ML20030B501
| ML20030B501 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 08/13/1981 |
| From: | Bayne J POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-3.D.3.4, TASK-TM JPN-81-60, NUDOCS 8108180213 | |
| Download: ML20030B501 (45) | |
Text
POWER AUTHOstlTY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 10 CoLUMaus CIRCLE NEW YORK. N. Y.1o019 12123 397 6200 GEORGE 7 BERRY opsnatina oprican TRUSTEES J3HN W. *lOSTON JOHN S.DYSON PmE IDEN ROCdDupES
- P'"'0""""CE GEORGE L INGALLS wic s cwasnuan JOSEPH R. SCHMIEDER at DE a cMIEF RICr4 A RD M. F LY N N ROBERT 4 MILLON!l LEROY W. El LA JPN-81-60
- ',%'A""'"'
rRE DERic =
R. CL A"*
THOM AS R FREY Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
""' Un'u* ' "', *.'."u' "'
U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission m
DJ Washington, D. C.
20555 t-ph Attention:
Mr. Thomas A.
Ippolito, Chief S
Operating Reactors Branch No. 2
%/ j Division of Licensing N GJ p
,.gj
Subject:
James A.
citzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-333 9
42 Response to NUREG-0737
/
Item III.D.3.4 Cu
/
N Control Room Habitability Requirements
Reference:
Letter JPN-81-5 from J. P.
Bayne (PASNY) to T.
A.
Ippolito (NRC), dated January 8, 1981
Dear Sir:
Enclosed is the Authority's response to NUREG-0737 Item III.D.3.4, " Control Room Habitability Requirements" for the James A.
FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
It con-tains the information requested by the NRC and an evaluation of the current design for compliance to the criteria identified in the NUREG.
As a result of this evaluation, the following measures will be implemented:
1.
SRP 6.4 states that a single failure of an active component should not result in loss of the system's function &l performance.
The only instance where the FitzPatrick design does not meet this is MOD 113 which does not have a redundant damper (see Figure 1 of the Enclosure).
A redundant damper in parallel to MOD 113 will be provided.
It will be powered from a safety related power supply.
2.
An acceptance test will be performed to demonstrate pressurization of the control room to + 0.125" W.G.
as required by SRP 6.4.
lp40
/'I 8108180213 810813 Il
'O PDR ADOCK 05000333 P
l l 3.
Periodic verification tests will be performed every eighteen (18) months to ascertain that the makeup air capacity is + 10% of the design value.
The plant Technical Specifications will be changed accordingly.
4.
SRP 6.4 states that self contained breathing apparatus and six hour air supplies should be on hand in the control room for at least five men.
Additionally, the NRC has stated that one extra unit should be maintained for every 3 units on hand in order to satisfy the single i
failure criteria.
Although not required to mitigate the j
effects of a toxic gas release, the Authority will pro-vide additional operator protection.
Five additional self-contained breathing units will be provided for the control room.
Three large air cylinders and three face masks will be added to increase the manifolded air supply to provide sufficient air to supply five men for six hours.
l We estimate that item 1 can be completed by January 1, 1983 subject to equipment availability.
Items 2 through 4 will be implemented by January 1, 1982.
Very truly yours, Jk ya nior Vice President
' Nuclear Generation cc:
J.
Linville Resident Inspector P.
O.
Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 1
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POWER AUTHORITY OF THE ST TE OF NEW YORK JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT f
CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY EVALUATION f
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TABLE OF CO!1 TENTS PAGE 1.
Control Ro m Ventilation System Operation in 1
the Isolation Mode 2.
Control Room Characteristics 7
a.
Air Volume 7
b.
Emergency Zone 8-I c.
Ventilation System Flows and Schematic 9
1 j
d.
Infiltration Leakage Rate 12 l
l e.
HEPA and Charcoal Filter Efficiencies 16 l
l f.
Containment and Air Intake Separation
}7 i
j g.
Layout and Radiation Protection 19 i
(
h.
Automatic Isolation Capability 26 f
l
- i. Toxic Chemical Releason 28 l
- j. Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus 35 k.
Pottled Air Supply 36 1.
Emergency Food and Water Supply 37 m.
Personnel Capacity 38 n.
Potassium Iodida Supply 39 3.
Technical Specifications 40 a.
Chlorine Detection 40 b.
Control Room Filtration System 40
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tiU RE C 0737 Ill.D.3.4 CONTROL R00tl HABITABILITY REQUIREMENTS 1)
Control Rcom Ventilation System Operaticn, Isolacion Moce.
The JAFNPP control rcom ventilation system oceration for accident or isciation conditions uses ;one iso'ation, with the incoming air filtered and a positive pressure maintained by the ventilation system fans. When the control switch is in i solate posi tion,. (See of an accident, the Figure 31, the mode utilized in the event system will be in foil recirculation with all air filtered through regular filters F-5 and F-17.
In addition, two 1004 capacity scecial filter trains F-11A and F-11B will be utilized as redundant units to filter outside air from either of two outside air intakes to provice up to 1000 cfm of outside air for maintaining positive pressure in the Control Room.
The system is designed such that the outside air, af ter filtration through the special fil ters, will be filtered again with the recirculated air through the regular filters before entering the Control Room :one.
Both special filters consist of a prefilter, a HEPA filter, a charcoal filter and a second HEPA filter.
The regular filters have a combined mininum NBS cus-removal efficiency of a5 percert.
The Standby System (either AHU-3A or AHU-3B and FN-4A or FN-LB) will be centrolled by di f ferential pressure swi tches, or detection of no air flow at the lead fan discharge, these switches witt clos 2 contacts to sound an alarm on the local canels HV-5,A, HV-5B and the the ver.tilation panel 09
.'5 in the tiain Control Room and will start i
redundant / standby system.
in tne event that the filters on the operating train become clogged or tne acerating booster fan fails, a differentiel pressure switch l
loss of pressure and automatically starts the spare filter i
s'enses a f
train and annunciates an alarm in the Control Room.
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With the control switch in the isolate cosit ten the following occurs:
1 (MOV-107), the atmospheric exhaust valve and (MCV-108), tne cutsice air supply valve will close.
(MOD-105). the outside air supply damcer and (M00-100),
the 2.
atmoscheric exhaust damcer will close.
3 (M00-110A) (M00-Il03), tne reci rcula t ica dampers will coen.
L.
(FN-!!. :ne exhaust fan for tne toilet and kitenen wil: st::
and (M03-lil}. its ciscnarge :amcer. wili ;ics2.
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5.
Decending uoon which unit is operating, (FN-6A) or ( Fil-6 8 ),
the errergency supply fan on the scccial filter trains F-!1A or F-llB will tart a r.d (M00-l!2 A or 8), the emergency suoply fan discharge dampers will open.
