ML20024D256
| ML20024D256 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/25/1983 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8308030438 | |
| Download: ML20024D256 (85) | |
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8 .h* e .e ~ u a u r i t T i, .i .J y TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1 Court Reporters 1625 I Street, N.W. Suite 1004 8308030430 830725 m c m, a c. m PDR 10CFR (202) 293-3950 PT9.7 ppg
l 1 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA () 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 4 BRIEFING ON PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE SECTOR l 5 SURVEY ON COST CONTROL 6 7 PUBLIC MEETING 8 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 9 Room 1130 1717 H Street, N. W. 10 Washington, D. C. 11 Monday, July 25, 1983 '12 13 The Commission convened, pursuant to notice, 14 at 2:00 p.m. 15 l 16 COMMISSIONERS PRESENT: 17 NUNZIO PALLADINO, Chairman of the Commission THOMAS ROBERTS, Commissioner p3 JAMES ASSELSTINE, Commissioner 19 20 STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED-AT COMMISSION TABLE: 21 S. CHILK H. PLAINE 22 W. PETTISS B. RUSCHE g3 M. ROWDEN 24 25 l. '"'; TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STitHT, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 I (202) 293 3950 l l \\ t l
2 1 DISCLAIMER '() 2 This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting 3 of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on 4 July 25, 1983 in the Commission's offices at 1717 H 5
- Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C. The meeting was open to 6 public attendance and observation. This transcript has not i 7 been reviewed, corrected or edited and it may ccntain inaccuracies. 8 9 The transcript is intended solely for general { u) informational purposes. As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is 11 not part of the formal or informal record of decision of j j the matters discussed. Expressions of opinion in this 12 13 transcript do not necessarily reflect final determinations j or beliefs. No pleading or other paper may be filed with g r ,uk-15 the Commission in any proceeding as the result of or us addressed to any statement or argument contained herein, i i 17 except as the Commission may authorize. 1 18 19 20 1 21 l n n l 24 l 25 /3 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES V ie2s i suser. N.w. - sum iOO4 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
3 o PROCEEDINGS 1 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Good afternoon, ladies and 2 v 9'"D1***"* 3 The purpose of this meeting is to receive a 4 briefing on the NRC related portion of the President's 5 p a e sector suney on cost conhol. 6 Our speakers this afternoon are Mr. Walter R. 7 Pettiss, Mr. Ben C. Rusche and Mr. Marcus A. Rowden. I 8 will ask each individual to give his affiliation when it 9 is his turn to speak. 10 Mr. Pettiss served as Director of the DOE /NRC/FERC Agency Task Force and Mr. Rusche and Mr. Rowden were NRC project team members. 13 We are pleased to welcome Mr. Pettiss and his colleagues, Mr. Rusche and Mr. Rowden, neither of whom are 15 Shangers to or tame, aM k is good to see you bod 16 again. g We regret that Mr. Hanley, Co-Chairman of the g Energy Agency Task Force, was not able to join us today. We have, however, received a letter from him endorsing the 20 findings of the task force report. The Commission has had an opportunity to review the task force report and recommendations on NRC and we appreciate this afternoon's opportunity to explore some of these matters more fully with you. l O TAYLOE ASSOCIATES l ) 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITI 1004 WASNINGToN, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 l
4 1 Do any other Commissioners have opening 2 remarks? 3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: No. 4 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: No. 5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: If not, I will turn the 6 meeting over to Mr. Pettiss. 7 MR. PETTISS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 8 Good afternoon, gentlemen. 9 I am Walter Pettiss and I am here today as the 10 team Project Manager for the President's private sector 11 survey that dealt with the Department of Energy, the 12 Nuclear Regulatory Commission and FERC. 13 First of all, I want to thank you for the 14 opportur.ity to review our findings and recommendations -,+ I ('--' 15 with you. 16 As Chairman Palladino referred to Mr. Hanley's 17 ' letter of the 23rd, he is sorry that he can't be with us 18 this afternoon, but he has had an active part in the gg review process and does endorse the findings and 20 recommendations that we are making. 21 The energy team, as we call ourselves, was 22 cc-chaired by Mr. Jack Hanley from Monsanto and Mr. Roger z3 Milliken from Milliken and Company. The participants in 24 this team were drawn from industry, from the professions i 25 and from the academic community. A TAYLOE ASSOCATES 1625 i STitHT, N.W. - SulTE 1004 l j WASHINGTON, 0.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 l l
S 1 The approach of the team was to use () knowledgeable people to gather facts, review the facts as 2 3 gathered and to present their findings and conclusions to 4 the two co-chairmen and a core group of team leaders from 5 within the team. 6 Through this exchange process we were able to 7 come forward with a set of findings and a set of 8 recommedations that is truly the result of a team effort. 9 As Mr. Hanley said in his letter, many hours to were spent reviewing and refining the product of the 11 working groups. Basically with respect to the Nuclear 12 Regulatory Commission the team focused on regulatory 13 instability which stood out as a major burden of the [._ n current process,. and we also saw a need to strengthen the \\ V' 15 executive and administrative authority of the Chairman of 16 the Commission. 17 We hope that. this study will be useful to you 18 and we hope that our presentation today will serve as a i9 start in the implemention process of those things which 20 you find to be valuable in the study. 21 I w uld like to turn the next part of the 3 presentation over to Ben Rusche who I would be inadequate 3 to introduce to this group since you all know him better 24 than I do probably and let him give a general summary. y; Then he in turn will turn it over to Mark ^ TAYLOE ASSOCIATES .j 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 I .j WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 ( (202) 293 3950 i
6 1 Rowden who will follow with agency improvement h recommendation's and regulatory reform recommendations. 2 3 Ed. 4 MR. RUSCHE: Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, it 5 is a real pleasure for me to sit back at this table again 6 and to have the oppportunity to review with you some of 7 the work that we did under Mr. Pettiss' direction and 8 under the direction of Mr. Hanley and Mr. Milliken. 9 I was pleased to hear you say that members of 10 the Commission have had an opportunity to see both our 11 summary and the reports 12 themselves. In an effort of this magnitude I am sure that 13 it comes through fairly clearly that what we have done is 14 aimed at nany audiences. 15 When the task force leaders invited us to 4 16 participate in the study team, it was clear to us that we 17 needed to focus our attention on the Commission and its 18 activities, but the Commission does not function in a 19 vacuum obviously. 20 so many of our recommedations are aimed at 21 other than the Commission itself, for an example, to the ( n President and his staff, to Executive agencies, such as ( 3 FEMA and DOE and others that might be involved with 24 Commission-related activities, and of course to the 25 Congress where there are activities that we thought l l ^ TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ) 1625 I STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.r. 20006 (202 29 53950
4 7 1 deserved the attention and possible implementation of () 2 legislative corrections. 3 I hope, too, that the document as you have 4 seen gives adequate recognition to what we saw as 5 considerable progress that you as a Commission have made 6 in your tenure as you have looked at some of the same questions that we were trying to address. Even today, now 8 some six or eight months after the report was put 9 together, things have continued to happen. 10 So I hope that the report will not be viewed ti just as a complaint list. We tried to recognize the areas ,12 where we knew major progress had been made because we 13 believe that in fact it has been made, but we thought also 14 that there were things that we could identify which might ( ;,i 15 be valuable in your considerations and in the s, 16 considerations of the Congress. 1-So I didn't want to miss the opportunity to 18 say thank you for the good things that you have done and perhaps the things that we have identified will allow an 39 20 even better job to be done. 21 The briefing summary that we have provided to 3 you will be the essence of my comments even further summarized because we wanted to use the afternoon for as 3 much discussion as you thought worthwhile, j g i l 3 Rather than attempt to review the report in ( TAYLOE ASSOCIATES . h. -) 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004 (202) 293-3950 g w -,-==s-w v
8 1 its entirety, we will just direct attention to several () 2 areas that we consider important and Mr. Rowden will 3 review in a little bit more depth two or three areas that 4 we believe deserve further expansion as prelude to our 5 conversation. You will notice that the objectives of the 6 7 task force review were to improve the effectiveness-and 8 efficiency of the regulatory process. 9 Now those words are not unfamiliar words to to every person who has been a part of NRC because they were 11 the words that were stuck up on the wall the first time I 12 think many of us saw the Commission in its first 13 existence. They are objectives that you have and we had, g too. (_ 15 We wanted to look at the ways we could reduce i 16 the impact of the process on the private sector, that is 17 both the industry and the public, while assuring is protection of the-public health and safety. 19 In the President's study to reduce costs we 20 concluded that the cost of the operation of the 21 Commission, though an important parameter for review, was a not the area of primary attention because it was through n your actions that the primary impact of the Commission's 21 activity is expressed and is felt by the public and by the 25 industry. 1 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES i ^ ') 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D C. 20006 i (202) 29 5 3930
9 i Then of course we wanted to see if there was () anything we could do that would make a constructive 2 3 suggstion with the conduct of your own business from the 4 standpoint of expending federal dollars. 5 our primary conclusions were that major 6 reforms in the licensing and regulatory process were 7 needed to improve stability and predictability. We think these support the primary mission of the Commission a'nd 8 9 will contribute to efficiency as well. 10 In our attempts to see whether our views, it based on a good bit of our personal experience as well as 12 contacts with many people in the industry and others, were i 13 not just biased views or just views based on limited experience, we sought from the EEI an additional study to (, 34 Ns 15 look at costs attributed to regulatory actions. 16 We were pleased that the EEI did conduct such 17 a study. It is an element in the major report and I hope will be of value to all of us as we look at the 18 justification for some of these actions. gg 20 I would point out, though, that both the EEI 21 and we on the task force did not see this study as an 22 attempt to accumulate very precise data, but rather to get some flavor, if I may use the term, as to whether people g3 24 over the last 15 years, 12 or 15 years who have been a y; party to this process preceived the same kinds of things, J7 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 'j 162s i sTaaf, N.W. - $UM 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004 (202) 2953950 . ~
10 1 both economically and by dollars as well as conceptually. ( ) The conclusion we reached was that in general 2 3 yes, there was a feeling and impression that there was 4 room for improvement. 5 Let me turn briefly to the recommedations that 6 I wil1 paraphrase quickly. 7 In the reform of the regulatory process per se 8 we concluded that the actions that are before Congress now 9 certainly deserve support, both those that have been 10 Proposed by the Commission and by the Department of 11 Energy. 12 You will hear further from Mr. Rowden as we 13 look at these that our awareness of your actions at the y time the report was published was very limited inasmuch as 15 they had not been finalized. The actions of the Department 16 of Energy had been pretty well finalized. So the bulk of 17 our comments in the report goes to the DOE set of 18 Proposals. 39 We concluded that the complementary 20 administrative changes, some of which you had under 21 advisement at the time and some of which you have taken 3 and others which remain to be taken I think, were very 23 valuable and could add stability to the process. 24 We divided our recommedations into two sets in 25 attempting to looking at plants that were currently in TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
- j 162s STRHT, N.W. - SUM 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C.
