ML20030B897
| ML20030B897 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bailly |
| Issue date: | 08/21/1981 |
| From: | Cassidy H, Hauck F SAVE THE VALLEY - SAVE MARBLE HILL, YALE UNIV., NEW HAVEN, CT |
| To: | AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8108250141 | |
| Download: ML20030B897 (70) | |
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April 10, 8
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SUBJECT:
PSI's Impending Financial Problems 4.
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Friends:
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3 s(N A number of indications imply that PSI, in their determi n to \\y rush the building of Marble Hill, has ignored some very s i
financial eventualities that are in store.
We are sure that you must be aware that the entire electric utility 4
industry is experiencing hard times.
It has become impossible to in-crease utility dividends at any rate approaching that of inflation!
Because PSI in the past enjoyed good management, it is currently in a little sounder condition than some systems.
But, our analysis of today's rapidly changing conditions indicates that PSI's finances are in'for some rough sledding.
Their upcoming traumatic problems will be due to:
1.
Marble Hill's Exorbitant Cost When originally planned in 1974 and 1975, Marble Hill's cost was esti-mated at only S1.4 billion.
Belatedly, in 1980, management finally increased their cost estimate to S3.4 billion.
But, an almost identical
$1.5 billion (1975 estimates) 2300 megawatt Westinghouse facility in New York State was re-estimated in 1979 to cost $4.5 billion!
Fur-ther, there are many indications that even $4.5 billion may be at least
$1 billion too low!
MIT's expert, I. C.
Bupp, has estimated nuclear power's cost escalation at 21% annually, and that was before Three Mile Island!
Using the industry's optimistic 30-year reactor life, even Marble Hill's estimated S4.5 cillion capital cost will require $565 million per year for debt ret'.rement alone.
When compared with last year's total revenue of $6A; million, this $565 annual debt payment should cause all of PSI's management grave concern.
Even the power expert market to the North has all but vanished, and the national electric utility res 7e capacity has now risen to 43% and is still rising!
There are inGications that these national reserves will reach 55%
before 1985:
SI has tried to reduce the appearance of their own excess capacity by shortening theoretical plant lives on all coal-fired facilities to an unheard of 30 years, even though common knowledge puts these plant-life figures at 40 to 50 years.
Annual Report figures indicate that PSI currently has generating capacity reserves in excess of 50%.
Standard reserves have previously been pegged at 17-20% by PSI and most other utilities.
2.
Very Large Natural Gas Supplies i
The availability of continued ample supplies of natural gas is rapidly removing PSI's winter load growth.
Indiana Gas Co. alone has recently added more than 18000 new customers, This change is a national trend.
8108250141 agoggg jpd I
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page 2 Because natural gas-costs less than 1/3 the cost of energy from resistance and half that from an electric heat pump, Public Service Indiana will soon again return to summer peaking.
The gas industry confidently forecasts increasing large supplies past the year 2000!
PSI can be no exception to this strong national trend.
3.
5%+ Real-Dollar Electricity Cost Increases Past empirical measurements over more thar. 30 years indicate that electricity consumption (per person and r er unit of production) will decrease by an average of about 30% as the real-dollar cost doubles by about 1995!- This 30% reduction is a total of all use by all classes of users, and is estimated from measurements taken in many different parts of the United States.
PSI again cr be no exception.
4.
The PURPA Guidelines Consumption changes resulting from just the sugg.csted time-of-use rate structuros discussed in the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act 4
(PURPA) will bePalmost certain to stop peak growth for a decade or more.
PSI, we emphasize, can be no exception!
5.
Indiana's Slow Population Growth Indiana's population, along with that of most of the Midwest and East, is growing at less than half the averago U.S. growth rate.
This slow growth alone is a powerful indication that Indiana's electrical energy l
growth will be much slower than the anticipated U.
S.
average of 2 %
annually.
Yet PSI, after its third reduction in peak projet,tions l
since 1977, is still forecasting growth rates nearly double national rates!
The Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.,
S. Commerce Department continues to place Indiana and all surrounding states in a very slow growth category.
Be sure to study tho attached chart on PSI's peak forecasts, See that j
the 1985 demand has been lowered from 7120 megawatts to 4600, a drop much greater than the capacities of both Marble Hill units!
The not offect of the above impacts will be that Marble Hill's capacity will be unneeded, probably even by the year 2000!
Financial prudence would ihdicate that construction cease while PSI's officers and directors, the ones who bear the real responsibility for a fiasco, l
and whose reputations and financial integrity ride on this respon-i sibility, reassess their options!
I Again, offered with concern copies to:
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PSI Officers
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and Directors Fred Hauck E
STV Mailing list Engineering Consultant Q%& f,' f(.2
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i Media and Industry b/
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Harold G, Cassidy
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Professor Emeritus Yale University
NEW ENERGY SOURCES APPROXIMATE COST PER MILLION BTU'S END-USE ENERGY (1981 DOLLARS)
SOURCE
$4.5 Billion S35 Billion
$17.5 Billion
$6,5 Billion Nuclear Plant North Slope Deep Basin D.nestic 2260 MW Natural Gas Nat<ral Gas liatural Gas Capital Cost Amortized in
$13.45
$2.50 (45 yrs)
$2.00
$0.75 30 years-12%
Fuel Costs 2.29 (7.8 mils 2.50 (per Mef) 5.00 (per Mcf) 5.00 (per Mcf) per kwh)
Insurance
.10
.01
.01 91 i
Labor
.15
.05
.03
,02 Maintenance 1.00
.25
.10
.05 APPROX. TOTALS
$17.00/MM BTU
$5.50/MM BTU
$7.00/MM
$6.00/MM 15 Lifetime Energy 1.26x10 BTU 33x1015BTU 30x1015 15 BTU 4x10 BTU (over 30 years)
(over 50 years)
(over 50 years)
(over 20 years) 012.17 billion 02.5 billion 92.5 billion, 00.6 billion kwhrs/ year cu ft / day cu ft / day.
cu ft / day Equivalent to 1 Marble Hill 24 Marble Hills 24 Marble Hills 3 Marble Hills 5.80/kwh
= $5.50/Mcf
$7.00/Mcf
$6.00/Mcf
=
=
=
(+ Dist. cost)
(+ Dist. Cost)
(+ Dist. Cost)
(+ Dist. Cost) l From the above figures it's easily seen that nuclear energy's major costs are related to its capital requirements.
Natural gas costs seem mainly related to the well-head cost of the gas itself!
Will political clout or economics determine where our new energy sources will be developed?
Certainly the marginal (new source) cost of natural gas will be less than one-hali that of electricity!
Since an average family uses about 12 million BTU's of energy monthly, one can choose to underwrite either a $200 monthly (if all energy comes from new sources) nuclear building program or an $80 monthly natural gas building program!
Hauck 3/29/81
O March 26, 1981 FRED HAUCK TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN P.
O. Box 391 or
Subject:
ENERGY'S CAPITAL COSTS Route 3, Tower Heights Shelbyvitie, Ky 40065 Friends:
The two sheets attached tell interesting stories about the tremendous costs of supplying energy by building nuclear power plants.
These costs are compared with natural gas costs revealed by the latest infor-mation.
Here are the numbers as we have analyzed them:
l CAPITAL COST TO BUILD MARPLE HILL l
(2260 MW Westinghouse PWR)
S4.5 Billion Capital Cost S3.57 per million BTU's (furnished over the plant lifetime)
=
2260x1000x62%x24x365x30x3412 l
' CAPITAL COST TO BUILD THE NEW ALASKAN NATURAL GAS PIPELINE (The most expensive source of new natural gas) i S35 Billion Capital Cost
$1.18 per million BTU's (furnished over the 50-year lifetime)
=
9 2.5x10 x1000x65%x365x50 CAPITAL COST FOR THE NEW PANHANDLE FASTERN PIPELINE ADDITION (A less expensive source of new natural gas)
$64.2 Million 50.05 per million BTU's (furnished over the 20-year lifetime)
=
9
.243x10 x1000x65%x365x20 THE MULTI-BILLION DOLLAR QUESTIONS:
Why are our " experts" recommending the spending of -
$3,57 for a million BTU's of energy from nuclear, when we can get the same amount of energy from natural gas for
$1.18 fror. Alaska or S0.05 from Louisiana.
NOTE:
All energy is expensive but nuclear energy is exoribitant!
Since an average family uses.about 12 million BTU's of energy monthly, you can choose to underwrite either a $42 monthly nuclear building program or a 600 monthly hAtQral gas building program.
Which addition to your monthly bill are you voting for?
t
Subject:
NATURAL GAS vs. NUCLEAR ELECTRICITY (a) Capital Cost Comparison
)
March 1, 1981 Friends:
4 A detailed examination of capital costs shows that nuclear electrical energy costs an astounding 3-times as much per energy unit. delivered as will the futura use of very expensive-North Slope natural gas.
Our calculations follow:
NORTH SLOPE NATURAL GAS.
A 2260 MEGAWATT NUCLEAR FACILITY Capacity: 2.5 billion cu. ft./ day Capacity: 62%.x 2260 MW Life:
a0 yrs (probable min)
Life:
30 yrs (probable max)
Efficiency: 65% (end use)
Efficiency: 100% (end use)
Est. Cost: $35 billion Est. Cost:
$4.5 billion Calculations:
Calculations:
9 2.5x1d'x1000-x 365x50x65%
2260x1000x62%x24x365x30x3412 15 15
=29.65 x10 BTU's for $35 billion = 1.26 x 10 BTU's for $4.5 billion Sl.18 per million BTU's or S3.57 per million BTU's 1
Our Comment:
SHOULD NOT THE CURRENT MONEY SITUATION CAUSE OUR BANKERS TO SHUDDER AT THIS TREMENDOUS COST DISPARITY?
IN CAPITAL COSTS ALONE Fred Hauck North Slope Natural Gas Ist i
67% Cheapte" per BTU of End Use Energy and will deliver:
14-times as much energy per year 4
and will be eaual to at least 24 Marble Hills in total energy outp':t!
Shelbyville, Ky. 40065 FRED HA UCK October 31, 1979
. Bo 391 or Route 3, Tower Heights, Shelbyville, Ky. 40065
" PSI's DECLINING PEAK FORECASTS" 4
J This curve (see attached) indicates that PSI has rapidly I
'and steadily reduced 1985 peak growth expectations.
Begin-ning with the Jrne 1973 forecast, the peak expected in 1985
, has been reduced from 7120 megawatts to the currently fore-1 p
cast 5035 megawatts.
This rate of reduction (more than 300 Mw/ year) would seem to assure that the maximum 1985 peak expected by STV of about 4500 megawatts could not I
.possibly be exceeded.
s:
PSI's current capacity (including Gibson #4) is 5700 mega-watts.
Gibson #5, scheduled to go on line in 1983 will bring total capacity to 6350 megawatts.
,,Thus, PSI reserves (reserve-to-peak ratio) are likely to be a minimum of 43% in 1985 without any of Marble Hill's capac-pl jity.- Reserves 'a't~this'nioment are actually 53%!
-[
",, Sitice th'e industh.; reserve standard 1.3 only 20%; what does
,, PSI: intend - to do.with this wasteful surplus?
~
re the Valley residents expected to bear the pollutant load b
for power to be exp'orted to the north and east?
o(6/30/80) - PSI's latest quarterly report again reduces their estimate
.of 1985 needi It is now 4650 mW (Winter) and 4440 (summer).
Because of rapidly increasing natural gas supplies PSI will soon again become sum-mer peaking.
This latest estimate has therefore reduced the 1985 peak l
by 2680 megawatts (from 7120 to 4440), aven more than the total capacity of both Marble Hill units!
They still seem to feel no need to reduce their hell-bent-for-leather building program!
It's also interesting to i
note that Save-the-Valley's forecast of PSI's maximum 1985 peak given during th_e NRC hearings in Madison was 4450 megawatts!(M W.,A pril g j rf) s p ed,k
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PSI's DECLINING PEAK FORECASTS
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7dt, DE3f PSI's WEAKENING POSITION
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l An open letter To Whom It May Concern 7
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7 1 - PEAK GROWIH N,S PSI's peak growth has been linear (straignt-line) for many years.
Peaks j
are apt growing at a compound rate as PSI has fantasied far, too long.
Figure 1-is a. copy of the surves submitted to the NRC at the bbdison hear-
-ings 4 years ago.
Note that STV's linear projection 4 years ago indicated a 4460 megawatt peak for the year 1985.
Af ter many PSI peak reductions over the la st 7 years, th ey, PSI, are now forecasting a 1985' summer peak of only 4440 MW, 20 FM below STV's peak forecast ma de in 1977.
Even their present winter forecast is only 4650 MW.
PSI will soon again become summer peaking because of vastly increased natural gas supplies.
PSI's 1973 estimate of the 1985 peak has now been lowered bv much more than the total cacacities of both the crocosed bb rble Hill units:
2 - PSI RESERVES FERC data gives PSI's current generating ca pacity as 5694 MW.
PSI's 1979 Annual Report lists total capacity (Summer 1980) as 3896 MW.The PSI 1980 Annual Repo as 5716 MW.
i gives their all-time system peak Using the lower FERC data, we ha ve :
5694 current total capact y (without proposed bbrble Hill)
-3896 all-time system peak
=1798 reserves / 3896 = 46% reserves If we should add 650 MW for Gibson #5, these reserves would bei 2448 / 3896 = 63% reserves
" Standard" reserves, as admitted by PSI in the past, have been considered as 17% to 20%:
(Extra unneeded ca pacity increase.= the rate-base. )
3 - INDIANA 'S FUTURE GROWTH The 1980 Census indicetes that Indiana and the nearby states of Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, W.V. and Kentucky have grown at oniv 30% of the
.na tional population growth ra te.
The Wes tern S ta te s of Texa s, eZ, CA,
or Nevada and NM grew at 199% of national, while TN, N. & S. Carolina,
GA, FL, AL, Mississippi, LA and Arkansas, grew a t 184% of national.
Further, out-migration from Indiana and nearby states seemingly is even increasing according to news reports and continling pessimistic auto and l
steel-data.
l 4 - INCENTIVES TO BUILD UNNEEDED CAPACITY Dr. Duane Chapman of Cornell University has c.mpiled a detailed 43-page showing 7 " subsidies" that encourage the building of new electrical report l-
2 ca pacity whether it is Itkely to be needed or not.
These " subsidies" for a theoretical utility in Southern IndianJ that is building a 2260 MW nuclear facility, would total, in just the last 5 vears of construction before Roing on line
$1.86 billion to the utt11ty (similar to retained earnings) plus $111,000 in essentially "for free" stock in the utility to every executive making $100,000 or more annually:
(Essentially, according to Chapman's report, all participating utility employees from the janitor up, would receive die equivalent of more than 1 year's salary in free stock over a period of perhaps 15 years.
These stock plans are also available to other industries, but electric util-ittes are perhaps 10-times as capital intensive, so total stock value will be 10-times as great')
5 - OTHER INDICATORS OF FUTURE SLOW GROWTH IN ELECTRICITY DEMAND Please refer to the previous report we sent you*, and especially to. the paragraphs headed:
"bb rble Hill's Exorbita nt Cost" "Ver "5%+y Large Na tural Gas Supplies" Real-Dollar Electricity Cost Increases" "The PURPA Guidelines" These paragraphs give additional logic for the expected future very slow electricity growth rates.
Since PSI seems to lowe. the estimates of their generating reserves much below the figures we ha ve given, we list below their apparent ta ctics :
By reducing 40-year coal-fired lives to 30 years, far below a.
even the 33-year book life recommended by FERC.
Even a 52-yea r life can be realistic for a well-maintained coal-fired plant.
- b. By wholesaling power to other utilities during PSI peaks.
We ha ve suspected that " games" could be played with such nearby utilities as IPALCO and NIPSCO, but that's pretty difficult to pro ve.
PSI'd..nnual Report doesn' t list wholesale sales.
- c. To obvia te installation of scrubbers, etc., PSI has agreed ** to operate some units below full rating.
Everything unat we ha ve learned about all utt11ty over-capacity indicates that PSI will find it increasingly difficult to export electricity in anv d irection.
It would seem tha t PSI should cut their losses by stopping work on bbrble Hill now.
Offer in concern for the possible harsh effects of a potential corporate meltdown upon the Company and public:
Fred Hauck Harold G. Cassidy
- Copies a va ilable.
- For whatever reason this has been done, the total capacity is still there and a va ilable to the ra te-base.
Sent to:
Officers of PSI, Members of the Bor.rd of PSI, >bdia, Industries, selected Itsts, and Save The Valley officers.
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l K open letter to the !.soard of Directors and Management Of Public Service Indiana On the cubject of MARBLE HILL Ladies and Gentlemon:
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We address ourselves to Management for reasons that are obvious: we address ourselves to the Board because not only are their reputations involved but also because of a growing realization that they have legal responsibilitics toward Company management for which they are accountable.
Lsec the Wall Street Journal, Section 2, March 3, 1981.]
The shoddy work in safety related structures that has come to light has destroyed public confidence in Marble Hill, What is the value of an impressive-appearing spread of buildings, and forects of rusting reinforcement bars, if they hide a diseased body? And resumed pouring of safety-related concrete has still not been sanctioned by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Mcanwhile new regulations and worrics for all nuclear planta continue to pile up in the aftermath of Three Milo Island. Organic Gardening, March 1981, p.
