ML20028F962

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Final Deficiency Repts for Conditions 10,58,62,83,98 & 155 Re Unacceptable Installation of Concrete Anchors & Anchor bolts,out-of-calibr Torque Wrenches & Welding on Baseplates. Tech Specs Revised & Retorque Program Expected by 830601
ML20028F962
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 01/28/1983
From: Matlock R
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To: Engelken R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, GO2-83-79, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-2, NUDOCS 8302070242
Download: ML20028F962 (9)


Text

, , , ,, Docket No. 50-397 1

50.55(e) Report nt ,

P.O. Box 968 Washington Public Power Supply System $Jf509) 3000 GeorgeWashingtonWay Richland, Washington 9935 fi!12: yy Docket No. 50-397 O!0ll:a.n :,

January 28, 1983 G02-83-79 l

Mr. R. H. Engelken Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596

Subject:

NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 10CFR50.55(e) REPORTABLE CONDITIONS #10, 58, 62, AND 83 -

DEFICIENCIES IN CONCRETE EXPANSION ANCHOR PROGRAM;

  1. 98 - OUT OF CALIBRATION TORQUE WRENCHES; AND
  1. 155 - WELDING ON BASEPLATES

References:

a. Letter No. GI2-82-47, dated April 3, 1982, R.H. Engelken to R.G. Matlock, same subject.
b. Letter No. G02-82-430, dated May 10, 1982, R.G. Matlock to R.H. Engelken, same subject.
c. Letter No. G02-82-111, dated January 26, 1982, Out of Calibration Torque Wrenches
d. Letter No. G02-82-ll2, dated January 26, 1982, Welding on Baseplates Reference b informed you that WNP-2 had reopened 10CFR50.55(e)'s #10, 58, 62, and 83 as requested in reference a. Attachments 1, 2, 3, and 4 provide the Project's final reports on these items.

References c and d provided our final reports on 10CFR50.55(e) #98, and

155, respectively. Attachments 5 and 6 provide a revised final report i i on these two conditions in order to provide a complete and up-to-date response on the Project's anchor bolt program.

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l January 28, 1983 G02-83-79 i

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! If you have any questions regarding these subjects, please contact Roger Johnson, Project QA Manager, (509) 377-2501, extension 2712.

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Ry..Matlock7tiddeA l Program Director, WNP-2 LCF/kd Attachments: (6) As stated cc: W.S. Chin, BPA - Site 1 A. Forrest, Burns and Roe - HAPO

N.D. Lewis, NRC J. Plunkett, NUS Corp.

'; A. Toth, Resident NRC Inspector - Site Document Control Desk, NRC WNP-2 Files - 9178 i

Attachment 1 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 i DOCKET NO. 50-397 LICENSE N0. CPPR-93 UNACCEPTABLE INSTALLATION OF CONCRETE ANCHORS 10CFR50.55(e) CONDITION #10 FINAL REPORT Description of Deficiency Drilled-in concrete anchors used for installation of safety-related hangers by Contract 215 were not fully expanded. Approximately 50% of a sample of 75 installed aangers were cor.sidered to have anchors unacceptably expanded to accommodate design loads.

Safety Implication The improper installation of the concrete anchors could cause failure of the anchors if subjected to design loads. The failure of the anchor (s) could cause failure of the support and the subsequent loss of the safety-related function of the component / system being supported. This item is reportable l under 10CFR50.55(e).

Corrective Act in l

Specifications and procedures have been revised to provide proper installa-i tion and inspection requirements. These requirements were based on manufac-l turer's recommendations, a site testing program and I.E. Bulletin 79-02.

Reinspection of all drilled-in concrete anchors installed by Contract 215 l prior to February 1978 (approximately 2400 hangers) has been performed.

The reinspection was not limited to a check of expansion, but included items required per 1.E. Bulletin 79-02 (i.e., verification of torque, depth of shell below the concrete, etc.).

Unacceptable anchoes are being reworked, replaced and/or the hanger modified for new anchor locations to meet established design criteria.  :

This reportable deficiency primarily focuses on expansion problems with Phil-lips Red Head anchors. This type anchor was only used by Contract 216 (on a NCR exception basis) and Contract 215. The subject concerns are addressed by the reinspection program (referred to above), elimination of the use of Phillips Red Head anchors (WNP2WBG-215-F-79-911, dated March 22, 1979), and the revised installation and inspection requirements. Due to Contract 215 documentation inconsistencies, an additional anchor pull test program was performed as a neans to generically address and accept Seismic Category I drilled-in concrete anchor installations made after January 1978, i.e., for anchors outside of the reinspection program discussed above, i The pull test program and project-wide concrete anchor issues / concerns are addressed in-depth for each applicable contractor in the report entitled "WNP-2 Drilled-In Concrete Anchor Evaluation - 1983" and is available at the WNP-2 Site for review by your office.

