lifting device analysis where the shear stresses are given by the expression 2
2 V
R\\l 3(R )
r=-a=
3 A
2 / 2A 8A (3)(62,630)
(58)
(8)(1.91)
= 19,674 psi.
For the other cases when the combination is tied to the truck bed, the shear strain is equal to r=1 (59) l A
l where A is the total shear area equal to the sum of the areas at the tangent planes that are parallel to the direction of the force applied; for 0 = 30*
62,630 7=
= 12,847 psi u,d)
(4.7 + 3.1) l i
for o e 45 39,893 r=
= 11,398 psi.
(61)
(3.3+2.3)
The stresses in the welds at the tie-down device and cask interface due to tie-down loads are also calculated using the model described in the lifting device analysis, it will be sufficient to show that the stresses at these welds due to the largest tie-down case (when 0 = 30 ) satisfy the criteria. With reference to Fig. 2.8, the following parameters are calculated:
l 2
P', = R sin 30* =62,630 sin 30*
(62)
= l 5,658 lb.
1 l
l 25 2
V=R cos 30* =62,630cos 30*
2 2
(63)
= 22120 lb.
M = P"(2.0 + 0.5 cos 30*) = V(2.0 + 0.5 sin 30*)
= 15,658(2.43)- 27,120(2.25)
(64)
= -22,971 indb.
The maximum tensile stress at the minimum section area of the weld is:
P Me 15,658 (22.971)(4.5) a=~+-=
d A I 5.66 50.94 (65)
= 4,796 psi.
The peak shear stress at the weld pattern is equal to:
V 3 27,120' r = a - =-
A 2 5.66 (66)
= 7,187 psi.
The analysis shows that the tie-down device is adequate to meet the specified criteria when subjei ed to the loads associated with the tie-down for the cask to skid and combination casV-id to carrier bed. The analysis shows that the shear stress it the tie bolt is about 20 peret.I in excess of the allowable shear quantity; this calculated stress is a peak value when calculated using stra;ght beam theory; it can safely be shown that the average shear stress in the shear plane is iess than this value; therefore, there is a certain amount of conservatism in the calculation sc.icme shown.
The cr%ation of the shear stresses at the pins associated with the tie-down loads follows.
The maximtm forsceable load in the pins is equal to 62,630 lb which occurs when the cask-skid combmation is tied down to the carrier bed; the shear stress in the pins is P
62,630 r = 2A 2(0.7854)
=
(67)
= 39,8 70 psi If it is specified that the material of the pins is steel with designation AISI type 4140, which has a minimum yield stress of 100 ksi (and a minimum shear stress allowabk of 50 ksi), the computed value is within the allowable stress.
2.3 Standards for Type il and Large-Quantity Packaging The structural standards for large-quantity packaging of the regulations include load resistance of the packaging anc the external pressure that the package must withstand.
26 Compliance of the TRU Curium Shipping Container with these requirements is discussed in the following subsections.
2.3.l Load reshtance When regarded as a simple beam supported at its ends alorg any major axis, the container must be capable of withstanding a static load, normal to and uniformly distributed along its length, that is equal to the times its fully loaded weight without generating stress in any material of the cask in excess of the yic'J strength of that material.
Load evaluation. 'Ihe TRU Curium Shipping Container, loaded as required as a simple cylindrical beam, is shown in Fig. 2.13. The reactant force actir g on the end of the simple beam (Ri) is found as follows:
CW Ri = 2 (68)
=
= 7.000 lb, where C== factor 5, W = weight of the containci. 2S00 lb.
'I he unit loading,W is found as follows:
CW Eu=f (69)
= 453 in.-lb, where L = length of the beam,30.875 in.
ORN L OW1717834R2 L = 3 0. 8 7 5 in.
CW l I i l R,
R 2 Fig. 2.13 Loading diagram of the TRU Curium Shipping Container regarded as a simple beam.
27 From these loadings, the maximum bending moment (% ), which is in the center of the beam, is calculated as follows:
(R i
LL Mmax "
2 8
(70)
= 54,084 in.-lb.
The moment of inertia (/) is calculated as follows:
/= E (ro
- r:4) = 3455 in.",
(71) d 4
where ro = radius of outside of drum,14.', in.,
ri = radius of inside of drum,14.125 in.
The maximum bending stress (S3), which is also at the center of the beam, may be calculated as follows:
g_M ro max (77.)
= 227 psi (<30,000 psi).
Since the maximum bending stress is well below the yield stress, the TRU Curiura Shipping Container exceeds the load resistance requirement. The concrete, which was not considered in thir, calculation, will also help the drum to resist bending.
2.3.2 Etternalpressure The regulations require that the design of the shipping package be adequate to ensure that the containment sessel will suffer no loss of contents if subjected to an external pressure of 25 psig.
Evaluation of requirements stated in 2.3.2 The inner containment vessel will not suffer loss of contents if and when the shipping container is subjected to an external pressure of 25 psig.
The critical unit load for thin-wall cylinders' may be calculated as follows:
l' t
/0.065 S
(0.625 (25,000)
\\r F
s
=
p=1+4S 1 + (4 X 25,000) y 2
(73)
E O 28 X 10s [0.625 t)
\\0.005
= 1956 lb/in.2 (>25 lb/in.2),
k
23 where p' = critical unit load, Ib/in.2, t = wall thickness, in.,
r = mean radius, in.,
Sy = yield strength, !blin.2,
E = Young's modulus, Iblin.'
The inner container calculations were compared to the salues listed in the " Table of Maximum Uniform External Pressure for Steel Pipe" (ref. 5) and were found to have external pressure resistance many times greater than the required 25 lblin.2 3.
COh1PLIANCE WITil STANDARDS FOR NORNIAL CONDITIONS OF TRANSPORT The regulations stipulate that a single package must be able to withstand the normal (onditions of transport without substantially reducing the effectiveness of the package and without releasing radioactive material from the containment vessel. The contents of the container are limited such that the package will contain no gases or vapors that could reduce the effectiveness of the packaging. No circulating coolant other than atmospheric air is used, and no mechanical cooling device is required or provided. The TRU Curium Shipping Container and its inner containers are designed so that the contents will not be vented to the atmosphere under normal conditions of transport. These normal conditions include the effects of heat, cold, pressure, free drop, and penetration.
3.1 lleat The cask must be designed and constructed so that if it were subjected te dWet sunlight at an ambient temperature of 130 F in still air, its effectiveness would not bs reduced. In addition, the temperature of the accessible external surfaces of the cask must not exceed 122*F in the shade when fully loaded,. assuming still air at ambient temperatures. If the cask is transported in a vehicle assigned for the sole use of the consignor, the maximum accessible external surface temperatures shall not exceed 180 F.
To evaluate the adequacy of the curium shipping cask under normal operating conditions, heat transfer tests were conducted both in the shade and in the sun.
The first test performed at ORNL simulated full-shade conditions. The second test simulated exposure to the sun. In the first test, the cask was placed in the crane bay of a building where the ambient temperature was controlled at 70 F. A heat source of 150 W was placed inside of the inner container. The cask was closed in its normal way and the resultant temperatures were monitored for 4 days by use of chromel-alumel ther mocouples. One thermocouple was attached to the outside of the cask, one was located at the inside bottom corner of the inner container, and a third was placed in the ambient air, approximately 6 in.
from the external surface of the cask.
The temperature in the inner container reached equilibrium approximately 32 br after the start of the test. The surface temperature equilibrated about 8 hr after the inner cavity. Table 3.1 lists these recorded temperatures and the corresponding extrapolated temperatures.
29 The test to measure the effects of direct sun was conducted Juring the first week of December and the thermocouples again measured the same locations as in the " shade" test.
The weather was clear and cool with bright, sunny days.
The cask and its skid were placed outside on a bitumen surface in full sunlight and the heater in the inner container was adjusted to 150 W. The temperature in the cavity reached a maximum in about 42 hr and rennined there for the remainder of the test. The surface temperature also took about 42 hr to equilibrate anJ it rennined constant thereafter. Table 3.2 lists the temperatures attained at the three locations and the temperatures calculated for 130*13 ambient conditions.
The neoprene gasket area reached a temperature of approximately 105'F (192 1 extrapolated). Since the maximum operating temperature of the neoprene gasket material is 300'F. the package will operate properly under normal temperature conditions required by the regulations.
Table 3.1.
Cask t emperatt.res with a 150 W source, determined in the sinde l
(inside crane bay)
Measurement Measured Extrapolated l
location temp temp
(*F)
(*F) l l
Ambient 70 100 l
l Outside surface 91 121 j
Inside cavity 185 215 Table 3.2.
Cask temperatures with a 150 W source, determined in the sun (on bitumen surface)
Measurement Measured Extrapolated location temp temp
(*F)
(*F)
Ambient 43 131 Outside surface 70 152 Inside cavity 145 232
-~
v 30 3.2 Cold The shipping package must be able to withstand an ambient temperature of -40 F in still air and shade.
If Ti = 40 F (420 R) and no internal heat load is assumed, the final or maximum pressure (P2) in any cavity sealed at a pressure of 14.7 psia and a temperature of 70 F (530 R) is (P T2) i P=
r, (74) 2
= 11.65 psia.
The a sulting pressure differential is less than the 25-psia differential pressure investigated in Sect. 2.3.2. A temperature of -40 F is within the operating temperature range of the seals and the stainless steel cladding, structural components, and fasteners. Brittle fracture of these components under the stipc.ated cold condition is not likely because the temperature of these components are above their ductile-to-brittle transition temperatures.
The above considerations indicate that the stipulated cold conditions will not reduce the effec iveness et the packaging, and that the container conforms to the requirements for the cold condition of normal transport.
3.3 Pressure The regulations for normal conditions of transport specify that the package must be able to withstand an atmospheric pressure of 0.5 times the standard atmospheric pressure; the resulting pressure is 7.35 psia.
Pressure evahiation. The radioactive material is shipped in containers described in Sect. 5.
In addition, the inner cavity is sealed with a gasketed closure and the cover is also gasketed.
All seals at:: capable of withstanding a differential pressure of 0.5 atm. Checklists (Sect. 9.4) are used to determine that the gasket is in place and that the bolts are adequately tightened.
The integrity of the package will, therefore, not be reduced should the amhient pressure be reduced to 0.5 atm.
3.4 Vibration The container is of welded construction, and vibrations received in transit are not expected to affect the integrity of the weldment. All fasteners are equipped with lock washers and are not expected to loosen during such vibrations.
In addition, the casks built several years
%., have operated in the transportation environment, suffering no ill effects as a result of vibrations encountered.
3.5 Water Spray The containment capabilities of the TRU Curium Shipping Container are not compromised by wr'er spray since all external surfaces are of stainless steel. The closure seal is impervious to water
31 3.6 Free Drop The regulations for -normal conditions of transport require that a package weighing less than 10,000 lb shall be capable of withstanding a free drop through a distance of 4 ft onto a l.
. flat, - essentially unyielding horizonal surface, striking the surface.in a position at which maximum damage is expected to result.
