ML20027B992
| ML20027B992 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 09/24/1982 |
| From: | Knox J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Srinivasan M Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8210120128 | |
| Download: ML20027B992 (100) | |
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MEETING WITH NRC TO DISCUSS f
SEABROOK ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS l
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July 20. 1982 i
I (1)
IHTRODUCTION.........
(Baxter)
(2)
METHODOLOGY
.......+...................
(Greiman) t (3)
POWER CIRCUITS...........................
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CONTROL CIRCUITS........
(Taouderos) t S
(5)
INSTRUMEN*ATION CIRCUITS....
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MISCELLANEOUS CIRCUITS (Greiman)
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OPEN DISCUSSION i
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nuu~3 APPENDIX 8B REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS i
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CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1-1 1.1 Historical Narrative of Seabrook Station i
Separation Criteria 1-1 1.2 Purpose 1-3 1.3 Report Contents 1-3 2.0 METPODOLOGY 2-1 2.1 Initial Categorization 2-1 2.2 Nucle. Island Boundaries 2-1 2.3 Determination of the Raceways that Traverse the Nuclear Island /Non-Nuclear Island (NI/NNI) Boundary 2-1 2.4 Determination of Cables that are Contained in NI/NNI Raceways 2-2 2.5 Review of Associated Power Circuits that Traverse NI/NNI Boundary 2-2 2.6 Review of Associated Control Circuits that Traverse NI/NNI Boundary 2-3 2.7 Revisw of Associated Instrumentation Circuits that Traverse NI/NNI Boundary 2-5 2.8 Analysis of Associated Circuits that Traverse NI/NNI Boundary 2-5 2.9 Analysis of Associated Circuits Contained within the.
Nuclear Island 2-5 2.10 Analysis of Associated Circuits Contained within the Non-Nuclear Island 2-5 3.0 ANALYSIS 3-1 3.1 General 3-1 3_
I CONTENTS (Cont'd)
SECTION TITLE PAGE 3.2 Analysis of Associated Power Circuits that Traverse r
NI/NNI Boundary 3-7 3.3 Analysis of Associated Control Circuits that Traverse NI/NNI Boundary 3-17 3.4 Analysis of Associated Instrumentation Circuits that Traverse NI/NNI Boundary 3-:48 3.5 Analysis of Associated Power, Control and Instrumentation Circuits Contained within the Nuclear Island 3-44 3.6 Analysis of Associated Power, Control and Instrumentation Circuits Contained within the Non-Nuclear Island 3-46 i
4.0
SUMMARY
AND EVALUATION 4-1 4.1 Susumary of Review and Analysis 4-1 4.2 Summary of Modifications 4-1 4.3 Evaluation 4-2 t
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Historical Narrativa of Seabrook Separation Criteria In 1973 Public Service Company of New Hampshire (PSNH) submitted the i
Preliminary Safety Analysis Report for Scabrook Station which provided the criteria for cable separation in Section 8.3.1.4.
This criteria was established to satisfy the intent of General Design Criterion 17 " Electric l
Power Systems." In December 1973 PSNH received PSAR question 8.15.
This l
question required PSNH to compare and discuss the degree of conformance of the Seerook Station design to Attachment C to AEC letter dated December 14, f
1973 " Physical Independence of EleEtric Systems." Attachment C was essentially the smse as the final draft of IEEE Standard 384-1974. In the t
interests of staadardization, it wes agreed to adopt Attachment C as the criteria for physical independence of the electric systems.
l Attachment C defines associated circuits and establishes that associated circuits have to meet Section 4.5 (a) or (b) or (c). Seabrook Station has elected to use Section 4.5 (a). Section 4.5 (a) specifies the type of additional requirements to be placed on associated circuits; these are typically, cable derating, environmental qualification, flame retardance, splicing restrictions, and raceway fill.
i Reiviatory Cuide 1.75, Revision 2 (September, 1978) repeats these requirements, and goes one step further by providing the basis for the requirements in Section C.4.
On 0:tober 17, 1978, PSml representatives met with the NRC in order to make a detailed presentation of the physical independence of electrical systems l
i for Seabrook Station.
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The purpose of the meeting was to familiarise the NRC with the method selected to implement the cable separction requirements committed to in the PSAR. It was hoped that by making the MRC knowledgeable at that stage,
',ture questions, conceres, and apparent items of non-compliance could be avoided at the FSAR stage.
~
The meeting was documented by the NRC and in summary the staff indicated Feneral concurreece with the applicant's approach to in.plementation of its criteria for physical independence of electrical systems.
At meetings held on May 27, 1982 and June 17, 1982 representatives of the NRC's Power Systems Branch informeE PSNH representatives that the cable and 4
raceway separation criteria was unacceptable because the associated circuits did not meet all the requirements placed en Class IE circuits. Specifically it was stated that:
Associated' circuit raceways must be identical to Class 1E a.
l raceways, in that they need to be in Category I buildings throughout their run and mst be qualified and supported the same as Class 1E raceways. In lieu of this, an analysis could be performed to demonstrate that the associated circuits will not degrade the Class IE circuits below an acceptable ' level.
b.
Associated circuits including the non-Class IE circuit device (e.g. loads, switches) met meet the same qualification criteria as Class 1E loads. In lieu of this, an analysis could be l
performed to demonstrate that the associated circuits will not degrade the. Class 1E circuits below an acceptable level.
c.
I.icensee must analyse and demonstrate that the associated circuits will not degrade the Class 1E circuits below an acceptable level.
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Though PSNR objected to this altogether new interpretation of the f
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i requirements for associated circuits, which in their opinion went well beyond the requirements of IEEE Standard 364-1974 and ' Regulatory Guide 1.75,
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Revision 2, the NRC insisted that this was their position and the licensee would be required to comply.
1.2 Purpose
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The purpose of this report is to address the NRC concerns with respect to Seabrook Station associated circ *. sits and their compliance to the latest NRC requirements so stated in the meetings of May 27 and June 17, 1982.
l Specifically it will address the interface between Class 1E circuits and i
associated circuits and show how the NRC position is set.
i i
1.3 Report contents i
I This report is comprised of the following:
4 A "Hethodology" section which summarises the program utilized to i
a.
review and analyse the associated circuits.
b.
An " Analysis" section which provides the detailed analyses of the various associated circuit configurations and their interaction f
and interface with the Class IE circuits. Also provided are the
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necessary modifications that are recommended to prevent the
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deleterious interaction between associated circuits and Class IE l
circuits.
I c.
A "Sumry and Evaluation" section which summarises the results of f
the review and analysis.
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1-3 i
l 2.0 METHODOLOGY To provide guidance to the various personnel required to support the review and analysis of associated circuits, the procedure discussed below was established.
2.1 Initial Catesorization For the review and analysis, associated circuits were first subdivided into three broad categories:
Circuits that traverse tiie nuclea'r island /non-nuclear island a.
boundary b.
Circuits that remain within the nuclear island c.
Circuits that remain within the non-nuclear island 2.2 Nuclear Island Boundaries Se nuclear island (NI) boundaries are established by use of drawing 9763-F-300210 " Key Plan - Nuclear Island Area, Electrical." (See Figure 2.2-1) '1his drawing denotes the buildings, structures, duct banks, etc.
which are part of the nuclear island. All other building, structures, etc.
are considered to be in the non-nuclear island (NNI).
2.3 Determination of the Raceways that Traverse the Nuclear Island /Non-Nuclear Island (NI/NNI) Boundary Associated circuit cables that traverse from the nuclear island to the non-nuclear island and vice-versa are routed through specific electrical I
raceways. To determine these raceways, a review of the raceway arrangement
- drawings is performed to identify those that cross the NI/NNI boundary.
- H is review includes trays, conduits, embedded conduits and duct banks.
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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE KEY PLAN - NUCLEAR ISLAND AREA ELECTRICAL SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT l
FIGURE 2.2-1
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l 2.4 Determination of Cables that are Contained in MI/NNI Raceways l
Me specific cables contained in the raceways that cross the NI/NNI boundary are determined by utilizing the computerised Cable Schedule Program (CASP)
Reports C and D.
Rose computer reports list every cable in each tray I
section (Report C) or conduit (Report D).
Se cables determined by this t
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method are then entered into CASP subroutine CSP 60s, which providas an j
output report for each circuit level (power, control, instrumentation).
Included in these reports is an alphanumeric listing of the cables; e description of the termination points of the cable; the complete route of i
the cable; and the related schematic diagrams. Sie information is utilised in the review and analyses described below.
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2.5 Review of Associated Power Circuits that Traverse NI/NNI Boundary l
Each associated power cable that crosses the NI/NNI boundary is individually reviewed to determine if it is routed with Class IE circuits in the nuclear
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island. If it is determined that the power cable is routed with a Class 1E t
I cable, then an additional review is performed to categorize the circuit. If the power cable is not routed with a Class IE cable, it is assumed that there will be no interaction.
4 I
Based on this review, the power cables and their related circuits were found to fall into three basic categories; each category representing circuits with certain comen characteristics. R ese categories are as follows:
l P1 - Circuits having power source in the non-nuclear island and the cable enters the nuclear island to connect to a non-Class 1E v
i load or device (See Figures 3.2-1 through 3.2-5) i P2 - Circuits having power source inside the nuclear island and the j
cable enters the non-nuclear island to connect to a non-Class 1E load or device (See Figure 3.2-6 through 3.2-11)
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F3 - Circuits in dedicated raceways throughout their entire route that do not associate with any Class 1E cables (See Figure 3.2-12)
These categories are further subdivided into distinct cases. A discussion of each case is presented in Section 3.2.
2.6 Review of Associated Control Circuits that Traverse NT/NNI z
Boundary Each associated control cable that crosses the NI/NNI bounds y is individually reviewed to identify the following:
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Location and type of power source b.
Location and type of protective device t
c.
Location of circuit device (s)
Based on this review, the control cables and their related circuits were t
found to fall into ten distinct cases; each case representing circuits with l
certain common characteristics. These cases are as follows:
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l C1 - Circuits having 125 Y de power supply and the protective device in l
NNI, with the circuit device in NI.
(Figure 3.3-1)
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Cla - Circuits waving 125 7 de power supply and the protective device in NI, with the circuit device in NNI.
(Figure 3.3-2)
C2 - Circuits having 120 V ac control power transformer power
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source and the protective device in NNI, with the circuit device i
in NI.
(Figure 3.3-3)
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C2a - Circuits having 120 Y ac control power transformer power source j
and the protective device in NI, with the circuit device in NNI.
I (Figure 3.3-4) f C3 - Circuits having 120 Y ac distribution transformer power source and the protective device in NNI, with the circuit device in NI.
(Figure 3.3-5)
C3a - Circuits having 120 V ac distribution transformer power source and the protective device in NI, with the circuit device in NNI.
(Figure 3.3-6)
I C4 - Differential relay scheme'. circuits having current transformer as power sources, which cross the NI/NNI boundary.
(Figure 3.3-7) i C5 - Circuits having inverter power source and the protective device in NNI, with the circuit device in NI.
(Figure 3.3-8) 5 C5a - Circuits having inverter power source and the protective device in NI, with the circuit device in NNI.
(Figure 3.3-9)
C6 - Circuits having potential transformer power source and the i
protective device in NNI, with the circuit device in NI.
(Figure 3.3-10) f Each control cable that crosses the NI/NNI boundary'is then tabuleted o a the Associated Circuit Tabulation Sheet. A typical Tabulation Sheet is provided j
as Figure 2.6-1.
L A discussion of'esch case is presented in Section 3.3.
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2.7 Review of Associated Instrumentation Circuits that Traverse NI/NNI Boundary Each associated instrumentation cable that crosses the NI/NNI boundary is listed on a table similiar to that prepared for the control cables. Rese cables and their related circuits are reviewed to determine if the available i
fault current is of significant magnitude.
2.8 Analysis of Associated Circuits that Traverse NI/NNI Boundary Each category of circuits defined in Sections 2.5 through 2.7 is analyzed to determine their interaction with the Class IE system. Were the analysis indicates a potential for degrading,the Class IE circuits below an acceptable level, a suitable modification is proposed. Sese analysis are contained in Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
H e proposed modifications are contained in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 and summarised in Section 4.2.
4 2.9 Analysis of Associated Circuits Contained within the Nuclear Island Associated power, control and ins.rumentation cables and their related e
l circuits contained within the nuclear island were reviewed to determine their interaction with Class IE circuits. B is analysis is contained in Section 3.5.
2.10 Analysis of Associated Circuits Contained within the Non-Nuclear Island Associated power, control and instrumentation cables and their related 1
circuits contained within the non-nuclear island were reviewed to determine their interaction with. Class 1E circuits. Were the analysis indicates a potential for degrading the Class IE circuits below an acceptable level, a suitable modification is proposed. His analysis is contained in Section l
.3.6.
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3.0 ANALYSIS This section contains the following:
1.
General 2.
Analyses of associated power circuits that traverse nuclear island /non-nuclear island boundary 3.
Analyses of associated control circuits that traverse nuclear island /non-nuclear island boundary 4.
Analyses of associated inetrumentation circuits that traverse nuclear island /non-nuclear island boundary 5.
Analyses of associated power, control and instrumentation circuits contained within the nuclear island 6.
Analyses of associated power, control and instrumentation circuits contained within the non-nuclear island These analyses address all the possible combinations of associated circuits which exist at Seabrook Station.
3.1 General
. 3.1.1 Assumptions and Postulations The following is a list of the assumptions and postulations that are used in the associated circuit review and analysis.
a.
All raceways, equipment and devices within the non-nuclear island may be disabled by a Design Basis Event.
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Fuses or other protective devices in the NNI, seismically l
I quclified and seismically mounted and protected to the extent practical, will survive the DBE and will perfcts their protective function (see cases C3 and C6 of Analysis).
f b.
All non-Class 1E equipment in the nuclear island may be disabled by a DBE (except as defined in "d" below).
'bb').
r' gE c.
All raceways in the nuclear island are not subject to failure by a M
!*N#
DBE based on their seismic design requirements
[
)bl*
p f*?
d f
l e
j d.
All switchgear, unit substations, motor control centers, i
f4 g **}
distribution panels and o.ther equipment specified, purchased,
{
y e"
manufactured and installed tha same as Class 1E equipment will d
function the same as the equivalent Class IE equipment e.
Circuit breakere are not used ac isolation devices in tb9 context of IEEE Standard 384 and Regulatory Guide 1.75 5
t f.
Circuit breakers in the nuclear isinni are used as protective devices
?
g.
Cables in the same raceway in the non-nuclear island may interact f
t with one another under DBE.