119, reports that I
a public information officer at TMI, John Fidler, says cican-up of the plant will run to 41 billion. Alco that accordinq to a Pennsylvania Stato University study the cost of houcchold evacuationc within the 15-mile arca wac betwcon SG million und GlO million, the coct of loct work days betwoon y3 million and i
I 44.5 million,with large hidden costs to health and in stress, In vicw of theco conciderations, and of the rapidly changing picturc of the availability of natural gas one han to ack "Can PSI curvivo building and carrying Marble Hill?"
The attached chcot cuggests that new gas discoverica will ma%n Marbic Hill power plant obsoloto before it can be finished.
The financial effectc may well cause grave concern to PSI rate payers, or so we think.
Isn't thic time to cut locccc, before pouring more money into Marble Hill? Much of the invectment already made can curely be put to more benign uscc, Very ruly ou
/
l Harold G.
Caccidy
' Fred Hauck Board mcmberc, Save The Vallcy l
1
Subject:
NATURAL GAS vs. NUCLEAR ELECTRICITY la) Caoital Cost Comparison March 1, 1981 Friends:
A detailed examination of capital costs shows that nuclear electrical energy costs an astounding 3-times as much per energy unit delivered as will the future use of very expensive North Slope natural gas.
O _ calculations follow:
NORTH SLOPE NATURAL GAS A 2260 MEGAWATT NUCLEAR FACILITY Capacity: 2.5 billion cu. ft./ day Capacity: 62% x 2260 MW Life:
50 yrs (probable min)
Life:
30 yrs (probable max)
Efficiency: 65% (End use)
Efficiency: 100% (End use)
Est. Cost:
S35 billion Est. Cost:
S4.5 billion Calculations:
Calculations:
9 2.5x10 x1000- x 365x50x65%
2260x1000x62%x24x365x30x3412 15 15 29.65 x 10 BTU's for.S35 billion
= 1.26 x 10 BTU's for S4.5 billic
=
S1.18 ner million DTU's or S3.57 por million DTU's h
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Our Comment: SHOULD NOT THE CURRENT MONEY SITUATION CAUSE OUR DANKERS TO S11 UDDER AT THIS TREMENDOUS COST DISPARITri IN CAPITAL COSTS ALONE North Slope Natural Gas is:
Fred Hauck 67% Cheaper per BTU of End Use Energy and will deliver:
14-times as much energy per year and will be equal to at least 24 Marble Hills in total energy outnut!
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TVA Manager Urges Utilit to Cut Back TV^ 9*"*r*1 **"^7*r "*r"S th^t "th*
Y utility must tr2.m its ambitious nuclear Nt cle Plant Program plane construceton program to avoid
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spiraling rate increases."
7gg speevas se, Tur. wau. stater Jovn=4.
KNOXVILLE, Tenn. - The Tennessee
/
Valley Authnrtty's general manager warned that the utility must trim its ambitious nu-@
i c! car plant constniction program to avoid
' spiraling rate increases.
wiutam willis recommended that the trimming the program will give TVA halt constniction at one nucicar plant e relief to the public utility's 2.3 mil-and put off completion of two others. Any
/
lion customers in 7 states.
cutbacks in the nation's largest nuclear con.
struction program are subject to approval
[
by the TVA's three member board.
Str. Willis said that trimming the pro-
/
. he " urged the board to stop con-gram wtli give rettet to the public ut!!!ty's' 2.8 million customers 1.1 seven states, but struction on the 42%-complete Phipps also will result in the layoff of about 6,2 Bend (2 units @l233 mW) plant
.. and ed on a staff revision f load fore-recommend that the completion of the
- Yellow Creek (2 units @ 1285 mW) nuclear casts. Atr. Willls urged the busrd to stop
,p ennstruction on the 42%-complete Phipps plant and the Hartsville (4 units Bend nuclear plant, which employs 3.500
@l233 mW) p1 ant be postponed until about workers 70 miles northeast of KnoXYllle. Atr9 Wilhs also recommended that the comple. i 1991 tion of the Yellow Creek nuclear plant in northeastern 5tississippi and the Harts <dle nuclean plant near Nashville be postponed until about 1991, three years later than cur.
"The staff found that despite a growing rently scheduled.
economy, power demand dropped for the TVA str. willis's recommendation is subject t from 1973 to 1979.
Meanwhile the cost of TVA board npproval at a public hearing e
borrowing $2,0111 ion annually to finance here Aug. 6. Approval is almost a certainty, e
offletals said.
y nuclear Construction has been a major eco omy. her deIand ppedQ*y factor in the revenue deficit that is TVA from 1973 to 1979. steanwhue, the cost causing rate increases of borrowing $2 billion annually to financ8 nuc! car plant constniction has been a major factor in the revenue deficit that is causing rate inercases, the staff said.
[
Rates have Inemased on the average of W'.pl 15% a year from 1974 to 1981.
-84.yps J ~ 7I3f In 1974, the TVA had planned to build 17 nuclear reactors. It currently has four of the f y 3L units operating and a fifth licensed. Two other plants currently under construction.
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the Watts liar in East Tennessee and the liclifonte plant in northern Alabama.
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r wouldn't be affected by the cutback.
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As recently as March. TVA officials had M d -
p33 defended their onginal nuclear program.
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A WHITE PAPER XVI ss i
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THE TRUE COST OF THE PROPOSED MARBLE HILL NUCLEAR STATION Prepa red for SAVE THE VALLEY, INC: by Harold G.
Ca ssidy,
Ph.D., Emeritus Professor in Chemistry, Yale University, and Member of the Board of Save The Valley, Inc., a not-for-profit Kentucky Organiza tion, licensed in Indiana, Box 813, Ma di son. Indiana 47250. @ Harold G.
Ca s sidy,
1981.
" DON'T BITE MY FINGER.
LOOK WHERE ITS POINTING!"
Attributed to Warren McCulloch "The impression I am lef t with here is that when we start to get beyond what this subcommittee has done.
this particular experience at this particular plant, in many ways can rightly be viewed as a Three Mlle island in the construction a rea. "
[ Hon. Toby Moffett, interrogating Mr.
Hugh A. Barker.
See p. 31 below for reference.]
" Wha t you a re saying, in effect, is that we ha ve not done anything wrong in the past 2 years and we promise never to do it a gain. "
Hon. Joel Deckard, interrogating Mr. Hugh A. Barker.
[See p. 31, below, for reference. ]
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OUTLINE - INDEX - TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE NO.
L Outilne - Index - Table of Contents 1
Introduction 2
What is >brble Hill?
3 Analysis of the bbrble Hill Caper 4
Safety-related Structural Deficiences, I 5
Structural Deficiencies, II.
CUTSHALL Testimony 6
Structural Deficiencies. III. ROGERS Affidavit 7
Structural Deficiencies, IV.
WALSTON Affidavit 8
Structural Deficiencies, V.
FDRTENSEN Affidavit 9
Structural Deficiencies, VI.
Media Reports,1 10 Structural Defi 2tencies, VII. Media Reports, 2 11 Structural Def. clencies, VIII. Media Reports, 3 12 Structural De' tciencies, IX.
Media Reports, 4 13 Structural Deficiencies, X.
Media Reports, 5 14 Structural Deficiencies, XI.
Media Reports, 6 15 Structural Deficiencies, XII. Media Reports, 7 16 Structural Deficiencies, XIII. Media Reports, 8 17 Structural Deficiencies, XIV. Media Reports, 9 18 Inspections of PSI's Marble Hill Work, I.
19 Inspections of PSI's Marble Hill Work, II.
20 Inspections of PSI's Marble Hill Work, III, 21 Health Costs. I.
22 Health Costs, II.
23 Health Costs, III.
24 Dangers and Health Costs of Nuclear Power I 25 Dangers and Health Costs of Nuclear Power II 26 Costs of' Jobs 27 Growth 28 On the Matter of Need 29 The Whole Energy Picture 30 End-us, Energy 3'1 Who Pays ? I.
32 Who Pays ? II.
'How Much? 1 33 Who Pays? III. How Fbch? 2 34 Who Pays? IV.
The Subsidies WE Pay, 1 35 Who Pays ? V.
The Subsidies WE Pay, 2 36 Who Pays ? VI.
The Subsidies WE Pay, 3 37 Who Pays ? VII. The Subsidies WE Pay, 4 3C Who Pays, VIII.The Subsidies WE Pay, 5 39 Who Pays? IX.
The WVPA Electric Cooperative?
40 Paddlewheel Protests, I.
Their Costs.
41 Paddlewheel Protests, II.
42 Paddlewheel Protests, III.
43 Chances and Cost of Accidents.
L
(
ti n
44
. Costs of Regulatory.Hea rings, I J.45 Costs of Hearings, II 46 Costs of Hearings, III 47 Chronology of Marble Hill Caper - 1 48 Chronology of Marble Hill Caper - 2 49 Chronology of Marble Hill Caper - 3 50 Chronology of Marble Hill Caper - 4 51 Chronology of Marble Hill Caper - 5 52 Chronology of Marble Hill ', aper - 6 53 Chronology of Marble Hill Caper - 7.
54 War on Progress?
55 Cost Ethical Considerations, I 56 Cost - Ethical Considerations, II 57 In Retrospect i
1 1
INTRODUCTION The bald statement of dates and actions cannot adequately con-4 vey the fiscal and human costs which have been incurred in the Save-The-Valley /Pubile Service Indiana-NRC struggle over bbrble Hill.
It would take a more skillful writer than I to picture the fears and worries of our friends.
One thing I can ensure, however, is that it may be made clear that Public Service Indiana (PSI) undertook the i
Marble Hill adventure in spite of advice, and of warnings about the i
consequences of such a course of action.
Now, as a consequence of ill-advised management failures in the guality-assurance program (Tr-3/15)] the company is in danger (tu see pp. 156ff in Transcript of bbrch 23, 1980 meeting of Ebdison j
(
my opinion) of corporate melt-1 down.
I In this White Paper, Number S'1 teen in the Save-The-Valley i
series, I shall present facts and ar lysis about what bbrble Hill 1
is, including a chronology of events to date (Janua ry-February, 1981).
l Where it seems desirable for reasons of interpretations, I offer i
clearly marked opinions; views about the costs of the Marble Hill adventure.
4 i
In this way the Reader may be in the best position to form his j
own opinion of this whole (in my opinion, miserable and evil) affair.
1 It is essential that the people of this region let their voices be heard loud and clear in opposition to bbrble Hill.
If we a
j' do not act we shall be saddled with a $4.5+ billion plant run by a management whose record for mismanagement is already expensively demonstra ted (pp. 4-20) and who must be censured.
a 1
If we do not act we shall see 100% race increase over the j
next few years, especially if we allow CWIP in the rate base.
i I
If we do not act we cen expect to be exploited in the fictitious name of need for electrical energy (pp. 28-30).
j LET US ACT!
PLEASE SUPPORT SAVE-THE-VALLEY.
}
i
2 WHAT IS " MARBLE HILL"?
In late 1840 an enterprising gentleman named Hiram Dean, interested in the stone out-cropping along the Ohio River above Bethlehem, Indiana, found marble.
It appeared to be of good quality--some of the stone is now part of the Madissa courthouse
--and by 1850 a quary was in full swing.
But by 1856 the vein of quality marble ran out.
The colony of some fif ty families who lived by it were out of work.
They gradually dispersed to other jobs, so that in a few years nothing
.ms left of the little community, or to Mr. Dean's venture.
Dean then turned to raising peaches.
By the la te ' 80 s he and his four sons controlled plantings of some 125,000 trees along three miles of the River bluff on the Indiana side, and land across in Kentucky.
Then came 1896, and another disaster.
With peaches at 25c a bushel (it cost 35c to pick them) and wheat at 40c farmers couldn't meet the bills they owed to the huge Dean store, and collapse followed.
[ Fro.Y. Chas. E. Heberha rt, "They Say and Do in the Country," Ebdison Courier, 11/7/38, with thanks to Professor Frank Baker of Hanover. ]
A third, possibly as ill-starred, venture is in progress at Marble Hill.
Public Service Indiana [ PSI] has been authortzed by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission [NRC] to construct two pressurtzed water nuclear reactors designed to operate at core power levels of 3411 megawatts thermal each, to be known a s
>brble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 [ Marble Hill].
8 f
1 j
3 l
ANALYSIS OF THE MARBLE HILL CAPER 2
1.
If Marble Hill construction is completed, and If the plant is permitted to operate, e
Then it will generate radioactive atoms (" radioactivity")
i a) Radioactivity will be continuously released to land, air and water.
[The release systems are designed to 3
produce effluents of radioactive materials "as low as 3
is reasonably achievable. "
Design is cne thing, actual f
behavior another, and there are, nationwide, frequent
" unplanned" releases of radioactivity which raise questions whether the designers know enough.
Besides i
there is no lower limit below which nuclear radiation 1
is not a menace to health--except zero. ]
{
- 1) Radioactivity released to land will find its way to the water table.
J
- 2) That released to air will travel as a plume.
Madison, Hanover, Milton are close by dowa-wind i
some of the time.
Jeffersonville, Clarksville, New Albany and Louisville are down-wind some of the time.
- 3) That released to water will travel in the Ohio River to the water supplies of down-river towns.
2.
Construction at Marble Hill l
a) Requires N-certifica tion j
b) Has meticulous and extraordinary quality requirements.
j c) Is extremely costly i
=
3.
The possibility of accident is recognized by the NRC require-
)
ment that evacuation plans be in place before the plant can be started up.
j PLAINLY, leaving out further disadvantages, the customers of PSI are asked to pay for the construction and financing of this expensive Nuke, and at the same time pay for evacuation plans go we can run for our lives from it.
(Cost / Benefit bottom line. )
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4 i
SAFETi-RELATED STRUCT~ P9_L DEFICIENCIES AT FBRBLE HILL, I.
u An account of the pubite discovery of the shoddy and unsafe work going on Ln safety-related structures at bbrble Hill must be given at several levels.
I shall take up the offidavits cot.rageously given to Save The Valley by Mr. Charles Edward Cutshall and three other concrete workers at bbrble Hill, Then I shall excerpt from the newspaper reports that followed when the matter was made public (perhaps the reader will have enough information to draw conclusions about the integrity and the crediblitty of the protagontsts).
My account begins with a long article from the Madison Courier of May 4, 1979.
"Hugh A. Barker, president of Public Service Indiana, was the guest speaker at last night's Madison Rotary Club meettrig.
{
" Barker talked abou! Marble Hill nuclear power plant being built near Fbdtson by PS' and what the accident at the Three Mlle l
Island nuclear plant in Harrisburg, Pa., will mean to it.
{
Barker spoke of a four-member " Marble Hill Review Task Group j
whose job is to examine Marble Hill's design and, if necessary, recommend changes.
h'e will continue with Marble Hill," he said, j
"only as long as we are satisfled that the operatton of that factitty will place no undue risk to members of the pubite or to plant j
personnel."
He gave no hint of problercs at the construction site (but see pn9ffof this series).
On May 8 Mr. Cutshall made an affidavit before a Notary Pubite f
who took the sworn sta tement down in sLorthand and on a tape re-i corder, later transcribing it in the f s im presented as testimony to the congressiongal sub-committee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, November 27 and 28.
This Committee was chaired by Hon. Toby Moffett.
The transertpt is i
referred to as Tr-HR.
i d
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5 STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES, II. CUISHALL TESTIMONY.
Mr. Cutshall said, in answer to ques tions from Mr. Robert Gray, of Sa ve The Va lley :
A.
I've been around concrete work all my itfer my father's been a finigher for close to 50 years.
I am famtllar witn concrete I'm concerne]d about work. L P.
3 A.
the conditions of die concrete and thin s e
I have seen on the >brble Hill construction site, pertaining to honeycomb patches.
[p. 4]
A.
If a form is, say En instance, four (4) feet thick--or the concrete would be a four (4) feet thtek wall and has a honey-comb on the side, tt might go in as much as two (2) or three (3) feet into it and have the air pocket to where a concrete is loose.
You can just beat it out with a hammer, and in some cases it 'll fa ll out on its own--just breaking it with your hand.
Q.
Thus leaving Lt much more narrow than the spectf tcations call for?
A.
Yes, str.
Q.
Okay, and you've seen this at bbrble Hill?
A.
Yes str.
It is one of my jobs to patch the ;e--to supply [p. 4]
materials for the finishers to patch these areas.
Mr. Cutsnall said that he had worked in and outside of the contain-vessels and steam tunnels, and that honeycombs were present in ment all.
In one steam tunnel water was le king in at 5 to 20 gallons an hour due to the poor concrete work p.
61.
The contractor's supervisor or superintendent, and ESI officf als on many occasions said to patch over the hoceycomb without proper repair before the NRC inspector can see it Lp. 7].
"Before the ins pectors can get around, they'll have them just more or less mask over, cover up, the areas before the inspector can see it. " [p. 8]
Mr. Cutshall said furtner, on questioning, that he had seen an
' NRC inspector about three times in 2 months.
The supervisors received notice before they can even come on site and then not without a PSI escort [pp. 11-12].
