ML20028A235
| ML20028A235 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/10/1982 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8211170242 | |
| Download: ML20028A235 (76) | |
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COMMISSION MEETING
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PUBLIC MEETING BRIEFING ON SANDIA CONSEQUENCES STUDY m.
November 10, 1982 PAGES:
1 - 72 r
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Washington, D. C.
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l A.LDOMON REPORTING
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400 Virr M a Ave., 5.W. Washin gen, D.
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20024 Talachc=a: (202) 554-2345 8211170242 821110 PDR 10CFR PT9.7 PDR
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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
4 5
BRIEFING ON SANDIA CONSEQUENCES STUDY 6
7 8
PUBLIC MEETING 9
10 11 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Room 1130 12 1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
13 Wednesday, November 10, 1962 14 The Commission convened, pursuant to notice, 15 at 3:20 p.m.
16 COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
17 NUNZIO PALLADINO, Chairman of the Commission 18 VICIOR GILINSKY, Commissioner JOHN AHEARNE, Commissioner 19 IHOMAS ROBERTS, Commissioner JAMES ASSELSTINE, Commissioner i
2 STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT COMMISSION TABLE:
21 S.
CHILK 22 B. BERNERO D. ALDRICH 23 R. BLOND W.
DIRCKS 24 J.
ZERBE 25 ALDERSoN REPoRTIN3 COMPANY,INC.
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DISCLAIM R This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Comission held on Novembe'r 10, 1982 in the Cormission's offices at 1717 H Street, tt. W, wasnington, D. C.
The meeting was open t:r public a.ttendance and observation.
Tnis transcript has not been reviewed, corrected, or edited,. and it may contain inaccuracies.
The transcript is intended. solely for general infomational purcosas.
As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is not part of the farinal or infonnal
- record of decision of the matters discussed.
Expressions of opinion in
.this. transcript do not necessarily reflect final detenninations or beliefs.
No pleading:or other paper may be filed with the Commission in any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any, statement or argument U,
- contained hereirT, except as the Conmission may authorize.
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CHAIRMAN PALLADIN0s Good afternoon, ladies 3
and gentlemen.
4 We are meeting today to ha ve the staff brief 5
the Commissioners on a report that was completed earlier 6
this year by Sandia National Laboratories entitled 7
" Technical Guidance For Siting Criteria Development."
8 The intention of the Cornission to examine its 9
siting policy was announced in Jult of 1980 and this 10 report is one of the results of studies coming from that 11 announcement.
12 The purpose of the report was to analyze and
.13 document the technical guidance to support the review 14 and, if necessary, reformulation of power plant siting 15 regulations.
16 The Sandia report has recently received a 17 great deal of attention b7 the press as a result of 18 statements made by Congressman Markey about the report's 19 implications on the public risk.
20 I trust that the staff is prepared today to 21 discuss the comments made by the Congressman.
We are 22 also interested in a general discussion of what the 23 staff believes the report is telling us.
24 Do any of my fellow Commissioners have any 25 opening remarks?
ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, I have a 2
question on your statement.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
All right.
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Was this intended to 5
provide information for a broad siting rule or was this 6
especially directed at a rule dealing with high 7
population sites?
8 MR. BERNERO:
I will address that in the 9
briefing.
It is a broad siting rule.
to COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
And when was the 11 project started?
12 MB. BERNERO:
Well, I will address that in the 13 briefing.
14 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
It seems we have to 15 pay another quarter in.
16 (Laughter.)
17 HR. BERNERO:
Fifty cents.
18 (Laughter.)
19 CHAIRMAN P ALL ADINO:
Any other opening remarks?
20 (No response.)
21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Okay, I will turn the 22 seating over to Mr. Dircks.
23 MR. DIRCKS :
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
24 What we are going to do today bef ore we get 25 into the study itself, I would like to take the ALDERSoN MEPoRTING COMPANY,INC.
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1 opportunity at the beginning of the meeting to put on 2
the record the conclusions and the way the staff views 3
the effort.
Sometimes once the meeting gets underway we 4
tend to lose the conclusions we want to come out in the 5
confusion of the give and take.
6 We have Bob Bernero here who will be from the 7
staff side doing most of the talking, Boger Blond is 8 next to him and then Dave Aldrich from from Sandia 9
Laboratory.
10 As you know, the Washington Post news story 11 about the NBC-sponsored siting study performed by Sandia 12 Lab has led to widespread interest and a good deal of 13 further reporting here in the United Etates and I might 14 say over in other parts of the world, too.
15 I was in Europe when the stcry appeared and I 16 was immediately informed of the contents of the study by 17 many people from other countries who read with great 18 interest the account.
The concerns that are expressed i
19 both here and abroad arise in part but not entirely from l
20 the original report in the Washington Post.
21 In brief these concerns are:
l 22 One, that the Sandia study constitutes a new 23 set of estimates of severe accident risks at nuclear 24 power plants that greatly surpass the estimates of the l
25 reactor safety study, WASH-1400; l
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Ivo, that these new estimatas are cause for 2 great public concern, especially because of the great 3 doubts about the predictions of low probabilities; and 4
Three, that the.NRC is misleading.the public 5 about what the worst case possibilities might be or are.
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I gather you are saying 7 those are concerns.
8 MR. DIRCKS:
Those are concerns.
Those were 9 the concerns that were expressed and I think those are 10 the concerns that we would like to address today.
11 What we would like to do today is brief the 12 Commission on the verk and to deal with these concerns.
13 Before turning to the staff I would like to give you a 14 brief summary of the substance and conclusions that will 15 result I hope from the briefing.
16 The Sandia study numbered NUREG CR-2239 is 17 entitled " Technical Guidance For Siting Criteria l
18 Development."
Its purpose was to develop the technical l
19 guidance to support the formulation and comparison of 20 possible siting criteria for nuclear power plants.
21 It includes information ons 22 One, the consequences of hypothetical severe 23 accidents; 24 Two, characteristics of population 25 distributions around curren t reactor sitess l
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Three, site availability within the United 2
States; and 3
Four, socio-economic impacts of reactor siting.
4 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS When was the study 5
begun?
6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY He.is going to get to 7
that later.
8 (Laughter.)
MR. DIRCKS:
Offhand in 1980.
9 10 COMMISSIONER ROBERTSs Another 50 cents for me?
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
That is right.
12 (Laughtar.)
13 HR. DIRCKS:
I gave you 10 cents worth.
In 14 1930 it started and it flowed out of several 15 ccasiderations and we vill get into it.
Part of it was 16 a statement in the Authorization Bill and part of it was 17 the initiatives undertaken by the Commission.
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Sounds like you get it 19 on credit.
l 20 (Laughter.)
21 ER. DIRCKSa I would like to stress the Sandia i
22 study is not a new generic analysis of the risk of l
23 reactor ac:idents.
It merely assumes the occurrence of 24 severe accidents of different severity and calculates l
25 the range of rossible consequences at U.
S.
reactor 1
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1 sites.
2 Although the Sandia study provides us with 3
useful analyses of the importance of various siting 4
factors, it does not change our overall perception of 5
reactor risk.
On the contrary, the results presented in 6 the report are consistent with those presented in the 7 reactor safety study, WASH-1400, and later publications.
8 The results in the Sandia study also give us 9
assurance that our present reactor siting criteria are 10 not seriously flawed.
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYa Let me ask you this, 12 were any of these results presented in the reactor 13 saf ety study in the extreme cases we are talking about?
14 MR. DIRCKS:
The extreme cases?
15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYa Yes.
16 MR. BERNERO:
Yes, some were.
It is rather 17 complicated the way it was averaged and portrayed.
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, isn't that 19 exactly the point?
20 MR. BERNERO:
Well, please, I would like to 21 get to the presentation and the information in an 22 orderly way.
23 MR. DIRCKSa I think further we believe that 24 it is reasonable to postpone further consideration of 25 changes in siting criteria until new information on ALDERSoN REPCRT1NG CCMPANY,INC.
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I radioactive source terms is available next year.
2 The news stories have concentrated on the peak 3
or maximum calculated values of consequences.
The 4
likelihood of occurrence of these most severe 5
consequences is very low.
The exact value of this low 6
probability is of course quite uncertain, but the fact 7
that it is very low is beyond reasonable dispute since 8 the necessary sequences of events is a combination of 9
low probability events.
10 The report assumes that the a nnual probability 11 of full-scale core melt at a typical plant is one chance 12 in 10,000 and that the probability of large-scale 13 release, if there is a f ull-scale core melt, if one 14 chance in 100,000.
These assumptions are supported 15 reasonably well by existing risk studies.
16 COMMISSIONER AHEARNEs This is if there is a 17 full-scale release?
18 MR. BERNER0s Let me get to that with a 19 slide.
That has been reworded a couple of times.
The 20 overall probability is 1 in 100,000.
21 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Right.
22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
The overall probability 23 of what?
24 MR. BERNER0s Of a large-scale release 25 resulting from a core melt.
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY But it says here "This 2 report assumes."
3 3R. BERNER0s Yes, we will get to that.
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYa Do you mean that there 5
was no independent calculation?
6 MR. BERNER0s Yes.
7 HR. DIRCKS:
The siting study merely assumes 8 these probabilities of core melt and large release, but 9 it calculates f urther probabilities based on the 10 meteorology and popula tion data.
The analyses indicate 11 an annual probability of one chance in ten that anyone 12 at all will be killed if a large release occurs and one 13 chance in ten thousani that weather sequences and wind 14 direction could combine to produce the very unlikely 15 scenarios which led to the maximum calculated 16 consequences.
17 The staff estimates that these are one chance 18 in one billion events even without recognizing the 19 furt$er reduction in either probability or severity 20 which should be made to account for known conservatisms 21 and radioactive release source terms and other f actors.