't
'h h.
Cables carrying fault or overload current are assumed not to cause l
failure of other cables in the same raceway as long as the time versus current limit for its insulation combustion temperature'is not exceeded i.
Cables in separate raceways (trays or conduits) cannot interact with one another under DBE conditions l
3-2 i
_y
f i
_ j.
Cables of different voltage levels in separate raceways cannot interact with one another (see Section 3.1.2) k.
Lighting distribution circuits from distribution panels to the loads (lighting fixures etc.) cannot interact with associated or Class IE circuits because the lighting circuits are containad in dedicated raceways.
i 3.1.2 Interaction Between Circuits of Different voltase Levels 1
s.
Concern A DBE could cause a non-Class 1E power cable of higher voltage to i
contact a non-Class 1E power, control or instrumentation cable of a lower voltage which in turn may interact with a Class IE circuit and cause it to degrade below an acceptable level.
f A'alysis b.
n l
Separate raceways are designated for the different voltage levels in accordance with FSAR Section 8.3.1.4a.
i i
Any accident involving the raceway system, or equipment, that can cause a higher voltage power cable to come in contact with another
[
lower voltage cable will first cause the higher voltage cable to l
be grounded. This is assured by the fact that the cables are in f
I grounded metallic tray or enclosures, and that the 13.8 kV and 4.16 kV power cables are of armored construction.
t i
A ground fault in the low scesistance grounded 13.8 kV system will I
cause protective circuit breakers to open; however, if the circuit breaker is disabled, subsequent contact of the higher voltage f
cable with a lower voltage cable will cause no flashover or i
4 I
i i
h 3-3 1
e
__p--------------~~--
- - ~ ~ ~ ~ -.
I.
i failure in the low voltage system since its potential with respect to ground will be unchanged.
A ground fault in the high resistance grounded 4.16 kV and 480 V system will not cause circuit breaker actuation, however, subsequent contact of the higher voltage cable with the lower volcage cable will cause no flashover or failure in the low voltage system since the potential of the low voltage cable with respect to ground will be unchanged. Deleterious interaction between cables of different voltage levels in separate raceways l
is, therefore, ruled out. Deleterious interaction of cables in the same raceway is considered credible and is analysed.
I 3.1.3 Failure of Non-Class 1E Equipment in the Nuclear Island a
a.
Concern i
A DBE can cause failure of non-Class 1E eqaipment located inside the nuclear island and thereby affect the integrity of Class IE circuits.
b.
Analysis j
Failure of a non-Class 1E motor, load or device within the nuclear island will have no consequences provided its circuit protective device functions under DBE conditions to isolate the resulting overload or fault condition. At Seabrook, all non-Class IE switchgear, motor control centers, and distribution panels wit' in h
the nuclear island are of identical design to their Class IE counterparts. They have been purchased to the same specification requirements, inclusive of quality control.
3-4 i.
l t
i a
i i
i Mounting of the non-Class IE switchgear, motor control centers and distribution panels within the nuclear island is identical to the mounting of their Class IE counterparts. In conclusion, a
t functioning of the protective device under DBE conditions is assured.
)
In any cases where the non-Class 1E equipment located inside the
)
i nuclear island may be disabled by a DBE, an analysis will be performed to determine the possible interaction of its circuit with a Class 1E circuit.
i 3
3.1.4 Turbine Building Design f
4 a.
Concern A DBE can cause partial or total destruction of the turbine building.
b.
Analysis i
l Design parameters for the turbine building and heater bay are s
as follows.
1) wind Load 110 MPR for elevation 0 to 50' 135 MPH for elevation 50 to 150' i
2)
Snow Load 50 lbs/ft2 l
f 3)
U.B.C. Seismic Loading For Zone 3 i
i 4)
Dead loads, live load, piping loads as specified on floor plans and crane loads as specified on section drawings.
l 3-5
i t
F I
r l
l In addition to above loads the building is designed to prevent collapse under tornado loads or seismic (SSE) loads in the North-South direction. Bays 12, 13, & 14 are also designed to prevent collapse in the East-West direction under tornado or seismic (SSE) loads.
j l-i The turbine generator pedestal has been designed to meet the stringent deflection, column shortening and low allowable stress criteria specified by the turbine manufacturer j
(General Electric Co.) under severe upset and normal machine
)
running condition.,
[
Ai ouilding and turbine generator pedestal foundations are bearing on sound rock.
l i
i Nan-safety related quality assurance requirements are used f
for the structural materials and ccustruction.
t In view of the above conservative criteria, there is little i
t likeliboed of the turbine building being affected by a DBE.
[
I o
I t
i L
f 3-6
.- -_._ - - - -. _ _ - -... -~
f
i 3.2 Analysis of Associated Power Circuits thtt Travarse NT/NNI Boundary l
3.2.1 General In general, the crossing of power circuits from the nuclear island to the non-nuclear island is not allowed; however, in some instances, this was found to the necessary. All these individual cases were reviewed and analysed. ilhere necessary, modifications to the present design are oroposed to provide assurance that the Class IE circuits are not degraded below an acceptable level.
he circuits have been divided into three basic categories (P1, P2 and P3) and then further subdivided into eleven distinct cases as illustrated in Figures 3.2-1 through 3.2-12.
He cables falling into each of the cases discussed below are idtatified in Table 3.2-1.
3.2.2 Category P1 l
In this cctegory the power source is in the non-nuclear island and the circuit enters the nuclear island to connect to a non-Class IE load or device.
3.2.2.1 Case Pla (Figures 3.2-1 and 3.2-2) - 15 kV power circuits to the reactor coolant pumps and to unit substations inside nuclear island.
a.
Analysis 1)
Dese cables run in their own dedicated raceways. No class 1E cables run in the same raceways.
s 3-7
~--"~ ^ **
- L-_"S_*
_ _. _ _ _**'****M?.*._""_"_&_"N.'_*'**.'-*
.P_2
2) he cables are of interlocked armored construction and are in similar construction to qualified interlocked armored 5 kV Class IE cable.
3) he raceways used in the nuclear island are seismically designed.
4) he non-Class IE unit substations are identical to qualified Class 1E unit substations and are seismically anchored.
5)
Esactor coolant pump feeders.are protected by qualified fusec 4
located in Category I building (electrical penetration area).
6)
%e raceways for the feeders to the unit substation in the waste processing building are not seismically supported.
De concern is due to the postulated failure of non-Class IE breakers located in non-nuclear island to clear a fault. If the fault is within the non-nuclear island, the fault current will be within the area and will have no impact on Class 1E circuits. No fault is postulated in the nuclear island since all raceways are j,
seismically qualified. If the fault is at the reactor coolant pump, the feeders are protected by seismically qualifed fuses. No fault is postulated at the unit substations since they will be l
seismically qualified. A fault, however, could occur at the raceways in the waste processing building.
4 b.
Modification As a result of the above analysis, the design will be modified so that the raceways carrying unit substation feeders in the waste processing building area are seismically supported.
3>
N 3-8 l _
3.2.2.2 Case P1b(Figure 3.2-3) - 120 Y ac inverter power feeders from a non-Class 13 inverter panel in the non-nuclear island to non-Class 1E loads in nuclear island.
l l
a.
Analysis These circuits may degrade Class 1E circuits running in the same trays in the nuclear island if a failure occurs and the non-Class IE inverter distribution panel is assumed to be disabled.
b.
Modificatien In order to resolve this. concern, it is proposed that all these circuits be powered through a distribution panel similar to Class IE panels in construction and installation and located in the nuclear island so that credit can then be taken for the breakers to isolate any failures.
In addition, the incoming power feeder to this panel will be run in conduit in the non-nuclear island.
3.2.2.3 Case Plc (Figure 3.2-4) - 125 7 de circuits from the non-class IE-de distribution panels in the non-nuclear island to non-Class IE loads in the nuclear island.
a.
Analysis he concern is identical to Case P1b above.
b.
Modification Se modification is similar to Case P1b above.
3-9
_____I_?_*__7_N"'______ri'^-_".*"2__"_**"**'**.
I*'*""'*
3.2.2.4 Case Pld (Figure 3.2-5) - 460 Y ac circuit from non-Class 1E motor control centers in non-nuclear island to non-Class IE loads in the nuclear island.
a.
Analysis The concern is similar to Case P1b above.
1 b.
Modification the proposed modification is that.these loads will be powered from a 4607 motor control center located in the nuclear island. This MCC is identical in design, construction and manufacturing.to a qualified motor control center and is seismically anchored.
Credit can therefore be taken for the protective devices.
3.2.3 Catetsry P2 In this category the power source or protective device is inside the nuclear island and the circuit enters the non-nuclear island to connect to a non-Class IE load or device.
3.2.3.1 Case P2a(Figure 3.2-6) - 120 V ac inverter power feeders from non-Class IE inverter distribution panels in the. nuclear island to non-Class IE loads in non-nuclear island, s.
Analysis The concern is that the non-Class IE distribution panel protective device may fail to operate on fault in the s.on-Class IE portion of the circuit and its associated cables may thus degrade Class IE circuits running in the same raceways.
3-10
These panels are identical in design construction and manufacturing to Class IE panels, and the breakers in these panels are similar to breakers in Class IE panels. These panels are seismically anchored in a seismic building. Our engineering evaluation is that these breakers are as reliable as Class IE breakers. Raceways for all these cables within the nuclear island j
}
are seismically qualified. Bence, under any DBE, no adverse interaction with Class 1E circuits is possible.
L b.
Modification None 3.2.3.2 Case P2b(Figure 3.2-7) - 460 V ac and 120 V ac power feeders from diesel generator powered MCC in the nuclear island to non-Class IE loads in the non-nuclear island.
Modification, In order to minimize number of power cables crossing the boundary between the nuclear island and the non-nuclear island, these esbles will now be powered from a motor control center Icested in the non-ruelcar island. Thus these circuits will be totally in the aca-nuclear island.
3.2.3.3 Case P2e(Figure 3.2-8) - 125 V de power feeder from distribution panels in the nuclear island to non-Class IE de loads in the non-nuclear iciand.
Analysis & Modifications l
Analysis and modifications of Case P2a applies.
3-11 1
L..
'.E g.
'*wo
,AAe*-
- t-'F==
- * = =. - *
- .m-*
- ----=*'=-*a'+
= = = = * - - - -
-y
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
____a 1
f F
l 3.2.3.4 Case P2d(Figure 3.2-9) - 460 V ac and 120 V ac feeders from non-l I
Class IE MCC in the nuclear island to non--Class IE loads in the h
non-nuclear island.
j Analysis and Modifications r
This case is similar to case P2b. These feeds will be moved to a
{
non-Class 1E motor control center in non-nuclear island. Thus,
[
these circuits will be totally in non-nuclear island.
i 3.2.3.5 Case P2e(Figure 3.2-10)..- 460 V ac power feeders from a Class IE MCC in the nuclear island to Class IE loads in the non-nuclear f
f island (waste process building - tank form).
f r
t Analysis and Modifications A portion of the raceways, even though not in the nuclear island, is in the waste processing building which is seismically designed.
These raceways are seismically qualified through their entire i
i route and, therefore, Class IE circuits cannot be degraded by
}
these circuits.
3.2.3.6 Case P2f(Figure 3.2-11) - Power feeders from Class IE f
i distribution equipment in the nuclear island to non-Class IE loads
[
in the non-nuclear island.
i l
Analyses and Modifications l
Since the power source for these feeders is a Class IE device, and the cables are supported in qualified raceways in the nuclear island, there is no DBE which can cause degradation of Class 1E l-circuits below an acceptable level.
I v
3-12 i
L t
.. -... -. -..... ~.......... _,. _..... _. _. -
e I
3.2.4 Category P3 In this category the circuits are in dedicated raceways throughout their entire route and do not associate with any Class 1E cables.
3.2.4.1 Case P3 (Figure 3.2-12) - Power feeders in dedicated raceways.
a.
Analyses th'ese esbles are in dedicated raceways which are separated from Class IE raceways by an acceptable separation distance. Hence they will not degrade the Class IE circuits below are acceptable level. Not withstanding the above, these circuits will still be subjected to all the requirements of associated circuits.
b.
Modifications None.
J l
3-13
TABI.E NO. 3.2-1 ASSOCIATED POWER CABLES THAT TRAVERSE NI/NNI BOUNDARY Care Pla Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
A05-EK7 A09-EK9 A20-EK8 A24-EK0/1 A05-EK7/1 A09-EK9/1 A20-EK8/1 A25-AN1 A06-AB1 A15-AM9 A24-EK0 A27-API Case P1b Cable No.
Cable No..
Cable No.
Cable Mc.
EJ9-FJC EJ9-FJ7 EJ9-FK3/1 EJ9-F46 EJ9-FJ0/1 EJ9-FK3 EJ9-FE3 Case Plc Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
AC3-E97 AH3-E97 DPO-EN8 DQ3-E89 Case Pld Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
CN5-JU9 CY6-E2 l
e 3-14
_._. _ ~;,
__-_.7,_.....;...-._,.___.
TABLE NO. 3.2-1 (Cont'd)
ASSOCIATED POWER CABLES THAT TRAVERSE NI/NNI BOUNDARY Case P2a Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
EJ7-CY0 EJ8-CY9 EJ8-CIN f'
Case P2b Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
D68-EU2 E42-94P E42-C41 Case P2e Cable No.