He said that he had seen honey-combs "a foot or better" deep, and irregular shapes up to 4 feet in diameter [p. 19]. 'He had the impresston that the NRC inspectors were pretty sharp--but that they couldn't see everything in their 3
i limited vistts [p. 20].
He htmself was concerned "because I believe that such things that I've explained will definitely affect the workabil tty of the nuclea r power plant. "
Q.
Would it be rea sonable to sum up then tha t you think that the guality is below standards at Marble Hill?
A.
Yes str. Lp. 21]
These excerpts are from'the sworn statement of Mr. Cutshall inserted in the transcript of the Hea ring Tr-HR.
6 STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES, III. ROGERS AFFIDAVIT.
I, Jewel W.
Rogers, of legal age and being duly sworn, state:
1.
That I worked at bbrble Hill as a concrete f tntsher's helper for Gus Newberg Construction Company out of Local 795, Laborer's Local.
2.
That I worked a t bbrble Hill from March 1979, through May 18, 1979.
3.
That I ha ve personally in my capacity as a concrete finisher's helper at bbrble HL11 been present when one Newberg supertn-tendent over concrete finishers and their helpers, directed concrete finishers to cosmettcally cover honeycombs before the honeycombs were to be inspected.
4.
That I worked along with Charles Cutshall at Marble Hill.
5.
That I am personally aware that Newberg Construction is using unskilled and untrained unton laborers in and around the concrete pours and finishing.
6.
That I am personally aware of the speed in which Fbrble Hill ts being constructed; that such speed in butiding is causing unsafe working conditions and improperly poured concrete; that when I complained to my union about this speed and concerning lack of proper gear in which to pour and fLntsh concrete, I promptly was laid off from my employment.
7.
That I have worked in and around concrete for the past twenty (2Q) years or so.
Signed by Jewell W.
Rogers 07/07/79.
7 STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES, IV.
WALSTON AFFIDAVIT.
I, Michael L. Walston, of legal age, and being daly sworn, sta te :
1.
That I was employed as a concrete finisher working directly under Local 821 of Cement bbsons from February,1979 until the latter part of June, 1979.
in 2.
That I have six (6) years experience worktng and around A
concrete.
3..
That my foreman, Jim Cutshall, ordered me to cover up honey-combs improperly.
4.
That '. have personally observed concrete being dropped thirty
[30) feet, a pproxima tely, from the conveyor belt to the pour areas numerous times at the Marble Hill site.
5.
That I have personally observed pours being made too quickly for the vibrator operators to keep up and properly vibrate dae concrete that this event has occured quite frequently.
6.
That, in my opinion, most of the concrete pours upon which I have personally observed have not been properly vibrated.
7.
That I was personally sent home by a Newberg superintendent while two (2) laborers remained overtime to finish concrete in my area; that the (2) laborers at that time were not concrete finishers.
Signed Michael L. Walston 07/08/79.
I 9
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l.
8 STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES, V.
FORTEN9EN AFFIDAVIT.
I, Stanley J. Mortensen, of legal age and botng duly sworn, state:
1.
That I was employed - out of Local 694, of Coment bbsons, Loutsvt11e, Kentucky, working directly under local 821 of Cement bbsons, Seymour, Indtana, for Newberg Construction Company at bbrble HL11, from early March, 1979, through May, 19 79.
That my sp(ectf tc occupation at bbrble Hill was as a concrete 2.
ftntaher coment mason); that I would be considered a journeyman in the trade.
3.
That Steve Gayso, Newberg's superintendent over cement work at Marble HL11, advised dits aff tant personally to cover up honeycombs cosmettcally before the inspectors saw them.
4.
That this af f tant has personally observed laborers being placed in the capacity of concrete finishers by dLrection of Steve Gayso.
5.
That in my capactty as a concrete f tntsher, I was persona ~11y ordered to cover up a stx (6) Lnch wide and approxtmately twelve (12) foot wide expanston joint on and around the base of thu" reactor butiding, which expansion joint was to be two (2) inches wide, Ln my understandings further, the quality control personnel admttted thore was a mistake but to cover up the mistake.
6.
Tha t I have personally observed testing personnel at bbrble Hill testing concrete in a sheltered area whtle a concreto pour wa s being ma de in the steady, hea vy ra in.
7.
That during my term of employment all black concrete finishers sont to ebrble HL11 were terminated: that, spec tf tcall (2) blacks were termtnated after the hiring of two (2)y two white concrete f Lntshers.
l
\\
8.
Tha t I have personally observed (dead) dry pack used to cover tLe holes.
9.
That I am appalled with the quallty of concrete work at l
Marble Hill that I ha ve personally observed, i
10.
That, in my opinion, the union workers of each and every unton at bbrble HL11, are being directed to construct bb rble Hill too quickly: in the process, the qualit coming questionable and approxima tely four (y of work is be-4) years of wages per unton member are being lost.
l Signed Stanley bbrtensen 07/08/79.
I
9 STRi1CTURAL DEFICIENCIES, VI.
MEDI A REPORIS, 1 The papers most frequently referred to are The Louisville Courier-Journal [CJ], the bbdison Courter [FC], The Indtana polis Star [IS].
06/14/79, Cl.
"According to an account broadcast last night by Louis ville Television sta tion WAVE, the NRC said the >brble Hill construction site contains more than the average number of honey-combed sections of concrete than are usually found in nuclear plant cons t ruction. "
06/21/79, DC.
"The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission says irregular-ities were found at the Fbrble Hill construction site in the method used to check welds and seams in Itner plates designed to contain radioactive material.
"NRC spokesman Jan Strasma said the agency had turned down a PSI request to send a fulltime inspector to the construccion site.
"Strasma said the commission is aware of the non-compliance, but the NRC to waiting for the subcontractor
[Sargent and Lundy] to bstify the use of the lower standard.
"'I wouldn't call this a ma ior problem, ' St ra s ca said of the devlaion from the NRC. standards.
" " PSI President Hugh A Barker told a news conference at the construction site Tuesday volds are common and to be expected for any large-scale concrete pouring operatton However, Barker said all voids are identified and repatred under a pproved procedures, and he sad he is confident NRC inspectors 'will support our assertion that no unsafe or pccentially unsafe conditions exist.
'" [ Emphasis added.]
06/23/79, MC.
"NRC investigation specialist James E. Foster told reporters in a news conference yesterday tha t it was 'not our (NRC) view of the moment ' to consider shutting down the facility because of the improper concrete pa tching.
" Barker said all voids ha ve been repaired according to NRC standards.
06/27/79, EC.
" Concrete work at the bbrble Hill construction site
. has been stopped temporarily until the Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission is satisfied with its procedures.
PSI announced the work stoppage of safety-critical structures today to ' assure tha t concrete work at its Ebrble Hill nuclear project would meet highest s ta nda rd s of sa fety. '
The ut titty estimated work would resume in about a week with NRC approval.
The NRC requested the shutdown yesterda3 and the 160,000 yards of concrete already in place will be reexamined The Article continued with excerpts from Mr. Cutshall's testimony.
l 10 STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES, VII.
MEDIA REPORTS, 2.
06/27/79, MC.
Save The Valley's spokesman, Mr. Robert Gray, stated l
to the Madison Courier:
Those of us who have identified what we consider serious generic construction methods are in the ridiculous position of laboriously and expensively identifying and point-ing to obvious corrective methods.
We are not in the business of helping PSI to build a better mousetrap.
Alternately we feel dbrble Hill is an imminent and inherent danger to the health and safety of this entire region.
STV feels that the NRC is naive in l
appearing to envision STV as 'in harness' with PSI, cont ra cto rs,
and the NRC to identify and correct defects--but to continue to build.
In reality STV feels that we have identified a full just-ification for construction to stop.
And to reevaluate electrical generation priorities for this entire region.
The cement defects l
and Qeld tiner substandard procedure identified by the NRC are in our opinion merely symptomatic.
STV does not feel that we should stand as watchdog for apparent NRC laxity and to identify apparent contractor and uttitty corner-cutting and questionable safety-rela ted construction practices.
STV feels that the Marble Hill l
plant is inherently unsafe and unhealthy for all of us in this region."
06/28/79, MC.
"Public Service Indiana and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have found 170 patched ho ycombs [of 517 so far detected] at the utility's nuclear plant site at Marble Hill that are suspect.
And an NRC official is questioning all the concr.ete that has been poured at the nuclear power plant construction site
'There 4.s a qua. tion in our minds as to how good the concrete is in the cotal structure,' James Keppler, director of the Region III NRC office in Chicago, said.
Keppler said it is too early to determine if there was an Entent'iondl effort to cover up the repair problems.
An NRC spokesman in Chicago, l
Jan Stra snm, added:
'There is some significance to the problem, l
particularly if it was done as a coverup'.
PSI estimated l
that it will be a week before full construction resumes."
l 06/29/79, MC.
"In other developments regarding PSI's nuclear l
power plant, L. S.
Rep. Joel Deckard, R-Ind., ha s called for a congressional investigation of the plant.
PSI president Barker was quick to reply to Decka rd 's charges.
'We would be shocked and totally surprised if the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has made such a statement since they have closely monitored the bbrble Hill project from its start, ' Barker sa id. "
.~
11 STRUCTURAL DIFICIENCIES, VIII.
MEDIA REPORTS, 3.
06/30/79, C3.
Mr. Bvron Himmelheber, a spokesman for The Paddle-wheel Alliance "said PSI is treating the construction problems as
'a question of public relations ra ther than the safety of the people of Southern Indiana. '"
Replying to a comment by congress-man H. Joel Deckard, Jan Strasma, NRC media representative in Chicago said, "'There has never been an instance when a construction permit wa s revoked, ".
Jou have to be talking about very severe problems regarding the health and safety of the pubitc or a total lack of confidence in the uttitty's ability to safely construct the plant.
07/04/79, IS.
Jan Strasma (NRC) says that the pace of work under
" fixed-price contracts" with no provisions for paying cost overruns may have contributed to poor concrete work.
NRC has ordered PSI to stop pouring concrete in safety-related structures.
07/07/79, MQ.
The NRC -postponed a decision on giving the grern light for resumption of construction work" by PSI.
07/10/79, Eg.
STV told Eq that it has several sworn statements about situations that could affect health and safety.
James Keppler, regional NRC director based in Chicago said that "Everything Cutshall has said so far has turned out to be true.
07/12/79, Ql.
"The president of the utiltty butiding the bbrble Hill nuclear power plant acknowledged yesterday that there had been serious concrete-pouring problems at the plant, but denied any cover-up."
He said that the workers should report any problems to their supervisors, or if necessary to the NRC.
"We want them to know.
that the proper place for them to go is to the NRC, not to some group whose motives are quite different and well known."
07/12/79, NG.
"bbrble Hill is 'not shoddy construction,' according to PSI president Hugh A.
Ba rke r. "
This is what Barker told a group of bbdison community leaders.
He urged the group to look a t STV's ".
. underlying motives.
They are not interested in safety; their cbjective is to put a stop to Marble Hill and all power plants.'"
07/IV79, GJ.
"A House subcommittee will investiga te alleged con-struction irregularities at the bbrble Hill nuclear plant, Indiana Representa tive H. Joel Deckard, R-Evansville, announced yesterday.
In a rela ted development, Sen. Wendell F. Ford, D-Ky., threatened to bring the same issue before a hearing of the Sena te Energy Committee.
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12 STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES, IX.
MEDIA REPORTS, 4.
I 07/13/79, Cl.
Edito rial.
" PSI President Hugh A. Barker now acknowledges that the problems at Marble Hill have been more than routine, as he earlier characterized them.
The vice president of Newberg Construction Company, which is performing work on the site, says concrete pourer Cutshall may have been ' planted' on the job by' Marble Hill opponents.
A more loyal worker, presumably, wouldn' t have blabbed.
"But tf Charles Cutshall tadn't blown the whistle, it seems clear that the last barrier against an accident capable of laying waste much of Kentucky and Southern Indiana could have been fatally defective.
And another ' China Syndrome' enterprise, run by people with eyes for only the profit-and-loss statement, would have been an obvious possibility."
07/17/79, MC.
" Concrete work on the containment and auxiliary butidings [at Marble Hill] was halted for 12 days in late June and early this month after NRC inspectors said 170 air pockets, one of them 15 feet long, had been improperly repaired.
The NRC still is investigating Cutshall's charges that the improper repairs were intended to concep1 the defects.
07/19/79, 10
" Corps of Engineers will check concrete.
The NRC has four inspectors at the Marble Hill site along the Ohio River.
They are watching concrete pours, conducting tests of previcesly poured concrete and investigating allegations concrete faults in the reactor butiding were concealed.
Four former workers have charged that officials of Newberg Construction Co. and Public Service Indiana, which is financing tne plant, ordered the cover up.
The compantes have dented the cha rges.
[See part II of this Section.]
I
13 STRUCIURAL DEFICIENCIES, X.
MEDIAL REPORTS, 5.
07/22/79, IS.
Reporting on two damaging construction incidents, the Indianapolls Star wrote:
"In the second case, concrete was poured for the contain-ment liner at a rate of 10 feet in 70 minutes--three times the NRC-specified rate of 3 to 3 feet per hour.
The wooden forms buckled and cracked, and the steel liner may have been deformed.
"Sargent & Lundy examined the damage on February 22, nine days after the incident, but PSI's sa fety committee was not informed until April 10.
When the NRC inspected the site April 30 through Eby 3, PSI still had not notified the federal agency.
" Telephone notification was made June 1, end in a letter written June 29, PSI Vice-President--Naclear, James Coughlin stated:
' PSI has not determined whether this incident is report-able as a significant deficiency. '
"But NRC regulations spectfy that the plant licensee--
in this case PSI--must notify the federal agency within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of discovering 'a significant def tetency in construction of or stanificant damage to a structure, sys tem or component which will require extensive evaluation, extensive redesign or extre 7 repa tr. '
"'This 24-hour period starts when the Itcensee or his agents first finds the deficiency,' the report said.
"Although Newberg's def tetencies have caused many of the problems a t the plant, PSI is responsible for its contractors' work, and the NRC has made it clear that the uttitty will be held responsible.
" Thomas M. Dattilo, the >bdison attorney who represents Save The Valley, whtch opposes the plant, cha rged that the breakdown in quality control a t >brble Hill 'shows tha t PSI is not capable of constructing a nuclear power plant.
"'Etther PSI knew about Newberg's lack of quality con-trol, or they a ren' t capable of supervising the construction.
In either case, I believe their construction permit should be re voked, ' Da ttilo said. "
14 STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES, XI.
MEDI A REPORTS, 6.
07 25/79, bfC.
The Corps of Engineers say "'We' ve been invited by f
the NRC to look at the U. S. Testing labora tory and concrote.
Wo don' t normally go to a11 the nue lear s t tes, but are working at a few others on different problems.'"
07/26/79, FC.
"Moro Nuclea r Regula tory Commtssion Enr.pectors a re coming to HIrblo filll nuclear plant botng built near here as part of a special investigatton over constructLon troubles plagutng the project, the agency announced yesterday.
"The action came af ter resul ts of a Juno inspection by the Nattonal Board of Bollor and Pressure Vessel Inspectors were announced this wook.
The group concludod af ter inspections June 12-14 that Pubite Servico Indtana butiding tho Ohto RLver plant lacks propor corttftcation to construct the plant and that it has not properly documented the safety of some crit tcal equipment. "
07/26/79, IS.
"The f Lvo or s Lx-man team will probe a wide varloty of codo vtETa ttons and cons truct ion flaws, ' ranging far beyond the concreto problems' whtch the NRC has focused on for the last several months, spokesman Jan Strasma said.
The now investigation could lead the NRC to order a complete halt to work on the power plant. Strasma sa id.
"'But we bollove that Lf the NRC stays within its chart.or, as Lt dof fnes it they'll never find anything," Datttlo said, ' They fool they cannot go beyond judstng procedures in safety-related work, and the problems at R' rbio 'it 11 go far beyond tha t. '
'('NRC koops looking at the single troos, and tha t a pproach will load to a doad end,' f,atttlo said, 'Our sma ll organi za r ton has boon able to provide them wLth in forma tion they never would ha ve do voloped, even if they stayed on the caso f tso years. '
"The Kirblo llL11 probloms 'lio in many, many union and ma na gemen t problems, in contracts and contractor relationships,'
Da tt tlo sa id.
The NRC has ruled many of thoso areas outstdo Lts chartor a a regulator of nuclear plants.
"Moanwhile Floyd County Prosecutor Stephen Beardsley said detocttvos are investigating a report that a member of Laborers Union Local 795 throatened to shoor Jewol Rogers.
one of fout former Mirblo litll workers who gavo Save The Valley affidavits alleging the concreto cover-up.
Boa rdsley sa id the threa t to Rogor's ILfe ' presents a case of tntimidation in L ts clearest form.'"
s 15 STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES, XII.
MEDIA REPORTS, 7.
07/28/79, EC.
"The Depa rtment of Justice has been asked to jotn the investigation of construction practices at the bbrble HL11 nuclear plant to determine if any federal laws [e.g. En relation to the alleged cover-ups of concrete flaws] have been violated, an official says."