20004 l (202) 293 3950 1 i i I
11 1 operation or under construction and those that might be ( ) 2 just applicable to future projects. \\ 3 The clear-cut impression that came from all of 4 our discussions and a good bit of our experience was that 5 backfitting was an important issue that needed to be l 6 addressed in the context of plants now in operation and 7 those that are at various stages of construction. 8 We have provided in the back-up sheet or in 9 the briefing sheet a list of detailed and specific points to that we thought were important. 11 As I looked at these again now six months 12 after we prepared the report, and in light of events that 13 have gone on since that time, I remain convinced that two g elements that we identified are especially important. 15 One is that the burden for demonstrating the 16 need for backfit should clearly rest on the part of the 17 proposing party, whether it is the Commission or the 18 utility or an interested ott:er party. It just seems fair in the circumstances that that be the case. g9 20 In addition, it seems to me that cost benefits 4 21 should somehow be considered in making backfit 3 determinations, that costs just cannot be neglected. There 3 are limid resources available. 24 So I hope these two points might be the 25 subject of further discussion. I q TAYLOE ASSOCIATES s. _) 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 i WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950
( i 12 t We looked at the safety goal policy and (/ ) 2 conicuded that it was valuable, but it needed to be viewed 3 in a very careful light and we were not prepared to make 4 some sweeping recommendation about its adoption and full 5 implementation without looking very carefully at the 6 circumstances. 7 Generic resolutions were important and you 8 have taken important steps in that area. 9 It occurred to us as we talked to folks and 10 looked at the record that there were possible improvements 11 in the hearing process, some of which are addressed in 12 both legislative packages that are before Congress. 13 If we look at recommendations that affect 14 future projects only, a number of the issues that we have 15 listed are issues which you have addressed in your 16 legislative proposals and which I think may be valuable 17 for further discussion, but I will not list them 18 specifically. They have to do with simplifying the process 19 and permitting confidence to be added as early in the 20 process as possible. 21 We then looked at the scope and functions of a the Commission and we concluded that there was a n possibility that the Commission was being diverted from 24 matters of primary importance, and we thought it important 3; for the Congress and for you to look at being sure that / m TAYLOE ASSOCIATES '~-) a2s i sum u.w. - sum i0u WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950
13 I the mission and scope was confined to nuclear safety and (I 2 domestic safeguards. 3 There just appeared to be so many things out I 4 on the street that the Commission can give its attention 5 to that --- COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: Get us out of the export 6 7 business, is that what you are saying? g MR. RUSCHE: Yes, sir. 9 We then turned our attention to management and l 10 accountability within the Commission itself and, as both 11 Mr. Hanley and Mr. Pettiss have mentioned, we concluded 12 that the mangement of this najor venture within the 13 Federal Government deserved better management y circumstances than you are able to function under under "k the present statute. 15 16 We thought the Chairman should be designated 17 by statute as the NRC's Chief Executive and Administrative 18 Officer and given adequate authority to discharge this responsibility, and we chose as our model that that the 39 20 Chairman of FERC now functions under. 21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Are you going to expand 22 further on what you mean by Chief Executive and Administrative Officer? 33 MR. RUSCHE: I would be glad to discuss that at 24 g; whatever length you care to, sir. 1 q TAYf.OE ASSOCIATES (3/ 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
S 14 l 1 An important element we saw that we think ,g ' (j) 2 merits attention is that impediments to staff 3 communications with and directions from the Chairman of I 4 the Commission should be removed at every stage possible, f 1 5 and I suspect if necessary today we could cite examples ) 6 even in the last few weeks in which we at least sitting as 7 members of the private sector from the outside wonder 8 whether the communications were as good as you would want. 9 We did notice that the Commission remains 10 physically fragmented and that folks are all around town. 11 Although this may have some desirable features, we 12 couldn't find very many and thought it would be much more 13 effective from a communications and management standpoint 14 for the Commission and the staff to be consolidated in one 15 location. 16 We looked at the regionalization plans that 17 you have and we commented in the report and we have noted 18 since the report was issued that you have continued down 19 this road. 20 Our view at the time was incomplete because we 21 did not have full plans. You had not made final directions 22 and, as I gather, there is still some room for evolution 23 in that process. We concluded that there were both pros 24 and cons of regionalization and that each step you take 25 needs to be considered very carefully and hopefully all a TAYLOE ASSOCIATES \\_/ 162s a sinur, n.w. - sum to04 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950
15 I the parties that are involved would have an opportunity to en[;g) 2 give you the benefit of their input before the steps were 3 taken. That may not have been the case when the first 4 steps were taken. 5 An important element that Mr. Rowden will 6 address in some detail has to do with the interface 7 between the Commission and facility licensees. We have 8 seen in our own activities in recent months, as well as 9 our long experience, that this interface needs to be 10 nourished and refined and perhaps even changed in 11 character, and that we believe that that would be a very 12 valuable step. 13 We looked at research mangement and the 14 incorporation of research results in regulations and we (; ~. 15 concluded that much of what is being done is valuable. 16 There were mixed views about its effectiveness in terms of 17 being incorporated into regulations and its impact on 18 regulatory decisions and I think that is a place where some attention would be worthwhile. 19 20 Finally we looked at interagency coordination, 21 and since that time we have even seen more evidences of 22 the need for correlation and cooperation between federal 23 agencies such as yourselves, FEMA and perhaps other 24 federal agencies. I believe the Congress has this matter 25 under attention at the moment. i ~'2 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 l
I 16 1 Even from our vantage point nearly a yea
- ago, e-%
C,) 2 we were convinced that that was an area that was going to 3 be troublesome and perhaps will continue to be troublesome 4 until it is resolved perhaps in the Congress. 5 I think with that brief summary of the report, 6 I wil-1 stop for now and Mr. Rowden direct our attention 7 into two or three areas with somewhat more depth, and then 8 we would be prepared to discuss any of these points in 9 greater detail. / 10 MR. ROWDEN: Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, thank 11 you very much for allowing some time on what I know is a 12 very busy schedule. 13 I will emphasize what Ben said about our 14 pleasure about being here, and my particular pleasure 15 being on this side of the table is something from which 16 you can draw your own conclusion. r 17 (Laughter.) 18 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: You prefer that side I 19 infer. 20 (Laughter.) 21 MR. ROWDEN: I would also underscore Ben's n observation that we are not here as public or private 23 scolds. We are here because we think on the basis of the 2 study that we have done, the insights of which we are 3 going to share with you, we believe there are some i TAYLOE ASSOCIATES i 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 l
s 17 1 constructive recommendations that can be made and acted }'m , ~,) 2 upon. Some of them are going to be familiar to you some r ) 3 of them are going to be tracking new ground and some of 1 4 them you are going to be uncomfortable with, but we think 5 they are at least worthy of your consideration. I 6 I think that I in particular, and Ben to a i I 7 lesser degree, had the discomforting feeling from time to 8 time as we worked on this project last summer that we were 9 in a sense critiquing our own handywork. i 1 lo (Laughter.) l 11 MR. ROWDEN: I know I am parti.cularly sensitive l 12 to that. This isn't the first time that I have encountered i 13 that phenomenon. On the other hand, I can say that while 14 distance doesn't necessarily lend enchantment, it does u l... 15 give you some sense of perspective. So we have tried to i 16 temper personal cupability with objectivity here and you i 17 be the judges as to how successful we have been. i i 18 Ben has asked me to talk about regulatory J reform, which is really the thrust of almost all that we 19 i 20 huve done here. i For purposes of making a brief summary 21 n presentation, I would break it down into three categories. 23 One, the licensing reform, legislative and 28 administrative, and that you are quite familiar with. 25 secondly, structural reform, which contains m TAYLGE ASSOCIATES j 1425 i STRfET, H.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004' (202) 293 3950
18 I several ideas that I think you are aware of and to us are ?!e x , }) 2 as important as the licensing reform, which has-received ] 3 greater attention. 4 Then, third,'something that Ben alluded to and 5 I would like to spend a little bit of time on because this 6 is new, and that is the interface between the regulator 7 7 and the regulated. 8 Now as far as licensing reform is concerned, I 9 don't want to spend too much time on this because, to i 10 begin with, as far as the legislative aspect is concerned, 11 this is a matter which is now in the hands of the i l 12 Congress. 13 As Ben indicated, we did our critique at a 4, 14 time when the contents of the DOS proposal were fairly _/ 15 clear and the NRC proposal was, how shall we put it, in 16 the fetal stage. 17 We now have two proposals to compare and I i 18 don't want to do it on an ex post facto basis. I would say 19 from a personal standpoint, and I think reflecting the ~ 20 views not only of Ben, Walt and myself, but of Messrs. 21 Milliken and Hanley who did work with us on a very active 22 basis throughout. They were not simply titular heads of 23 this task force, as I can tell you from many 7 o' clock in 24 the morning meetings. s We would give the Commission high marks in the - "'T TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 ~ WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004 (202) 293 3950
19 I area of its strong support for standardization and its !q 2 focusing on what we believe the proper function of the 3 hearing should be and on its stepping up to the question 4 of recognizing economics as a factor, cost as a factor 5 that should be taken appropriate account of in the 6 regulatory process. 7 In other respects, and these respects I would 8 have to say quite frankly are major respects, we would 9 state I think a fairly decided preference for the DOE 10 approach. 11 We believe that backfitting, which is the 12 paramount problem facing the regulatory process today, 13 needs to be addressed by the Congress as a major public (. 14 policy issue and that the Commission should receive 15 guidance and a framework within which to exercise its 16 authority from the Congress in this area. We have made a 1; number of recommendations as to what we think that 18 guidance should be and in the area of one-step licensing, 39 which we think is central to any viable approach to 20 standardization. In those areas we think the DOb bill is 21 preferable. a Administrative reform, there are a number of n 3 recommendations that we have made, almost all of which you 24 are familiar with and some of which you are engaged in 3 grappling with now. Backfitting of course is one of them n m TAYLOE ASSOCIATES I 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
~ 20 I and it has its administrative dimension and not only its ) legislative dimension. 2 3 An issue which'is of some currency, and I will i 4 come back to this in a moment when I talk about structural 5 reform, is the question of communication, and I am talking 6 about-communication within the agency, the ability of the 1 7 Commission to direct its own staff, on the one hand, and 8 also to be able to have accessible to it without 9 artificial and unnecessary procedural impediments the best h 10 technical advice that the agency can offer. We think i 11 after all this is the function of'the agency to reach 12 sound procedural decisions. 13 The thing that distrubed us in looking at the 14 process, and not only in its licensing phases where some
- (
- k' 15 proceduralization I think is understandable given the i
16 environment in which we live, but pervasive throughout the 17 process is an element which can only be characterized as 18 a bar to communication between the Commission and its 4 staff and between the Commission staff and the licensees. 19 ~ i 20 There is a compartmentalization here, a we and l 21 they attitude, adversarial attitude, depending upon the l 22 groups involved which is very discomforting and quite 23 unique to the American regulatory process, and I would 24 like to get back to that in a few moments when I talk I about the NRC-licensee interface. n l l S TAYLOE ASSOCIATES d l 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASNINGTON, D.C. 20004 (202) 293 3950
21 1 For the moment I don't think I will talk any () more about classical licensing reform. I would like to 2 3 talk a bit about the matter of structural reform. Ben 4 alluded to the two principal recommendations that we made, 5 neither one of which is new, but both of which have 6 continuing validity. 7 In a sense this is unfinished business from 8 the Kemeny and Rogovin Commission and inquiry reports 9 respectively, of what should the proper mission of the NRC to be. 11 Commissioner Roberts, when Ben put the issue 12 on the table, said do you mean export licensing is 13 inappropriate in effect as far as the NRC's mission is (, y concerned, and to that I think we would give a resounding 15 yes. 16 Now there are two ways to look at this.