ETS-ET9 Case P2ds
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
31U-ML4 CT4-NB1/2 CV5-r:K3 G7-NB4/1 B1V-MLS CT5-NB2 Cv5-K3/1 G7-NB4/2 B1W-ML6 CT5-NB2/1 CV6-NK4 G8-NBS CS3-N06 CTS-NB2/2 CV6-NK4/1 G8-NB5/1 CS4-N07 CT6-NB3 CWO-V88 G8-NB5/2 CSS-N08 CT6-NB3/1 CW7-N07 G9-NB6/1 CS6-V81 CT6-NB3/2 CW8-N10 G9-NB6/1 CS7-K5 CT7-N77 CW9-N11 G9-NB6/2 CS7-K5/1 CT7-N77/1 GO-N79 CZ8-JD7 CS7-V82 CT8-N78 GO-N79/1 DT9-JU8 CS8-V83 CT8-N78/1 GI-V89 DZ6-EW4 CT4-NB1 CU7-NK5 G2-V90 JT1-ZB3 CT4-NB1/1 CU7-K5/1 27-NB4 JT2-ZB3 I
Case P2e Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
B78-VE6 B79-VE5 D39-VA2 D82-VA1 3-15 g
... ~ - -
TABLE NO. 3.2-1 (Cor.t'd)
ASSOCIATfD POWER CABLES THAT TRAVERSE NI/NNI BOUNDARY Case P2f Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
AF4-C99 BZO-EY8 CT9-N97 C69-NC7/1 AF4-C99/1 BZ9-EV2 CT9-N97/1 C74-EE2 AR6-EH1 B1C-E1K CY3-N98 ET6-ETO AI7-EH1 C69-NC7 CY3-N98/1 J95-JC3 A47-A93 Case P3 Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
ABO-HD0 A95-C12 CU7-VM3 DQ2-BD0/1 ADO-RED A95-C12/1 CU9-JUI EV3-JT3 AG9-CW6 BR2-EN7 C13-V91 DV4-JT4 AG9-CW6/1 BR3-858 CX4-V92 DZ3-VQO A04-AG1 CSu-V85 CK5-V93 D21-EV5 A05-A64 CS9-v84 C16-V87 D31-EU4 A09-A70 CTI-V86 CYO-V09 ET3-ET7 A20-A65 CT2-Y79 CZ5-711 ET4-ET8 A23-AMI CT3-V80 CZ5-VR2 E15-JV2 A24-A66 CUO-JU2 CZ7-YR4 FE3-HL1 A43-AQ0 CUS-VM1 DQ2-EDO FE3-HL1/1 A43-AQO/1 d
I
(
3-16
- i
NON-NOCLEAR ISLAND :
T
- NUCLEAR ISLAND iseavaus f
\\\\,.
p
=. - - - -
/
U
._. ri,
[
ru u I
w I
surenuxre m cam. tu DEDICATED RACEWAYS
=
- l
)
o A
POWER SOURCE (13.8KV) AND PROTECTIVE DEVICE ARE LOCATED IN THE NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND. LOLD IS LOCATED IN THE NUCLEAR ISLAND,
~
e EXISTING PROPOSED M004F1 CATIONS 9
NONE 9
1 9
d h
I l
CASE Plo (SHEET IOF 2)
ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS PUBLIC SERVICE COMPAt# OF NEW HAMPSHIRE REVIEW AND ANALYSIS SEABROOK STATION-UNITS 1 & 2 R CIR ITS ~
FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FIGURE 3.2-1 U
NUCLEAR ISLAND e NON
/
- NUCLEAR ISLAND I
- ==== = '-
p k.
wn g
-====
k u
.u a.
)
b POWER SOURCE (13.8KV) AND PROTECTIVE DEVICE ARE LOCATED IN THE NON-lOCLEAR
?
ISLAND. LOADIS LOCATED IN A SEISMIC BUILDING,BUT IS NOT QUALIFIED.
[j
?
EXISTING s.
PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS
'rj a
T
- NUCLEAR ISLAND N
NON NUCLEAR ISLAND c
/
,~
.. 3-9 y
p
/,
u K
. 5.
see E
/
%s
" " u_:a_ m_ _ _a
/
f k
h, l
s
=-
2 ts
't
.c e
.p' f
CASE Plc (SHEET 2 OF2)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE D ANA M S S
SEABROOK STATION-UNITS I & 2, OF POWER CIRCUlTS FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FIGURE 3.2-2 v.h
swvesnan NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND c NUCLEAR ISLANC y
/
ic:
m canti inavs
/
p/
r Aurito nAcewAvs
)
ou
/
fI Lono j
\\
l m
I j
1,1
^
j k )
mgn nonst
/
cincurTs
^
/
J oestnieuison manet
/
(Tyncau u
~
f non se
)
POWER SOURCE (INVERTER) AND PROTECTIVE DEVICE ARE LOCATED IN THE NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND. LOAD 131.DCATED IN THE NUCLEAR ISt.AND, BUT IS NOT NECESSARILY ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED.
l t
EXISTING PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND <
r NUCLEAR ISLAND
- ouALINto nACathys -
ll f
e %__._-_-_______________.
n b________________________
u h
l
/
)
i
/
/
n
/
T \\
Lot.o IN CABLE YnAvs n
I -
/y: ^-_+
^'i/
non it ovuoi
~
O "cacuru l
l 2
cistnisution enmEL
~
+
LoAo (TYPicaO NoN=lt 1
i.
. CASE Pib ASSOOATED CRCulTS PUBLIC SERVICE COMfRNY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE SEABROOK STATION-UNITS I & 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYEIS REPORT s
FIGURE S.2-3
~-
~-
~
n_
1 NON NUCLEAR ISLAND :
- NUCLEAR ISLAND pp
.9
/
-). -3 p/
r. unio..es n
ou A
r1 ri Loao j
m 1
[
A i1 t i nom ic m en 7'
glN CASLE TRAVs}
cincutts
~
oisTnieuTion paart
//
ITTmcan u
80cN= E POWER SOURCE (125VDC) AND PROTECTIVE DEVICE ARE LDCATED INTHE NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND. LOAD IS LOCATED IN THE NUCLEAR ISLAND, BUT IS NOT NECESSARILY ENVIRONMENTAU.Y QUAUFIED.
l i
I EXISTING PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND c NUCLEAR ISLAND 4,9
%/
/
r9 I
8
-,/
ouaLmte nacewart -
! k_______________________
y
[
l su sTert comourr
/j/
>-3 i
/
m n
/
A 7 i Loao IN CAeLE TRAV5 b8 g
(1 (mtER Noel IE p,
/ -p cincuits
---o 2
pisTnieuTIon rangt ITymcat) ouALIFIED HAcEWLYS Isoff-lE CASE Plc ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS PullLIC SERVICE COMfMNY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE REVIEW AND ANALYSIS SEABROOK STATIOPJ-UNITS 182 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FIGURE 3.2-4 9
,.n.
O
NON-NUCt. EAR ISLAND c T
- MJCLEAR ISLAND
//
- =;a f
1>
- 7
^
^ OuAUPED AAEEWAN me t
t IN CASi.E TRAW nom.g d
POWER SOURCE (460V) ANO PROTETIVE DEVICE ARE I.DCATED IN fitZ NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND. l. DAD IS LDCATED IN THE NUCLEUt ISLAND,BUT IS NOT NECESSARILY ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED.
EXISTING _
PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND
- NUCLEAR ISLAND
/p win p,
m now.ic t
e e
e 0
t y,
CASE Pld ASSOCIATED CWICulTS PUBUC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE REVIEW AND ANALYSIS SEABROOK STATION-UNITS I & 2 OF MER CIRCM FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
'l FIGURE 3.2-5
..m-_.._m
NON NUCLEAR ISLAND c, NUCLEAR CLAND
//
inws:. Tan
//
f 9
c -- --
p/
s h
~
h incamaman j
monis
)
//
O w
LOAD
[
LOAD f1
//
'I i
/
I
/
n n
csonr U
/
U
,o gme
^
^
/
i
- d casinieuTion ranst j
wm POWER SOURCE AND LDAD ARE LOCATED IN THE NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND.
PROTECTIVE DEVICE IS LDCATED IN THE NUCLEAR ISLAND,BUT IS NOT NECESSARILY SEISMICALLY MOUNTED.
EXISTING f
PROPOSED MOOlFICATIONS i
i 1
I i
NONE t
?
i i
t i,
?
l i
CASE P2e ASSOCIATED CIRCUlTS PUBLIC SERVICE COW %NY OFNEW HAMPSHIRE REVIEW AND ANALYSIS SEABROOK STATION-UNITS I &2 OF POWER CIRCUITS FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT l
l FIGURE S2-6 4
M M --
NON NUCLEAR IS.AND T
- PAJCLEAR ISLAND l/
seestL easse f
renta nums
/
J
.J
/
y i
d i
b i
POWER SOURCE AND PROTECTIVE DEVICE ARE LOCATED IN THE NUCLEAR
[
ISLAfC. l. DAD IS LOCATED IN THE NON NUCLEAR ISLAND, BUT IS NOT NECESSARlLY ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED.
EXISTING f
PROPOSED MODIFICATIOCS l
j i
NON NUCLliAR ISLAND :
T r NUCLEARIS.Al's
{
/
omstLamoso Powen a wLv-3 l
~
c:>-- m c.att inays
- Loas non se I
i
+
~-
i f
r CASE P2b PLBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OFNEW HAMPSHIRE DNE l
SEABROOK STATION-UNITS 1 & 2 l
CiRWITS FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT i
FIGURE 3.2-T t
NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND
- NUCLEAR ISlJWO
/
f n
}-3
/
1*
Loan p =s "i
I
^
d'
' i==,"
1 PCWER SOURCE (125VDC) AND PROTECTIVE DEVICE ARE LOCATED IN THE NUCLEAR ISLAND. LOAD IS LOCATED IN THE 'NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND, BUT IS NOT NECESSARILY t
ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED.
l EXISTING PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS NONE l
l l
8 CASE P2c PUBLIC SERVICE COMRufY OF EW HAMPSHIRE REVIEW AND ANALYSIS SEABROOK STATION-UNITS I & 2 OF M CIRCM FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FIGURE S.1-8 a o' o
NON-M.lCLEAR ISLAND :
T
- NUCLEAR Cl.AND
/
s t'ON 2 esoy sus j
p
~
[
n n
se casts Tnars.1#
ountirico naceways y
,,m. g
\\
I l
POWER SOURCE (460V) AND PROTECTIVE DLW;E ARE LOCATED IN THE NUCLEAR ISLAND. LOAD IS LOCATED IN THE NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND, BUT IS PCT NECESSARtLY ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED.
i
)
?
[
EXISTING I
)
PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS I
t k
[
r NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND :
- NUCLEAR ISLAND f
ww-it t
mm u
j
)
c>-- ouaurito naceways
/
Loao now se l
?
t L
t I
i r
t f
I i
j i
I i
CASE P8d t
ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS
[
l PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE I
l REVIEW AND ANALYSIS SEA 8R00K STATION-UNITS I & 2 OF POWER CIRCUITS FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT 9
FIGURE S.2-9
- la.m - "'
=
NON.p ri raR ISLAND :
T L NUCLEAR ISLAND
/
cuss et Pousa sweer f
h WM
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^
we N
_. _,s J (
-. ~. J s%
,e
/
2 s
POWER SOURCE AND PROTECTIVE DEVICE ARE LDCATED IN THE NUCLEAR ISLAND. LOAD IS LOCATED IN THE NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND AND IS QUAUFIED AND SEISM!CALLY ANCHORED.
EXISTING PROPOSED MOD 5 CATIONS
~
NONE l
CMEMe l
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OFNEW 1%MPSHIRE I
, SEABROOK STATION-UNITS I & 2 l.
FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
-l FIGURE 32-10 e
-=
NON MJCLEAR ISLAIC c T
- NUCLEAR ISLAND b
Q ea.s,a t
l poen sumr
)
f f
l
^
^
ma J
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euntrato nncesiers J um.g
, a casts vnavs 2
i 4
I POWER SOURCE AND PROTECTIVE DEVICE ARE LOCATED IN THE NUCLEAR ISLAND.LDAD IS LOCATED IN THE NON NUCt. EAR ISLAND, BUT IS NOT NECESSARILY ENVIRONMENTALLY QUAUFIED.
F I
EXISTING PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS
?
l t
i i
l i
~
NONE I
l i
I i
i t
l h
I l
I CASE P2f ASSOCIATED CIRCUlTS PUBLIC SERVICE COMRUM OF NEW HAMPSHIRE REVIEW AND ANALYSIS SEABROOK STATION-UNITS I & 2 i
0F POWER CIRCulTS FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FIGURE 3.2-11 e
o
NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND c
/-
- NUCLEAR ISLAND
/
mouces W MY
/
n,-----........--.-
w 3.------._-
__3..........--..
~~,c naceways
/
POWER SOURCE AND PROTECTIVE DEVICE ARE I.DCATED INTHE NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND. LOAD IS LOCATED IN THE NUCLEAR ISLAND,BUT IS NOT NECESSARILY ENVIRONMENTALLY OUALIFIED.
EXlSTING PROPOSED MOD!FICATlONS NONE f
CASE PS ASSOCIATED CIRCUlTS PUBLIC SERVICE COMRufY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE SEABROOM STATION-UNITS I & 2 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FIGURE S.1-12
-==
=
n o
9' 3.3 Analysis of Associated control Circuits that Traverse NI/NNI Boundary 3.3.1 General All control circuits that cross the boundary between the nuclear isised and non-nuclear island have been analysed. All credible failure modes have been studied, their effects evaluated, and modification if necessary have been proposed.
Se circuits have been categorized in ten distinct cases as illustrated in Figures 3.3-1 through 3.3-10.
Se cables falling into each of the cases discussed below are identified in Table 3.3-1.
3.3.2 Case C1 (Figure 3.3-1) - 125 Y de power source and protective device are located in the non-nuclear island and circuit device is located in nuclear island.
l l
a.
Analysis Of all the failure modes analysed for circuits falling under this cr.se, only two sedes had the possibility of degrading Class IE circuits sharing the same raceways:
MDDE 1:
Se non-Class 1E load or device inside the nuclear island fails in such a way that it causes a short between positive and negative leads. Because the protective device is in the NNI, it is assumed to be disabled. Se consequential short circuit current from the battery could be of significant magnitude to 3-17
)
!f..
~. =. =
2 i
possibly degrade the Class IE circuits that run in the same raceway.
MODE 2:
The portion of the circuit in the non-nuclear island esa fail and short to another circuit. The load on the other circuit can now fail as described for Mode I with similar consequences.
4 t
I The effects of other failure modes such as open circuits and single grounds do not degrade the Class 1E circuits below an acceptable level.
b.
Modifiestions I
The distribution panel will be relocated inside the nuclear island and will be seismically mounted. The distribution panel design and construction is similar to the design and construction of Class IE distribution panels. This relocation will enable. credit to be taken for the protective devices to isolate the failures described above.
The main feeder to the distribution panel will run totally in steel conduit within the non-nuclear island as an additional precaution.
p The above modifications resolve the concerns outlined under Mode 1 and 2.
3.3.3 Case Cla (Figure 3.3-2) - 125 7 de power source and protective device are located in the nuclear island and circuit device is located in the non-nuclear island..
P 3-18 F
. ~
4
i I
a.
Analysis For cases where the power source and protective device are in the j
nuclear island and the circuit device is in the non-nuclear island, any failure of the circuit device or raceway in the non-nuclear island wil'1 have no adverse consequence because the ensuing fault will be interrupted by a qualified protective device.
b.
Modifications None 3.3.4 Case C2 (Figure 3.3-3) - Power source (control power transformer) and protective device are located in the non-nuclear island and circuit device is located in the nuclear island.
a.