22 Significant reductions in source terms are expected 23 based on the current work, and we talked about this last 24 week or two weeks ago, and they alone are expected to 25 lead to a very large decrease in the estimates for early ALDER $oN REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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fatality or injury.
2 In addition, the present calculations 3
incorporate a conservative bias in the emergency 4
response assumptions for the extreme cases which leads 5
to a conservative overestimation of the number of deaths 6
or injuries, and Bob will certainly cover that portion.
7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Are you going to cover 8
the sensitivity to those assumptions?
9 MR. BERNERO:
Yes.
10 MR. DIROKSs Yes.
11 The reactor safety study attempted to display 12 the nature and range of severe accident consequences and 13 the probabilities which should be associated with them.
14 Probabilistic risk analysis'has been further refined 15 since then and both NRC-sponsored and industry 16 publications have displayed a range of consequences with 17 extreme values similar to those associated with a 18 flighting study.
Example publications include the 1978 19 report by Sandia, Sand 78-0556, An Investigation of the l
l 20 Adequacy of the Composite Populations Used in the 1
21 Reactor Safety Study, the 1980 NUREG 0715 Task Force 22 Report On Interim Operation of Indian Point, and the 23 many environmen tal impact statements which have been 24 published since the Commission adopted the policy of 25 describing severe or Class 9 accident risks in such ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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statements.
2 A similar ranga of consequences can be found 3
in recent industry-sponsored risk analyses such as the 4
Zion Probabilistic Saf ety S tudy and the Indian Point 5
Probabilistic Safety Study.
6 The NRC has even invited the attention of 7 Congress to this range of estimates as a possible basis 8 for change in the liabilty limits of the Price / Anderson 9 Act in a 1980 letter to the Chairman of the Senate 10 Committee on Governmental Affairs.
11 The maximum consequences cited in the current 12 news reports are pessimistically overstated estimates 13 for very low probability sequences of events.
They 14 should not be cause for great public concern.
The 15 results of the Sandia study have not increased our 16 estimates of reactor risk.
On the contrary, they give 17 us further assurance of the acceptability of past and 18 current reactor siting policy.
19 What we wanted to do was get that on the 20 record and then go into the briefing itself and Bob 21 Bernero will cover the details of the study.
22 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
When is the last time 23 there was a construction permit application, 1978, is 24 that correct?
25 MR. BERNERO:
I don't know.
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COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
I don't understand why 2
in 1980 when there hasn't been an application for a 3
permit, why are we commissioning a study on siting?
4 MR. BERNER04 We vill get to that.
5 HR. DIRCKSs It is optimism, but I also think 6
ve have to go back to the various directions we got from 7
the Congress at that period to re-evaluate the sites 8
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Since this cover and 9
several sets of paper may be used elsewhere could I just 10 ask two clarifications on your introductory remarks.
I 11 would just like to make sure I understand.
You have at 12 least on my page 2 where you talk about the probability.
13 You say near the bottom, "This report assumes 14 that the annual probability of full-scale cora melt at 15 the typical plant is one chance in 10,000," and I had 16 read th a t and how you have a conditional probability, 17 "If there is a full-scale core melt the probability of a l
l 18 large-scale release is one chance in 100,000."
l 19 MR. BERNERO:
It would be more accurate to say 20 something like this.
The probability of a large-scale 21 relea se resulting f rom a full-scale core melt is one 22 chance in 100,000.
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Thank you.
24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO Is that per reactor year?
25 MR. BERNERO:
Yes, the traditional annual ALDERSCN REPCRTING COMPANY,INC.
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1 probability.
2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yes.
The other 3
quastion really had to do with your weather sequences 4 and perhaps you will get to it later when you are 5
m ul tiplying all these numbers together, but you have one 6 chance in 10,000 on weather sequences.
7 HR. BERNERO:
Well, I have a display to 8 cla rif y that in one of the viewgraphs.
9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I was just 10 simplistically trying to go to 10 to the minus five, ten 11 to the minus one and ten to the minus f our and then you 12 have got ten to the minus nine.
If you had one chance 13 in 1,000 then those numbers would flow.
14 HR. BERNER0s.
Jim, could I please have 15 viewgraph 2.
16 (Slide presentation.)
17 If you turn to your handout right beneath the 18 sta tement, th2re are five points I would like to cover i
19 with the material of the briefing and, if need be, go l
20 into individual areas at your pleasure.
21 The first point is that this Sandia so-called 22 siting study is not a new risk assessment.
It is not by i
23 any stretch a replacement of the reactor safety study or 24 anything like it and it should not be a cause for public 25 concern.
l l
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CONHISSIONER GILINSKIs You know, I think it 2
would hels, if we let people decide what worries them for 3
themselves.
We ough t to tell them what we think or you 4
ought to tell them what you think.
5 HR. BERNER04 Yes, we will present our 6
information.
I think we have rnd we will continue to 7
present it I think fairly and completely.
8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Let se since 9
Commissioner Gilinsky raised it, I think the most l
10 important thing is for us to try to get objective 11 information.
Unfortunately, one of the reasons I 12 believe we have to have today's meeting is that the c 13 information that was presented was not presented j
14 objectively.
This has led to a substantial amount of 15 public concern and I would guess that we do have some 16 responsibility to address whether or not that public 17 concern in our sind is justified.
18 COHHISSION ER GILINSKY:
Well, since you bring 19 it up let se pursue it.
It seems to se parfectly 20 sensible to give the facts as you see them.
Just as a 21 matter of psychology I will tell you I thin?
's 7 you
' 22 start telling people not to worry, that is when people t
23 get concerned and there has been too much of that over 24 the years.
25 I think we ought to just explain, or you ought AtoansoN REPORTING CoWPANY. INC.
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1 to explain in this case what you think the probabilities 2 are and what you think the study is and let people 3
decide for themselves.
4 NR. BERNER0s Yes, fine. Let's proceed.
5 The second point I would like to make is that 6
this of course if a Commission jitdgment tha t will some 7 day next year I believe be made, but the staff 8
evaluation to date is that the current siting policy is 9
not seriously flawed based on this and other work.
10 Thirdly, that the publicized maximum 11 consequences, the values that were tabulated in the 12 Washington Post the day before the election are probably 13 ove. sta ted d ue to conservative modeling assumptions.
14 Fourthly, that the scenarios for those worst 15 cases are extremely improbable.
16 And, inst, that this range of consequences and 17 extremely low probability values for them is something 18 that has been published and discussed for years, and I 19 will bring that up as we go along.
20 CONHISSIONER GILINSKY You are going to 21 substantiate that point, Bob.
22 MR. BERNER0s Yes.
23 May I have No. 3, please.
24 For the background it is important to set the 25 clock back.
Just before Three Mile Island there wa s. an ALDER $oN REPORTING CoMPA.W. INC.
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1 inquiry by t his ag en cy into its siting policy, was the 2
siting policy adequa te.
The siting policy is delineated 3
in 10 CFR 100, Part 100 of the regulations, and a very 4
important regulatory guide, Regulatory Guide 4.7.
5 This work was going on by a task force made up 6
from NBC staff principally and the task force report was 7
made, NUREG 0625, just after Three Mile Island and was 8
videly interpreted as being a call for more remote 9
siting, a basic or fundamental change in reactor siting 10 policy for the agency.
11 That clamor or call was echoed in the Kemeny 12 report and especially in the Rogovin Three Mile Island 13 inquiry.
14 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Let me ask you, did 15 NUREG 0625, and I don't remember it at all, have cases to involving hundreds of billions of dollars of damage?
17 MR. BERNERO:
I don't recall that it had any 18 consequence analysis in it.
19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Is that Dan Muller's ---
20 MR. BERNER04 Yes.
Dan Muller was the 21 chairman of the task force.
22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE4 As I remember, what it 23 had was a list of recommendations, for example, to stay 24 avsy from this class of natural hazards and it had some 25 mileage separation.
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COMMISCIONER GILINSKYa Well, let's see, and 2
maybe I am missing your point.
Is this just for the 3
historical background?
4 MR. BERNERO:
Yes, this is historical 5
background on how we got to be doing this work.
Now the 6 call was for reconsideration of many aspects of siting 7 policy, not merely risk.
8 COMMISSIONER AHEiLRNE:
In fact, one of the 9 aspects was to separate the technical parameters of the 10 plant f rom the siting.
11 MR. BERNERO:
Yes.
Uncoupling design from 12 siting was one of the fundamental things because we had 13 developed an historical pattern.
As the population went 14 up, the attention to engineered safety features became 15 more specific and you tuned reactor building leak rate 16 requirements and special weld channels and things like 17 that to the proximity of population.
There was an 18 apparent coupling of design to siting and there was an 19 argument th a t siting policy should be uncoupled from 20 design.
21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
It was more than 22 apparent.
23 MR. BERNERO:
Yes.
24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Yes, I remember not being 25 at least at that time not being in accord with that.
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don 't see how you can uncouple it, but that is a 2
dif ferent subject.
3 MR. BERNERO:
Then in 1980 the NRC 4
Authorization Act included a call or a mandate for the 5
agency to proceed with the development of new siting 6
policy uncoupled from design and we began pursuing the 7 work in 1980 and '81 to develop the technical basis for 8
the full spectrum of considerations of siting.
9 Now in late 1981 and early 1982 of course ---
to COHNISSIONER AHEARNEs That historical 11 perspective also, was not there some statement that the 12 siting criteria shouldn't preclude any region in the 13 country?
14 HR. BERNER0s Yes, that included a direction 15 that we should be careful that we don't foreclose the 16 nuclear option in any major section of the country.
17 COHNISSIONER AHEARNE:
I raise that because I 18 see that as part of their reason for doing the detailed 19 geographical analysis.
20 MR. B ER N ER04 And land availability and 21 socio-economic impacts.
Well, toward the end of 1981 22 the staff had much of the work done and was prepared to 23 go forward with the development of new siting policy and 24 there were two factors that acted together to put it on 25 the shelf for a time.
