ML20029E188
| ML20029E188 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/05/1989 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20028G715 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9405170160 | |
| Download: ML20029E188 (27) | |
Text
FG I,
i i
BRTEFING FOR THE C0lHITTEE TO REVIEW GENERIC EQUIPPENIS (CRGR)
ON T E PROPOSED FINAL RULE ACCESS AIITHORIZATION PROGRAM FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS l
BY DIVISION OF EGULATORY APPLICATIONS OFFICE OF NUCLEAR EGULATORY RESEARCH l
i i
ZoLTAN RoszToczy X23760 OhFNI4B11 SHER BAHADUR X23775 DECEMBER 5, 1989 SANDRA FRATTALI X23773
'74051[thhhhhR GR to Enclosure 2 PhTING175
- PDR,
i l
l l
BACKGROUND l
IN THE SEPTENER 13 MEETING, CRGR OBSERVED THAT THE RULE WAS TOO PRESCRIPTIVE, l
AND IN ADDITION, IDENTIFIED TE FOLLOWING ITEMS THAT NEEDED FURTHER WORK:
1.
A. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE NEED FOR A RULE FOR EXISTING PLANTS.
B.
POSSIBILITY OF ADOPTING NLPMRC GUIDELINES WITHOUT EXCEPTIONS.
l 2.
EFFECTIVENESS IN THE f%INTE?MNCE fbtICY STATEMENT VS, CONSISTENCY IN THE ACCESS AUTHORIZATION RULE.
3.
ASSURANCE OF PROPER CONTROLS DURING COLD SHUTDOWN.
4.
ELIMINATION OF REQUIREENT FOR PERSONALITY TliSTING TO BE BOTH " VALID" AND
" RELIABLE."
5.
REPLACEENT OF THE WORD " CONTINUAL" WITH " CONTINUED" FOR BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATION.
l 2
i 1
i l
l NEED FOR EXISTING PLANTS TE RULE AND ASSOCIATED REGULATORY GUIDE SPECIFICALLY ACCOPFLISH THE FOLLOWING:
CLEARLY DEFINE A STAN!MRD ACCEPTABLE TO NRC.
REQUIRE EXISTING LICENSEES TO IMPROVE W EIR PROGRAM TO THE INDUSTRY-WIDE LEVEL.
I i
l i
3.
(.
l l
EFFECTIVENESS VS CONSISTENCY THERE IS NO DIFFERENCES IN THE APPROACHES TO TIE %INTENANCE IDLICY STATEENT AND TIE ACCESS AUTHORIZATION fh>LE.
BOTH HAVE AN OBJECTIVE TO IPPROVE EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH THE PLAffT/ LICENSE LIFE.
ACCESS AUTHORIZATION RULE ESTABLISHES GENERAL REGJIREENTSJ THE REGULATORY GUIDE ENDORSES THE INDUSTRY STANDARD AND PROVIDES SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY.
STANDARD FOR ACCESS AUTHORIZATION ALREADY EXISTS IN THE INDUSTRY.
fD SUCH STANDARD EXISTED FOR t%INTENANCE.
i l
l k
=
l r
ISSUE OF COLD SHlTTDOWN NtfMRC GUIDELINES DOES NOT DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN T11E PROTECTED AND VITAL AREAS.
NOT CLEAR ABOUT TIE PROCEDURES FOR START-4JP AND SAFE OPERATION OF PLANT SYSTEMS.-
NRC PROPOSED RULE NOT PREPARED FOR A GENERIC ENDORSEMENT OF NIfMRC GUIDELINES.
i l
' RULE PROVIDES FOR A CASE-BY-CASE PLANT SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION.
j l-STAFF CONSIDERING DEVELOPING APPROPRIATE PROCEDURES FOR VITAL l
l AREAS THROUGH PUBLIC PROCESS.
I J
t 1
l 5
EXEFTIONS TD THE IMXJSTRY GUIDELINE AS PRESENTED IN SEFTEPBER MILITARY HISTORY TOTAL, NOT JUST FOR FIVE YEARS.
RELIABLE AND VALID PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS, NOT JUST RELIABLE REVIEW PROCESS EXTENDED TO ALL EffLOYEES, NOT JUST FOR PERMANENT i
E?PLOYEES OF THE LICENSEE.
AUDIT EVERY YEAR IF A LICENSEE CONTRACTS OUT EVEN A PORTION OF ITS PROGRAM.
REVISED REVIEW PROCESS EXTENDED TO ALL EMPLOYEES, NOT JUST FOR PERMANENT EPPLOYEES OF THE LICENSEE.
A RELAXATION FOR COLD SHUTDOWN PROVIDED ONLY ON A CASE-BY-CASE SITE SPECIFIC BASIS.
GRANDFATHERING ALLOWED IF INDIVIDUAL HAD UNINTERUPTED ACCESS AUTHORIZATION FOR AT LEAST 180 DAYS ON THE DATE THE RULE IS PUBLISHED.
AUDIT EVERY YEAR IF A LICENSEE CONTRACTS OUT EVEN A PORTION OF ITS PROGRAM.
1 I
l l
I j
i 6
[
s. -r l
Suggested Paragraph for the Connission Paper to Address the OE Concern i
It was pointed out by the Office of Enforcement that this rule in its present form is rather general.
NRC will not be able to take enforcement action against licensees who address the three elements of the rule (background investigation,psychologicalassessmentandbehavioralobservation),but clearly do not meet provisions of the regulatory guide. The regulatory guide l
would become enforceable only if the licensees agree to commit to it. As the staff understands, NUMARC is willing to explore such a possibility once the rule is issued.