07/31/79, NC.
" John Blair, editor of the Ohio Valley Environment newspaper.
said he feared tha t southern Indtana could become 'a nuclear jungle,' producing energy for the rest of the nation.
">b ry Cl a shma n of 'Sa ve the Va lley, '
also complatned about >brble Htll's location, saying that if there were 3 nuclea r accident, it would be virtually impossible to evacuate the 13,000 residents of Madison because of the road system in the area. "
08/01/79, La fayette (Ind. ) Journal & Courter.
"Nuclea r power opponents have urged a specia l legislative committee to recommend laws 1Lmiting the chances of any nuclear power plants beginning service in Indtana, including the two presently under construction. "
08/02/79, EC.
"Sta te ins pector will check bbrble Ht11 pipes, fixtures."
"But an ASbE staf f engineer, Arlene Spadafino, said the state's effort 'doesn't even address what we're interested in.'
The ASME Nuclear Certifica tion Commtttec ' won' t accept anyone else's report without checking Lt out oursel ves, ' she sa ld. "
08/03/79, MC.
"'We would have to constder very seriously whether we could allow construction to continue (if) there had been cover-up by the uttitty, ' sa td Jan Strasma, an NRC spokesman in Chicago.
"bbanwhtle, concrete pouring for escuctures that might leak radia tion during a nuclear acctdent has been halted for the second time.
The first stoppage was for defective concrete work, the current one for allegedly fa t1 Lng to take sufflctent precautions to prevent defects.
08/04/79, Cd.
"The executives of Pubile Service Indiana should be ready, if they're not, to bewall the day the sitck salesmen of the nuclea r industry turned them f rom the relattve certa tntles of coal-f tred power to the awesome imponderables of nuclear generation The case for constructing a billion-dollar-plus nuclear plant in a region with easy access to coal and good t ran sporta tion never was convincing.
But if PSI can't wen get concrete poured to exacting standrds a layman may well wonder how it will perform when faced with the far more difficult tasks of but1 ding and operating the actual genera ting and safety systems.
But an even better question is whether PSI and its customers and neighbors wouldn't all be better of f if the 6tfitty cut its losses right now and abandoned a project that was ill-advteed in the first place."
/
E
\\
16 STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES, XIII.
MEDIA REPORTS, 8 08/06/79, 10.
"At lea st one new area of poorly packed concrete has been found through testing at the Marble HL11 nuclear plant site.
l a spokesman for the Nuclear Regulatory Commisston said.
l Construction in areas that could leak radtation is currently at a l
standstill at the NRC ' s, request."
l 08/08/79, Cl.
"The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is considering l
a formal order that would require Public Service Indiana to prove that deficiencies at the bbrble Hill nuclearpower plant have been l
corrected before construction can resume in safety-critical areas of the plant.
'decause the problems a t the site have contin-l ued, we're considering a formal tool.
An order ha s legal force, '
Stra sma sa id.
Barker said the steps he outilned should solve problems that were found by commission inspectors.
'We'vetcted with the pressure of the commission behind Qs, ' Barker said.
t Barker said it would cost an additional $12 million each month that construction is delayed.
The cost would be passed to the consumer, he said. ' Addttional costs from anticipated delays are not con-l sidered 'stgnificant,' Barker said. "
08/16/79, MC.
"The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) yesterday tssued an order confirming the work stoppage on all safety-related a rea s a t the nuclear plant construction site.
The order also provided the opportunity for any person whose interest may be affected by the order to request a hearing within 20 days of. the issue date of the order."
"Mr. Thomas M. Dattilo said he would request a hearing.
STV needs to know what NRC intends to do with the defective l
concrete, why it was not detected earlier.
He pointed out that during the pre-construction hearings, 'We attempted to question l
(PSI President Hugh) Barker, who was hustled out of the hearings because, he said, he had to go to Washington for a meeting.
08/.16/79, CJ.
"Bart Gra bow, vice prestdent of public. relations for rubite Service Indiana, told members of the Bluegrass chapter of the Pubite Relations Society of America yesterday in Lcubville that continued modta attention to the plant's problems has damaged pubite cunf tdence in the project ' far in excess of che merits of the case.
"Once those problems surfaced, he added, the ongoing situa-tion became much like the one of ficials faced at Three Mile Island.
"'Every day brought Lts new crises.
There was no wav to gain control of the sources of in forma t ion. ' " LEmphasts addedj Ihis would seem to be a fair sta tement of PSI's a ttitude as observed from outside, i
17 STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES, XIV.
MEDIA REPORTS, 9.
08/17/79, Cl.
" Kentucky Atty. Gen. Robert Stebnssaidyesterday he will decide within a week to 10 days whethe to ask for a public hea rtn6 (See previous page.)
He noted the state involved in a federal court appeal of the construction permit granted Pubite Service Indiana by the Nuclear Regulatory Commisston.
And he noted hLs of f tce has been actively pursuing a boundary dispute with the states of Ohio and Indtana."
08/22/79, Hard Times Newspa per.
John Flynn, Sta ff writer:
"Hard Time 3 has learned from informed sources that a former cement in-spector a t bbrble Ht11 alleges that one of his inspection reports was falstfled, wLth his named assigned to Lt "He alleges that his inttLal report tndicated a failure of the cement batch, but was changed to show that i t ha d pa ssed.
His other charges in a lon$ transcript include allega tions that s Coment samples were placed on tce for environmental control.
Coment was poured in drtving rains.
Curing temperatures for-cement were recorded on days when no one was present.
He was instructed by U. S. Testing to watt for a ' good batch' of cement before sampilng it.
None of the Nuclear Regula tory Commission inspections came as a surprise.
08/29/79, Gl.
" Attorney General Robert Stephns said yesterday he will not seek a pub 1Lc heartng on an order that stopped safety-related construction on the ebrble Hill Nuclear Power Plant in Souther indlana.
Howe ve r, he said, if another party seeks such a heartnd, 'we wtsh to pa rtictpa te a s an interes ted s tate. '"
HEADLINES 08/279/79, Cl.
"U.
S. Attorney, FBI joining bbrble Hill investt-gatton."
09/19/79, Ng.
">brble Hill def te tencles found before construction" (NRC "twtce found deftetencies in plans for supervising construction before work began.
")
11/23/79. EC.
">b rble HL11 cons t ruction advisers named" (Manage-ment Analysts Corpora tion LMACJ of San Diego) 02/08/80, Mg.
" PSI discovers some pipe supports may be faulty. "
02/09/80, Cl.
"Some pipe supports at bbrble Hill may have to be removed, PSI says."
02/14/80, !LC.
" PSI receives authortza tion f rom ASME. "
02/14/80, IS.
"bbrble Ht11 Gets ASME OK To Start Butiding PLptng System."
(PSI "ha s recetved tempora ry a pproval.
to construct ptptng systems at bbrble Hill.
")
07/08/80, DC.
" PSI ge t s a ppro va l to recetve, inspect sa fe ty-rela te d ma t er ta l. " ("'It should be noted tha t yes terd y 's NRC action author-tzed only a resumption of ins pecting matertals which will be used in sa fety-related a reas of the plant.
' " sa id "S.
W. Shtelds.
PSI sentor vice president--nuclear divts ton. ")
11/15/80, Cl.
"NRC says improper repa irs vere o rdered at ob rble Ht11. "
(But the U. S. at".orney 's of fice in T.nd taca pol ts said no criminal indletments would be returned.)
12/06/80, EC.
"LLmited piping, electrical work okayed at Marble H t11. "
l s
18 INSPECTIONS OF PSI'S MARBLE HILL WORK, I.
The NRC, Region III (Chicago) issued a report dated bby 29, 1979, of inspection conducted by Messrs. E. J. Galla gher, F. C.
j Hawkins, and J. F. Suermann, a t the hbrble Hill Nuclear Station.
The covering letter to PSI by the writer James G. Keppler said, among other things :
During this inspection, certain of your act-ivities appeared to be in noncompilance with NRC requirements, as described in the enclosed Appendix A.
Items No. 2 and 4 shown in the Notice of Viola-tion enclosed with this letter are recurrent items and warrant your personal attention to preclude further recurrence.
. we are concerned with the lack of effect-iveness of your quality assurance program for con-struction activities of Ebrble Hill Appendix A is entitled Notice of Violation, and ha s four sections.
The first is said to be a deficiency and the remainder to be infractions.
I excerpt from all four, with comments.
In each case Appendix A cites the relevant NRC regulations, whence the phrase " Contrary to the above" which recurs.
"1.
Contra ry to the above, the following two deficiencies were not handled in an expeditious manner."
These deficiencies were that certain metal plates had been damaged on February 12, 1979, but not reported to NRC until April 19.
In the meantime " Concrete backfill material on the exterior of the containment has been subsequently placed thus not permitting direct inspection of the subject a rea. "
2.
Contrary to the above, immediately prior to concrete placement, the NRC inspector observed the following specific conditions adverse to quality which had not been corrected in two con-crete pour areas which had been inspected and re-leased for concrete placement by responsible QA/QC [ quality assurance / quality control]
personnel, a.
At least 12 reinforcing steel shear ties which had not been properly secured.
b.
Loose wood pieces, tie wire, duct ta pe, a nd other general construction debris.
c.
Standing water.
d.
Embedded wood in a horizontal construction joint within the pour area,
e.
Unacceptable cleanliness of formwork.
19 INSPECTIONS OF PSI'S RTRBLE HILL WORK, (continued) II.
These observations by NRC inspectors lond the strongest valtda-tion to the aff tda vits of the co.' crete workers, quoted on pages They are shocking evidence of the sn Jdy construction practices permitted by PSI.
3.
Contrary to the above, the inspector, with Itcensee personnel present, observed tha t curing of the Unit 1 containment wall ICW-Ext. 6 was not being perofrmed in accordance with Sargent
& Lundy SpecLfica tions.
The inspector was unable to verify that adequate corrective action to assure proper curing of con-tainment wall 1CW-Ext. 6 was taken a t any time during this inspection.
Item 4 has to do with documentation, which was inadequate and ignored or was ignorant of the relevant requirements.
Tbts whole report ts frightening in its impitca tions for the_
sa fetv of the public.
It is an indictment by NRC of PSI management.
The National board of Boller and Pressure Vessel Inspectors /
Indiana Boller and Pressure Vessel Board made several site visits to the Narble Ht11 Station in June, August, September and October, 1979.
Below are excerpts from 1) team f tndtags during the June 1-14 vtste, and 2) the jotat revtew of documentation of November 12, 1979.
1.
A very serious problem encountered by the inspecting team was in the dtsarray of documentation.
All ma terial tha t Boes into a nuclear plant must be carefully inspected and certtfled correct--the "N" certifica tion.
The reason is in part that many metals when subjected to the heavy flux of neutrons from a core become transmuted into other atoms which distort and thus weaken the structure.
- Further, hydrogen may be produced.
In that case, certa in metals react with hydrogen to form hydrides--chemical molecules which may lead to embrittlemear and further structural weakening.
Only properly trained quality control / quality assurance inspectors are Itcensed to make such inspection and certification.
The matortals are produced as purchased to specif tg codes of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers LASME.j and these codes must be kept up-to-date.
20 INSPECTIONS OF PSI'S MARBLE HILL WORK (continued), III.
1.3.4.
It appeared apparent that nolghter the owner or the subcontractors had the necessary information for determining the specific Code Edition and addendas material was purchased to.
Consequently, the proper documentation, receiving procedure, etc., could not be determined by either the subcontractors or the National Board Team.
1.6 Public Service Company of Indiana, Inc., suppites material to their sub-contractors on this site.
They do not have a material identification and verification program as required for a ma terial supplier and do not appear to meet any of the require-ments of NCA-3800.
1.6.2 Some of the documentation accepted by Pubile Service Company of Indiana for material to be used in safety related Code construction for thh site indicates the material is not acceptable for nuclear Code construction and in addition is not documented as required by NCA-3867.6.
2.
Teams made several visits to the Marble Hill site to check on whether their recommenda tions had been fo'. lowed.
They issued the Joint Reivew, November 12, 1979 as a text of some 14 pages followed by some 85 pages of exhibits.
They listed 12 examples of nonconformances (exam les in the exhibits) and added "As previously indicated these nonconformities appear to be generic
~
to all the system documents reviewed and in the interest of brevity, only those examples [necessary to illustrate the non-conformities are included. "
- p. 6].
l In the Summation of Findings the Report says, 5.1.
PSI was made aware of serious issQes involv-l ing noncompliance and potential noncompilance with ASME Code requirements regarding material and material certification docu' ments as early as July 14, 1977 by letters ffom site contractors identifying these problems but has failed to j
date, to provide comprehensive and responsible corrective action.
l
=
21 2
HEALTH COSTS, I When the subject of health risks came up during the Marble Hill hearings on March 11, 1977, the NRC expert, Dr. G. Hoyt Whipple, Professor of radiological health of the University l
of Michigan said in written testimony [Tr. p.
1601]:
In conclusion, it is my considered opinion that the impact of radioactive releases from Marble Hill on the environment has been ade-quately and thoroughly evaluated by both the Applicant [ PSI] and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff.
Any effect produced on human beings and native organisms by the opera tion of the Station are so small, both in absolute and in relative terms, as to be quite without significance.
He did.say, on questioning, that there is no lower limit (except zero) at which radiation is harmless to living cells.
bbch of his reliance was on the BEIR [ Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation, National Academy of Sciences--National Re-l search Council, November 1972] report.
I In the follow.ag September (1978) Dr. Karl Z. Morgan, i
then at the Georgia Institute of Technology, an authority on health physics whose word is seldom disputed by either the nuclear industry or its critics, who had served for some thirty years as director of the Health Physics Division of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory [until 1972, wrote, in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists September, 1978,
- p. 30] on the subject 4
of " Cancer and low level tonizing radiation."
i His survey of findings of studies on -the effects of low-level radiation are described on the following pages, i
Ionizing radiation includes medical X-rays and the radia-tions from radioactive nuclei.
These latter include high-energy X-rays ( Y-rays) and nuclear particles fired off at high speed (high energy)), including helium nuclei ( x -pa rticles) electrons ( p -particles neutrons (penetrating neu
~
about as massive as the nucleus of a hydrogen atom)ctral particles
)
other energetic entities.
and assorted
" Low-level" means that these high-energy entities are re-leased at a slow rate.
But they are selli high-energy, and capable di doing damage to living creatures.
- _ - _ _ _. ~-
22 HEALTH COSTS, II i
j Iontzing radiation is radiation which can knock electrons out of atoms leaving them charged:
tons.
In order to understand i
radiation-dose talk I have to define the units " rad" and " rem".
4 Rad is the name of a unit of " radiation absorbed dose."
One Igd is a spectf tc amount of energy absorbed by a definite quantity j
of material.
However when radiation penetrates living bodies, different tissues are affected differently.
Sex organs.and red bone marrow are affected differently.
Sex organs and red bone marrow are most sensitive.
(Red blood cells and white leucocytes
(
are produced in red bone marrow. )
Hands, forearms, feet and ankles are some 15 times less sensittver single organs are in i
between.
Because of these differences, and because different types of radiation deliver wallops of different effectiveness another unit called a rem is defined as the rad equivalent man, which produces a standard biological effect.
Thus for a number of j
different radiations absorbed in a body, the total can be added up.
J When radiation penetrates the ILving body Lt may 1) pass through or near a cell without doing any damage to speak of--
but one rem of one mt11 ton electron volt gamma rays corresponds l
to about 2 billion quanta of energy passing through one square centimeter of body surface, and so the Itkelthood of not doing i
some damage is small.
- 2) The radiation may kill the cell or i
make it unable to divide and grow by destroying some vital molecules.
3)
The radiation may damage the cell, but the body repair forces may heal it well enough.
- 4) The nucleus of the l
cell, where (in the human being) there reside the 46 chromosomes 1
which code millions of bits of information which control the proper' functioning of the cell may be damaged but the cell i
survives, having lost some vital control functions, so that l
lt multipiles untti "in 5 to 70 years" it is diagnosed as maligancy.
- 5) The damaged chromosomes may survive without 4
loss of the cell's ability to reproduce.
If this happens in the sex-organs, the gonads, then the damaged or altered j
heredita ry ma tter may be transmitted to offspring.
The chances a re that most such changes are of a lethal nature, but some j
will be passed on to viable offspring as genetic defects.
3 Wtth the accumula tion in the gene-pool of mankind of hereditable defects, and with the accumulation of radiations from waste products and from releases of radioactive krypton, xenon, todtne and their daughter products cestum, cobalt, :
her6ntium,' and still others such as plutontum and the other, toxic nuke-made trans-urantum elements, which will continue to radtate us for generations, we are mortgaging the future of humanity and placing a burden on our offspring, unto untold genera tions, for which they shall curse our memory, and our j
greed for nuclear money.
23 HEALTH: COSTS, III In the face of admissions that not enough was known about the effects of radiation on living creatures--man, animals, plants--
except that it was known that any lonizing radiation could damage a cell, it seemed unwise to go ahead developing nuclear energy LTr.
following p. 1751].
Two issues are frequently addressed:
- 1) the health risk from increasing radiation, judged by the number of people who die is far less than that from auto traffic, thus for the good obtained in respect of energy production, the loss of life is acceptables and 2) is it true that the limits set by NRC rules are strict enough to protect the pubitc.
