ML20030A538
| ML20030A538 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/28/1976 |
| From: | Demoor D, Petitjean G CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20030A537 | List: |
| References | |
| LER-T-1-76, NUDOCS 8101090966 | |
| Download: ML20030A538 (4) | |
Text
.
FIRST OF TWO SHEETS (3).
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK:l l
l l l l l (PtEAes PRINT ALL REOUIREO M8 FORMATION) 1 6
(
NAME LICENSE NUMAR YPE TV 0
l Ml Il Bl R l P l 1l l 0l 0l-l0 l 0 l Ol 0l 0l-l 0l0 l lh l1 l1l1l1l l0l1l 7 89 14 15 25 26 30 31 32 TYPE RC DOCKET NUM3ER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE Cc m l l l LTJ LL_'
101 s 101-10111 s i s l Lp l i l il 917161 10 t i 12 la 17161 7 8 57 58 59 66 61 88 69 74 75 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION 96 l During a review of Appendix J testing requirements, a vacuum instrument was identified l 7 89 80
@@ l as having inadequate design pressure rating. No redundant device is operable. Event l 7 89 80 h l simil' r to A01-75. Device valved out with procedural controls to return to service l
a 7 89 80 39 lvhen needed. Replacement of device being invectigated.
(T-1-To) l 7 89 80 EG 1 1
7 89 80 m,E CODE COMPONENT CODE SUF'PLER MANUF A
VOLATON DE lllDl (BJ (J l N l S l T] Rl UI W
lBl0lhl5l (NJ 7 89 10 11 12 17 43 44 47 te CAUSE DESCRIPTION l Bailey Meter Co pressure transmitter model BDlllT4 contains a diaphragm.d.ich may l
8 7 89 80
@ l rupture if exposed to pressures greater than 10 psig. DBA pressure is 23 psig.
l 7 89 80 DE I l
ST US
% POWER OTHER STATUS DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRtPYON W
l0l 6l 0l l NA l W l
NA l
7 8 9
10 12 13 44 45 46 80 (E ED OF REL ASE l AMOUNT OF ACTMTV LOCATON OF RELEASE W
NA l
l NA l
(_Zj 12 7 8 9
10 11 44 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBE R TYPE DESCRIPTON 8 1 0 1 Ol el LzJ l
NA l
7 89 11 12 13 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBfR DESCRIPTON l0l0l0l l NA l
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14 7 89 11 '. 2 80 i
l PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES
]E l Failure of the device vould result in a loss of containment vacuum indication (contd) l 7 89 80 t.OSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTON nnnD n Inikl Al l
D2 L7J l NA 7 89 10 F
Un U
IUllinL eo PU8UCITY
$ l This report will be distributed to the Michigan media on transmittal to the NRC.
l 7 89 80 ADDITIONAL FACTORS h l PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (Contd) and would cause a small breach of containment l
(
89 so f
l integrity (1/h-inch nine size).
l 19 7 89 80 gjepo %
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SECOND OF 'NO SHEETS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK:l l
l l l l
l
[PLEASE PRINT ALL REOUWIED IAIPORARATION) 1 8
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LcENSE NUMBER PE I Ml ll BI R I Pl 1l l 0 l 0 l-l0 l 0 l 0l 0l 0 l-l 0l 0l l h l 1 l1 l1 l 1l l0l1l 7 89 14 15 25 26 30 31 32 EE DOCKET NUM9ER EVENT OATE REPORT DATE TY BE CONT l l l lid l 0l S l 0l-10 l1 l 5 l 5 l l 0l1lll 9l7 l 6l l0 l1l 2l 8l 7l6 l 7 8 57 58 59 60 61 68 69 74 75 80 EVENT DESCRPTON 35 l During a review of App J testing requirements, several containment pressure sensing l
7 89 80 EE l svitches were founa to have inaaequate design pressure ratings. No redundant pressure l 7 89 80 Q l switches are installed. Event similar to A0 1-75 Corrective Action: Valved out l
7 89 80 32 l switches whose function would be tnpaired during a DBA vith procedural controls to l
7 89 80
@ l valve in when needed (T-1-76).
l 7 89 80 pw ODE COMPONENT CODE SLF5MR MANUFACTUER 90LATUN DE [ShD_l [B_l lI l N l S l Tl Rl UI 11 lMl2l3l5l
[NJ 7-89 10 11 12 17 43 44 47 48 t
CAUSE DESCRIPTIOP l Mercoid press are switches - DAW 23-153(R-3A) and DAW 533(R-2) are installed in the l
8 7 89 80 0
l containment pressure sensing lines. The set points of these switches vill change l
7 89 80 1O l if they should be exposed to pressures anticipated during a DBA.
