ML20024D417
| ML20024D417 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/27/1983 |
| From: | Palladino N NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Markey E HOUSE OF REP., INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024D418 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8308050005 | |
| Download: ML20024D417 (3) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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June 27, 1983 CHAIRMAN The Honorable Edward J. Markey, Chairman Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Comittee on Interior and Insular Affairs United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C.
20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
3 Your letter of June 7,1983 identified a number of concerns in the area of protection of nuclear power plants against " insider" sabotage. The Comission also considers this an important matter, and has pursued a variety of efforts to assure continuing protection of the public health and safety from the threat of nuclear power plant sabotage.
As you.know, last year at the direction of the Comission the staff was re-quested to study the relationship between safety and security measures. The Report of the Comittee to Review Safeguards at Power Reactors (the " Safety /
Safeguards Report") was not complete at the time of our February 7 response to you concerning sabotage incidents. The report makes a number of recommen
dations that are relevant to your concerns about the insider.
The Safety / Safeguards Report reaffirmed our belief in the need for a careful i
balance between security and safety concerns; these two disciplines share a comon goal (protection of the public health and safety).
The report found the degree of internal compartmentalization for security purposes (vital areas) could adversely affect operational safety, especially during abnormal or emer-gency situations.
Internal compartmentalization is one of the measures em-ployed to protect against the insider threat.
The staff is taking action to implement the recommendations of the Safety /
Safeguards Report. First, a notice has been sent to all power plant licensees (Enclosure 1) advising them of potential problems identified by the Comittee, and measures to minimize the impact of security and administrative procedures on plant' safety. The notice addresses such issues as " fail-open" and " fail-closed" doors, fai' lures and mistakes involving automated access systems, and l
the benefits of establishing management reviews.
In addition, the proposed
" Insider Rules" have been drafted to treat such issues and provide the appro-priate regulatory authority to ensure action on the part of the licensees.
The new rules, if approved, would place increased emphasis on assuring the trustworthiness of plant personnel in lieu of using increased internal compart-mentalization.
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CORRESPONDENCE PDR
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The design basis threat, which includes external adversaries as well as the insider, was established by the Comission after careful study.
The staff continues to perform assessments of safeguards events which might have a bearing on the design basis threat. These assessments involve an examina-i tion of foreign and domestic nuclear related incidents and intelligence information. The Safeguards Summary Event List, which we provided in our February 7 response, is a compilation of such ir.cidents._ Staff reviews also take advantage of feedback from inspection personnel in our five Regions.
To date, the Comission has received no new information that would lead us to believe that the design basis threat is inappropriate, as a reference for designing safeguards systems.
Notwithstanding the inherent resistance of nuclear pcwer plants to sabotage, the Comission agrees with the Advisory Comittee on Reactor Safeguards' suggestion that further study be given to the subject of design changes to increase sabotage resistance of existing plants. The staff is currently studying this issue, giving due consideration to the cost-effectiveness and possible safety impact of any proposed plant modifications.
j You suggested that sabotage be classified as an Unresolved Safety Issue (USI).
The Comission currently has,an approved design basis threat and regulations designed to protect against that threat. Accordingly, the Comission does not consider that sabotage is an unresolved safety issue. The staff, however, is pursing continuing programs to refine nuclear power plant safeguards re-quirements in the interest of the public health and safety. These programs t-include:
1.
The adoption of an action plan based on the recommendations of the Safety / Safeguards Report, includinc the publication of the Insider Rules at an early date.
2.
A program of Security System Assessments, at selected facilities, in which NRC personnel will perform on-site surveys to assure that implemented safeguards measures actually provide the level of pro-tection intended by the Comission, and are compatible with over-all plant safety.
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3.
A continuing examination of ways to increase sabotage resistance through design changes.
t With regard to yodr question concerning categorization of safeguards events, we recognize the need to clarify definitions used for such purposes. To that l
end, the staff is developing new incident reporting requirements and procedures l
for the categorization of safeguards incidents. These new standards will take into account the recent amendments to Section 236 of the Atomic Energy Act dealing with the definition of sabotage, and will factor investigation results into final classification of events.
In the incident at the Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Station, the Comission relied on the Department of Justice to characterize the unlawful acts that occurred.
In its letter to the Pennsylvania House of Representatives j
(Enclosure 2), Justice described the Beaver Valley incident as was reported I
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. in our February 7 letter.
Notwithstanding the Department of Justice position, the Comission's concern in this matter is reflected in its decision to de-clare the Beaver Valley incident an " abnormal occurrence", and report it to the Congress, as you noted in your letter.
For your further information, we are also providing a copy of an NRC Office of Inspector and Auditor report containing the results of a recent audit of o
the reactor safeguards program. The report includes the staff response de-scribing actions to be pursued (Enclosure 3).