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One of course is that there were no new site 2
requirements, no new applications to deal with.
So from 3
a practical point of view a new siting policy wasn't 4
really needed at the moment and, secondly, the technical 5 work in the siting consideration and elsewhere showed 6
that the radioactive release source terms used for risk 7 appraisal were recognized with greater clarity as being 8 quite conservative.
These are the WASH-1400 source 9
terms, the accident release characteristics first 10 described in WASH-1400.
11 We recognized that they were quite 12 conservative so the Commission instructed the staff to 13 withhold development of new siting policy until revised 14 source terms based on new information were available and 15 that is right now scheduled for next year we vill have a 16 very large body information on radioactive source terms 17 to give a more realistic risk appraisal and the siting 18 vork has been postpon'd until then.
19 This report serves two purposes then.
We were 20 proceeding to publish it because it serves the two l
21 purposes of showing that the sensitivity analyses within 22 it about the effect of source term on risk show how 23 sensible it is or logical to wait until you have better 24 source term information before jelling the policy for 25 siting and, secondly, the report also acts as sort of an ALDER $oN REPORTING CCMPANY. INC.
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1 analysis to show that the present siting policy is not 2
so serious flavad that one has to go back with great 3
concern about existing plants that are still being 4
licensed that vera selected with this siting policy Reg.
5 Guide 4.7 10 CFR 100.
6 So the technical risk, even with the high 7
source terms, the pessimistic source terms, the risk 8
display shows that the siting policy is not seriously 9
flawed.
So it is both sensible and logical to put the 10 siting policy rulasaking activity on the shelf for 11 another year and at the same time go ahead and publish 12 this report so it is available in the public record.
13 May I have No.
4, please.
14 This is th e report itself, the tital page.
It 15 really is a 1981-early '82 report.
It has an '81 title 16 number from Sandia and Dr. Aldrich here at the left end 17 of the table with me is the person you can consider the 18 principal author of it.
19 May I have the next one, please.
20 Now the technica.'. approach used in this study, 21 this is not only parametric risk or conditional risk 22 analysis, the technical approach of the study includes a 23 scope covering four aspects.
24 The first aspect of the scope is to leek at 25 accident consequences independent of design.
In other ALDEFISoN REPCRTING CCMPANY,INC.
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1 words, looking at the full range of accident 2 consequences that can prevail at sites, not 3
distinguishing or altering the design of the reactor 4 which is the source of those consequences.
So there is 5
a need there to have what one might call a typical LWR 6
accident profile and that is why this report actually 7
assumes such a thing.
8 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
You say it is design 9 independent, but then you do assume some characteristics 10 of the design.
11 MR. BERNERO:
Yes.
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
So it is not entirely 13 design independent.
14 MR. BERNERO:
Well, we have synthesized what 15 ve believe is a source tera profile which is 16 characteristic of LWR's, light water reactors of the 17 current generation.
4 18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
The reason I stress that 19 is because had you picked a dif f erent characterization 20 of the dasign you would have gotten a different answer l
21 there.
22 MR. BERNERO:
Ye s, we would get different 23 displays.
24 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
What kind of profile?
25 MR. BERNERO:
Well, we picked a series of ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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accident source terms.
2 Jim, would you go into No. 19.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADIN0s I didn't want te get you 4
off the course.
5 MR. BERNER0s This is actually an input to the 6
study.
If you look at this, it is a table and you can 7
find it in the report or you can also find it in a 8
previous report, NUREG 0771.
It is a synthesis of five 9
groups of accidents, categories of accidents.
10 No.
1, the worst, is the worse kind of core 11 melt where you have a massive core melt early 12 containment failure and virtually nothing works.
The 13 engineered safety features fail and the containment 14 fails.
15 Th e second is ---
16 CHAIRMAN PALLADIN0s But there are some 17 assumptions about what gets out.
18 MR. BERNER0s Yes, the accident source term 19 that we use of course is modeled, the physical chemistry 20 is modeled as we would in WASH-1400 and did then and 21 still do until we have the new data.
22 Now the second one is a severe core melt with 23 containment failure, but at least some of the things 24 work.
25 Ihe third one is a full-scale core melt where ALDER $oN REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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most of the engineered safety features work; in other 2 words, the containment holds.
3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Where do you get the 4
probability?
5 MR. BERNER04 Then fourth and fifth are the 6
less significant.
Four is a TMI accident and five is a 7
limited, and I think you will find on page ---
8 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
2-12?
9 3R. BERNERO:
Yes, 2-12 and 2-13 of it.
I 10 have alterad it editorially a little bit for display 11 because I wanted to fit the probabilities on here also.
12 We took what we kriew of existing risk analyses, 13 WASH-1400, the follow-up reactor safety study 14 methodology applications studies that we had sponsored, 15 the IREP studies that we had and were sponsoring and the 16 staff, the NRC staff synthesized typical probability 17 values.
For SST-1, 2 and 3, and the really significant 18 one is SST-1 19 20MMISSIONER GILINSKY So this study 20 basically deals with what happens to the radioactive 21 saterial once it leaves the area of the reactor?
22 MR. BERNERO:
Yes, and if you look at this 23 report you will find again and again that it speaks of 24 conditional probability.
What that means is it says 25 assume that SST-1 occurred, th a t tha t release occurred, ALDER $oN REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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and now start calrulating probability from there.
2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY Then you look at the 3
spectrum of possibilities.
4 MR. BERNERO:
Then you look at the spectrum of 5
veather, emergency planning, all the siting things, but 6
you do not dwell on the design.
You just take the 7
design as a given.
The report says if you have to 8
assume a probability, you assume the probability one 9
times' ten to the minus five per year for the largest 10 release and correspondingly lower for the other releases.
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Has this ever been 12 done befor2?
13 MR. BERNERO:
In a way it had in NUREG 0715, 14 the Indian Point rask Force Report and its predecessor 15 the report which is cited in the opening statement.
I 16 will show you one graph that illustrates that.
It is 17 something like that.
It is a development of this sort
'8 of approach in fact that W ASH-1400 itself used of a 19 standard set of accident profiles described as 20 characeristic of a PWR or a characteristic of a light 21 vater reactor.
22 Can we go back to slido 5, please.
23 The other aspects of the scope of the report, 24 the scope of the Sandia study are the characteristics of 25 population distribution as found in the U.
S.,
and there ALDER $oN REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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is perhaps no better way to look than to look at the j
2 sites that have been chosen over the last 20 years, the 3
full range of site availability there and site 4 characteristics.
5 Then the scope of the report goes on to study 6
the availability of land for further siting, 7 socio-economic impacts and all of the general questions 8 of siting policy.
Now the controversy or the interest 9
today is on the risk portion.
So I will be confining my to comments and the further discussion to the risk 11 portion.
I as really not prepared to go into the other 12 parts which require specialties other than our own.
13 Now the risk portion as I said is based on 14 that set of severe accident releases and it includes the 15 anaysis of 9.1 reactor sites, 91 U. S. reactor sites.
16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYs When you said risk 17 portion, what is it that you are leaving out?
18 MR. BERNERO:
I am leaving cut the 19 socio-economic impacts, land availability, the siting i
20 issues that are covered in the report but are other than t
l 21 the conditional consequences calculations.
22 MR. BLONDS Chapte r 2.
23 MR. BERNER0s I am actually in Chapter 2.
The 24 other chapters are covering these other issues.
25 Along with the consequence analysis for the I
i ALDER $oN REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
26 1
all 91 sites and using these accident source terms we 2
conducted an extensive sensitivity analysis, and of 3
course when you do sensitivity analyses you uncouple 4
yourself from reality to some degree.
You will do power 5
level sensitivity and go to higher power levels than are 6
authorized, 1500 megawatts electric, f or example.
You 7
vill shuffle population around in fashions different 8
than what you tolerate now and see what would it mean.
9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
You mean for a 10 hypothetical now?
11 MR. BERNER0s Yes, you hypothesize different 12 combinations of things.
For a sensitivity analysis what 13 you want to do is to see what is the vs..ation of risk 14 with the change and am I vulnerable to inaccuracy in 15 some model or in some assumption.
16 CHAIR 5AN PALLADINO:
Bob, did you study the 17 sensitivity to the number of people that remain 18 outside?
In other words, I think, if I remember 19 correctly, I was to;i that this assumes that 20 percent i
20 of the people are just standing there doing their normal 21 business outside.
22 MR. BERNER0s Yes.
23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Now suppose you vent to l
24 10 percent or some other number, how sensitive are these?
l 25 MR. BERNERO:
There are extensive emergency I
I ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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27 I
response assumptions in there, including the upper limit 2
assumption or worst case limit, if you want to find such 3
a worst case, that no one does anything at all after 4
that very severe release.
5 CH AIRM AN P ALL ADINO:
I thought the assumption 6
in here was that people are doing their normal thing.
7 MR. BERNERO:
As I will explain later, for the 8
maximum calculated consequences that were publicized 9
there was a set of assumptions that included 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of 10 normal activity even after the radioactive rain fell on 11 the populated area.
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO.
But was there any study 13 on what the consequences would be if most of the people 14 that were outside went indoors?
15 MR. BLOND:
Yes, there was a sheltering study 16 which made sheltering assumptions.
17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Okay.
For the moment we 18 I will let that answer suffice.
19 HR. BERN ERO:
It is difficult even to answer 20 questions like that without resorting to the authors and i
i 21 the experts.
The output of these studies is really 22 enormous.
This book here that is between Roger Blond I
l 23 and Dave Aldrich, that is microfiche.
That is film, 24 microscopic reproductions of pages of computer printout 25 and there are approximately 50,000 pages of computer l
ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
28 1
printout buried in that book if we chose to reproduce it 2
in hard copy and no one does.