Free-drop evaluation. A free drop of. the TRU Curium Shipping' Container through a-distance of 4 ft is expected to nroduce a denting of the outside steel shell and some fracturing -
of the concrete. The fractured concrete is expected to be contained, and there should be no L
reduction in effectiveness of the package 'or loss of contents because of the 4-ft free drop.-
Analysis of _the hypothetical accident involving a 30-ft free drop indicates that damage from'a j
4-ft drop will, at most, be superficial. If the package were dropped flat on its top, the top bail cover would be crushed. However, no other damage would result, and the effectiveness of the package would not be reduced.
3.7 Penetration The regulations for normal conditions of transport stipulate that the package must be capable of withstanding the impact of the hemispherical end of a vertical steel cylinder that weighs 13 lb, has a 1-1/4 in. diam, and is dropped from a height of 40 in. onto the exposed l..
surface of the package that is expected to be the most vulnerable to puncture.
Tests have been conducted on similar shipping casks and the results indicate that the effectiveness of the stainless steeljacket will not be reduced.
3.8 Compression The package must be able to withstand the greater of two compressive loads equal to either five times the weight of the package or 2 lbfin.2 multiplied by the maximum horizontal cross section of the package. The load shall be applied uniformly against the top and bottom of the package for 24 hr in the position in which the package would normally be transported.
Compression evaluation of carrier shell. The stress (S.) created in the steel shell by imposing on the head a weight of fhe times the weight of the package is determined as follows:
S' SW 5(2640)
==
ndt n(29)(0.375)
(75)
= 386 psi. (<30,000 psi),
where
,.1 W = weight of fully loaded container,2640 lb, l-d = diameter of container,29 in.,
t = th ckness of container shell,0.375 in.
i i
+
. -. ~
L L
i I
32 i
j The stress (Ss) created in the steel shell by a pressure on the top of the package of 2 psi is determined as follows:
3 Sa = 2nd 2(nX29)2
=
4rdt 4(nX29X0.375)
(76)
= 39 psi (<30,000 psi). -
The stress that was developed in the shell by imposing a weight of five times the weight of the package of 2640 lb was the greater of the two compressive loads required. This stress did not exceed the
. strength of the shell of the container; therefore, the TRU Curium Shipping Container meets the requirements No allowance was made for the additional strength that results from the cask being filled l
with concrete.
Compression evaluation of inner cavity cover. The stress (S,) created in the inner cavity by j
a weight imposed on the head of five times the weight of the package is determined as follows:
l l
s'.SW 5(2640)
_ =..
ndt n(12X0.250)
(77) i
= 1400 psi (<30,000 psi),
where
.W = weight of fully loaded container,2640 lb, d = diameter of inner cavity cover,12 in.,
t = thickness ofinner cavity cover,0.250 in.
l The stress (Ss) created in the inner-cavity cover walls by a pressure on the inner cavity cover of 2 psiis determined as follows:
2nd:
2(nX12)2
%' s
- 4ndt 4(nX12X0.250)
(78)
= 24 psi (<30,000 psi).
The stress of 1400 psi developed in the inner <avity cover walls by the weight imposed of five times the weight of the package was the greater, and it did not exceed the strength of the shell of the cover. Therefore, both the carrier shell and the cover for the inner cavity can withstand the conditions of the compression test.
4 4.
COMPLIANCE WITil STANDARDS FOR llYPOTilETICAl.
ACCIDENT CONDITIONS The standards for the hypothetical accident conditions stipulate that a container used for l-the shipment of fissile or large quantities of radioactive material shall be designed and h
construct;d in such a' manner and its content:. limited so that, if it is subjected to the specified
33 free-drop, puncture, thermal, and water-immersion conditions, the following requirements would be met:
1.
The reduction in shielding would not be sufficient to increase the external radiation dose rate to more than 1000 mR/hr at a distance of 3 ft from the outside suface of the package.
2.
No radioactive material would be released from the package except for gases containing total radioactivity r.ot to exceed 0.1% of the total radioactivity of the contents of the l
package.
3.
The contents would remain suberitict
,. I Free Drop The first in the sequence of hypothetical accident conditions to which the cask must be subjected is a free trop through a distance of 30 ft onto a flat, essentially unyielding, horizontal surface, 3:.>xing the surface in a position at which the maximum damage is expected to occur.
Damage to the ORNL Cunum Shipping Cask was evaluated by assuming the cask struck the unyielding surface in one of three different orientations. These included impact on the side, the top end, and the top corner.
4.1.1 Impact on side A series of tests was performed at the llrookhaven National Laboratory (llNL) in which three concrete-shielded wam vault containers were dropped 30 ft onto a 10-in.-thick slab of l
armor plate.' The container, having outside dimensions of 4 x 8 x 4 ft and designed with a l
concrete shielding thickness of 17 in., survived the impact with only hairline cracks observable.
[
lts shielding efficiency was reportedly unimpaired.
l The HNL containers were of bare concrete made from normal type stone. Review of these l
test results indicates that concrete in rapid compression (such as in an impact) will crumble l
and shear on fault plancs; however, in the case of the TRU Curium Contamer, the fragments formed will be held in place by the reinforcing wire and the outer steel shell, which will become distorted only in the impact area.
These tests, together with observations made of high-speed impact onto reinforced concrete bridge abutments, suggest that the concrete in the immediate area of the impact will fragment; l
however, the concrete only slightly removed from the impact area will be unaamaged. Because the concrete fragments will remain approximately in their original area as a result of the reinforcing wire and the stainless steel shell, the shielding is net cxpected to be significantly l
reduced. In addition, cracking, probably all hairline, would not be in a strai ht line and would F
not allow streaming of radiation.
4.1.2 Impact on topflange It can be demonstrated that the shell of the cavity " top-hat" cover fails by compression in lieu of budling
-a.
I 34 The buckling load is calculated' as follows:
2 Et s/2 FBK=
2 3(1 - V )
g
= 190,800 in. lb.
where E : modulus of elasticity,29 x 10',
t thickness of coser shell,0.25 in.,
V = Poisson's ratio,0.300, R = inside shell radius,5.75 in.
The compression load is calculated as follows:
Fcp = ot = 15,000 in.-lb,
(80) w hece o = dynamic yield steel,60,000 psi,"
t = thickness of cover shell,0.25.
llecause the cavity top-hat cover will fail under compression with a load of only 15.000 lblin., or less than 10% of the load required for failure in buckling, it can be assumed that the cover will fait under compression when an axial load is applied. The energy required to crush
- the side walls of the top-hat coser is found as described below.
The energy absorbed in deforming the cover side walls a distance, dA, is calculated as follows:
du = F da (81) where du = incremental energy absorbed, F = force, Ib, dA = incremental deformation.
The length of the deformed side is calculated as follows:
A = cL (82) w here A = deformation, in.,
e = fraction deformed, in./in.,
L = length of side, in.
w-m--
w
35 Differentiating Eq. (82), it is determined that dd = L de (83)
Force is found as follows:
F = o, A, (84) where o, = stress, psi, A; = cross-sectional area of metal in sides of cover, in.2,
because a, = fle)
(85) where f(e) = function of e.
Substituting Eq. (85) into Eq. (84) gives:
F = fle)A3 (86)
Further, substituting Eqs. (86) and (83) into Eq. (81) yields:
du = f(e)A;L de (87)
Integrating Eq. (87),
U = A L f f(e) de (88) i It has been determined that f(e) = o, = 4.33 x 10'e + 60,000 (see ref. 9);
(89) therefore, substituting Eq. (88):
' (4.33 X 10 e + 60,000) de (90) 5 U = A;L Integrating Eq. (90) and solving within the limits of zero of e, we find that 4.33 X 105 U=
A L = (54,125 + 30,000)(18.46) 2 i
2 e + 60,000 e (9I) 6
= 1.553 X 10 in.-lb.,
36 where e = 0.5, A; = area of metal in shell wall,4.23 in.2.
L = length (,f sides of shell wall,2.0 in.
The maximum energy (Um) available is the energy of the falling cask, which is calculated as follows:
U, = E7h = 2640(360) n P
6
= 0.9504 X 10 in. lb. available, where L'r = weight of cask,2640 lb.
h = drop height,360 in.
'I he energy, Um. that is available when a cask is dropped is not as great as the energy required to crush the side walls of the top hat [U, Eq. (90)]. An intermediate value of e is therefore determined using the asailable energy found in Eq. (92). It was found that e = 0.368.
(93)
Ihe stress in the coser sides attained as the actual final value by solsing Eq. (85) was o = 2.195 x 10' psi.
(94)
The force was determined by solving l
5 F = oA = (2.195 X 10 )(9.23) i (95)
= 2.026 X 10' lb.
The maximum acceleration (g ) was found as follows:
F 2.026 X 10'
-
'e"'
W 2640 (96) 7
= 767 x g The force on the eight I/2-in. studs holding the shielding plug is determined from i
F, = n'3g,,, = 103 X 767 (97)
= 79,000 lb,
w here Fe = force on studs, L = weight of shielding plug and contents,81 + 22 lb.
l 37
[
The stress on each bolt is determined as follows:
l:
Fr = 79,000 a=NA 8(0.142)
(98)
= 69,500 psi
[
where N = number of bolts,8, A = area of bolt,0.142 in.2, l
t l
l The stress of 69.500 psi is si ch that the bolts under the extreme accident condition (f l
dropping the cask on its top, will yield but not break. (Figure 4.1 indicates that stress would have to exceed 90,000 psi before bolt fracture would occur).'
The bolts will not rupture or break to release the shielding plug; in any case, the plug could not fall out because the cask is resting on it. Containment of the cavity will have been broken; however, thiswill happen in the fire when the plug gasket is destroyed. The contents of the inner cavity must therefore be contained in a 2R-type container or be encapsulated as described in Sect. 5.
4.l.3 hnpact on top corner The ability of the bolts to hold the shielding plug in the cavity when the cask is dropped on its top corner depends on their capability to withstand the stresses generated in an impact as a result of cask deceleration. These deceleration forces will act on the plug and the contents of the inner cavity. Upon impact on an edge, the steel shell and concrete immediately behind it OR NL DWG. 68 9580 ACTUAL Sn:90,000 psi l
IDEAL Syp=63pOOpsi l
STRESS j
l l
8u 0.270 infin.
s E
Fig. 4.1 Stress-strain curve for annealed 4140-series steel.
. ~,
Jl
l 30 will start to crush. A computer program was developed (see Sect. 9.3) to analyze the forces and acceleration involved in an edge drop. This program calculates the cask deceleration as a i
function of the specific energy (in.-lb/in.') of concrete.
l As a result of the analysis, it was found that a specific energy of 28,000 in.-lb/in.8, which l
is considered to be very high for concrete encased in steel, produces a deceleration of 450 g.
Applying this g-level to the weight of the cask lid and contents, the force (t,) on the eight I/2-in. studs holding the shielding plug is determined as follows:
F, = W.,g = 103(450) 99)
= 46,350 lb.,
where W, = weight of plug plus contents of inner cavity,103 lb.
