ML20024G084
| ML20024G084 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 02/03/1976 |
| From: | Goller K Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024G078 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9102070517 | |
| Download: ML20024G084 (4) | |
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The issuance of t his amendment will not be inimical to the carman d<-tanse and securit y or t o the healt h ami safet y o f t h e.
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l ATTACIMDTT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 16 PROVISIONAL OPEi'ATING LICENSE NO. DPR-22 4
3 DOCKET NO. 50-263 l
Del ate existing pages 76 and 83 of the Technical Specifications and 3.. sert the attached revised pages 76 and 83.
The changed areas on the revised pages are shown by tTarginal lines.
1 1
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3.0 LIMITED CONDITIONS FOR PPERATION 4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 2.
Reactivity margin - stuck control 2.
Reactivity margin - stuck control reds.
rods.
Control rod drives which cannot Each partially or fully withdrawn be moved with control rod drive operable control rod shall be exer-pressure shall be censidered in-cised one notch at Icast once each opeiable. The directional controi week. This test shall be performed valves for inoperable control rods at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in the shall be disarmed electrically and event power operation is continuing the rods shall be in such positis with two or more inoperable control a
that Specification 3.3.A.1 is met.
rods or in the event power operation If rore than six non-full; inserted rods is continuing with one fully or are inoperable during power operation partially withdrawn rod which cannot #9%
the reactor shall be placed in a shut-be moved and for which control rod down condition.
If a partially or drive 2echanism damage has not been fullf withdrawn control rod drive ruled out.
The surveillance need not cannot be moved with drive or scram be completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> i f the pressure the reactor shall be brought number of inoperabic rods has been to a shutdown cendition within 43 hours4.976852e-4 days <br />0.0119 hours <br />7.109788e-5 weeks <br />1.63615e-5 months <br /> reduced to less than two and if it has unless investigation demonstrates that been demonstrated that control rod drive the cause of the failure is not due mechanism collet housing failure is not to a failed control rod drive mechanism the cause of an immovable centrol rod.
collet housing.
B.
Control Rod K thdrawal B.
Contrcl Rod Withdrawal 1.
Each control rod shall be coupled 1.
The coupling integrity shall be to its drive or completely inserted verified for each withdrawn control and the directional control valves rod as follows:
i disarmed electrically. This require-ment does not apply when removing a (a) when the rod is fully withdrawn control rod drive for inspection as the first time subsequent to long as the reactor is in the refuel-each refueling outage, observe ing mode.
that the drive does not go to the overtravel position; and 1
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Am,mdment No. 16
Bases Continued 3.3 and 4.3:
with drive pressure.
If the rod is fully inserted and then disarmed electrically *, it is in a safe position of maximum contribution to shutdown reactivity.
If it is disarmed electrical?y in a non-fully inserted penition, that. position.shall be consistent with the shutdown reactivity limitation stated in Specification 3.3.A.1.
This assures that the core can be shutdown at all times with the remaining control rods assuming the strongest operable control rod does not insert. An allouable pattern for inoperabic' control rods, Mich shall meet this Specification, will be available to the eperator. The number of rods permitted to be inoperable could be many more than the six allowed by the Specification, particularly late in the operation cycle; however, the occurrence of more than six could be' indicative of a generic control rod drive problem and the reactor will be shutdown. Also if damage within the control rod drive mechanism and in particular, cracks in drive internal housings, cannot be ruled out, then a generic problem affecting a number of drives cannot be ruled out.
p Circumferent ial cracks resulting from st ress nu isted intergranular corrosion have occurred in the collet housing of drives at several BMs.
'lhis type of cracking.could occur in a number of drives and if the cracks propagated entil severance of the collet housing occurred, scram could be prbvented in the affected reds.
Limiting the period of operation with a potentie11y severed collet hous ing and requi ring ' ac reased surveillance af ter detecting one stuck rod will assure that the reactor will not be operated with a large number of rods with failed collet housing.
B.
Control Rod Withdrawal 1.
Control rod dropout accidents as discussed in the FSAR can letd to significant core damage.
If coupling integrity is maintained, the possibility of a rod dropout accident is climinated.
The overtravel position feature provides a positive check as only uncoupled drives may reach this position. Neutron instrumentation response to rod mevement provides a verification that the rod is fellowing its drive.
Absence of such response to drive movements after the reactor is critical would indicate an uncoupled condition.
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2.
The control rod housing support restricts the outward movement of a control rod to less than 3 inches in the extremely remote event of a heusing failure, The amount of reactivity which could be added by this small amount of rod withdrawal, which is less than a normal single withdrawal increment, will not contribute to any damage to the primary coolant system. The design basis is given in Section 6.5.1 of the FSAR and the design evaluation is given in
- To disarm the drive electrically, two amphenol type plug cennectors are removed from the drive insert and withdrawal solenoids render.ing the drive innovable.
This procedure is equivalent to valving out the drive and is preferred since it allows continued cooling water flow and minimites crud accumulation in the drive.
3.3/4.3-9
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