When you do that kind of 3
work, it is just too voluminous and it would be 4
extremely rostly to do so.
It stays in the computer 5
tape and it stays in microfiche form, if you wish to 6
refer to it, and you instruct the computer appropriately 7
to plot this data or plot that data or you refer to the 8
microfiche or refer to whole runs.
You can rerun runs 9
if you wish in order to analyze the data.
That is rav 10 data.
11 HR. DIRCKSa Was this microfiche released?
12 NR. BERNER0s This is the raw data that was 13 the basis of the newspaper story.
The set of microfiche 14 that Roger Blond had for reference was loaned to the 15 Congressional staf f and the numbers that we re publicized 16 were extracted from certain pages and I will show you 17 one of the pages to show you what they look like.
18 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Who did the extraction?
To our knowledge, it was a 20 couple of Congressional staffers that did it.
That was 21 made available the Thursday before the election by my 22 best recollection.
23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, let's see, was 24 this improper?
25 MR. BERNER04 You know, the material in that ALCERSCN REPORT:NG COMPANY,INC.
29 1
aicrofiche has been made available for Indian Point 2
through the discovery process in Indian Point because we 3 are talking about all the different risk calculations 4
there.
There have been a couple of other cases, Shorhan 5 and Pilgrim where ---
6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY If someone asks for it 7 would we not give it to them?
8 MR. BERNERO:
Oh, yes.
After this meeting we 9 intend to put the notes from the meeting *nni a copy of 10 this, and we have had a copy made, we intend to put tha t 11 in th e PDR.
If someone wants to go read the 50,000 12 pages or look things up 13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Is it clear from reading 14 that what assumptions are implied?
No.
I will show you a page just 16 for that very reason.
17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Well, shouldn't that be a 18 part of what you make available?
19 MR. DIRCKS:
That is the backup to the study.
20 MR. BERNER0s the study is the analysis of 21 that raw data.
The implica tion is easily d raw if we are 22 reluctant to let the raw data out that we are trying to 23 hide something.
We are not now or haven't tried to hide 24 anything.
25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I am saying that it is ALCEASCN REPORTING CCMPANY. INC.
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not sufficient to get that out, but it is also necessary 2
to indicate I believe what is behind it and what are the 3
assumptions.
4 ER. BERNER0s Yes, that is what the report is.
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE4 There is the report and 6
then Bill's opening statement.
7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO Are you releasing th a t 8 with it?
9 MR. BERNER0s The report is eithe r in the 10 printer or going to the printer and it is a matter of 11 just the physical time to get it published.
But in the 12 meanwhile we will put the notes that we prepared for the 13 seeting, along with a little cover memorandum that I 14 vill prepare and our newly obtained copy of the 15 microfiche, we will put that in the Public Document Room.
16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Let me ask you did the 17 persons who turned that into hard copy violate some 18 agreement with you?
19 MR. BERNER0s No, I wouldn't say it is 20 violating an agreement.
It is just not very 21 scientific.
That is all.
22 You know, if you want to rummage around in the 23 children's building blocks set and spell naughty words, 24 you know, 25 (Laughter.)
i ALDER $oN REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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MR. BERNERO:
That is really what they did.
2 (Laughter.)
3 COMMISSIONER. GILINSKY:
Well, let 's see, I 4
don't know who did this, but did the persons who got 5
this information and put it into hard copy, did they 6 misrepresent the results that you had there?
7 MR. BERNERO:
It is hard to say because they 8 didn't publish the results.
They got the material on a 9
thursday evening and aust have worked like fiends.
That 10 is hard on the eyes to look at microfiche.
I am myoptic 11 to begin with and I have a real hard time looking at 12 it.
They worked like mad into the weekend and I have 13 the impression that the Washington Post rushed 14 villy-nilly into print on Sunday afternoon.
I get the 15 home edition up in Gaithersburg and it was all garbled 16 in there.
The whole first column was missing and ther 17 had to retype set or whatever they do.
The work must 18 have been done between Thursday evening and Saturday or 19 Sunday in order to get it to the Post and I presume l
20 there was some preparation go that the Post was prepared 21 for it.
That was a lot of saaare inches of space.
I 22 just don't consider that professional technical behavior.
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Did the Congressional 24 people contact you to dake sure they understood the 25 assumptions?
ALDER $oN REPCRTING COMPANY,INC.
32 1
MB. BERNER0s There was a discussion of it on 2
the preceding Tuesday I believe, and I will let Roger 3
talk to that because Roger had been contacted.
4 MR. BLONDa Yes, the individual did contact me 5
concerning the information in the report which was made 6
available to him previously.
At the time he mentioned 7
interest in the microfiche and the maximum results, and 8
ve had a fairly extensive discussion of the 9 uncertainties involved and the maximum results that 10 would be indicated and the validity of the results.
I 11 at that point thought the discussion was complete.
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Had you reviewed that, 13 what you gave then?
Had you reviewed that inf ormation 14 so that you knew what assumptions applied to that?
l 15 HR. BLOND 4 Ch Yes.
16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
You had reviewed it.
17 MR. BLOND:
In great detail, yes.
18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
What is that?
19 MR. BLOND:
In detail we had gone through it.
l 20 CHAIRMAN PALLADIN0s Somehow I got the 21 impression that it had not been reviewed by NBC.
l 22 MR. BERNER0s No.
Roger Blond of my staff has 23 been deeply involved with this work from the beginning.
1 1
24 May I have slide 6, plea se.
l l
25 I think the best way to understand what is in l
ALoERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
33 1
the report as against what is in the raw data is to take 2 one of the,teport curves and blow it up.
It has been 3
redrawn here and you can find the core of this curve 4 slightly edited in Appendix C of the report.
5 We took the first reactor site on the list, 6
Allens Creek.
7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
A pretty safe one.
8 ER. BERNER0s Yes, I understand it has been 9 cancelled.
So we are not even talking about a real 10 plant any more.
We are just talking about a site.
As 11 it turns out Allens Creek is about typical and I will 12 show you some data to indicate that it is typical.
13 Nov what I ha've done is I have changed the 14 probability scale to absolute probability away from 15 conditional probability so that now we are talking about 16 the probability per reactor year counting the 17 probability of the accident because in the report 18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
And the weather 19 con di tions.
20 ER. BERNERO:
Yes, all of the probabilities 21 that are explicitly treated.
Now this is a risk curve 22 and we characteristically display risks as this function 23 of probability versus consequence, this risk curve.
24 Now in order to read it, if you will take th e 25 lef t-hand axis, notice these vertical lines represent ALoER8cN REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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one death.
Ten to the zero is buzz vords for one 2
death.
Ten to the one is ten deaths, ten squared is a 3 hundred deaths and a thousand deaths and ten thousand 4 deaths and then a hundred thousand deaths and it marches 5
on up the page.
6 Now if you look a t that left-hand column and 7 go way to the top you see the highest probability listed 8 is the ten to the minus five for that SST-1 release.
9 Now what that represents really is the hypothesis that 10 there has been some transient er small loss-of-coolant 11 accident or whatever the accident was that is going to 12 cause this release.
13 You have had the failure of the engineered 14 safety features that leads to core melt and the core 15 melted with no mitigating sprays or coolers or anything 16 lik e that.
There is the failure of the containment 17 engineered safety features thus and you have the early 18 failure of t.he. containment.
So now you have the largest 19 release and that is how you got it.
All of those things 20 failed and that puts us at ten to the minus five per 21 year.
22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I am sorry, I lost you.
23 Where did you get ten to the minus five?
24 HR. BERNERO:
That is the upper-left-hand I
25 corner of the figure.
l 1
ALDER $oN REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
35 1
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
But what has that have to 2
do 3
MR. BERNERO:
Well, it is not even on the 4 curve yet.
That is the hypothesis.
That is given you 5
have the SST-1 release.
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADIN04 Okay, thank you.
7 HR. BERNERO:
Now to find the first point on 8 the curve the model used in the calculation and it is 9 supported by a full range of sensitivity studies in the 10 analysis, assumes what we call a summary evacuation, and 11 a summary evacuation says that 30 percent of the people 12 act promptly and move and then 40 percent of the people 13 are a little slower.
They don't get going.
They delay 14 for a couple of hours.
Then another 30 percent of the 15 people, the rest of them, delay for even more hours, a 16 couple more hours.
So that it is a distribution of 17 emergency response by the people within the first ten 18 miles.
19 So that assumption is made in this particular 20 run that there is summary eva uation as we call it and 21 then you look at the weather probabilistically.
What is 22 the weather likely to be at the time of the accident 23 using a real set of data and candomly sampling that data, 24 Now what it shows, the curve starts at ten to 25 the minus six, one death at ten to the minus six. It is ALDERSoN REPoMT1NG COMPANY,INC.
36 1
slightly above, ignore the difference and I will show 2
you the number.
What that shows is that nine times out 3
of ten there are no early fatalities even with th at 4
largest release.
One time out of ten there will be 5
early fatalities with hat release and that is due to 6
the combination of the evacuation effects and the fact 7
that if the wind is blowing with any vigor it will 8
scatter the plume and therefore reduce the likelihood of 9
lethal doses.
You will get dispersion of the to radioactivity.
11 Remember this curve here is for early 12 fatalities where in round numbers a person has to be 13 exposed to something like 500 rem in order to be fatally 14 injured by the radiation.
15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE Is this at all affected 16 by the population distribution?
17 MR. BERNER0s Yes, it will vary and it is site 18 specific.
I am going to show you a range of these.
19 Therefore, this is one of the extremes of the curve.
20 This is the favorable extreme of the curve, the extreme 21 value being how of ten is anyone killed at all.
22 Now if you follow down the =urve the flatness 23 of the curve as you go out indicates that a nuclear i
24 reactor a::iden t tha t would release a large puff of 25 radioactivity is unlikely to kill only one person.