- One, 17 what should the NRC be doing in terms of marshalling and ig applying its resources to carry out its primary function, 19 i.e., public health and safety, and there we feel very 20 strongly that those resources a'nd the Commission's 21 attention out to be devoted in a fairly singular way to y
nuclear safety and domestic safeguards. 33 The second is a more fundamental issue. This is something tnat goes beyond what the Commission believes 24 3 it should be doing, but what as a matter of public policy -A TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ',) 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
22 i is the best way to handle the types of issues that are [ ) 2 involved, at least the contentious issues that are r'eally 3 the only meaningful issues involved in the nuclear export 4 licensing process. 5 Where.should responsibility for that 6 decision-making lie, who should be held accountable for 7 those decisions, what agencies of government have the 8 resources best adapted to dealing with these decisions and 9 we come out fairly categorically in favor of transferring 10 that function from the Commission to an appropriate 11 Executive Branch agency. The State Department to us seemed 12 the most logical, but th,ey are not the only possible 13 repository for that. 14 That, as I say, is unfinished business from a [ 15 number of standpoints. 16 The other aspect, and the Chairman I noted had 17 some questions in this regard, relates to the management is of the agency and what is the most effective mode for gg giving out the Commission's programmatic responsibilities. 20 I felt for some time, even before the Kemeny 21 Commission report, that as a regulatory body this agency's n responsibilties were really as much programmatic as they n were quasi-judicial. I think that what we see going on now 28 only serves to reinforce that. This is quite apart from 3 the wisdom imparted to us by Kemeny and Rogovin. w TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ) 1625 i STRHT, N.W. - SulTE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
23 1 I see a phasing out, at least for an-interim I ) 2 period and perhaps for an indefinite interim period of the 3 Commission's licensing responsibilities and an entry into 4 an era, and maybe we are already there, where the 5 Commission's functions are going to be programmatic and 6 managerial. 7 One of the interesting aspects of working with 8 successful people, and these two gentlemen who entered our 9 task force were I think by any fair characterization in to the business community successful chief executive officers 11 of successful companies, was their view of the way the 12 agency was structured and the management tools that were 13 given to it, not only in terms of comparing it with the g4 sort of authority that a chief executive officer has in h the privata sector, and obviously they recognize there are 15 16 going to be distinctions in the public sector, but because t; we had the opportunity of looking at the NRC at the same 18 time we looked at the FERC. By'the way I would say the 39 FERC, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, is not 20 singular in this regard. 21 The singular agency is the Nuclear Regulatory 22 Commission. It has a structural' charter which is for any 3 major federal regulatory agency really unique in that the 21 Chairman has less managerial authority than the chairman a of any other regulatory agency that I am familiar with. n 3 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 l 1
24 1 -I think that this is distrubing. It is \\ ;.,, 2 disturbing because I believe without the authority to do 3 the job, one cannot expect an individual to have 4 responsibility for performing that job, let alone being 5 accountable for its performance. There are a number of us who believe, and as a 6 j 7 matter of fact, should you read the full report that we 8 Prepared, that the recommendations made by both Kemeny and 9 Rogovin that this Commission be headed not by a group of 10 five Commissioners as a collegial operation, but by a 11 single administrator, which is the way that I think every 12 other,significant and safety function is discharged within la the Federal Government, is still very sound today. 14 It was a disappointment that President Carter 15 didn't follow up on that recommendation, and I will say 16 quite frankly it was a disappointment. The original 17 proposals made by the Carter Administration were deluded 18 and the authority of the Chairman was cut back in some i9 significant respects. 20 I would.name two which I think are sufficient / 21 at least to put the issue on the table. n One, if there is to be a Commission form of n management, we think, and this is not simply a personal 24 view, that the Chairman ought at least to have the 25 authority to appoint the principal staff officials of the . -s TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 I STREET, N.W. - SulTE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950
25 1 Commission without the need for the concurrent, that is k the formal concurrence of the other members of the 2 3 Commission. 4 Secondly, the ability of the Commission as a 5 body to determine what is a policy matter as contrasted to 6 a managerial or administrative matter is something which 7 we believe dilutes the authority of the Chairman. 8 Now our objective is not simply to elevate the 9 Chairman to some sort of primacy which has no relationship to to any functional utility that would be served. As I 11 indicated before, you are really running a program here. 12, You are not a group of judges with wigs and robes deciding l cases and somebody really has to be responsibile for 13 34 management direction. 15 By virtue of the way organizations run, 16 particularly large organizations and diffuse g7 organizations, it has to channel up to one individual who 18 has responsibility and accountability that goes along with 19 it and the staff surrogate in this regard should be the 20 Executive Director for Operations. 1 21 we would strongly recommend, and this is not a 3 recommendation obviously addressed to the Commission, just 33 as the recommendation I made about divesting the 21 Commission of its export licensing functions is not one y; directed to the Commission, but we would strongly I ^ g TAYLOE ASSOCIATES i 1625 i STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 h 1
26 1 recommend that proposals which have this legitimacy and ,r ~(,), 2 this functional reality behind them not simply be 3 consigned to the dust bin of history because no positive 4 action was taken on them before. As a matter of fact, I l 5 think the reality of their need is even greater today than 6 it was in the past. 7 There are other recommendations that we made 8 that I think you are dealing with in the context of 9 administrative reform that also fit in with this. The one to that I think is paramount in our minds is that dealing 11 with the inhibitions on staff communication with the 12 Commission on matters which are the subject of a' licensing 13 process. 34 I know this is a contentious issue. There are 15 those who hold that these inhibitions are appropriate even 16 though they are not required by law. 17 We do not think that they serve a purpose m which is consistent with the primary function of the 39 Commission in terms of its discharging its health and 20 safety mandate and we think they stand in the way of the 21 Commission Chairman or Commission management of the staff functions. 33 l g3 In terms of health and safety functions, it 24 just seems anomalous to me that,in matters which demand 3 the Commission's direct attention and involve important l ^ TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 I STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004 l (202) 293 3950
i 27 1 health and safety decisions simply by virtue of the fact 1 () 2 that these are involved in the licensing process is 3 sufficient to cut the Commission off from the source of .g staff advice which is the most competent technical advice s it can obtain in this area. CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Is this what you mean by 6 inhibitions? I didn't pick up your thrust. 8 MR. ROWDEN: Well, the Commission's rules 9 preclude members of the staff who are involved as to witnesses or other supporting elements of the staff in a it licensing proceeding or a related licensing proceeding, 12 one which deals with a related matter from communicating 13 with the Commission on matters in issue and then g proceeding. Now there are exceptions to that rule and I I 15 know there are avenues for dancing around this inhibition 16 which I think are unfortunate because it shows the fallacy 17 of the inhibition rather than the adequacy and the 18 flexibility that the Commission has. 39 I think that this is an issue that ought to be - 20 confronted directly. If the Commission's purpose in being 21 is to protect public health and safety or be the overseer 3 of that more properly, and if the staff is the principal 3 repository of technical expertise in this matter, it seems incongruous to me that the Commission is in any way 21 3 inhibited from communicating with its staff by the sorts TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 l (202) 293 3950
28 1 of procedural inhibitions that are on the books now. I am I ') 2 sure this can be done in a way where the results of that J 3 communication are documented. I think that the process 4 need be no less open to public examination than it is now, 5 but this is an aspect of needless proceduralization 6 because it isn't required by law of the regulatory process 7 which disserves the Commission in discharging its 8 functions and disserves the public. 9 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: You say it is not required to by law? 11 MR. ROWDEN: It is not required by law in the 12 form of licensing that the Commission primarily engages in 13 now, so-called initial licensing. 14 In enforcement proceedings where there is an ( 15 adversary process dictated by the Administrative Procedure 16 Act as well as the Atomic Energy Act there are certain 17 inhibitions that the Commission must observe, but that is 18 not the typical situation we are talking about. 19 What we are talking about are the types'of 20 construction permit and operating licensing proceedings 3i that are underway today. 22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: You are saying that on z3 initial licensing there should be no barrier between the 24 people that are participating? 1 3 MR. ROWDEN: My view is that there should be no 1. TAYLOE ASSOCIATES .1 1625 i STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 k
29 1 barrier. There are others who would qualify that and deal (.Th) with this incrementally permitting the Commission to have 2 3 access to only certain components of the regulatory staff 4 rather than the regulatory staff as a whole. The only 5 judgment being made by the Commission is who is the most 6 knowledgeable person on this particular issue. My view is 7 that that is the way the process ought to be run. To a certain extent this does relate to the 8 9 party role of the staff in the licensing process, but I 10 think the issue has an independent status however the 11 Commission comes out on the issue of whether the staff 12 should or should not be an adversary party in construction 13 permit and operating licensing proceedings, and my views 14 on that are I think fairly well publicly documented. ( 15 This issue calls for independent examination 16 and action by the Commission and we would strongly urge 17 that the Commission take that action. 18 Now I talked about the public health and safety aspects of this. The other aspect deals with the gg m ability of the Commission to manage the staff. You bulid these barriers into the process and t'he capability for the 23 22 Commission to exercise any managerial direction over the 3 staff is going to be severely impeded. If you can't l communicate, you can't direct. 24 25 You see throughout, and I helped create these ^ TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ) ' sj 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950
30 I artificial distinctions in terms of staff organization, h) 2 but you see throughout the agency departmentalization of 3 the staff which is driven by this very consideration. You 4 have two legal staffs, whereas in point of fact in my view 5 at least there should be one legal staff. You have a 6 policy group advising the Executive Director for Operation 7 and a policy group advising the Commission. I don't think you can run an agency 8 9 effectively or most effectively on that basis. I think to that whatever the good intentions and informed insight on 11 the part of those of us who went into the creation of this 12 sort of a structure may have been at the time the 13 Commission is entitled to act on the basis of the sort of 14 informed judgment that can only come from experience, and ( 15 I think that experience should tell the Commission that it 16 is time to take a hard look at the structuring of 17 the agency in a way which will allow those who are 18 entrusted with its management, that is the gentlemen 19 sitting around the table, to in fact, not simply in law, 20 but in fact manage the operation. 21 We dealt with regionalization, diffidently a perhaps, but I think the message is clear. I would say 33 quite candidly that we were the first to raise the caution 24 signal in this area. It is not that we were against the 3 concept of appropriate diffusion of functional m) TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ~.' 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20004 (202) 293-3950
31 1 responsibility, emphasizing the word " appropriate." 2 our concern was that the Commission was, at l 3 least in terms of what we knew, and we knew very little 4 and that was part of the problem, that the Commission 5 seemed to be going too far and too fast and without the 6 sort of consultation that we thought was necessary with l those who not only would be most affected by it, that is 8 the licensees and the Commission, but those that had 9 something to contribute in terms of what the practical 10 problems might be. 11 There was also a concern on our part that 12 regionalization had to be approached with a dagree of ) 13 prudence if this sense of managerial effectiveness that I k,
- 4 have emphasized so strongly is to be maintained.