M e
e'
-=
c e-
~
w e
+-w
-m--
-' +
w-m w
--emsv rws
--r-warv e 4m. e
-w-e w
m
-r
- -, - + - m
1
. to the Minutes of CRGR Meeting No. 175 Proposed Revision 3 to Regulatory Guide 1.35 and Proposed Regulatory Guide 1.35.1 December 5, 1989 TOPIC The proposed Revision 3 to Regulatory Guide'1.35 would implement a number of changes in inservice inspection programs.for ungrouted tendons in pre-stressed concrete containments as currently specified in Revision 2.
It was, with some.
exceptions, parallel to the recently issued subsection IWL of ASME Section XI.
The proposed Regulatory Guide 1.35.1 would provide essentially new guidance on predicting and evaluating pre-stressing forces.
At this meeting the Committee continued its review'of this subject, begun at Meeting No. 172'on October 25, 1989.
Bob Bosnak (RES), Andy Murphy (RES), and Herman Graves (RES) responded to the Committee's previous questions, which were documented in the Minutes of Meeting N0. 172.
Copies of handouts-used in making the presentation are provided as attachments to this enclosure, as follows:
1.
Table entitled " Options 'for Endorsing Subsection IWL" 2.
First two pages of a letter dated November 15, 1989 from Sammataro, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Committee to Bosnak, NRC, 3.
Memo dated March 15, 1989 for Beckjord from Treby, subject:
Application of the Backfit Rule (10 CFR 50.109) to Amendments to Codes and Standards.
~
Regulation (10 CFR 50.55a)
BACKGROUND The background material consisted of the package submitted for CRGR review and additional materials provides by the staff as detailed in the minutes of Meeting No. 172.
CONCLUSIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS The Committee completed its review of this matter and recommended issuing the proposed guides subject to the conditions discussed below:
1.
The proposed guidet would be issued in final form.
Changes to make the j
guides forward fit only and other changes to reflect CRGR comments would i
be coordinated with the CRGR staff.
2.
The CRGR staff would obtain any further detailed technical comments from J. Sniezek, G. Arlotto and D. Ross (whc, were not present at this meetir:g) for staff consideration in the final guides.
1
.. a
- l. 3.
The staff would proceed in parallel to adopt the recently issued ASME Subsection IWL in 10 CFR 50.55(a)(g).
RES would identify and document differences between the Regulatory Guides and Subsection IWL and forward the differences to ASME to consider for adoption in Subsection IWL before the regulation change was proposed.
It was expected that the differences would be ironed out with ASME by mid-1992.
When proposed, it would be decided whether the regulation change would apply to existing plants (rather than be forward fit only).
l 4.
As a backup option, in case of problems with issuing the regulation, the staff might consider adopting Subsection IWL as a code case in the future.
The staff also briefly disciised the following issues:
(1) whether changes to 10 CFR 50.55(a)(g) updating tre ASME Section XI inservice inspection require-ments were, in general, exrmpt from the backfit rule, and (2) the degree of CRGR review appropriate foi such changes.
No decisions, recommendations, or CRGR responses resulted fram this discus.. ion.
l i
i l
i I
l l
l i
l l
- - -. ~
k OPTIONS FOR ENDORSING SUBSECTION IWL DATE JAN '90 JAN '91 JAN '92 JAN '93 OPTIONS i
Pickup n lasue for issue 50.55a along IWE Public com.
final n__ o_ n, n n i_ d_ _
w.
v.a.r.
e=dee!q paNk ca.
a=e!
-ME Reg. Guide issue as is,with IWL final 50.55a plans Reg. Guide issue i
on code final case N-478 l
. ///
\\
COIBIBITTEE CORRESPDHDEHCE_
i COMMITTEE: ASME: Boiler and Pressure ADDRESS WRITER CARE OT:
Vessel Committee,Section XI Robert F. Sammataro Subgroup on Containment OENERAL DYNAMICS i
Electric Boet Division
SUBJECT:
Status of Revisions to Nuclear Engineering / Dept. 478 j
Subsection IWE for Groton, Connecticut 06340-4989 Containment inservice Phone:
(203) 446-3904 Inspection Fax:
(203) 441-1400 t
DATE:
November 15,1989 COPY TO:
K.I. Baron S.H. Bush TO:
Mr. Robert J. Bosnek Deputy Director O. F. Hedden
- 0. C. Millman Division of Engineerin" C.V. Moore
)
U.S. Nuclear Reguletory Commission Washington, DC 20555 A. Murphy D.J. Neus-R. L. West j
SO/ Containment
Dear Bob,
WO/ Concrete I would like to thank you on behalf of the ASME Section XI Subgro,up on Containment and the l
Working Group on Concrete Pressure Components for arranging to have Andy Murphy attend our recent meetings in Orlando. I most certainly appreciate the opportunity that his visit provided to establish a cooperative basis for proceeding to obtain USNRC approval and implementation of both Subsection IWL and Subsection IWE.
The following is a summary of the status of actions related to Subsection lWL and Subsection IWE es of the meetings in Orlancb from November 5-9, 1989.
(SO/C) item numbers are shown to factl1 tate tracking of these items. Subcommittee (ISI) and Subg ADDroval of buDSeClion lWL- /nMrV4F /nSArt/m. NeM/r enf reb /dtPMm/
Raxnrmimts nr C/en tY lb7/atnmmis of lids /-Weter Cw/af P/mts. SC/kn X/.