l FACUTY METHOO OF STATUS
% POWER OTHER STATL,J DISCOVERY OfSCOVERY DESCR@ TON M
[E_l l 0l 6l 0l l NA l Q l
NA l
7 8 9
10 12 13 44 45 46 80 ACTMTV CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTMTY LOCATON OF RELEASE E
L2J LzJ l NA I
I NA l
7 8 9
10 11 44 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBE R TYPE DESCR@ TON BE I 0101 01 LzJ l NA l
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7 89 11 12 13 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCR@ TON
@ l0l0lOl l NA l
7 89 11 12 80 PROBABLE CONSEQUENCFS DE l Switches (PS-66h thru 667)(DAW 23-153) vill still function to pmvide trip (contd) l 7 89 80
' LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRWTON DnnD At IPIM Al l
03 L J l NA 7 88
'o i UUn Ulilullulk so PUBLICITY DE l This report vill be dist ributed to the Michigan media on transmittal to the NRC.
l 7 89 80 ADDITIONAL FACTORS l PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (Contd) signals to reactor protection system. Switches l
18
' 89 80 l DPS 0051 and 0052 (DAW 599) may not function as designed and therefore, are valved out[
19 7 89 80 spo set.esT e
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i p
RBSew211, P21-107 DEDeMoor, Big Rock /
CORSUIRell k
GHPetitjean, Big Rock PoWCr oave January 27, 1976 Company suescer ADDENDUM TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NUMBER T-1-76
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a af C E 4 V E D cc R. B.
De Ws rr P D/- //S' JAN 2 91976 Nt' CLEAR LICENSING 1.
Analysis of Occurrence a.
Pressure switches PS-664 through PS-667 sense containment pressure and operate at a pressure of 1.5 psig to initiate reactor scram and containment isolation. In a post Design Basis Accident (DBA) situa-tion, these switches would experience loss of calibration and a change of setpoint; however, this deficiency would occur only after these switches had accomplished their safety-related function. For these switches (MERCOID DAW 23-153, R3A) damage results from a per-t manent deformation of the bourdon tube sensing element when exposed to sustained pressures greater than 20 psig. The containment pres-sure anticipated during a DBA is 23 psig.
b.
Pressure switch DPS 9051 opens the ventilation supply valve to provide a vent path when containment pressure falls into the vacuum region.
Pressure switch DPS 9052 provides an alarm indication when containment pressure falls into the vacuum region. In a post DBA situatior.. both of these switches would lose calibration and experience a cbnge in setpoint, such that they could not be relied upon to carry out their function should the containment go into vacuum during quenching with the encicsure spray system. These switches (MERCOID DAW 533, R2) ex-perience damage identical to MERCOID DAW 23-153, R3A, except that damage is expected to occur at pressures greater than 15 psig.
c.
Pressure Transmitter PT-173 provides only a display signal; however, this signal is needed to permit operator backup action in the event of a failure of DPS 9051 and DPS 9052.
(
f DED/GHP Memo Add:ndum to Licinssa Ev nt Rsport Numb r T-1-76 (contd) 2.
January 27, 1976 i
(~
d.
Note that if DPS 9051, DPS 9052-and PT-173 were all rendered inoperable, no indication of containment pcessure under vacuum conditions would be available, nor would automatic containment vacuum relief capability be operable.
2.
Immediate Corrective Action The Plant Review Committee (PRC) concluded that since pressure switches PS-664 through 667 would still function to provide signals to the reactor protection system, continued reactor operation with these switches in service vould not adversely affect public safety or health.
After a safety review of applicable portions of the FSAR and Technical Specifications, the PRC concluded that isolation of PT-173, DPS 9051 and e
9052, with procedural requirements to return these instruments to service, s
should they be needed' (and when containment pressure would be sufficiently low to prevent damage) was warranted, and would not adversely affect public safety or health. An Operations Memo was issued on 21 January 1976 to put these procedural controls into effect.
3.
Permanent Corrective Action Replacement of the instruments with instruments having proper pressure ratings is being pursued.
DED/CHP 1/27/76 i
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Consumers 4
power
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Company cene..i oma.; si2 we.t Mkhigan Avenue,Jactison, Michigan 492CM e A,ee Code S17 708 0550 February 2, 1976 srm.
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,/,'[s Mr. James G. Keppler
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US Nuclear Regulatory Commission s
799 Roosevelt Road s
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137
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DOCKET 50-155, LICENSE DPR-6 BIG ROCK POINT PIANT Transmitted attached is a Licensee Event Report for the Big Rock Point Plant.