We have 15 some very unhappy examples of what regionalization has led 16 to in other agencies of the government, and although one 17 can say we are not going down that road at the NRC, the 18 fact is that the mined fields and the booby traps are there. 39 20 Secondly, we were concerned that the concept 21 of regionalization not undermine what we think is a very 22 desirable concept which the Commission has actively 3 propounded, and that is of standardization. I think 24 universality of approach is something that is going to be 25 much more difficult to apply when you have five regions '3 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ':j 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950
l 32 1 dealing with the same types of problems than with it being C.%) 2 handled by a central directorate, and there are the 3 other problems that you are familiar with of where do you 4 get the staff capability to deal with these matters in 5 that diffuse a fashion. I think that the Commission, not simply 6 because of what we have said in this regard, but because 8 it believed the process required greater visibility and 9 more input from the private sector, is on the right track 10 now in terms of the process that it set in motion for 11 making informed judgments as to where and how 12 regionalization should proceed. 13 The last area that I am going to talk to, with 34 the exception of something that Ben I think gave too light 15 attention to, and that is the data which we asked the 16 industry to help us compile in area of regulatory 17 stability, in other words hard data with regard to changed 18 requirements, and I think mayb Ben can say a bit more 19 about that when~I am through, that and the area of the 20 NRC/ licensee interface are really the two areas in which 21 we plowed new ground. 3 This matter of NRC/ industry interface is. 3 something that has troubled me for a good deal of time. It 24 goes back to an observation I made before about the 3 changing nature of the regulatory process and moving from ,7 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES / 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950
33 i 1 a licensing mode, and by the way, this is a problem, into i ( ) a more global regulatory oversight of facilities that are 2 3 in operation and where this is going to be a continuing 4 problem. 5 Again, the kernel of concern goes back to 6 observations that were made and recommendations that were 7 made by both the Kemeny and Rogovin studies. 8 We have developed in the United States a 9 remarkably paternalistic regulatory process. It is almost to singularly so when you look at the regulatory programs of 11 the other major industrialized countries in the world. 12 Each of these processes, including our own, 13 pays lip service to the proposition that the basic g responsibility for safety rests with the licensee / operator k 15 of the facility and that the most that the Commission can p5 do and must do is to exercise regulatory oversight. 17 That rests not simply on divesting oneself of p3 responsibility for what happens, but on the functional 39 reality that there is simply not enough resources to do 20 this sort of job as regulators and there is no way you can 21 substitute for technical proficiency and management 22 responsibility on the part of the people who are actually 23 running this agency. 3; Unfortunately, and I think that the Kemeny 25 report and the Rogovin report did a great public service i ^ TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
34 1 in underscoring this, the system has not developed in that .- N f.) 2 way in the United States. There has developed what I would 3 characterize as a system of adversarial dependency. It is 4 adversarial in ways in which we all know. Everybody fights 5 with everybody else, the staff with the applicant, the 6 intervenors with the staff and the applicate and the Commission with the staff and the ACRS. I mean as a lawyer 4 8 I suppose I should be comfortable with it, but as a former 9 public official and as a citizen I am very disturbed by lo it. 11 That is the adversarial aspect of it, but the 12 dependency aspect of it is that the industry really is in 13 a reactive mode or is discouraged from becoming other than y reactive in this regard. It looks to the Commission for 15 guidance and wnat the Commission doesn't tell us to do, i 16 the industry says that there is no incentive for us to do. 17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Hasn't that attitude 18 contributed to the problem? 19 MR. ROWDEN: It is an attitude which is there 20 and I don't want to universalize because not everybody on what I would call the industry side looks at it in that 21 n way. But it is an attitude which, as both Kemeny and 3 Rogovin pointed out, is built into the process. It is not 24 just the Commission process, it is the way public utility 3 commissions regulate utilities and what they will allow as TAYLOE ASSOCIATES .i 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950
35 1 costs. g.). \\;) 2' But beyond that, the licensing process, which 3 we are struggling so heroically to reform, is a major 4 contributor to that. What incentive is there for a license 5 applicant or a licensee, for that matter, to propose a 6 safety initiative if all it is going to do is to derail 7 the review of its license application and raise a thousand 8 new questions which can be pursued by adversary parties in 9 a proceeding. To delay it in terms of achieving a major 10 objective may possibly lead to a shutdown of an operating 11 facility. 12 The. fact is that the system itself imposes 13 positive discouragement to licensee initiatives. Now to a 14 certain extent that has changed, or there is an emerging ( 15 possibility for change in the aftermath of the 16 institutional structures that the industry has set up I 17 think with Commission encouragement following TMI. INPO 18 bviously is the most compelling example, but these are very fragile institutions and they require nurturing by 39 20 the Commission and unless the Commission offers positive incentives toward this sort of activity, these initiatives 21 could be, I won't say stillborn, but come to a de facto 22 dead end. 33 We we looked at this problem of the NRC/ 24 3 licensee interface we saw three components to it. l l O* TAYLOE ASSOCIATES l 1625 i sTusT, H.w. - suite i004 ( WASHMGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3930
l 36 1 One, inhibitions to communication. I was G 0Z/ 2 astounded by the extent to which I found in talking to 3 utility representatives the pervasive belief that they had 4 to deal with a regulatory staff in a highly proceduralized 5 fashion and that the easy give and take that many would 6 prefer between technical people discussing technical 7 issues simply wasn't possible in part because they felt 8 that these inhibitions were inherent in the process. 9 I think there is also a diffidence on the part 10 of the staff to deal with license applicants and licensees 11 other than on a highly formalized fashion, which really 12 may be comfortable to lawyers, but is a severe impediment 13 to communication among technical people, at least timely 34 and effective communication. 15 There was also a belief, and I think that 16 there are documented examples of this, some of which are 17 contained in the appendices to our report, and I don't is want to rely on episodic examples, but I think there is a 19 recognition that there are too many instances where a 20 license applicant or a licensee is informed of a 21 regulatory staff position at a point in time when it is 22 too late for a private sector contribution to lead to a, l 3 how shall we say it, a more informed judgment, maybe not a different judgment on the part of the regulatory staff, 24 3 but a more informed judgment on the part of the regulatory l l 4 %, TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950
37 1 staff, and beyond that when consequential actions have em t j 2 been taken by a utility in reliance on a contrary 3 understanding either of the Commission's requirements or 4 the interpretation of those requirements. 5 I think those are aspects of communication 6 which-require I think the attention of the Commission. We simply didn't level criticism. We tried to point out areas 8 where the process of communication was deficient and what 9 we thought the remedial aims of the Commission should be to and we recommended a number of steps that might be taken it to facilitate authoritative communication between those 12 whom the Commission regulates and primarily the 13 Commission's staff. 14 The second area deals with the seemingly 15 ageless dispute between prescriptive requirements and 16 Performance objectives, and I have to say in this regard i-there are many in the industry who are very comfortable 18 with prescriptive requirements. You tell us what to do and we will do it. 39 20 There are those, however, who believe that on 21 a selective basis, and perhaps on an increasingly 22 pervasive basis the Commission ought to move to regulation 23 by performance objective choosing its targets very 21 carefully and maybe even applying them selectively only to 25 those licensees who they feel have the capability for TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STRHT, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950 1
38 1 proceeding on that basis, and there are ways of doing .m]' that, the parties who best know their operation to + a ? ~ 3 structure their activities to meet the Commission's end 4 objective rather than telling them in detail what they 5 have to do. Now one has to be careful with that. You can't 6 7 simply turn loose of the process at this stage and say 8 everything from now on is going to be done by performance 9 objectives. As I say, this has to be done on a very to calibrated basis, it has to be done in consultation with 11 the industry, it shouldn't be done unilaterally, and that 12 is part of the recommendation that we made. 13 We simply are identify this as an areas which 14 we think not only ought to have but really demands a more 15 direct affirmative Commission initiative. 16 Finally, there is the area of what we call 17 self-initiated evaluation. I don't like the term is "self-regulation." I know it is a convenient shorthand 19 term, but it has approbrious connotations. 20 We see this being adopted by the industry in a 21 number of areas. INPO I think is probably the most 22 compelling example of this. Again, this is an attempt on z3 the part of the Commission to encourage industry 24 initiatives rather than to encourage simply an industry s response. 3 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ,j 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 ~ WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950
39 1 We believe that there is much that can be done en (c.. ) 2 in that area. We have intended to box the compass as to 3 everything that could be done. We have made a number of 4 suggestions which we think would give fairly fertile 5 ground for Commission exploration with the industry of 6 initiatives in this regard. 7 Again, I would make the same observation that I made before. If the Commission believes these ideas are 8 9 attractive, it ought not to proceed simply on the basis of to its own self-initiated regulatory program, but ought to 11 proceed I think on a basis of consultation and 12 coordination, not of course solely with the industry, 13 obviously the public has an interest in this, but I think i4 there ought to be a consultantive process with the 15 industry to develop the sort of data base which will allow 16 you to formulate better informed initiatives in this 17 connection. 18 Ben is telling me covertly that I am overstaying my welcome here. So I will turn the floor back i9 20 to you. 21 MR. PETTISS: Mr. Chairman,-I may have 3 misunderstood or misinterpreted a request that you made at 23 the beginning that we give our current affiliation. CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Oh, yes. 24 MR. PETTISS: In that event I am President and 3; ! c'T TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ,j 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 I WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 i 1
l 40 1 Chief Executive Office of Telecommunications Systems, (,,.% --jj 2 Incorporated, which is an intra-state telecommunications 3 common carrier. 4 MR. ROWDEN: I am a lawyer now in private 5 practice with the firm of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver 6 and Kampelman. 7 MR. RUSCHE: I am associated with Management 8 Analysis Company in San Diego as a Vice President and 9 Manager of the Atlanta Regional Office and consulting with / 10 utilities primarily. 11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Does that conclude your 12 presentation? 13 MR. PETTISS: Yes, sir. 14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: All right. Well, thank 15 you. 16 A number of questions came up as we went along 17 and sometimes I couldn't hold back. 18 Let me, if I may, just pick up on the last ~ ig point, the point of interfacing with industry and 20 particularly the prescriptive versus performance 21 requirements. I think there is a lot of merit in trying to n give performance requirements rather than prescriptive 3 requirements, but just on reflection most of the severe 24 problems that are facing some of the utilities have been 25 the ones where there have been performance requirements en TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ,,j 16251 STRHT, N.W. - SulTE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
41 1 rather than prescriptive requirements. ,~,8 .) 2 I am thinking particularly in the general area 3 of quality assurance in construction where we are not that 4 prescriptive. What we want is the utility to set up a 5 quality assurance program and then follow it. This is 6 where some of the major failures have come about. Now 7 there are some companies that you don't have to tell them 8 any more than a major objective and they go ahead and 9 achieve it. 10 So I think we are caught in a situation where it a significant number of the utilities can work quite well 12 with performanc.e objectives, but some of the others don't 13 seem to do so well. How do we cope with that kind of a 14 situation or interfacing problem? C$ 15 MR. ROWDEN: Well, we looked at this, and Ben 16 is active in this area, but we looked at this very 17 carefully. The one caution we made was to pick your 18 targets for application of this concept very carefully. There have been some unhappy experiences in this area. We 39 20 didn't cite quality assurance as that, but we had another example of that. On the other hand, there have been areas 21 22 where it has worked successfully. g3 So I think you really have to pick your 21 targets very carefully. That would be the first caution in 25 this regard. I l I ^ TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ',j 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 l WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
42 1 secondly, I see no reason why it has to be all ,m. ( j? one way or all the other. If there are certain elements of 3 the regulated body, utilities if you will, who can work 4 effectively with performance objectives, why can't that be 5 an alternative for them if they qualify for that, and 6 others would work against more prescriptive requirements. 7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: But what happens is these 8 failures bring about more prescriptive requirements. I 9 hate to get into particular cases, but as you get into a 10 paraticular situation where there has been a failure in 11 achieving general performance requirements, the natural 12 thing seems to.txt to follow it up with something more 13 prescriptive. So they have to do thus and so. 14 I would like to see the performance, C.,. 15 requirements be the rule rather than the exception. 16 MR. RUSCHE: Mr. Chairman, may I add a comment 17 on that QA issue itself. 18 I think some of us were around even when g9 Appendix B was published in the early '70s and it s 20 continues to be an effective guide for licensees to 21 f0110W-22 I guess I from my limited experience, and I g3 have one of my colleagues from my company who has even had 24 more extensive experience who is present, but from my 25 limited experience I wondered if the one example you m TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ,,j 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. ' 20006 (202) 293-3950
43 1 picked may not be, I shouldn't say inappropriate, but when en (-} 2 you start talking about prescriptive requirements in QA, 3 one can specify the process very specifically. 4 One cannot specify the performance. The 5 performance comes after management has committed to 6 executing the guidance that is already in existence. If 7 you look at the countless cases in which QA deficiencies 8 have been observed, I dare say that the absence of 9 prescriptive requirements has been a major part of the to problem. 11 That the fix has come more with recognizing 12 the existing guidance, which is fairly objective in its 13 orientation, is coupled with people and structures 34 internally that carry that out. The fact that you need to 15 follow a particular ANSI standard to have a quality weld 16 or pipe installation or instrumentation system cr 17 something of that sort is pretty well recognized by the 18 industry. So your restating that kind of prescriptive gg standard sort goes without saying. 20 It seems to me that what you are finding in 21 the industry is the recognition in far too many cases late n that it is their performance, according to this objective, gg that is the problem and that no amount of prescription is 24 going to be the real cure for that. 25 Have I made any sense to you?