Analysis he majority of circuits under this case are control circuits for various valves. Dere are a small number of control circuits for fans and other small or medium s.ze motors.
8 De maximum size of the control power transformer for such circuits is 150 VA and the minima 100 VA.
Se minimum size control cable used in the control circuits is f14 AWG.
All control circuits are fused at least once at the MCC compartment.
Of all the failure modes that were analyzed for circuits falling under the category, no mode had the possiblity of degrading the i
3-19
O Class 1E circuits below and acceptable level. The basis for this conclusion is outlined below:
1)
The power source (control power transformer) is not large enough to provide short circuit current of sufficient magnitude and duration to overload the control cables. This type of transformer will fail in a very short time in the event the short circuit is not interrupted by its protective 4
fuse.
2)
The failure mode of the CPT is assumed to be by open circuit of the primary or the secondary winding. No means.for interaction between primary and secondary is envisioned.
In addition to the case described above where the power source is a control power transformer (CPT), a limited number of cases involving power supplies of limited energy have been identified and their analysis is similiar to the above. Such cases involve the 22 Y de, 24 V de and 125 V de power-supplies utilized for the electro-hydraulic control system of the turbine generator.
It is our engineering judgment that for the above reasons, control circuits falling in this case are not susceptible to failures that could degrade other Class 1E circuits sharing l
the same receway. Therefore, no modifications are proposed I'
for these type of circuits.
l b.
Modifications None 4
l l
I 3-20
~
i-
[
i l
l l
t 3.3.5 Case C2a (Figure 3.3-4) - Power source (control power transformer) and protective device are located in the nuclear island and i
i circuit device is located in the non-nuclear island.
[',
6 i
s.
Analysis For cases where the power source and protective device are in the nuclear island and the circuit device is in the non-nuclear island, failures of the circuit device or raceway in the non-nuclear island will have no edverse consequences for reasons i
similar to the ones above; furthermore credit can be taken for the qualified protective device.
I I
i f
b.
Modifications I
i None 3.3.6 Case C3 (Figure 3.3-5) - Power source (distribution transformer) and protective device are located in the non-nuclear island and circuit device is located in the nuclear island.
l a.
Analysis e
l Of all the failure modes analyzed for circuits falling under this
[
t category, only two modes had the possibility of degrading safety l
t related circuits sharing the same raceways:
Mode la The power source of the control circuits under this case l
is a power distribution transformer of size up to 15 f
KVA. Under a DBE, the non-Class 1E circuit device
{
inside the nuclear' island could fail in such a way that i
l 21 l
l i
I
- .. _.-. ; - ;~..
f
-.-- l : ~~:_,,,
the short circuit current available from the distribution transformer could start a cable fire and i
degrade the Class IE circuits in the same raceway.
i Because the interrupting devices are located in'the non-nuclear island they are assumed to be disabled.
Mode 2:
The portion of the circuit outside the nuclear island
{
can fail and short to another circuit. The load on the
{
other circuit can now fail as described for Mode I with similar consequences.
b.
Modifications i
Relocating the distribution panel into the nuclear island is not feasible because the distribution panel is an integral part of the l
motor control center. Therefore, current limiting fuses will be added to the distribution transformer to limit the available short j
i circuit current to a level which can not cause damage to the
[
I control circuit cables.
Though this current limiting fuse will be located in the NNI, its use is justified because it will be in an enclosure external to I
t the motor-control center. Additionally, the power cable to the fuse enclosure will be run in steel conduit, and the enclosure and
{
its mounting will be seienically qualified and protected to the l
extent practical, given that it will be located in non-Category I building. Locations such as turbine generator pedestal, heavy steel columns, walls that are designed to prevent collapse und'er I
tornado loads or seismic (SSE) loads. etc. will be considered as I
i mounting locations for the fuse enclosures.
l t
It is out. engineering judgment that the tsodifications described i
above minimize to the extent practical the probability of failure L:
l 3-22 i-i
- -. ~. -, -
n..
- - ~ ~
t
..-n.
Q modes 1 and 2 and ensure that the Class 13 circuits are not degraded below an acceptable level.
3.3.7 Case C3a (Figure 3.3-6) - Power source (distribution transformer) and protective device are located in the nuclear island and circuit device is located in the non-nuclear island.
a.
Analysis For cases where the power source and protective device are in the nuclear island and the circuit device is in the non-nuclear island, failures of the ' circuit device or raceway will have no adverse consequences because the qualified protective device will isolate the fault.
b.
Modifications None 3.3.8 Case C4 (Figure 3.3-7) - Differential relay scheme circuits having current transformers as power sources which cross the NI/NNI boundary.
a.
Analysis Circuits falling under this case are limited; they include differential relay scheme circuits for the RAT and UAT feeders to the Class 1E buses and differential schemes for the reactor coolant pump actors.
Of all the failure modes that were analyzed for circuits falling under this case, no mode is considered as having the possibility 3-23 l
e r
l F
i i
of degrading Class IE circuits sharing the same racevey for the f
following reasons:
1)
Shorting or grounding of the CT circuit creates no hasard since CT's are designed to be shorted.
2)
Opening of the CT circuits may create pulses of overvoltages across the open circuited leads. These j
pulses may cause breakdown of the insulation of the CT l
or its leads. Because of the lot energy levels it is l
i not feasible for this insulation breakdown to degrade j
other cables in the same raceway. The breakdown itself I
would very like.ly put the CT in its desized mode of operation.
I I
It is our engineering judgement that for the above I
i reasons the limited control circuits falling in this i
i case are not susceptible to failures that could degrade t
Class 1E circuits below an acceptable level.
j i
b.
Modifications t
None j
3.3.9 Case C5 (Figure 3.3-8) - Power source (inverter) and protective device are located in the non-nuclear island and circuit device is I
located in the nuclear island.
a.
Analysis
~
i Although the inverter is a current limiting device, the magnitude -
of the current is such that failure modes have - to be evaluated.
j l
i e
3-24 4
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gg, h g-mme*
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e e.
e e
=
4
- =
4
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--e
=
h f
he failure modes for tr'.s case are similar to the modes described for Case C1.
b.
Modifications h e proposed modifications are similar to the modifications for f
Case C1.
I i
3.3.10 Case C5a (Figure 3.3-9) - Power source (inverter) and protective device are located in the nuclear island and circuit device is
{
located in the non-nuclear island.
[
i a.
Analysis For cases where the power source and protective device are in the
[
nuclear island and the circuit device is in the non-nuclear f
island, failures of the circuit device or raceway will have no f
adverse effects because the qualified protective device will interrupt fault.
b.
Modifications
[
None
[
I r
3.3.11 Case C6 (FiFure 3.3-10) - Power source (potentia 1' transformer) and protective device are located in the non-nuclear island and circuit device is located in the nuclear island.
f i
a.
Analysis Of all the failures analyzed for circuits falling under this case, only two modes had the possibility of degrading Class IE circuits sharing the same raceway 3-25
l i
Mode 1:
The non-class 1E load inside the nuclear island fails in
{
such a way that it causes a short of the potential f
transformer. The relatively high short circuit current f
although of short duration can possibly cause failure of other cables which run in the same raceway. Because the interrupting device (fuse) is in the NNI, it is assumed to be disabled.
I i
Mode 2:
The portion of the circuit outside the nuclear island i
can fail and short to another circuit. The load on the I
i other circuit can now fail as described for Mode I with similar conseqdences.
f The effects of other fail'ure modes such as open circuits and j
single grounds do not degrade the Class IE circuits below an t
acceptable level.
f I
b.
Modifications i
A qualified fuse and enclosure will be added in the portion of the
[
circuit located in the NI.
If the fuse cannot be mounted in the
~
NI for technical considerations, then it will be mounted in the l
NNI taking into account design parameters as outlined for Case C3.
[
This will enable credit to be taken for the protective devices to
?
isolate the failure described above.
l l
As an additional precaution, the portion of the circuit within the
{
non-nuclear island will run totally in steel conduit.
i
' The above modifications resolve the concerns outlined under. Mode 1 f
and 2.
i
}
i 3-26 4
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l TABLE NO. 3.3-1 ASSOCIATED CONTROL CABLES TRAT TRAVERSE NI/NNI BOUNDARY Case C1 CaSle No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
a AH3-E97 AZ4-F66 A11-F70/1 A32-F71/1 AJ2-F81 AZ5-F66 A11-GE3 A32-F71/4 AJ8-F61 AZ5-F66/2 A11-V83 A34-F61 AJ9-F61 AZ5-F66/3 A12-F81/1 A34-F61/1 AK2-F81 A01-F81 A15-F81/1 A35-F61/3 AK8-F61 A01-F81/3 A16-F81 A35-F61/2 AK9-F66 A02-F81 A16-F81/3 A35-F61/3 AK9-F66/2 A02-F81/1 A17-F81 A36-F61/1 AL2-F81 A02-F81/4 A17-F81/1 A36-F61/2
.i AMO-F81 A04-F81/1 A17-F81/4 A36-F61/3 ANO-E97 A05-BA1 A19-F81/1 A40-F81/1 AN2-F81 A05-F31/1 A20-BA2 A41-F71 i
AN3-E97 A05-F31/2 A20-F31/1 A41-F71/3 APO-FD8 A05-R36 A20-F31/2 A42-A52 AP3-E97 A06-F81/1 A20-R35 A42-F71 AP9-FD8 A07-EB0 A21-F81/1 A42-F71/1 ail-F61 A07-F70 A22-EB0 A42-F71/4 ail-F61/1 A07-F70/1 A22-GE3 A43-F81/1 AX1-F61/2 A07-GE3 I22-V82 A44-F61 ail-F61/6 A07-Y81 A24-BA4 A44-F61/1 AX2-F61 A08-F81/1 A24-H36 A45-F61/
AX2-F61/1 A09-BA3 A27-F81/1 A45-F61/2 A12-F61/2 A09-H35 A31-F71 A45-F61/3 AZO-F81 All-EB0 A31-F71/3 A47-A93/1 AZ2-F81 A11-F70 A32-771 A47-A93/2 A47-F60/1 E97-F27 F51-M7/1 F90-GB4/2 A47-F60/2 E97-F29 F51-47/2 F90-GB5 A47-F60/3 E97-F41 F.61-Gf4 F90-CB5/1 A47-F60/5 E97-CPI F61-GF4/1 F90-GB5/2 A50-F71/1 E97-GU4 F61-GF4/2 P90-CB6 A71-GB4 F51-M0 F90-GB3 F90-CB6/1 A72-GB7 F51-M3/1 F90-CB3/1 F91-CB2 A93-ED7 E51-M3/2 F90-GB4 F91-CB2/1 E91-GP1/1 F51-M6 F90-CB4/1 F91-CB7 EP2<,P1 h
3-27
..-7-------,
--;_~
TABLE NO. 3.3-1 ASSOCIATED CONTROL CABLES THAT TRAVERSE NI/NNI BOUNDARY Case Cla Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
A51-CB4 FB3-W1 FB3-W6 FB3-UK2 A52-CB7 FB3-W2 FB3-W7 FCl-C14 E89-EB1 FB3-W3 FB3-W8 FC1-C14/1 E89-C67 FB3-W4 FB3-W9 FC2-C11 FB3-WO FB3-W5 FB3-UK1 FC2-C11/3 l
G 3-28 g
w e.e, %.
,eeues--=.
we.a>=mr=*-
mw a*w*=-
- 'h' a**-
W"WN-*
[
'I
TABLE No. 3.3-1 (Cont'd)
ASSOCIATED CONTROL CABLES THAT TRAVERSE NT/NNI BOUNDARY Case C2 Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
A47-F60/4 CD4-F86 CIA-FK7 DT8-F60/1 BJ7-FD8 CD5-F86 C66-F61 DDS-F60 BJ8-FD8 CD6-F86 C75-F71 DU6-F60 BS7-FD8 CD7-F86 C76-F71 DU7-F60 BS8-FD8 CF3-F72 C78-F61 DUS-F60 BS9-FD8 CF3-F72/1 C79-F61 DV5-FK4 BD2-FD8 CF9-F61 C79-F61/1 DK5-F51 l
BU3-FD8 CJ2-F51 C81-F61 DX6-F51 l
BU4-FD8 CJ8-F61 C94-HR2 DX7-F51 BUS-FD8 CK3-F70 C95-HR2 DX8-F51 BU5-FD8/1 CK3-F70/1 C96-BR2 FD8-HUD BIA-E2 CK4-F70 C97-HR2 FD8-HU9 cal-F60 CK4-F70/1 C98-HR2 FK6-WKO -
CA2-F60 CK5-F70 D80-FD8 FK6-WK0/1 CA3-R2 CK5-770/1 DCl-FD8 FK6-WK1 CAS-R2 CK6-F70 D59-FK7 FK6-WK1/1 CA6-FE4 CK6-F70/1 DT1-F86 FK6-WK2 CA6-F61 CK7-F70 DT2-F86 FK6-WK2/1 p
CA6-F61/1 CK7-F70/1 DT3-F86 FK6-WK3 CCO-F86 CK8-F70 DT4-F86 FK6-WK3/1 CC8-F86 CK8-770/1 DTS-F86 FK6-WK4 CC9-F86 CN1-F60 DT6-F86 FK6-WK4/1 CDI-F86 CN3-HR2 DT7-F60 FK6-WK5 CD2-F86 CU8-HR2 DT7-F60/1 FK6-WK5/1
=
CD3-F86 CW3-HR2 DT8-F60 FK6-WK6 FK6-WK6/1 FK6-WL3 FK6-WL8/1 F60-G1V/1 FK6-WK7 FK6-WL3/1 FK7-WLO F60-C1V/2 FK6-WK7/1 FK6-WL4 FK7-WL0/1 F60-CIV/3 FK6-WK8 FK6-WL4/1 F51-VC0 F71-J2F FK6-R8/1 FK6-WL5 F51-VC9 F71-J2F/1 FK6-WK9 FK6-WL5/1 FSI-VD1 F71-Zv3/1 FK6-WL9/1 FK6-WL6 F51-VD2 F71-Zv3/1.
FK6-WL1 FK6-WL6/1 F51-V98 BF1-HR2 FK6-WL1/1 FK6-WL7 F51-V99 HF2-HR4 FK6-WL2 FK6-WL7/1 F60-G1V ER2-J2F.