Divisim /
1 The Working Group on Concrete Pressure Components unanimously approved a motion on November 7,1989 to encbrse the USNRC proceeding with approval of the rules in Subsection IWL in 10CFR50.55a as a first priority in parallel with endorsement of Coch Case N-478 in USNRC Regulatory Outde 1.147. Code Case N-478 has been approved through the Board on Nuclear Codes and Standards and is being prepared for publication in the next Nuclear Code Case Supplement. The Code Case is identical to the rules in Section XI, Subsection IWL,1986 Edition with 1988 Addende. The action taken by the Working Group was unanimously approved by the Subgroup on Containment on November 8,1989.
ih a
si 1
l l4 w
l CIlElIBITTEE CORRESPODDEHCE.
Mr. Rcbert J. Bosnak November 15,1989 Page 2 e
Co6e Case for Subsection \\WE-Inservix /nspsettbn. Repett end Ren/ ament Rcovirements for Cless MCendMetallib L iners Of C/ess T QvnD0neots Of / lbf//- Wefer avla1Plents. S6ctibnX/. Divisibn 1 (lS1-89-038)
This Code Case provides that the rules in the 1989 Edition of Subsection IWE in conjunction with the applicable rules of Subsection IWA and Subsection lWB of Section XI, Division i shall be used for the inservice inspection, repair and replacement for Class MC and metallic liners of Class CC components of light-water cooled puwer plents The Code Ca3e was approved by the Subgroup on Containment on November 8,1989 and was unanimously approved by the Subcommittm on Nuclear Inservi inspection on Nwember 9,1989. It will be forwarde:! to the Main Committee for appro.al.
Revisions to Subsection IWE to Provide Rules for the Visual Examination of Base Metal Examination Areas (ISI-89-027)
This revision was unanimously approved by the Subcommittee on Nuclear inservice inspection on November 9,1989 and will be forwarded to the Main Committee for approval. This action provides for periodic YT-1 visual examination of base metal examination areas susceptible to corrosion or degradation. Areas susceptible to corrosion or degradation are to be defined on a case by case basis for each containment type or are to be identified as a result of the general inspection prior to each Type A test or as a result of the 10-year VT-1 visual examination. Table IWE-2500- 1, Examination Category E0, and corresponding text is added to Subsection IWE to define the examination requirements and acceptance criteria. This action was initiated by the Subgroup on Containment in 1987 and was unanimously approved by the Subgroup at the August 30,1989 meeting in Boston.
j Revisions to Subsection lWE to Reduce or Delete Inservice insoections of Welds an e
Restate and Clarify the 10CFR50. ADoendix J Reouirement for Insoection of Containments Prior to a Tvoe A Test (SG/C-89-006)
The Subgroup reached a consensus on the following:
1.
Perform the general inspection now required by 10CFR50, Appendix J, prior to each Type A Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test. The required inspection shall be performed by or under the direction of a " Responsible Engineer" and shall include all areas of the containment structure essential for containment pressure-retaining integrity. All areas in question shall be repaired or replaced or found acceptable by en engineering evaluation prior to the Type A test. Areas of observed or potential base metal degradation shall be identified and shall be subject to periodic inspections as base metal examination areas (See 151-89-027). (SG/C-89-006)
g ** *' CQ
.?
UNITED s T A Tr3 5js h
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f
usmuoton. o c. 20sss
..'... /
March 15, 1989 MEMORANDU!1 FOR: Eric S. Beckjord, Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research FROM:
Stuart A. Treby Assistant General Counsel for Rulemaking and fuel Cycle Office of the General Counsel
SUBJECT:
APPLICATION OF THE BACKFIT RULE (10 CFR 6 50.109) TO AMENDMENTS TO CODES AND STANDARDS REGULATI'"! (10 By memorandum dated October 20, 1988, you reouested OGC concurrence on a pro-posed rulemaking package to amend 10 CFR 50.55a, " Codes and stendaros," to in-corporate by reference Subsection IKE of Section XI, Division I, of the ASME Boiler and Pressure-Vessel Code ("ASPE Code").This office reviewed that rule making package. On November 2, 1988, OGC returned the package to the RES con-tact, Mr. W.E. Norris, noting that although OGC had several editorial comments that it wanted incorporated, 0GC had.no legal objection to the action being proposed.
Because the concurrence package proposing the rulemaking did not include a concurrence page, RES requested a formal written memorandum from OGC confirming its position of "no legal objection"' to the proposed action and stating OGC's position both on the general applicability"of the "backfit rule" to routine updates to 6 50.55a and on the specific "backfit" issue raisea by the proposed action.
Those are the purposes of this document.
With respect to routine updates to 10 CFR 50.55a, it has consistently been the positionoftheOfficeoftheGeneralCounselthatsuchroutineupdates,wh incorporate by reference new Editions and/or Addenda of the ASME Code, are not subject to the backfit provisions of 10 CFR 50.109.