It i
l ALDERSoN REPORTING CCMPANY. INC.
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would kill a group because of its very nature.
That is 2
why the curve is fairly flat and you see out past 10 3
fatalities and 100 fatalities and then the curve starts 4 to break down.
Now we are calcula ting for all the 5
different probabilities of weather sequences and that 6 includes whether or not it rains, which way the wind was 7 blowing and so forth.
8 It is interesting to note the next line right 9 after the curve shifts downward is ten to the minus 10 seven per year.
If you go in our standard review plan 11 you will find if you are worried about some plant that 12 sight be close to an airport, that is usually used as a 13 screening value.
Then to the minus seven per year, the 14 probability of a catastrophic event, is usually used as 15 a screening value.
If a realistic appraisal shows it is 16 less than that probability, you needn't concern yourself 17 with it.
So in a way you could say the regulatory i
18 practice would normally cut off at ten to the minus 19 seven.
20 If you go down in the report you will find l
21 where the solid line goes.
Appendix C of the report 22 cuts them off at ten to the minus eight, where in 23 general the shape of the curve is there.
You have got 24 the curve delineated.
25 Remember we are going to be integrating or i
ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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will integrate this curve, average it because the full 2
weight of risk is what counts, what is the full weight 3
of risk and not merely the extremes.
4 Now the calculations which average the curve 5
also calculated those maximum or extreme calculations, 6
the ones that were publicized, and what we have done in 7
this curve is done it with dashed lines.
That is what 8
was actually calculated and is included in the 9
microfiche but not in the report.
10 CHAIRNAN PALLADINO:
Was that included in the 11 average?
12 5R. BERNERO:
It was included in the average.
13 When you integrata you take everything that was 14 calculated.
Now the maximum calculated value for Allens 15 Creek is right where the dashed line ends and that l
16 happens to be 2.45 times ten to the minus ten per year, 17 and I will show that number to you on the next slide.
18 So the maximum calculated consequence of early 19 fatalities for Allens Creek happened to come out at that 20 probability per year.
21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
What you mean is that 22 which was called the worst case ?
23 MR. BERNER0s Yes, it was the maximum 24 calculated.
It is really not the worst case and that is l
25 why I put question marks.
If we went into further ALDERSoN MEPoRTING COMPANY,INC.
39 1
speculation and actually we hide probability in the 2
emergency response assumption.
In the emergency 3
response planning we say I will assume that people do 4
this and people do that.
There is actually a 5 probability of that.
When you make those assumptions 8
conservative what you are really doing is moving farther 7 and farther down the probability scale and we just don't 8 numerically treat it.
9 But the point is that if you wanted to you 10 could reconstruct the accident assumptfons and emergency 11 response.
12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYs Could you do that?
13 Could you tell us what it is that takes you out to that 14 question mark?
15 3R. BERNERO:
Well, let me say :he assumptions 18 that got you to the maximum that was calculated are that 17 the plume was released by the accident,and it moved 18 slowly so as not to disperse it but just fast enough to 19 get out to a population renter 15 or 20 miles away.
So f
(
20 figure several hours to get there.
Then it assumed that l
21 once it got over the people there was an unfortunate 22 rain, that it rained and the rain fell on the people.
23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY Does rain turn out to l
24 be pretty severe ---
25 MR. BERNER04 Yes, all of these maximum are ALDER $oN REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
40 1
rain out sequences.
2 COHNISSIONER GILINSKY Had rain out been 3
considered before?
4 MR. BERNER04 Yes, there are research reports.
5 COHHISSIONER GILINSKY :
Was it considered in 6
WASH-1400?
7 HR. BERNER0s Yes.
8 Now the rain is assumed to dror, the 9
radioactivity to the streets and the building surfaces 10 and, by the way, all this time we are assuming those 11 people are going about their every day business which 12 seans 80 parcant of the time they are inside their homes 13 or offices, 20 percent the'y are outside and half of the 14 20 percent outside is in automobiles or buses.
So it l5 just assumes normal activity and the shielding that goes 16 with that, the shielding f actors that go with that and 17 that depends on region, you know, is it typically 18 masonry houses or wooden houses.
19 Now the further assumption is made that when 20 the rain drops the rain goes down the gutter by the l
21 radioactivity sticks to the ground.
It would be 22 possible perhaps to spend the money and develop a better 23 model for that, but when you are out here the risk l
24 significance pales so there is not much sense in 25 spending a lot of money on it.
i i
ALDERSoN MEPoRTING COMPANY. INC.
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/
1 Than the assumption is made in this particular 2
set of calculations that for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after the rainfall 3
the people went about their 80 percent indoors and 20 4 percent outdoors.
For 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> they did that.and they C'
are getting this gamma shinu, you know, the radiation 6
shine and that is the dose that is building up these 7
early fatalities, and that after 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> they finally 8
nove out.
9 Now we can clearly be more realistic.
We can 10 assume 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or perhaps six hours.
If you count the 11 fact that it takes several hours for the plume to get 12 there and about an hour for the rain to fall and put the 13 plume on the ground, we could argue about some more 14 realistic assumption and get a lower maximum calculated 15 value, but it would be a diversion.
It would be worth 16 doing only if it were truely significant to the risk.
17 We could also.get a higher number.
We assumed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 18 sitting under the gamma shine.
We could have assumed 48
~
19 hours2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br /> or we could have assumed a week, seven days.
20 CHAIRHAN PALLADIFOs But those are not all 21 equally probable assumptions.
22 MR. BERNERO:
Oh, no.
That is what I meant by 23 hidden probability.
24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Well, I think it is 25 necessary to say.
If there had been a rain out, it is a
ALDER $oN REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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42 1
far less likely th a t people would stay another 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, 2
but it is likely that if it started that they might move 3
out in six or some other number.
So not all of them 4
have the same signifi.ance so f ar as the study is 5
concerned.
6 MR. BERNERO:
We really don't pursue it.
The 7 shape of the curve down there can be twitched back and 8
forth by assumptions about emergency response that are 9
worth looking at from a sensitivity point of view, but 10 it is very ~hard to put probability values on them.
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYs At what point does 12 rain out become the im porta nt phenomena, on the last 13 part of the curve?
14 MR. ALDRICH:
It would depend on the site, but 15 I would quass on this plot at about the tan to the minus 16 nine level, somewhere around there.
17 MR. BERNERO:
See, remember the rain mustn 't 18 just ha p7en.
It has to wait to happen until this 19 isotope rich plume reaches.the population and happen 20 just then and not later.
21 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Because otherwise it 22 will take it out in the meantime.
23 MR. BERNERO:
It will wash it out before or 24 wash it out after and you won't get the population.
25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Before you leave ALDERSCN REPCRTING CCMPANY,INC.
43 1
that chart a couple of things.
One, you mentioned you 2
have got an evacuation model. built into this.
Is that 3
site specific as well or not?
4 NR. BERNERO:
Not in this study.
It was done 5
parametrically.
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
What was not done in this 7
study, an evacuation model?
8 HR. BERNERO:
There was no attempt to identify 9
an evacuation model description pertinent to a specific 10 site.
In other words, the team that did this work did 11 not go look at Allens Creek and evaluate the roads or 12 anything like that.
13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
But you did make an 14 assumption about the 30 percent likelihood?
15 MR. BERNERO:
He made a summary evacuation and 16 then sensitivity analysis around it.
17 Roger.
18 HR. BLOND:
There was an extensive sensitivity 19 analysis conducted on emergency response which is part 20 of the report.
21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Did you use that for 22 every part of this?
I thought up here you said the 23 people were going to go about their normal business and 24 up here you said a summary.
25 MR. BERNERO:
The summary was out to ten i
ALCER$oN REPORTING CCMPANY,lM' 8138 fEEOdC
44 1
miles.
It was just arbitrarily cut off at ten miles for 2
siting study purposes.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I see.
4 HR. BERNERO:
You know, a planning zone out to 5
ten miles doesn 't mean that is as far as you would ever 6
evacuate.
7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
No, I am just trying to 8 understand your assumption.
Your assumptians were out 9
to ten miles?
10 HR. BERNER0s Ten miles ---
11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
And you assumed a summer 12 type evauation and than somewhere else you assumed 13 something else.
The only thing I know other than that 14 is that at the time the plume comes these people haven't 15 done anything and they are going to stay there 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 16 and then they are going to get wet.
17 COHNISSIONER AHEARNE:
After the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
18 HR. BERNERO:
Everyone beyond ten miles has 24 19 hour2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br /> plume ---
20 CHAIRHAN PALLADINO:
Everybody beyond ten 21 miles.
22 COHNISSIONER GILINSKY:
Now what takes these 23 results beyond the numbers one associates with WASH 1400?
24 HR. BERNERO:
Well, it depends.
See, we 25 didn't display in the report, or I should say Sandia ALDER $CN REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
U 45 1
didn 't display the maximum calculated numbers in the 2
report because they displayed the curve.
3 CONNISSIONER GILINSKY:
No, no.
I an asking 4
why did these numbers not show up in WASH-14007 5
3R. BERNER0s Well, numbers like this 6
WASH-1400 calculated 7
MR. BLOND:
WASH-1400 didn 't go this low in 8
probability is wha t it amounts to.
9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
But there is a number 10 I remember being listed as the maximum accident that was 11 possible and that was 3,000 ---
12 MR. BERNER0s That is what was presented in 13 the CCDF, that one with all the dam failure and 14 e ve ry thing else that had a probability cut-off.
Any 15 time a curve, and that includes a risk curv e especially, 16 comes down that doesn't mean that is the end of the 17 calculation.
I mean WASH-1400 had a positive slope to 18 that curve.
19 Jim, would you put up -- yes, that one.
20 See that had a visible slope to it clearly 21 indicating that there are maximum values beyond that 22 probability cut-off, but what is their significance?