FK6-WL2/1 FK6-WL8 3-29
TABLE No. 3.3-1 (Cont'd) i ASSOCIATED CONTROL CABLES THAT TRAVERSE NI/NNI BOUNDART l
i Case C2a Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
i l
A05-D70 E0-G03/1 CT2-Y79/2 CW7-260 A09-D71 M7-G03 CT3-v80/2 CW8-Z60 A20-D55 BK7-G03/1 CT4-GE3 CW9-260 A24-D54 BK8-C03 CT4-PC6 CKO-GUS BA6-G03 E8-G03/1 CT5-GE3 CK1-GK1 BB1-G03 BK9-G03 CT5-PC7 CK1-Z60 g
BD4-C03 BK9-G03/1 -
CT6-GE3 CK2-GK2 BD4-G03/1 31U-J2U CT6-PC8 CK2-V90/1 BD5-G03 B1V-J2U CT7-GUS CK2-V90/2 ED5-C03/1 31W-J20 CT8-GU5 CK2-Z60 BD6-G03 B78-VE6/1 CT9-Z60 CK3-V91/2 BD6-G03/1 391-G03 CU0-JV2/2 CK4-V92/2 ED7-G03 391-G03/1 CU5-VMI/1 CK5-V93/2 BD7-G03/1 B92-FD8 CU7-VM3/1 CK6-V87/2 l
BEO-CO3 CS6-C78 CU9-JV1/2 CX7-GE0/2 l
BEO-C03/1 CS6-V81/1 CV5-TQ8 CK7-PC9
[
BF1-G03 CS6-V81/2 CV5-UH7 CK8-GE0/2 l
BF1-G03/1 CS7-GT7 CV6-TQ9 CK8-PCO BF2-G03 CS7-V82/1 CV6-UH8 CK9-GE0/2 BF2-CO3/1 CS7-782/2 CV7-TQ0 CK9-PD1 BF4-G03 CS8-GT8 CV7-UH9 CYo-V09/2 BF4-G03/1 CS8-V83/1 CWO-GWO CY3-Z60 BF5-G03 CS8-V83/2 CWO-V88/1 CZ4-VR1/1 BF5-G03/1 Cs0-785/2 CWO-V88/2 CZ5-VR2/1 BKO-G03 CTI-v86/2 CWO-Z60 CZ7-VR4/1 C69-J2G D65-G03/1 FE4-HL1/5 FE4-U46/2 i
DCOH;1U D82-VA1/1 FE4-HL1/8 FE4-U47 DC8-G1D EEG-J2G FE4-HL1/9 FE4-U47/2 DC9-GIU EE8-VM1 FE4-HL2 FE4-U48/1 DD1-GIU EE8-VM3 FE4-HL2/1 FE4-U48/2 i
DJ1-G1D EE8-VQO FE4-HL3 FE4-U49/1 DJ3-G1D EE8-VR1 FE4-HL4 FE4-U49/2 7
DJ4-CIU EE8-VR2 FE4-HL5 FE4-U50/1 4
DT9-JUS /2 EE8-VR4 FE4-HT6 FE4-U50/2 DIO-G68/1 EF3-G2F FE4-HT6/1 FE4-U51/2 DX0-G68/2 EF3-G2F/1 FE4-JV9 FE4-U51/3 Dx0-V56/1 FE4-CB0 FE4-UB0 FE4-U51/4 DIC9-G68/1 FE4-GF4 FE4-UB0/2 FE4-U52/2 DX9-G68/2 FE4-C21 7E4-UB7
~FE4-U52/3 DX9-V55/1 FE4-G21/1 FE4-UB8 FE4-U52/4 I
t 3-30 r
TABLE No. 3.3-1 (Cont'd)
ASSOCIATED CONTROL CABLES TRAT TRAVCRSE NI/NNI BOUNDARY
_ Case C2m (Cont'd)
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
DZ3-VQO/1 FE4-HB4 FE4-UB8/2 FE4-U53/2 DZ4-JU8/2 FE4-HL1/A FE4-UB9 FE4-U53/3 D14-G03 FE4-HL1/B FE4-UB9/2 FE4-U53/4 D15-GV4 TE4-HL1/C FE4-UL2/2 FE4-U54/1 D39-VA2/1 PE4-HL1/D FE4-UL5/2 FE4-U54/2 D51-EF8 FE4-HL1/E FE4-UL8/2 FE4-U55/1 D51-C03 FE4-HL1/F,
FE4-UM1/2 FE4-U55/2 D51-C03/1 FE4-BL1/G FE4-U45 FE4-U55/3 D65-EF8 FE4-HL1/H FE4-U45/2 FE4-U56/1 D65-C03 FE4-HL1/J.
FE4-U46 FE4-U56/2 FE4-U56/3 FE4-WN3 F71-J2G VE4-VE6 FE4-WM8 FE4-WN4 F71-J2G1 VE5-VE7 FE4-WN2 FE4-WN5 HR4-J2G 3 -
~ ~ ~ " ' ~ - '
'~~
~
-ZZ~~~~~
~
l TABLE NO. 3.3-1 (Cont'd)
(
t ASSOCIATED CONTROL CABLES TRAT TRAVERSE NI/NNI BOUNDARY t
I Case C3
(
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
I APS-GV4 EC6-U7N E61-136 G03-CG6 AX1-F61/3 ED7-F61 FD8-U7A G03-GG7 i
AX1-F61/4 FD7-F66 FD8-U78 G03-CG8 AX1-F61/5 ED7-F66/1 FD8-U7C C03-CG9 AX1-F61/7 ED8-F71 FD8-U7D C03-GH1 l
A47-A93/4 EF2-F60 FK1-WC7 G03-H35/2 BA6-CO3/2 EF3-GV4/2 F36-GV4 C03-H35/3 BB1-G03/1 EF3-G03 F36-G02 G03-H36 BD4-G03/2 E2E-IB1 F51-G87
[
BD6-G03/2 E2E-IB7 F51-G88
[
BF2-G03/2 E2E-IB9 F51-9Q3/3 BF4-G03/2 E2E-115 F51-HQ7/3 BK7-G03/2 E2E-123 F60-UU6 l
B91-G03/2 E2E-I24 F61-HT6 l
C72-FK4 E2E-I25 F61-U36 j
DR6-F88/3 E2E-I28 F61-U6Z
[
DS6-F88/3 E21-F61 F86-WJ2 I
EA7-F60 E26-FD8/2 F86-WJ3 EA7-F60/1 E46-F61 F86-WJ3/1 l
EB2-FD8 E61-IE4 GV4-P72
{
EB2-FD8/1 E61-IOS GV4-UU1 EB3-F60 E61-I14 GV4-VP9 EB3-F60/1 E61-I26 C03-GG0 i
EB4-F60 E61-I27 C03-CG4 EBS-F61 E61-I29 G03-CG5
[
i 4
.i r
e i
1 3-32 i
t
-.,m,m.
e.+
w-==+-=->h=*t w"**
m m. mmum
-,.,,.,. =,
u y,p, w
-wg
l l
i TABLE NO. 3.3-1 (Cont'd) i ASSOCIATED CONTROL CABLES THAT TRAVERSE NI/NNI BOUNDARY t
Ct:se C3s l
I Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
[
f AR7-F81-DX0-V56/2 EF5-UL3 FF6-U4G r
AX6-F81 DX9-V55/2 EF5-UL4 FF6-U4J I
B78-VE6/2 D39-VA2/2 EF5-UL6 FF6-U4L I
B79-VE5/2 D52-le(1/1 E15-GE3 FF6-U4N CS0-V85/1 D66-NLO/1 E15-V79 FF6-U4Q CT1-V86/1 D67-let2/1 E15-Y87 FF6-U4S CT2-V79/1 D82-VA1/2 E58-GEO FF6-U4U CT3-V80/1 EAl-M53 FB3-P23 FF6-U4W l
CT4-GE3/1 EAl-TM1 FB5-GL1 FF6-U4Y CT4-CE3/2 EBO-UYS FB5-CL2 FF7-U4B CT5-CE3/1 EE8-SBl FB5-L61 FF7-U4D CT5-GE3/2 EE8-SB3 FB5-L65 FF7-U4F I
CT6-GE3/1 EE8-SB4 FB8-CLI FF7-U4H l
CT6-GE3/2 EE8-3B6 FB8-CL2 FF7-U4K l
CX3-791/1 EE8-SB7 FB8-L62 FF7-U4M f
CX4-V92/1 EE8-SB9 FB8-L64 FF7-U4P l
CX5-V93/1 EE8-UZ6 FB8-L66 FF7-U4R l
CX6-V87/1 EE8-UZ7 FB8-L68 FF7-U4T CX7-GE0' EE8-UZ9 FE6-HL1/3 FF7-U4V CX7-CE0/1 EE9-SCI FE6-HL5/1 FF7-U4X CX8-CEO EE9-SC3 FE6-BQ0/1 FF7-U4Z CX8-GE0/1 EE9-SC4 FE6-HQ6/1 FK7-LC7 CX9-GEO EE9-SC6 FF6-U4A FK7-LC8 CX9-GE0/1 EE9-SC7 FF6-U4C FK7-NDI f
CYO-V09/1 EE9-SC9 FF6-U4E FK7-ND2
[
FK7-URS F56-WO2/2 F62-WZ0/2 F62-WZ8/6 l
FK7-UJ1 F56-WD2/3 F62-WZ0/?
F62-WZ8/7 F16-VA1 F56-WZ6 F62-WZ0/4 F62-WZ8/8 I
F16-VA2 F56-WZ7 F62-WZ0/5 F62-WZ9
[
F16-VES F61-G50 F62-WZ6/1 F62-WZ9/1 l
F16-VE6 F61-C50/1 F62-WZ8/2 F62-WZ9/2 l
F16-WD2 F61-G50/2 F62-WZ8/3 F62-WZ9/3' F16-WD2/1 F62-WZO F62-WZ8/4 F80-G27 l
F56-WD2 F62-WZ0/1 F62 -WZ8/5 F80-TN7
[
F56-WD2/1 E
i l-I 3-33 j
s-
- ~
~: -
- -. - l
e l
TABLE NO. 3.3-1 (Cont'd)
ASSOCIATED CONTROL CABLES THAT TRAVERSE NI/NNI BOUNDARY Case C4 Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
A01-F81/1 A17-F81/2 A38-F71 FE4-J20 A02-Ft1/2 A28-F81 A41-F71/1 F61-CAO A13-F81 A31-F71/1 A42-F71/2 F61-GC3 A16-F81/1 A32-F71/2 A48-F71 F61-J20 O
d 0
0
+
3-34 i
+ -
,-r e
.-+,--.-m,--
--~~~~~~-~--:--~~-~~e
= ~ ' ~ - - ' " ~. ~ ~ ^ ~ ~
- * * ^ '
";"~'
~
TABLE NO. 3.3-1 (Cont'd)
ASSOCIATED CONTROL CABLES TRAT TRAVERSE NI/NNI BOUNMRY Case C5 Cable No.
A22-FB3 O
O S
e O
3-35 1
1
l TABLE NO. 3.3-1 (Cont'd)
ASSOCIATED CONTROL CABLES THAT TRAVERSE NI/NNI BOUNDARY Case C5a Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
AK9-F80 A11-F62 FS3-J15 F62-HL5 AZ4-F80 A22-F62 FS3-J58 F62-WC7 AZ5-YSO A47-F16 FS3-J59 F62-XZ8 A07-F62 EA6-F60 I
3-36
TABLE No. 3.3-1 (Cont'd)
ASSOCIATED CONTROL CABLES THAT TRAVERSE NI/NNI BOUNDARY Case C6 Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
A05-H36/1 A20-H35/1 A51-GC2 A72-GE7 A07-N06/1 A22-N07/1 A52-GA7 FE4-GA9 A09-H35/1 A24-R36/1 A71-GC2 FE4-WP1 A11-N08/1 9
6 0
3-37 J.
~;.
L_ _ _ _:T _ _ _ _____ _T _ _ _ _ _~_T_~~_' T_^ ~ ~ ~' * ' ~ ~
~~~-
4 NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND :
2 NUCLEAR ISLAND g,g, l
l
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ouauriso nAcewAv5
[/
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f I f 1 agvice m
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V orNan NON IE
^
i
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C>'p IN CABLE TnAYS}
fj "concuiTs
//
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i'/
oiSTnieurioN PANet
//
tTypicAu cKT d
DEvict IIDN lE POWER SOURCE (125VDC) AND PROTECTIVE DEVICE ARE LOCATED IN THE NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND. CIRCUIT DEVICE IS LOCATED IN THE NUCLEAR ISLAND,BUT IS NOT NECESSARILY ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED.
EXISTING PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND <
r NUCLEAR ISLAND pg,
\\/
/[
i I
[/
8 ouaunto nAceways-t i
i s_______________________/
Ay
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IN STEL CONout?
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pisinteuTION PANEL
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,c t TYPicAu r
NON -It
-QUALIFIED nacENS f
i l
i I
i CASE Cl
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ASSOCIATED ClpTS PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE R
W. A D MALES SEABROOK STATION-UNITS I & 2
[
OF CONTROL CIRCUITS FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
[
FIGURE 3.3-1 l
t
NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND :
r NUCLEAR ISLAND
,g,g k
>.4
..A_ _. t %
r 1 1 1 A
DEVtM m
100N IE ii I, 1 b
g g
CIRCUIT."
- GueLIFIED RAEWAY NivPYc"at$
POWER SOURCE (125VDC) AND PROTECTIVE DEVICE ARE LOCATED IN THE NUCLEAR ISLAND. CIRCulT DEVICE IS LDCATED IN THE NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND, AND IS NOT NECESSARILY ENVlf.ONMENTALLY QUAUFIED.
EXISTING PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS NONE I
l CASE Clo CIRCUE PUBUC SERVICE COMPANY OFNEW HAMPSHIRE REVIEW AND ANALYSIS SEABROOK STATION-UNITS I & 2 OF CmM CIRCUM FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FIGURE 3.3-2 l
~ ~ "
- NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND t
- NUCLEAR CLAND 9
PWIT GF IfCC COedPT.
"x, in4 se cast.z inAYS OUAUFIED ftACEWAY l
C N
$.l y
y
/
=
g POWER SOURCE (CONTROL POWER XFMR) AND PROTECTIVE DEVICE ARE LOCATED IN THE NON NUCLEAR ISLAND.CIRCulT DEVICE IS 1.DCATED IN THE NUCLEAR ISLAND.BUT IS NOT NECESSARILY ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED.
EXISTING PROPOS5 MODIFICATIONS
~
i NONE e
e 9
8 CASE C2 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE SEABROOK STATION - UNITS I & 2 OF CMM CIEUITS FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FIGURE 3.3-3
NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND 7-
- NUCLEAR ISLAND
/f
/
PERT OF GCc M.