The stress (a) on each bolt is determined from:
12, 46,350 o=
=
NA 8(0.142)
(100)
= 40,800 psi (<90,000 psi),
where l
l N = number of bolts,8, A = tensile stress area of bolt,0.142 in.'
ilecause the stress in the bolts is below the yield stress, the bolts are adequate and the plug will remain scaled on the top corner drop.
The computer program described in Sect. 9.3 was used to experimentally calculate the deformation resulting from a 30-ft corner drop. Results indicate that the shielding remaining after the deformation is more than adequate to safely shield the cask.
4.2 Puncture The second in the sequence of hypothetical accident conditions requires that the cask must j
be subjected to a free drop through a distance of 40 in. striking the top end of a vertical mild-stcei har mounted on an essentially unyielding, horizontal surface. At the moment of impact, the cask must be in a position at which maximum damage is anticipated. The mild-steel bar shall have a diameter of 6 in., with the top horizontal and its edge rounded to a l
radius of 1/4 in., and the bar shall be of such length that it will cause maximum damage to the cask, but not less than 8 in. long. The long axis of this bar shall be normal to the surface of the cask upon impact.
To analyze the puncture accident, a rather conservative model can be used which assumes that all the energy absorbed by the cask is absorbed by the outer stainless steel and none is absorbed by the concrete shielding. A testing program, conducted at ORNL, evaluated the resistance to puncture of cast 2 x 4 x 8 in. limonite concrete bricks. These approximate twelfth-scale,16-lb concrete bricks covered with 30-mil stainless steel sheet were dropped from l
39 40 in. onto a 1/2-in.-diam punch. The 30-mil stainless steel sheet covering the brick did not puncture, but there was extensive fracture of the brick and some fracture of the limonitt aggregate. Full-size aggregate was used in all tests. To estimate the effect of the puncture test on the full-size cask, these tests were scaled up based on the linear dimension of the punch (a factor of 12). The scaled-up weight of the test is then 16 lb x 12', or 27,648 lb, and the scaled-up shell or cover plate thickness is 0.030 in. x 12, or 0.36 in.
Because the TRU Curium Shipping Container weighs 2640 lb, which is considerably less than 10% of the scaled-up weight, the 3/8-in. side and bottom plates are more than adequate, and the 1/4-in. top plate is also adequate to resist puncture in the prescribed test of the 40-in.
drop onto a 6-in.-diam piston. On the basis of a different set of test data," 1/4-in. 304L stainless steel was determined to be adequate fc,r a cask weighing 2640 lb.
l l
4.3 Thermal Evaluation l
The third in the sequence of hypothetical accident conditions specified by the regulations to which the cask must be subjected is a 30-min exposure to a source of radiant heat (fire) having a temperature of 1475 F and an emissivity coefficient of 0.9 or equivalent. For calculational purposes, it shall be t.ssumed that the package has an absorption coefficient of t
0.8. The package shall not be cooled artificially until after the 30-min test period and the temperature at the center of the package has begun to fall. or until 3 hr following the test
(
period.
l
)
4.3.1 1hermalproperties of materials The thermal properties of materials used to compute the temperature distribution under steady-state and transient conditions are listed in Table 4.1 (see Sect. 3.1.1).
4.3.2 Thermal accident analysis i
A thermal analysis of the TRU Curium Shipping Container (using the llEATINGS code),"
assumed that the container was exposed to the hypothetical accident conditions described I
above. The temperature distribution in the cask was initialized, assuming an internal heat source of 500 Btulhr, an ambient temperature of 100,F, a solar heat load of 144 Btu /hr imposed on the projected container surface area, and dissipation of heat from the sides and top of the cask by convection and radiation. The container was then exposed to the 1475 F radiation heat source for 30 min, after which the original ambient conditions were reimposed.
The inner cavity temperature was initially 179'F; this temperature increased and peaked at 412 F approximately 3 hr after the end of the fire. At this temperature, any residual moisture
(<0.19) would increase the internal pressure of the inner container by less than I atm. The lead shielding remained below this temperature. The maximum concrete temperature occurred i
at the outer surface, reaching 919 F at the end of 30 min.
As a result of these temperatures, the TRU Curium Shipping Container gaskets are expected to be destroyed," and some water may be driven out of the concrete. Only the outer 2 to 2-1/ 2 in, of concrete is expected to be affected by temperatures above 212 F; consequently, the effectiveness of the shielding will not be impaired to any significant extent.
l
Table 4.1.
Thermal properties of materials used to compute temperature distribution Heat Temperature Thermal conductivity Density capacit Material
(*F)
[ Btu hr-lft-1(*F)-1]
(1b in.-3)
[ Btu lb-1(*yF)-1]
Fuel 6.62 0.0978 0.214 Seal 0.143 0.0347 0.469 Stainless steel, 32.0 7.736 0.282 0.130 304L 212.0 9.428 932.0 12.571 s
1292.0 14.989 1472.0 15.000 Air 32.0 0.017 4.11 x 10-5 0.240 212.0 0.018 392.0 0.022 572.0 0.026 752.0 0.029 Concrete 0.600 0.090 0.21
41 l
Only limited experimental data are available on the temperature distribution in concrete exposed to a fire." Table 4.2 confirms that concrete, when exposed to a fire of 30-min duration, is not affected to any great depth.
The source inside the TRU Curium Shipping Container will always be contained in either a steel 2R container or a welded capsule. Cavity temperatures below 400 F will have essentially no effect on the integrity of these inner containers.
Table 4.2.
Measured temperatures in concrete exposed to a 1300*F fired Temperature Temperature l
Distance from after 15 min after 30 min face (in.)
(*F)
(*F) 0.5 l
716 950 1
356 608 2
158 230 bata based on ref. 14.
4.4 Water immersion The fourth in the sequence of hypothetial accident conditions to which the cask must be subjected is immersion in water in such a manner that all portions of the package are under at least 3 ft of water for not less than 8 hr.
It is assumed that all rubber gaskets will be destroyed in the fire. Ilowever, since the solid radioactise material is contained in sealed capsules whose integrity has remained intact throughout the accident sequence, no material will be lost. In addition, the moderation afforded by the water is not detrimental. Therefore the cask will meet the water immersion requirements.
5.
CONTAINMENT Containment for radioactive material transported in the TRU Curium Shipping Container is provided by welded special-form capsules. These capsules are occasionally enclosed in a 2R" container for case of hanaling.
5.1 Containment Boundaries The containment boundaries for the shipping options available with the curium cask are the cask cavity sealed by its gaskets (see Fig.1.2) and an inner container that meets specialform requirements.
Any material carried in a 2R container will be enclosed in a welded capsule. In all cases, there will be at least one welded seal between the source and the cask cavity. Furthermore any plutonium shipped have two welded seals between the source and cask cavity.
5.2 Special-Form Shipments The welded encapsulation provides primary containment for all special-form shipments (see Figs. 5.1 through 5.4 for examples of special-form encapsulations). If the material is doubly
I 42 ORNL DWG. 7411675R1 h
o 4
f W?.
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43 ORNL DWG. 74 f170f RI
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+<g y
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l
(
l l
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--T 7-y
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-w
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.9.8N.
Materiol: 304L SST 5.4 Singly encapsulated container for shipping powder.
l l
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r.- - - -, _.. _
m
--7
W 46 encapsulated, the outer *cided capsule prosides secondary containment. Visual inspection of these lines of containment are performed on a routine basis, and the welds are radiographed.
The cask seals form an additional line of containment. The cask is equipped with gasketed closures that are leaktight during normal transport. An accident might result in a rupture of the seals, but the contents in their primary containers would remain in the c:nity.
The ORNL Operations Division is ainhorized by 1.aboratory management to certify that a material conforms to the special form requirements of Appendix D of 10 CFR Part 71. The tests prescribed have been performed on a number of capsule designs. When a capsule is similar in design to a capsule previously tested (i.e., in ietation to site, mass, wall thicknesses, materials, weld, etc.), the design is certified as passing the special form requirements based on previous test results. If this similarity does not exist, it is required that a prototype be tested as prescribed.
5.3 Containment Requirements for Normal Conditions of Transport t
l The test sequence for containers of special-form materials is more severe than for those l
with normal conditions of transport. The pressure increases that are encountered will be less l
than those experienced in the thermal test for special-form materials. No loss of primary coolant (air) is expected.
l The 2R containers, housing a welded capsule, are designed for pressures and temperatures j
in excess of those encountered in normal transport. No release of radioactise material, loss of l
coolant (air), or contamination of coolant should occur.
5.4 Containment Requirements During the flypothetical Accident
'Ihe test series for special-ferm containers demonstrates that special-form encapsulation will not fail or leak the contents as the result of the free falls. The thermal test temperatures of specia!-form containers exceed those experienced by the inner cavity contents during the hypothetical accident (see Sect. 4.3.2h hence, no release will occur during the thermal exposure.
The water immersion test for special-form containers is identical to that specified in the hypothetical accident conditions.
~1he 2R containers, housing a welded capsule, are designed for pressures and temperatures in excess of those encountered in the hypothetical accident.
1
47 6.
CRITICALITY The analysis for the single container given below is adequate for an infinite array of similar containers because the concrete shiciding assures essentially no interaction.
A study" has been n
- .: of the criticality of curium and other transuranium elements under conditions of optimum moderation and water reflection. The results are presented in Table 6.1.
The quantity of fissile isotopes to be carried by this cask will be limited to 10 g with the exception of *Cf which will be limited to 2 g. Approval of the use of this cask for that quantity of fissile material has been granted by an ORNL Nuclear Safety Review (see Sect.
9.5).
Since the quandties of fissionable isotopes carried is below all minimum critical masses for tNse isotopes under optimum moderation and reflection, and since the cask effectively isolates the entents fro n neutron interaction with packages of similar design, unlimited numbers could be stacied togther without creating a criticality problem. Thus the package is adequate for Fissile Class I shipments.
Table 6.1.
Minimum critical masses of fissile transportation nuclides Mass (g)
Suberitical Concentration" Nuclide Critical limit (g/ liter) 242m 23 in 5
g 243 213 1,i0 40 g
245 42 25 15 Cm i
247 159 120 60 Cm 1
249 3
0 20 Cf 251 10 3
6 Cf a
i Approximate concentration at which minimum critical mass occurs.
I l
48 7.
SillELDING EVAI.UATION l
i 7.1 Discussion and Results The TRU Curium Shipping Container is designed so that its cavity is surrounded by 1/4-in.-thick stainless steel and a 3/8-in.-thick outer shell. The shielding between the two is filled with 9-3/4-in. Illackburn limonite concrete and approximately I in. of lead. The shielding effectiveness has been checked with transuranium sources and found to be adequate. A 48.8-g source of '"Cm produced a reading of I-mrem /hr gammas and 3-mrem /hr neutrons at a
distance of 6 ft from the side of the truck. In this# case, the driser's compartment registered approximately I mrem /hr. The cask contents will be limited so that the source will not exceed the allowable radiation dose limits of the DOT regulations." The shielding effectiveness will not be reduced by the hypothetical 30-ft drop accident, because concrete fractures in an intergranular manner providing a labyrinthine pathway for radiation, allowing no possibility of radiation streaming.
