ML20024G005
| ML20024G005 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 12/11/1990 |
| From: | Ebneter S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Hairston W ALABAMA POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9012270229 | |
| Download: ML20024G005 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000348/1990026
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DEC 111990
Docket Nos. 50-348, 50-364
Alabama Power Company
ATTN:
Mr. W. G. Hairston, 111
Senior Vice President
fluclear Operations
40 Inverness Center Parkway
P. O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201
Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
NRC INSPECTION REPORT r105, 50-348/90-26 AND 50-364/90-26
Thank you for your response of November 20, 1990, to our Notice of Violation
issued on October 2, 1990, concerning activities conducted at your Farley
facility.
We have examined your response and found that it meets the
requirements of !0 CFR 2.201.
In your response, you denied the violation since this area had been previously
reviewed by the NRC and contended that the violation is based upon a changed
position or interpretation and should therefore be subject to the backfitting
requirement of 10 CFR 50.109.
After careful consideration of the basis for your denial of the violation, we
have concluded, for the reasons presented in the enclosure to this letter, that
the violatiot, occurreo as stated in our Notice of Violation.
A Committee
consisting of Senior Regional Managers met and deliberated on the backfit
issues raised in your response.
After careful review, the Committee concurred
with the staff's arialysis that the violation is not based on a new staff
position or new interpretation of the regulation.
Accordingly, the provisions
of 10 CFR 50.109 do not apply.
If you desire to further appeal our finding, you may submit a response to our
analysis and conclusions to the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation,
Washington, DC 20555.
We have concluded that the proposed corrective actions described in your letter
appear adequate, and they will be reviewed during future inspections.
Sincerely,
Original Signed By:
' JAMES l'. MILHOAN
hStewart D. Ebneter
Regional Administrator
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Enclosure:
(See page 2)
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9012270229 901211
$6W
ADOCK 05000340
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Alabama Power Company
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DEC 11 1990
Enclosure:
Evaluation and Conclusion
cc w/ encl:
B. L. Moore
Manager, Licensing
Alabama Power Company
P. O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201
R. P. Mcdonald
Executive Vice President
,.
Nuclear Operations
Alabama Power Company
P. O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201
J. D. Woodard
Vice President
Nuclear Farley Project
Alabama Power Company
P. O. Box 1295
Birmingham. AL- 35201
D. N. Morey
. General Manager
Farley Nuclear Plant
P. 0. Box 470
Ashford, AL. 36312
5. Fulmers Supervisor
Safety Audit and Engineering Review
- Farley Nuclear Plant
P. 0 Box 470
- Ashford, AL 36312
= Louis'B._Long, General Manager
Southern Company Services, Inc.
P. O. Box 2625-
Birmingham, AL 35202
'C1aude' Ear 1 Fox, M.D.
State Health Officer
State Department of Public Health
State Office Building
Montgomery, AL 36130
(cc w/ encl cont'd - See page 3)
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Alabama Power Company
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DEC 111990
(cc w/o enci cont'd)
Mr. James H. Miller, III, Esq.
Balch and Bingham
P. O. Box 306
1710 Sixth Avenue North
Birmingham, AL 35201
Chairman
Houston County Commission
Dothan, AL 36301
State of Alabama
bec w/ encl:
NRR/ORIS/SB
Occument Control Desk
Steve Hoffman, Project Manager, NRR
NRC Resident Inspector
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Route 2, Box 24
Columbia, AL 36319
F. S. Cantrell
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ENCLOSURE
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION
On October 2,1990, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation identified
during a routine NRC inspection.
Alabama Power responded to the Notice of
Violation on November 20, 1990.
The licensee denied the violation concerning
Safeguards Information and contended the violation is based upon a changed
position or new regulatory interpretation and should therefore be subject to
the backfitting requirements of 10 CFR 50.109.
The NRC's evaluation and
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conclusion regarding the licensee's arguments are as follows:
Restatement of the Violation
10 CFR ~/3.21 contains the requirements for the protection of safeguards
i nformat ion.
10 CFR 73.21(b)(1)(vii) defines " Documents and other material
that contain lists or locations of certain safety-related equipment explicitly
identified in the documents as vital for purposes of physical protection"' as
safeguards information.
10 CFR 73.21(c)(i) limits access to safeguards information to those persons who
have met the requirements of 10 CFR 73.57 and have a need to know the
information.
10 CFR 73.21(d) delineates the requirements for the protection and control of
safeguards information to include beir.g under the control of an authorized
individual- or stored in an approved container.
Contrary to the above, the inspectors found that safeguards information was
contained in training and- badging materials which was not controlled as
required.
Summary of Licensee Response
The licensee states that, "Nowhere in the documents or on the badge does there
appear a list of safety-related equipment explicitly identified as vital for
physical protection of the plant.
What does appecr are generic, broadly
identified names of areas of Farley Nuclear-Plant that are commonly known and
acknowledged in the public domain...."
The licensee. cites, as support of its position, portions of a memo from the
NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations (NRR) to NRC Region- IV, which
states, in part:
"We agree with your view that it is -unnecessary to protect as
SGI [ Safeguards Information] a document that.only states that a particular room
or building is a vital aree."
The NkR memo continues, saying that a policy
statement is being developed to address this area.
The licensee discusses, at some length, information iccluded in the
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NRC-approved Physical Security Plan as it relates to the form and content of
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the plant security badge and previous NRC inspections that made reference to
the-security badge itself.