The legal bases for this 9 position are:
(1) the Section Ill, Division 1, updates apply only to new con-struction (i.e., the Edition and Addenda of the ASME Code to be used in the construction of a plant are selected based upon the date'of the construction permit and are not changed thereaf ter, except voluntarily by inservice inspection program every 10 years to the latest Edition and Addenda of Section XI of the ASME Code incorporated by reference into 6 50.55a twelve months before the start of the next inspection interval; and (3) endorsing and updating references to the ASME Code, a national consensus standard developed by participants (including both the NRC and representatives of the regulated industry) with broad and and varied interests, is consistent with both the in-tent and spirit of the backfit rule (i.e., the NRC provides for the protection of the public health and safety but does not unilaterally impose an undue bur-den on applicants cr licensees).
b L
. Unlike routine updates to % 50.55a, the proposed action would incorporate by reference the provisions of Subsection IWE of Section XI, Division 1, of the ASME Code. A Subsection not heretofore incorporated by reference, Subsection IWE would impose some new and additional inservice inspection requirements on existing licensees.
Thus, this action raises the question whether such incor-poration by reference constitutes a backfit within the scope of 5 50.109. The specific backfit question raised by the proposed action was addressed at an August 4,1988, meeting between RES and 0GC personnel and again at a meeting between OGC and NRR personnel on January 23, 1989. 0GC recognizes that the provisions of Subsection IWE were developed through the process used to formu-late national consensus standards and, consequently, received review and com-ment by NRC personnel and representatives of the regulated industry as well as by other individuals with expertise in the subject matter. addressed by Subsec-tion IWE. OGC also agrees with the RES position that Subsection IWE provides acceptable minimum requirements for the inservice inspection of certain spect-fied containment types and, therefore,- represents responsible application of engineering judgment to assure' adequate protection of the public health and safety.
It is, therefore 0GC's opinion that is 50.109(a)(2) and (a)(3) of the backfit rule do not apply because this action is within the scope of 9 50.109(a)(4)(ii).
The justification for imposing the requirements of Subsection IWE as adequate protection of the public health and safety is discussed in Appendix B of the regulatory analysis which is entitled "50.109 Documented Evaluation."
l5/
Stuart A. Treby Assistant General Counsel for Rulemaking and Fuel Cycle Office of the General Counsel DISTRIBUTION:
Central Files Regs OGC r/f OGC s/f EJakel STreby CODES & STANDARDS RULE 3/2/89 i
F
- RLFC/0GC
- D/RI.FC/DGC NAME
- EJakel { Q :STreby
-.----.:......... g...:___........
DATE
- 3/3/89
- 3// /89 m
,n
_,..m,,,,
,,g.,
,yy
_e
,,_.y, p.,,.
97..g.,7,,
n g
PROCESSING OF AMENDMENTS TO 10 CFR 50.55A RELATIVE TO BACKFIT RULE INVOLVING SECTIONS III AND X! 0F THE ASME CODE TYPE OF AMENDMENT BACKFIT CRGR REVIEW ROUTIflE UPDATE WITil NO NOT SUBJECT TO BACKFIT PROPOSED:
Rule SUBMITTED MODIFICATIONS OR PROVISIONS OF 50.109 FOR INFORMATION. PRESENTATION LIMITATIONS NOT' REQUIRED, FINAL: RULE PACKAGE INCLUDING RESOLUTION OF PUBLIC COMMENTS SUBMITTED FOR INFORMAT!ON.
PRESENTATION ONLY IN EVENT OF SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC COMMEflTS.
OR UPDATE WITH SPECIFIED MODIFICATIONS pr PROPOSED AND FINAL -
NRC MODIFICATIONS OR LIMITATIONS SUBJECT PRESENTATION TO CRGR LIMITATIONS TO BACKFIT. BALANCE ON MODIFICATIONS OF OF UPDATE NOT SUBJECT LIMITATIONS PORTION TO BACKFIT.
INCORPORATION OF PORTIONS SUBJECT TO BACKFil PROPOSED AND FINAL -
OF ASME CODE NOT PREVIOUSLY PRESENTATIONS TO CRGR ENDORSED NOTE: WE BELIEVE IN MOST CASES EDO HAS AUTHORITY TO APPROVE ISSUANCE OF RULE.
4
ASME CODE CASES IN REGULATORY GUIDES 1.8ti, 1.85, 1.117 1
ANNUAL REVISIONS
. TYPE OF REVISION CRGR REVIEW ROUTINE PICK-UP OF CODE CASES WITH GUIDE SUBMITTED FOR INFORMATION NO MODIFICATIONS OR LIMITATIONS PICK-UP CASES WITH MODIFICATIONS PRESENTATION TO CRGR ON MODIFICATIONS OR LIMITATIONS OR LIMITATIONS PORTION
= -
. to the Minutes of CRGR Meeting No. 175 NUBARG Appeal on Nuclear Hydrotesting 4
4 l
December 5, 1989 TOPIC The Committee discussed a proposed EDO response to the NUBARG Appeal on the NRC i
staff position prohibiting nuclear hydrotesting.
This matter was discussed earlier at Meeting Nos. 172 and 174.
There were no presentations by the staff at this meeting.
BACKGROUND There were no new background documents provided by the staff for the continued consideration of this matter at this meeting.
CONCLUSIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS As a result of their review of this issue, including discussions with the staff at Meeting Nos. 172, 174, and this meeting, the Committee agreed on the form and positions of the proposed ED0 response to NUBARG regarding their appeal.
The consensus CRGR conclusions regarding the technical, legal, and procedural backfit issues raised by the appeal, and the consensus CRGR recommendations regarding proper disposition of those issues, are included in the enclosed draft response to NUMARC (Attachment 1).
The Committee will consider further the need for possible additional recommendations to the EDO in this matter, outside the context of the response to NUBARG (to be discussed at a future meeting).
l
i i
' [pa aro v
I c,
UNITED STATES
[ y,.mf j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
. \\ W/
c WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
- .k 'f f o,,gv j Mr. Nicholas S. Reynolds Mr. Daniel F. Stenger Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform Group Suite 800 1400 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20005 Dear Messrs. Reynolds and Stenger.
