ML20028H864
| ML20028H864 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Saint Vrain  |
| Issue date: | 01/25/1991 |
| From: | Crawford A PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF COLORADO |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| P-91035, NUDOCS 9101310180 | |
| Download: ML20028H864 (7) | |
Text
- -.
e 9
) Public Service'
= M L.*
P.O. Box C40 Denver CO 8')201 0840 16805 WCR 19 1/2, Platteville, Colorado 80651 A. Clegg Crawford vice President Nuclear Operations January 2F,1991 Fort St. Vrain Unit No. 1 P-91035 U
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555 Docket No. 50-267
SUBJECT:
Response io NRC Inspection Report 90-15
REFERENCE:
NRC Letter, Collins to Crawford, dated 12/20/90(G-90306)
Dear Sirs:
This letter is in response to the weaknesses identified in the inspection conducted by Dr.
J.B.
Nicholas during the period November 6-8, 1990 (Inspection 90-15). The inspection included the implementation of the emergency plan and prccedures during the annua'l emergency response exercise (FOSAVEX-90).
No violations or deviations were identified.
- However, there were three weaknesses identified in the course of the inspection.
The following is PSC's response and schedule of corrective actions planned for each admitted weakness.
267/9015-01:
The inspectors noted several occasions when exercise cont *ollers or observers prompted CR operators.
a.
At' 0903, the CR communicator inquired of a QA observer the status of the "A" diesel generator and was given the equipment status by 1
the observer, At this time in the exercise scenario, the status of the diesel generators'should ret have been available from. any nonpl ayer-.
b.
At 0922, th= Superintendent of Goerations inquired of an exercise controller the status of the resuvi. auxiliary
.ran s former and was given the information requested. According to the exercise scenario, this information should not have been available at that time from a nonplayer.
I 9101310100 910125
(((),
PDR ADOCK 05000767
,. l
~ ~. -
+.g..
wa
,-on.-..~
~-
a a
a 9
P-93035-
- Page 2-January 25, 1931 c.
At 0929, the CR communicator inquired of an exercise controller as to whether reactor core maintenance had been in progress at the time of the declaration of the emergency.
The CR exercise controller responded negatively to the question from the td communicator.
Since initial plant and reactor conditions had been provided to the CR staff at 0814 and questions. had been
-addressed at that time as to piant activities in progress, the information requested by the CR communicator should not have been available from a nonplayer.
'd.
At' 0955, an exert ise contt oller volunteered the dimensions of the keyway sump to the CR-Emergency Coordinator.
This information was not provided as a contingency message. in the exercise scenario and should have not -been available from a nonplayer.
e.
At. 1057,
.a CR staff member inquired as to how many people were
' injured in the reactor building.
An exercise controller volunteered the infoication of two injured persons.
This infnrmation was conveyed by s ;ontroller message 'in the. exercise t
aio and s'
11 - rit : ave been volunteered verbally from a-te syer.
f.
At 1257,~the CR Emergency Coordinator asked the CR staff what was on Level 4 of the reactor building and' the exercise controller volunteered the information rather'than an exercise player.
This :t;1unteering of exercise information by exercise controllers or observers in response to questions posed by exercise players as-a means. of providing information not currently available from another exercise ulayer is considered an exercise weakness.
PSC Response:
o The ~ weakness is admitted. The controller training lesson plan, PT 017.01,-
will be revised to concentrate more heavily on
('
controller / observer prompting.
The aforementioned' examples of L
volunteering exercise -information by exercise controllers or
' observers will be included in the revision as well.
PSC is contacting other; plants in the industry to obtain ideas as to how u
they; train and prepare their exercise controllers.
E L
PT-017.01, " Controller Duties", will be revised by June 30, 1991..No p
further corrective actions are planned.
L g
lt h
l i
6
4 -
k I
P-91035 Page 3 January 25, 1991 267/9015-02:-.
The inspectors observed several problems with the licensee's ability to follow the emergency notification steps contained-in the licensee's Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP)-CR and RERP-Notification procedures.
The following are examples of the problems observed concerning offsite notifications:
a.
The Emergency Event Notification. Form - Sheet 2 from Procedure RERP-CR, Attachment'B, was not reviewed and approved by the SS/ emergency coordinator (EC) prior to the NOUE notification calls _to the Coualy and State agencies.
