ML20028G429
| ML20028G429 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 01/28/1983 |
| From: | Cooney M PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20028G430 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8302090339 | |
| Download: ML20028G429 (3) | |
Text
I PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 MARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHIA. PA.19101 (215)8414000 January 28 3 1983 Docket Nos. 50-277 50-278 Mr. R. C. Haynes, Administrator Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19046
SUBJECT:
Licensee Event Report Narrative Description
Dear Mr. Haynes:
The following occurrence was reported to Mr. A. R. Blough of Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission on January 20, 1983.
Reference:
Docket Mos. 50-277 & 50-278 Report Number: 2-83-02/IT-0 Report Date: January 28, 1983 Event Date: January 20, 1983 Facility: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station RD 1, Delta, PA 17314 Technical Specification
Reference:
Technical Specification 3.7.D.3 states that, "If Specification 3.7.D.1 and 3.7.D.2 cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated." Specification 3.7.D.2 states that, "In the event any isolation valve specified in Table 3.7.1 becomes inoperable, reactor power operation may continue provided at least one valve in each line having an inoperable valve shall be in the mode corresponding to the isolated condition." Table 3.7.1 includes the RCIC system steam line isolation valves.
Descriotion of the Event: ,
At full power following operater observation of unlit indicating lights for the RHR Shutdown Cooling supply valve (Mo-10-18 ) , the indicating lights for the PCIC system inboard steam supply 8302090339 830128 PDR ADOCK 05000277 QC4tA-a PDR
- Mr. R. C. Haynes Page 2 isolation valve were also found not. lit. An immediate investigation revealed that the' feed breaker,for the valves had
-been mistakenly open during the application of a. block. Upon
- discovery,.the breaker was. closed, restoring control room
- indication and power to the valves.- Because the.RCIC valve was
- in the open position when the feed breaker was opened, it was incapable of closure upon receipt'of an. isolation signal; During that time, the. redundant isolation-valve was not in the' closed position as required when an isolation. valve is inoperable.
Approximately one hour elapsed from misapplication of the block until the feed breaker on the RCIC inboard isolation valve was-reclosed.
, Probable Consecuences of the Event:-
l The RCIC system inboard steam supply isolation valve was inoperable during the period when the feed breaker was opened.
However, the RCIC system outboard steam supply' isolation valve was fully operable'during this time and would have performed the isolation function had.an isolation signal been received. The RHR system isolation valve was already in its isolated-position.
Because the RCIC outboard isolatio31 valve had isolation 4
capability and the inboard isolation valve was not isolatable for only a short time.and the RCIC system was operable,'the safety significance of this event is considered minimal.
Cause of the Event:
A permit was written to apply a block to-the Reactor Water Clean-up System to remove the system from service. Part of the permit-involved blocking of the isolation valves (MO-12-15 and 12-18) .on -
the Reactor Water Clean-up System. When applying the block to the Reactor Water Clean-up System, the operator de-energized the i' feed breaker for the RCIC System inboard isolation valve (MO 15) and RHR Shutdown Cooling valve (MO-10-18) by de-energizing l the feed in the wrong breaker compartment.
Corrective Action:
When the indicating lights were found not lit, an immediate
~
investigation was begun. On discovery that the feed breaker _had been opened, it was immediately reclosed restoring power and indication to the valve.
The operators responsible for preparation, review and application of this blocking permit have been disciplined based on the significance of their contribution to this incident. Further,
D Mr.-.R.
C.LHaynes Page 3
'this incident was discussed with.allishift oyerating personnel during-the' shift meetings.
The Superintendent ofl Methods and Training Division will. conduct a meeting with~ the' shif t operators involved .tci discuss - the .
importance of plant and individual safety when conducting blocking activities. A' review of plant administrative procedures regarding blocking will'be performed to determine if-the procedures are sufficient or require revision.
Sincerely J
',et.
M. J. Cooney Superintendent Generation Division-Nuclear cc: Mr. Norman Haller, Director Office of Management &; Program Analysis U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 A. R. Blough Site Inspector P.O. Box 399 Delta, PA 17314-0399