Attachment 1 Page 2 f

Status of Corrective Action Specifications and procedures were revised to reflect proper requirements.

A reinspection / rework program was performed on Contract 215 drilled-in con-crete anchor installations made before February 1978. Final review of the Contract 215 reinspection results is currently being performed and is schedul-ed for completion by February 11, 1983.

A pull test program has been performed to address documentation inconsisten-cies for Contract 215 Seismic Category I installations made after January 1978.

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Attachment 2 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 DOCKET N0. 50-397

LICENSE NO. CPPR-93 IMPROPER INSTALLATION OF CONCRETE ANCHORS 10CFR50.55(e) CONDITION #58 FINAL REPORT Description of Deficiency Contract 218 improperly installed (under expansion) drilled-in concrete anchors used to support safety-related equipment.

Safety Implication The improper installation of the concrete anchors could cause failure of the anchors if subjected to design loads. The failure of the anchors could cause failure of the support and the subsequent loss of the safety-related function of the component / system being supported. This item is reportable under 10CFR50.55(e).

Corrective Action Specifications and procedures have been revised to provide proper installa-tion and inspection requirements. These requirements were based on manufac-turer's recommendations, a site testing program and I.E. Bulletin 79-02.

(It should be noted that the directly applicable scope for I.E. Bulletin 79-02 is for safety-related piping systems.)

A 100% reinspection / rework program was performed for Contract 218 concrete anchor installations made before June 6, 1979. Contractor training and im-proved procedures address concrete anchor concerns fcr installations made after June 6, 1979.

Project-wide concrete anchor issues / concerns are addressed in-depth for each applicable contractor in the report entitled "WNP-2 Drilled-In Concrete An-chor Evaluation - 1983" and is available at the WNP-2 Site for review by your office.

Status of Corrective Action 1 Specifications and procedures were revised to reflect proper requirements.

A reinspection / rework program was performed on Contract 218 drilled-in con-crete anchor installations made before June 6, 1979.

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Attachment 3 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DOCKET NO. 50-397 LICENSE NO. CPPR-93 UNACCEPTABLE INSTALLATION OF ANCHOR BOLTS BY THE WALDINGER CORPORATION 10CFR50.55(e) CONDITION #62 FINAL REPORT Description of Deficiency Contract 216 improperly installed drilled-in concrete anchors used to support safety-related equipment. Anchor bolts were cut short and tack welded to the backside of the base plates. In some instances, anchor bolts were not threaded into the concrete anchors, and in one case, no concrete anchor was installed. Visual inspection of a completed installation would appear satis-factory and not identify the anchor installation deficiencies.

Safety Implication 1

The improper installation of the support anchor bolts could cause the Control Room HVAC ductwork to fail if subjected to design loads. In addition, its failure could cause damage to other safety-related equipment in close proxim-ity.

Corrective Action Specifications and procedures have been revised to provide proper installa-tion and inspection requirements. These requirements were based on manufac-turer's recommendations, a site testing program and I.E. Bulletin 79-02.

(It should be noted that the directly applicable scope for I.E. Bulletin 79-02 is for safety-related piping systems.)

A Phillips Red Head anchor retrofit program and a reinspection program, in-cluding ultrasonic testing to determine the length of installed bolts, identi-fied and corrected improper Contract 216 concrete anchor installations.

Project-wide concrete anchor issues / concerns are addressed in-depth for each applicable contractor in the report entitled "WNP-2 Drilled-In Concrete Anchor Evaluation - 1983" and is available at the UNP-2 Site for review by your office.

Status of Corrective Action Specifications and procedures were revised to reflect proper requirements.

I Rework / reinspection programs were performed on Contract 216 drilled-in con-crete anchor installations to resolve the concern.

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6 Attachment 4 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR PROJECT N0. 2 DOCKET N0. 50-397 LICENSE NO. CPPR-93 IMPROPER INSTALLATION OF CONCRETE ANCHORS 10CFR50.55(e) CONDITION #83 FINAL REPORT Description of Deficiency Contract 210 improperly installed (under expansion) drilled-in concrete anchors used to support safety-related equipment.

Safety Implication The improper installation of the concrete anchors could cause failure of the anchors if subjected to design loads with subsequent loss of the safety-related equipment. In addition, its failure could cause damage to other safety-related equipment in close proximity. This item is reportable under 10CFR50.55(e).