6.
(M00-ll3), the emergency cutside air intake dameer and (MOD-114), the recirculation damper, will be modulated by differential pressure indi..aters to maintain a positive pressure in the Control Room.
The primary air intake isolation valve (CRV-01) and the secondary air intake Isolation valve (CRV-02) for the emergency supoly fans are manually operated.
'a l ve (C RV-01 ) is normally open, while (CRV-02) is no mally closed during all operating modes.
These will be utilized only in an emergency situation where air will flow thrcugh them to the special filter train, in the event that the secondary air intake is required to supply air, (CRV-01) will be manually closed and (CRV-02) will be manually opened.
To preclude the entrance of cotential airborne contaminants through i n f i l t ra t i on', the conditioned spaces are maintained at a positive pressure under operating, shutdown or accident conditions.
The control system is designed for fail-safe operation in the event of any instrument or eculpment failure, causing the rcom exhaust air temperature to -ise above 104 F.
Both air handling systems and both chillers will start automatically in air recirculation mode with maximun cooling.
The operater can adjust room temp.rature manually by means of opening a bypass valve at the,three way valve of ai r handling unit AHU-3A or AHU-38 and at both When desired.
Conclusions The Control Room ventialation system provides an adequate protective means against contaminants.
in the event of an emergency, tbc system has the cacability to totally isolate the Control. Room ;cne from the surrounding areas, recirculating all the air within the
- one and at the same time pressurizing the zone by using emergency l
supply fan in conjunction with charcoal bed filter trains (special filters) ;o filter outside air.
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The system comoares favorably in all respects with Safety Review
(
Plan 6.4, Item III.3.a. Land in addition, it has as part of its I
design a dual inlet systcm. M1ile the dual inlet system' ensurea
{
that preseurizatfan can be delivered and assures that the closed l
inlet does not allow any flow, it does not meet the eingle active failure criterion presented in SRP 6.4, Item.II.3.b.
As can be stan in Figure 4, the system con lguration does not qualify since l.
outside air intake damper (MOD-113) is common to both intake legs.
A redundant damper in parallel to MOD 113 will be added te meet the single active failure criterion.
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Tne source of oowe'r and control s to eacii e::uiceent iten of :ne Control Rocm Ventilat'on System was also investigated.
it was determined that all of the compenents of tna system are connected to safety related power except for kitchen and toilet exhaust fan (FN-1) and its disenarge damaer.
It will not be recuired to orovide safety related power to these since the damper will fait closed upon loss of power and is seismically designed.
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-l i-t uAct oe I j i TolLET KtTCuen g. CONTROL Root 4 VENTI ( ATLON SYSTEM A _ ASSUMES *A' SYSTEM RUMNiMk (LEAD)- B' SYSTEM STO P P ED( STAN D BY), O MAMUALLY OPP. RATED VAWE5 t N THElR NORMM. POSL'T10M.,
III.D.3.4 CONTROL ROOM !!ABITABILITY REQUIREMENTS 2) Control Room Characterirtics a) Air Volume of Control Room, JAFNPP The following is a breakdown of the Control Room zone giving the air volume for each area. a Control Room (Includes Shift Supervisor's Office and liall)* 75' x 68' = 5100 x 19.5' = 99,450 cu. ft. Volume
- Shift Supervisor's Office _
10' x 16 ' = 160 x 19. 5 ' = 3,120 cu. ft. Volume i
- 1 tall 1050'x 19.5' = 20,475 cu. ft. Volume Operations Department Office 26' x 19' = 494 x 19.5' = 9,633 cu.ft. Volume Teilet and Kitchen 9'x 18' = 162 x 19.5' 7 3,159.cu. ft. Volume AC Equipment Room 65' x 26' = 1690 x 19.5' = 32,955 eu. ft. Vol'me Total Ft.3 volume = 145,197 cu. ft.
Conclusion Since the existing control room emergency zone has a volume build-up would not constitute a problem ft.,C02 of 145,197 cu. for 5 people occupying the area per the criterion of SRP 6.4, Section III.2. t
s !!!.D.3.4 CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY REQUIREMENTI 2) Control Room Characteristics b) Control Room Em.ergency Zone, JAFNDP The emergencv :ones are: Operations Department Zone ! Office Control Rcoe Zone !! Shift Suoervisor's Office Hall Ki tchen Toilet The two emergency zones identified above are located on tne Air is reci rculated same floor, and the areas are cont:-;uous. the ki tchen and toile t where under from all soaces except is exhausted to tne atmosphere and under normal conditions air fans are shut off so as to
- e. ergency condi tions the exhaus t decrease the possibility of infiltration into the emergency
- cne.
Conclusion The Control Room :ene has been aporocriately selected and the limited to that :ene ver.tila tion sys tem as noted above, has been exclusively, i 9 -8 m,
s Ill.D.3.L CONTF.0L R005 HASITABILITY REC.U'REMENTE i 2) Contre Rcom Characteris tics c) Control Rocm Ventila tion Sys tem Schematic wi th Normal and Emergency Ai r Flow Ra tes, JAFNPF The control recm ventilation schematic is presented on Figure 4 The following is an air balance calculation for both normal and emergency modes of coeration. NORMAL SYSTEM EMERGENCY SYSTEM 13,350 CFM Su: ply = 13,130 CFM Supply = 1,430 CFM 1,450 CFM Zone di Zone #1 = = 11,000 CFM 11,700 CFM Zone 42 = Zene *2 = 2,000 CFM - Zone il (1450 transferred
- 9.330 CFM - Zone #2 from hall area)
Retu, n = 12,230 CFM 2,e00 CFM - Zone 41 (1650 tranferre: 49.L50 CFM - Zone #2 from hall area) Return = 12,350 CFM Toilet Exh. = 120 CFM Toilet Exh..= 0 CFM Exhaust to Atmos. = 0 CFM (minimum) Exhaust to Atmos. = 0 CFM i Max. Max. 0.A.I. - 920 CFM 0.A.I. = 1,000 CFM Return - Zone $1 =
- 2,000 CFM Return - Zone El = + 2,cCu CFM Zone 32 = + 9,330 CFM Icne 52 = + 9,450 CFM Re turn f rem Return frem 12,350 CF*
12,230 CFM Ss s tem = Sys:em = 0 CFM 0 CFM Exhaus =- Exnaus: =- Re: urn to 12,350 CFM Re: urn :o 12,230 CFM Uni: = Unit = 0.A.I. =+ O25 CFM 0.A.1 = + 1,000 CFM ~~~ Supolv to Sucolv : 13,350 CFM 13,150 CFM Sys:em = Sys:en = l 11,900 C:" 11,700 CFM Zone s2 Sucply l Zona d2 Supoly = = I Air Transferred Air Transferred 1.L 5C 1.L50
- u Zone l
to Zone El = - =- 10,250 CFM 10,'50 CFM 3 C:" 120 CFM Teile: Exn- = - Teile: Exn. 10,130 CFM i,-!O CF' f RCCm Ex'fil-RCOm. EXfi = - 1.000 CF" 300 CFM
- ra:!cn l
tra:icn =- Return frc.- Re:ur- *r:m Zone 2:
- C,330 CFM Z:re ::
"*:,k50 C:- e l!-c-- n_2 - m
n o 111.D.3.4 CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY REQUIREMENTS 2) Control Room Characteristics c) Control Roon Ventilitation System Scheratic with Normal and Emergency Air Flow Rates (Continued)
- 9,080 from contro! room
- 9,200 from control room
+ 250 from offi:e + 250 from office 9,330 CFM return 9.450 CFM returh Unfil tered inleakage or makeup ai r 0 Filtered makeup air 920 Filtered recirculated air 12,230 Conclusion Curing normal condition, as can be noted in the above section, ai r i s reci rcula ted f rom all spaces except the Kitchen and Toilet where the air is exhausted to the atmoschcre. During an emergency condition, the control room ventilation system will be
- s. itched to the Isolate position.
