ML20029E174

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Forwards Matl on CRGR Meeting 179 Re Proposed Bulletin on Loss of fill-oil in Transmitters Mfg by Rosemount & Proposed Generic Ltr to Correct Deficiency in BWR Critical Power Ratio Calculations Involving Channel Box Low
ML20029E174
Person / Time
Issue date: 05/10/1994
From: Allison D
NRC
To:
NRC
Shared Package
ML20028G719 List:
References
NUDOCS 9405170147
Download: ML20029E174 (2)


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MEMORANDUM FOR:

James M.

Taylor Executive Director for Operations rROM:

Edward L. Jordan, Chairman Committee to Review Generic Requirements

SUBJECT:

MINUTES OF CRGR MEETING NUMBER 179 The Committee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR) met on Wednesday, February 7,1990 f rom 1: 00-4: 30 p.m.

The following items were addressed at the meeting 1.

S. Newberry (NRR) and C. Berlinger (NRR) presented for CRGR review a proposed bulletin on Loss of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount.

The Committee recommended issuing the bulletin subject to several revisions to be coordinated with the CRGR staff.

This matter is discussed in Enclosure 2.

2.

D. Fieno (NRR) and L. Phillips (NRR) presented for CRGR review a proposed generic letter to correct a deficiency in BWR critical power ratio calculations involving channel box low.

The Committee recommended in favor of issuing the proposed positions, subject to a number of revisions, in the form of a bulletin.

The revised proposal would be circulated to members on a negative consent basis.

No further meetings were planned.

This matter is discussed in Enclosure 3.

In accordance with the ED0's July 18, 1983 directive concerning " Feedback and Closure of CRGR Reviews," a written response is required from the cognizant office to report agreement or disagreement with the CRGR recommendations in these minutes.

The response, which is required within five working days after receipt of these minutes, is to be forwarded to the CRGR Chairman and if there is disagreement with CRGR recommendations, to the EDO for decisionmaking.

Questions concerning these meeting minutes should be referred to Dennis Allison (492-4148).

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ELJ' Edward L. Jordan, Chairman Committee to Review Generic Requirements

Enclosures:

As stated cc:

See next page Distribution: See next page r {jf 3p s

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i James M. Taylor cc w/ enclosures:

Commission (5)

SECY J. Lieberman P. Norry D. Williams Regional Administrators CRGR Members Distribution:

Central File (w/o encl.)

POR (NRC/CRGR) (w/o enc 1.)

P. Kadambi CRGR CF CRGR SF M. Taylor

.E.

Rossi C. Berlinger R. Jones D. Fieno A. Thadani S. Newberry R. W. Houston E. Jordan D. Ross J. Conran D. Allison 3

I Attendence List for CRGR Meeting Number 179 CRGR Members E. Jordan S. Lewis (for J. Moore)

J. Sniezek J. Murphy (for D. Ross)

L. Reyes G. Arlotto NRC Staff J. Heltemes J. Conran D. Allison E. Rossi A. Thadani C. Berlinger-S. Newberry J. Ramsey V. Thomas J. Mauck L. Whitney P. Khadambi L.' Phillips D. Fieno R. Jones P

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t to the Minutes of CRGR Meeting No. 179 Proposed Bulletin on Loss of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount February 7, 1990 TOPIC C. Berlinger (NRR), S. Newberry (NRR), A. Thadani (NRR), and E. Rossi (NRR),

presented for CRGR review a proposed bulletin on loss of fill-oil in transmitters manufactured by Rosemount.

Rosemount transmitter Models 1151, 1152, 1153 and 1154 were widely used in the nuclear industry.

It had been reported that they were susceptible to failure due to loss of full-oil from the transmitters' seals sensing modules.

In addition, transmitters of other manufacturers that use the same components might be susceptible to failures from the same cause.

The proposed bulletin would request that licensees identify the subject transmitters, review experience from symptoms of oil leakage.

In this process, licensees would develop acceptance criteria and replace transmitters when needed.

Transmitters from suspect lots (which were known to be highly susceptible to failure) would be replaced on an expedited basis.

Licensees were also requested to develop and maintain bases for continued operation for the time from identification of oil leakage symptoms until transmitter replacement.

Licensees would be requested to confirm compliance with the above actions.

Further, they would be requested to identify all transmitters indicating symptoms of oil leakage (nr confirmed failure) for staff review to determine failure rates.

They also would be requested to identify transmitters from suspect lots.

For future symptoms or failures which were not reportable to NRC, licensees would be requested to document and maintain records of appropriate information.

The slides used by the staff in its presentation are provided as Attachment 1 to this enclosure.

BACKGROUND The package submitted by the staff for CRGR review of this matter was transmitted by a memorandum dated January 29, 1990, from J. Sniezek to E. Jordan.

The package included:

(1) The proposed bulletin, and (2) Contents of packages submitted to CRGR.

The Committee was also provided with two sets of comments that had been received from industry groups:

1.

A letter dated February 6, 1990, from S Wanek, Rosemount, to C. Berlinger, NRC (Attachment 2 to this enclosure).

2.

A letter dated February 7, 1990, from N. Reynolds, NUBARG, to C. Berlinger, NRC (Attachment 3 to this enclosure)

CONCLUSIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS The Committee recommended issuing the proposed bulletin subject to the following revisions:

1.

The required actions of the bulletin should be limited to Rosemount Models 1153B, 11530, and 1154.

This was the case because there were relatively few known failures in other models and there were design differences that should make other models less susceptible to the specific concern being addressed.

2.

The bulletin should indicate that the NRC was requesting enhanced surveillance consistent with the recommendations of Rosemount, except that the NRC had not accepted Rosemount's " infant mortality" rationale for excluding transmitters that had already been in service under certain time and pressure conditions without failing.