SUBJECT:
BACKFITTING APPEAL REGARDING SYSTEM HYDROSTATIC AND LEAKAGE TESTING This is in response to your letter dated March 16, 1989 to me transmitting the backfitting appeal regarding the NRC staff position which prohibits the use of nuclear heat in the system hydrostatic and leakage testing of boiling water reactors (BWRs), as was done previously at the Hatch plant.
This matter has been given careful consideration and your appeal has received an independent i
review by the Committee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR).
The evaluation of your appeal focused in three main areas:
(a) the technical correctness from a safety point of view of the disputed NRC staff position; (b) the clarity of applicable regulations and other legal requirements, e.g., license conditions and any approved staff positions interpreting or implementing the applicable regulations; and (c) the question of whether the disputed staff position constitutes backfitting (as defined in 10 CFR 50.109, and in applicable internal NRC procedures such as the CRGR Charter and NRC Manual Chapter 0514).
As a result of this thorough review, my determinations are summarized as follows:
1.
The primary staff safety concerns with nuclear hydrotesting as done at l
the Hatch facility are: (1) it is contrary to the principle that nuclear operation of a plant should not commence before completion of hydrotesting to verify the basic integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RPCB), a principal defense-in-depth barrier to the accidental release of fission products; and (2) it involves plant conditions and a creates a severe working environment that encumber required inspections during hydrotest, to such extent as to call into serious question the adequacy and ability of those inspections to properly verify reactor coolant boundary integrity. These are legitimate and serious safety concerns, and irrespective of possible confusion that may have resulted from ambi-guities in governing requirements and staff positions, I conclude that the staff's technical safety views on the matter are sound; and, therefore, as a significant safety matter, the disputed staff position should be upheld.
Accordingly, that aspect of your appeal is denied.
- DRAFT -
Attachment to Enclosure 4
~...
2-2.
There are ambiguities and apparent inconsistencies in the regulations and associated staff positions central to the nuclear hydrotest issue, as indicated in your appeal.
These ambiguities will be clarified by appro-priate revisions to the applicable regulations and staff guidance in order that the staff's long-standing safety views regarding nuclear hydrotest-ing, as reflected in the disputed staff position, are clearly understood by all conce,'ned.
Actions taken by the staff for needed clarifications will be conducted in accordance with applicable provisions of the backfit rule and the procedures specified in the CRGR Charter and NRC Manual Chapter 0514.
l l
3.
In the case of Hatch, the licensee indicated to the NRC that they wanted l
the issues involved decided on their technical merits and not under the j
provisions of the backfit rule.
Accordingly, although the staff's action in imposing the disputed position (by prohibiting nuclear hydrotesting) at Hatch was arguably.a backfit, no formal plant-specific backfit claim or appeal challenging that action was ever submitted by the licensee.
The disputed staff position has not been challenged at any other facility; and it has'not been necessary to clarify the hydrotesting requirements at other facilities as was done at Hatch.
Specifically, the staff has not taken generic action at other facilities with regard to the disputed staff position subsequent to their action at Hatch.
That being the case, there is no valid basis for any generic backfitting claim or appeal in this matter.
No further determination is required, therefore, regarding that aspect of your appeal.
All of the points summarized above are discussed further in the enclosure.
I appreciate the keen interest in the proper administration of the agency's backfit control process shown by your letter.
Mutual benefit should always come from the added insights that result from the exercise of established appeal mechanisms on important issues such as nuclear hydrotesting.
Sincerely, James M. Taylor Executive Director for OperatioKs
Enclosure:
As stated l
l
- DRAFT -
<+-,.. -.,,,.
,.-t.
...,.__m,.,
1 2.
There are ambiguities and apparent inconsistencies in the regulations and associated staff positions central to the nuclear hydrotest issue, as indicated in your appeal.
These ambiguities will be. clarified by appro-priate revisions to the applicable regulations and staff guidance in order that the staff's long-standing safety views regarding nuclear hydrotest-ing, as reflected in the disputed staff position, are clearly understood by all concerned.
Actions taken by the staff for needed clarifications will be conducted in accordance with applicable provisions of the backfit rule and the procedures specified in the CRGR Charter and NRC Manual Chapter 0514.
3.
In the case of Hatch, the licensee indicated to the NRC that they wanted the issues involved decided on their technical merits and not under the provisions of the backfit rule.
Accordingly, although the staff's action in imposing the disputed position (by prohibiting nuclear hydrotesting) at Hatch was arguably a backfit, no formal plant-specific backfit claim or appeal challenging that action was ever submitted by the licensee.
The disputed staff position has not been challenged at any other facility; and it has not been necessary to clarify the hydrotesting requirements at other facilities as was done at Hatch.
Specifically, the staff has'not taken generic action at other facilities with regard to the disputed staff positior, subsequent to their action at Hatch.
That being the case, there.
l is no valid basis for any generic backfitting claim or appeal in this l
matter.
No further determination is required, therefore,'regarding that aspect of your appeal.
i 1
All of the points summarized above are discussed further in the enclosure.
l I appreciate the keen interest in the proper administration of the agency's l
backfit control process shown by your letter.
Mutual benefit should always come from the added insights that result from the exercise.of established appeal mechanisms on important issues such as nuclear hydrotesting.