/[f,
,=;s
.s.u
-T S'
l cur g
I eves V
rum 31 l
seau is
/
EE
/
i urim i
s l
POWER SOURCE (CONTROLPONER XFMR) AND PROTECTIVE DEVICE ARE LOCATED IN THE i
NUCLEAR ISLAND. CIRCulT DEVICE IS LOCATED IN THE NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND AND IS NOT NECESSAR!LY ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED.
w EXISTING PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS I
~
NONE
'5 i
l CASE C2e CIME PUBLIC SERVICE COMI%NY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE O M M IS SEABROOK STATION-UNITS I82 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REFORT OF CONTROL ClitCulTS FIGURE 3.3-4 4
m,
PON-NUCLEAR ISLAND :
7
- NUCLEAR ISLAND
-T.,..C t
/p p
I
)
IN CASLE TRAYS
[j QUAURED AACEWAY
^
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cut
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Dever i
i l
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ri Nou ng
-EEEiTs
[
J f) ossini.uTion panct
//
(TYPICAO M
POWER SOURCE (DISTRIBUTION TRANSFORMER) AND PROTECTIVE DEVICE ARE LOCATED IN THE NON NUCLEAR ISLAND. CIRCUIT DEVICE IS LOCATED IN THE NUCLEAR ISLAND, BUT IS NOT NECESSARILY ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED.
EXISTING PROPOSED MODIFICATION PART 0,WCC NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND :
- NUCLEAR ISLAND
/
8
,//
- - - -i unan" =,.
/
- EF:,
f T
y
J l
f IM STEEL CONDUIT
/
/
3
,,,CA m, AT.
- ooAa,
/ c o
-T l
/
DCYct t>--- ^
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t i1 NON IE
_g gg fj CIRCUI,5
//
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(TYPICAL)
CASE C3 AE NRS PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE A
S SEABROOK SRTION-UNITS I 82 OF COME CIRM FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FIGURE 3.3 -5
- ~
NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND :
L NUCLEARISLAND
/j wrrer uce f
i
- .i f
l T) ' t
/
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/l eeonso no v m i
/
su cAats TRAV5 OuturtED RACDIW5
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J
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^
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m
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1
^%
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l "0" 8E ofwan V
i 1
cmcum -
l
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3
.g i
POWER SOURCE (DISTRIBUTION TRANSFORMER) AND PROTECTIVE DEVICE ARE LOCATED INTHE NUCLEAR ISLAND. CIRCUIT DEVICE IS LOCATED INTHE NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND, AND IS NOT NECESSARILY ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED.
1 4
EXISTING FROPOSED MODIFICATIONS NONE CASE C3a PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OFPEW HAMPSHRE ASEAMD CEUlu SEABROOK ' STATION-UNITS I&2 D N SIS
' FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FIGURE 3.3 - 6
NON NUCLEARISLAND
/
NUCLEAR ISt.AND
[
a-aus
/
f = -. f f--
/
g v
v
/l h '"' """
2 k:URRENT TRANSFORMER LEADS (PARTOF DIFFERENTIAL SCHEME)
ENTERING NUCLEAR ISLAND. PORTION OFTHE DIFFERENTIAL SCHEME IS LOCATED IN NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND.
EXISTING PROPOSED M00iFICATIONS NONE n
CASE C4 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF EW HAMPSHRE ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS SEABROOK STATION UNITS I & 2 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS FINAL SAFETY ANA!.YSIS REPORT OF CONTROL CIRCUITS FIGURE 3.3-7
mvtstus' NON-PAJCLEAR ISLAND C
/
-- NUCLEAR ISLAND L
l
[
C sescAatt inAve
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,rOuAurito aActu.-
l,
\\
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/
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ie cu,Ts f
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oisinleuT10N PhletL (TYPtCAQ M
otvict s
PCMIER SOURCE (INVERTER) AND PROTECTIVE DEVICE ARE LOCATED IN THE NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND. CIRCUIT DEVICE IS LOCATED IN THE NUCLEAR ISLAND,BUT IS NOT NECESSARILY ENVIRONMENTALLY QUAUFIED.
EXISTING PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND <
NUCLEAR ISLAND f
n
/
l l
/
- OUALIFED RAcetsWS -
f
,g 5 f
e u-----------------------
b-----==---------
j
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^ '
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oncu Ts
,[y,,
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2 Disui nti.
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CASE C5 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY CF NEW HAMPSHRE D CMin SEABROOK STATION -UNITS I & 2 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT OF CONM CMB FIGURE 33-8 s
. _....- 1,w w -
f-NUCLEAR ISLAND
[/
euaLimo nactuavs
- )
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In cama inave
)
' cut Ia iiGiG I
T1 noust J
n m
gi
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1 i n
cincuits-
/
I
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oisTammon nuett ITY7sceu i
POWER SOURCE (INVERTER) AND PROTECTIVE DEVICE ARE LOCATED IN NUCLEAR ISLA!O. CIRCUIT DEVICE IS LOCATED IN THE NCN NUCLEAR ISLAND,AND IS NOT NECESSARILY ENVIRONMENTALLY QUAUFIED.
EXISTING PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS
~
NONE CASE C5o PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE AS Am NM SEABROOK STATION-UNITS I & 2 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT OF CONTROL CIRCUITS I^
FIGURE 3.S -9 i
l-
NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND T
r NUCLEAR ISLAND
/,/
/
{8"888'E78AT8
[/
pepauriso naceumvs q
puoE Ui I
p-
/
w v
Davics
/,
n l
[
1 1
i POWER SOURE(POTENTIALTRANSRRhER)AIC PROTECTIVE DEVICE ARE t.DCATED j
IN THE NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND. CIRCulT DEVICE IS LDCATED IN THE NUCLEAR ISLAND, BUT IS NOT NECESSARILY ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED.
- i
}
i 1
EXISTING
{
PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS 1
ii i
=
i NON NUCLEAR ISLAND <
T
- NUCLEAR ISLAND
/
j
/
h PUSE
-~
1 CIRCUIT j
l t
C.r_$n
/
C h
DEVICE PT j
ouAUFIED FUgg NONlE j
-lN STEEL CO IOUlf
//
l f),//
oWaurito nacewars-
//
/
a L
i-i j
-IN STEEL CONOUtT P
r y
/
p
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0 g
. v e.
PT GUALIFIED PUSE SEISMCALLY
,//
MOUNTED f
. U u.,,
e CASE C6 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS SEA 8 ROOK STATION-UNITS I & 2 OF CONTROL CIROJITS FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT e
FIGURE 3.3-10 e
3.4 Analysis of Associated Instrumentation Circuits that Traverse NI/NNI Boundary 3.4.1 General All instrumentation circuits that cross the boundary between the nuclear island and the non-nuclear island have been analyzed. All credible failure modes have been studied and their effects evaluated. Results of this review determined that all instrumentation circuits can be grouped into one generic category for analysis.
The cables falling into this case are identified in Table 3.4-1.
3.4.2 Case II (Figure 3.4-1) - Associated instrumentation circuits that traverse NI/NNI boundary s.
Concern A DBE can cause failures in non-Class IE instrumentation circuits which in turn could degrade Class IE instrumentation circuits.
b.
Analysis Review of each instrumentation cable and its related circuit which traverses the nuclear island /non-nuclear island boundary has determined that each circuit is part of an instrumentation loop that is powered from a transducer or a low voltage power supply.
By the nature of its design this type of device limits the available fault current to a magnitude below that which would cause significant degradation of the instrumentation cable and hence prevents any interaction with the Class 1E instrumentation circuits. In addition, based on the discussion presented in Section 3.1.2, the instrumentation cables will not be subjected to 3-38
a voltage higher than their design rating due to interaction with power or control cables from other raceways. This interaction is further prevented by use of enclosed raceways and by use of shielded cable constructions.
b
.m 4
)
l f
i 3-39
,w.
TABLE NO. 3.4-1 ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION CABLES THAT TRAVERSE NI/NNI BOUNDARY Case 11 Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
AK2-G82 A04-F81 A19-GY3 A36-GY3 AK9-F66/1 A04-GY3 A20-F38 A38-F71/1 AN0- 34 A05-F38 A20-GY3 A38-GY3 AN2-N4 A05-GY3 A21-F81 A39-GY3 AN3-R4 A06-F81 A21-GY3 A40-F81 APO-54 A06-CY3 A22-F70/2 A40-GY3 AP9-34 A07-F70/2 A22-GY3 A41-F71/2 AR6-GY8 A07-GY3 A23-F81 A41-GY3 i
AR6-GZ1 A08-F81 A23-GY3 A42-F71/3 AX1-F66 A08-GY3 A24-F38 A42 G 3 AX1-F66/1 A09-F38 A24-GY3 A43-F81 AX1-F66/2 A09-GY3 A25-F81 A43-GY3 AX1-F66/3 A11-F70/2 A25-GY3 A44-F66 AX2-F61/3 A11-GY3 A27-F81 A44-GY3 A12-F61/4 A12-F81 A27-GY3 A45-F66 AX2-F61/5 A12-GY3 A28-F81/1 A47-A93/5 AX6-GQ5 A13-F81/1 A28-CY3 A47-FD5 AX7-R7 A13-GY3 A31-F71/2 A47-F60 l
AZ4-F66/1 A15-F81 A31-GY3 A47-GY3 A::5-F66/1 A15-GY3 A32-F71/3 A48-F71/1 A01-F81/2 A16-F81/2 A32-GY3 A48-GY3 A01-GY3 A16-GY3 A34-F66 A49-CY3 A02-F81/3 A17-F81/3 A34-GY3 A49-G82 A02-GT3 A17-GY3 A35-F66 A50-F71 A03-GY3 A19-F81 A36-F66 A50-GY3 i
CA6-F66 FA5-QE8 FE4-UB9/1 FE6-HL1 CR4-R7 FA5H2E9 FE4-UL2 FE6-HL1/1 j
CR5-R7 FA5-QF4 FE4-UL2/1 FE6-HL1/2 C66-F66 FA5M}F5 FE4-UL5 FE6-RL1/4 C82-F65/2 FA5-QF6 FE4-UL5/1 FE6-HL2 C82-F66 FA5-QF7 FE4-UL8 FE6-HL3 i
DR6-F88 FA6-G12 FE4-UL8/1 FE6-HL4 l
DR6-F88/1 FA7-C12 FE4-UM1 FE6-HL5 i
DR6-F882 FA8-G12 FE4-UM1/1 FE6-BL5/2 l
DS6-F88 FA8-G12/1 FE4-U45/1 FE6-HL6 l
DS6-F88/1 FC9-52Q FE4-U46/1 FE6-RQO I
DS6-F88/2
' FE4-4L1 FE4-U47/1 FE6-RQ3 l
EAl-GY8
'FE4-GL2 FE4-U48 FE6-HQ3/1 EAl-GZ1 FE4-CL2/1 FE4-U49
' FE6-BQ6 i
EB1-R4 FE4-HL1 FE4-U50 FE6-RQ7 I
3-40 i
i l
_..g..--:.....y-;_.------
- - - - - - - - _ 3- _~ ;--
i l
~
TABLE NO. 3.4-1 (Cont'd)
ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION CABLES THAT TRAVERSE NI/NNI BOUNDARY I
Case II (Cont'd)
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
t
-ECO-JW7 FE4-HL1/1 FE4-U51 FE6-HQ7/1 FAl-GL1 FE4-HL1/2 FE4-U51/1 FG7-GlQ FAl-RB6 FE4-BL1/3 FE4-U52 FG7-GlQ/1 FA2-GL2 FE4-BL1/4 FE4-U52/1 FG7-C1Q/2 FA2-RB7 FE4-EL2/2 FE4-U53 FG7-C1Q/3 FAl-RB8 FE4-EL2/3 FE4-U53/1 FG8-GlQ FA4-RBO FE4-UB0/1 FE4-U54 FJ0-CIO FA5-G12 FE4-UB7/1 FE4-U55 FJ0-GL1 FA51E6 FE4-UB8/1 FE4-U56 FJ0-GL2 FA5-QE7 FE4-UB8/3 -
FE6-HB8 FJ0-CQ5 FJ0-GS3 FJ0-G99/1 FJ7-G13/1 FK3-R95 FJ0-CS3/1 FJ0-G09/2 FJ7-C13/2 FK3-TKO FJ0-GS3/2 FJ0-G09/3 FJ7-G37 FK3-Tk9 FJ0-CS4 FJ0-G69 FJ7-HT6 FK3-TL1 FJ0-GS4/1 FJ0-G88 FJ7-PQO FK3-TL2 FJ0-GS4/2 FJ0-HQ3 FJ7-728 FK3-TL3 FJ0-GS4/3 FJ0-HQ7 FJ7-729 FK3-TL4 FJ0-GS4/4 FJ0-RH9 FJ7-P30 FK3-T3F FJ0-GS5 FJ0-RS4 FJ7-RCO FK3-T6G FJ0-CS5/1 FJ0-RS5 FJ7-RY5 FK3-T78 FJ0-CS5/2 FJ0-RS6 FJ7-RY6 FK3-T79 FJ0-CS5/3 FJ0-RS7 FJ7-R01 FK3-T80 FJ0-CS6 FJ0-167 FJ7-R02 FK3-T81 FJ0-GS6/1 FJ0-SA9 FJ7-R03 FK3-T82 FJ0-CS6/2 FJ1-RH8 FJ7-R51 FK3-T83 FJ0-GS6/3 FJ4-RHO FJ7-R53 FK3-T06 FJ0-GS6/4 FJ4-RY7 FJ7-T71 FK3-T07 FJ0-GZ3 TJ4-RY8 FK1-G87 FM3-GYO l
FJ0-GZ9 FJ7-GL2 FK1-G88 FM3-GY0/1 FJ0-CZ9/1 FJ7-CL2/1 FK1-HQ3 FM3-GY0/2 4
FJ0-G08 FJ7-G08 FK1-HQ7 FM3-CY8 FJ0-G08/1 FJ7-G08/2 FK1-X70 FM3-GY8/1 i
i FJ0-G08/2 FJ7409 FK3-qK0 FM3-GY8,2 l
FJ0-G08/4 FJ7-G09/1 FK3-QF8 FM3-GY9 l
FJ0-G09 FJ7-C13 FD3-QL1 FM3-GY9/1 i
FM3-GY9/2 F70-V79 CY3-HE0/1 G25-H45 FM3-GZ1 F70-v80 CY3-RS7 G2B-H45/1 l
FM3-GZ1/1 '
F70-V87 CY3-RS7/1 G28-H45/2 FM3-GZ1/2 F70-C1s GY3-RS7/2 G2B-H45/3 i
FM6-GY9 F71-GIS/1 GY3-RS8 G2B-H45/4 l
1 g
3-41 7
f g _.