8.
QUALITY ASSURANCE 8.1 Fabrication. Inspection, and Acceptance Tests This container was fabricated in the ORNL shops in accordance with normal shop fabrication procedures and prior to the adaption of a formal quality assurance program by the DOE and ORNL Material was specified on the original drawings as -304L SST. Material was withdrawn from llill of Materials Stores stock. The casks were inspected by ORNL Shop Inspection Department personnel for conformance to the drawings, quality of workmanship, and compliance with welding requirements when fabricated. In the opinion of the inspecting personnel, the weldments were made in accordance with the drawings and specifications. This is further supported by the fact that these casks base operated for as many as 13 yers without failures or loss of effectiveness. The routine operating inspection procedures ;,ecify perio ic d
weld inspections to verify weld integrity.
A formal quality assurance program has now been prepared." and future shipping containers will be constructed in accordance with provisions set forth in tnis progrme.
8.2 Opera ing Procedures and Routine inspection The Transura lium Processing Plant, Chemical Technology Division, has established operating and routine inspection procedures and standard checklists to ensure that all shipments are safe and that they comply with DOE regulations as well as all ORNL procedures and regulations. A copy of typical procedures and checklists are present.f in Sect.
9.4 i
8.3 Periodic Maintenance and Inspection i
inspections are required prior to each shipment, or biennially (see Sect. 9.4). Maintenance will be required only when routine inspections indicate damage.
F
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APPENDIXES i
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I 9.1 Drawing l
TRU Curium Shipping Container Assembly and Details - M-12175-CP-078-E-3 i
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u s DhPAaTMENT or ENERGY y
ul tri CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE Fe Red.oective MetereeN Pectaps Tose No. Pages to Ceridate Nweriher th Nov.nen No if Pache0e 11ont<taten No Id Page pa te s
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35A/3461/BL(DOE-M) _ _l 2
2 PREAMsLE 2e Th.e cet.f ce.e se.es.ot to est.e#y sociene t 73 3fsle.173 JD4 173 J95. and I 73 396 of the Depeatmene of Teenspoeveien Herendous Meter e's 6egwwtens 149 cf R 170-Is91 2b The poderas and conseats desi;eced sa steni 6 heio= amore the eefety stendeede set toeth in Sut.pset C of T.tw to. Cores of FeJesel Rogu seeae Post 79 Pectag.ng oI Red.oert.w Mesev e< for Teeneport end Tsenoporteten ot Redesct we Mater el urwier Carte <n e
Coad.v eas "
h Th.e toe tafete dues not eeoew the cons.goor fro.n cuevs.ence egh may requesenent of the regwist.one of the U S Depentavat of Transerwieteri e othe< euphcstne reg +esce, egenc s. encted.ng the go orne was of say count <y through or eato which the pettese amat tse transporved 3 Ih e ces th.ete se ees.ed oa the bet, of e eeNey eassys,g seport of the pos kege deg.go of appM et.on +
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Deco 1979 Oak Rkdge National Laboratory Safety Analysis Report for Packaging Post Office Cox X (SARP) of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Oak Ridge Tennessee 378?J TRU Curium Shipping Container Report No.;_ 0RNL-5147/R1 4 CONDITIONS Th.s cert cote se cond.tenesopun the *.itarei of the raiaveements of subvers D of to CF R 71.es epchcebee.and the cond trone specAed
.n. teen 6 hvow 6 Descr.pt.oa et Pec* st", a w Avehoe.<ed Con ente, Mrdel Nu teer. F see.se C.ess. Othee Conditicas. sad References r
a, Packagingt (1) Model: ORNL TRU Curium Shipping Container (2)
Description:
Packaring for solid radioactive materials. The container is a right circular cylinder 29 in, in diameter and 30 7/8 in, high with a 304L stainless steel outer R5elle which is 3/8 in. thich f or the bottom and sides and ' /4 in. for the top. The shell for inner cavity is 81/4 in, diameter x 191/4 sei. deepe is fabricated from 1/4 in. thick 304L stainless steel plate, and is recessed 1 3/8 in. from the top. The cavity shell is a cylinder 31/4 in. diameter x 191/4 in, high and is f abricated f rom 1/4 in. thick 30'eL stainless steel.
The inner cavity for the radioactive materials is 6 in. diameter x 8 in. high and fabricated from 1/4 in thick 304L stainless steel. Seven-eights in, thick lead fills the space between the sides and bottom of the cavity shell and the inner cavity. The annulus between the outer shell and inner shelt is filled with limonite concrete.
The inner cavity is closed with a corerete-and-lead plug which is enclosed in 1/4 in. 304L stainless steel plate. A 1/16 in, thick neoprene gasket serves as a seal between the top flenge of the plug and the cask body. Eight se Dets of N.=e=
Qqt_gber le 1979 l 6h f aceestee Dete FOR TMf u s DFPARTMf hT oF INf RGY 7.
Ad+e.eforporres
.,o % r
% s.,nst r Nene.and T iw lof Oof Amoroseae Off wl U. S. Department of Energy Qw Post Office Box E Willias H. Travis Director e
Oak Ridge TN 37830 Safety and Environnental Control Division e
1
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58 l
l Page 2 - Certificate of Compliance USA /5461/BL l
(2) Description (continued) 1/2 in. x 13 NC-2 nuts on studs hold the plug flange to the cask body. A 3/8 in. diameter 304L stainless steel bail is used to lift the plug.
A 1/4 in. thick 304L stainless steel plate, which covers the top flange and bail, is held to the top of the cask by six 1/2 in. x 13 NC-2 nuts on studs.
[
The cask is equipped with four 1/2 in. thick lifting and tie-down cars with two 1 in. diameter holes per ear. The cask is also j
mounted on a skid for handling with a forklift.
l The gross weight of the cask and skid is 2800 lb.
l (3) Drawing:
The packaging for the TRU Curium Shipping Container is constructed j
in accordance with Oak Ridge National Laboratory Drawing No. M-12175-CP-078-E-3.
b.
Contents:
(1) Type anf Form of Material:
Any isotope of plutonium, americium, curium, berkelium, californium, and fermius in the form of metal, oxide, chloride or other salt.
l (2) Max (mum quantity of material per package:
(1) A total of 10g of 239Pu, 241Pu, 242,, 243Cm, 245Cm, 2h7Cm, 3
and/or 249Cf.
(ii) 3g of 251Cf.
(iii) The balance of the transuranic and other non-fissile radio-active materials will be limited to a heat load of 500 Btu /hr.
and to the external radiation levels specified in US DOT Regulations 49 CFR Part 173.393.
(iv) Contents are either singly or doubly encapsulated in a welded container meeting special form requirements and may be further placed in another DOT Specification 2R container for handling purposes.
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4 59
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't DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION e -
,.1 HAZARDOUS MATERI ALS REGULATIONS BOARD t,
y waswincrew. o.c. zosso GPECIAL P2?F.IT 20. $461 Thic special p(a)mit(1), Departm2nt of Trancportation (DCT) of 2r 10 issued purcuant to the authorit" 49 CFR 173.22 Hazardoua P.aterialc Regulations, cc amended.
1.
The OAK RIDG2 PATIO'!AL LA? ORATORY, OaP Rid;e, Tennc0nce, 13 heraby authoriced to chip radicactivo naterial, n.c.c.,
further deceribed oc trancurentum iaotcp23, undar the pro-viciona of 1:9 CFR 173.393(f)(9), and 173.393(m) of the DDT Regulationa, in acccrJance, tith the prov10 ions 'c the U. S.
Atomic Enar;y Cor"t as'on (USA 20), Cnh Rid;c Cperaticna Office, approval dated Octob2r $1, 1967, anci ca further pro-vided fcr heccin.
2.
7"te authorized packacin; chall ccnciat of a lead and co r.e r 2 t ? ahtelded cask, -tith a stainloca Otcel chc11, 30 inchan 1cnc and 29 inchen in diameter, identified ac the l
TRU Curium fhipping Containar.
The oackage 10 de c eribed l
cn ORUL dra:in; number !!-12175-OP-07;.
t 3
For chipt.cnt of nitrat? colutionc, no polyethylan2 bottle cay bc uGod which has also been ua3d as a storage vessel for nitrate colutions for rcre than 30 days.
Any internal pr233urc. 1 thin the poly 2t'r.ylene bottic nuct hava been ralleved ulc.Jn 43 hours4.976852e-4 days <br />0.0119 hours <br />7.109788e-5 weeks <br />1.63615e-5 months <br /> prior to shipmenta.
An 0-ring seal (Viton-Flucralcatcmer, or approved equ _'va-lent) must be used as a pcrt o" the cap clocura.
The esp must be subJceted to at 2can 5 foot-pounda of torque l
durin; clect:re.
Venting la not autherined.
Bottica m;;t confore to the requ'ramenta for DOT 3pecificaticn ES, 2T, l
or 34, w!ti' a m:.ninum uall th'cknocs cf 0.045 inchea, ac measurad at any point on the bott20.
The pockece la not authorized for nitrate colutions conta:nin; nitric acid in strength exceeding 20j.
4 The closure device muct he'/c affixed to it a tanparproef lock vira and seal edequate to prevent inadvartent op2nin; of the container, and of a type that must De bro %cn if the packa;c is cpanad.
[._
i l
(d)
REVISED SPECIAL PERMIT No. $h61 Pursuant to the authority of h9 CFR 173 22(a)(1), Department of Transportation (DOT) Hazardous Materials Regulations, as amended:
Special Permit No. $h61, authorizing the shipment of not more than 10 grans of certain transuranium isotopes in the TRU Curium Shipping Container, is hereby amended by adding the U. S. A'IDMIC ENERGY COMMISSION as an authorized shipper under the terms of the permit, and by changing paragraph (3) to read as follows:
"3 For shipment of nitrate solutions, no poly-ethylene bottle may be used which has also been used as a storage vessel for nitrate solutions for more than 30 days. Any internal pressure within the polyethylene bottle must have been relieved within h8 hours prior to shipments. An 0-ring seal (Viton-Fluorelastomer, or approved equivalent) must be used as a part of the cap closure. The cap must be subjected to at least 15 foot-pounds of torque during closure. Venting is authorized. Bottles must conform to the require-ments for DOT Specification 3h. The package is not authorized for nitrate solutions containing free nitt-ic acid in strength exceeding 6 wier. The package is exempted from the provisions of Para.
173 268 of the DOT regulations.
All other terms of the permit remain unchanged.
Issued at Washington, D.C., this 7th day of June 1968.
W. R. Fiste Mac E. Rogers For the Administrator For the Administrator Federal Highway Administration Federal Railroad Administration Address all inquiries to: Secretary, Hazardous Materials Regulations Boani, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C. 20590. Attention: Special Permits.
i L
i
61 Continuation of SP 5461 Pace 2 5
The authoriced contents of each pac:'.a' 9 ch311 consict of nct more then 10 crema (large quantit;-7 of any isotope of Americium, Curium, Ber!:cliur, Californ'_un, Zinctelnium, or Forcium in the form of retal, c:dde, er nitrate colu-tion.