- f. 3 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES t j 16251 STREET, N.W. - SulTE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C.
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44 1 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I agree, but that tends to A - l. / 2 be the answer. If there is failure on performance, then 3 the attention goes on the particular aspect of the problem 4 and you try to fix that and that is not always the right 4 5 thing to do, and yet there are some utilities that seem 6 not to function too well under performance requirements. 7 But you do admit to treating them differently. 8 MR. RUSCHE: Oh, yes. 9 MR. ROWDEN: We found half a dozen or so areas 10 which we thought merited exploration, and the Commission 11 without much difficulty could formulate its oun list. 12 I think the important thing is to embark down 13 this road in a calculated way as a matter of policy, okay 14 experimental and okay tentative, but the alternatives are 15 really very uncomfortable. j 16 What we are really talking about is putting 17 the burden where it should be, and that is on the 18 industry. 19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: We believe that. 20 MR. RUSCHE: Everybody accepts it as a matter 21 of principle, but you have got to start reshaping or a shaping the regulatory process to make that something that n is credible. You have got to create the sort of incentives 23 in obviously making discriminating judgments that make 3 that a reality. ~s TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ) ,1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950
45 'l "lo me it is a far more attractive way to f) (,, 2 regulate than regulation by embarrassment which is frankly 3 what fines are. I don't consider that to be an effective 4 way to regulate on a long-term basis. 5 COMMISSIONER RO.BERTS: I happen to share that 6 View - 7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, it would be nice not to have to resort to fines, but it is surprising that some 8 9 of the situations that lead to the fines don't get p) attention sooner by the mangement people running the 11 organization. 12 MR. RUSCHE: Do you think that the fines 13 intensify that attention? g4 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I think it has in certain (",i 15 casas gotten the attention of management at a level that 16 would not have taken place otherwise. 17 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:. I think so, too. 18 MR. RUSCHE: I would guess that from some of the things I have seen that it is the events that lead to gg 20 the definition of the circumstances, if you would care to 21 call them enforcement conferences or what-not when the 22 staff makes clear its understanding of the present 33 circumstances that has been more effective in getting management's attention. 24 25 Very often the fine comes at a time that is TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 l (202) 293-3950
46 1 1 long after the event has occurred and it becomes sort of (f, ) 2 as Mark called it, an embarrassment, but the attention and 3 the effect is achieved long before the fine is even 4 discussed. 5 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Do you think a fine 6 is appropriate though in a case where you have a long 7 history of problems in a particular area and repeated 8 efforts in enforcement action on an escalating basis and 9 quite frankly the failure on the part of the utility to 10 correct the problems? 11 It seems to me that is an example of where a l l 12 large fine may well serve a useful purpose where you have 13 a long history of the same kind of violation and a (2_ 14 gradually increasing enforcement action, including l 15 meetings and negotiations and notices of violations before 16 you get to that point. I guess my own view is that is a 17 case where a large penalty is perhaps appropriate. 18 MR. ROWDEN: I don't think you ought to mistake 19 our comments as being ones that would discount fines as an 20 appropriate arsenal in the regulatory bag of weapons, so 21 to speak. You have a fine as a punishment. I called it a regulation by embassassment. Obviously that is a z3 characterization simply to get your attention, but there 2; is a kernel of truth in that. s Sure, fines are going to be appropriate in m TAYLOE ASSOCIATES -:) ions i sinur. N.w. - sum iOO4 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004 (202) 293 3950
47 1 some ciretastances. Sometimes the Commission has no /%" ) alternative but to levy a fine, but you have to be r 2 v 3 uncomfortable with a process that relies on fines to get 4 the attention of the industry. You have to wonder whether i 5 that is the right way to go about it and whether over the 6 long run you are really instilling the sense of initiative in the industry which is really the first line of safety 8 protection. That is the only point that I am trying to 9 make. 10 MR. RUSCHE: Mr. Chairman, could I add just one 11 coment to the Commissioner's eyeball contact with me on 12 the subject. 13 I think that if you looked at the mangement of g the activity by the utility or other industrial 15 enterprise, the thing that is most influential in getting 16 the attention of management to take corrective actions 17 ought to be something that is related to his mangement of 18 the asset that is there. 39 The fine as a tool may still have its place, 20 and I would not discount it as a completely valueless 21 action on the part of the Commission. Sometimes if you 22 could do it quickly, it is almost like a slap on the hand. 3 That is not very often the case. 24 But the other side is the man who is the 25 president of a company that has got 20 percent of his ^ TAYLOE ASSOCIATES (' 1625 I STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 l
48 1 assets tied up in a plant ought to be much more strongly ( ) 2 driven to manage that asset and have it available to 3 produce its desired purpose within the company. 4 The fine becomes an irritant in the case that 5 you referred to where there has been repeated violations 6 of failure to correct. It would seem to me that you are 7 looking for some way to communicate not only to the 8 person, but to the public the inability of that company to 9 affect its actions in a way that is responsible from a 10 public standpoint. The fine I think has an attention 11 getting value, but it does not produce very much of the 12 desired result. 13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, I don't want to 14 concentrate on fines, but it is one that came up. ) 15 I wonder if we might try to organize our 16 questions and go to the aspects of the regulatory reform 17 first. If I might, let me ask a question that I am sure 18 would come up even more strongly were one of our 19 colleagues here today, Commissioner Gilinsky. 20 You talk about single-stage construction and 21 operating license, a single license, one-step license. One 1 n of the questions that comes up in considering a single 3 stage license is the fact that there are things that you 24 can't necessarily settle way at the beginning of the 3 construction stage such as, for example, in developing 3, TAYLOE ASSOCIATES -/ 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 s ~~ WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004 (202) 293 3950
49 1 emergency plans. () Even if the plant is built in in six years, 2 3 with the detail that is required on these emergency plans, 4 you can't predict who the various players are going to be 5 six years hence. So this led to the provision in the 6 Commission's approach where things that can't be handled 7 at the beginning can be handled toward the end. 8 How do you see the effectiveness of a 9 single-stage license so that it really can work? 10 MR. ROWDEN: Well, in depends on what you mean 11 by the single stage and if you have two stages --- 12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, maybe you ought to 13 define what yo': mean. 14 MR. ROWDEN: By single stage I mean a 15 regulatory review and authorization which would be 16 accompanied by some appropriate public participation, 17 following which if an affirmative determination were made 18 then a license to construct and operate would be issued gg with the staff retaining its authority to maintain 20 oversignt over the construction and exercise the authority 21 it now has and obviously to look at the facility after it 22 has been completed to determine whether it can safety g3 operate. But an additional license would not issue at the 24 operating license stage. 3 In other words, an affirmative action would t,.m TAYLOE ASSOCIATES E) 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE m WASHINGTON, D.C. 22 (202) 293 3950
7 50 1 have to be taken to withdraw the authorization previously (/ 2 given, and in any event there would not be an automatic 3 opportunity for public hearing which is really I think the 4 touchstone of the difference between the two schools of 5 thought on whether you should have so-called single-stage 6 licensing or whether there ought to be a "second stage." 7 I would say frankly, Mr. Chairman, that I had 8 understood the Commission's license reform recommendation 9 to contemplate something more than a hearing on the to emergency planning aspect. 11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: It could be on the 12 effectiveness of the training program for operators. I 13 just picked that as an example. 14 MR. ROWDEN: The training program, the details 15 of construction, or however fertile an intervenor's mind 16 might be. At least that is the way we read the size of the 17 door that was left open. 18 Let me address your functional question of is ig it possible to devise something that would be adequate 20 with respect to something like emergency planning. I think 21 the answer on the part of those who have been working on a the other side in the private sector on licensing reform g3 is yes, even in the area of emergency planning, not down t 24 ot the final detail, but the structure of an adequate y; emergency planning regime I think could be put in place. I ) TAYLOE ASSOCIATES / 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 s WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
51 1 If it couldn't be, then we would have to face () 2 the prospect of having a further examination of it, but I 3 think the burden is one that the private sector is 4 prepared to assume in coming forward with viable and. 5 implementable mechanisms for dealing with that issue. If, on the other hand, you are talking about 6 7 dealing with assurance that the plant as constructed meets 8 specified criteria and you are talking about something 9 more than a regulatory staff or ACRS review, but you are 10 talking about a routine opportunity for public hearing, 11 then I think the view on the industry's side is that 12 standardization is a wonderful concept, but you might as 13 well forget about it as a viable proposition. 14 You simply are not going to get the customers 15 to make the sort of commitment to a facility in the 16 context of what they perceive on the basis of past g-experience as being an inherently unstable process with ig the prospect of a preoperating license hearing staring them in the face. 39 20 Now you may not accept that as a valid point f view, but believe me that is a fairly -- well, I won't 21 22 say fairly -- that is a universal viewpoint in the private sector. Whether anotner nuclear plant will be ordered or 23 not is going to be dependent on a variety of 21 25 considerations, and they are quite categoric in saying m-TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ~) 1625 l STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 s WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 i (202) 293-3950
52 1 that with all of those other considerations falling into () 2 place with the process as it is presently st'ructured and 3 with the two-stage hearing review that is provided for now 4 or the prospect of its continuation would stymie any 5 responsible utility board from going the nuclear route. Now that is my functional answer to your 6 7 question. 8 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, the responsible 9 utilities really haven't had a problem. It has been those 10 that haven't been too responsible that I think have gotten 11 into problems. 12 MR. RONDEN: Oh, I don't know that intervenors 13 really choose between responsible or.less responsible g4 utilties in deciding what their targets for intervention (, 15 are going to be. s. 16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: But the hearings go much 17 better when --- 18 MR. ROWDEN: Sometimes they do and sometimes 19 they don't. We hear complaints whether justified or not. 20 We hear complaints across the spectrum, and whether those 21 complaints are grounded in the experience of what we call n here the more responsible utilities or not, they are 3 sensitized by the experience of others. There is there but 24 for the grace of God goes -- you know, you are betting the 25 destiny of your whole organization when you commit to go x TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ~l 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