Sincerely, James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations
Enclosure:
As stated Distribution:
l Central File J. Heltemes
(
ED0 RF D. Allison AE0D CF J. Conran J. Taylor E. Jordan 0FC : AE0D:CRGR : AE0D:00
. AE00:0
- E00 NAME : JConran
- CJHeltemes : ELJordan
- JMTaylor DATE : 12/18/89
- 12/ /89
- 12/ /89
- 12/ /89
l l
l DETAILED DISCUSSION OF EDO DETERMINATIONS ON NUBARG BACKFIT APPEAL A.
Safety Aspects of the Nuclear Hydrotesting Issue 1.
Technical Correctness of the Disputed Staff Position The assured integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RPCB) is fundamental to the safe operation of nuclear power plants and is, therefore, of critical importance in adequately assuring the protec-tion of public health and safety.
For this reason, General Design Criterion (GDC) 14 requires explicitly that the reactor coolant pressure boundary shall be designed, fabricated, erected and tested so as to have an extremely low probability of abnormal leakage, of rapidly propagating failure, and of gross rupture.
The tests performed pursuant to GDC-14 are specified in the ASME Code and are referred to as system hydrostatic and leakage tests.
System hydrostatic tests are conducted prior to initial operation, prior to operation following modification or repair of the RPCB, and at ten year intervals during the life of a plant.
System leakage tests are performed prior to operation following each refueling outage.
If the objectives of these system pressure tests are to be met, and the results relied on, careful and thorough inspection for leakage from the reactor coolant boundary during hydrotesting is essential.
The adequacy of inspections done during hydrotesting is, therefore, an important factor in assuring adequate protection of public health and safety.
l In system leakage tests as they were conducted previously at the Hatch facility, heat produced by a critical reactor core was used to raise reactor coolant temperatures to the normal operating range (i.e., approximately 550 F), and reactor vessel water level was maintained at the normal operating level.
This practice involves the following safety implications and consequences:
a.
The elevated reactor coolant temperatures result in a severely uncomfortable and difficult working environment in plant spaces where hydrotest inspections must be conducted.
The greatly increased stored energy in the reactor coolant increases the hazard to personnel and equipment in the event of a leak; and the elevated temperatures contribute to increased concerns for personnel safety due to burn hazards, even if there is no leak-age.
As a result, the ability and perhaps even the willingness, under such adverse condition, for plant workers to perform a comprehensive and careful inspection becomes greatly diminished.
l l
b.
The requirement for closed containment when reactor coolant temperatures are greatly in excess of 200 F means that the containment vessel head must be installed during nuclear hydrotest.
Installation of the containment head, however, results in physical interferences that restrict access to
- DRAFT -
e 2-portions of RPCB that must be inspected during hydrotest; and this further diminishes the ability of plant personnel to perform thorough and careful hydrotest inspections.
c.
In accordance with the defense-in-depth safety precept, nuclear power plant design provides multiple barriers to the accidental release of fission products from the reactor; and the RPCB is one of the principal fission product barriers in the plant.
Consistent with this conservative approach to the protection of public health and safety, and the critical importance of the RPCB in preventing the release of fission products that result from nuclear operation of the reactor, the staff has long been of the view that verification of the integrity of the RPCB is a necessary prerequisite to any nuclear operation of the reactor.
Taking the reactor critical for the purpose of hydrotesting, which is done to verify RPCB integrity, is contrary to this basic safety principle.
l In conclusion of the above, nuclear hydrotesting as done at Hatch l
involves serious impediments to careful and complete hydrotest l
inspections and, thus, inherent uncertainty with regard to assuring the integrity of the RPC8; further the practice is not consistent i
with basic defense-in-depth nuclear safety principles.
Accordingly, it should be prohibited as a widespread, routine industry practice.
2.
Related Issues a.
The NUBARG appeal noted an earlier documented staff statement l
that appears to downplay safety concerns associated with nuclear hydrotesting and to contradict the view given above that this practice raises significant safety concerns that justify its prohibition.
It should be recognized that the context for that statement was a discussion of the staff's rationale for granting a one-time exception to allow a repeat of an established practice (at Hatch); it was not the staff's intent that their statement in that specific context be construed to apply more broadly to address the possible suitability of nuclear hydro-testing as a routine industry-wide practice.
If not read in the proper context, that earlier statement may be subject to misinterpretation; but, in the immediate context (i.e., the recent extensive discussions within the staff of the nuclear hydrotest appeal by NUBARG), it is clear that there exists a broad and strong consensus within the staff, regarding the seriousness of the safety concerns raised by the previous nuclear hydrotest practices at Hatch, for widespread use by licensees as a routine means of hydrotest conduct.
i b.
The NUBARG appeal states that the elevated system temperatures l
employed in nuclear hydrotesting (i.e., near 550 F) are l
"particularly advantageous," in that testing can be done in a l
region where brittle fracture is not a concern.
The staff believes that statement is misleading in its implications and,
- DRAFT -
(
r in any event, of little safety import.
The minimum tempera-tures required by Appendix G for pressure testing (e.g., in the range 150 -250 F) are high enough that brittle fracture is not a concern, regardless of the method used to heat the reactor coolant.
Said another way, the staff believes that there is insignificant difference in the brittle fracture susceptibility of a reactor vessel over over the range from minimum tempera-tures allowed by Appendix G to normal operating temperatures.
c.
The NUBARG appeal states that nuclear hydrotesting permits higher system temperatures than are possible using pump heat alone.
