ML20024D274
| ML20024D274 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/11/1983 |
| From: | Jackson K NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | Higginbotham L NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| References | |
| REF-WM-3 NUDOCS 8308030456 | |
| Download: ML20024D274 (6) | |
Text
YW Recorj 'rh
. - Q ld Pf 6 Cl 3
W. ]0hD)x::e! No._
l PDR. _ V DISTRIBUTION LPDR NMSS r/f Di Ma-JUL 11 1983
[ffh KJackson (li nitriio WM 62fS5)~
e u
PHLohaus
~ ~ fiEMORANDUMTOR: Leo B. Higginbotham, Chief DMartin Low-Level Waste Licensing Branch Eidawkins REBrogning N
FROM:
Ken Jackson, Senior Project Manager Low-Level Waste Licensing Branch
SUBJECT:
TRIP REPORT - VISIT TO ARKANSAS F0WER AND LIGHT COMPANY (AP&L) AN0 SITE, JUNE 28, 19.83 I was accompanied on the subject visit by Drs. R. Barletta and B. Bowerman of Brookhaven National Laboratory.
The purpose of the visit was to meet with officials at Arkansas Power and Light regarding the exothermic reaction -
in a high integrity container loaded with dewatered resin.
We were met by Mr. David Snellings, corporate health physicist for AP&L, at 8:00 a.m.
June 28 and driven to the plant site.
Upon arrival, we were given a radio-logical safety briefing in the training center by a member of the staff.
The briefing lasted about 30 minutes.
We were then processed through the whole-body counter and security before entering the plant around 10:00 a.m.
We met with the following AP&L officials:
Matt Bolanis, superintendent of health physics, AND Tom Baker, head of technical analysis section, AN0 Chuck Fellhauer, radwaste supervisor, ANO Dave Snellings, corporate health physicist, AP&L The discussion ranged from what was known about the pre-existing conditions to the exothermic incident to AN0's immediate response and planned response.
Tom Baker stated that ANO wanted some credible answers to questions concerning the cause (causes) of the exothermic reaction in order to satisfy their own safety concerns as well as any by South Carolina or NRC.
No conclusions could be drawn from the analytical data compiled in the first phase of the Battelle investigation. Although ANO officials believe the incident would not recur, they are determined not to do anything with the five liners currently stored onsite until final results of the Battelle study are in, hopefully by September.
Some details from our discusssions follow:
Tom Baker - There are two resin holding tanks, one each for Units 1 and 2.
Spent resins are sluiced to the respective holding tank.
The primary polishing demineralizer resins are not sent to'the holding tank, but are sluiced directly to a cask for solidification.
The resins used are mixed anion and cation gel-type resin, usually Diamond Shamrock #5.
The primary system resins are Rohm & Haas IRN 150 LC 50/50 anion / cation resin mix.
Chuck Fellhauer - The auxiliary bulding waste drains to a sump from which it is automatically pumped to a larger holding tank with a takeoff pipe approximately 8" from the tank bottom.
When the tank is pumped out, any oil will be in the 8" heel.
This heel is then pumped out, dewatered, and the oil 8309030456 030711 PDR WASTE HM-3 pop
i 2
is solidified in envirostone (U.S. Gypsum product).
As to what may have gotten onto the resins via the auxiliary building, Fellhauer was quite candid in stating that there was no record of an unusual spill that may have reached the auxiliary building sump, but this was no guarantee that it had not happened.
Since the incident, plant health physicists have been alerted to keep a closer eye out for potential unreported spills.
As to potential oxidizing agents, Baker related that a small amount of sodium nitrite had been used as a passivating agent following a citric acid decontamination operation.
Battelle did find unusually high concentrations of iron and copper in the affected resin (these could serve as a catalyst for the exothermic reaction).
There is groundwater inleakage to Unit 2 and this may account for the high iron content (residents using wells in the area have to apply treatment because of high iron content of groundwater). However, in spite of the speculation as to what jma have caused the exothermic reaction, so far there is not enough analytical data to support any of the scenarios.
Barletta requested a sample of the groundwater for analysis; ANO will send.
Regarding the resin in the liner where the reaction occurred, Tom Baker stated that some of the resin may date back to 1978 during pre-startup operations.
This is probably the material that had crusted to the sides and bottom of the i
holding tank.
Other than the need to break up the clumps before resin l
transfer, the only unusual circumstance was the number of cycles required to dewater the resin.
Usually, three cycles are required, consisting of one 8-hour dewatering period (pumping), then 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> of settling time.
On this occasion, six cycles were required to meet the Chem-Nuclear criteria of a maximum 2000 ml water extraction.
Barletta felt that BNL may benefit from information concerning the plant's experience with dewatering.
Fellhauer said these records are kept by Chem-Nuclear and was advised to contact their regulatory affairs people. We will make the contact.
i I have attached the ANO chronology of action taken during the exothermic incident.
Fellhauer stated that the steam (smoke) given off by the resin l
didn't smell like ammonia as expected, but had a " sewer-type" smell.
I i
ventured that this could have been sulfur decomposition compounds from the
(
resin, since these compounds are known for their stench.
Baker discussed followup work with Battelle.
As a second phase to their l
investigation, they plan to experiment with dewatering of resins in an inert and an oxygenated atmosphere.