As the event involved several instrumentn, two forms are attached, even-
[
though it is considered one report. Supplemental information is also attached.
./fJ w
l Ralp i B. Sewell Nuclear Licensing Administrator CC:
Director, MIPC, USNRC
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[TO.
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FIRST OF TWO SHEETS UCENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK:l l
l l l l
l (M. EASE PRINT ALL REOUNIED INFORMATION) 1 6
iAME LOENSE NUMBER EG TV l Ml Il BlR l Pl1l l 0l 0l-l0 l 0l Ol Ol 0l-l 0l0 l l h' l 1 l 1 l 1 l 1 l l0l1l 7 89 14 15 25 26 30 31 32 TYy EE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE
@ CON 7 l l l
[T_} [LJ l 0 l 5 l O l-l 0 l 1 l 5 l S l l0l1l1lol7l6l l0 l1 l2 l8 l7 l 6 l 7 8 57 58 59 60 61 88 69 74 75 80 EVENT DESCRIPTON DE I During a review of Appendix J testing requirements, a vacuum instrume.c was identified l 7 88 80
@ l as having inadequate design pressure rating. No redundant device is operable. Event l 7 89 80 EE l similar to A01-75 Device valved out with procedural controls to return to service l
7 89 80 UE l vhen needed. Replacement of device being investigated.
(T-1-76) l 7 89 80 EI I
7 89 80 p,,,,
C E COMPONENT CODE SL5 MANUF VOLATON
@E l1l Dl W lI lN l Sl Tl Rl Ul
[NJ lBl0lhl5l
[NJ 7 89 10 11 12 17 43 44 47 48 CAUSE DESC llPTION l Bailey M ter Co pressure transmitter model BDll174 contains a diaphragm.d.ich may l
8 7 89 4
80 3l l rupture i? exposed to pressures greater than 10 psig. DBA pressure is 23 psig.
l 7 89 BO 1o l l
6 US
% POWER OTHER STATUS 6COVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTON
[gj l0l 6l 0l l NA l W l
NA l
7 8 9
10 12 13 44 45 46 80 LE ED 0
EL ASE AMOUNT OF ACTMTV LOCATON OF RELEASE Lzi LzJ l
na l
I NA l
2e 7 8 9
10 11 44 45 80 PERSONNEL iXPOSURES NUMBE n TYPE DESCRPTON DE 101 01 01 LzJ l nr __
s#AA a s= = -
I 7 89 11 12 13 lg gQ l "l a.UllER UE1IU5IE l
80 PERSONNEL INJURIES U
E.
NUMBER DESCRPTON l0l0l0l l NA l
14 7 89 11 12 80 PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 3E l Failure of the device vould result in a loss of containment vacuum indication (contd) l 7 89 80 LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACLUY TYPE DESCRPTON 32 Lzj l NA l
7 89 10 80 PUBLICITY
$ l This report will be dintributed to the Michigan media on transmittal to the NRC.
l 7 81 80 ADDITONAL FACTORS h l FROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (Contd) and would cause a small breach of containment l
(
89 80 f
UE l integrity (1/h-inch nice size).
l 7 89 80 sao een...T r
SEODND OF WO SHEETS UCENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK:l l
l l l l l (PLEASE PRINT ALL RSOUIRED INPOAMATION) 1 6
Ypg Mt tcENst NuMetR i
G I Mi ri nlR I Pi ll 10101-10101010101-10101 lhll,lill W lolli 7 89 14 15 25 26 30 31 32 TYP DOCKET NUMBER IVtNT DAff REPORT DATB 3[ CONT! l l d l_L } l 0l 5l 0l-l 0 l1 l 5 lj l 0l1l 1l 9l7 l 6l l0 l1l 2 l 817l 6 l 7 8 57 58 59 60 61
.68 64 74 75 80 EVENT DESCRIPTON BG l During a review of App J testing requirements, several containment pressure sensing l
7 89 80 h l switches were found to have inadequate design pressure ratings. No redundant pressure l 7 89 80
@ l switches are installed. Event similar to A0 1-75 Corrective Action: Valved out l
7 89 80 92 l switches whose function would be impaired during a DBA with procedural controls to l
7 8 80
@9l valve in when needed (T-1-76).
l 7 80 80 m
Out coupONtNT CODE MANUFACTUI R W1LAf1DN El l S l D l (_BJ lI l N l S l Tl Rl Ul
[ N_j lMl2l3l5l
[NJ 7 89 10 11 12 17 43 44 47 48 CAUSE DESCRIPTION l Mercoid pressure switches - DAW 23-153(R-3A) and DAW 533(R-2) ar.
