ML20028A262
| ML20028A262 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/03/1982 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | Brandt E HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, DEPT. OF |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20028A259 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-82-480 NUDOCS 8211170527 | |
| Download: ML20028A262 (2) | |
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AUG 0 31932 Edward N. Brandt, Jr., M.D, Assistant Secretary for Health Department of Health and Human Services Washington, D. C.
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Dear Dr. Brandt:
This is in response to your letter of May 14, 1982 to Chaiman Palladino concerning the Public Health Service (PHS) involvement during an emergency at e comercial nuclear power plant.
We recognize that PHS has been involved in a broad spectrum of activities in planning for response to radiological emergencies.
The NRC welcomes the opportunity to confer with HHS on any matter related to your area of expertise and responsibility in carrying out our agency's responsibilities.
With regard to the ccnfiguration of responsibilities in emergencies involving NRC licensed activities, the State and local authorities have the primary responsibility for protecting the public health and safety.
The licensee is responsible for keeping these offsite authorities, as well as the NRC, informed on the status of the emergency as it relates to public health and safety.
In addition, the licensee has the immediate and primary continuing responsibility for limiting the consequences of an accident involving NRC
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licensed activities.
The NRC has the responsibility to coordinate the 1
technical response activities of the Federal agencies and develop a Federal technical recomendation on protective actions for State and local agencies.
NRC intends to confer with HHS, FEMA and other Federal agencies on those matters which are closely related to their responsibilities.
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It should be noted that the focus of NRC response will be at the NRC Operations Center during the early stages of an incident and will shift to the site when the Chairman designates a Director of NRC Site Operations (DS0).
This is expected to be accomplished within about two to ten hours after NRC is notified, depending on weather conditions.
The authority to provide NRC recomendations on protective actions to offsite authorities will generally be transferred to the DSO at the time of his designation (NRC recommendations may be in the l
form of an endorsement of protective actions recommended by the licensee or may supplement licensee recommendations).
As you point 'out regarding the HHS public health role, it is essential that-i the Federal agencies with response capabilities and expertise be recognized and involved in the formulation of recomendations for protective actions.
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l Edward N. Brandt, Jr., M.D.
- The NRC's procedures for responding to radiological emergencies recognize the role and expertise of HHS and other Federal agencies in emergency response.
The NRC procedures anticipata liaison with the key agencies.
It has been our experience that the most efficient and effective arrangement is the briefing of technical liaison personnel who have good access to their upper
. level management in emergencies and keep their agency management infomed of the situation. As the need arises, this arrangement is augmented by i
telephone conferences between the NRC Executive Team and high level management j
of the other Federal agencies.
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We have met with members of your staff (Thomas Reutershan, Alex Martin and j
Michael Terpilak) to discuss the appropriateness of this arrangement. There j
appears to be acceptance at staff level that the current arrangement is appropriate given the fact that the lead for NRC's response is nonnally transferred to the DSO in the field within several hours and that the nature of events varies with respect to the need for pmtective action.
2 A related matter on which our staffs have been working closely is the development of guidance on the use of potassium iodide (KI) as a thyroidal blocking agent by the general population to prevent the uptake of radioiodine which could result from a significant nuclear power plant accident. The Food and Drug Administration's Bureau of Radiological Health (FDA/BRH) has concluded that KI is safe and effective for this purpose.
FDA/BRH has indicated in its most recent recomendations on tha use of KI for thyroidal blocking that there is
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some disagreement within the medical comunity regarding the exact projected dose to the thyroid at which blocking with KI should be instituted.
In addition. FDA/BRH has indicated that there is some uncertainty with regard to the side effects that might be observed when KI is administered to a large population.
In view of the uncertainties about both the risks associated with wide scale distribution of KI for use without direct physician supervision and the potential benefits to be derived from its distribution, it appears appropriate that additional Federal policy be developed regarding the stockpiling.
l distribution and administration of KI. We would suggest that the appropriate l
vehicle for your participation in this policy development would be the l
interagency task force of the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Comittee.
Pleasecontactme(301-492-7511) or Mr. Brian Grimes 6f g staff (301-492-4614) l to arrange a meeting to discuss either of these matters.
t Sincerely.
- For previous concurrences see attached ORC (3igag Willim L M l
IE:IRDB IE:IRDB William J. Dircks
- EWilliams: esp *TJMcKenna Executive Director for Operations 6/29/82 6/29/82 M
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