Corrective Action Specifications and procedures have been revised to provide proper installa-tion and inspection requirements. These requirements were based on manufac-turer's recommendations, a site testing program and I.E. Bulletin 79-02.

(It should be noted that the directly applicable scope for I.E. Bulletin 79-02 is for safety-related piping systems.)

A sample reinspection and concrete anchor replacement program has been per-formed by Contract 210A. These programs were implemented on those concreto anchors installed by Contract 210 prior to Contract 210 having adequate pro-cedural controls which would have identified and corrected improper concrete anchor installations.

Project-wide concrete anchor issues / concerns are addressed in-depth for each applicable contractor in the report entitled "WNP-2 Drilled-In Concrete Anchor Evaluation - 1983" and is available at the WNP-2 Site for review by your office.

Status of Corrective Action Specifications and procedures were revised to reflect proper requirements.

A reinspection / rework program was performed on questionable Contract 210 l drilled-in concrete anchor installations to correct deficiencies.  ;

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Attachment 5 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR PROJECT N0. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-397 LICENSE NO. CPPR-93 OUT OF CALIBRATION TORQUE WRENCHES 10CFR50.55(e) CONDITION #98 FINAL REPORT Description of Deficiency Before the initiation of daily torque wrench calibration checks in January 1980, the 215 Contractor used a number of torque wrenches which exceeded the applicable calibration tolerances on concrete anchor bolts.

Safety Implication Improperly torqued concrete anchor bolts supporting safety systems cause two (2) concerns: 1) under-torqued bolts (insufficient preload) do not ensure that fatigue failures or loosening of the bolts will not occur if the anchors are subjected to cyclic loading, and 2) over-torqued bolts may have degraded the function of the anchor or anchor bolts. This condition is reportable under 10CFR50.55(e).

Corrective Action Bechtel Power Corporation has retorqued 100% of the past (pre-Stop Work Order No. 9) Quality Class I and Seismic Category I Contract 215 pipe support concrete anchor bolt installations. The retorque program is ongoing for equip-ment and will ensure that the proper preload is applied to the subject anchor installations.

Concerning over-torqued bolts, Burns and Roe evaluated the related Contract 215 inspection reports, torque wrench daily usage records, and the torque wrench recalibration records. This review determined that no torque wrenches were used on concrete anchor bolt installations which were sufficiently out of calibration (high) to cause damage to the installations (rtfer to Burns and Roe letter BRWP-F-82-2988, dated August 16, 1982). This determination, in conjunction with the Bechtel retorque program resolves the concern.

Status of Corrective Action The concrete anchor bolt retorque program for pipe supports and the over-torque evaluation are complete. The retorque program for equipment installations is ongoing and scheduled for completion by June 1, 1983.

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Attachment 6 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 DOCKET N0. 50-397 LICENSE N0. CPPR-93 WELDING ON BASEPLATES 10CFR50.55(e) CONDITION #155 FINAL REPORT Description of Deficiency In two cases, welding of stiffeners by the 215 Contractor to installed hanger baseplates that were attached oy torqued, drilled-in concrete anchors resulted in concrete failure around the anchors. In another case, concrete anchor failure occurred during baseplate installation, and it is believed that the craftsmen were to trying to rake a flat plate conform to a curved surface.

Safety Implication This condition was originally defined "potentially reportable" consider-ing that other baseplate installations could be overstrested or damaged such that the concrete anchors could fail under design loads. Based on further evaluation, this condition has been determined to be not reportable (refer to following paragraph).

Corrective Action A detailed investigation was performed of the specific items identified by the NRC Inspector in the related NRC Inspection Report 80-08/20.

The results of this investigation indicate that one failure was due to welding a stiffener on the baseplate after torquing, a second failure could be partially attributed to welding after torquing and the other two failures were due to improper fitup. In addition, approximately 500 work packages were reviewed to check weld dates with torque dates.

This review indicated no additional cases of welding after torquing.

Based on this review, it was concluded that overstressing of concrete expansion anchors or damage to concrete anchor installations due to welding on hanger baseplates was an isolated event which has been cor-rected and thus is not reportable under 10CFR50.55(e). To preclude recurrence of the specific problem, Project Engineering Directive 215-CS-3738 was issued which requires anchors to be loosened prior to welding on a baseplate. This requirement has been incorporated in Bechtel proce-dure SWP/P-P-1, " Field Fabrication, Modification, Installation and Inspection of Pipe Supports."

This concern, as related to concrete anchor installations by other con-tractors, is addressed in the report entitled "WNP-2 Drilled-In Concrete Anchor Evaluation-1983" and is available at the WNP-2 Site for review by your office.

Status of Corrective Action Applicable specifications and procedures were revised to address this concern.

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