23 WASH-1400 actually calculated some numbers beyond that 24 level, but at a very lo w proba bili ty.
25 Now in a risk curve you can even have a Ai.DERSoN REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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vertical curve twitch.
You know, there are 2
discontinuities or deflections in the curve, and merely 3
presenting a probabilistic cut-off, you know, these are 4 log -log plots.
5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY I think one of the 6 difficulties is the way WASH-1400 was portrayed and 7
there wasn't any talk about slopes or curves.
3,000 or 8 some number like that was presented as a maximum of 9 casualities that you could expect.
10 MR. BERNER04 WAS!i-1400 was trying to present 11 an industry average, and that is what that CCDF is, the 12 risk of a hundred reactors, and they were synthesizing 13 different sites and representing all the rekctors with 14 just a PWR and a BWR.
That l's the way it was 15 presented.
There is a long history with that.
16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, I know that.
17 MR. BERNER04 Let 's go on with the eigh t years 18 since then.
t 19 Would you go to No. 7, please, Jim.
20 This is 'the corresponding microfiche page for l
21 Allens Creek.
22 COMMISSIONER GIIINSKY:
Well, let me ask you, 23 if you said to me what is the significance of going 24 beyond where WASH-1400 went, or you are going beyond 25 where WASH-1400 vent l
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)
1 MR. BERNERO:
And we are also saying that we 2
see it as of diminishing interest and calculations have 3
gone down into there for years as I will show you and 4
you have to ask yourself what is the significance of a 5
maximum calculated consequence which is pessimistically 8
overdrawn and is associated with some uncertain 7
probability, but with a recurrence interval somewhere 8 like the geologic age of the earth.
You know, it pales 9
in significance.
10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY So why are we running 11 these calculations?
12 MR. BERNERO:
You run them down to some 13 extreme and then stop and you just shouldn't attach too 14 much significance to the extreme.
We use the mean, the 15 sean value, the weighted average of the curve.
That is 18 what is tabulated in this report and that is the real 17 weight of the risk.
18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
If I understand 19 correctly, the report stopped at where you showed a 20 solid line.
21 HR. BERNERO:
Yes, the report really displayed 22 the ten to the minus eight cut-off for graphics.
23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Someone else made th e se 24 calculations.
25 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, Sandia made the ALDER $oN REPCRTING CCMPANY,INC.
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calculations.
2 MR. BERNER0s This page that is on the screne 3 now is one copy, one hard copy of the Allens Creek page 4
for this particular early f atality consequence.
This is 5 one of the 50,000 pages we could print if we wanted to 6
print all this in hard copy.
Up at the top you can see 7 it has got the identification of the site and code words 8
for what accident sequence and what evacuation scheme.
9 You know, it is the entry assumptions of the thing.
~
10 If you look at the top of the columns over in 11 the right-hand side, the second column from the end, see 12 where it says " Peak," that is the maximum calculated 13 acute f atalities, people who die in one year.
For this 14 particular plant it is 7,410.
15 Now right next to it is the probsbility of the 16 peak.
Now that is a conditional probability, 2.45 times 17 ten to the minus five, because the whole code was set up 18 to calculate conditional probability.
To convert it for 19 the curve we merely multiplied it by the SST-1 20 probability of ten to the minus five to get 2.45 times 21 ten to the minus ten.
22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYs Is that what got left 23 out of the newspaper?
24 MR. BERNER0s Yes. The person that went in and 25 took the top of the second column from the end ALDERSoN REPCRTING CCMPANY,INC.
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49 1
apparently lef t out or chose not to attend to the last 2
column.
Maybe the didn't understand it, that it was a 3
conditional probability.
4 May I have slide 8, please, Jim.
5 We went in and took the other extreme and 6
tab ula ted it.
I think this is a significan t siting 7 question, and that is if you go to the left-hand end of 8
the curve where the probability of any f atality at all, 9
and remember these curves are fairly flat, that 10 probability if you would divide the number of sites.
11 Now this is not currant reactors.
This is of these 91 "ccording to the results of 12 sites.
We scrted them out a
13 the report 14 (At this point in the proceedings, 4:25 p.m.,
15 Commissioner Asselstine left the Commissioners' table.)
16 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
When you say they are 17 not current reactors ---
18 MR. BERNERO:
Well, Allens Creek isn't real 19 any more, you know.
20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But as of the time of 21 this report th ey all were.
22 3R. BERNERO:
Well, they could be.
They are 23 reactor sites, yes.
They could be reactors.
Nov 24 notice, this is in decreasing risk.
25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
You started to say what i
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you calculsted.
2 HR. BERNERO:
What we calculated is the 3 chance, as the lagend says at the bottom, the 4
probability of one fatality per reactor year.
That is 5 any fatality per reactor year.
That is the lef t-hand 6
end of the curve.
(! hat that shows is the highest 7
population sitel, or the left hand.
Two sites will fall 8 in the ran7e t five to ten chances per million, which 9
is almoc
- a.
crobability of the release.
That says on 10 those si'
' it there is a t least higher than a 50/50 11 chance that..imeone will die if that release occurs and 12 not r a :p,- O, fly those are two highly populated sites, 13 you knN,
- 0, roversial sites, Limeri:k and Zion.
14 Then.f you go down you see when you get below 15 the 50/50 chan u, tt e t is the next block, one to five 16 chances per mi'_ lion, teat is less than a 50/50 chance of 17 someone dying if th+re ta such a release.
There are 30 18 sites in that category.
19 Then if you get down to the next catetory, and 20 now the chance is less than one in ten that someone will 21 die if that large release occurs, you see two dozen 22 sites and another two dozen sites in the next set, and 23 you can see that the bulk of the popula tion -- well, 24 Allens Creek is at the end of the second block.
So 25 Allen's Creek represents a typical site, one chance in ALCERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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ten.
2 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO Can I just ask you.
You 3
said this is the probability fatality per reactor 4
year ---
5 MR. BERNER0a If the release occurs.
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
If the release occurs?
7 MR. BERNER0s Yes.
8 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Now w ha t do I multiply 9
this by, ten to the minus five?
10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Is this of one or at 11 least one?
12 MR. BLOND:
It is at least one.
13 CHAIRMAN P A LLA' DIN 0 s Ten to the minus five?
14 HR. BERNER0s It has been multiplied by ten to 15 the minus five.
16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
That is what I am asking 17 you.
I am just trying to understand this curve.
s 18 MR. BERNER0s If you assume the odds of the 19 release are one chance in a hundred thousand, the odds 20 spelled here prevail for these sites.
21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Ihat is what I thought.
22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
This is one or at 23 least onei 24 MR. BERNERO:
One or at least one.
Those are 25 fla t curves and therefore this is a risk significant ALOERSCN REPORTING CCMPANY,INC.
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thing because the characteristic of the risk curves are 2
fairly flat and at least on e is very close to a t least 3
ten is very close to at least a hundred.
You know, you 4 get a group.
5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Are you going to tell 6 us something about property damage?
7 MR. BERNERO:
We didn't prepare a lot of 8 material about that, but we can answer questions on it.
9 I don't know when you would want to do it.
10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, why don't you 11 complete what you have, but I would like to hear about 12 property damage.
13
- 58. BERNERO:
May I have slide 9 please, Jim.
14 There is extensive sensitivity analysis in 15 this report.
Remember what we are trying to find here 16 is the signficant variation of risk and the important 17 ones are listed here, population distribution, 18 meteorology, emergency response, the source terms, which 19 we have discussed earlier, and interdiction and 20 decontamination, this is where the property damage 21 becomes very important.
22 Interdiction is where there is a certain 23 release.
You calculate the contamination level, you set 24 an assumed criterion for telling people to leave the 25 property or to decontaminate that property based on the ALCER$oN REPCRTING CCMPANY,INC.
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dose you would suffer if you stayed th e re a nd used the 2
property.
So you interdict it.
You take people off.
3 Now there are two things you can do.
You can 4
interdict it and just block it off and write it off, 5
tha t is, not let anyone back, or you can decontaminate 6
it and develop a cost estimate for decontamination of 7
the property to get the dose down to a low enough level 8
so people can go back and use the property, farmland or 9
whatever it is.
10 COHNISSIONER GILINSKY:
Is that where you come 11 up with the number for damage?
12 MR. BERNERO:
That is where you get the very 13 Large numbars.
You can get up into property damages of 14 a hundred billion dollars or more, depending on the 15 assumptions you use.
You can also by a peculiar quirk, 16 and you can go into this report and find very large 17 numbers.
18 In the sensitivity analysis, the one that 19 leaps to mind is even cited in the report and you can 20 gets hundreds of thousands of early fatalities.
You can 21 get very high levels of latent cancers calculated if you 22 assume nobody moves.
If you say don't decontaminate and 23 don't make the people move out.
In other words, you 24 bring the property damage to zero by letting people use 25 the land.
Of course, it is an absurb postulation that ALDERSON REPCRTING COMPANY,INC.
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they would just get all this radiation.
2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
To get the hundred 3
billion dollars you must be decontaminating what?
Large areas.
5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
City or farmland or 6 what are you talking about?
7 HR. BLOND:
That would be a city.
8 HR. BERNERO:
City property, urban.
In 9 general the land value in the model I believe is roughly 10 proportional to the population density.
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
What are you 12 calculating, just the value of the labor involved in 13 decontamination?
14 HR. BLOND:
There is an extensive amount of 15 information that involved with the decontamination 16 process and that is the materials and the labor.
There 17 is a section in WASH-1400 whi:h goes into detail on that.
18 MR. BERNERO.
We have put out publications l
13 before, research reports.
The report on the consequence 20 model in WASH-1400 is a NUREG report and we have 21 discussed with the Commission before the sensitivity of 22 the property damage to assumptions about cleanup 23 criteria and so forth.
24 Earlier in the statement that was read by Bill 25 Dircks at the beginning there was rention of a i
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Congressional letter.