While that is true, the implication that the only choice is hydrotest with nuclear heat, or hydrotest with recirc pump heat, is not true.
Other alternative methods for obtaining higher system temperatures for hydrotest have been identified by the staff, other licensees and the reactor vendor.
Examples are: use of available steam from an existing plant heating boiler; use of an auxiliary boiler provided for the specific purpose of hydrotest heating; and use of pumps other than recirc pumps, with different operating characteristics (e.g., RHR pumps).
Those alternative hydrotest heating methods are not objectionable to the staff on fundamental safety grounds (as is nuclear heating); and they appear practical with regard to design and operational factors and cost.
One such system has already been installed at the Nine Mile Point plant.
d.
The NUBARG appeal asserts that the recirc pump heating method could contribute to operational unreliability of the pumps used, because running those pumps outside their normal design condi-tions could jeopardize pump performance characteristics or increase pump maintenance because of seal wear.
This assertion was stated as a potential concern; but no objective evidence is provided in the appeal to substantiate it.
The staff is not aware of any available operating experience data to support a finding that such pump use presents a significant reliability issue.
Since this atsertion could not be validated, it does not establish a basis to justify use of nuclear heat rather than pump heat.
Even if such concerns were to be subsequently validated, the staft' is aware of alternative hydrotest heating methods that could te safely and practicably employed, as dis-cussed in 2.c. above B.
Clarity of Applicable Regulations and Previously-Approved Staff Positions It is clear, from the recent extensive discussions of the NUBARG appeal, that the staff has believed for many years that certain practices and reactor plant conditions, that are basic features of the nuclear hydrotest method, should be prohibited, i.e., (1) the production of heat by a critical reactor core to raise the temperature of the reactor coolant and pressurize the reactor coolant boundary for hydrotest; (2) pressurizing the RPCB with water-and-steam for hydrotest, rather than hydrotesting in essentially a water-solid condition; and (3) the greatly increased stored energy in the reactor coolant, when hydrotest temperatures are in the normal reactor operating range (i.e., near 550 F), rather than near the
- DRAFT -
' " l minimum temperature compatible with brittle fracture limitations (i.e., in the range from about 150 F for new reactor vessels, up to about 250 F for some highly-irradiated reactor vessels).
It is also clear that the staff's intent was not consistently and unambiguously reflected in applic-able regulations and documented staff positions intended to convey the staff's thinking in these areas, as illustrated by the following examples:
1.
Core Criticality Prohibition During.Hydrotesting NUBARG noted in their appeal the following statement in paragraph IV.A.S. of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50:
"If there is fuel in the reactor during system hydrostatic pressure tests.or leak tests, the requirements of paragraphs 2 or 3 of this section apply, depending on whether the core is critical during the test."
(emphasis added)
NUBARG's reading of this paragraph is. that it permits hydrostatic and leakage testing with the core critical.
The staff's response is that the scope of Appendix G is'" fracture toughness requirements" only; that scope is stated clearly in the title of Appendix G, and Appendix G was never intended to include or specify system opera-tional requirements.
It is not correct, therefore, to interpret paragraph IV.A.5. as permitting nuclear hydrotesting.
The final' phrase in IV. A.5. (underlined above) was included in the rule :for the sake of completeness, to specify appropriate fracture toughness requirements in the event that a licensee for some reason wanted to l
have the core critical during hydrotest, and was given approval to l
do so (e.g., as in the case of the Hatch units, where nuclear hydro-testing was allowed one last time as an approved exception).
That explanation is understandable; but the ambiguity in the words of the rule, and the resultant potential for~ misunderstanding their intent (as NUBARG did), must nevertheless be acknowledged.
NUBARG indicates in their appeal that they were misled regarding the staff's intent to prohibit core criticality during hydrotest, not only by the ambiguous wording included explicitly in paragraph IV.A.5.,
but by omission, in the final form of paragraph IV.A.3., of language (underlined below) that appeared in its forerunner staff position given in the SER on topical report NED0-21778-A.
That staff position read as follows:
"When the core is critical (other than for the purpose of low-level physics tests) the temperature of the reactor vessel shall not be less than 40 F above (22 C above) the minimum 1
permissible temperature of-paragraph e. of this section nor less than 60 F above (33 C above).the reference temperature l
of the closure flange regions that are highly stressed by the bolt preload.
All control rods shall be fully inserted during hydrotests."
(emphasis added)
The underlined sentence was included in the staff's position in the SER specifically to preclude core criticality for the purpose of.
- DRAFT -
5-warming the reactor vessel for hydrotest (to reduce the possibility of a control rod drop accident while the reactor vessel is water-solid for hydrotest).
Omission of the underlined wording (in para-graph IV.A.3. of the rule finally published) is seen by NUBARG, therefore, as reinforcing the suggestion lent by language actually included in the final rule (i.e., paragraph IV.A.5., as discussed above) that the wording of the final rule (by intent) permits nuclear hydrotesting.
It is not correct, of course, for NUBARG to presume that, because the underlined sentence was not included in the rule, it is no longer the staff's position.
(Obviously, many staff positions are never incorporated into the regulations.) Another i
problem, however, is that the sentence'omitted from the rule does not correctly state the staff's. intent anyway.
The specific words chosen by the. staff for statement of their. position in the SER would l
certainly have precluded criticality during hydrotest; but it would also have precluded an allowed practice by licensees that the staff had no intention of precluding, i.e., the exercising of individual control rods (without resultant criticality of the core) during hydrotest.