6.
Prior to cach 3;i.pmant authorized by this parmit, th2 consignae chall le notificd of the dates of chipment end expected arrival.
7 The cutside of each pac'< ace choll be plainl marited " DOT 3P 5461' and "aADicACTIVZ IIAT2 RIAL"y and durchly in conna -
tion uith and in addition to the other mar::ings enc' laicis preceribed by the DOT Regulations.
Zech shippind paper iacued ir connection with shipcenta matie under thic parait ci'st baar the notation " DOT SP2CIAL P2m:IT 110, 5461" in connection uith the conmodity descriptien thereon.
8.
The partit docc not relieve the chipp?r from corp:iance with any requirement of the DCT Reculations, except as specific?lly provided for herein.
9 Shipment 3 are authoriced only by notor vehicle, rcil fraight, and rail c:gress.
- 10. This permit chall expire D2cember 15, 195,0 Incued at '.lachington, D.C.,
this 13th day of Decaniar 195~.
- h. sf. N'h il.
R. Ficte For the Adainictrator Federal *Iighun; f.dminist rat ion
/. f:?. J.ms/wf
. G A1;;dtra:
For the Admin *ctrator Federal Railroad Administration Addrecc 211 inquiriec to:
Chairman, IIacardouc Materiala Regulat.cnc Board, U.S. Department of Transportation,
'clashin; ton, D.C. 20590.
Attention:
Special Permitc.
F 62
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[' / ',' sf. g nzi%rmtxur oir vr A:cr0;rrt. Tion l.
Hr/J.f;DoUG tjM rt:l/.LG RECULATioMG DOMtD f
UADHit?CYOP!. D.C. RC!C3
'"i" #
SECO:M RClTE@ SfnCXAL PEDI:1T 110. Sh61 Purcernt to 49 CFR 170.13 of tha pcytrttant of ' iran 0portation (DOT) Ibany;"oro 154 crit:10 Rocult.ticos, to caonded, and on the bacin of th01:0y 0,1959, petition by the och REso Uctienal latoratory,.0ct: nidco, T(meereo:
Specib1 Porait 1:o. 51:51, cuthovicirc the ch3poont of certoin is horoby omn(ed by chrnsing pracGraphs (1) pin' Contcibar,,(3),and(5),
tran mrantun icotopc0 in the YnU Geritu Shin to read on folloro:
"1.
Shipuente of 3tm3e que.ntitiec of radiocctivo t'ntoricle, n.o.c., era herOlr/ Outhoriced in tho pnckecina oc dt. scribed in thic cpocini perait.
Thic pac!:acirs, tfaon conctructed and encoubled an preccribed horcin, with tho contente no outhor-ized heroin, r.ccto tho atendards p(o)ceribad in tho ro DOT retu.latioun, Sectioin 173.395 (2) and 173 390(c). Shiir.anto i;uct bo in accorcanco uith tho rovinions of the U. S. Ato:uic Enercy Conaincion USAnc), Ock Ridge 0.7erctionn Offico approval Ho.
9 -010, deced /.pril 15, 1959, and an further pro-vided for horcin.
"1::, Each uncr of thin porcit, other then the poti-tionor n0cca obovo and the previoncly identified petiticncra (U. S. I.tonin nuor3y Ccimicnion, Savarneh Rivor nnd Richlt nd 0,iorations Office) chall recinhar hin identity uith thin Loerceprior to his firat uno of tha pomit.
"3-For shiprnt of nitrato r.olutions, no poly-cthy]cno bottle toy 'bc uccd thich hoo alao beca unoc nu a ntorego vec. o1 for nitrato r.olutic:m for F.oro th;n 30 Cuya. liny internal proccura uithin the polyothylono bottic t.:unt havc been rolicycd 1:ithin 48 hourc prior to tih5puanta.
/.n O-ritig coal, (Viton Fluocolostonor, or opproved equivalcnt) t.iuci bc esco ca part of the c:p clo-suro. 7n0 cop wot bo cub.10cted to at Accet 19' foot-pound 9 of torgno du'.*in; clonuro. Ventin ;
in outhorio d.
Ecttacc wat ccnfora, to tho x.cificotion 34 c:.:cc recuirmonta for P7;' S,6, cnd 3JrC.19-7(c)(2)pt for Eh0.19-c(b), 178.19-The pacheco in not nubborized for nitrato volutions con-ta$ning frco nitric ccid in otrc$h c::ccodi.r3 6 cohn. Tim peo':eco io cr.or.ptcd fron tha proviniows of f 173.250 e.? the L'J/ r:2cintions, i
t 63 Continuation of 2nd Rev SP 5451 l'aco 2 "5.
Yho 12uthorized coatonto of cach pac!z.co consiste of 3 arco quantities of radioactivo voterial, cc cny isotope of americiun, curiun, berkelina, californiua, einstoinitu, or for;aiuu, in the forn of 1.otal, oxido, or nitrato solution,47, californium-249, and californiun-except that for suoricium-242-II, curina-245, curlua-2 251, not tsoro than 10 crcus por packpao 10 cuthorir:od.
Tho bolenco of tha icotopco chall be limitcd to 500 DIU/hr heat content."
All other tercs of the nernit romain unchanced. The co;rgloto permit currontly in cff'oei concists of the original iccuo end the First and Second Movisic.'s.
Issued at Washington, D.C.:
i p4.4.Ac "
"'Ti&WW For the ACattnictrator Fodoval Hight:ay Administration 1
//
g 13hY 2 71%3 1-Z.c..-
.r hac"li.~-)fo,scra/
(bete)
For tiie Actainistrator Podoral Railroad A0ainistration Addroca all ino.uirice to: Socratary, liczart.ouc Ikteriale Regulaticas Doord, U.S. Departuent of Trenoportation, Washington, D.C. 20590. Attention: Speciol Peruits.
Dist:
a,d,c,h,i U. S. Atomic 1.'norgy Corn 11ccion, Richland, Wash.
U. S. Atoaio Encrcy Couatission, Aikcn, South Carolina A
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wo t:ue )O.4, u.c. thro THIRD REVISED SPECIAL PERMIT NO. 5461 Pursuant to 49 CFR 173.15 of the Department of Transportation (DOT) Hazardous Materials Regulations, as amended, and on the basis of the October 20, 1969, petition by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenner,sec:
Special Permit No. 54fl is hereby amended by revising para-graph (10) as follows:
j "10. This permit expirca on December 15, 1971, j
and may be revoked for cause at any time."
All other terms and conditions of this permit as revised remain unchanged. The complete permit currently in effect consists of the original issue and the Second and Third Revisions.
Issued at Washington, D.C. :
('=,h
. oo t-V Gi4.j
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.- /f/ $T "7 "'-
(" 'e>
For the Administrator Federal Highway Administration c:../.*.)
YS.C i E'
.. i s s
( '41ac E.
Rogers
/ r(
(Date)
For the Administrator Federal Railroad Administration Address all inquiries to:
Secretary, Pazardouc Materials Regulations Board, U.
S. Department of Transportation, l
Washington, D.C.
20590. Attention: Special Permits.
Dist:
a,d,e,h,i U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, Aikan, S.C.
U. S. Atomic Energy Conaission, Richland, Wash.
Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Inc., Oak Ridge, Tenn.
I l
65 jp "*% g, l
ee
[/
'j DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION HAZARDOUS MATERIALS REGULATIONS BOARD
/
WASHINGTON. D.C. 2059e FOURTH REVISED SPECIAL PERMIT NO. 5461 Pursuant to 46 CFR 14 6.02-25 of the U. S. Coast Guard (USCG)
Dangerous Cargo Regulations and 4 9 CFR 170.15 of the Depart-ment of Transportation (DOT) Hazardous Materials Regulations, as amended, and on the basis of the February 10,'1970, peti-tion by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn. :
Special Permit No. 5461 is hereby amended by revising para-graphs (9) and (10), and by adding new paragraphs (11) and (12) as follows:
"9.
This permit authorizes shipments only by ocean vessel, motor vehicle, and rail.
"10. For shipments by water:
a.
A copy of this permit must be carried aboard any vessel tran' sporting radioactive material under these terms.
b.
The shipper or agent shall notify the USCG C* tain of the Port in the port area s
throur.: which the shipment is to be made, of the name of the vessel on which the shipment is to be made, and of the time, date, and place of loading or unloading.
When the initial notification is given in a port area,.it must be accompanied by a copy of this pemit, addressed to the atten-tion of that Captain of the Port.
c.
Packages shall not be overstowed with any other cargo.
If stowed below decks, the hold or compartment.in which stowed must be ventilated.
"11. The authorized package described herein is hereby certified as meeting the specific require-ments of the In' arnational Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) "Regula' '.sns for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material", Safety Series No. 6, 1967 edition, as follows:
66 Continuation of 4th Rev SP 5461 Page 2 f
a.
Marginal C-6.2.3 - The package design meets the requireinents for-Type B packag-ing for large quantity (source) radioac-tive materials. Specifically, the packag-ing design meets the requirements of Marginal C-6.2.3.1(a) for unilateral approval.
b.
Marginal C-2.4.3 - The packaging design is based on the ambient conditione.
c.
Marginal C-6.5 - No special transport controls are necessary during carriage and no special arrangements have been prescribed, except as specified herein.
"12.
This permit expires.on February 28, 1972, and may be revoked for cause at any time."
All other terms of this permit as revised remain unchanged. The complete permit currently in effect consists of the original issue and the Second and Fourth Revisions.
Issued at Washington, D.C.:
b77 E.
kM E:
b $' f0 E. G.
Grundy, Capt.
(Date)
For the Commandant U. S. Coast Guard fg.L,cl..
a-,
W. R. Fiste (Date)
For the Administrator Federal !!ighway Administration L Z:.
W acfm 8
/
~
- Mac E. Rogers
- ~ /y (Da te)
For the Administrator Federal Railroad Administration
67 Continuation of 4th Rev SP 5461 Page 3 Address all inquiries to:
Secretary, Hazardous Materials Regulations Board, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C. 20590. Attention:
Special Permits.
Dist:
a, b, d,.e, h, i U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, Richland, Wash.
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, Aiken, South Carolina Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore, California.
Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Inc., Oak Ridge, Tenn.
68
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HA* Af<DDUS f4/JcfslN G 1.cCL"_/.YlC."G t OMID
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'%,,, Y SPECI?.L PE10:IT NO. 5461 FIl~ tit P.1;VISIO:0 Pursu :nt to 4G C1'R 1/.6.02 25 of the U. S. Coast Guard (UsCG)
Dangerous Cargo Regulations c'id 49 CPn 170.J 5 of the Depart-tent of Transportetion (DOT) 1:azardous Hnterials Regulations, as ar.endad, end on the basis of the Noverber 5,1970, petition by the Union Carbide Corporation, Nuclear Division, Oak Ridco, Tennessec:
Special Por:: lit No. 5461 is hereby tr.en6cd as follows:
1.