The County and State agency. not fications were nade between 0849 and 0852.
During d
that time r,erioc only Emergency Event Notification Form - Sheet I from RERP-CR, Attachment 8, had been reviewed and approved by the SS/EC.
Sneet'2 of the Emergency Event Notification Form was.
approved later by the iS/EC at 0853, b.
The information. contained in line 4 of the Emergency Event-Notification Form - Sheet 2 from Procedure RERP-CR, Attachment B, was not communicated to Weld County authorities during the-initial ' notification: call announcing tne NOUE at 0849.
Line 4 contains information concerning offsite dangers posed by the.
emergency -including. protective action recommendations.
The-information conveying no danger to offsite personnel (line 4, Item A).wes11ater communicated to Weld County officials at 0851
-in ' response -to a return call to the CR form-Weld County requesting the info *mation concerning danger to the public.
c.
-During the initial notification of the NOUE-to thel State-authorities at 0852, the event resulting in -
the NOUE classification was not communicated.
This information was-written on the notification form under the heading of plant-responses, d, _The-emergency event notification form from: Procedure RERP-CR,, used for the exercise ALERT notification'of.offsite agencies, was not reviewed or approved by the CR Emergency Coordinator-prior to the notification of offsite authorities at-
-0906.
The form had. been approved by the SS, but he had been
. relieved of the CR Emergency Coordinatar responsibilities by 'the Operations - and ' Maintenance Manager at 0900, in accordance with Procedure RERP-CR, Attachment B.
Step 7.
Procedure RERP-CR, Attachment B, Sten 6(a), directs the CR Emergency Coordinator to review and approve the completed notification forms.
-e
+
r..,,
e-v
, - - + - ~,,, -
w
4 P-91035 Page 4-January 25, 1991 e.
The followup notification form (RERP-Notification, Atta;1 ment A) was used to notify offsite authorities of the Site Area Emergency at 1045.
Step 3 of this form did not indicate the current-emergency classification.
The licensee's failure to obtain required reviews and approvals on notification forms prior to their use in performing offsite agency notifications and also not disseminating all of the required information contained on the notification message form is considered an exercise weakness.
PSC Response:
The weakness is admitted.
The requirement for proper completion of the emergency notification
- forms, found in both RERP-CR and RERP-Notification, will be stressed to Operations personnel as well as personnel responding to the Technical Support Center in the event of an emergency.
During drills and exercises involving both the Control Room and the Technical Support Center, more emphasis will be placed on. properly filling out notification forms, obtaining the necessary approvals, and conducting effective notification calls to offsite agencies.
Control Room -and Technical Support Center personnel will receive Ltraining on the proper completion of notification forms by April '15,
f 1991.
No further corrective actions are planned.
267/9015-03:
.The inspector noted several problems with'the performance of the rescue operations in a very high radiation area. The following are examples of the problems observed during the rescue operation,
<4 a.
The fire brigade / rescue team did not receive a briefing from 'the CR or TSC before entering Level 5 of the reactor building to begin their search and rescue activities.
For. example, the CR-had radiation readings from various area = radiation monitors in the reactor building in the areas the team was-to enter, but this g
information was not-discussed with the fire origade/ rescue team prior to entering the reactor building. -
b.
The fire brigade / rescue team had difficulty donning their anti-contamination clothing and respirator equipment prior to' entering the reactor building.
The team could have started the search and rescue attempt in the reactor building much sooner if help had been provided to assemble the necessary protective equipment and instruments and help the team get dressed.
l'
4 4
P-91035 Page 5 January 25, 1991 c.
One fire brigade / rescue team member did not place his self-reading pocket dosimeter on the outside of his anti-contamination coveralls.
Self-reading pocket dosimeters should be readily accessible for immediate dose determination when entering ard working.in a high radiation area, d.
The fire brigade / rescue team appeared rather_ disorganized.
No single person was in charge of the team's activities.
There should be assigned a team leade: to oversee and be in charge of the team's activities and act as the communicator between the team and the CR or TSC.
e.
The fire brigade / rescue team entered-the reactor building on Level 5 without the team's health physics technician in the lead position to monitor the radiation fields that they were entering, since this information was-unknown.