Issue No. 1 ts eastly disposed of by the recognition that deaths from automobile traffic are.under the decision of indtvid-uals--one may choose not to drtve.
But radia tion da mage is not under such control for it is,fotsted on the public indiscriminately and involuntarily and thus is an immoral imposition by the nuclear industry upon the populace.
The second issue is addressed by Dr. Ka rl Z. bbrgan [ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1978, September,
- p. 30].
In his optnton "The cancer rtsk from exposure to radiation is much greater than was thought to be the case some years ago. "
[p. 32]
The problem is complicated because there seems to be an en-hanctng effect in cancer production by accompanytng genetic factors, certain diseases, and such factors as " age, sex, eating and smoking l
habits and, perha ps, many other indtvidual characteristics.
Dr. >brgan thinks the NRC " allowable" levels are too high but is unwilling to advise excessive reduction for reconomic reasons.
In the neighborhood of a nuclear plant persons may risk cancer to the extent of 0.0003 cancers per man rem (for 1 million of these people, 300 cancers) from an environmental dose of 100 milltrem L"mtllt"means one thousandth] accumulated over a 10 year l
period.
In these circumstances a chlid with asthma would expertence 50 times the rtsk because of the synergistic effect of the two dtseases on each other.
It is no solace to know that natural background radiation ts 100 mt11trem each year.
Or, to know that even an unusually clean coal-fuel plant would increase the health risk to 5%, though the primary risk would then become chronic bronchitts and emphysema ra ther than cancer.
Dr. Morgan empha s tzes tha t far grea ter than (but not of course mintmtzing) the risk from radtoactive Tollutions is the danger of low-level ionizing radta tion from medical a nd dental X-ray exposure as commonly expertenced.
24 DANGERS AND HEAL 111 COSTS OF NUCLEAR POWER, I.
It might be worth remembering)that although the Rasmussen Commtsston Report (cost, $3 million was directed by the Mass-achusetts Institute of Technology professor, yet it was staffed and largely carried out bv AEC personnel.
In the first place the risks are incredibly hard to judge because of lack of information.
In the second place LT an accident were to occur--and the chance increases with each new plant bullt--the results would be ca ta stroph te n thousands dying within two days: tens of thousands developing leukemia and other kinds of cancer over the next 20 years: those of us.'
down-wind of the plant would be especially vulnera ble.
Insurance compantes do insure us against tornados, although they are not common.
On April 1, 1974 most people woul d have laughed at the possibtllty of a tornado httting bbdtson and Hanover.
On April 3, no one laughed: the fact that there hadn't been a tornado here for over a hundred years was no longer relevant.
Houses were de-roofed and leveled on all sides.
But insurance companies will not insure against nuclear da ma ge.
There are several important differences between a nuclear accident and accidents such as tornados, earthquakes, fires and other great natural calamttles:
- 1) We can avoid nuclear holocausts by not butiding nuclear plants: 2) Insurance compantes will not insure against nuclear damage, but wt11 a gains t tornado, earthquake and fire: 3) You can't go home
[
again af ter a nuclear contamination--papers, valuables of all kinds would be unapproachable for at least one generations the house would be uninhabLtable.
John W. Gofman, M.D.,
Ph.D., who helped isolate the first milligram of plutontum writes Ldn Irreverent Il lustrated View gf Nuclea r Power, 1979, Committee for Nuclear Responsiblltty, bbin P. O.
B.
11207, San Francisco, CA 94101, p.
121]4 To the best of my setentific ability, I have con-stdered the question of whether there is any way that man can Itve a healthy itfe with nuclear energy, and I have reached the conclusion that he cannot.
The re-quirements for adequate conta tnment of the radtoacttve by-products are far beyond any REASONABLE expectation for human endea vor, and the result of failure is an in-evitable epidemic of additional cancer deaths, leukemia deaths, and genetic deaths which are gotng to plague humans for generat ions, even if tne monstrous stupidity, known as nuclear energy were to stop within the next few decades.
1 25 j
DANGERS AND HEALTH COSTS OF NUCLEAR POWER, II.
It seems that the insurance people have been right all along
--from their point of view.
3 The dangers of Nuclear energy are continually becoming more evident.
For example, the New York Times of January 13, 1979, reported tha t Dr. Thomas Mancuso had quit an inquiry into radiation-induced illness at the nuclear submarine base at Kittery, Maine.
He said that the Government refused him full a ccess to Na vy da ta.
4 Dr. Mancuso was one of two M.D. 's who had examined the records of some 13,000 workers at the Hanford, Washington nuclear 1
establishment.
They found a signifteant increase in various forms of cancer among the workers, compared with a group of l
citizens who had not been exptsed.
i The Mancusco study, si, > malth physicist Karl Z.
Morgan
[ loc. cit., p. 23], confirmed the earlier findings of Samuel ML1 ham (19?4) that cancer risk had increased for radiation workers at the Hanford plutonium facilities.
i Morgan writss, as 'a result of his studies, that cancer risk j
from exposure to tontzing radiation fcf. p. 22] is a good deal i
greater than had been thought ea rlier.
He cites work of I. D. J.
l Bross who found that children who had been X-rayed in utero and I
who later developed asthm2t or certain other respiratory lli-nesses were especially likely to develop leukemta because there I
appeared to be a synergy between the two types of bodily damage j
(5000% increased risk).
l
{
Ihese and otner studies clearly show that low-level radia-i tion is not of negligible danger to the pubite, as the NRC has i
been claiming.
To the planned release of low levels of radio-I active gases and toxic new elements must be added the unplanned j
releases which hardly ever have been reported.
Since we in Hanover and >bdison, Indtana, and Milton, j
Kentucky, are downwind much of the time from the hbrble Hill site we have every reason to wish this construction stopped, for the evidence seems strongly to tell us that we will all be at risk 1
of contracting cancer from the continuous radioactive effluents from the plant if it were to go into cperation We can therefore applaud the sta tements of the Paddle-wheelers in. their opposition to the Ma rble Hill plant of Public Service Indiana [pp. 40-42].
4 4
-~nr-m
--n,--
-m
-= - - - --, - -
,.-,--------+-a
---.,------r,wg-,
26 COSTS OF JOBS At the Marble Hill Hea ring, Ma rch 9, 1977 [ Transcript, begin-ning at p. 1004] Colleen Comerford, of Sargent & Lundy Engineers, saldi According to projections, there will be a 3-year period durthg"khtch the construction force will number around 2,000 people, reaching a peak of approximately 2,200 people.
Af ter construction is completed, an operating force of 155 ' people will remain.
In other words, a plant costing as a mtalmum 4.5 billion will provide jobs for about 3 years for a maxtmum of 2,200 people, or an expenditure of over $2 million per job.
Then over some 27 years of operation about 155 jobs at a cost of $29 million per job.
This is wha t is ir.eant by "canttal intensive industrv. "
For comparison Robus Products Corporatton of bbdtson, Indiana, is planning expansion to cost $3 to $5 million, with an increase of 75 jobs [Ridtson Courier 01/26/81].
This amounts to around
$67 thousand per job, maximum estimated, or less than one four-hundredths tha t of the nuke.
Little oC the specialtzed labor on the nuke can come from this a rea.
On che other hand in bbdison and surrounding towns and country there is plenty of need for carpenters, painters, plumbers with imagination and willingness to work at small jobs--home and farm repa trs, for example.
This kind of individual enterprise, labor intensive would be aovJ for everyoneln the area, essenttally non-polluting and ;.unhaza rdous.
Possibilities of other jobs abound.
~
To attempt to justify as job-producing, construction of equals $417[,246 per unneeded bbrble Hill at $417,000 per man-yea r of job 2,200 x 3 + 150 x 27, divided into $4500,000,000, man-year] would seem pure sophistry.
It underlines a ripoff of PSI customers by those who stand to gain by selling heavy eqtpment, by handling the money and financing it, and by planning and supervising the construction.
A study of U. S. Census figures [ Statistical Abstracts.
U. S. Census, 1971] reveals that electric power required an in-vestment (at that time) of $224,000 per employee compared with some 30,000 per employee for general manufacturing, reports Richard bbrgan.
[ Nuclear Power:
The Bargain We Can' t Afford.
Environmental Action Foundation, 1977,
- p. 74. ]
The.dtsparity for nuclear plants is greater than for the electrical industry as a whole.
The tremendous amounts of capttal that uttittles need to finance nukes drains money away from iob-producing, labo r-inten sive industries.
[ Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation, A Time to Choose:
America's Energv Future.
Cambridge) Mass.,
Ballinger Pubitshing Co., 1974.
Appendix F,
- p. 493.
~_ ___
i
~
i i
27 4
GROWTH In a memorandum to ORBES I wrote:
1 1
j To reject a new power plant on the ground that it is not needed is to be tagged an exponentof "no growth."
[See p. 2 6.]
The issue is so heavily j
loaded with emotion that it becomes a ma jor i
i challenge to obtain a hearing for someone who would ask whether growth in one direction might not profitably be replaced by growth in another.
For exa'aple, the mental and physical energies j
released by not building an unneeded plant may find profitable constructive growth in an area of imaginative, im i
efficiency [see p. proved services and increased
(
26].
(In addition enormous capital is released,
- p. 26.)
j
" Growth" is a multiordinal word s it has meanings that j
depend on the context in which it is used.
The re is, for example, a great deal of evidence that growth of Gross National l
Product (goods and services) is not tightly linked to increase i
in energy use.
Growth may be a healing process, as when a i
wounded body is returned to normal.
Growth may be cancerous l
when the body's control is lost.
Growth may involve ir-revocable loss of natural resources, as -when oil or coal are burned.. Grgwth may occur in the use of recyclable materials as in the burning of paper,
'r wood, or alcohol made from j
agricultural products.
" Growth" may be the last refuge of an exploiter (to paraphrase Dr. Johnson).
A l
A tragic result of misconceived demands for material
" Growth" is in the exploitation of non-renewable resources.
1 We are using up a priceless heritage from past ages.
At the fearful rate of this exploitation it is as though we gave no thought to the needs of succeeding generations.
It is only j
where it helps us develop renewable resourcss that such pro-fligacy will become justifiable in the eyes of posterity.
1 1
Growth in conservation, growth in services tha t j
improve life quality, and growth in moral and spiritual i
stature must be the goals of good stewards of this Earthly s pa ceship.
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1 28 ON THE bOTTER OF NEED The matter of need for a power plant is complicated by the prevalance of and indeed necessity for considering, trade-offs.
However, given empirical facts such as we try to offer throughout this White Paper (as distinct from the " facts" of utility public relations blurbs), some firm conclusions can be reached.
Over the years Save ~ he Valley has repeatedly pointed to increasing overcapacity of area public utilities.
The report on subsidies (pages 34-38 above) suggests some incentives for building in excess of need.
It. October 1980 we reported that PSI currently has 5716 megawatts of connected generating capacity.
There is 695 megawatts more of coal-fired capacity due on line from Gibson Station #5 by 1983.
Total 40-year retirements will be 4 small units amounting to only 244 megawatts by 1991.
Using these figures (all of them are ttken from PSI's last annual report and confirmed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission), we find that PSI currentiv ha s a $3% reserve ratio.
The national figure for reserve capacity is now 43%.
" Standard" is only 174 to 20%, less than half actual total reserves!
It's easy to check this figure because it's taken from a long article called, "30th ANNUAL ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY FORECAST" in the 9/15/79 " Electrical World," the mouthpiece of the industry.
This 43% number means that all the electric utilities in this country could generate 43% more energy than they generated at the sum of all of last yea r's 1-hour peaks.
Please note that Indiana Gas Company is ra pidly removing the possibility of PSI's winter heating load growth.
Both because of price and because of rapidly growing supplies, Indiana Gas has recently added more than)7000 new customers.
The 36" gas main soon to come to Dwight, Illinots, just 50 miles from the Indiana border, will furnish the energy of 22,500 megawatts of electrical capactty, equivalent to 10 t!arble Hills.
Pubile Service of Indiana will conserve several billions of dollars of very scarce and very expensive capital if con-struction were to be stopped immediately, and resumed only when and if need actually develops.
hbrble Hill's 2260 mega-watts of capacity can't possibly be needed before the year 2000:
i 29 The Whol e Enore.y Pi c n ire i
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cac=ar Reading down on thi.s chart Coal represents non-electricLty-generation use.
This provides 6% of energy tha t a ppears a t i
end-use-on the job.
O_.,i1 is the largest energy supplier, mostly for transporta tion.
Na tural P.a s is used mostly for hea ting and manufacturi.ng.
IG ectrici t v comprises only 12%
of end-use, but uses up 3 times its end-use value in the production process.
Finally, nuclear energy provides only 1.6% end-use energy.
If it doubles to 2000 it will still be relatively tiny i.n production while becoming increasingly gross in cost.
3b END-USE ENERGY (End-use energy ts defined as the amount of energy that arrives at the point-of-use.)
A NEW CONCEPT FOR SHOWING THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF ENERGY FORMS Thts is a different (and we think a better) way to show the relattve importance of each energy form.
(Refer to previous page.)
In the pa st, relative energy use was portrayed as the amount of rimary fuels (coal, oil, natural ga s and urantum) consumed.
p(See left Quad = 10 gand column of numbers " Primary Energy in Quads."
One 7
BTU.)
This method grossly exaggerated the importance of electricity to the fuel mLx.
For example, to generate electricity, we required:
FOR 1978 (ACTUAL)
Quads of Primary This is This Which ts This Fuels Used To Percent of All Percent of Total Generate Electrt-Primary Fuels Energy At Point-city Consumed of-Use 23 quads 30%
12 %
(Of 1978's 77h (Of 55 Quads Quad Total) total Delivered in 1978)
ELECTRICITY'S IMPORTANCE IN THE ENERGY MIX To L11ustrate the mintscule role played by nuclear energy, the 1978 percentage was only 1.6% of total end-use energy.
By 1990, this percentage may double, but even then it will be less than 3h% of total energy consumed at the end-use potnt' bbst people seem to think mtstakenly that electrtetty furnishes most of our energy, and that nuclear power is the main source for the future.
This is clearly not so especially since alternative sources of energy (sun, wind, geothermal) are coming into use.
Is Lt worth mortaging the future of humankind to " enjoy" 2% td 3% of our total energy?
Based on data from Fred Hauck WLth Permission.
1 t
i 31 i.
i WHO PAYS?
I Public Service Indiana [ PSI] is a monopoly which is required by law to render adequate service in its field at reascnable
~
price to all who apply for it [the definttton of "pubite utility"].
Its rates and standards are estabitsbed by law under regulation j
by the Pubitc Service Commission.
j To set a context for following discussion I now turn to the Transcript Conetruction Problems at Marble Hill Nuclear Facilitv.
i Nuclear Reaulatory Commission Oversight.
LHearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of i
}
Representatives.
NLnety-sixth Congress, First Session, November 27
)
and 28, 1979.
U.
S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1980 (55-7070)] [Tr-HR].
STV was represented a t this hearing, j
but we were not allowed to testify.
j Mr. Hugh A. Barker, president of PSI is being questioned by j
Congressman Lee H. Hamtiton about the cost of delay during the 1
period in which safety-related construction has been stopped by the j
Nuclear Regulatory Commission [NRC].
I j
MR. HAMILTON:
Who will absorb the losses caused by the delay?
You understand, I am sure, about the extra costs and i
mistakes in management.
j MR. BARKER.
I do not think that question can be answered sa t-t sfacto rtly.
I think there will be some negotiation and some a
j of these spectf tc costs, probably with the contractors.
-In the end, howevsr, that determination will have to be made at the time that the cost of the plans are considered as l
part of the rate base of the company.
It will ha ve to be con-I sidered as a package.
MR. HAMILTON.
In the end, then, the consumer will have to bear j
the costs?
MR. BARKER.
No, I would not reach tha t concluston automatically.
MR. HAMILTON.
Wha t is the other possibility?
MR. BARKER:
The other possibility is that the investors would have to pick up part of it.
Tha t.wlll result if a portion of
.1 the cost were not allowed, as part of the rate base of the company.
However, there will be more delays.
Nuc1 par construction g
has sown a history that has been one of many, may delays.
[pp.'284, 285.]
1
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~
The Reader should draw his own concluslon.
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1 32 WHO PAYS?
11.
HOW MUCH?
1.
That comeone pays follows from an old and completely valtr ated
('
adage:
no material thing ts ever f ree.
On the previous page T offered some hints about who will pay for Marble HL11.
Now I in-quire from our expert, engineer Mr. Fred Hauck, "How much?"
Here ts half of his reply:
1 Three other nuclear generating factittles that are scheduled l
for completton between 1984 and 1990 have a currently estimated average cost of $2020 per ktiowatt of capacity.