Paragrcph 1 is chcng:d to require that shipa nts involving the contents ni, dascribed in pcragraph (Sa) niust be in occordance with the provicions o.f the USAUC, Oak Ridge Operations Of fice approval No.70-006, dated October 19, 1970, or.other equiva3cnt US7J;C epproval.
2.
A nc. paragraph.Sa is coded to read its follows:
"Sn.
As an altc:rneta, the contents of each package authorized by this permit muy con-sist of large qu'intitics, of any non-fisci3e radioactivo natorial, n.o.s.,
further Jimited to a max!raum thermal dact.y energy of not more then 500 Btu /hr. Contents will be either singly or doubly encapsulated,.or containcd within DOT Specification 2R inner containers."
All other was of this permit, as reviced rc:aain unchanged.
The cotaplot.
erait current 3y in effcet consists of the original iss.
tnd the Second, Pourth, and Fifth Revirions.
i
69 Continuation of 5th Rev SP 5461 Page 2 Jssued at UO3hingtoa, D.C.:
D(9
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,U D,.;, Cuant Cuorsi pf,k'.
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ox tc r For the Adr.:inistrator I'c6ern1 113 ghway Adrainistration N
UEC 9 IE'b kG&*c'k,/
/ '_
^> p s.,
} ac U.
Rogers
)
(DATi?)
I'or the A6ministra o2.
i'ederal Ra!1 road Administration Addrese all inquiries to:
Secretary,llazardous Materials hogulaL3 cns Board, U.S.
Deparimont of Transportation, Opchintiton, D.C.
20590.
Atteni.f on:
Special Perinits.
Dist:
a,b,d,e,h,i Univers3.ty'of Coorgia, Athens, Ga.
Drco';hawn National Laboratory, Upton, N.Y.
Lawreaco. Radiation Loboratory, Liverraoro, Calif.
Los Altunos Scientific Laboratory,. Lor. Alaraos, N.M.
Oak } idga Natioital Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennesoco U. S. Ato:aic Uncrgy Co nission, Aiken, South Carolina tJ. S. Atomic Energy Co:'.nfesion, Richlanc, nachington Oak Ridg2 Assceinted Universitics Inc., Oak Ridge, Tenn.
70 INTRA LABORATORY CORRESPONDENCE OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LA40RATORY August 7, 1974 TC 74-3 l
l l
To B. B. Kliina, L. B. Sheppert From:
Transportation Connaittee
Subject:
Approval of SARP of CRNL TRU Curium Shipping container i
The ORNL Transportation Comsnittee has reviewed your submission of the subject SARP to fulfill the requirements (internal review) of paragraph B of AEC Iramediate Action Directive 5201-3.
Particular attention was given t
the five areas of structural integrity, thermal resistance, radiation shielding, nuclear criticality safety, and quality assurance.
The results of the evaluation show that the container meets the equire-ments of AECM 0529 and the SARP is approved for submission to the AEC for request of a certificate of Compliance for approval of the cask for use for offsite shipments of fissile and radioactive materials.
8.n4%, Chairman E. M. King Transportation Cossaittee EMKabb cc: Transportation Committee
9.3 Computer Program to Calculate Corner Drop Deccleration Forces The computer program shown in the following pages was developed by John 11. Evans, Engineering Division, ORNL, to calculate the deformation of a cask undergoing a 30-f t corner drop. It utilizes an assumed specific energy absorption for the concrete-steel body of the cask.
A high specific energy of 28,000 lb-in./in.' was used to calculate the maximum stress in the bolts holding the plug. This value is considered to give conservative deceleration rates on which the strro calculations were based.
The lowest specific energy assumed was 4000 lb-in./in.', which is conservative for this cask construction. T his value produces a deformation of 4.15 in liigher specific energies will produce less deformation and higher deceleration rates.
L = distance from corner of cask to inner container,16.1 in.,
D = deformation resulting from 30-ft corner drop,4.15 in.,
I. - D = minimum thickness, 16.1 - 4.15 = 11.95>l 1.5.
The minimum shielding thickness necessary to shield the cask safely is 11.5 in.; thus, the above ealculations indicate that the cask will be shielded adequately.
71
73 l
l
- F f.N. L. E e G.
l C
GAcGaAM nJMoCd loot-CASK C HADE OF A HO406t.%tOUh MATEdlAL / AN ICTAL SixtSS-blRAIN ksLAlluNSH1P C isP ACII NG AN UNYi SLO!N3 SwK f ACE. INE CAS A i M ACTS UN ITS CJANtd C IHl h FxOGsAM CU:'.edT E5 THe a t5 fun 5 t CF A C A$n H AvlNG diJhi C VLINJRIC AL C CtbMiTA(.
j C
BY JChN EV ANS P.E.,
GtNtd A L te.GINitMING 01vl51: 4. CA A A10dE NATIL,N AL L Ad.
C C
GLOSSARY CF fouTATICN C
A=AAJius OF CASA C
C=eASA LENGTH C
5=Y!Etu 5TAESS LN FLLd PHE550RE C
d*;ASA 4cl6HT C
H =D RIJ a nE l t,H T C
0 = A.u s. Al dHICH CASA iMFACTS C
v=C6thGY C
r 4 ts(t C
T = T !.e' C
AC=AC;tLeaATICN C
Vi= TCT AL F..EsGY
. ~. - - - - - - - -. -
C vavELoutT/
C xaucrC.h % TION C
ANe iG C lis CCNTACT / THs $UAFACE C
Cl o t ?.51 bN V!1JJJ3eAN1100LIefl10CC),L11000lell160CleANilsJele 1 t il Ju 31. A J11000 )
5 = C. 0 AN A = 0.0 C INPui NATEMlaL CuNiTANI C I fC'U T L A S M GeCMETRY I; = 1 *,. 4 'J C=33.d 60 woM J.
Gm.$ i r.8 2.
- A /C )
C tf#ut ichi CONJI!;0N 00 40.Wat,1 H=43.
IFIsi:.Ne.11 60 T0 $0 H a li> J.
C INPUT At6'.t 1 a.C/s ALN!5 30 6:'..Ji 44.01 LO 20
- 1,.'
5=f ts, A1 ;f.l *wJ 0.
W,1 T L 151,10C2) w<lti 151,1001) d4!TE 131,101J)
[010 F t.e= Ai lln.3CX,' Tf 5T 14G LF Jt50L tT E CA3K5. Te if 1' )
hi;1i t 151.1 G L,2 )
' KITE 151,1004) a C 2cka SU3SLAaP TED YARI AdLES.
00 14 !=1,1000 AN i i l = 0. 0 AG1I != J.0 VII1=0.c X X 13 ='J.0 TIIl=0.0
74 F(l)=0.0 Uil)=0.0 j
AR(1)=0.0 14 CUNTINUE C ZCR0 NONSUSSCRIPTEJ VARI ABL ES I
TA=3.0 AE=0.0 A=0.0 AR=0.0 TX=0.0 y= 0. 0 XX=0.0 XA=0.0 UT='*H n
V V=S QR T ( (d 4. *H )/12.1 00 1 t=1,1000 AR=0.0 C
INCREMENT ANGI 2 A 9 AuA+AA CA=CGSIA)
G=0.0 AE=0.0 Suru=0.0 10 00 2 J =1,1000 C
l hC R E >.F NT ANG LE B B=d+BB CB=COS(b)
C CALCULATE VcLUXE OISPLACEO 11 LC=(CB-CA)
BY= T Ar4 (Ol
- R*CC bX=R*CC 12 DL=a*CE*D3 C CALCUtaTi ENERGY ABSORBE0 SU).U=SLMV+0U C C*ALCULATE ARE A 13 D A=2.*BX*]Z/COS(0)
At=AF+UA IF(S.GE.A) GO TO 3 ' '
- ~ ~ ~ ~ '
2 CLhTINUE 3 U I I ) = S L'M U If(U(I).GF.UT) CD TO 4 AsttlaAs C CALCULATE F04Ce
' ~' ' - ~
F (!)= Ad(!) *S C CALCULATE VELLCITY 5 VA = SCR T( (64. /( 12. *w I ) * (UT-U( I ) ) )
C CALCUL ATE ACCE LERATION AG(ta=F(!)/W C CALCULATE DEFORMATION
~
-~
XA = ( T AN( 0) *C OS (0 ) *R* (1.-C A ) )
XII)=XA C CALCULATE TIME T X=( XA-XX) / ( (VV+V A ) *6. )
7 TA=TA+TX l
T(I)=TA*1000..
gg,,,
i
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6 V(1)=VA 8 VVaVA AN(!)=A*S7.3 IF(U(1).Gc.UT) GO TO 4 1 CONTINUE 4 CONTINU2 C
OUTPUT-halTE LOOP KaI-L WalTE (S1,1002) hk1TC(bi,1004) 1C04 FORM AT ( 1H, 9X,37HCASK GEC:4ETRY ANC MATERI AL PROPERTIES) hk1TL (S1,1002) w s1 T E ( 51,1005) 100 5 F ORM A T ( 19, 4X,oHRADIUS,8X,oHLENGTh 10X,6HWEIGHT,6X, _ __._. _.
1 15HSPtCIFIC ENERGY)
WR I T e ( 51,1 v0 6) 1005 FCRN AT ( 14, 4X,6HINCHES,dX,oHINCHES,10X,cHPCUN05,6X 1
13 HL b-I N / CU. I N..'
Wit !T h ( 51,! u02 )
1002 F0f: MAT (1H0)
WRIT E i st,1007 )
R, Gen,S 1C0 7 FORM AT ( F 1 1. 3, F 14. 3, F 16.1, F 18.1 )
WRITE (51,100ZJ l
hk!!E(51,1000) l 100J FCnMAf ( iii.,44,11h0E FO.tM A T 10N,4 x e 8 EV EL OG I T Y, 7X,4 HT IM h,13 X. 5HFudC E,
1 10 X, od ENE RGY,5X,12H ACC E L E H A T ION )
Whift(51,1901) 1001 FGRMAT ( 1:1, 6X,6 H I NC HE 5, 7X, S HF T. / S E C.,4 X,12 HM IL t. I s hCON DS,8X,
1 6H PuuN05,10 A,6HL E-1 N.
10X,3 HX G)
'iR I T E ( 51,1002 )
00 15 1 = 1, K WRI T C i s t,1003 ) X(1),V(1),T(1),F(!),U(1),Au(!)
l 1003 FORM AT (1H,F14.4,F13.2,Flo.>,F15.2,F10.2,F12.2) t 15 CONT INUt
(
IFIN.NE.1.AND.N.NE.7) GO TO 20 l
CALL CW1XPL(X, AG,K, ' LINE AR', 'M.C.JURGdNSEN5' )
l 2C CONTINVC STCP END l
l
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l - ll 76 CASK GLCME TRY AND NATERI AL PkOFEATIES l
i RAdlUS LENGTH WEIGHI SPtCIFIC ENERGY INCHE5 INCHES POUN05 Lb-IN/CU. IN.