This practice of health physics personnel surveying an area prior to entry is standard operating procedure.
This matter was later corrected before _the team entered the truck bay area.
f.
While removing the first injury victim from the reactor building truck bay area, the fire brigade / rescue team membars were 11 radiation areas of 1-11 Rem /hr.
However., no one checked h's self-reading pocket dosimeter to determire the amount af radiation exposure he had received.
Self-reading pocket dosimeter results were not read until the team arrived t the fuel storage building.
p g.
The fire brigade / rescue team did not identify the_ se:ond injury
-victim on the truck bed during the initial search.
After the
-first injury victim had been transported to_the-fuel _ storage building, one of the team members mentioned that he saw another victim on the truck bed..
- However, this team member did not volunteer this information to the other team members until after several inquiries. had been made by the CR concerning a second
(:
victim.
Once it was determined that there definitely was a second injury victim still in the reactor building truck bay, there appeared to be no urgency on the part of the fire brigade / rescue team to return to the reactor building truck bay to rescue the second victim. At 1113 a team member stated he had observed a second injury victim.
However,.the team did not depart 1the fuel storage building until 1132. to retrieve the second injury victim.
During the time following the fuel cask incident which happened at 1030, until'1132, the second injury L
victim was in an approximately 11 Rem /hr radiation field.
l -
^.
L
s P-91035 Page 6 Janua ry 25, 1991 The failure of fire brigade / rescue team to work swiftly and-efficiently and perform their task using proper health physics practices to minimize radiation exposure to themselves as well as-to the injury victims and also to minimize the spread df radioactive contamination during the rescue effort is considered an exercise weakness.
PSC Response:
The weakness is admitted. The fire brigade / rescue team does indeed
- have a specified team leader.
During fire brigade response, the leader is clearly identified by the hat which he wears.
During this particular exercise,
- however, because _-they were entering
-a potentially contaminated area, it was decided that the team.would don anti-contamination clothing as opposed to the typical fire brigade apparel.
Because fire brigade personnel were not accustomed to j
donning anti-contamination clothing prior to responding to a
situation, this led to the excessive dress _out time and-apparent lack of leadership among the team and succeeded in fu aer degrading the a
remainder of the team's response ef forts.
In order to better familiarize the fire brigade team with the various response mrJes which may be required of them, the drilling frequency of -the t e.m will be Increased and the scenarios to which they are drilled will be more widely varied. _In the past, fire brigade drills were. focused towards fire fighting efforts rather than a variety of fire -fighting, contamination control, and search and rescue applications.
Fire brigade.
drills will _ now include varying
. objectives covering the donning of appropriate protective clothing,-
response to contaminated /high radiation. areas, response to s'ituations of multiple victims and victims ' located in more than one specific
- area, and first aid treatment-for injured individuals, both-contaminated and noncontaminated.
Proper contaminatior, control techniques will be stressed during drills, as_ appropriate.
The Control Roon staff will participste in these, drills as well and
<bj"ctives-in this area will include proper job briefings for the responding team.
Beginning in -January,1991, the drill frequency of the fire brigade team will be_-increased to a minimum of one drill per month with at least' five of _these being unannounced, backshift drills.
On January'23, 1991, a backshif t drill of the fire brigade. team was held.
The drill scenario' included response to a cor*aminated, injured individual and was observed by a member of the For:
e Vrain Quality Assurance Division.
Initial indications following $6e d*ill were quite favorable. No furth,r corrective actions are planned.
. ~. _ _ _ _.... _ _ _ _.......,
P-91035 Page-7 January 25, 1991 If you have any questions or_ comments associated with this inspection response, please call Mr. M. H. Holmes at (303) 480-6960.
Sincerely, dd $ -
A.C. Crawford Vice President Nuclear Operations ACC/rm cc:
Regional Administrator, Region IV ATTN:
Mr. G. L. Constable, Chief Technical Support Scction Division cf Reactor Projects (2 copies)
Mr. J. B. Baird Senior Resident Inspector n
Fort St. Vrain.
t Rick Hatten, Director--
Division of Disaster Emergency Services State of Colorado-I-
j
' u..,', ;... _ ;
-