NRC Evaluation
The licensee is correct in stating that the documents in question are -not
explicitly labeled " Safety-related equipment vital for purposes of physical
protection." However, the text of the training document in question, " Security
Orientation Training Program Text," discusses the fact that certain security
access controls are applied to vital areas, which the text defines as " areas
containing vital equipment which is essential to safe plant operation or
shutdown of facilities." The listing of areas and equipment " essential to safe
plant operation or shutdown," in conjunction with the general content and
purpose of the Security Orientation Training booklet explicitly link the
identified vital areas and the fact that they play a specific role in the
licensee's program to protect the plant against acts of radiological sabotage.
The licensee
- incorrect in stating that the list is simply a list of broauly
identified
. within the plant. The listing of areas and equipment on pages
10-11 of-t
cecurity orientation training document, for example, is quite
specific in its identification of rooms and vital equipment.
The NRC notes that the pages of the licensee's Physical Security Plan, to which
the licensee refers are stamped " Safeguards Information," as is the page which
contains Table 5.1-2, a listing of vital areas at the Farley Nuclear Plant.
Therefore, this information was defined by the licensee as safeguards
information when it was submitted to the NRC.
The NRC accepted this
information as safeguards information, properly marked as meeting the
requirements of 10 CFR 73.21.
This previously NRC reviewed and approved
Physical Security Plan reflects 10 CFR 73 and the regulatory requirements
against which the licensee's implemented program was judged.
The licensee's discussion. of NRC knowledge of the information reflected on the
security badge is not immediately relevant to the issue at hand. The Notice of
Violation addresses the Security Orientation Training booklet and " badging
materials," not the security badge itself.
As indicated in the associated
inspection report, badging materials referred to the licensee's badging request
form.
The possibly unique status of the security badge (issued to and
controlled by screened individuals or stored in areas controlled and
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continuously staffed by security personnel) had been the subject of discussion
between the NRC inspectors, NRC Region 11 management personnel, and licensee
representatives, but was not included in the Notice of Violation to which the
. licensee objects.
The NRR memo to which the licensee refers is one part of an NRC staff action
concerning a possible future revision to the Commission's regulatory position
on the type of information that must be protected as safeguards information.
The exact nature and scope of any -change that might result from the staff's
deliberations remains to be determined.
Licensees are, of course, expected to
comply with the existing regulatory position until any changes that might be'
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under preliminary consideration are formally adopted and published by the
Commission.
NRC Conclusion
For the above reasons, the NRC staff concludes that the violation did occur as
stated.
Corrective Action:
The licensee's corrective actions appear to be acceptab_le.
Summary of Licensee Response With Regard to This Being a Backfit
The licensee indicates that its training and badging materials have been
previously reviewed by the NRC and that several NRC inspectors had been trained
using the subject training document and had not questioned its safeguards
significance.
The licensee believes that the NRC had provided at least tacit
approval of the training _ and badging material specifically because:
(1)
Previous ~ NRC inspections in 1981 and 1984 had discussed the form and
information content of the plant security badge, and (2) because NRC inspectors
had previously seen the training document, as part of their in-processing, and
had not questioned its safeguards significance.
As a result of this belief,
the licensee contends that the violation represents a new interpretation of the
regulation and therefore requires a backfitting analysis in accordance with
10 CFR 50.109 demonstrating that the direct and indirect costs of
implementation are justified.
NRC Evaluation
The -prior NRC inspection reports to_ which the licensee refers discuss, as shown
by the ' licensee's letter, the security badge and its associated key card.
The
licensee does not claim that prior inspection reports addressed the content of
the- security orientation training booklet or the security badge request form
(the " badging materials" referred to in the inspection report and associated-
Notice of Violation under discussion).
We also note that the 1981 inspection
referred :to by the licensee was performed approximately one month prior to the
effective date of the NRC's regulations establishing requirements for the
identification, marking, 'and protection of safeguards information.
The 1981
inspection report is, therefore,' irrelevant to this matter.
The-NRC has previously considered the question of " tacit approval," through
inspector knowledge of, or exposure to, some licensee activity or procedure.
Tacit' approval is specifically addressed in - NUREG-1409, "Backfit Guidance,"
prepared by the NRC's Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
(AE0D).
In Section 3.1(1) of that document, the NRC states:
" Cases where an
inspector provides tacit approval are relatively rare.
Simply not challenging
a licensee's practice normally would not be considered tacit approval." This
is the situation here.
The fact that an NRC inspector had not previously
challenged the licensee on this issue is not considered tacit approval.
The
NRC inspection program is not a 100 percent audit but is instead a sampling
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program.
It cannot be assumed that during previous exposure to the training
material as a part of satisfying the licensee's requirements for badging, the
inspectors would have recognized or focused at all on the lack of adequate
protection of the safeguards information contained therein.
Previous
inspectors had not recognized the violation.
When this issue was discussed
with security inspectors, all of them agreed it was a violation.
NUREG 0794, Protection of Unclassified Safeguards Information, dated October
1981 states:
"In addition to physical protection measures, the rule requires protection
of documents or drawings that identify certain safety related equipment as
being vital for the purpose of physical security.
Normal engineering or
construction drawings that show the locations of safety-related equipment
are not Safeguards Information,
in order to be Safeguards Information,
the drawing must explicitly state that the equipment or area is vital from
the standpoint of physical protection."
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In other words, not - all safety related equipment is protected as vital
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equipment.~
Lists that delineate which equipment is protected as vital
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equipment are considered Safeguards Information.
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In its Security On entation Training Program Text, G-017 and G-402, dated May,
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1989, the licensee not only lists general areas or locations that are
. considered vital areas; they list specific equipment or unique areas.
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NRC Conclusion
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The action does not constitute a new staff position which interprets the
regulation differently than a previously applicable position and is not,
therefore, a backfit.
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