Here are the indtvidual figures CURRENTLY COSI PER KILOWATT OF FACILITY ESTT MATED COST
' CA PACI TY l
2130 mw Jhtladelphta Electric's
$3.9 billion
$1831/kw l
Limerick Plant
( Pennsyl vanta) i i
1264 mw Consumers Power Midland
$3.1 billion
$2452 Plant (Michigan) 1 2300 mw I
Long Island Lighting's
$4.5 bt11Lon
$1956/kw
]
Jamesport Plant j
(New York) i TOTALS 5694 mw
$11.5 biliton
$2020/kw*
{
- Therefore bbrble HL11's f tgures are Itkely to be at least the following
]
2260 mw
$4.56 bt11 ton
$2020/k" i
To be sure tha t we remember PSI's past hist.ry on bbrble Hill cost increases, here a re PSI's public estimates:
4 7
At NRC hearings in 1976
$1.4 billion I
in 1978
$1.8 bt11 ton in 1980
$3.4 billion in 1982
?
in 1984
?
in 1986
?
1 1
1 1
I i
i i
4 33 WHO PAYS?
III.
HOW MUCH?
2.
It is shown on the previous page that present realistic estimates of the cost of Marble Hill construction and equipment must be set at $4,500,000,000.
This is a conservative estimate.
An article in the Wall Street Journal [01/08/81] " Fate of Nuclear Power in U.S. Could Depend on Troubled Project" reports very similar problems to those that PSI has worked itself into.
In fact," says Pa trick O'Donnell, author of the article, the NRC found so many defects [in welding][--20 in one inspection, 13 i n another--tha t it ordered WPPSS Washington (State) Public Power Supply System] to stop work for several months on major
. parts of one plant.
The NRC has even raised the possidli ty of
' suspension, modification or revocation' of the plant's con-struction-license."
i Work had begun in the early 1970s on the WPPs first 5 nuclear units estimated then at 4 billion.
The price tag is now 17 billion, and still no power has been produced (sce p. 31).
What about the cost to the PSI consumer?
Marble Hill's $4. 5 billion cost is Itkely to be amortized (paid off) in 30 years 2
j
@ 12% per year for financing costs:
J This cost is estimated @ $565 million annually.
i 1
i PSI's 534,454 customers must therefore each pay an average of:
i" 54 r $1057 extra per year for 30 years Last year's total revenue (all receipts from customers) was :
$628. 5 million, which amoor.ts to t i
$1176 per customer.
Therefore, it appears that all PSI rates must be increased by:
I f or 90%, just to cav for obrble Hill, writes t
Mr. Hauck.
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34 WHO PAYS ?
IV.
THE SUBSIDIES WE PAY. 1.
When Marble Hill was first announced some five years ago, the cost was listed as $1.4 billion, equal in magnitude to about 80% of PSI's total investment at the time.
Three years ago, this grew to $1.8 billion, equal in number to about 90% of PSI's bond
--and shareholder's money.
However, more than a year ago, we said that the proper figure should be at least $3 billion.
The dis-crepancy prompted us to dig deeper, and on August 7, about a; year ago, after analyses of cost figures used by pubite service commissions in the Northeast and in the deep South, we concluded that $4.5 billion is a much more realistic cost figure.
Thus, Marble Hill alone, if it is ever finished, will triple the investment in the entire PSI system!
Less tnan two months ago, Mr. Barker admitted that Marble Hill might cost $3.4 bill 16n more than double the original amount, but still more than 1 billion dollars short of total rea sonableness.
PSI's money reasons for building a factitty that may never actually be needed, and that could, if ever completed, cost ratepayers more than 50% increases merely to pay 9he finan ing costs of bbrble Hill may raise speculation.
Following, is the story of Marble Hill's many federal
" subsidies" and of the money enticements for PSI executives and other employees to fantasize a need for additional capacity (see, also, pp. 28-30.)
About a yea r a go, the Ohio River Basit. Energy Study (ORBES) spent $31,000 for a special electric uttitty study to be done by Cornell University utility economist, Dr. Duane Cha pman.
The study, just completed, and flercely resisted by the utiltties, is called " Energy Production and Residential Heating:
Taxa tion,
Substdtes and Comparative Costs."
It includes a year-by-year comparative analysts of the effect of five different federal sub-stdies on earnings.
The prototype plant is situated in Southern Indiana.
The study's computer readout says that PSI, if bbrble Hill ts ever completed, will recetve a total of $1.86 billion as a total of fLve different subsidies; and dais will occur before Lt can generate a nickel's worth of electricity in just the 5 yea r period before going on Ene.
An interesting aside is that the $1.86 billion is not sub-tracted from the rate base but is considered " manna" from Washington and treated as retained earnings. (Continued on the following page. )
In the following pages I excerpt from Dr. Chapman's study.
i b
l l
35 i
WHO PAYS?
V.
THE SUBSIDIES }g PAY, 2.
What are these subsidies that we pay either through uttitty j-rates or through general Federal or State taxes and that are referred to on the previous page?
The answer is found in the
" Appendix" to a report of the Ohio River Basin Energv Study (ORBES),
" Energy Production and Residential Heating:
Taxa tion., Subsidies,
and Compa rative Costs," by Duane Chapman, Kathleen Cole, and Michael Slott, Cornell Universtty, March 1980, obtainable from the Office of Research and Development, U. S. Environmental Protection l
Agency, Washington 3 D.C.
20460.
This is a comp 1tcated matter and for utmost clarity I quote frequently from the "Appendtx."
AFUDC income is the Allowance for Funds Umr0 Quring gonstruction, tha t is, before any power is pro-j duced.
The significance of AFUDC, of course, arises from its inclusion in accumulated rate base which is the basis for future rates.
By way of illustration, For a re-presentative 2.5 billion plant having a 10-year j
construction add [at an 8% period from 1978 to 1987, AFUDC Would rate] $600 million to the plante rate base and $40 million to the fuel rate base.
None i
of this is taxed as earned, and is all defined as part of net inco me.
Interest deductions.
4 Interest expense payments are generally viewed in the United States as ordinary business expenses and thereby deductible from taxable in-However, the other form of capital con-come.
2 1
tributton--stock and equity--have payments made to them subject to tax liability.
Consequently, utilletes prefer debt to new stock issues in part because a dollar of new debt reduces overall tax j
liability while a dollar of new equity does not.
1 l
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i 36 l
l WHO PAYS ?
VI.
THE SUBSIDIES WE PAY, 3.
This is a continuation of the previous page and reports Corporate income tax provisions that affect pover generation and encourage butiding power plants even beyond needed capacity.
l Investment tax credit.
The investment tax credit is a direct reduction in tax liability.
At the maximum rate, it is equal to 11 percent of quallfied investment.
Qualified investment is essentially construction cost excluding land and structures.
AFUDC is not included.
Qualified investment is thus approximately 95% of construction cost.
The maximum effective rate, then, 'is 10% of actual construction cost.
[The 1 percent of the 11 per-cent is taken up next.]
A possibiv important incentive to butiding ts provided by the last 1 % of the investment tax credit.
Put in its simplest terms, this portion of the investment tax credit uses public funds to in-crease the compensation of utility managers who choose to construct a new plant.
This interpreta-tion has not been seen as invalid by Treasury l
Depa rtment personnel with whom I have discussed this problem.
As an illustration with data utilitized in this study, the investment tax credit reduces the company's tax liability by a sum of $275 million.
LSee previous page also. ]
Of this amount $36 million is contributed to the stock ownership plan [$2.5 billion x 0.95 x 0.015 =
$36 million].
In addition, dne cost of admin-l tstering the plan is creditable against tax
[
liabiltty.
2 i
e 1
I
4 i
i I
i 37 WHO PAYS?
VII.
THE SUBSIDIES WE PAY, 4.
I continue to report from Dr. Duane Chapman's ORBES analysis, referred to above.
I i
Accelera ted depreciation.
l For net income determination as well as rate-i ma king, depreciation expense is defined by the normal straight-line basis.
Depreciation expense is simply assumed to be - spread equally over each 2
year of the plant's life, and is each year equal j
to 3-1/3% of original cost.
Accelerated depreciation literally speeds up j
depreciation for tax purposes.
By placing larger deductions in earlier years, it shelters significant i
income in those years from tax liability.
i l
The normal rate is doubled, from 3.33% to j
6.67%.
This percent is applied to the undepreciated j
basis at the beginning of each yea r, and the result is current deprecia tion for-tax parposes.
(It seems that two sets of books may be kept.
One for tax calculation by the accelerated method, and one for the " tax" charged for collection to the rate-payers.
I am told that this type of sheltering is legal.)
I Tax life.
1 The arbitrary tax lives assigned to nuclear power equipment provide an additional tax subsidy.
j The IRS permits depreciation to be based upon a 16-year period rather than the 30-year expected Ilfe.
Consequently, the double declining balance method [ accelerated deprecia tion, which "is most effective in terms of maximum tax reduction $, applied to a 16-year tax life, gives a 12. 5% deprecia tion i
expense rate.
Af ter eight of the 16 years the i
utility switches over to normal, straight-line
~ depreciation for the remaining basis.
This ensures total depreciation in 16 years.
-For a $2.5 billion plant, Federal depreciation deduction is $314 million in the first year.
Normal depreciation for rate base investment is j
$104 million.
1 i
i
=
l 38 1
WHO PAYS?
VIII.
THE SUBSIDIES WE PAY, 5.
l This completes the analysis of Dr. Duane Chapman for the ORBES study, reported earlier, on taxation and subsidies, as I excerpt it.
_Reoa ir allowance.
The IRC repair allowance has been interpreted to allow a company to elect the larger of either actual repair expenses or the IRC percentage allowance as deductAble expense.
Utilities fregaently select the' l
percentage allowance because it exceeds actual expense.
l The repair allowance rate for a nuclear power i
plant is 3%, giving an allowance of $75 million in 1988 j
for a hypothetical plant. [See V of this series.]
i Non-taxable dividends.
As effective tax management brings the utility into a position with to significant tax liability, the utility may exempt its dividend payments from income tax.ltability for the recipients of the dividends, i
Suppose a company normally has a positive and sign-ificant net income and net cash receipts:
it is in a I
position 'to make dividend payments if it elects to do Suppose it has, for tax purposes only, no taxable so.
profits.
Then, all its dividends would be tax-exempt for dividend recipients :
it is essentially a fictional capital repayment.
L l
Indiana corporate income taxation.
Indiana tax provisions differ [% rather than 45]/.
from the Federal in four ways.
First, the rate is 3 on net income.
Second, there is also e revenue tax.
l Third, no investment tax credit is a pp.tcable.
- Finally, die Indiana tax liabilities are dbductions from Federal taxable income.
L Dr. Cha pman [ Reference in VIII-2, above] points out i l
Tax policy will give the lowest after-tax cost to i
utilities and their customers if credits, exclusions, and deductions are claimed at the earliest poss ible l
dates.
As a result, no depreciation deductions will be j
available in the last years of a plant's life.
Net income and net cash flows follow from the reg-ulatory and tax policies, and are very low or negative in the last year" of a plant's life.
l The overall result is the creation of a financial incentive for premature construction of new plants and premature retirement of old plants [p. 15].
l
r 39 WHO PAYS?
IX.
THE WVPA ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE?
During the Nuclear Regulatory Hearing in the matter of PSI's proposed Fbrble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, at the Madison Jeff erson County Public Library, September 28, 1977 Dr. Gustave Linenberger, member of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board questioned Mr. Hugh A. Barker at some length.
He also questioned bk. Edwa rd P. Ma rt in General bbnager of the Wabash Valley Power Association [WVPAl,w tch had undertaken ownership of 17% of the Marble Hill station!
Transcript pp. 5978, ff.
This document is referred to as Tr-NR.
Dr. Linenberger asked whether the Wabash group would exercise survet11ance over, among other aspects, financial reports that PSI publishes [p. 6015].
Witness Fbrtin said "We will monitor the financial development of the project.
however.
. we don't ha ve.
an input into the technical dectstons for any phase of the plant." [p. 6015]
I DR. LINENBERGER:
Suppose part way through con-struction you look at the summary of expenditures to date and the projections of cost, and you say my gosh, this is not turning out the way we ex-pected at all, and I am very unhappy about this, and I am sure all the member utilities will be also; what recourse do you ha ve?
What do you do about it at tha t p61nt?.
WITNESS MARTIN:
We pay our part.
l DR. LINENBERGER:
Do you feel that you have the right to come to Mr. Barker or appropriate individuals r
in PSI and say, look, we are concerned and we would sure Itke you guys to exercise a little tighter reins on this project, or do you feel that you are in a position of having to accept whatever they l
come up with, whatever they experience in the way
}
the program goes?
l WITNESS bMRTIN:
The answer is we must accept what they ultimately come up with and experience.
DR. LINENBERGER:
Mr. Barker, do you have any dis-agreement with or amplifications on anything Mr.
Martin said here in ter.r.s of anythin being.not quite as you would have expressed it WITNESS BARKER:
No, I have no disagreement with anything Mr. Martin said. [Tr-NR, pp. 6016, 6017]
Note:
At the time of this hearing PSI clatmed that the Sta tion would cost about $1,400,000,000.
See, now, p.
32.
The cost is estimated at over $4 billion.
l l
d s
40 PADDLEWHEEL PROTESTS,
I.
THEIR COSTS.
l Many costs of a nuclear plant can not rea d tly--or perha ps at all (see pp. 44, 55, 56)--be quantified.
This is the case, I think, with the trauma, fear, mental and emotional turmoll, and f rustra tion that leads people to protest the imposition of a nuke upon them.
Paddlewheel Alliance began unofficially in April, 1977, with a Seabrook support walk up the Ohio River to Washington, D. C.
Petitions against the Marble Hill nuke were carried, along with a letter stating local citizen's intentions of stopping construction of the bbrble Hill Nuke if the officials would not inter vene and halt construction.
Since that time PWA has co-ordinated various antt-nuclear actions including a balloon release, legal demonstrations and rallies, a march and symbolic die-in at Ma dis on, Indiana, fund-raising concerts and public education projects.
Throughout, we have endeavored to function as a non-sexist, non-racist, non-partizan, non-prof te, and non-Vlolent direct action organtzation.
[From Marble l
Hill Occupation Handbook, Paddlewheel Alliance, P. O.
Tax 194, New Albany, IN 47150, October, 1978,
- p. 3.]
1978 10/06
. Aff tht.ty groups and marchers totaling some 125 persons assembled near the bbrble Hill site.
10/07 The 31 occupiers proceeded to PSI property, climbed the fence and " sat on the ground, holding hands and '
singing, including ' America the Beautiful.'
A PSI representattve asked the protesters to leave, and when they refused, officers were summoned to ramove them."
They peacefully boarded a school bus to the Jefferson county jail.
They were booked and released on a $500 bond each.
[ Madison Courier (MC) 12/28/78]
12/28MC Trial began for 29 protesters--two had appeared earlier, and been fined $49.50 each.
12/29MC. Paddlewheel was represented by Steve Richardson, l
Esq., and Da ve Colman, Esq., of Bloomington and Paul Watts, Es q. of Spencer.
Jury selection was slow.
Fifty prospective jurors were questioned yester-day.
Only 25 persons were present, the other four having agreed to abide by the jury's decision.
46
)
new prospective jurors called.
i 12/30Cl Stx jurors and one alterna te were selected yesterday.
The demonstrators have been charged with criminal i
trespassing, a misdemeanor.
l I
l 41 j
PADDLEWHEEL PROTESTS, II 1979 01/03~
Louisville Courter-Journal [CJ] 01/04/79.
S ta tements began today.
Defense claimed that-demonstrators did not criminally trespass because they acted "in response to perceived harm and danger."
l 01/05MQ Expert testimony about nuclear power was barred, yes-terday, as being irrelevant to the cha rge.
The defense argued tha t under the state's criminal code, the threat of "tmminent sertous bodily injury" constitutes duress, which is a defense against a tres pa ssing charge.
01/06MC The trial ends in a hung 'jdry.
03/10MQ Jefferson County Prosecutor decides aasinst re-tri A1.
The trial cost about $4,000.
01/112C The Fbdison Courter editortaltzes that laws covering incidents such as the occupation should be strength-ened.
02/02MG 1respassing-trial juror says she is scared of nuclear power; learned a lot from the Paddlewheelers testimony.
02/17hg Sheriff Armand would prefer no newsmen at Fbrble Hill demonstrations because of the crowd appeal of the news-media.
05/30MQ Paddlewheel alliance announces another demonstration at Marble Hill on June 4.
More people than before are expected to cross the fence.
Participants are ex-pected from Loutsville and Lexington, Kentucky, Evans ville,
Bloomington, Ma dis on, Muncle, Indianapolis, English, Lafayette, Columbus and Zionsville, Indiana.
05/31MQ PSI says it will prosecute trespassers.
Paddlewheel makes further plans for a demonstration followed by i
I rally in Madison.
06/04MQ Yesterday a group of Paddlewheelers walked from Reed's orchard where they had camped the night to the hbrble Hill s tte.
They lis tened to ta lks, then, carefully avotding a wheat-field on the hbrble Hill side, crossed the fence.
89 were arrested.
They sat in the field planted trees and sang while being processed.
Two school buses took them to Jefferson County Jatl.
Arratgned in Jefferson County Court today the County prosecutor filed charges aga ast only one, Gardner Weber, who allegedly resisted arrest.
The prosecutor has one year in which to bring more charges.
He was concerned at converting the court into a propaganda l
forum by the Paddlewheelers.