This action (See Figure 2) will:
- 1) close the ventilatien system isolation valves (MOV-107, 108) and dameers (MOD-105, 109), 2) fully open the recirculation dampers (M00-Il0A, 1108) and allow emergency outside ai r intake.
damoer (M00-113) and recirculation damper (MOD-114) to modula te to provide air for pressuri:ation as requi red, 3) stop so as exhaust fan (FN-1) from Ki tchen and Toilet and close i ts discharge dameer (MOD-Ill). Based on the leak cath area, as calculated in Item 4.2.d, the ncemal flow. ate will provide 800 CFM for aressuri:ation, which will create a cosi tive pressure wi thin the boundary of 0.18" W.G. During emergency conditions, 1000 CFM is;provided for pressurization, which will create a positive cressure within the boundarv of 0.27" W.G. The pressurizatic.. rate, based on the Control Rocm :one volume and the makeup air suoplied, is aporoximately 0.4 volume changes per hcur. As per SRP 6.L, item II.3.C.2 this condition w:ll recuire periodic (every 13 montns) verification that the ma?euo is : 10'; of design value. In addition, the Technical Specifications will be revised to reflect this requirement. -
CO!iTROL ROOM vet:TILATIO!i SYSTEM SCHEMATIC (IITH NOR?GL A:D E!!ERGE: ICY SIR FLOU RIsTES ~ EXISTING JAFNPP DEStGN EYHadT O SEcoMDARN [N \\ ou.gios.Aig 14000 g 4 OUTSIDE ALR / IMTAKE Hood W.4 i N "iA K E uo.3 o @e g. @g g x y x k \\ 1.920 j D O(W), 114 c.1 o5 o(E) t b"' 6- {TD fr% W M loco (E) f 1 I v-M AN U AL h.~<9 ) 4-1 O AMFCR (TVP) FN-1 g to Z Jgo(g) FN 4 A FN-4 6 f 2 m.g O O /I2: 2Eo(N) 3o ) 123 550(E) i f Q W y' [-- -T I FM GA y (,)S lOoO(E) Q I s ), NFN GB
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gp em % 45C(5) I ttt 1 2.90o(9) 2s too(E) r OPER ATion s A/C EQUlPMENT - y g DEPT. 'O F Fic e ZOQE 1 _g 4 4o ROOM 1450 I f it,9oo(E) l l. ' loo ( N) Ag
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'tc.000(wi ur,o j l Qo_l di 'E LE) HACL f 12 0 l l TOIL 5 T RITCHEN 1 5 CONTRot Room VENTit. ATloN SYSTEM - ? 30 ( N) 2 50 (t"-) 600 ( 4) EX Ftt.Th T I O 4 (.N) - NORTA At. C F M I 1R Flow R479 I,0 00( E) EX Fit.TRATiou 4 (. E) - EMERGEN CY C FM AIR 1:t.ow R AT E FIGURE 4 - ~.., g. my,,yggg,;,_.
J 111.0 3.4 CONTROL ROOM HAB!TABILITY REQUIREMENTS l 2) Control Room Characteris ti cs d) Infiltration leakage Rate The control rocm em.ergency ventilation system is designed to isolate with full recirculation and at the same time pressurized the zone. As per calculations (shown below), during normal condi tion,5, l there will be an exfil tration of 800 CFM for a pressure of 0.18" V. G. and during amergency conditions, there will be an exfiltration of 1000 CFM for a cressure of 0.27" V.G. 1 Calculations for leak path area, infil tration leakage rate. cake up flew rate, normal and emergency condition pressurization follew: I I i l l l l l r 1 l I i l i i l l l l
I!l.D.3.L CONTROL ROCM HAS i TAS I L1 TY REO,!J i RE.".ENT5 2) Control Rec.v. Cha ra c te ri s t i cs d) Infiltration Leakace Rate (Continued) c, c '<, .%.. w,. c.,. _1 - 1 = _4.- ..e v a. r e,.
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= m e. ~ g = y. -.. 3 (.,.. o. j e. m,n, .a aw -e 2
- m. e + 1 1 ( n e.*<. u c, a c
O m Q..R., v 0' .e.2 w. sm = ..-._47,._,, .J m m. r s 3 '< 2. o. 03 o v3' v. ~ - - ~ ~ ?.m. *- 4 a.. a .1..
- c.
. b. o %3 5 o. , _ t. a u. - A 4. _.e. s. - a.n. &.. 3 - n: 1 / 0. " 1 o _..,. ,e -.. s -/ n. w. e '. r.*. 4- ..W o Ool2.. O..w-e. - ata: a, k - 3 4.m. v.a-7H ti. i. 7..C, n 'n'. t *
- 3... A n
u 6- .m .o v. v. so.. i_. ---. 2 -.w. 3,. 1 32
- n.7 O :; ie W.G.
on c n.r. s ;.: o _ n.,.: u a v r-w -..o-a.,. . e,. E C.7 :q =.... t'.., - ~ u.,., L,., C n ..6.u. L.,. 2 C : : - C = v aJ 's 4.*. r_-.*.e. -T n, = -r -4s ., 4 - .~ o a -.,.' a. .. _ e. a : .. :,:s.- _4 .i n., f-- i.e. a ..~.-.'3 p,
- u.,.. ~ a
, =...,.. a.3s- =..A-a--o5a-m p 1-3e -.. _ - 2. s ' sn * . 3.. e 4 a- -.---.iam.m.. i 4 ". *,
- s..'.