3.

The bulletin should encourage industry organizations to take the lead in compiling the information on operating experience that would be needed for closure of the issue or relaxation of the enhanced surveillance requirements.

4.

The bulletin should make licensees aware that the NRC was continuing to review operating experience with other Rosemount Models (such as 1151 and 1152) and the requirements of the bulletin might be extended to those models in the future.

Licensees should be encouraged (but not required) to report all failures to Rosemount and to include all transmitters in enhanced surveillance programs.

5.

The discussion should be expanded to emphasize the potential risk of undetected and common mode failures as a basis for taking the actions in the bulletin.

The revisions should be coordinated with the CRGR staff.

No further review was anticipated.

1 It was noted that this action was considered to be justified as a compliance

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i PRESENTATION TO THE CRGR FEBRUARY 7, 1990 LOSS OF FILL-Oll IN TRANSMITTERS MANUFACTURED BY ROSEM0UNT I

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4 SLIDE 1 PRINCIPLE OF OPERATION OF VARIABLE CAPACITANCE TRANSMITTERS o

SENSING DIAPHRAGM IS PLACED BETWEEN A SET OF PARALLEL CAPACITOR PLATES CAPACITOR IS FILLED WITH OIL WHEN PRESSURE IS APPLIED TO ISOLATING DIAPHP.AGM A FORCE IS TRANSMITTED THROUGH OIL CAUSING SENSING DIAPHRAGM TO DEFLECT DEFLECTION OF SENSING DIAPHRAGM CAUSES CHANGE IN DIFFERENTIAL CAPACITANCE CHANGE IN DIFFERENTIAL CAPACITANCE IS CHANGED TO OUTFUT CURRENT (TYPICALLY 4-TO 20 OR 10 TO 50 MILLIAMPS).

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DESCRIPTION Of LOSS OF FILL-Oll PHENOMENON OIL LEAKS FROM SEALED CAVITY LEAX 15 NORMALLY INTERNAL TO SENSING MODULE DESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION OF SENSING MODULE IS NORMALLY REQUIRED TO CONFIRM Dil LOSS p

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o SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE TRANSMITTERS ARE UTIL12Fil TO MEASURE PRESSURE, LEVEL, AND FLOW TRANSMITTERS ARE RELIED UPON TO PROVIDE INPUT TO REACTOR CONTROL AN PROTECTION SYSTEMS TRANSMITTERS ARE RELIED UPON TO PROVIDE INPUT TO THE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM TRANSMITTERS WOULD BE REllED UPON BY OPERATORS WHEN TAXING ACTIONS TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT PERFORMANCE OF TRANSMITTERS THAT ARE LEAKING FILL-OlL GRADUALLY DETERIORATES AND MAY EVENTUALLY LEAD TO FAILURE TRANSMITTER Ft.1 LURE DUE TO LOSS OF FILL-0IL MAY NOT BE DETECTAPLE DURING REACTOR OPERATION

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. SLIDE 4 EXTENT OF LOSS OF FILL-0IL PHENOMENON o

LOSS OF FILL-Olt PHENOMENON IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERED BY THE FT'.FF BE APPLICABLE TO MODEL 1151,1152,1153, AND 1154 TRANSMITTERS AND SENSING MODULES MANUFACTURED BY ROSEMOUNT CERTAIN MANUFACTURING LOTS OF MODEL 1153'AND 1154 TRANSf11TTERS H BEEN IDENTIFIED BY ROSEM0UNT AS HAVING EXHIBITED A HIGH FAILURE FRACTION THE STAFF IS ?!0T AWARE OF INFORMATION THAT INDICATES THAT TRANSMITTERS SUPPLIED BY OTHER MANUFACTURERS ARE CURRENTLY EXPERIENCING A SIMILAR PHENOMENON

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS REQUESTED IN BULLETIN 1

IDENTIFY POTENTIALLY SUSCEPTIBLE TRANSMITTERS IN USE IN SAFETY-RELATED AND ATWS (10 CFR 50,62) SYSTEMS.

ESTABLISH AND IMPLEMENT A PROGRAM TO MONITOR THE IDENTIFIED j

TPANSMITTERS REPLACE AT THE EARLIEST APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY THOSE TRANSMITTEP.S-l THAT ARE FROM THE MANUFACTURING LOTS THAT HAVE EXHIBITED A HIGH.

j FAILUPE FRACTION AND ARE. UTILIZED IN THE RPS OR ESFAS i

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SLIDE 6 COMMENTS RECEIVED FROM INDUSTRY ON DRAFT BULLETIN o

INCLUSION OF MODEL 1151 AND 1152 TRANSMITTERS INTO THE ACTIONS RE00ESTED APPLICATION OF ACTIONS REQUESTED TO TRANSMITTERS ThAT UTIll2E FILL-Olt BUT ARE NOT PANUFACTURED BY ROSEMOUNT RESPONSIBLE EFFORT TO /fDRESS DIFFICULT PROBLEM, BUT HAS TECHNICAL INADEQUACIES THAT NEED CLARIFICATION i

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Figure 1 Utility Decision Tree Determine all1153 &

1154 transmitters received

  • y YES Do you have any 1153 No safety concern e

Series A units?

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spares or not Rosemount for in-service?

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U Continue to operate using diagnostic guideline (s) until critical pressure x time in service value is met or until transmitter is replaced.

  • Model 1153 and 1154 with serial numbers less than 500,000 containing the original sensor module Plant specific analysis of application and transmitter diagnostics should be considered

MAXIMUM TIMF IN SERVICE 11 - --

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This visual aid is one of ten used to. support a verbal presentation.

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