They joined some 300 to 400 l
in an anti-nuclear rally on the hbdtson riverfront.
06/05MQ bbdison Courier editorializes on trespassers, commends l
Sherif f and his officers, speaks well of rally, a pproves i
of Prosecutor not filing charges thus sa ving expense to taxpayers and cucting off desired pubiletty from demonstrators.
.~
y' 1
PADDLEWHEEL PROTESTS, III 06/05MC One Paddlewheeler sent to jail for criminal contempt of Court.
PSI files 6,000-page safety analysts report and appites for an operating license for the plant. (See
- p. f/ f.)
l 08/02Cl Pre-trial hearing for Gardner Weber cancelled.
08/16MC Council for Gardner Weber yesterday itsts 100 witnesses that could be called at August 23 trial.
List includes Nader, Spock, Hugh Ba rker _(PSI), Jan Stra sna (NRC).
08/22CJ Court to decide today tf nuclear power can be debated in Gardner Weber trial.
08/23MC Jefferson County Court Judge dentes motion to suppress nuclear issue.
Jefferson County Prosecutor dismisses charge against l
Gardner Weber, refusing "to put nuclea r power on trial. "
Paddlewheel Alliance announces public meeting August 26 in bbdtson, Ind. with notable speakers, and followed by a candlelight procession to the Courthouse, and a period of medttation.
l 08/24Cl Paddlewheel alliance says more demonstrations are planned.
08/27MC l'out 65 people attended Paddlewheel rally in Madison last night.
After speeches Paddlewheel members walked i
to the Courthouse, each holdtng a candle.
11/02hc Paddlewheel Alliance a t a press conference announced no endorsement of either can.tdate for Kentucky State r
l go vernor.
l 11/09MC Paddlewheel announces a rally in Indianapolis, Sunday, November 11.
1980 03/16 Paddlewheel Alliance Newsletter.
A few Paddlewheelers l
picketed PSI offices in New Albany, Madison and Bloomington.
The event was well received by the passing pubile and achieved WLKY-TV coverage.
On May 28, 50 members of the Loutsville area sa fe I
energy and peace groups as well as interested in-dividuals met in an anti-nuke, anti-Fb rble Hill strategy session.
On Friday, June 13, it is planned to mall broken concrete to PSI and NRC with d3e message "NO INDEPENDENT INSPECTION, NO FMRBLE HILL, NO FBI REPORT, NO MARBLE HILL. "
A rally is planned on the Louisvt11e Belvedere for Saturday, August 2.
08/09 In commemoration of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and to protest renewed construction by PSI and in support of Survival Summer. Paddlewheel l
Alliance plans a rally, with Canvasstng, Theater Protest in Fbdison, Indiana for August 9.
(
l
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i 43 CHANCES AND COST OF ACCIDENTS Twenty-three years ago (1957) the Atomic Energy Commission tried to guess the dangers present in a nuclear power plant.
They concludeo that a serious accident could cause 3400 deaths, 43,000 injurtes and $7 billion in property damage.
This estimate was not given to the public.
In 1972 a "more comprehenstve" study was undertaken, which tssued a s the "Ra smussen Report. "
In tha t report the experts worked with inadequate data and impromptu methods.
They cal-t cula ted tha t the probability of a serious accident is small.
1 This conclusion has been widely criticized.
A new report has been published by NRC.
This one finds serious fault with the Rasmussen Report, and questions the i
validity of its use in licensing power plants.
LRisk Assessment Review Group Report to the U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, H. W. Lewis, Chstrman of the Group.
September, 1978, NUREG/CR-0400.]
"The consequence model used in WASH-1400 [The Rasmussen Report]
should be substa tially imp' roved, and Lts sensitivities explored, before it is used in the regulatory process. "
[p. xt]
(It had been treated like holy writ during the safety hearings for 1
bbrble Hill. )
The new Risk Assessment Review Group Report, while it ha s a pat on the back for the Rasmussen effort, finds its results un-reliable in important ways:
1.
Its " executive summary," which is all most people could read and understand, the Report says, "does not adequately indicate the full extent and the consequences of reactor acct-dents: and does not sufflctently empnasize the uncertainties l
involved in the calculation of their probability.
It has therefore lent itself to misuse in the discussion of reactor risk." [p. ix]
1 2.
The error bounds of accident probabilities are greatly
]
understated.
3.
The Reviewers were unconvinced of the correctness of the 4
Rasmussen conclusion that fires, earthquakes, and human failures 7MI!)
would contribute negligibly to overall risk.
4.
Its statistical analysis " lea ves much to be desired" and ts poorly presented.
i 5.
The Reviewers say that "There have been instances in which WASH-1400 has been misused as a vehicle to judge the acceptabiltty of reactor risks.
In other cases it may have been used pre-maturely as an estimate of the absolute risk of reactor accidents without full realization of the wide band of uncertainties invo lved.
Such use should be discouraged. "
[p. x]
i
}
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l 44 COSTS OF REGULATORY HEARINGS, I.
One of the nearly unquantifiable costs of Marble Hill is that of the so-called pubile hearings:
of the frustrating, deceptive and degrading effects of these hearings.
i STV was the only public intervenor that survived the bbrble Hill hearings in bbdison (see pp. 44-46).
Some 33 persons were allowed 5 minutes each to make " limited appearance statements"
[Tr.
- p. 785 begins these statements, March 8, 1977].
Twenty-five persons opposed and eight favored the bhrble Hill project.
~
One of the speakers asked "Who is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regula ting?
Is there in fact and in current p[ra ctice an actual separation between regulation and promotion?"
Tr.
p.
891J The general feeling was well epitomized by Charles D.
Ka pla n, Esq., who appeared on behalf of dae City of Louisville, Ky.
In his opening statement he said:
Somehow, I'm reminded of an anecdote an old history professor of mine at Washington and Lee told regarding the invasion of Ethiopia by the Italian Air Force.
And I can very vividly recall the images of the Ethiopian native tribesmen trying to shoot down the Italian Air Force with their spears.
I feel somewha t a kinship, today, along with, I'm sure, most of the folks that spoke this morning, with those Ethiopian tribesmen in trying to deal with this maze of federal bureaucracy, with these hearings, and the arsenal that the Public Service Indiana has at their disposal in their attempts to obtain this Itcense.
[Tr.
- p. 920]
NRC Staff held a pre-hearing conference with lawyers for local government bodies, but omitted STV.
Thus we had no real knowledge of what was expected of us, while Staff and PSI legal counsel had the great advantage of experience.
We were continually given the impression that what we had to say was irrelevant.
This impression arose because the proceedings flowed along Ilke a well-rehearsed ballet between Staff and PSI lawyers, with the Board acting as deus ex machina.
Bowing and scraping, and mock contention between them was obvious.
The carefully prepared evidence we gave was ignored, or stonewalled.
We sa id, for example, that all the evidence indicated that there was no need for Marble Hill, that PSI's estimate of growth rate in energy demand of around 7 to 8% was exaggerated, and tha t even the Staff's mild disagreement in suggesting that 6% was more Itkely, was wrong.
We gave evidence that vn"'d lower the forecast close to 4% or less but all the oppos'
_un experts dismissed us.
We have, however, been proven currect, or even a bit high, by subsequent e vent s.
So with some other contentions.
i, 45 COSTS OF HEARINGS, II At the time of the bbrble Hill hearings Save The Valley people were quite unprepared except for Mrs. Fbrie Horine, who was the moving force in Save Marble Hill.
(This new group was later consolidated with Sa ve The Valley. )
She had found the time, some-how, to work her way through the huge PSI environmental statement.
She it was who essentially authored all of 60r " contentions," though her knowledge of nuclear matters was self-taught.
Devotion to her family drove her.
In the case of Fbrble Hill the hearing was a farce, and the construction--the concrete pouring (pages 4-8)--is a tragedy.
Lest our strictures on PSI /NRC seem to a naive reader unduly severe (I feel restrained from making them adequately strict) I turn to a study by Steven L. Del Sesto, Science, Politics, and Controversy:
Civilian Nuclear Power in the United ' States, 1946-1974, 1979, West-view Press, Boulder, Colorado.
Del Sesto writes only(his doctoral of the Atomic Energy Commission [AEC] since he cut off his studies
-dissertation, 1976-78) a t 1974.
However, the NRC has carried on in this area indistinguishably from the AEC.
In his first chapter Del Sesto remarks of the regulatory pro-cess:
The process not only lef t citizens with bitter ex-periences, but suggested an inherent weakness in the regulatory process which a peared preoccup. n with promotto6a1 efforts. [p. 4 Writing of the criticism of the AEC which followed the rapid commercialization of nuclear power and the strain this produced in the regulatory program, together with.public concern about safety, Del Sesto remarks :
These concerns were confirmed by citizens and pubile groups' experiences in the public hea rings.
It was here that public groups first realized the incredible strength of the nuclear power estabitshment and their own rglattve impotence.
But more than tha t, the incredibly ritualistic treatment of public groups via the public hea ring seemed to alienate them from both government and big business interests involved with nuclear power develop-ment.
[p. 110]
Del Sesto [p. 12] quotes John von Neumann, a renouned mathe-matical physicst.
In the 1946 McFbhon sena te hearing on atomic energy he said "It is only now that science as such and for its own sake has to be regula ted, that science has outgrown the age of its independence from society."
Technology is not independent.
This is why engineers are licensed (or should be).
L
,s 46 COST OF HEARINGS, III.
THE CRUX OF THE FSTTER There have to be regulations, and there should be public hea rings.
But the present practice is irrational, L11ogical, and promotional rather than regulatory.
It became apparent during the Marble Hill hearings that the real purpose of that expensive, tiae-consuming, and-humanly debasing and false effort was to provide a leeal basts in case of appeals to show that the law had been comdied with..
Yet Sa ve the Valley had to hang ' n there.
If we had with-drawn there would have been no-one to suaect to high-handed pro-cedures, to try to make NRC toe the legal ILne, as in the illegal jumping of the gun by PSI in the bbrble Hill road construction.
(Our counsel Thomas M. Dattilo, Esq., made heroic efforts. )
We had to stay in to try to counter the NRC/ PSI apparent ballet.
How can the abuses be corrected?
l Af ter a uttlity has spent money on a project (PSI is reputed i
to have spent about $1 billion already, and the plant ts less than 25% complete).
It takes a State Public Scrdce Commission, or other agency an unusual amount of character and guts to say " Halt. "
But it has been done directly in coal cases, indirectly in nuclear.
Environmental Action Foundation's Richard Morgan, warns us a gainst rate increases, particularly CWIP, a proposal to put costs of sonstruction work in progress into the rate base before--some-times for years before--the plant produces.
He says nuclear pro-jects were cancelled by Consumers, Detrott EdB on and -Florida Power & LLght followin the power commissions.g unfavorable action on rate increases by The tssue must be joined before money in any significant amount is spent because once it ts spent then a certain momentum is on the i
side of the uttltty.
This could be the beginning of a Lockheed or Chrysler syndrome.
The consumer then ts forced to pay the bill.
(The Iowa Commerce Commission was given full stting and certification, gowers to be exercised before the fact, by the Iowa Leglsla ture ca, 1976]).
I When the Fbrble Hill Hearing was held, PSI had already committed itself to purchases from Westinghouse (see p. 47), ha d prepared an expenstve set of documents and had appiled for a license (see p. 47).
All this was done behind closed doors, as far as STV was concerned.
Then when Staff came to the hearing it was with minds already set.
Staf f counsel said [Tr., pp. 935-6] "... the Staff has not come to the hearing a s a neutral party writing an a clean sla te.
Is it any wonder, then, that we found the hearing "degradinc from an echtcal point of view, and farcical if constdered as an opportunity for meaningful pubite input"?
[ White Paper IX, 1978]
47 CHRONOLOGY OF FBRBLE HILL CAPER - 1 Note:
Dates a re important.
Iney help to realize if anyone has been playing changin6 tunes.
Save The Valley has been highly consistent.
The following chronology comes from PSI sources, newspapers, and our own observations.
For extended information on certain items see the pages on " Structural Deficienctes," below.
The dates given below are mostly taken from newspapers and may be off by a day or so with respect to actual dates of actions described.
1971 04/17 Plans for an electrical genera tton fact 1 tty in south-eastern Indiana announced.
11/13 Announcement of selection of Jefferson County stte.
11/--
Na me ">brble Hill Nuclea r Power Sta tion" chosen.
1974 08/05 Cont ra c t for nuclear part of plant to Westinghouse.
1975 07/02 PSI Files with NRC for permission to butid.
10/08 Notice of hearing published:
40 Federal Register 47219 (1973).
1976 01/27 Special pre-hearing conference.
03/05 NRC tssues draft environmental sta tement.
03/12 Save The Valley sta tes intention to intervene.
10/21 Special prehearing conference.
STV not informed.
11/02 Atomte Safety and Licensing Board admits STV and Save bbrble Hill, consolidated as STV, as intervenors.
11/22 NRC issues final environmental sta tement.
12/02 Final prehearing conference.
1977 02/07 Amended not tce of hea ring :
the co-owners of Fbrble Hill are de facto co-appitcants.
03/04 Wabash Valley Power Associatton (some 23 co-ops) to own 17% of Phrble Hill project.
NIPSCO to purcha se some output.
03/08-11; 15-18; 22-25; 04/18-27, 05/2-3.
Eventiary hearings i - ebdison.
08/24 NRC grants PSI limited work authoriza tion.
08/27-30 Pubite hearing _tn bbdison on health and safety aspects 1
of bbrble Hill L SH ].
l 12/13 NRC grants PSI second limited work authortzation.
1978 04/04 NRC grants full construction permit for >H.
1
I 48 CHRONOLOGY 0F FMRBLE HILL CAPER - 2 l
1979 04/03 PSI to revtew FH design in light of TMI accident.
l 04/08 Mr. Charles E. Cutshall gives aff tdavit to Mr. Robert Gray and Mr. Thomas Dattilo, blowing. whtsite on shoddy work a t FE.
04/13 Cutshall quits at FH.
04/19 Trtmble County, Kentucky, fiscal court adopts unamtnous resolution of objection to construction and operatton l
of bH requests "tha t same cease and desist. "
06/12 Cutshall charges made pubi te by STV.
06/13 NRC says it knew of some flaws and had ordered PSI to pa tch them.
06/12-14 Na tional Board of Boller and Pressure Vessel Inspectors representatives inspect MH.
l 06/19 PSI's Barker says construction problems routine, and none poses safety threat.
06/21 Government inspecdon ra tses questions about methods used to check welds and seams in liner plates designed to contain radioacttve materials.
06/22 Two federal inspectnrs begLn probe of FH.
06/26 James Keppler of NRC Chtcago Office arrives to inspect.
l PSI announces, at commission's request, halt in pouring.
06/27 PSI renews request for full-ttme federal inspector.
06/28 Rep. Deckard says he might request congressional. in-ves tiga tion.
06/29 A legislative committee of Indiana Senate agrees to study safety a t FH.
Rep. Toby Fbffett says subcommittee of the House of Representatives will consider holding heartngs on construction problems a t FH.
07/7-8 Cor.ntsr ton allows concrete construction to resume.
Dattilo and Gray announce three more affidavita that support Cutshall.
07/10 NRC says Lt will send two inspectors to FH tc in-vesttgate charges of cover-up.
Cutshall identtf tes more flaws a t bH.
07/11 PSI's Barker returns to bbdtson to say that PSI con-siders the concrete problems serious, but they pose no threat to safety.
Will do patching correctly.
07/12 Representative Deckard says House subcommittee in-vestigation has begun.
Senator Ford threatens Senate heartngs.
l 07/12 Francis Durocher, Newberg Construction Co. vice
. president says Cutshall was planted by STV.
sty's l
reply:
" Ridiculous."
Durocher says he's going to l
put ads in the paper to straighten out Newberg's t
posttion.
07/13 U. S. House subcommittee agrens to investigate con-struction trregularttles at FH.
l
i 49 1
^
CHRONOLOGY OF MARBLE HILL CPAER - 3 i
1979 (continued) 07/18._ U. S. Senate legislates penalties aga tast failure to comply with safety regulations in construction and mainta ining a nuke.
j 07/19 Senate rejects six-month moratorium on issuance of construction permits for new nuclear plants.
07/19 U. S. Army Corps of Engineers is asked to analyze strength of concrete.
07/20 NRC requests stoppage of concrete work at FH.
i 07/21 Rep. Deckard discusses shoddy work with 35-40 con-struction workers.
07/22
">brble Hill Damage Wa sn't Reported to NRC For 3 months" Indianapolis Star.
07/23 Jan Strasma of NRC credits Cutshall with revealing ex-tent of problems a t Marble Hill.
07/23 STV places primary blame for safety defects on PSI, secondary on NRC.
07/23 Newberg spokesman dentes delaying damage report.
07/24 Crew from Army Corps of Engineers arrives to review concrete testing results paper work.
07/25 Inspectors of National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors recommend to ASFE that PSI lose certificate of authorization unless problems resolved.
07/25 Newberg Construction Co. inspectors from 13 to 18.
07/26 NRC says it will donduct special inspection of PSI's procedures a t MR.
07/27 NRC asks Justice Department to investigate charges of i
co ver-u p.