C 3 C. a r .6.,. ..3- - --.f.3 3 i
h I i l HABITABILITY REQUIRE"ENTS l l i D. 3.1. CONTROL R00." 2) Controt kocm Characteris;ics d) Infiltration Leakace Rate (Continued) s 3. Makeue Air Flow Raie Calculation To obtain a pressure of 1/4" W.G. relative to the surround-ings, the calculation will be based on 0.2S" W.G. pressure differential at :ere wind conditien, no ther-.al colunn c::ects or pressure chanc.es. 1.5 hvi O = Av = 2027 C:'M 0.280 = hv = 0.19" W.G. O 1746 FPM V = ..----4,,,..-~.. s-..-. C-I a.,,. 4 a. e;., .c-e.s, e e 3 -.4nco- -,000 dif f erential of aP.croxi-.atelv. 0.25" W.G. can be realized. 4. Normal Condition Fressurization Ediltration = 800 CFM A-a= ( ' a..n..t. a.'"... ' t ) - 0... c~ 0,
- s..
1361 FPM Ve'ocity = hv = 0.12" W.G.0 p = 0.13" W.G. 5. Frercency Condition Pressurization -...:t,~ . tnn,,000 C~.., 0.588 ft l Area (leak path total) = Velecity = 1700 FP'I i t u..,., 0.3-,
- 4. v,.+
s 0,2,n .s. v. =. = l U.,.S..* e d'b Q. c C_ a fo: React:: Ata=ics Interna:icnal - Conventional 30ildin s C ind-...,.4..o.... .m .., g u. 3..M . w " - M. O.., -- -r . y .8 -...J ..4.;. ) .%.W...M e, ,e _ a.... -. a_
- s. 1
- -M. * ** -== 5 s *
's' p e I 1.g.--.E.=, r_.=. e - 3... /.".*.a.=, e. af, n
- o. e.. p. p
- m e
.... g C -.--a
- _ n o,
- c. ;.s 3,
c,.. - n ..,7-.n a. a. -..A..-..--.a.2 -3 a - i :.. l
k w m Ifl.D.3.4 CONTROL RC)M HABITABILITY REQUIREMENTS 2) Control Room Characteristics I d) Infiltration Leakage Rate (Continued) Conclusion The infil tration leaksge calculation rate presented, which assumes 0.125" W.G. as the base pressure differential as described in Reg. Guide 1.78, is the more conservative when compared to the method outlined in SRP 6.4, Itan III.3.3.2, therefore, mly_this value obta'aed for infiltration is subnitted. Since the system is designed to' isolate, recirculate and pressurize the control room zone during an emergency condi tion, as cbscribed in section me of this report, there.is, no. Possibility of any unfiltered air entering by infiltration. Based on calculations oresented above, the system cro provide a posi ive pressure differential in the control room of approxi-mately 0.25" w.G This assumes that zero wind conditions exist, and that thermal column effects or pressure changes do not take
- pitce, in addi tion, only the Relay Room ventilation sys tem has -
been considered to supply ai r to zones adjacent to the Centrol Roor zone during a postulated accident since it is safety related. As per SRP 6.4, Item II.3.C.2, an acceptance test will be perform-ed to demonstrate pressurizatien of-the control room to.125" W.G.' i ~ i =13--
E Ill.0.3.4 CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY REQUIREMENT 3 ~ 2) Control Room Characteristics e) High Ef ficiency Particulate Air-(HEPA) Filter and Charcoal Absorber Efficiencies - JAFNPP HEPA Filters As ger specifications, filters are temperature resistant to 750 F. Filter efficiency is ro' less than 99.97 cercent-based en DOP test eethod with 0.3 micron smoke when handling alr frem 98 to 100 percent relativt humidity. Cells are 24 x 24 inches by aporoximately 12 inches thick with an ini tial clean filter air resistance of not more than 1.0 inches (water gage) at 275 FPM face velocity. Charcoal Absorber As per specificatiens, the carben bed in each train has the capabilitt to remove 99 9-percent minimum of iodine with 5 percent in the form of methyl iodidy (CH3!) under entering conditlocs of 70 percent RH and 150 F. The carbon bed has a retention time of 0.25 seconds. The ini tial f!cw resistance of the carbon bed does not exceed 1 in,h (water gage). Conclusion The HEPA filters and charcoal absorbers (carbon bed) in the special filter trains (F-ll A) and (F-llB) are maintained and operated according to egulatory guide 1.52. The radiation shielding analysis, oresented in item 2.h, conserva*ively assumed a carbon bed flter efficiency of 95 percent and indicated that the filters are effective in protect-ing against iodine releases during a LOCA or other design basis accident. In addition, the iodine loading capacity of the control room carbon bed filters was analyzed and w0s found to be adequate in view of the postulated iodine release. t e# 'M
s Ill.D.3.L CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY REQUIREMENTS 2) Control Rcem Characteristics f) Closes: Distance Betweer. Containment and Air intake The existing design at the JAFNPF Site utili:es dual inlets. The inlets are located in the Administration Building as snewn on Figure 5, se; 1 rated by a dir :ance of approximetely 65 feet. The primary intake is located at a heri: ental distance of approximately $3 feet from the edge of the Reactor Building and tne secondary intake is located at a hori:catai distance 5 of approximately 53 feet from the edge of the Reactor Stilding. Conclusion The adequacy of the dual inlets with respect to contamination from radioact;ve emission will be treated in 1:em 2.h of this report, s 4 l
j ll
- ]
h o 1 O d'. ,o 'om-R O o E ,J b-I N I R OL 1Y!. l l C ( R L G e D o bE N K N tT uW R! N A T eA oH E A E A T sRM HE E T S G
- R eER PE A
N S O W iH MR ~ I N I a E. OC I PS C D D O A C A L I 8 I S U N B E M T I T/ yoo 2 n j'C M EN D 3 i R I f M '1 l q M A N T l f '/ o o B 5 I I K p h/. o g A W 'B B R- '9 T A F 5 N S t S e 2 E 4 O E L u O CI N A l C T B C , I R u I S L R E U o S o T Ko T, T E I I s K C C A-0 f-E T 'B 1 A A e. L No T F z E .t N l CL E I E Nfn a G EE K g i g S A ,O d 3t g R A TN '4 I R 1 g h Mp T g' A O ig i g t. a t T M M. D( N 'g. S g RL Ag Og M t s j O L PE. a C ) {4_ n$ O A R C f '. 7 i I '2 L M 'as ~ 6 O E l R l s T C ( h4O N l O E R. '0 C T "o o4 I 1 TD 8 'B '4 CL 6 1 F S Jq O N AB lq O 2 i 4 E y. s E T(M T i N A R Ag U R T eor O E P. ~ H p; Y l R l i O 4p[' A T O M j) R T l1 L O PS Q. 7 Y O0 /l j'_ T R a 7 t R G T D A, ~ u NR CM ~ I L d E QT YR ~ t . O B a B t c S L T 3D I h .O M M A T T R
- o 7,o m S7 n
ygOC$ m [ i jIlIljli l l' lI'
b Ill.0.3.4 CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY REQUIREMENT 5 2) Control Rocm Characteristics g) Control Room Radiation Protection 1. General A l'ayout of the control room showing the concrete shielding wallc, roof slab, location of duct wall penetrations and openings is shown in Figures 6, 7 and S. The dashed line (---) in Figure 6 denotes the pressure boundaries. The south wall of tne control room procer is 2.5 fee: thick. Tne south wall of the adjoining AC Equipment Room is 2.0 feet thick. The roof over the pressure coundary
- ene is 2.5 feet thick.