4 In summary, the Commission believes that current and planned safeguards activities reflect a comitment to assure continued protection of the public health and safety from the risks of nuclear power plant sabotage.-
Sincerely, gC N
i Nunzio J. Falladino
Enclosures:
1.
IE Information Notice No. 83-36: Impacts of Security Practices on Safe Operations 2.
Ltr to Frederick R.
Taylor, Esq. frm U.S.
Dept. of Justice dtd
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11/5/81 3.
Report to the Commission-Review of NRC's Reactor @
Safeguards Program cc: Rep. Ron Marlenee I
SSINS No.:
6835 IN.83-36 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 June 9, 1983 IE INFORMATION HOTICE NO. 83-36:
IMPACT OF SECURITY PRACTICES ON SAFE OPERATIONS
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9 Addressees:
l All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or construction pemit (CP).
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Purpose:
' This infomation notice is, provided to inform licensees of some of the results of an NRC Comittee's recent study.of the impact of safeguards requirements on safety at powerrgactor facilities.
It is expected that licensees will review this information.for applicability to their facilities.. No specific action or response is required at this time.
Description of Circumstances:
- In February 1983, an NRC staff comittee completed an ev'aluation of the impach.
of NRC security requirements on operational safety at power reactor facilities.
While the committee did not find that operational safety had been significantly affected at the five facilities which were visite'd, they did find that the potential for. an adverse safety impact does exist, to varying degrees, at licensed facilities.
Problems are mo'st likely to occur during abnormal or emergency conditions if plant'. operators are unable to quickly pass through locked doors because of (1) ' failure of the computerized security access system or its components, (2) operat6r n'.: stakes in using automated access systems, or l
(3) local procedu'res which require doors (other than security doors) to be locked for other purposes.
The NRC committee report (which will be available later this year as a NUREG l
report) is being used by the staff in developing proposed revisions to 10 CFR 73.55.
The information contained in the following paragraphs does not require a change in NRC requirements and should be of use to licensees now in evaluating security and safety. interactions at their facilities.
9 ENCLOSURE,'1 w
IN 83-36 June 9, 1983
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Page 2 of 3 Measures to Minimize the Impact of Security and Other Acministrative '
Procedures on Plant Safety 1.
Assurance of prompt operator access to operating spaces and equipment is vital to safe operations.
Such access can be achieved by providing backup keys or other means of opening security doors which lock in the closed position in the event of loss of electrical power _or access control computer. failure.
Interior vital area doors are not required to fail in the locked position.
These doors may fail in the open position if. pro-cedures are established to provide' prompt compensatory measures for the open door, e.g., deploying guards to strategic locations.
Procedures governing the use of locks for other administiative or personnel safety considerations, including Radiation Areas, should also be structured to ensure prompt operator access, if ~necessary, for plant safety.
2.
Theuseofindividual,manuallyenteredcodesand" anti-passback" feat'ures in vital, area access control systems may adversely affect safety and 4
are not specifically required by NRC.
The use of such features can lead to denial of operator access if mistakes are made or if the system mal-functions.
Such additional measures,~which are beyond those of a basic access control system, are not required and their use is not recommended.
- Although some licen~ sees were previously encoura'ged through guidance and interaction with their license reviewers to use the anti-passback and 1
manually entered codes, experience now indicates that a better safety /
safeguards balance may be achieved without these features.
Licensees who believe that plant safety could be enhanced through the removal of
'.thes.e features may wish to contact their license reviewers to make appropriate arrangements for modifications.
1 3.
Security Plans, Safeguards Contingency Plans, Energency Response Plans,-
l and Emergency Operating Procedures which are individually develo;ied, l
reviewed, and audited for implementation can result in inconsistencies which could affect safe operations.'
An integrated management review of these documents can be helpful in identifying conflicts and inconsistencies in plans and procedures which might adversely affect safety.
4.
Management can use established programs such as Safety Committee reviews,
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QA audits, and plant-wide deficiency reporting systems, to ensure that
, security practices do not inhibit safe operations.
Although committee review of'all security procedure and system changes is not required, the onsite committee could be briefed on planned security procedure or system changes and their effect on operations.
The annual audit of the security program would be enhanced through assignment of an auditor with operations experience to the team.
A deficiency reporting system'whi.ch is availab.le to all members of the plant staff, could provide a means for identifying practices and conditions with safety significance which exist outside of,
written plans and. procedures.
With management encouragement and followup, all members of the plant and corporate staff can contribute to the identification and correction of security, radiation protection, or other measures which might adversely affegt operational safety.
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IN 83-36 June 9,1983 5.
personnel can be minimized throughInte Page 3 of 3 s between security and both staffs on practices to adversely affect safe oorga The' committee found that the pot ential for securitypractic organization has an appreciation and perations is reduced when each members of the shift are expected t respect for the jobs that other
. If you need additional information about thi o perfonn.