W m slied in the l
8
^ ' "
7 89 00 El l containment pressure sensing lines. The set points of these swit
- es will change l
7 89 80 lif they should be exposed to pressures anticipated during a DBA.
l 10 FACLITY METHOO OF STATUS
% POWER OTHER STATUS 06COVf RY O'SCOVE RY DEbC5uPTON M
(E_j l 0l 6l 0] l NA l
l NA l
7 8 9
10 12 13 44 45 46 80 RELE D
OF RELEASE l AMOUNT OF ActrviTY LOCATON OF RELE A$f
( Zj W
NA l
l NA l
1?
7 8 9
10 11 44 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMB ( H TYPE DESCRWTON
@ [ l 0l 0l 0l (_Zj l'
NA l
7 89 11 12 13 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBE R Df SCRFTON
.Dfif1D ADIDIM AI 1
10101 o1 l NA 14 7 88
'2 f.. U U n Ulti ullir1L 80 PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES
$ l Switchas (PS-66L thru 667)(DAW 23-153) will still function to provide trip (contd) l 7 89 80 LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY tys; OfSCRPTON 03 l.1) l NA l
7 89 10 80 PU8LICITY DE l This report will be distributed to the Michigsn media on transmittel to the NRC.
l 7 14 9 80 ADDITIONAL FACTORS
[,PROBABLECONSEQUENCES(Contd)signetlstoreactorprotectionsystem. Switches l
18
(
' 89 80 f
h l DPS 9051 and 0052 (DAW 537) may not funetion as desicned and. therefore. are valved cut [
1 89 u0 po ses.ee, v
s T2 RBSewall, P21-107 DEDeMoor, Big Rock /
CORSum8!5
$(
CHPetitjean, Big Rcck power Dave January 27, 1976 Company suostcv ADDENDUM TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT j,"lty^,,,,c, y
NUMBER T-1-76 DECEIVE 9 cc R, B. Ds War PD/~ H5 JAN 2 91976 NI' CLEAR LICENSING 1.
Analysis of Occurrence a.
Pressure switchea PS-664 through PS-667 sense containment pressure and operate at a pressure of 1.5 psig to initiate reactor scram and containment isolation.
In a post Design Basis Accident (DBA) situa-tion, these switches would experience loss of calibration and a change of setpoint; however, this deficiency would occur only after these switches had accomplished their safety-related function. For these switches (MERCOID DAW 23-153, R3A) damage results from a per-
{
manent deformation of the bourdon tube sensing element when exposed to sustained pressures greater than 20 psig. The containment pres-sure anticipated during a DBA is 23 psig.
b.
Pressure switch DPS 9051 opens the ventilation supply valve to provide a vent path when containment pressure falls into the vacuum region.
Pressura switch DPS 9052 provides an alarm indication when containment presst.re falls into the vacuum region. In a post DBA situation, both of these switches would lose calibration and experience a change in setpoint, such that they could not be relied upon to carry out their function should the containment go into vacuum during quenching with the enclosure spray system. These switches (MERCOID DAW 533, R2) ex-perience damage identical to MERC01D DAW 23-153, R3A, except that damage is expected to occur at pressures greater than 15 psig.
Pressure Transmitter PT-173 provides only a display signal; however, c.
this signal is needed to permit operator backup action in the event of a failure of DPS 9051 and DPS 9052.
I
' DED/CHP Memo
(;
l Addendum to Licin:22 Ev;nt Rxport Numbar T-1-76 (contd) 2.
.J,anuary 27, 1976 e
l d.
Note that if DPS 9051, DPS 9052 and PT-173 were all renderca inoperable, no indication of containment pressure under vacuum conditions would be available, nor would automatic containment vacuum relief capability be operable.
2.
Immediate Corrective Action The Plant Review Committee (PRC) concluded that since pressure switches PS-664 through 667 would still function to provide signals to the reactor protection system, continued reactor operation with these switches in service would not adversely affect public safety or health.
After a safety review of applicable portions of the FSAR and Technical Specifications, the PRC concluded that isolation of PT-173, DPS 9051 and 9052, with procedural requirements to return these instruments to service, should they be needed (and when containment pressure would be sufficiently low to prevent damage) was warranted, and would not adversely affect public
{
safety or health. An Operations Memo was issued on 21 January 1976 to put these procedural controls into effect.
3.
Permanent Corrective Action Replacement of the instruments with instruments having proper pressure ratings is being pursued.
DED/CHP 1/27/76
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