2. Analysis and Results Results of analyses of che LOCA and other DBAs are included in the licencee's resconse to AEC Question No. 11.6 dated 1/12/72. This response is part of the FSAR, Volume Vitt. The Main Steam Line Break Accident (MSL3A) analysis has been modified to reflect revised models of the steam and water release and the activity concentration. The tire profile of the mass blowdowa from the steam line was taken from a figure on page 21 of Supplement 25, Responses to "Information Reques ted by AEC letter of December 21, 1972." The mass of steam released was 4.36 x 10 gm; the nass of water released was 2.24 x 10 gm. The activity concentration in the water was assumed to be that existing prior to the accident consistent wi th a 30-minute of f gas release rate cf 0.26 Ci/sec. THe concentration of halogens in the steam pnase was based on an assumed 2 percent carry over from liquid to steam. The noble gas release was obtained by multiplying the isotope release rates (normal i zed to the total 0.26 Ci/sec at 30-minutes) by 10.5 seconds, where this 10.5 secons is the time required to achieve a full closure of the M51Vs. The resulting integrated cose to the thyroid is 0.15 Rem. i The cose contributions f rom the DBA considered in the resporte to question 11.6 cre summarized in Table i. The MSLBA entries are the revised values. The resconse to Question 11.6 did not address itself to leakage from tne main s:eam isolation valves or to :ne ESF leakace f:lle,ing a LCCA. A main steam isolation valve leakage collection sys:em (MSLCS) is installed :o collect and process via tne Stancav Gas Treatme-: System (50T5) all :cs:ulated leakage fecm the MSIVs. MSIV leakage will nave no significan: in ac: on the consecuences of a LCCA. ~ ~ _qs.
r 111.0.3.4 CCNTROL ROCM HABITABILITY REQUIREMENT 5 2) Control Room Characteristics g) Control Room Radiation Protection (continued) Leakage from tne ECCS alarms in the control room when the leakage exceeds the 100 gpm sump pump capacity (FSA~, Vol. Vill, Page Q.6.3-1). For analysis of ESF leakage, the maximum ocerational leaka,ge was assumed to be 100 gpm. The dose analysis was then based on twice this leakage, as stated in Standard Review Plan 15.6.5, Appendix B. Half of the iodine inventory in the care was assumed to be mixed in a volume of 105,600 feet, the water in tne suppression pool at minimum water level. This is consistent with the Safety Analysis Model given in Chapter IL of the JAF FSAR for a LOCA, in particular, Table 14.4-2. Ten percent of the iodine in the leaking water is assumed to become volatile and released to the environment via the SGTS and stack. The efficiencies of the charcoal absorbers in the SGTS and the control room emergency ventilation system were conservatively taken as 95 percent. The results of the analysis, if the leakage continues for 30 days, are: Whole Body Gamma Dose .0017 Rem Eeta Skin .03 Rem Thyroid Dose 7.6 Rem Activities from the charcosi filter beds in the Control Rocm Emergency Ventilation System have been analyzed. The dose rates due to direct radiations from icdines en these fil ters in the control room are given in Table 2 as a function of time. Conclusion Because of the positive pressu.e maintained in the control rcom, there is no cath other than througn the Emergency Ventilat. ion System for aircorne radicactive material te enter the control recm. The dose acceptance cri teria for control room habitabili ty are satisfied for the DSAs. The worst CBA is tne LOCA, inclucing the leakage from the primary cantainment, MSIV's, ESF at a 100 gpm leakage rate, (analyzed according to SRP 15.6.5, *ccendix B recuirements), direct radiation from the reactor building and the iodine builduo on the control roca eme rgency ven t i l a t icn system charcoal filters. The total calculated deses fran these sources are: hhole Body Ga: Trna Dose 0.6117 Ran Beta Skin 0.3 non Thyroid Dose 10.6 Pan % _, - s- - -.rwwmwnmm-~ -
s Ill.D.3.4 CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY REQUIREMENTS I 2) Control Rcom Characteristics g) Control Room Radiation Protection (continued) TABLE 1 POST DBA CONTROL ROCM DOSES 4 1 OVER ACCl0ENT DURATION OF 30' DAYS r (From Response to Questien 11.6) Acc.ident Whole Scdy Thyroid Oose Dose (Rem) (Rem) Loss of Ccolant l Primary Containment Leakage 0.61 30 Main Steam Line Break 0.001 O.13 (Revised) Centrol Rod Drop 3.0 7.9 O.IS 0.15 Refueling i i r i I i t. "^ '~" ,,a
p-- 2 111.0.3.4 CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY REQUIREMENTS 2) Control Room Characteristics g) Control Room Radiation Protection (continued) 1 TABLE 2 DIRECT RADIATION DOSE RATES IN CONTROL 4 ROOM FROM POST-LOCA ICDINE ACTIVITY IN THE CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION CHARCOAL FILTERS Dose Rate Time After Accident (hours) (mrem /hr) 0.0L 1 0.08 8 0.10 24 ? 0.09 96 0.10 ISO 0.10 360 0.07 540 0.04 720 9 -
1 CONTROL ROOM RADIATION PROTECTION I h 2c.o-h S s.c zu.o-2c.e-r 12"C O N C. '- P Riu. O. A. I. IMTAKE blK. WALL '+' [d TO SEC. O. A.I. I NTAKE 4 p_
- AA 97
-8 [
- /s! D l
t I d CONC l .l A/C EGUtPMENT .l p,,COMTROL Room io' W Att-g E b TV P! -e I . f 12'C O NC. WAL L L A l 'e l p OPER. DEPT. OFFICE 'h. I . I i I _D -- ) H g " 'l I. d cYl ll -12" CONC. 8 B LK. W Alt. A ^ ? l [, l ~ bl
==> c 5 l = {Q II A, m III I n ii _== g'.c" CONC l .g WALL t }l l G-e]B 6b -C -g --j I [- [ I l 'o L REACTOR 15 LOG l [ f l L i N I ~ J r h-l 1 A TML d L1 ' 'g i oT u i ,o I l J '2 0' 1 l _l, M T vtEwlMG l CONC WEL OFFICE C2 At.LERY I, l --Q P L A N E L. 3 00'- o' E'igur 6 -
r CONTROL ROOM RADIATION PROTECTION ROOF El 322'-O' k M IS' l d T4 ~L l- " [ 1 I 11 4p< _,;;,; g - p-w-sur s 6 : ^ PL ATE EL3t D' c," Ji l 70 F t t B w- 'O[ A, / Lw;. J 70 AHU-3A 7o*AHU 3B j / f f. 6 'Fl oOR E L. Soo'- o* l*2 ' J VIE W A-A -24 Figure '
r-CONTROL ROOM" RADIATION PROTECTION 9 LOW PotMT OR Pu Rt.1uG EL.4'2.S'- B" le. e O E h / a F l i l RiiACTO R SLDG. DOME -tNSULATED METAL SIDING J r r I I C c 1. Flo o R Et. 3 G9'- G" -iI '2 G'-o" i 1 1 C~ 29 G" 2 G'-o" 1 t B'- G" r = l El Stf-G" l Roof ~ ~ [-- T-C~ Ro0F El 322'-o" t.. I ~ M. G. SETS coNTRot ROOM IONE D,~~ s ' Floor Et Bo o'- o* I ^