In 1980 after we did the Indian 2
Point Task Force Report, which is sort of a lead in to 3
this study, they are very similar in methodology, we 4
used the full range of results in that report as a basis 5
of comment on the Price / Anderson Act liability limits 6
and wrote to Congress and gave $100 billion as the 7 number for property damage and 50,000 was the number in 8
the letter for early fatalities.
I remember those two 9
numbers.
10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYs There is a letter we 11 sent to the Congress?
12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNEs Yes.
13 HR. BERNER0s Yes.
14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNEs Commission approved.
i 15 (Laughter.)
16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
There is one problem I am 17 having when we extent out to these improbable 18 situations.
If I were to take the bridge which I got 19 from your primer, and say that there is one chance in 20 ten to the minus "X" that if I walk across the bridge 21 that bridge vill fail because they left out the rebar or 22 the rebar wasn 't connected right or the concrete was bad 23 and everything vent bad.
That is the kind of situation 24 ve are really talking about here to try to put it into i
25 perspective th a t th e se vay-out situations are not l
ALDERSoN REPORTING CCMPANY,INC.
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realistic situations, or at least I am led to believe 2
that they are not.
3 HR. BERNERO:
Well, as I say, many of these 4 things ---
5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Because if we are going 6 to worry about that, then some of the other things that 7 we don't worry about won't get attention.
8 HR. BERNERO:
There is a. custom that pervades 9 even the purportedly realistic risk analysis that 10 certainly is pervasive in conventional engineering 11 intlysis, and that is you try to be realistic but you 12 try to approach it from the conservative side and when
- 13. in doubt you bound.
This is one example, the emergency 14 planning assumptions.
How much debate during the course 15 of an analysis is warranted to decide whether to change 16 that emergancy pisnning assumption from 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of 17 lingering to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or to six hours, which are 18 certainly more realistic.
It is just at a certain point 19 you cut it off.
20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I think what bothers a 21 lot of people is that you can keep on going out to more 22 and more improbable circumstances and find larger and 23 larger controversies.
24 3R. BERNERO:
Yes, that is why we drew those 25 questien marks.
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CHAIRMAN PALLADINOs It is intuitively 2
bothersome and that is because we haven't done it under 3
circumstances and that is why I want to go back to the 4
bridge.
If you take increasingly improbable 5
circumstances you can say don't even cross the bridge by 6
yourself or even a fly going across there could break 7
the bridge.
8
- 58. BERNERO:
In the press conference we had 9
the Monday the story broke I raised a point about 10 aircraft crashes.
I happened to live in the 11 Philadelphia metropolitan area for nine years and I few 12 a lot in those days as well as now and I flew out of 13 Philadelphia International Airport very regularly, out 14 and in on large aircraft and there are three sports 15 stadiums virtually at the end of the runway.
There are 16 three in a row.
17 It is like a sports stadium store and it is 18 very common to have a sports event going on and many, 19 many times in my life if I have been on a heavily loaded 20 jet, and I don't know if you are aware cf it, but a 21 Boeing 747 veighs about 750 or 800 thousand pounds, and 22 when it takes off there is a couple of hundred thousand 23 pounds of jet fuel in it.
It is a massive airplane and 24 a lot of them take off from that airport.
That is an 25 international airport, a big city.
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I used to look down in idle speculation on the 2 sports stadia there and if you fly into LaGuardia Shay 3 Stadium is there.
I have flown over baseball games in 4 Shar Stadium.
You go into San Francisco and there is 5 Candlestick Park.
But society deals with that.
We 6 don 't try and sit there and model the f uel splashing 7 across the 50 yard line stands.
You know, we look at 8 that and we treat it realistically.
9 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
That was my point.
We 10 are not in the habit of doing it.
11 MR. BERNERO:
Except in one industry.
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO In this industry, and 13 tha t is why it is so bothersone.
14 MR. BLOND But that is precisely why we do 15 not include that information in our analyses and try to 16 limit where we go with it.
17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
See, it is so poorly 18 understood and that is what leads people to say well, we 19 are hiding something and you didn 't put it in the paper 20 and I had to put it in the paper.
21 MR. BERNER0s Jim, would you put up No. 23 22 again.
While we were talking on this most recent 23 subject, we had a backup slide on this letter and I 24 think it is just worth showing it to you.
At the time, 25 1980, we had done the Indian Point Task Force Report and ALDERSoN REPORTING CCMPANY,INC.
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there was a GAO study of the Price / Anderson Act and the 2
Commission made comment in this letter to Senator 3
Ribicoff and it extracted the range of values from NUREG 4
0715 which was presented to the Commission and these are 5
the values that were presented.
6 You see there $100 billion is e,ne property 7
damage range at ten minus nine per year and 50,000 early 8
fatalities.
9 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Is this something we have 10 got here?
11 HR. BERNERO:
No, you don' t have a backup.
12 That is a backup chart.
It was signed by the then 13 Chairman John Ahearne.
14 (Laughter.)
15 MR. BERNER0s And he knew about it and I did, 18 too, because I wrote it.
17
( Lau ght er. )
18 HR. HERNERO:
May I have slide 10, please, Jim.
19 Let me go back.
I constructed just to set 20 down this one slide because it is difficult.
Those of 21 us who work in the field are constantly switching from 22 the conditional probability to absolute probability and l
23 all sorts of turmoil.
It is difficult to follow.
I l
24 made a table so that one could understand the events and l
L 25 the probabilities associated with them for clarity and l
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we have three columns heres the even t, the conditional 2
probability per year and the cumulative probability per 3
year.
So you can add up all the preceding events.
4 There has been extensive discussion of 5
two ---
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Say that again.
I didn't 7
understand cumulative.
8 MR. BERNER0s Well, the cumulative is the 9
absolute probability that the event described in that 10 row happened.
So that if I go to No.
4, the maximum 11 calculated weather sequence and population combination, 12 in other words, the maximum calculated value, it has a 13 typical absolute probability of one time then to the 14 minus nine per year and it has a conditional probability 15 of one timas ten to the minus three per year over the 16 preceding event, which is any fatality.
17 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE By the way in looking 18 at your chart, was the question I raised back in the 19 sta temen t.
It has got ten to the minus four.
20 MR. BERNERO:
Well, see the weather is part of 21 item 3 as well.
See the weather is a part of the 22 conditional probability of any early fatality.
It is 23 confusing and that is why we made the table just to 24 clarify it.
25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
What is confusing me is ALDERSCN REPCRTING CCMPANY,iNC.
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the ten to the minus four being both conditional and 2
cumulative under large-scale ---
3 MR. BERNER04 Well, that happens to be the 4
first item and that is why.
5 CHAIRHAN PALLADIN0s It is a reference.
6 HR. BERNER0s Yes, it is a reference.
7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But let me persist in 8 my question.
On page 2 of the opening statement it says 9
"The analyses indicate an annual probability of one 10 chance in ten that anyone at all vill be killed if a 11 large release occurs and one chance in 10,000 with 12 veather sequences."
13 MR. BER N ER0 4 les, that is a conditional 14 probability on SST-1.
I: is not conditional on any 15 fatality.
16 COEMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I would suggest that 17 you might look at your opening statement ---
18 (Laughtar.)
19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
It is just that your 20 opening statement is trying to be as clear as possible.
21 So I would imagine you would like to give it to people 22 to use.
I can understand your argument 23 HR. BERNERO:
I will look at it very carefully 24 and in the cover memorandum that does to the PDR I will 25 be sure that we have that ALDEPSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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CHAIRMAN PALLADIN04 If it is clear to the 2
Commissioners there is a chance that it might be clear 3
to others.
4 3R. BERNERO:
Now I would just like to add 5
there has been widespread discussion of two percent 6 chance of something.
7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yes.
8 HR. BERNERO:
And one time ten to the minus 9
five per year, which is event No.
2, the large SST-1 10 release, if you say there are going to be a hundred 11 reactors operating over the next 20 years as a first 12 shot at what the industry would be for a while, then you 13 can multiply the numbers out and you get a two percent 14 chance of an SST-1 release.
15 Now some of the news stories said that.
Some 16 of the other news stories ---
17
' CHAIRMAN PALLADINC:
How did you get that two 18 percent?
19 MR. BERNERO The two percent would be a 20 hundred times 20, a hundred reactors times 20 years at a 21 probability of ten to the minus five.
22 Many of the news stories picked up the maximum 23 calculated consequences as somehow having a two percent 24 chance, which of course it would be two ten / thousands of 25 a percent which would be a very low figure.
l i
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May I have slide 11, please.
2 In order to show where W ASH-1400 calculations 3
fit into this and where later publications fit, we just 4
chose this one slide.
It is out of a Sandia report the 5
title of which is at the top of the page and this is 6
cited in the opening statement.
The Commission has seen 7
this, not all of you because you weren't members of the 8
Commission.
This report was in 1978 and it was looking 9
at population distributions.
If you notice, the upper 10 curve, No.
1, is Indian Point, and No. 2 is Zion.
11 What was being done here is the accident 12 release profile of the reactor safety study plant was 13 being tuned for power level and Moved from site to site 14 hypothetically to look at population distribution.
The 15 curve with the star is the reactor saf ety study curve.
16 What it showed wa s well, W ASH-1400 is an 17 average, but if you go to a high population site or to a 18 low population site you can get quite a spread.
This 19 curve was I think a significant factor in the strong j
20 interest in Zion and Indian Point which has led to the 21 current hea ring.
22 Notice that this curve here displays the Zion 23 curve way out at the right-hand side at the ten to the 24 minus nine cut-off and that is -- what is that 25 3.something times ten to the fourth, you know, high ALDERSCN AEPoRTING CCMPANY,INC.
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consequences and you are picking up the population there 2
that is around that site which is fairly populated.
3 May I have slide 12, please.
4 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Where lid this come from?