14.200 30.875 2640.0 4000.0 DEFLAMATION VtLOCITY TIME FuMCE ENERGV ACCELEAAIICN l
It.CPE S FT./SLC.
MILLISECbNJS PuuNOS L3-1N.
XG a
0.0020 43.82 0.wCAT8 0.0
._ 0.00., _.
0.0 C.C005 43.o2 0.DC094 O.0 2.4e v.00 0.0445 43.o2 0.u td. 9 15.00 0.03 0.01 0.0079 43.o2 0.J 1310 av.21 0.14 0.01 0.0124 43.d2 J.0 2 32v d0.13 v.39 J.VJ 0.u179 43.32 0.03397
~ ~ 1%4.11 1.00 0.05 0.0243
'U.0317 43.d2
_ 0.04o24
,, _. 23J.9d _ _,, _ 2.22 u.09 43.J2 J.0603d J54.69 4.4.
4.13 C.0 eJ2 43.82 U.0 7v41 G11.42 d.04 0.19 C.D eS4 43.a2 J.09432 700.10 13.60 0.27 C.Jo00 45.42 J.1 1411 9,9.50 22.4J 0.36 0.0714 43.o2 u.13517 12*u.Cv J4.40 0.47 O.Cd33 4 3. 22 0.159s1 1504.40 d2.3i
..u.00 O.0:)11 43.42 J.16412 19bo.ud fu.43 b.15 3.1115 4 3. 32 0.414J0 2*al.19 10o.0/
J.9J 0.120s 43.cl 0.2111) 2Vdv.li 159.12 1.13 0.1431 4J.d1 J.47214 3567.76 2J3.30 1.36
- 3. lcJ 4 4J.s1 u.4C;03 4 67.20 Jia.id 1.u2 J.11au 43.d1 0.33)i1 SU2a.1b
.hsa.as 4.22 1.90 c.1979 43.41 1.3is3a asIO.81 sos.dk 0.?!dt 43.40 J.*14JJ 6dO3.51 SJh.91 4.5d e.2291-4 3. n3 U.wS2Jb Td29.31 143.of 2.97 0.in14 43.00 0.44/23 8952.21
'149.71 J.39 S.2C4) 43.79 3.54122 1C17 42 11>e.78 3.o5 J. s e'. a 43.19 0.241J4 11sJa.03 1411.52 4.30 0.3336 43.;d a.o3e70 16945.45 1/1/.96 s.9d 0.3296 43.11 0.oc420 14*vt.99 2Jis.73 a.*9-J.3aoL 43.76 0.73ss2 1o198.20 24ad.0$
6.12 0.4145 43.15 J.lsabd 17959.69 296v.32 6.d0 0.4434 43.14 0.64367 19dto.vu 3510.34 1.33 3.4712 4 3. 72 0.5039 4 3. 11
0.900*i 21923.25
- 13J.38 d.34 O.95910 24104.41 46,1 14 9.13 0.5336 43.o9 1.01955 2o 10.42 asst.o*,
IJ.01 0.5s33 43.u7 1.061d2 2dJ14.15 0254.14 10.94 0.6Ji9
~
43.64
~ 1.14591 31475.11
~ oosa.ob '~
11.9 4 7231.20 0.6364 43.62 1.21181
34223.00 '
14.9o 0.6718 43.59 1.27954 37122.01 9954.70 14.06 l
l i
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77 0.7032 43.56 1.34908 40175.52 11359.96 15.2 2 0.7454 43.52 1.42044 43Jd6.95 12917.63 ___
_16.43 0.7d36 43.45 1.49362 46759.59 14039.46 17.7 1 0.8227 43.43 1 56363 SC296.71 16537.61 19.05 0.862o 43.39 1.64246 54001.4a 18o24.87 20 46 0.9037 43.33 0.9455 43.2T 1 72413 57oF6.98
. _ _. 2 0914. 52..___..
21.92 1.dC463 61926.41 23*20.40 23.46 0.9dd3 43.21 1.be69o 66132.44 20126.98 25.06 1.C319 43.14 1.9711e 7C5de.13 29139.02
<6.73 1.0764 43.05 2.05724 75146 50 32Jd2.0T
/d.4u 1.121o 42.9d 2.14518 79920.19 3a902.12 30.2 1 1 16d1 42.69 2.23500 64dS1.94 _ _ _
39115.70 _...
32.15 1.2152 42.u0
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- 4.9d 2.91o00 125086.31 701J4.06 41.3d 1.5a93
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t 9.4 Operating and Inspection Procedures i.
)
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e 81
83 Transuranium Processing Plant ORNL NOS. 4S2-209, 210 and 213 DOT APPROVED 5461 ORNL DWG. NO. 12175-CP-078E PROCEDURE FOR USE OF: TRU CURIUM SHIPPING CONTAINER Shipping Container No.
Date Time By 1.
Materials to be shipped quantity
- to la.
Quantity Certified by 2.
Move carrier to loading area following clothing procedures of that area.
3.
With health physics personnel present, remove hex nuts from plug cover and remove Cover.
4.
Remove hex nuts from plug.
5.
While surveying with cutie pie carefully remove plug Rdg.
mrem.
6.
Have cavity smeared for alpha and gamma contamination.
c/m/cm2 alpha c/m/cm2 gamma 7.
Clean if above smears exceed 30 c/m/cm 2 alpha and 300 c/m/cm2 gamma.
8.
Plug gasket seating surfaces clean and do not need repair.
8a.
Plug gasket present and in good condition.
9.
Using appropriate procedures to limit personnel exposure to < 20 mrem, load material into cavity.
Exposure mrem.
10.
Replace plug into carrier.
11.
Carrier loaded shall not have over the following readings.
200 mr at surface.
10 mr at 3 ft.
12.
Replace hex nuts on plug studs and tighten to 35 in. Ib.
, ^
Shipping Container No.
Date Time By 13.
Cover gasket seating surfaces clean and do not need repair.
13a.
Cover gasket present and in good condi-tion.
14.
Replace cover and tighten hex nuts to 35 in. Ib.
15.
Container tied to skid in approved manner.
16.
Approved for ' shipment.
i (This procedure may-not be used for shipments of liquids until a 4
letter or procedure has been executed indicating ~ compliance with paragraph 3 of DOT Special Permit 5461.)
1 1
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85 ORNL NOS 4S2-209, 210 and 213 DOT APPROVED 5461 ORNL DWG. NO. 12175-CP-078E TRU CURIUM SilIPPING CONTAINER Routine Shipping Container Number Inspection Check List Annual Date Time By, 1.
General condition of carrier checked.
Remarks:
2.
Cover gasket present condition:
l good poor replaced 3.
Plug gasket present condition:
good poor replaced 4.
Scaling surface condition:
good needs reworking or cleaning 5.
Nuts condition:
good replaced 6.
Studs condition:
good replaced 7.
Welds inspected (visually) good need repair repaired 8.
All needed repairs and final inspections completed. Cask is in good condition to use.
1 Approved Date
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9.5 ORNL-Nuclear Safety Review t
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. REQUEST OR HCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW F
cRca===ner e
l This request covers operations with fasile esterial in a control area and/or fissile material transfers that origuiate within the control area. The control area supervisor shall complete N5R NO.
869 the t>lecks below and describe the process and/or operations to be performed, emphasizing the provisions for nuclear ca.tscality safety on the reverse side of this page. This request
[
shall be approved by the Radiation Control Officers of the originating Davisson and of July, 1984
. Division (s) having active N5Rs in the Control Area.
i TITLE, CONTROL AREA, AND 5UMMARY OF BASIC CONTROL PARAMETERS n.6....r..46,.i.. c
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TRU Curium Shipping Container 10/ 31/ 73 11/15/79 E31;Yeo. nea
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Transuraniuna Processing Plant (TRU), Bldg. 7920 72
- " 7920 r21emical Technology TYPE ANO FORM OF MATERIAL Isotopes of Pu, Am, Cm, Bk. Cf, Es, and Fin in solid form.
ACTivt NIRsIN Tr#E CONTROL AREA l
Pan isotav go naThw on uket. unss am 3 esoTopic egect= Tau I
j QUANTITY
_f oi AL to es enoctsste l
0F l
FIS$1LE F,0 TOPE $
foTat rissitt isognags se ComT#ok anta l
Concentiation or DenLety of Fsssie hterial Spacing er Fesssie Units Pese ty and Type Of Neviron Reflectors er Ad Jcent Fassile Material 3
Leinet en Moderateen Lemet en Neutren Absorters Limit en volo.nr er Dinensions af Containers THi$ REQUEST : O ** '.es O a eiaces NSR N.
W No.NsR l-RECOMMLMDATIONS n. 6....i..a 6, *. c..<.i. c...i This endorsement is based on our present understanding of the operation (whether acquired verbally or in writing) and is subiect tc. review and cancellation.
Rec-me enimum pe, isaiaea naien es unit Rec c.noed...
te. ine cent..i A. a l
l This request is approved.
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Provisions for nuclear enticalsty shall be descnbed below in accordance with App ', dices !! and llt of the llOE Laval Chap'ee 0530. Inis shall nef descnption of the process and/or all oper.tions to be performed. plans and ptmedures for the operations for.
snticelity s.fe',. and the basic control parameters.
Please attach 11 ct 4es on
,cierenced draenngs and documents.
The TRU Cur! am Shipping Container is used to trans}mrt any isotope of plutonium, americium, cur;om, berkelium, californium, einsteinium, or fermium in a solid form as metal, oxide, or salt.
We maximum quantities of Pu-239, Pu-241 Am-242m, Cm-243, Cm-245, Cm-247, and/or Cf-249 Fermitted to be shipped is a total of 10 grams: Cf-251 will L limited to 3 grams. The balance of the isotopes is limited by heat evolution with a maximum of 150 W (500 Btu /hr) being allowed. The source strength is limited such that nternal dose rate will not exceed the 3evel specified in the Ix7r regulations.
The cask, which is shown on Dwg. M-12175-CP-078-E, consists of a 0.78 m tall cylinder, which has a 0.74 m outside diameter and an internal cavity 152 m in diameter by 203 m deep. The shielding consis'ts of ag toximately 25 m of lead and 248 m of Blackburn Limonite concrete. The outside shell and bottom of the cask are type 3% stainless steel, 9.5 mm thick, and the top and inner shell are 6.4 m-thick 304L stainless steel. The lead on the side and bottom of the cavity is encasel in 6.4 mm-thick 304L stainless steel.
The snaer cavity is closed with a plug made from 6.4 mm-thick 304L stainless steel plate. During construction, the plug was first filled to a depth of 25 m with lead and then filled with limonite concrete. Af ter the limonite concrete had cured, the top plate was welded on the plug.
ORNL CRITICALITY COtsaTTit asR. no.
869 July, 1984
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- 10. R CERENCES I.
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 71.
2.
Safety Standarin pr the Packaging of Fissile and Other Radioactive Afaterial, DOE Manual Chapter 0529 (June 14,1973).
3.
R. J. Roark, Formulasfor Stress and Strain,4th ed., McGraw-H:" New York,1965.
4.