- N p-6 viEvJ B-B
-25 Figure 8 e. t_.__-
r s 111.D.3.a CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY REQUIEEMENTS 2) Control Room Characteris tics h) Automatic ! solation Capabili ty - Damper Closer Time, Damoer Leakage and Area, JAFNPP The control recm ventilation sys tem isola tion mode of ooera tion requires manual initiation by the operator placing one switen into the " isolate" position. Motor operated valves for the normal flow cath only (intake and exhaust) are used at the JAFNPP si te to isolate the control room zone from outside air. The isolation dampers on the emergency outside air intake are not motor operated, one is ocen to allow ficw to the emergency makeup fil ters. Valve Leakage The following field tests were performed on the normal flow inlet and outlet valves MOV-107 and MOV-108 by SIF/ General Signal Corp./ United Tool and Die - Acme Tank Div, and were checked satisfactory: A-Hydros tatic tes t was cerformed for a period of fifteen minutes at pressure of 7-1/2 lbs. wi thout indication of leakage. B-Scao bubble leak test - maximum allewable p essure was held for a minimum of 15 minutes without indication of leakage. Valve Closing Time Ocerating test time for opening and closing was 4 seconds. Valve Area A - 60 inches x 36 inches - 15 sq. ft. area Conclusion in response tc SRP 6.4 1:em II.3.a, as cer the accve tests cerformed, the dampers are leaktight, thereby assuring that no leakage can occur between the contrei reem rones and adjacent
- cnes or the outside during an emergency.
To isolate the control room, the following excer:: from the JAFNPP coerating procedure 55B (CP-553) describes the secuence of events : (1) Hi radia tion detected by radia tion moni tors in ei ne-stack er in the air sucolv duct scund an alarm in tne CCntrol rcCm. e - -- ~ ._n
~ l O CONTROL ROOM HABITA8:LITY REQUIREMENTS Ill.D.3.4 2) Control Room Cha racteri s ti cs Automatic isolation Capabili ty - Damper Closer Time, Damper h) Leakage and Area, JAFN7? room operators manually place the ventilation (2) Control mode control switch in the isolate Position. (3) Dampers and valves operate as per design. in response to SRP 6.4 ltem Ill.3.c, the i sola tion damp (rs (M00-105) and (M00-109) which will close during an emergency are backed uo by isolation valves (MOV-107) and (MOV-108) which as previously noted are leaktight and are designed The isolation dampers have been ter ted by to close also. for seismic qualifications and leakage. Johnson Service Co. 4" W.G. pressure di f ferential was The maximum leakage atshould these fail, the isolation valves 15 CFM. Therefore, will prevent unfil tered ai r f rom e itering the Control Room Zone. O i { l I l l l - 2 /- l
r i i l Ill.D.3.4 CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY REQUIREMENTS 2) Control Rcom Cha racteri s tic ; i i) Onsi te and Nearby Of f si te Toxic Ch' nical Release, JAFNPP t Tchles 3 and 4 summarin the ensite and the offsite toxic i chemicals and their as;sciated parameters which were used j in the analysis. Analyzed offsite sources include truck shipments along U. S. Route 104, and storage containers ) located at the Alcan Sheet and Plate facili ty and Nine Mile F t. Unit 2. Figure 9 shows the-locations of these f'. sources. There are no water shipments which transport chemicals within 5 miles of the J.. A. Fit: Patrick 14uclear Power Plant. A li ttle used railroad spur is located wi thin ' 5 miles of the control room intake. Discussions w;th Conrail indicate that only one hazardous chemical shipment in an f 13 month period ever reaches the Oswego terminal. Tra f fi c j on the spur from Oswego is even less. Niagara Mohawk's j Nine Mile Point Unit I chumical s torage informa tion has i not been received for incorporation into this report. The ef fect of an accidental release of each of the chemicals listed in Tables 3 and 4 on Centrol Room habi tabili ty was i evaluated by calculating toxic vapor concentrations for both I outside the centrol room at the air intakes and inside the control room l environment as a ft:nction of time Except for onsite carbon dioxide relea: es, i this calculation 9as perforr.ed using a model which.follows the methodology l outlined in NUREG-0570 " Toxic vapor concentra tions in The { Cbatrol Reom Following a Postulated accidental Release," June j 1979, and utilizes the assumptions de:cribed in Regul a to ry Guide !.78, "Assumotions for Evaluating the Pabitability of a Nuclear Plant Control Room Curing a Pos tula ted Ha:ardous l Chemical Release," June 1974 A description of the model l formula tions and cssumptions are as follows : l ) A. In a postulated accident, the entire.caten ts o f the largest single storage container is released, resulting l in a toxic vapor cicud or plume which.; t r a r.s co r t e d j by the wind towa rd the control "cem intake. The fermation of the toxic clouc or piume is dependent on tne nature of the chemical being evalua ted. The entire amount of a chemical stored as a gas is trea ted as a puf f or cloud which has a finite volume that is determined from the q;antity and the densi ty of the s tored chemical A toxic substance stored as liquid with a boiling point below the ambient temperature forms an instantaneous puff due to flashing (rapid gas formation) which is ccmcrised of some f raction of the cuanti ty stored. Tne remaining liquid forms a puddle which cuickly screads to a thin cancake on the gcund and then va orizes, forning a ground-level toxic vspor and then vacori zes,