53 1 nuclear. I mean the size of the commitment and, the lenght ( 2 of the nuclear plant cycle is such that you are literally v 3 betting not only your own professional future, and that is 4 something of passing concern to utility executives, but 5 also the economic destiny of your coodany on that. 3 Now when you are dealing with those things, 6 7 you want a great deal more security than you have now, and 8 these distinctions between good utitities and bad 1 9 utilities I am afraid really aren't that persuasive. 10 MR. RUSCHE: Could I cite one specific point, 11 Mr. Chairman. 12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: All right. 13 MR. RUSCHE: Perhaps we have done enough to i 14 this one, but taere is what I would call a good utility (; 15 today looking at circumstances attendant to the start-up 16 of a plant near an OL stage in which the circumstances in 17 the present regulations providing for hearings have 18 offered the opportunity to revisit issue after issue after gg issue which have been heretofore decided. 20 I think it is very much like the generic 21 statement we made a moment ago or very early that somehow 22 there needs to be a way to place the burden for the 23 raising of these issues on people who have some 34 accountability for it. y; The one-stage process provides the m TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 'I 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950
54 I accountability between you and the licensee to take j Tj) 2 certain actions and take them effectively. You have even 3 by the processes you now have in operation with the 4 resident inspectors during.the construction and so forth 5 an opportunity to observe that performance, and when it 6 doesn!t meet the test, then you have mechanisms for 7 assuring that it does. l 8 But unless there is a basis for questioning 9 it, doing it again and again I think, as Mr. Rowden said, 10 clearly discourages people from looking in that direction. 11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, even in our proposal 12 we recognized that and said that all of those items that 13 could have been dealt with at the beginning should be 14 dealt with at the beginning. 15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I must say, Ben, I 16 agree with you that there ought to be a limitation on 17 relitigating issues over and over and over again, and I 18 think there ought to be a restructuring of the hearing 19 process. It is still not clear to me, and Mark you and I 20 have had this discussion before, but it is not clear to me 21 why those kinds of changes aren't sufficient and why you n need to go that next step to essentially cut off the u opportunity to get a hearing on certain kinds of issues that in all likelihood you really aren't going to be able 24 25 to raise very effectively until the preoperation stage, TAYLOiE ASSOCIATES l _y 162s i sTaEET, N.W. - SURE 1004 l WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950 l
55 1 I guess the one that really sticks in my mind, () 2 given the plant construction QA problems that we have seen 3 over the past few years, is whether the plant has been 4 built right. 5 MR. ROWDEN: I don't want to prolong this, but 6 I think that there is one observation that I would like to 7 make because it is fundamental and unless we face up to 8 this, both on the industry side and on the government - 9 side quite realiss'7 ally, we are going to be talking at 10 cross purposes. 11 This proposal for one-step licensing and these 12 proposals for standardization, and the two really, as I 13 say, inextricably interwoven, are really proposals that g contemplate tradeoffs. On the one hand, you expect the .D 15 industry to make certain commitments and, on the other 16 hand, you want the public to have certain opportunities. - 17 Overall, one has to draw back and say what is 18 the public getting out of this process and in return for what they are getting out what sort of accommmodations 39 20 have to be made. There is a matter of balancing here. 21 I think that one of the accommodations that 22 has to be made, except in extraordinary circumstances, and 23 I guess I would go along with the recommendation made by y ur ad hoc committee that the 2.206 procedure as 24 3 appropriately modified, and nothing is chipped in granite, c:s TAYLOE ASSOCIATES \\ 16251 STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (20:21 293-3950
56 1 is a safety valve that would be useful, but I think that ) 2 to get the industry, not simply the vendors, but the 3 potential customers to make the sort of commitments that 4 are necessary to make standardization a viable concept, 5 the tradeoff is going to have to be a perception of 6 greater stability at the end of the process. 7 If the public believes that its participation 8 in the process is the ultimate safeguard as far as public 9 health and safety is concerned, or worse yet, if the 10 Commission believes that, then there is something 11 fundamentally flawed about the process. 12 I mean it simply cannot be that the 13 happenstance of a public hearing and who,happens to 14 preside and who happens to participate and what (, I 15 contentions that they happen to raise in a particular 16 proceeding is going to be the ultimate safeguard as far as 17 the public health and safety is concerned. 18 I think there are far more fundamental steps 19 that have to be taken, and I would put in that category 20 standization frankly. There I think the Commission is on 21 the right track. We are just trying to help you make it a 22 viable concept, that is all. 23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, we are just 24 exploring with you different approaches. j 3 Let me go over one more question and I will .m TAYLOE ASSOCIATES l ,I 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004 (202) 293-3950
57 1 let you lead on. .%hjh 2 On backfitting DOE is advocating Commission 3 decision on every backfitting decision. Would you care to 4 . comment on the viability of_that approach from your 5 experience. MR. RUSCHE: Mr. Chairman, let me make a couple 6 of comments and then I sure Mr. Rowden would add something 8 to what I might say. 9 My understanding of the bill, that is the DOE 10 proposal, is to place the final choice at the Commission 11 level operating under regulations or rules that would 12 assure that there is a centralized review process within 13 the Commission. g I think that the adoption of appropriate 'I 15 standards by the Commission such as we have suggested in 16 the report, sort of fundamental guidelines for that g -- centralized review to occur hopefully would not require i 18 the Commission itself to make every decision nor even many 19 decisions if the process operated effectively. 20 It seems to me that there is no element in the 21 circumstances today that requires more attention than this o one. Had we continued the other discussion another three g 3 or four minutes, I was going to suggest that not unlike my 24 experience five or six years ago when I first had the 25 oppportunity to sit across this table, even at that time I q TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 I STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950
l 58 I was struck by the importance of the Commission's portion [ of its responsibility with respect to operating reactors, 2 3 and that is even more important today. 4 We have spent a fair fraction of our time 5 talking about the future, but the future is going to be 6 operating reactors. I think very much, as Mr. Rowden said, 7 your programmatic responsibility and your management 8 responsibility is going to be I believe rather different 9 than it has been over the last six or eight years with to respect to a large licensing effort. 11 I think the backfitting issue is at the heart 12 of this and if it took Commission direct action to assure 13 that balance was being applied by the staff and the cost 14 effectiveness taking into account that the public's full 15 interest in the matter was being executed, then I think 16 that is not a bad role for the Commission to follow. 17 I would hope that you could adopt procedures 18 and approaches that didn't require the Commission to sit 39 up here and make a thousand backfitting decisions every 20 day, and I believe you could, but there might be a few 21 that you would have to. g CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I thought the DOE approach g3 did require the Commissicn to make the decisions. Our 24 approach lately has been to focus it in the Office of the =5 Executive Director for Operations. On the generic issues 7"3 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ) q 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
59 1 we set up a means for doing that and the EDO is looking at () a means for doing it on specific plant situations and I 2 3 think our staff requirements memo gives them additional 4 guidance in that regard. 5 MR. RUSCHE: I guess I have not seen the staff 6 requirements memo. 7 MR. ROWDEN: Well, I owe you the same answer I 8 gave Senator Simpson when he asked the same question, and 9 my response was I don't think it is an all or nothing to proposition. 11 The DOE approach is very prescriptive in terms 12 of its detailing process and the Commission's involvement 13 in it. The Commission's is give us the authority and we a will do the job. As between the two, I will say quite 15 frankly, and it is not just me, but others who have every 16 confidence in this group of esteemable gentlemen who how. 17 occupy your chairs, but say who is going to be here next 18 year and the year after that and ten years from now, or 39 since I have entered into a 49-year marriage contract with 20 the NRC, who is going to be here a couple of generations fr m how. You need something in a law to guide that. 21 22 As far as who does what, I think there are 3 aspects of the process which the Commission involve itself 24 in very directly, and I think you would recognize that 3
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60 1 There are other aspects of the process, and ( 3,)/ is 2 since your Executive Director for Operations tells us 3 there are 87 different ways that the NRC can de facto at 4 least backfit, there have to be a few of those in which 5 the Commission would want to involve itself indirectly and 6 a number of those in which the Commission would say we can 7 issue prescriptions to the staff and oversee the process 8 in an active way and we will be accountable for the 9 operation of that process. So that the Commission needn't to pass on every single backfit. 11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: But I think the proposal 12 is written that way that the Commission would require it. 13 The Commission can always step in under any of the 14 arrangements. (_ '- 15 MR. ROWDEN: I urged Senator Simpson to use the 16 same sort of ingenuity that the legislative process has 17 shown itself capable of in the past in devising a regime 18 which would give the Commission a sort of guidance and 19 provide for its participation, but yet allow it the sort 20 of flexibility so that it can occupy itself with other 21 important things. It is possible. 22 MR. RUSCHE: If I misrepresented the DOE bill, g3 my knowledge of the bill is less than a hundred percent, 24 but my expression was clearly my view which I thought was y; in the bill. In fact, I had a review from DOE which gave "3, TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 l STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 l (202) 293-3950 l i
61 1 me the impression that that was the case and I have here d' !Q)) 2 before me, but perhaps it was wrong. I think I would share 3 the view that I think we have all come to. 4 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: If I could follow up 5 on a couple of points on backfitting. CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Sure. 6 7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: There are three areas that I find difficult to deal with in the backfitting area a 9 whether you are going to develop a statutory standard or 10 do something administratively. 11 The first of those is, and I pick up on your 12 point, Ben, that in the outline you ought to look at cost 13 benefit considerations in making backfitting decisions. I g agree with that, but I think it is fairly difficult and I \\ \\l have some concerns both about the DOE standard and about 15 16 the administrative standards that we have been looking it 17 in fashioning a standard that fairly balances the kinds of 18 what I would expect to be fairly quantitative information 19 that you are likely to have on costs and what is in all 20 probability going to be much more qualitative information 21 in terms of the safety benefit to be gained by a proposed i 3 action. 23 I guess I have some reservations or some g questions still in.my mind about what the standards should 3 be or how it should be formulated in a way that fairly m., TAYLOE ASSOCIATES f 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 (
62 1 balances the kinds of differences in information that we sc ) 2 have. 3 The second problem area that I see is in 4 isolating and identifying the proposals for new 5 requirements that really are significant ones and 6 screening out a lot of the things that have been done in 7 the past or that really aren't of great significance. 8 I don't think the industry or we want to 9 convert large portions of the agency into simply cranking to out cost benefit analyses on a wide range of things, 11 including a lot of things that have been looked at in the 12 past and for better or worse have been put into place in a 13 lot of places. 14 That is a second problem area I see in 15 devising a system that really does identify the 16 significant ones, the ones that you want to take a close 17 look at, the ones where there are signifcant questions 18 about the benefits and the costs and really zero in on 19 those rather than making this pro forma exercise. 20 The third problem area I see, and it is one 21 that troubles me because I don't think.it is very well 22 addressed by any of the proposals so far, is the approach 33 that we seem to take to safety requirements by looking at 24 things on a piecemeal basis. All we look at is one 25 proposed change after another rather than trying to TAYLOE ASSOCIATES .) 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004