Seely and Smith, Advanced Afechanics of Afaterial-Table 5, p.149, 2nd ed., Wiley, New York.
i l
5.
S. Crocker, Piping Handbook rev. 4th ed., McGraw-liill, New York,1945.
l 6.
S. G. Pearsall, S. Majeski, and L. Gemmel, " Design and Testing of a Shipping Container for Large Quantities of Radioactin Waste," in Proceedings of the Second l-International Symposium on Packaging cal Transportation of Radioactive Afaterials,
(
CONF-681001 (1968), pp. 624-36.
t 7.
J. H. Faupel, Engineering Design, Eq. 8.253, p. 541, Wiley, New York,1964.
8.
D. S. Clark, "The Influence of impact Velocity on the Tensile Characteristics of Aircraft Materials and Alloys," Tech. Nue 868, National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, Washington, D.-C. (October 1941).
9.
L. B. Shappert and J. H. Esans, Analysis of the SARP 25-ton Target Tube Cask, l
ORNL/TM-3531 (January 1972), Appendix V, po. 89-91.
10.
M. F. Spotts, Design of Afachine Elements, 2nd ed., p. 459, Prentice-Hall, London, 1954.
I1. 11. A. Nelms (thesis), Structural Analysis of Shipping Casks Effects of Jacket Physical Properties and Curvature on Puncture Resistance, ORNLITM-1312, vol. 3 (June 1968).
12.
W. D. T urner, D Elrod, and I.1. Simon-Tov, IIEA TINGS, An /B3/ 360 // cat Conduction Program, ORNL/CSDITM-15 (March 1977).
f
- 13. Seal Compound Afanual, Catalog C5702, Parker Seal Company, Cleveland, Ohio (April 1971).
14.
T. N. W. Akroyd, Concrete Properties and Afanufacture, p. 265, Pergamon, New York,1962.
91.
i i
i l
l 91
- 15. Agent R. M. Graziano>' Tariff No. 29, lla:ardous.\\taterials Regulations of
<e fiepartment of Transportation including Specifications for Shipping Containers (issued ec. !$,1974; effective Jan. 14, 1975). paragraph 178.34
- 16. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 71, Appendix D.
17.
E. D. Clayton, "The Nature of Fission and the Criticalitj Process (from Protactiaium to Californium and Beyond)." Proceedings qf Short Course on Nuclear Criticality Safety, Taos, NM, May 7-11,1973, USAEC TID-26286 (1974), p.t.
- 18. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49, part 173.393 (j).
19.
W. D. Bc (, R. I). Seagren. and C. D. Watson, The ORNL Chemical Technology Division Quality Assurance Program for Radioactive.\\faterial Packaging, ORNL/TM-6471 (September 1979).
4
i 93 ORNL-5147/R1 Dist. Category UC-71 INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION 1.
G. A. Aramayo 22.
J. B. Ruch 2-6.
J. E. Bigelow 23.
R. W. Schaich 7.
W. D. Box 24.
R. D. Seagren 8.
R. E. Brooksbank 25.
L. B. Shappert 9.
G. H. Burger 26.
W. E. Terry 10.
H. C. Claiborne 27.
D. B. Trauger 11.
R. L. Clark 28.
- 5. C. A. Vaughen 12.
E. D. Collins 29.
J. W. Wachter 13.
J. H. Evans 30.
C. D. Watson 14.
V. A. Jacobs 31.
R. G. Wymer 15.
E. M. King 32-33.
Central Research Library 16.
L. J. King 34.
Y-12 Technical Library, 17.
A. P. Malinauskas Document Reference Section 18.
F. H. Neill 35-41.
Laboratory Records 19.
J. R. Parrott 42.
Laboratory Records, RC 20.
M. E. Ramsey 43.
ORNL Patent Office 21.
J. N. Robinson EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION 44.
E. W. Bailey, DOE, Oak Ridge Operations Office, P.O. Box E, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 45.
E. L. Barraclough, DOE, Albuquerque Operations Of fice, P.O. Box 5400, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185 46.
L. G. Blalock, DOE, Oak Ridge Operations Office, P.O. Box E, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 47.
C. L. Brown, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, P.O. Box 999, Richland, Washington 99352 48.
R. B. Chitwood, DOE, Division of Fuel Storage and Transfer, Washington, DC 20545 49.
H. N. Culver, DOE, Oak Ridge Operations Office, P.O. Box E, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 50.
R. I. Elder, Chicago Operations Office, 9800 South Cass Avenue, Argonne, Illinois 60439 j
i
94 51.
J. M. Freedman, Sandia Laboratories, Transportation Analysis and Information Division #4551, P.O. Box 5800, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185 52.
R. E. Harris, DOE, Oak Ridge Operations Office, P.O. Box E, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 53.
B. B. Klima, Roane State Community College, Harriman, Tennessee 37748 54.
W. G. O'Quinn, DOE, Savannah River Operations Office, P.O. Box A, Aiken, South Carolina 29801 55 D. M. Ross, DOE, Division of Operational and Environmental Safety, Washington, DC 20545 56.
R. W. Peterson, B2ttelle Columbus Laboratories, Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation, 505 King Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 43201 57.
W. A. Pryor, DOE, Oak Ridge Operations Office, P.O. Box E, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 58.
R. R. Rawl, Materials Transportation Bureau, U.S. Department of Transportation, DC 20545 d
59.
J. A. Sisler, DOE, Division of Fuel Storage and Transfer, Washington, DC 20545 60.
D. R. Smith, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, P.O. Box 1663, l
Los Alamos, New Mexico 87544 j
61.
F. R. Standerfer, DOE, Richland Operations Office, P.O. Box 550, Richland, Washington 99352 1
62.
L. L. Turner, DOE, Savannah River Operations Office, P.O. Box A, Aiken, South Carolina 29801 1
63.
Nuclear Research and Development Division, DOE, Oak Ridge Opera-tions Office, P.O. Box E, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 j
64.
Office of Assistant Manager, Energy Research and Development, DOE, Oak Ridge Operations Office, P.O. Box 2, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 i
65-79.
Health Protection Branch, DOE, Oak Ridge Operations Office, P.O. Box E, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 80-240.
Given distribution as shown in TID-4500 under category UC-71 --
Transportation of Property and Nuclear Materials ou S GovtRNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1980-644 24S/106
./
g ORO REVIEW OF REPORT ORNL-5147/R1 Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP)
Oak Ridge National laboratory TRU Curium Shipping Container Raymond E. Harris William A.'Pryor A.
General Standards for all Packaging:
1.
The materials and construction are such that there will be no significant chemical, galvanic, or other reaction among container components or between the package canponents and the package contents.
1 2.
There is no external shield or shock absorber associated with i
the package.
3.
The requirements for positive closure of the container are fully met.
4.
Lifting devices for packaging:
I The container can be lifted by any one of four essentially
[
identical devices spaced synnetrically around the container.
I Each device consists of two 304L stainless steel ears (5/8-inch thick, 4 inch wide, 8-inch long) connected by two steel pins (1-inch diameter) designated AISI type 4140. The ears are
-spaced 1 binch apart and they are attached to the skin of the container by binch full around fillet welds. The connect-ing pins exteni through the ears and are attached to the ears by full around fillet welds.
'iheclosureplugforthecontainerisdesignedtobelifted by a bail constructed from a 3/8-inch diameter 304L stainless-steel rod. The bail is shaped like an inverted 'V' and it is attached to the plug by a 3/8-inch full around fillet weld.
A cover is provided to prevent use of the hail for lifting the entire containers. A lockwire and seal are used with the cover during transport of the container.
The capabilities of the container lifting device and of the closure plug bail to meet applicable requirements were analyzed in the SARP based on mechanical properties of the material of construction shown in Table 2.1 of the SARP and on standard analytical techniques. ORNL also assumed that only one of the container lifting devices would be used for that purpose.
OR review indicates that reasonable basic assumptions are used in the analysis. OR calculations also substantiate conclusions in the SARP that the container lifting device and the closure plug bail meet lifting requirements for those devices. Fur-ther, since b:,ch devices are located on the outer skin of the container, failure of the devices would not impair the contain-ment or shielding properties of the package.
5.
Tiedown devices for packaging:
The container lifting device described above is also used for tiedown of the container during transport. Cables (four total) are attached to the bottm pins of the lifting mechanisms and are secured to eye bolts located on a specially designed skid.
1 Four additional cables are attached to the top pins of the same parts and are secured to the bed of the transport vehicle.
The evaluation is based on a range of tiedown geometries for the container to vehicle bed case (the geometry is fixed for the container to skid case) ard on mechanical properties of the material of construcction referenced above. Standard calcu-lational techniques are used in the evaluation to demonstrate empliance of the device with applicable requirements. OR believes that reasonable basic assumptions and calculational techniques have been used in the SARP for evaluating tiedown capabilities. Thus, OR agrees with ORNL that the device meets stress limitation requirements for tiedown devices.
When used for tiedown purposes, failure of the container lift-ing device under excessive load would obviously impair the ability of the package to meet other requirements of General Standards For All Packaging. However, OR feels that the device used for tiedown meets the intent of this latter requirement.
B.
Structural Standards for Type B and Large Quantity Packaging Well recognized theory is used in the SARP to demonstrate the capa-bility of the container to meet requirements in the Structural Standards for Type B and large Quantity Packaging. OR review indi-cates that ORNL had adequately ccvered and adequately demonstrated in the SARP the ability of the package to meet these requirements.
C.
Normal Conditions of Transport Standard techniques and test results related to this container have been used in the SARP to demonstrate cmpliance of the con-tainer with all requirements for normal conditicas of transport.
The OR review substantiates the ORNL conclusion that the container meets these requirements.
D.
Hypothetical Accident Conditions The evaluation in the SARP of the package to meet requirements under hypothetical accident conditions is based on conventional calculational techniques and on tests of similar packages. Results from the evaluation indicate cmpliance of the package with all of the reference conditions. OR review substantiates the conclu-sion in the SARP that the package meets the requirements for hypo-thetical accident conditions.
E.
Nuclear Criticality Safety 251 The mass limits of 3 g of Cm and 10 g of the other individual isotopes or mixture of the isotopes are less than the minimum critical masses of the isotopes to be shipped. The mininum criti-cal masses of these isotopes have been c mputed by H. K. Clark and are sunmarized in the Nuclear Safety Guide, Report TID 7016, Revision 2, Appendix Table A-1.
The lowest calculated mininum critical mass of any.of these isotopes under optim m conditions
F' 251 is 10 g for 0n. Since there is not_that nuch mass of this iso-tope currently available and since there will not be that nuch produced in the foreseeable future, there appears a minimal nuclear cri,-icality problem. Therefore, the container is exempt from the fissile material requirements.
F.
Quality Assurance The quality assurance requirements for fabrication and maintenance were reviewed by the OR Quality & Reliability Division and were found to be generally acceptable.
G.
Distribution The SARP was distributed under TID 4500, UC71.
H.
Conclusion The requirements of DOEM 0529 and 5201 have been met. Therefore, it is reconmended that the TRU Curium Shipping Container be certi-fled.
m
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