~
07/27 Indiana Governor 6 tis R. Bowen says he continues to support nuclea r power, despite problems at FH "because there are no better alterna tives. "
i 07/31 Before State legislative committee 27 witnesses say MH dangerous to safety and health of area.
08/03 U. S. Senate subcommittee asks NRC for documentation relating to criminal allegations at FH.
a 08/07 NRC says PSI must bear much of blame for construction problems at FM.
Construction in safety-related areas halted by order i
or NRC.
08/10 Glenn Rutherford of Louisville Courier-Journal says at i
a debate in Scottsburg, Jack Simmons, PSI spokesman, alluded to Khruschev threat of " destruction from within" and said to "take a look within the ranks of nuclear-power cpponents to see an ulterior motive. "
08/15 NRC confirms work stoppage order at FH.
08/16 STV asks for a public hearing on FH.
08/16 NRC lists 16 problems a t FE.
08/21 Former FE worker says he was told tc alter test results on concrete strength in a structure critical to safety.
He refused, but discovered later at least one fdlure had been changed to meet NRC standards.
i m
,7
, _ - ~,,.,,.,.,.,,,, -
~-
s 50 CHRONOLOGY OF MARBLE HILL CAPER - 4 i
f 1979 (continued) a 08/22 Laboratory and testing capabilitles of U. S. Testing Co. at MH approved "in general" by Corps of Engineers.
08/23 NRC defers resuming Itcensing of new nuclear plants.
l 08/28 Indtana Rep. Mtchael Kendall asks Governor Otts Bowen to appoint committee to study mtsmanagement a t FH.
08/29 U. S. Justice Department orders U. S. attorney and FBI in Indtanapolis to investiga te construction practices at bH.
~
08/30 U. S. Attorney Virginia McCarty meets with government i
agents to discuss bH.
09/01 NRC says PSI must shoulder blame for construction problems at MR.
09/12 Committee of American Society of Mechanical Engineers j
[ASME] will send inspection team to MH.
~
09/14 Nuclear Certification Committee of ASME has no immediate plans to revoke PSI's certificate to build MB.
09/15 Hugh Barker, PSI president, says lack of nuclear power plant expertence cause of construction problems at FH.
09/20 Hugh Barker defends FH plant at party for Southern Indiana news media personnel in Columbus.
10/10 NRC releases five reports harshly criticizing manage-ment practices of PSI.
i 10/31 PSI hopes to resume work in January.
11/10 A future PSC will decide who pays costs of construction i
delays a t FH.
11/23 Kentucky officials must plan to protect ettizens from neighbors' nukes.
{
11/27-28 Hearings scheduled by House subcoma.ittee on con-i struction problems at bH.
11/27 STV members not allowed to appear at MH hearing.
11/26 Charles E. Cutshall at congressional subcommittee hear-ing says he " opened up a can of worms that turned into 1
l rattlesnakes" when he blew whistle on construction problems at FH, but he's not sorry.
12/08 Sen. Mtchael Kendall says " PSI has engaged in a con,-
i spiracy to get work done at Marble HL11 before they got the work permit."
12/12 Indiana 's Governor Bouen continues to support bH.
j 12/14 bbrble Hill could have difficulty becoming operative due to state or county action via evacuation ' plan i
fa ilures.
12/24 W bash Valley Power Association officials have no a
regret about investment in costly MR.
12/29 Indiana officlas plan for evacuation drill in bbdison area.
1980 t
j 01/17 PSI expects to resume safety-related work a t FH in bb rch.
1 i
-<-.m v,
,w
,-v,7_--,
p rw
l[
..n j
51 CHRONOLOGY OF MARBLE HILL CAPER - 5 19.80 (continued) 01/18 Reps. Toby bbffect and Lee Hamilton request commissioners of NRC to - decide when ' work may resume--not NRC Staff.
01/21 PSC plans to offer 500,000 shares of new $100-par pre-ferred stock to help repay short-term debt and to finance construction.
01/22 Trimble County, Kentucky, citizens support fiscal court resolutton of last April opposing FE.
01/23 Routine inspection last November uncovered 19 alleged violations of federal rules at FH.
02/06 In a departure from norm federal NRC Commission will decide >H resumption.
02/08 Marble Hill evacuation plan calls for 15-minute warning a f ter accident, 10 mile radius evacuated to 100 miles, special siren in each home in 10 mile rad.tus, with mock evacua tion exercise in bby or June, says Civil Defense spokesman Gerald Glaze.
02/12 State Senate defeats three amendments affecting PSI and FH.
02/14 Indiana House bars future nukes unless provisions for disposal of atomic waste made.
02/16 Oldham County, Kentucky, backs call for plan to cope with emergency as at >H, but has neither money nor expertise to draw up such plans.
02/20 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., has downgraded PSI common stock from " buy / hold" to " hold" says it's not as c
attractive a s it ha s been.
Montions Indiana Pubite l
Service Commtssion's "well-known ' responsiveness' to utilities' needs in rate cases."
l 03/05 PSI submits taquest to NRC's Stello to be allowed to i
I resume sa fety-related inspections on ma tertals already received on site.
03/11 NRC will hold public meeting in Madison on >H.
03/11 NRC meeting da te postponed at Mr. Da ttilo 's request.
03/14 EPA rejects Sassafras Audubon and Knob and Valley Audubon request for hearing on bH.
Should apply later if they wish, on restart of work.
03/25 Meeting in Madison, Indtana m >H nuke.
03/26 500 attand NRC meeting on >H.
04/02 Southern Indiana Health Systems Agency board urge State and Federal plan for emergencies at FH.
Urge monitor-ing background radiation.
04/23 U. S. District Court of Appeals, basing on Supreme Court decision that Kentucky territory extends to low water mark of Ohio River as di 1772, upholds construction permit for Marble Ht11.
~~
j 05/02 NRC Staff urge Commission to allow some work to begin j
atbH.
Commission will hire independent engineer to i
inspect present MH.
l 05/03 Da rrell V. Menscer named president of PSI.
Hugh A.
Barker made chairman of the Board.
Menscer "has no l
expertence in construction management."
I i
s l
)
I
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52 CHRONOLOGY OF F9RBLE HILL CAPER - 6 1980 (continued) 05/15 In event of accident all Jefferson County residents i
within 15 miles of MH could be evacuated within 2 to 2
hours say officials.
06/12 Background radiation tests set at FH.
07/10 NRC spokesman says a federal grand jury will probe MH--the first time such a panel has ever investigated construction practices at a nuclear plant.
07/17 PSI revises cost estimates from $1.9 billion to $3.4 billion.
Unit 1 is about 28% complete and unit 2 about 11%.
Forecast winter peak load growth trtmmed from 6% to 4.4% per year.
07/24 NRC demands emergency plans 'for nukes; "An operating Itcense will not be issued unless a favorable NRC overall finding can be made. "
08/23 PSI plans rate increa se tha t is not related to con-1 struction delays at NH.
09/06 PSI 'vice president Seth W. Shields says 80% of Marble Hill parts now are stored on site.
The plant itself is about 16% complete.
Unit 1 ts about 20% complete 4
l and Unit 2 about 9%.
i 09/18 Two contractors at FH, Stewart Mechanical Contractors and LaBarge Products stripped of ASME "N"
- stamp, i
11/01 FH plant holds open house for 1,300 visitors.
11/08 Federal Grand Jury finishes MH probe without indict-i i
ments.
" PSI would Itke to say they are totally clea red. "
STV attorney T. Dattilo said "But they obviously do not understand, criminal law. "
He said grand jury's action does not change validtty of some 3
j allegations by former workers.
]
11/18 NRC allows Cherne Construction Co; and Commonwealth 1
-Lord' Joint Venture to resume recetving and inspect-j ing safety-related materials at FH site.
12/03 STV predicts 90% rate hike by PSI due to FH.
02/04 Gen. Billie G. Wellman, Adjutant of Kentucky says PSI has a moral obilgation to the people of Trimble County, Ky., for their safety and welfare.
12/09 PSI asks the Pubite Service Commisston for $119.6 million rate increase which represents 23% increase i
in revenue.
j 12/09 PSI says earnings decline from $3.79 per share common stock for 1979 to $3.34 for 12 months ending October 31, 1980.
12/10 Safety-rela ted work--about half the construction ha s 3
been halted at FH since August 7,1979.
At instance of STV, NRC hires two independent engineers to study the questionable concrete work.
12/27 PSI says no BH costs included in rate hike request.
1181 01/22 Indiana Pubite Service Commission orders Indiana &
Mtchigan Electric Co. to rebate $9.3 million to customers served 01/01/77 to 09/30/76.
Considered a drama tic precedent.
D a.
53 CHRON0 LOG'l OF RARBLE HILL CAPER - 7 1981 (continued) 01/24 Bill filed in Indiana House to prohibit construction of nuke without federally a pproved waste-dumping plan.
01/24 PSI blames rising costs for request to raise rates.
01/24 PSI files rate informat ton ba'cking rate request.
Cancels planned units 3 and 4 at FH.
o 54 WAR ON PROGRESS?
There appears to be an attempt a-butiding to convince eople that the great things done in this Country in the past p(when we had huge spaces, small population) were due to the unregulated state of free enterprise, and that now (when we have huge population, crowded cities) we shculd " return" to the "old principles" through which progress "was" achieved.
Let me state several principles that seem (to me, at least) reasonable and not overly simplistic in this extraordinartly complex present time.
1.
It ts not possible to " return."
Retrogression is possible, but it would mean deterioration.
2.
. Healthful growth is necessarily rugulated.
Un-regulated growth ts cancerous growth, and usually fa ta l.
3.
The early state of our Country's growth was not un-regulated: the regulation was not so much by vistble constraint as by respect for reltstous principles, combined with recognized common law, as well as social pressures.
4.
In today's highly seculartzed world (not necessarily bad) infiltrated by bbrxist false doctrine (on the whole bad) and largely culturally illiterate (a tremendous loss of heritage) we may rely on overt restraint and regulation to make crowded existence possible.
S.
There is a fundamental law of Nature and of Fbn which cannot be disobeyed with impunity.
It says that growth and maintenance inevitably require effort.
This is the way the World ts constructed.
There is no such thing as permanent sta tus quo.
Elther there is maintenance which involves healthful change and growth, or there is retrogression and decay.
Resting on the oars abandons one te drtf t.
6.
"The American Dream" is an abstraction trom Untted States of America 's reality.
Thts reality is based on principles set forth in our Constitution.
If we really believe in these principles, then each of us would have within himself the constraints, the regula tion, which would continue the grea tness, the power, and the example of principle-in-action, of the best of this Country.
o 4
55 l
COST - ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS, 1.
l Ethics is, in part, the theory of morals.
Moral stance may be inferred from actual behavior.
It seemed to us, f rom the be-havior of NRC and the utility, that in the dbrble Hill hearings many ethical principles were violated.
Extraordinary irony characterized the whole " hearing" process:
the Company, with huge financial support paid for by us through rates and taxes was in the largest part supported by the NRC Staff, also paid by us through taxes, to oppose the intervenors (ourselves) who had no tinancial support except what we could raise.
In addition, the Company and NRC are staffed by people work-j ing full time at promoting nuclear energy.
The intervenors are mostly people with full-time jobs, working for a living, Their i
efforts in opposing the Company, and trying to provide for health and good quality of life for themselves and thbir progeny, must i
be taken on in addigion to their regular jobs.
During the hevrings the onward-rolling parade of experts--
paid for by the public who are the victims--is impressive.
Or, it would be were not mar.y aspects of truth over-ridden in the name of sacrosanct ' generic' often out-of-date rules, or merely omitted never to enter discussion.
The name of the game, it seems, is to win legally and get the plant Itcensed.
Reason and Justice have a tough time in this atmosphere.
One reason that Justice has a hard time is especially a pparent in the strenuous attempts made by the lawyers opposing the intervenors to narrow down contentions if possible to such con-stricted statements that they can be answered in Yes/No terms.
In a hearing on environmental questions such narrow contentions are only obtained by distorting the facts.
To arrive at t ruth and justice in an environmental situation requires the evaluation of many impinging variables, each of which intimately affects the o th ers,
To rip one or two out and make them narrow enough--as claimed--to be "adjudicable," is usually to destroy the ecologic a pproa ch.
If the contentions are narrowed sufficiently then important considerations of justice and ethical behavior are automatically excluded.
This is because these considerations--inconventent for an approach which is designed to win, irres pect ive--a re h igh ly dependent on the context.
i l
Khen we tried to bring together several related issues that l
a ffected each other, for it was impossible to stick to "the truth,
)
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" and at the same time ignore all except one of the variables under discussion, our testimony was called " messy" [ Transcript of the hearings, p.
1759].
Perhaps, it occurred to us, in the cath. "Whole truth," should be omitted.
l L:
.i
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56 *** '
COST - ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS (continued), II If, as was repeatedly said, these were environmental hearings, then one would rationally expect them to be holistic and future-oriented.
Neither of these ethical requirements was adequately met.
It. seems to me tna t we are back to 1776, when absentee owners tried to control and profit from the people whose quality of life they were injuring.
An important ethical principle is violated when construction of a plant is beguns first because the scales of justice may be tilted by that act toward continuing die constnaction, and, secondly because once action is taken otherwise available options for changing plans may be foreclosed.
A s comment rela tive to the first point was made by Justice Douglas in another case:
Plainly these are not findings that the 'sa fety' standards have been met.
They presuppose--contrary to the premises of the Act--that safety findings ~ can b.e made after construction ja finished.
But when that 3
point is reached, when millions have been invested, the momentum is on the side of the appilcant, not on the side of the public.
The momentum is not only generated by the desire to salvage an investment.
No agency wants to be the architect of a ' white elephant.'
Congress could design an act that would give a completed structure that momentum.
But it is clear to me that it did not do so.
[Two (2) Treatise on Environmental Law, 1976 Edition, Radiation, Section 6.02, page 6-34. ]
The utility had violated regulations by illegally construct-ing, or having constructed, a portion of the Bower-Marr '.e Hill Road before being glyen permission.
NRC compounded that ethical failure by saying that since the violation had occurred, the matter wa s ' moot :
"In this case, that whole point is moot because the road has already been built.
[Tra nscript, p. 951]
No wonder that STV's Counsel said that the whole treatment by Staff and Board, including denlais of-his motions [cf. transcript,
- p. 949ff]
"may encourage the Appilcant [ PSI] to disobey the law."
NRC further compounded their ethical failure by holding secret meetin6s with the utility and administering a slap-on-the-wrist fine for the road-construction violation af ter ha ving explicitly promised [ transcript,
- p. 940] that the matter would be alred and all parties be kept fully informed.
My opinion, af ter unde (oing this hearing process on the hbrble Hill issue, is that it was degrading, from an ethical point of view, and farcical if considered as an opportunity for mean-ingful pubile input.
The~ final decision had been made in principle, and not subject to change, even before the " hearings" began.
O 57 IN RETROSPECT Public memory is notoriously short.
Over the long period necessary to dig out records, make tests and hear experts, memory of the shocks when we discovered PSI's gross mismanagement and unconcern for public =~facy (pp. 4-17) tend to fade somewhat.
The shoddy worksmanship apparently tolerated by PSI manage-ment's inattention to ASME Codes and NRC rules must not be forgotten.
The arrogance of PSI's failure to follow prescribed corrective safety measures, as shown when four months af ter the first ASME visit PSI was found not to have implemented " comprehensive and responsible corrective action" ( p.
19, 20) is diagnostic, it seems to me, of the whole opera tion.
I have recapitulated and interpreted the sorry tale of the co s t s -moneta ry, social, mental and emotional and ethical--of this extravagant adventure called "bbrble Hill. "
The foregoing pages may recall the shock of discovery that the containment building would be porus to radiation.
The structure, supposedly built to strict specifications for safety, was allowed to have pieces of wood and other construction debris embedded in walls and joints (p. 18).
Concrete was permitted to be poured into forms that contained standing water (p. 18).
Pouring wa s done in the rain (p.6 ).
Yet this building was to be the last bastion, in case of serious accident, between deadly radiation and thousands of deaths in a countryside of 100 square miles, rendered uninhabitable (p. 43).
The whole stupid business has us paying exorbitantly for con-struction of an unneeded plant of the most expensive kind AND paying l
to make plans to run for our lives from it in case of accident.
And I
accident-prone is, one must believe, what a plant will most likely be when one surveys the history of its shoddy workmanship (pp.
4-8, 18-20) aui infers the corporate unconcern for -the pubite which seems to show forth, i
Further, evidence continues to accumula te (pp, 21-25) that if the plant were to be built and if it were put into opera tion, the workers in it and the people at any time downwind of it would in-evitab1v, even discounting the unplanned radia tion releases, be a t serious hazard of leukemia and other cancers.
A bushel of loud words can not hide the certainty of indiscriminate killing.
It would seem to me that PSI would be wise to cut their losses before they pour $4 billion into the project on top of what has
- now, been thrown away in the shoddy work.
A good case could then be made for management with the guts (and humility as "public servants") to admit a mistake--possibly made at first in all good faith, but check-ma ted by circumstance.
This might prevent corporate financial melt-down.
In any event, the plant could be moth-balled for two or three years in its present state.
A final decision would then await more knowledge of real energy needs.