Regional Administrator of the app
.of. Safeguards, Office. of Huclear Materials Safet ropriate NRC Regional Office or th y and Safeguards.
e Division Edwar f
.Divisi Jordan Dire,ctor of Emerg,ency Preparedness and ngineering Response Te*chnical
Contact:
Office of Inspection and Enforcem ent George W. McCorkle, NM55 (301) 427,4018
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued IE Infonnati on Notices l
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Attachment l
IN 83-36 l,
June 9, 1983 l#
t LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES Information Date of Notice No.
Subject Issue Issued to l
83-35 Impact of Security Practices 06/09/83 All power reactor on Safe Operations facilities holding an OL or. CP -
~83-34 Event Notification Informa-05/26/83 All power reactor tion Worksheet facilities holding an OL or CP 83-33 Nonrepresentative Sampling 05/26/83 All power reactor of Contaminated Oil facilities holding an OL or CP
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83-32 Rupture of' Americium-241 05/26/83 All licensees holding Source (s)Containedina a specific license Well Logging Device to possess and use.
sealed sources con-taining byproduct or
'SNM 83-31 Error in Adipipe Computer 05/19/83 All power reactor Program facilities holding
an OL or CP; NMSS and A/Es 83-30 Misapplication of Generic 05/11/83 All power reactor Emergency Operating Proce-facilities holding dures (EOP) Guidelines an OL or CP 83-29 Fuel Binding Caused by Fuel 05/06/83 All power reactor Rack Deformation facilities holding an OL or CP 83-28 Criteria for Protective 05/04/83 All power reactor Action Recommendations for facilities holding General, Emergencies an OL or CP 83-27 Operational Response to 05/4/83 All power reactor Events Concerning Deliberate facilities holding Acts Directed Against Plant an OL or CP Equipment 83-26 Failure of Safety / Relief 5/3/83 All power reactor Valve Di,scharge Line Vacuum facilities holding Breakers an OL or CP OL = Operating License CP = Construction Permit w.
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United States Attorney Western District of Pennsylvania y(
633 United 3reses Post Off;te 4 Courthouse 412l644 3300 htssbu gh, ?cnnsyl><nis !3219 mp22 3300 r
November 5, 1981 Frederick R. Taylor, Esquire Counsel'.- Mines and Energy Management Committee House of Representatives Commonwealth of Pennsylvania P.O. Box 217 Hein Capitol Building Harrisburg, Pen sylvania 17120 r
RE:
Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Station
Dear Mr. Taylor:
In accordance with your telephone conversation of yesterday with Assistant United States Attorney David M.
Curry, I am responding to your letter of October 22, 1981 e.
addressed to Mr. Walter Weiner, Special Agent in Charge, l
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in which you requested the presence of a representative of the FBI for a meeting of the Committee on Mines and Energy Management on November 12, 1981 at 1:00 p.m.
As Mr. Curry indicated during your conversation, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has conducted an investi-l gation into an incident which occurred at the Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Station at Shippingport, Pennsylvania on or about June 5, 1981.
In addition to the FBI investigation, Mr. Curry and another Assistant United States Attorney l
personally visited the Power Station, inspected the site of the incident,,and discussed the circumstances of the incident with -representatives of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
As a result of the federal investigation we are satisfied that the person responsible for the incident has been identified.
However, in our opinion. there is insuf-ficient evidence of a substantive nature to warrant a criminal For this reason we prosecution for violation of federal law.
have declined prosecution and have closed our file.
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ENCLOSURE 2 l
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e Mr. Taylor Page Two November 5, 1981 l
The federal investigation has developed information which supports our belief that the person involved in the incident is no longer in a position to interfere with the safe operation of the nuclear facility.
We a.re further satisfied that the circumstances of the incident establish that'.the intent of the perpetrator was to harrass and/or embarrass the plant operator.rather than to sabotage the fac.ility.
We note that parallel investigations of the incident have been conducted by both the NRC and Duquesne Eight Company.
The technical significance of the incident in so f ar as the operation of the facility is concerned is undoubt-edly addressed in some detail in either or both of those reports.
We, of course, are in no position to comment on such matters.
Our function was to examine the evidence for the purpose of determining whether there was sufficient basis for a successful criminal prosecution.
As previously stated, we do not believe that to be the case.
From your conversation with Mr. Curry on November 4, I understand that the Committee has continued its meeting until after a report of the NRC investigation has been received and reviewed at which time you will communicate further if additional information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation is deemed necessary.
For your reference I am enclosing a copy of Volume 45, No. 245 of the Federal Register for Thursday, December 18, 1980 which sets forth the regulations applicable to requests l
l for information from the Department of Justice.
Yours truly, I
J. ALAN JOHNSON
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United States Attorney cc:
Walter A. Weiner Special Agent in Charge Federal Bureau of Investigation 13th Floor William S. Moorhead Federal Building 1000 Liberty Avenue Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222 Tevid M. Simonson 319 Federal Triangic Building 115 Ninth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.. 20530
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