TABLE NO. 3.4-1 (Cont'd)
ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION CABLES THAT TRAVERSE NI/NNI BOUNDARY Case II (Cont'd)
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
FM6-GY9/1 F71-CIT GY3-RS8/1 G2B-H45/5 FM6-GY9/2 F71-GIT /1 GY3-L57 G25-H45/6 FM7-GYO F86-G13 GY3-TM2 G2B-JW4 FM7-GY0/1 F86-HB6 GY3-TN4 G2B-JW4/1 FM7-GYO/2 F90-CB7 GYS-HF2 C2B-JW4/2 FM7-GY8 F90-CB8 GYS-J2G G2B-JW4/3 FM7-GY8/1 F96-E2 GY5-7A2 G2E-JW4 FM7-GZ1 F96-HL2/1 CY5-VE5 G2E-JW4/1 FM7-GZ1/1 F96-HL2/2 GY7-HIG G2E-JW4/2 FP1-GY8 F96-HL3 CY8-HIG G2E-JW4/3 F56-HQ3 GE3-JW7 GZ1-HIG G2E-RWO F56-HQ3/1 GE3-JW7/1 GZ1-JX1 G2E-RX1 F56-BQ7 G10-JW4 CZ1-RD8 C2E-IWS F56-BQ7/1 G15-JW4 CZ1-RP6 G2E-TW5/1 F60-C34 GQS-GRO GZ1-RQ7 G31-JW4 F61-CY7 GR7-JW4 C01-JW4 G31-JW4/1 F61-GZ1 GU7-JW7 G01-JW4/1 G31-JW4/2 F61-J08/2 GU8-JW4 GlQ-G2B C42-GYS F66-G34 GY3-HD0 GlQ-G2E C66-JW4 F70-V09 GY3-HE0 GlQ-G2E/1 C66-JW4/1 G68-JW4 I19-Z98 JW4-RN9 JW7-VQO G82-CW9 I19-Z98/1 JW4-RP2 JW7-VR1 G82-HIF I19-Z99 JW4-RTO JW7-V09 G82-IJO 119-Z99/1 JW4-RZ5 JW7-V79 HM8-Q55 I20-IA6 JW4-SWS JW7-v80 HM8-Q55/1 120-IB1 JW4-SX0 JW7-V84 HV2-XM7 I20-131/1 JW4-SX6 JW7-V85 IOS-Y1B 120-IB4 JW4-SX7 JW7-V86 105-Y1B/1 120-Z97 JW4-SX9 JW7-V87 106-Y1B I20-Z98 JW4-SY1 JW7-V91 I11-I19 I20-Z99 JW4-SY2 JW7-V92 111-119/1 121-IB5 JW4-TK1 JW7-v93 111-WT9 127-IE4 JW4-TQ7 JZ6-TH6 I11-WT9/1 127-IE4/1 JW4-T07 JZ6-TH7 112-I21 I28-IB9 JW4-T3R JZ6-TH8' I12-I21/1 128-189/1 JW4-T3J JZ6-TH9 113-WT9 136-YM2 JW4-VA1 JZ7-TIF 114-I16 136-YM2/1 JW4-VE6 JZ7-TIG I14-116/1 I37-YM2 JW7-PL7 JZ7-T1H 115-I17 JW4-L54 JW7-RDO JZ7-T1J 3-42 y'
','l.,
p._ : -...,,-;,.
~?
p c..-
- -'..*j W ' ;.... / ' f -Q ?,. j '; _ ' ;'
- y ; ^ %
s,'
V i
^
t
- . Q Q. ~. ' - -' 1. '
sk*
4 TABLE NO. 3.4-1 (Cont'd)
ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION CABLES THAT TRAVERSE NI/NNI BOUNDARY Case II (Cont'd)
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
Cable No.
f 113-117/1 JW4-P10 JW7-RD9 JZ7-TIK I19-129 JW4-P21 JW7-TS9 JZ7-TIM 119-129/1 JW4-P22 JW7-TV5 JZ7-TIV I19-297 JW4-P35 JW7-VM1 JZ7-T1W 119-297/1 JW4-RA2 JW7-VM3 JZ7-T11 JZ7-T2A JZ7-T2R JZ7-T2Y Q56-QR1/1 JZ7-T2B JZ7-T2M Q20-Q48 Q62-Q70 JZ7-T2D JZ7T2N Q20-Q48/1 Q62-Q70/1 JZ7-T2G JZ7-72Q Q56-QR1 RPO-GY8 W
e 6
3-43
NON NUCLEAR ISLAND :
P NUCLEAR ISLAND j
/
~,
/
l
[
IN ENCLOSED OUALIFIED m gg I
CABLE TRAYS ENCLOSED EQUIPMENT =
I RACEWAY
- COMPUTER, J
f iL INotCATOA, i
l ETC.
1 2 g
~~
]
g
-19f97RutIENTAT10sl CAALE I
5 NON CLASB IE TRANSOUCER LOW VOLTAGE 5 5 LOW YOLTASE POWDt SUPPLY Oft OTIER I
POWER SUPPLY Oil OTNER CUdftENT LitIIT1888 CUftRENT LIMITING DEVICE.
DEvlCE.
r INSTRUMENTATION CIRCUITS t
t l
EX ISTING t
PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS I
j I
NONE i
~..
i i
l I
l i
i i
i i
i i
h f
CASE Il i
1 ASSOCIATED CIRCUlTS f
RJBLIC SERVICE COMI%NY OFNEW HAMPSHIRE i
REVIEW AND ANALYS!$
SEABROOK STATIG'-UNITS I & 2 OF INSTRUMENTATION CIRCUITS F
u RNT t
i FIGURE 3.4-I l
3.5 Analysis of Associated Power, Control and Instrumentation Circuits Contained within the Nuclear Island 3.5.1 General Associated power, control and itstrumentation circuits contaic.ed entirely j
within ti.e nuclear island have bien reviewed. All credible failure modes have been studied and their effec ts evaluated. It has been determined that all these circuits can be grouped under one case for analysis.
t 3.5.2 Case C1 (Figure 3.5-1) - Associated power, control and instrumentation circuits ' contained within the nuclear island.
j a.
Concern A DBE could cause failure of non-Class 1E equipment contained within the nuclear island and powered from power supplies located within the nuclear island.
t -
b.
Analysis The associated circuit (which shares the same raceway as a Class IE circuit) will not interact and degrade the Class 1E circuit below an acceptable level based on the following analysis:
1)
All power supplies (e.g. motor control centers, distribution panels, etc.) and their protective devices are specified, designed, manufactured and installed to the same criteria *es Class IE equipment, therefore, credit can be taken for the protective device.
2)
All cables are specified, designed, manufactured and installed to the same criteria whether they are for a Class 1E or for an associated circuit.
3-44 l-
-~~
s 3)
All electrical raceways are installed to meet the Category I requirements.
4)
The only portion of the circuit which may not be similar to Class IE is the equipment itself (motors, heaters, controls, instrumentation, etc.).
The equipment is assumed to fail; however, the failure of this equipment will be protected by a Class IE or similar protective device as discussed in 1) above, and hence vill prevent the associated circuit from degrading the Class IE circuits below an acceptable level.
S k
q 4
6 3-45 N.
NON-NUCLEAR ISLAND C T
q NUCLEAR ISLAND a
(
class rt roman sumr nom.nAss rt powen m J
)
)
+
(C>--ouaunto nAcesay
$=u y---
p h
h e
m.-
e
[
tono Loao tone l
l b-ch ch ci ASSOCIATED POWER, C014TPOL AND INSTRUMENTS CIRCUITS IN NUCLEAR ISLAle i
EXISTING l
PROPOSED MODFICATIONS i
l j
NONE 1
i
\\
f I
~~~
'r j
t-CASE Gl ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE REVIEW AND ANALYSIS SEABROOK STATION-UNITS I & 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT OF NUCl. EAR ISLAND CIRCUITS 4
FIGJRE 3.5 -1
I 3.6 Analysis of Associated Power, Control and Instrumentation Circuits 1
contained within the Non-Nuclear Island i
i 3.6.1 General I
Associated power, control and instrumentation circuits contained i
entirely within the non-nu: lear island have been reviewed. All credible failure modes have been studied and their effects evaluated. It has been determined that all these circuits can be grouped under one case for analysis.
6 3.6.2 Case C2 (Figure 3.6-1) - Associated power, control and j
instrumentation circuits contained within the non-nuclear island.
a.
Concern A DBE could cause the failure of non-Class 1E equipment contained within the non-nuclear island and powered from power supplies. also located within the non-nuclear island. his failure could affect l
the integrity of circuits that share the same raceways and i
ultimately enter the nuclear island.
}
i l
b.
Analysis
+
1)
Power Circuits t
With the exception of Class 1E power circuits in the waste process building (which will be in qualified raceways) there 1
are no other Class 1E power circuits in the non-nuclear l
Island; therefore, there is no concern with associated power circuits contained within the non-nuclear island directly interacting with Class IE power circuits. Sey may, however, interact with other associated circuits in the non-nuclear 3-46
-,,m.w...-.
^d-
-e 0
s a
---r-
f f
island that are ultimately entering the nuclear island and r
i could subsequently degrade these associated circuits. All associated circuits which traverse the non-nuclear island / nuclear island boundary have already been addressed, t
and shr _ not to have the potential to degrade the Class IE l
t circuits below an acceptable level.
2)
Control Circuits With the exception of the inputs to the RPS from the turbine f
generator which are in conduits and some control circuits in l
the waste process building, which are in qualified raceways, 4
I there are no other C, lass 1E control circuits in the non-l r
nuclear island; therefore, there is no concern with associated control circuits contained within the non-nuclear island directly interacting with the Class IE circuits. They i
may, however, interact with other associated circuits in the non-nuclear island which are routed to the nuclear island, and could subsequently degrade these circuits.
f l
The scenario postulated is that a circuit within NNI would
'I t
contact a Case C2 or C3 type circuit which does not have
{
t protective devices in the NI.
A subsequent-fault at the Case l
I C2 or C3 circuit device would result in fault current that j
could damage the cable and thus affect any adjacent Class 1E circuit.
l To prevent this degradation of the Class 1E circuits below an acceptable level, modifications similar to those proposed for the associated control circuits addressed in Sections 3.3.2 l
(Case C1),'3.3.6 (Case C3), 3.3.9 (Case C5) and 3.3.11 (Case j
C6) will be implemented.
f 3-47 p..._.
-.-.7....
7-- -.. - - - - - -
7-
3)
Instrunnent Circuits Associated instrumentation circuits contained within the non-nuclear island will not directly interact with Class 1E circuits, nor will they degrade below an acceptable level, the associated circuits which traverse the non-nuclear island / nuclear island boundary for reasons outlined in Section 3.4.2.
Based on this, no modifications are required.
0 l
3-48 Jr
NON-NUCLEAR ISAD +
= NUCLEAR ISLAND
---w E N *senet j
C>- m casts nav on cowourt e#
9
=-
ASSOCIATED PONER, CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION CKUITS IN N(N NUCLEAR ISLAND EXISTING PROPOSED MODIFCATIONS l
FOR CONTROL CIRCUIT MODIFICATIONS-SEE CASE 3 CI (FIGURE 3.3-1),C3(FIGURE 33 5),C5(FIGURE 3.3 8) AND C6( FIGURE 3.3-10) r
.t t
~
CASE G2 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE REVIEW AND ANALYSIS SEABROOK STATION-UNITS I & 2 OF NON NUCLEAR ISLAND CIRCulTS FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
~
FIGURE 34-1
~-
4.0 SIDOLUM AND EVALUATION Mis section sussearises the review, analysis and modifications necessary to meet the NRC requireestate relative to associated circuits.
4.1 Summary of Review and Analysis he review program that was established considered all associated circuits at Seabrook Station. Each circuit was reviewed and analyzed in detail. he review prcerca required the detailed review of approximately 1500 power, c antrol and instrumentation cables, which traverse the nuclear island /non-ns. clear island boundary and other cables within the nuclear island and the non-nuclear island that were reveived generically.
4.2 Susmary of Modifications Se following is a summary of the modifications which have been proposed to satisfy the separation criteria established for associated circuitst a.
Relocate all de distribution panels into the nuclear island.
b.
Relocate all ac inverter distribution panels into the nuclear is land.
c.
Reroute certain cables in non-nuclear island in dedicated conduits.
d.
Add qualified fuse panels in non-nuclear island and mount and protect seismically to the extent possible.
e.
Add qualified fuse panels in the nuclear island.
f.
Add motor control centers in the circulating water building.
g.
Upgrade raceway system and supports in the waste process building to Category I.
h.
Provide separate raceway systems for Class IE and non-Class 1E cables in service water building.
i.
Reroute power and control cables throughout the plant as necessitated by the above changes.
4-1 b...~.-
t 4.3 Evaluation Upon completion of the proposed modification, Seabrook Station's design for physical independence of electric system will satisfy the NRC's requirements for associated circuits as stated in Sectior,1.1. The modifications and additional design controls will assure thec compliance to the requirements j
will be maintained throughout the life o'.
the plant.
a 9
4-2~
'A
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __. _ _ _ _E_- _
.......!AfdN fk h1' C.
7..~.)9 ~ L
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March 23, 1982 c.
EB 1.5 2 p
d
_RAI 430.45 Identify sa:h difference between the separation critaria of regulatory gu'ida 1.75 (IIII Standard 384 1974) and separation critaria identified in Appendix 8A of the TSAL
~
RESPONSI
~
It is apparent from RAls 430.39, 430.40, 430.41, and 430.59, that a few
- basic misconceptions may exist regarding the Saabnok separation design' phil-osophy. The,following s y of the separation naign 14 provided to clarify.
any misconceptions, and help answer questions:
Backcround Ib separation critaria outlined in TSAR Appendix 8A, Physical Indesende' nee of Elae:rie Systems, was provided by the NRC in, question 8.15 to the Saabrook PSA1. At that time it was called Attachment C and de.flaad the staff J
. Position, in the form of critaria for implementing the separation requirements of IIII st=nA=vds-279-1971, 308-1971 and general design criteria 17 and 21.
In the intarast of standardi:atism Saabrook adopted NRC's A*ttachment C as the criteria for physical independ'ence of alactric systems.
To familiarize the NRC with Seabrook's unique method of separation, and to 6;-
' preclude later misunders*=nMnts and afsconceptions, a presentation to the l
) %.J.