F Il!.D.3.L CONTROL RCOM HABITABILITY REQUIREMENTS 2) Control Room Cha racteri s ti cs i) Onsite and Hearb: Offsite Toxic Chemical 'Mease, J A F!iP P A. (Centinued) forming a ground-level toxic vascr plure. A liquid that has a boiling point above the amcient tercerature 'crms a c;dcle whicn evapcrates by forced convection into the air, resulting in only a ground-level plume release wit.n no tlasn..ing y In all cases, the. i n s o,a v e m. puf f or ground-level plume i s di spersed by a tmospheric turbulence as it is transported by the wind toward the control rcom i n take s. 3. In the evaluation o' liquid spills, :ne vaporization cr evaporation et. the sp.ll .is a runct. ion or. i .ts i sur,. ace area. _ h a. s area i s es t i ra tec.ry assuming that i the initial shape of the spill is in the form of a cylinder with the height ecual to the radius of the .h. area does not e x p a n c, cut base. i n d e r_ i n i t e,r y. i reaches a maximum sice decending cn tw.e vacorization or evapora:icn rate. Since the con: cur of the ground near the soill cannot normally be a e ',1 described, the naximum sur f ace a rea is calcuiatey g s .y assuming a sp:ll hickness of I cm. Soills invciving icuids with bcili g points belcw tie ambiert temcerature produce an instanta-neous puff release. All of the assuretions are identicai to those listed in Section 2.L.2 of NUREG-0570. r. -'n e na c i ta oi. ty or- :ne contro'i recm is evaluates a i 1 s i vy ccm:aring the calculated chemical ccrcen: rations inside the control room wi:n heran cxicity limits. These lini:3 3rc determined c be ne icwest concentratien of a chemical that couid in:erfere with an operator's abili v to function proceri, inc are cbtained from Reguia: cry Gu'de 1.73 and other aporcariate references. The contro; recm is consicerec to be un i nna b i :abl e v. hen the toxic limits shcwn in Tacle 5 are exceeded. The input data required by the program inciuces the chemical pnysical c race r ti es, con t rc l r cm carameters, retcore!cgical date, distance fren the saill to the i n t s <, s
- uanti
- y or cremical releasec. a n e, toxicity iimits.
For chemicals s:ored as ga,es, the cnly physical carare:er reeded is the density of *he gas. For icw-boiling poin: liauids, :he boilirg coint, cef? density, heat of /ac r- ? : 3': i c n, s:ccific neat and licuid densih are requirec as incut The assesscent Cf ~,or ai boiling poin: II;uits recuires the siquid dens.ity, rolecular weight, Saturaticr Vacof ?res$ure, 3Nd,...TIuslCn OceIIscienI 3s incuts O e wi redel. -2C-n.%.
- m., m < ~ w
.w.,.. m..., w w =-..u w w.. .... n. w., m. ..a . w. .u......--. .c.
l r 111.0 3.4 CONTROL ROOM, HABIT 6BILITY REQUIREMENTS 2) Control Room Characteristics 1) On-site and Nearby Off-site Toxic Chemical Release, JAFNPP C. (continued) For the J. A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant evaluation, a meterological condition of F stability coupled with a wind speed of 0.5 m/second was found to result in the maximum control room concentrations. It was further conservatively assumed thac the spill and intake cleyations were both zero and that the puff or plume center-line impacted both intakes (Y=0). The control room parameters of 0.9 n.jnput theanalysisincludedaventilationgate used as +3 / seconds and a control room value of 4,093 mt. For both onsite and offsite chemical sources, the contents .of the largest single storage contciner was used as the amount of chemical released. For the release of carbon dioxide from offsite sources, the previously describsd UUREG-OS70 model was used for th: analysis. For the onsite release of carban dioxide, a single modification was made to the modcl. To account for the fact that carbon dioxide is substantially heavier than air, the analysis was based on the fact that the control room air intake is physica.11y located 54 feet above the release point. rather than assuming that both are on the same grade elevation as does NUREG ^370. Although this approach is less consarvative thar, NUREG-0570, it is justified based on the carbon dioxide to air weight differential. Conclusion Results of the onsite and offsite toxic chemical analy',es are presented in Table.5. The results show that the maximum internal control rcom concentrations are less than the corresponding human toxicity limits.
( lit.D.3.4 CONTROL ROOM HABITA2fLITY REQUIREMEf1TS Table 3 -- Onsite Storage of Chlorine and Other Hazardous Chemicals. Distance from Centrol Toxic Room Outside Air in-Chemical Location take (meters) Quantity Sulfuric Water Treatment 107 5,000 gal. Acid Buiiding Licuid Outside Reactor 51 5,000 gai. Nitrogen Building Carbon Turbine Buildirg 21 20,000 lbs. Dioxide Procane Outside Security Building 153 22 500 lbs.* _ *. Maximum quanti ty contained in the supply truck. tio chlorine is stored on the JAFilPP site. l 31 - n zw, -n 'E. Y 'MW4 ?'" ~{
F L' ? III.D.3.4 Cv5 TROL ROOM HABITA3ILITY REQUIREMENTS Table 4 - Of fsite To: ic Che::tical Sources Distance from Control Toxic Rocm Outside Air in Chemical location take (ceters) Quantity Chlorine Alcan Sheet & 5,470 2,000 lbs. Metal Co. Propane Alcan Sheet 6 5,470 100,000 gal. Metal Co. Nitrogen A:can Sheet & 5.470 13,000 gal. Metal Co. Sulfuric Alcan Sheet c 5,470 6,000 lbs. Acid Petal Co. Sulfuric hine Mile 705 46,000 gal. Acid Point Unit 2 Hydrcchicric Truck S h i c.me n t 5,630 4,000 gal. Acid U. F. Route 104 Ca rten A'can Sheet 5 5,570 115,000 lbs. Dioxide retal Co. i Carben Nine Mile 705 2,600 lbs. Dicxide Point Unit 2 F -
e s t ONSITE AND NEARLY OFFSITE TOXIC CHEMICAL RPLEASE N ( Co nt.' d. ) LAKE NTARI I .5 Mik e c. c tu s i ' t l t-S A.P tTT.PAtmlCW u uc u r a, p o w eo. w r - MU.E RCtMT l l "'HUctE 4,G. GraficM. U NITS a l e s* 2 I A i . Ec uj tueer su: ~. 71' i .) PLATt-COMPAN'f .I a. n.u ,l n .i i 1 . i, u... i M I.l ,,~ V
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ITEM IV. 2.i ONSITE AND NEARBY OFFSITE TOXIC CHEMICAL RELEAS$ (Cont'd. ) TABLE 5 MAXIMUM CONTROL ROOM TOXIC CAS CONCENTRA'" IONS Maximum Control Room Toxicity Limits Toxic Chemical ' Concentration (g/m3) 3 (g/m ) (1) Nitrogen, onsite 121 274 (1) Nitrogen, offsite 0.638 274 -4 (2) Sulfuric Acid, onsite 5.9x10 0.002 -7 (2) Sulfuric Acid, offsite (Alcan) 2.6x10 0.002 -4 (2) Sulfuric Acid, offsite (Nine 2.7x10 0.002 Mile) (3) Carbon Dioxide, onsite 1.32 18.0 (3) Carbon Dioxide, offsite (Alcan) 0. 23 2 18.0 (3) Carbon Dioxide, offsite (Nine 0.483 18 4 Mile) (4) Propane, onsite 28.6 43.1 (4) Propa n e', offsite 3.61 43.1 -2 (2) Chlorine, offsite 1.32x10 0.045 -3 (5) Hydrochloric Acid, offsite 3.29x10 3.05 TOXICITY LIMITS REFERENCE._S: (1)
- Patty, F.A.,