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63 1 integrate a large number of changes together or perhaps og (.f) 2 all that we think might be expected for the foreseeable 3 future. 4 On that last point let me just mention a 5 possibility to you and I would like to get your reactor to 6 it along the lines our encouraging licensee initiatives 7 which, Mark, you mentioned earlier. 8 It really seems to me that there would be a 9 real benefit, given the number of unresolved safety issues 10 that we still have outstanding, to say to licensees that 11 within a specified period of time the burden in on them to 12 Propose a plan for how they would deal with essentially 13 everything that is still outstanding and come in with a 14 package of changes that they believe fairly and fully i 15 addresses all of the open questions that now exist. 16 If you did something like that, did a review 17 of it and then reached an agreement on that kind of an 18 approach, it seems to me something like that then might justify a truly high threshold in terms of the ability to 19 20 go back then and reopen issues and impose new requirements. 21 3 But those are the three problem areas that I see. I guess I just am concerned that I don't think the 3 24 pr posals we have heard so far really fully and fairly l 25 address those three problem areas in a way that I would be l l TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ',,), 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
= 64 1 comfortable in saying to the Congress fine, enact that ,? *\\ (,/ 2 provision and it solves the backfitting problem and we are 3 never going to have to worry about this again because you 4 have locked up all of the loose ends. 5 MR. ROWDEN: Well, if that is your objective, 6 then it is an unattainable one. You and I I think will 7 reach agreement on that fairly quickly. 8 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Yes. 9 XR. ROWDEN: Let me deal with your questions in 10 reverse order and then Ben can pick up after me. 11 I agree that the global look is the only 12 meaningful one. One of the useful aspects we thought of 13 the DOE proposal was that it had within it the kernel of 14 looking at overall plant safety in the operating life of 15 the plant. I 16 Now how you apply that is something that can 17 be subject to implementation, discussion and even dispute, 18 but I agree with that concept. 39 Secondly, I also agree that the sort of 20 initiative you talked about, which I think began with an 21 Iowa utility and there is another utility, is a very 22 useful one. When we did the study as a backup for this n report, that is one of the initiatives that we focused on. 2; We said now here is really something innovative and useful y; and the Commission ought to encourage experimentation with 7 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ,/ 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
~ 65 I that. So I totally agree with that and it serves a number ((3j,! 2 of desirable objectives. 3 With respect to the difficulty of coming to 4 grips with costs, all I can is do the best you can, and we 5 can do something in that regard. I don't think that can be 6 an excuse for doing nothing. 7 As a matter of fact, we are not doing nothing 8 now. I have been involved in this regulatory process long 9 enough to know that there is not an engineer that sits to down to make a decision who in the back of his mind is 11 running how much is it going to cost and it is worth it. 12 It may be a conscious or it may be a subconscious thing, 13 but this is the way the human mind works. We make these 14 value judgments all the time. 15 We are saying two things about cost benefit. 16 One, bring out of the closet and into the open 17 and have it done in public so that it can be done in a 18 systematized way and the public knows what it is getting and what it is paying for what it is getting. I don't g9 20 think anybody should have any quarrel with that from a 21 public policy standpoint, 22 The other aspect of this, and we didn't 1 mention it in going over all the wisdom in our report, but 23 24 the one major conclusion that we drew was that you really y; shouldn't be diffident about saying cost is an appropriate l ,S TAYLOE ASSOCIATES j 16251 STREET, N.W. - $UlTE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950 i l l
~ 66 I factor. Cost if a vital factor in the safety process. Cost OS (,) 2 determines how you allocate resources and cost determines 3 how you prioritize what is significant from what is of 4 lesser significance. I think there is a social value, 5 quite frankly, a regulatory value in bringing cost into 6 the process in a meaningful way. It is your challenge to 7 deal with it in the most effective way. 8 But considering all the esoteric problems that 9 we have dealt with, some adirably and some less admirably 10 in this process tnat are a lot more difficult than this, I 11 don't consider this to be an insuperable problem. 12 MR. RUSCHE: May I comment? 13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Yes, sir, please. 14 MR. RUSCHE: Commissioner, you mentioned two or 15 three points that caused me to go back and look at some 16 experience of 10 or 15 years ago in another environment. 17 I think it is very important to keep together 18 the idea of separating out the important safety issues and 19 important safety related activities to which you ought to 20 even consider a backfit question as well as looking at the 21 cost benefit consideration in determining whether or not 22 you should implement it. 33 I can recall an experience in the '60s at 24 another installation at which we were faced with what 25 appeared to be horrendous expenditures to achieve what r s. TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ( ~ 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 ~# WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 l i
g7 t appeared to be small benefit. At that time I think G if7 2 Chairman Palladino might even have been on the ACRS. v 3 We can to the conclusion that you probably 4 cannot develop the universally acceptable standard and 5 that somebody who is in responsibility acting in the 6 public interest has to make a judgment. 7 I think Mark's point abo,1t getting these 8 things out on the table is a very key pctnt. I was an 9 engineer or a manager at that time, and my bosses in the 10 company I was working with wanted to know how I was making 11 decisions. So I brought out cost benefit elements and laid 12 them on the table and it was a little bit sobering and I 13 think it would be sobering to you. 14 In fact some of the data that we got from the ( 15 EEI study I think is fairly sobering in that regard, that 16 an action that you or the staff have taken has caused the t7 expenditure of a very large amount of money in a plant or 18 many plants. So I think that the insistance on a confidence 39 20 that you are going to have all encompassing standard to 21 start with sort of dooms the process to failure. I think n there is nn opportunity for the Commission and licensees a to work toward displaying what they are doing and reaching 28 mutual agreement even if you can't codify it to start with n and using that as a basis for the public recognizing the "N TAYLOE ASSOCIATES yj 1625 I STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
1 68 I allocation of resources. l( ) 2 With regard to your latter point, I think the l 3 idea of somehow developing an overall schedule for the 4 plant just makes great sense. Many companies I believe are 5 now realizing that. They are also realizing that when they 6 go to-do it they have not themselves taken the look that 7 is needed, and that when they look at the schedule and the 8 value of some of these things, they were making choices 9 themselves in the short term of what they might say in 10 response to Commission requirements or in response to 11 their own internal forces. 12 So I think that that has great promise as the 13 way to start the process. Visibility is the first test 14 though. 15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Ben, you mentioned 16 the.EEI survey. I noticed in the report that you reflected 17 that the survey found that more than $30 billion of the 18 cost of number power plants entering service between 1970 19 and 1982 were attributable to new regulatory requirements 20 during that period. 21 MR. RUSCHE: Yes. r COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I recognize that in z3 some instances there hasn't been a very good documentary 24 record of backfitting decisions. To what extent though do 3 you think that that $30 billion is attributable to either, ,e TAYLOE ASSOCIATES (. j 1625 i sneer, N.w. - suna i004 WASHINGTON, DA 20006 (2021 2953950
69 1 one, and I don't mean this in any disrespectfully, but () that we didn't do as good a job perhaps in the early years 2 3 as we should have and, two, that we simply didn't 4 understand some of the complexities about these machines 5 or, three, that we really went ahead with a lot of 6 requirements without really thinking them through or going 7 ahead with requirements that aren't contributing very much 8 _to safety? 9 MR. RUSCHE: Well, perhaps there are elements 10 of all of those in what is reflected in the data that EEI 11 got from the survey they conducted. We said in the report, 12 as we reflected ourselves on these data, that we could not 13 separate, and in fact most of the companies could not 14 separate specific items in a very clear-cut way as to 15 those that were absolute requirements for safety and those 16 that were perhaps valuable from either those that were 17 instituted by the company. 18 Many of the companies recognized as they began 19 to put some of this data together that when a regulatory 20 requirement was imposed, a backfit requirement, they took 21 some other actions that added time or cost as well. n Who is to say, and none of us would say, that g3 these ought to be looked at with great percision. I think 24 all of those elements are probably embodied in the 25 process, but they still say that if we had managed I <h TAYLOE ASSOCIATES fl 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950 i 1
l 70 I t the process better or if we had gotten the requirements )( h 2 where they should be and if the construction had been 3 managed in the way it should be, that that is the sum of 4 money that had to be spent or at least some large portion 5 of it. I think that is the message we were trying to 6 7 get across, that there is incentive for all of the parties 8 to give attention to the matter. 9 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Tom. 10 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: A two-part question. Do 11 you think there is any realistic possibility that, one, 12 the Congress.will get us out of the export business or, 13 two, give us a single strong administrator and, failing 14 that, at least clearly give the Chairman more authority? I 15 appreciate that it is highly speculative. 16 MR. RUSCHE: Commissioner, it would be very 17 presumptuous of me to think what the Congress would do. I ig would guess that the first point is more speculative than 19 the second point. 20 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: You do. 21 MR. RUSCHE: From some of the conversations I n have had I believe that tnere is a greater recognition on g3 the part of some folks in Congress for the need to improve 24 the ability of the Chairman to manage the Commission, y; COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: Do you think there is 3 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ,j 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SulTE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950 l
71 1 any likelihood that a single, strong administrator could ,e C? 2 emerge, which all the reports have advocated? 3 MR. RUSCHE: Not this year. 4 MR. ROWDEN: I think if you look at it from the 5 standpoint of applying a political litmus test to this, 6 the answer to your first question is I don't believe the 7 Congress would change the present structure for passing on 8 export license applications. 9 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I don't think the people 10 in the back can hear you. 11 MR. ROWDEN: I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I do not 12 believe the Congress would alter the present provisions of 13 law to take the Commission's decisional role in the export 14 licensing process away from it and give it to an Executive O 15 Branch agency. 16 We felt that the issue was important enough to 17 give it continuing viability rather than simply saying 18 well, if nothing can be done about it now, let's forget about it. 19 20 So the answer is it is still an important issue, but my political assessment would be no, it would 21 22 not be acted upon at the current time. 23 With regard to the Commission form of NRC 24 management, we said in the report that it is probably too 25 early now to revisit that issue since after the Kemeny O. TAYLOE ASSOCIATES y1 1625 i STREtT, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004 (202) 293 3950