PS3 3 ranch Chief.and his staff was nada on October 17, 1978. This presen-tation illustrated and discussed in graat detail the ma': hod used for Saabrook.
At the time, the NRC indicated that the rathod met with separation require-ments and indicated general concurrence with Saabrook's approach to imple-mentation of NRC critaria for physical independence of electric systems. A copy of the NRC meeting sumoary is provided as Attachment 430.40A.
Separation'Desien Philosophe '
In Saabrook there are two safety related load Trains A and B four distinct safety related inattumancation channels, I,. II, III, IT, and the balance of plant non-safety related loads and circuits. On Saabrook va elected to group the safety related circuits into four separation groups.
SIPARATION Cit 0UP A110VA11.I CIRCUIT 3 A
Channal I & Irain A
(
B Channel II & Train 3.
C r'h===el III D
' Channel IV,
Various acceptable methods for the treatment of the balance of plant non-safety related loads and cirucits are described in Appendix SA, Section 4.5 " associated circuits" and Section 4.6 "non-Class II circuits."
t i.
t g6J A m t.
=
s
.IMS C.S t u G ti 7-S $1
~
M RAI Rev. 1 March 23,1982
- 531&2 TSAR
'm Accordingly, Seabrook elected to follow 4.5(a) and 4.6.2, and designated all non-safety related circuits and loads as associated with either Train A or Train R.
The great majority of circuits are associated with Train A, and a few with Train R.
The'few non-safety related loads and circuito associated with
- ~
- Train 3 are auxiliaries to support the 3 Train power supply (diesel auxiliaries) and NSSS preference loads. This concept of association results in only four basic separation. groups:
SEPARATION CROUP AI.I.O*.lA31.E CTRCUITS A
Channel'1 & Train A & Train A associated 3
Channel II & Train 3 & Tr'ain B associated C-Channel III D
Channel IV e
These four separattion groups meet the'. requirements for physical independence of electric systems in Appendix BA. Therefore, associated Train A circuits.
are routed totally separate from associated Train 3 circuits and do not share the same raceway. Since the seabrook raceway and cable design utilizes the 4.5(a) option of Appendix 8A for associated circuits, they are uniquely f..
t/?,7 identified as such, remain with and are separated the same as the Class 1E circuits with which they are atsociated, and meet the requirements placed en IE circuits in cable derating, environmental qualification, flame __
retardance. splicine restrictions and raceway fill.JIn a f instan s,
F is51a* on devices used to a tain the sep tion ph osophy.
ess' a.---
iso tion device re circui reakers trip on an ident s' al and 1
c form to the equirement of Regulato uide 1 To fur er enhan he design, 41 the 3 T zn associat circuit 1 be de ergi this
~
manner un receive si a safety i eetion Furt 11 assocsated circuits connected to Class 1E bus ~es are connected by qualified Class II circuit breakers.
Coun11ance with Regulatory Guide 1.75 Regulatory guide 1.75 and IEEE standard 384-1974 were'not issued at the time Attachment C.vas adopted as Seabrook's
- parstion design criteria. We have addressed compliance with RC 1.75 in FSAR Section 8.1 and 8.3.1.2.b.5.
Ce'rtain erroneous statements in these sections have been clarified. FSAR, pages 8.1-7 and 8.3-28 have been revised accordingly.,
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.1.[ __ _.$_\\
~
l f$W Cahamy e 7 A*D' SB 1 & 2 Amendment 44 PSAR February 1982 limit switches. Qualification of valve appurtenances, such as motor-opera-tors, solenoid valves and limit switches, is in accordance with this Regula-tory Guide. Refer to Section 3.11 (B) for further discussion on this subject.
For HSSS safety-related motor-operated valves located inside containment, environmental qualification is performed in accordance with IEEE Standards 382-1972 and 323-1974. The qualification program for valve related equipment will be described in the NRC-approved version of Reference (9).
Regulatory Cuide 1.74 Quality Assurance Terms and Definitions (Rev. O,.2/74) 1 y Endorses ANSI N45.2.10-1973 44 The guidance of this. standard has been utilized to provide consistent terms and definitions.in the description of the quality assurance program with the following exception, regarding Section 2.0 of the standard: The definitions of " Certificate of Conformance" and " Certificate of Cem;11ance" shall be interchanged to comply with ANSI N45.2.13 (Section 10.2) and the ASME B&PV Code. For further clarification during the Operational Phase, see Section 17.2.
4 Regulatory Guide 1.75 Physical Independence of Electric (Rev. 2 9/78)
Systems Th esign is consistent with the criteria for physical independence of i
elee rical systems established in " Attachment C" of AEC letter dated December 14,1973 (see FSAR Appendix 8A) and is in general conformance with
. I Regulatory Guide 1.75, Rev. 2, except as follows:
4 l
Isolat nD ce - t abroo d ign c s to recomm b
tions o E 384-19, Sectio reg i
spe i electr' a j
isol on riteria
.4
%[
Battery Room Ventilation - four Class IE hatteries are located in
~i four seismic Category I structures, and are served by two cross-connected safety-related ventilation systems. Each room can be isolated by fire dampers.
The subject of this regulatory guide in further discussed in Subsections 8.1.5.3, 8.3.1.2,Q.p ( N N p aly.)
lg The NSSS-furnished aystems comply with the recoimnendations of Regulatory Cuide 1.75, Rev. 2, as discussed in Subsection 7.1.2.2.
4 f
1.8-29 e
y v
I SB 1 & 2 F
FSAR E
a R.
qualified by experience and seismic testing. ne 600 volt g
systen x/R ratio, psed in specifying the electrical.
4 penetrations is 4.
Calculations show that this value is L
conservatively applied because the, actual ratio is
=insiderably less than 4.
Refer to Subsection 8.3.1.2 6
" Physical Independence of Electric SysLw1*'
(Rev 2) 1 y
The design is consistent wfth the criteria for physical independence of electric systems established f
in Attachment "C" of AEC letter dated December 14, p
1973, and is in general confo:mance with Regulatory T=
Guide 1.75, except as follows:
holation%evicesMe sign con
- to' e]/
h re endat of IEEE-38 -19 Sect I
ing e ic electr isolati r a E
riter '.
E' Battery Room Ventilation.
The four, Class 1E q
batteries, located in four safety class e
structures, are served by two safety-related i
ventilation systems which have a cross-tie to allow one system to serve all four batteries in case of failure of the other system. ' Each room m
can be isolated by fire dampers.
=F h
Refer to. Subsection 8.3.1.2.
i RG 1.108
" Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units Used as (Rev 1)
Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plan t s" c
=_
The diesel generator testing is in conformance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 with
=
i one cirification:
E:
The requirements of position C.2.a(5) will be met y
every 18 months as follows:
The functional capability at full load temperature will be demonstrated at least every E
18 months by performing the test outlined in ik position C.2.c(1) and (2) immediately following the full load carrying capability test described in position C.2.a(3).
The full load i
carrying capability of position C.2.c(2) shall be demonstrated for greater than or equal to five minutes.
l#
8.1-7 p
5 L_
i
e
- ~
E'S r,4 C h cq.
7,.- lp C L L
SB 1 & 2 FSAR low energy circuits, is p'rovided with dual Class 1E overload protective devices. For more details refer to Subsection I
,y 8.3.1.lc.
15kV penetrations are protected by seismically
/
qualified. Class 1E fuses. Additional protection is provided by two non-Class lE breakers in series. These breakers are 4
coordinated and derive their control power from different
]f batteries. For more details refer to Subsection 8.3.1.la.
5.
Regulatory Guide 1.75 - Physical Independence of Electric Systems J
The design is consistent with the criteria for physical inde-f pendence of electric systems established in Attachment "C" of 9,eg AEC (NRC) letter dated December M; 10 M.
Aten h e "f"
f 4-incorporated as Appendix 8A b 4 4 5 *PM C#" N*j solati evices etween Cla lE and as ciated c cuits require Regu 'ory Guide 75 are pr 'ided in cor-g Nkf*
'da of E-384-77, Section
.l. L.
with t cuitswhk::;aren i
Class 1E a cw % -f:et mod,
k 11 c' a ocia d circut All 1 ation dev s are ssifie L Cla 1E meet t,
eeessar alificat
' requ pents.
N s
N
,j Physical separation and identification of circuits are described in detail in Subsections 8.3.1.3 and 8.3.1.4, respectively.
c.
Environmental Effects on Safety-Related Electric Equipment All safety related equipment that must operate in a hostile.envi-ronment during and/or subsequent to a design basis event are iden-tified with their ambient environmental conditions, and their qualifications are discussed In Section.,3.ll.
8.3.1.3 Physical Identification of Safety Related Equipment All cables, raceways and safety related equipment are assigned to a partic-ular channel or train. There are two redundant trains of power and controls, and four redundant channels of instrumentation. Each channel or train is assigned a particular color, as shown below:
Racevry or Separation Group Equipment Nameplate or Tag Cable Color
' t hannel I and Train A Red ed a.
Mlackw/RedTracer Train A Associated
- Black b.
Thennel II and Train B White ice train B Associated
- Black lack w/ White Tracer c.
bhannel III Blue lue d.
Channel IV Yellow Yellow
- Not applicable to raceways.
8.3-28 9
.e
. a -.
-a PSAA CL. 7e.? P j_
Each piece of electrical ' equipment is marked with the node number indicated on the design drawings, in the T a'rticular color corresponding to ch'e channel i
or train to which that equipment is assigned. Similarly, trays and exposed conduits are marked with calor coded markers. The cable jacket color code serves as its identification. The operator or maintenance craftsman needs only to observe the color of the nameplate of any piece of equipment or the cable jacket color to determine which channel or train it serves.-
(
8.3.3.4 Independence of Redundant Systems C s.mw3.. 3
..~ raceway systems distribute power, control and instrumentation f
m circuits within the plant at levels ranging from 13.8 kV down to low-level instrum'ntation signals. The design criteria employed for the separation of e
circuits and equipment comply with the requirements of Attachment.C to AEC (NRC) letter dated December 14, 1973, " Physical Independence of Electric Systems" (see Appendix SA). Additional criteria are outlined in the succeeding para-graphs. A discu'ssion is also included on administrative responsibility and control to ensure compliance withEthese criteria during the design and instal.
lation of these systems. Preservation of independence of redundant systems within the control boards and all other field mounted racks is discussed in h
lection 7.1-( S ec. 4 AS e-th gucuc teJ CacM5 1
-.. % bles.
N A90 Medium voltage (5 k'v and 15 kv) power cables are installed in raceways separate from those used for low voltage power and con-trol cables, low level signal cables, and nucle'ar instrumentation cable s.
Medium voltage powe'r, cables for lif ferent voltage levels are installed in separate raceways.
In vertically stacked trays, the highest voltage cables, are in the highest position in the tray stack.
Low voltage (480 volts ac and some 120 volts n'c, and 125 volts de) power cables in vertically stacked trays are located below the medium voltage power cables, and are separated from control, low level signal and nuclear instrumentation cable i.
Low voltage power cables associate'd with the control rod drive mechanism (CRDM)' are routed in raceways separated from control and instrument raceways.
Control cables in vertically stacked trays are located below the low voltage power cables.
Control cables are separated from low level signal and nuclear instrumentation cables, as well as from
- medium and low voltage power cables.
Low level signal cables are run in raceways separate from all other cables.
In vertically stacked trays, the low level signal tray is at the lowest level in the stack.
v e
8.3-29 3
iI 7
}
Fsy", m. m.s,
=
~
SB 1 & 2 f
FSAR Nuclear instrumentation cables are routed in steel conduits for their entire distance.
The two redundant trains (Train A and B) and the four redundant channels (Channels I, II, III and IV) are routed through four physically separated raceway systems, called separation groups, as shown in Table 8.3-4.
Physical separation of the four groups is maintained by means of one or more of the following 1.
Separcte exposed rigid metal conduits, or 2.
Separate concrete-encased plastic or metal ducts in the same duct bank, or o
3.
Cable trays separated by a wall. a floor, or an equivalent
?
barrier with a three-hour fire rating, or l
I 4.
Separate cable trays in the same room where a minimum of' three feet horizonial or five, feet vertical separation exists between trays of redundant systems.
s 5.
Separate cable trays
,.n the. cable spreading room (as defined in Appendix 8A, Section 5.1.3) where a minimum of one foot.
horizontal and three feet vertical separation exists between trays of redundant systems.
J.
e r
All non ety-related circ
- are ass isted ith either i
o I
or Tr nB accordance' h
ion
.5a of App dix 8A.
Tr nB ss isted c1 uits ar ept to a m imum, consist g ess tal t'
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Selection of cable Insulation Insulation systems for cables comprise materials or combinations
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of materials for primary insulation, jackets, shielding, tapes,'
fillers and armoring. The factors considered in selecting a cable insulation system include stability and length of life, dielectric properties, resistance to ionization and corona, resis-tance to high temperatures, resistance.to moisture, resistance to chemicals, resistance to radiation, mechanical strength, flexibil-ity, self-extinguishing and non propagdting fire characteristics, and general environmental considerati -
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ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS In accordance with the provisions of the Section 4.5a of Appendix 8A, we have elected to associate all the non-Class 1E circuits with Class 1E circuits. This application of associated circuits allows the plant to be designed with one less separation group; that is, instead of having five separation groups consisting of four safety related separation groups and one non-safety related separation group, Seabrook has only four separation groups. The major advantages of this approach is the ability to provide greater separation distance between the groups as well as to reduce the raceway system's exposure to fire.
The majority of non-Class 1E circuits are associated with Train A, while a very limited number are associated with Train B.
The circuits that are associated with Train A consist of:
(1) Those circuits for the non-Class 1E loads that are placed on Train A Class 1E buses (2) Non-Class 1E power, control'and inet'rument circuits located in the nuclear island (3) Non-Class 1E power control and instrument circuits located in the I
non-nuclear island (4) Non-Class 1E power, control and instrumentation circuits that traverse between the non-nuclear island and the nuclear island.
The circuits that are associated with Train B consist of:
(5) Those circuits for the non-Class 1E loads that are placed on Train B Class 1E buses (6) Non-Class 1E power circuits that traverse between the non-nuclear island and the nuclear island for the reactor coolant pumps.
In accordance with Section 4.5a of Appendix 8A, associated circuits are separated the same as those Class 1E circuits with which they are associated; their cables are subject to all requirements placed on Class 1E cables such as derating, environmental qualification, flame retardance, splicing restrictions and raceway fill. In addition, each associated circuit has been analyzed to demonstrate that the Class 1E circuits which it'is associated are not degraded below an acceptable level. This analyis is provided in Appendix 8B.
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