The sentence in question, then, is not a correct state-ment of the staff's intent, either as part of a rule or as an approved staff position; and this must be acknowledged as a further source of possible confusion for licensees in this area.
A further source of ambiguity in NRC regulations (specifically, 10 CFR 50.55(a)), regarding the intended state of the reactor core i
during hydrotest, arises from wording in Section XI specifying that system pressure tests be completed before " plant startup."' The staff's long-held view on this point is that the term " plant startup" equates to " reactor startup." As noted in the NUBARG appeal, however, some licensees interpret " plant startup" to mean something different than " reactor startup" (specifically, power operation of the core i
sufficient to roll the turbines).
Because the issuing authority l
(ASME) has indicated explicitly that reactor criticality was not intended to be addressed in Section XI, and because the staff itself differentiates between the terms " reactor" and " plant" in'many other contexts, the possibility for licensee confusion regarding the intended meaning of the term " plant startup" must be acknowledged.
From the discussion of the illustrative examples above,'it is clear that there are ambiguities, in both the applicable regulations and the documented staff positions that deal witF core criticality during hydrotest, that must be clarified, to provide reasonable assurance that the staff's intent to preclude such practice is properly under-stood and. implemented.by all licensees.
One step already taken to remedy this situation is the initiation of rulemaking action to amend Appendix G.
I 2.
Water-Solid Hydrotesting l
The staff's historical view has been that hydrotesting must be done l
essentially water-solid.
Notwithstanding this long-standing view and intent, the applicable ASME Code provisions incorporated into NRC regulations are ambiguous on this point.
ASME Section III specifies
- DRAFT -
l
i
<,.. l 4
4
'l that the initial (construction) hydrostatic test of a reactor vessel be done using "... water or other suitable liquid..." (emphasis
}
added); but, all subsequent system leakage tests in operating power
?
I plants are governed by ASME Section XI, which specifies'that pressurization of the test boundary be done using " reactor coolant."
The staff has always understood and intended the term " reactor coolant" to mean liquid water for the hydrotesting of both PWRs and BWRs.
Some licensees, however, understood this term to permit
+
pressurization using both steam-and-water in hydrotesting of BWRs.
As noted in the NUBARG appeal, this usage is supported by a recent ASME Code interpretation; but the staff intends to take formal exception to that interpretation in the regulations, if necessary, to make clear the staff's intent regarding water-solid hydrotesting of nuclear power plant systems.
3.
Stored Energy Concerns at Elevated Hydrotest Temperatures The. staff's intended position is that stored energy in the reactor 1
coolant should be' minimized during hydrotest (consistent, of course, with the specification of other required plant conditions).
This seems to the staff to fall.into the category of axiomatic, common sense, prudent engineering safety practice; so much so that it apparently did not occur to the staff that it needed to be documented in the applicable regulations and approved' positions prior to the Hatch review.
Although the staff did not envision that any licensee would conduct required hydrotesting at 550 F with a large vapor space in the top head and the core critical. it is clear now that explicit prohibition against such practice must be' included in the applicable regulations and staff positions governing hydrotest to make clear the staff's intent in that regard.
C.
Backfit Questions Raised by the NUBARG Appeal l
The most basic elements of a "backfit" (from definitions of backfitting in the Backfit Rule, NRC Manual Chapter 0514, and the CRGR Charter) are that it involves changes to requirements or previously-approved staff positions i
that are imposed on licensees.
In the plant-specific backfit context, j
plant Tech Specs are clearly identified (in NRC MC-0514) as " approved j
staff positions."
In the Hatch case, because of the ongoing licensee /
staff discussions in 1987 regarding nuclear hydrotest practices at that facility, J. H. Sniezek, Deputy Director, NRR, asked J. P. 0'Reilly, Georgia Power Company (GPC) whether that. utility desired.to make a backfit claim in the matter.
GPC indicated that they wanted to decide the matter solely on the technical merits, not under backfit rule provisions; and the staff proceeded on that agreed course of action to resolve the matter.
i The staff's decision based on safety considerations outlined above was to-halt nuclear hydrotesting at the Hatch facility.
Although the staff's intent was that nuclear hydrotesting should not be done at any BWR facility, no steps were ever taken by the staff to formally impose that position at other plants subsequent to the Hatch decision.
The staff saw no need for for further action in that regard, because they did not regard the staff position imposed at Hatch as a new position, and they were not aware of any use by other licensees of nuclear hydrotesting as done at Hatch.
- DRAFT -
s an
- From information considered in the recent review of the NUBARG appeal (specifically, topical report NEDC-31140), it appears that most BWR licensees do not regard nuclear hydrotesting as an attractive alternative technically for application at their facilities; or they see conflicts with existing plant Tech Specs, and anticipate (correctly, in view of the discussion in A. above) significant impediments to getting approval to use the method at their facilities.
There is some indication in NEDC-31140 that a few BWR facilities other than Hatch used (or had an interest in using) some nuclear hydrotest practices at some time in the past; but the evidence is not clear on that point, and the staff is not aware of any current use of nuclear hydrotesting as done at Hatch.
In summary, this case seems to involve (1) a single instance of plant-specific imposition of the disputed staff position without a backfit analysis, claim, or appeal per MC-0514 procedures; and (2) no generic imposition of the disputed staff position at other BWR facilities, to date.
There is no valid basis, therefore, for a generic backfitting claim or appeal in the matter; and no further action is required on that aspect of the NUBARG appeal.
i
- D8 AFT -
1