This experiment grows out of the long dewatering cycle which required unusual volumes of air passing through the resin bed, giving rise to a possibility that oxygen may have oxidized some constituents on the resin beads giving rise to the exothermic reaction.
The l
third phase, hopefully, will identify the exact cause.
l l
Baker confirmed with Barletta that BNL had received the sample of resin from l
Battelle.
ANO officials indicated that they would obtain any other samples that BNL may feel they need for their investigations.
l
~
3 Barletta made available to ANO officials a copy of Brookhaven's program plan for accomplishing the task authorized by NRC.
He pointed out that it was not the style of BNL to rely on results by others; they tend to take an independent approach.
However, he indicated that the PNL report, though inconclusive, would be helpful if only to identify unsuccessful attempts to find the cause of the exothermic reaction.
Dave Snelling said that he was now convinced that the independence of BNL investigations would not be compromised by the infor-mation contained in the PNL report.
He plans to seek management permission to release the report to BNL.
Currently, the report is only with AP&L (I returned our copy).
Following the discussions and a brief lunch at the plant, we were given a tour of the waste receiving and storage area by Fellhauer. We saw the five high-integrity containers of resin, which were covered with a heavy plastic tarp.
The containers were open and the resins were covered by water.
Following the tour, we checked out of the plant at 4:00 p.m. local time.
n i nt - ~+ n;a ry Ken Jackson, Senior Project Manager Low-Level Waste Licensing Branch f
/
s CWPB WMLL LL i
5520 KJac dos' fhPLohaus 7/8/83 7/f/83 7////83
\\
i RECORD OF EVENTS JANUARY 15, 1983 1
0030 -
Secured dewatering pump after 6th cycle of dewatering.
There was approximately 16 ounces of water collected in the barrel.
No. abnormal indications were noted.
0800 -
Smoke / steam observed drifting out from under herculite tarp that was placed over cask and liner to provide protection from inclement weather. Vapor was very odorous and sharp (heavy chemical smell).
0805 -
Notified Fire and Safety, Health Physics, Radiochemistry, Engineering and Technical Support, and Chem-Nuclear at Barnwell, S.C.
0820 -
Drewaportableag/ccsample under edge of tarp. Results g
indicated (1x10 0835 -
Sampled for toxic gases - results were negative.
0845 -
Performed pH analysis on water collected during dewatering using litmus paper. Results were 3.5 to 4.0.
Sent sample to Hot Lab for analysis on pH meter.
0900 -
Chem-Nuclear recommended adding 50 gallons of 1/2 molar Sodium Hydroxide to.the resin liner, then filling the liner with D.I. water.
0930 -
Chemist mixing Sodium Hydroxide.
0941 -
Drew a core sample of resin with a grain sampler, which' caused the smoke / steam to increase.
Chemist reported that the resin in the top of the liner had formed a crust.
0955 -
Measured temperature of resin in hole left.from core sample. Temperature was 365*F (185*C). Measured' tem-perature of the liner material. Temperature was 86*F (30*C).
j 1000 -
Drew grj/ce,15% MPC. ample at opening of liner.
Results indicated-2 x 10 l
l 1007 -
I Filled second liner in train bay with DI water.as a pre-caution. This liner had resin in it from the same source
.and had completed.its second day of dewatering.
(Desig-nated as. Cask B).
1032 -
Radiochemistry reported earlier pH sample had read 5.6 by pH meter.
-1
WP83069 JANUARY 15, 1983 (Cont.)
1035 -
Added 75 gallons of DI water to resin liner with original problem (designated as Cask A).
1037 -
Set up continuous air monitor in general area of Cask A.
1045 -
Drew g general ared air sample, results were (1x10
'/
cc.
1046 -
Filled liner to hose connection plate in liner with DI water.
Placed liner on recirc thru sandpiper pump. Total water added'was approxi mately 150 gals, at 50 F.
Measured temperature of recirc water. Read 80 F.
1135 -
Established surveillance on Cask B, monitoring temperature of water in liner.
1300 -
Moved Cask B from Train Bay to RWB, next to Cask A.
1430 -
Began hourly monitoring of temperature and pH to centinue until temperature stabilizes.
1900 -
Temperatures stabilized, sampling pH and monitoring temperature every 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
JANUARY 17, 1983 1600 -
Received word from Dow Chemical that we may have the potential for a bomb if the resin has been exposed to nitrates and we then attempt to dewater the resin. Hot Lab says that it is likely that resin was exposed to nitrates. Requested a nitrate analysis of water in liner.
JANUARY 18, 1983 1300 -
Installed theraccouples at bottom, middle and top of resin in Cask A, connected to chart recorder.
1315 -
Recirculated water in liner until temperature equalized. Middle thermocouple reads.10 F higher than top and bottom due to inaccuracy of system.
1700 -
Performed oxidation. reaction analysis on water from both liners. Results indicate that oxidizing-agents are present.in Cask A and reducing agents are present in Cask B.
2 T
r l
- . of WP83069 1
JANUARY 19, 1983 0700 -
Results of nitrate analysis indicated Cask A at 0.575 ppm and Cask B at 0.045 ppm. Notified Chem-Nuclear, they are notifying Dow.
0800 -
Chem-Nuclear called, Dow says we could have a problem if we dewatered the resin, but they don't have a solutTon.
3
.