5 MR. BERNER0s This is from a Sandia report 6
whose title is at the top.
It is a 1978 report and it 7 is cited in the opening statement, this report.
In 8
fact, if you go to the next slide, No. 12, it is the 9
first citation at the top, Sand 78-0556.
It was one of 10 the significant follow-up reports to WASH-1400.
11 I mentioned before in the Spring of 1980 ve 12 had the Indian Point Task Force Report which was simila r 13 in character and explored the full range of consequences 14 and that of course led to that letter to the Congress.
15 The industry reports, you know industry is nov 16 doing major risk analyses and I cite the Zion 17 probabilistic safety study here, but Indian Point.also 18 goes and they explore the outer reaches and then people 19 make cut-offs at one point or another.
But it is 20 obvious that the very low probability, high consequence 21 events are out there and their risk significance is put 22 into perspective when you see them on the risk curve.
23 Now, further, some time ago the Commission 24 adopted a policy of describing Class 9 or core-melt 25 accident risk in the reactor environmental impact 1
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statements such as this.
Here is the d raf t 2
environmental impact statement for Waterford.
3 Now since you have adopted that policy the 4
staff has been doing these analyses in as plant specific 5
a aanner as is fessible and presenting this full range 6
of results in those environmental impact statements, and 7 rather than flug you with things, we just tabulated the 8
NUREGs here.
There are 20 environmental statements.
9 The literature is almost overwhelming.
10 Now is going to vary from plant to plant and 11 site to site.
The environmental impact statements try 12 to be reactor specific and site specific, but they are 13 doing somewhat the same thing.
Unless they have a real 14 risk analysis for the plant, they are trying to 15 synthesize one.
But the point I make in this whole 18 thing is this has been in the literature for years.
17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Do you present maximum 18 cases of this sort in the environmental statements?
19 MR. BERNER0s Yes, they shoe the CCDF's coming 20 down and they present them essentially the same way as 21 this curve that I show in this report.
22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Maximum case is a hard 23 thing to say.
The worst case is where they stop.
24 MR. BERNERO:
Yes, the saximum calculation.
25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I guess you could always ALDER $oN REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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66 1
keep on going and find som e thing Lore ma'ximum or worse.
2 HR. BERNERO:
Again, I think the letter to 3 Chairman Ribicoff I think makes it abundantly clear, and 4
that was two years ago, that the full range of 5 consequences has been identified, has been recognized 6
and has been given to the Congress.
You know, you can 7 go read the letter.
The Congress is advised to consider 8 this in retaining or amending the Price /Anderton limits.
9 May I have slide 13, please.
10 Now I would just like to wrap up because there 11 are so many things we could cover with two conclusions.
12 The technical data in this report if 13 deliberately and carefully analyzed shows that our 14 present siting policy is not seriously flawed.
It could f
15 be refined, but it is now seriously flawed and it is 18 logical to delay further siting work on new siting 17 policy avaiting a revised source term.
Tha t is a 18 sensible thing to do.
19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Let me ask you, when 20 you say not seriously flawed, would you put reactors at I
21 some of the more highly populated sites that we have now l
22 or put additional reactors there?
l 23 ER. BERNERO:
No.
The siting policy I am
(
24 referring to is Reg. Guide 4.7 and 10 CFR 100.
You may 25 recall the history of Reg. Guide 4.7 is such that you l
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would not site Indian Point.
You know, Reg. Guide 4.7 2
in effect came into existence on the Newbold Island case 3
or right af ter it when we had this almost testing of the 4
Waters to see how populace a site was accaptable.
Then 5
Reg. Guide 4.7 vent into effect and then, what is the 6
site, I think it is Maguire reactor is spoken of as the 7
threshold.
8 COHEISSIONER GILINSKY.
Suppose you did 9
believe all these numbers, why wouldn't you site a 10 reactor at Indian Point?
s 11 MR. 9ERNERO:
Well, in one of the ACRS' 12 discussions of the content of this report, that very 13 subject came up.
It depends on what your safety: goal is 14 and what is your description of acceptable safety is.
15 The risk curves see here and you can look at them-16 backwards, so to speak, and say what risk are they ad 17 is that an acceptable risk.
I eqn look at the Indian l
i 18 Point risk.
i j
19 CH AIRH AN PALLADINO:
I th(ught there was a 20 task force that looked at Indian Point f.nd said it is 21 a cce pta b le.
22 MR. BERNERO:
The NUREG 0715 ---
s 23 CHAIRMAN PALLADING:
That is what we are 24 having published.
25 HR. BERNERO:
Yes.
I l
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68 1
COMMISSIONER AHEARNEs There was a difference 2
in the question.
One question is if a new plant came in 3
for a new permit, would you site it trera?
A second 4
question is given existing plants, would you let then 5 continua to operate at the sites they are?
6 Bob had said in the beginning in going through 7
this that these were looking at new sites.
I think most 8 people recognize that after you go through all this
~
9 development and analysis under the sugaestion that it is 10 for new sites, once that is all done, then it will be 11 applied as a template to look at well how do existing 12 sites fit.
b' are are really two separate questions.
13 CHAiotAN PALLADINO:
But Vic's question I 14 think is still a pertinent one, just to get a better 15 feel for what we have got.
16 KR. BERNERO:
Well, the policy choice remains 17 that given a sound source term basis so that we have an 18 accurate source term, we don't have it now, we have a 19 conservative one, b'It let's assume for the moment that 20 that conservative one prevails or is treated as l
21 realistic.
Wha t the staff is 'saying and has tried to 22 say in the work leading up to the suspension of siting un work, in discussions with ACRS and in some discussions 7
24 even with the Commission is that you can refine present 25 siting policy.
Reg. Guide.4;7 can be codified and you h
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can refine it a little bit tc put in sector limits so 2
tha t all the populatisn isn 't living in one epct but is 3
aore evenly divided.
You can control risk that way and 4
that is a perhaps sensible refineeent of-the present 5
policy, but tha t the level of risk that we see in this 6
distribution of sites is such that the presenting siting 7
policy is not tolerating inordinately populace sites.
8 Depending on how you would set your level of 9
acceptable risk, you can even look at the more populace 10 sites and ask yourself the question, will I tolerate 11 those or not.
12 Now when a new source term is available, and 13 we fully expect that source term to depress the 14 consequenca ertimstes, it will especially depress early 15 fatalities and early injuries.
Those are threshold 16 effects and they willl be reduced in more than equal 17 proportion to the reduction in source ters.
The 18 property damage and the latent fatalities, thoso affects 19 see essential linear with source term.
20 Nov wh'en that new information is available, 21 then it is a new ball game.
You can look at the' 22 information anu say what level of reactor safety 23 associated with the site is acce ptable.
Now this report 24 contains extensive sensitivity analysis of that but 25 makes no choice.
ALDER $oN REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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Now the last conclusion is one I at least 2
personally feel, but recognizing Mr. Gilinsky's concern 3
maybe I shouldn't read it.
4 (Laughtar.)
5 MR. BERNER0s There is no cause for increased 6 public con arn because of maximum calculated values.
7 I would be happy to answer any other questions.
8 COMMISSIONER ROBERTSs A minor question.
Are 9 latent fatalities linear to early fatalities?
10 MR. BERNER0s No, because they are calculated
~
11 on the integration of dose to the public.
The most dor,e 12 an individual gets, the higher the probability of 13 cancel.
But for early fatality you have to get at least 14 about 200 rem or otherwise it is not lethal.
15 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Yes, and even the latent 4
16 fatalities have problems with it because it assumes that 17 if a large number of people get one milliram or one rem 18 that that is going to cause as much cancer as if you 19 dis tribute it over others.
20 ER. BERNERO:
No, it doesn't.
I would like to 21 renind the Commission again, and I would like to do this 22 frequently, reactor accident consequence calculations 23 such as are done with the Crack Code or its similar 24 sisters, there are other codes like that, those 25 calculate the dose response usually with a model which ALDERSoN MEPoRTING COMPANY INC.
440 FIRST ST., N.W., WASHlNGToN, D.C. 20001 (202) 829 4300
71 1
discounts the radiation ef f ectiveness or the biological 2
effectiveness at low level.
3 It is roughly a linear quadratic model.
It is 4
essential consistant with the BEIR III Report.
It is 8
not the linear hypothesis.
You should be very clear on 6
thst.
It is not the linear hypothesis.
7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Are there any other 8 qu e s tion s?
a COHNISSIONER AREARNE:
Well, since Dave came 10 all the way 11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Well, here come the 12 paperclips.
13 (Laughter.)
14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I was just going to ask 15 whether you wanted to add anything given the insights 16 that he sees in his study.
17 NR. ALDRICH:
No, I don't really think I do.
18 I think Bob represented it very well.
19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Do you think what was in 20 the paper constituted a misrepresentation of the results 21 of your study?
I guess you would ask which paper and I 22 guess I will say the Washington Post.
23 MR. ALDRICHs Yes, I do.
I think it 24.
misrepresented the results.
25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO Do you think the statements made in the opening remarks by Bill Dircks, ALDERSoN REPORTING CCMPANY,INC.
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72 1
aside f rom clarifications, are censistent with your 2
thinking?
3 MR. ALDRICH4 Yes, they are.
4 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
We will probably think of 8 other questions when you leave.
6 (Laughter.)
7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Are there any other 8 points you would like to bring up?
9 (No response.)
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADIN04 Well, thank you very much.
11 I would call attention to that primer you 12 wrote.
If o thers haven 't read it, I found it very 13 valuable conceptually.
14 MR. ALDRICH:
Thank you.
15 CHAIRMAN PALLADINC:
Thank you and we vill 16 stand adjourned.
17 (Wharsupon, at 4S45 p.m.,
the meeting 18 adjourned.)
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ALDERSCN REPORTING CCMPANY,INC.
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