Industrial Hygiene and Toxicology, Vol. II, Inter-science Publishers, New York, 1963. (2) NRC Regulatory Guide 1 78, June 1974. 1 (3) Sax, Irving N., Dangerous ~ Properties of Industrial Materials, Fifth Edition. 1979. (41 Review of Criteria for Vapor-Phase Hydrocarbons, U. S. E.7..A, EPA-600/8-80-045, August 1980. (5) Sax, I-rving N., Dangerous Properties of Industrial Materials, 1957. l t I e ; 1
s o Ill.D.3.h CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY REQUIREMENTS 2) Control Room Characteristics j) Self-contained Breathing Apparatus, JAFNPP The following exists at the Site: a. The e are 2 scott paks, self-contained breathing apparatus of one-half hour capaci ty each, and three soare bottles for addi tional air capacity in :ne control room, b. An abundant cuantity of protective clothing for the Control Room operators is avail 31e. c. A minimum of ,18 addition:' scott air paks and forty spare bottles are maintained at various other locations at the JAFNPP site. Conclusion. An additional five self-contained breathing a=paratus will be located within the JAFNPP control room to assure i.mned i a t e availability to the emergency crew. S 9 a
Ill.D.3.4 CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY REQUIREMENTS 2) Control Room Cha racteri s tics k) Bottled Air Supply (hours suoply) JAFNPP Available are two large air cylinders, eac!: of 330 cu. ft, capaci ty, coupled together wi th mani fold outlets and two face masks which can be connected to a manifold. These are located in the Control Opera tions area adjacent to the Scott paks. The ov /si te supplier of bottled ai r is the Oswego Fi re Depa rtment. latory Guide 1.3, the brea thing ra ta per person is AsperAECRegg/sec,3 3.47 x 10-4 m which is equivalent to 1.22 m /hr. or approximately 35 ft /hr. of air would be recui red oer cerson. Based on this, the two cylinders at the site can each provide approximately 9 aours of ai r for one person. For a minimum requirement of a six hour sucoly, 210 ft of air would be needed per perron or 1050 ft' for the entire emergency crew of five people. Conclusion Three aJditional face masks will be provided for a total of five airlinus and facerasks in the control room. Three additional bottles of respiratory cuality air will be provided for a total of five allowing a minimum of four available with 1320 cubic feet of air. e Ill.D.3.4 CONTROL ROOM HASITABILITY REQUIREMENTS 2) Control Room Characteristics 1) Emergency Food and Potable Water Supply, JAFNPP Emergency Food Sucolv An emergency food supply is available in winter for six people for ^ one week. At all times there are vending machines at the site that dispense sandwiches, hot soup, pastries, candy, etc. When the machines are refilled they hold enough subolies to last two days with normal use. Under emergency condi tions (5 persons only) the duration of this food supply would be s i gni fi can tl y increased. Potable Water Oswego city water is extended to the olant for domestic use and distributed throughout the Fotable Water System at ci ty water pressure. A hot watzr heating and storage unit together wi th a ci rculating puma dis tributes hot wa ter to all recuired locations. A 15,000 gal potable,swego city water storage tank with pumo is installed in the screenwell building for standby demestic water supply should the regular Oswego city water supply be temocrarily disructed. Conclusien Food and drinking water is available for five men for five days for the control room. -37~
s O P 111.0.3.4 CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY REQUIREMEtiTS 2) Control Room Characteristics m) Control Room Personnel Capacity (Normal and Emergency) JAFNPP For normal operating conditions, two people are-capable of monitorireg the operation and maintaining the plant in a safe condition. Under emergency conditions, the emergency crew will consist of. a minimum of five people. Conclusion As per flVREG-0578, a Technical Suoport Center (TSC), seaarate f rom the control room, will be established in the luncnroom area on elevation 286'-0". It will have the capability to 4 display and transmi t olant status to personnel knowledgeable of plant operations. The Technical Support Center will be habitable to a similar degree as the control room'and is large enough to house 25 persons, necessary engineering data and information displays. Therefore, the minimum numbe-of people in the control room, coupled with monitoring from the TSC can maintain the plant in a safe condition. The cont rol roc 7 capaci ty is adequate for more than five people under emergency and rormal conditions. l l l l 38 - a i
s I 111.0.3.4 CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY REQUIREMENTS 2) Control Room Characteri s tics n) Potassium lodide Drug Supply, JAFNPP Currently no supplies of potassium iodide are maintained. The thyroid dose due to iodine as described in item 2.h of this report does not indicate the need for potassium iodide use. Conclusien The use of potassium iodide for the emergency team is not clearly justified. Potassium iodide will be stocked in adequate cuantities when clear guidocce is obtained from the NRC and/or medical authori tes on i ts proper and sa fe use. f ~ 39 - A
III.D.3.4 CONTROL ROOM HABITAPJpITY REQUIREMENTS 3. Technical Specifications a) Chlorine Detection System No chlorine detection exists at the JAFNPP. Conclusion No chlorine hazard is present at the JAFNPP site, therefore, no chlorine detection system is necessary. b) Control Room Filtration System The JAFNPP Technical Specifications require that each of the Control Room emergency ventilation air filter trains shall be tested once every 6 months as follows: 1. Pressure drop test across each filter and the filter system. 2. Di-octy1phthala te (DCP) test for particulate filter efficiency greater than 99% for particulate greater than 0.3 micron size. 3. Freon-ll2 test for charcoal filter byp4ss to measure filter efficiency for halogen removal. In addition, a sample of the charcoal filter shall be analyzed once a year to assure a halogen removal efficiency of at least 99.5%. Ccnclusion As stated in Section 2.C of this report, the Fit Fatrick Technical Specifications will be revised to address the requirements of periodic (every 18 months) verification that the makeup is + 10% of the design value. l l l ~}}