i 72 1 Commission and Rogovin Commission reports the then ,( ) 2 Administration chose a different course. 3 However, I do believe that it is politically 4 feasible to urge, if the Administration is disposed to so 5 urge and if there is I think reasonable support from this 6 body giving the Chairman greater administrative authority. 7 I don't believe that that is out of the realm of 8 political feasibility and I think it is a worthwhile step 9 and we recommended it as such. 10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Would it take a Commission 11 proposal? 12 MR. ROWDEN: Not necessarily. I think that the 13 Administration, just as it did at the time of action on 14 the Kemeny Commission repo'rt, could initiate such a ) 15 proposal. I don't know whether our report would be the m, 16 appropriate would be the appropriate catalyzing event. I 17 think it would be helpful if the Commtssion made a 18 proposal of this sort, but it is not necessarily 19 essential. I think a reasonable degree of Commission 20 support for it, however, would be central to its political 21 via bility. n COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: That might be very n difficult to find. 24 MR. ROWDEN: That is possible. 25 (Laughter.) 'e. '3, TAYLOE ASSOCIATES . j/ 16251 STitEET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
4_ l 73 j 1 MR. ROWDEN: One lives with the hope that (, ) 2 reasonable publi'c officials will coalesce around 3 reasonable propositions. 4 (Laughter.) 5 MR. ROWDEN: I hope it doesn't take another 6 catastrophic event to drive the point home. 7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, I hope some catalyst 8 such as your report might be effective. 9 MR. RUSCHE: Mr. Pettiss might care to make a to comment, but I think that the task force in assembling the 11 report and doing the study clearly wanted to offer the 12 suggestions that we thought had merit. I don't think the 13 task force was of the view that we ought to be the strong 14 proponents and we ought to be around town everywhere we 15 could trying to make proposals but, on the other hand, I 16 think just as Mr. Hanley said in his letter today, what we 17 did we believe has sufficient merit that in the right 18 environment I tnink that they will endorse, as they did this view, our expression of those proposals and we, just 39 20 as we are delighted to have this chance today, we would 21 look for other such opportunities that are appropriate. 22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Any more questions, Tom? COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: No. 3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Jim? 24 3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I had just a couple i l l TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ,j 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 l WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 { (202) 293 3930
l 74 1 more. (f On the nuclear exports issue, to what extent 2 3 is your recommendation driv'en by the principle that you 4 stated in the report that the Commission really ought to 5 focus its attention on health and safety matters as 6 opposed to the judgment that exports really are a major 7 consumer of Commission time and attention and agency 8 resources? 9 MR. ROWDEN: At one time I think the latter 10 observation was certainly the case. I don't know what the 11 fraction of time might be today that the Commission spends 12 on nuclear export issues. A lot of it has been routinized. 13 It is the significant questions which the Commission is 14 called upon to pass upon that I think are the more (/ 15 consequential part of this. 16 I think that both elements would stand on an 17 equal plane as far as I am concerned. I think that the 18 Commission ought to have as its mission a fairly clearly 19 defined domestic regulatory responsibility. I think that 20 colors its outlook on life, what its view of its 21 responsibilities are and how the staff views itself. I 22 think that is an important consideration quite apart from g3 the amount of time that may happen to be spent on it. 24 At one point in time, I know when I was on the 25 Commission and even thereafter, as I recall John Ahearne ! (% TAYLOE ASSOCIATES l ) 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 I (202) 293 3950 1 l l l
u. 75 1 stating, as much as a third or more of the Commission's (h 2 time was spent on this. 3 The other aspect I would accord equal 4 importance to from a public policy standpoint which is the 5 arm of government which is best equipped to make these 6 judgments and which is most accountable in the political process. I don't think we can walk about from that. We couldn't. I am not saying that that is your function, but 8 9 in terms of our assessing the process we could not. 10 MR. RUSCHE: Let me add the point, if I may, 11 that having had the opportunity for a couple of years 12 previous to this in functioning in an Executive agency and 13 having come through this other side of the house, that the g amount of time that you were spending or are now spending, ( 15 I guess I was not very much aware of. I had heard comments ~ 16 such as a third or what-not, but that was not a very 17 important factor in my thinking. 18 I think it is clear to me, and particularly as 39 I see you look forward to the future in which your 20 attention is going to be increasingly turned in the 21 direction of 120 or 140 or whatever number of reactors 3 that are going to be operating, I think your attention is 3 most properly placed in the domestic scene. 21 If we look towards perhaps eventual 3 reprocessing and if we look toward waste management, these i a?N TAYLOE ASSOCIATES \\j 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 l WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 l l
c.. 76 1 issues which are going to bring that picture into sharper () 2 focus, I think should command all of your attention. 3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I have just a couple 4 more. 5 One, Mark, on your comments on removing the 6 bars to communication with the staff, I guess I have a 7 question in my mind about how much of an inhibition those 8 bars are, the separation of functions restrictions are. 9 As long as the Commission is willing to hear to from the staff in an open meeting and give other parties 11 an opportunity to comment, it strikes me that it is more 12 in the nature of an inconvenience rather than something 13 that really ought to prevent the Commission from being 14 able to consult with its staff. That is my first question. _/ 15 My second one is isn't there an interplay 16 between relaxing those bars to communication with the 1; staff and improving the NRC/ licensee interface? That is, ie if we begin to draw more and more of the staff in as i9 privileged and off-the-record advisers to us on 20 adjudicatory matters, do we then create new problems for 21 the staff in terms of their ability to deal with the n licensees? n MR. ROWDEN:~ I don't think that tne latter is 24 necessarily the case. Obviously if the system is to 3 reshape, all aspects of it would have to be looked at, and
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.__ 4 77 1 then if some of the recommendations we made were () 2 implemented by the Commission, that would have to be part 3 of that global examination. 4 With regard to your first point, is it an 5 inconvenience or an inhibition, if one takes faithfully 6 and 1iterally what the Commission states in Part 2, it is 7 an inhibition and it is not an inconvenience. If the 8 Commission is of the view that it can do it whenever it so 9 chooses, then I think the exception is going to swallow to the rule and one ought to face up to the consequences of 11 that. 12 The injunctions in Part 2.714 or 2.850, or 13 whatever the numbers are, and you will excuse me if I am a 14 few decimal points off one way or the other, are fairly / 15 categoric and they are cast in terms of thou shalt not, 16 except if these are matters that deal with generic issues. 17 Those are games that really shouldn't be played. 18 There is a real problem here in the sense -- 39 or there is a challenge. It is not a problem. The 20 challenge is to utilize the staff resources that you have 21 available to you in the most effective fashion. This is g something that the law does not require. This is something 33 that was a self-imposed limitation because of the nature 24 f the Atomic Energy Commission witn the dual functions at y; the time that it undertood large-scale involvement in '/% TAYLOE ASSOCIATES / 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 l WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950 l
__4 78 1 civilian nuclear reactor regulation. () 2 The Commission simply wasn't involved in the 3 regulatory process, and I think we might as well face up 4 to that. But to continue to be saddled by it when you 5 really can use the advice of the body most capable of 6 rendering that advice, and you should be circumscribed by 7 procedural limitations, is something that I have a great 8 deal of difficulty in coming to grips with. 9 I made the observation in the past and Senator to Simpson in the course of some testimony recently talked 11 about the ungodly number of lawyers that the Commission 12 had. My position is that it isn't the lawyers that have t3 taken over the process. You have given the process to the t4 lawyers, including the Congress, some legacies from the s 15 Congress. 16 This proceduralization, particularly where the 17 law doesn't require it and recognizes that you need 18 latitude to carry out your functions, is something that 19 frankly as a lawyer completely confounds me. 20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, I hope we can do 21 some good in this particular area. We are working on it 22 and it is one that all of us are very vitally interested z3 in. 24 Well, gentlemen, we thank you very much for z5 coming today. We also thank you for your contributions to 1 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 'l 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
4 79 1 the private sector study. I think if properly viewed and () 2 acted upon that it can produce very beneficial results. 3 So we appreciate your willingness to exchange 4 ideas with us, and the mere fact that we asked questions 5 in a particular direction doesn't mean that is the 6 direction we necessarily want to go. We just wanted to 7 explore it. 8 MR. ROWDEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank 9 you, gentlemen. 10 MR. PETTISS: Thank you. 11 MR. RUSCHE: We thank you very much for your 12 interest, and I think it is fair to say that we remain 13 available if there are times we can help you. 14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, we may have 15 questions for you. 16 Thank you. 17 we will stand adjourned. 18 (whereupon, at 3: 42 p.m., the meeting gg adjourned.) go 21 22 23 21 25 / TAYLOE ASSOCIATES f 1625 I STREET, N.W. - SulTE 1004 WASHINGTON, DA 20006 (202) 293 3950 I I
.s i CERTIFICATE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 Y 2 This is to certify that the attached proceedings before 3 the duclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of a 4 Briefing on the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost 5 Control held in Room 1130 at 1717 H Street, N. W., 6 washington, D. C. on July 25, 1983, commencing at 2:00 7 p.m., was held as herein appears, and that this is the 8 original transcript for the file of Commission. 9 10 11 12 13 Mary C. Simons 14 (,' Official Reporter - Typed 15 &g_ _ ktk! M n________ 17 Official Reporter - Signature 18 19 20 21 22 t3 21 25 f4 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ~~ 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950
/e BRIEFING AGENDA FOR U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ON PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE SECTOR STUDY TO CONTROL COSTS JULY 25, 1983 Introduction and Procedure W. R. Pettiss Brief Summary of Report B. C. Rusche Focus on Recomended Agency Improvements M. A. Rowden and Regulatory Reforms Discussion i I
Objectives of Task Force Review To evaluate the nuclear regulatory program and its management and make recommendations which could: Improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the regulatory process; Reduce the impact of the process on the private sector (industry and public) while assuring protection of the public health and safety; Improve the effectiveness of Government spending on nuclear regulation. Primary Conclusions Major reforms in the licensing and regulatory process are needed to provide stability and predictability. These reforms are supportive of NRC's primary safety mission as well as process efficiency. Current efforts to achieve sounder, more effective NRC management should be continued. Recommendation I. Reform of the regulatory process - Congressional action on pending legislative proposals Adoption of complementary administrative changes A. Recommendations affecting nuclear plants currently in operation and under construction, as well as future projects 1. Backfitting Provide for centralized review and senior management approval of all backfitting requirements Backfit determinations should adhere to certain fundamental concepts: Backfitting should be imposed only where it is required to serve an important safety purpose. l l ~ J
The need for backfitting should be determined on the basis of overall plant operation. 4 Cost / benefit should be considered in making backfit determinations. The burden for demonstrating the need for backfit should rest expressly on the proposing ' party. 2. Safety Goal policy should be developed to assist in establishing regulatory requirements and measuring the need for subsequent changes. i 3. The Commission should emphasize generic resolutions of licensing and regulatory issues. 4. Hearing improvements: The role of the hearing should be confined to dispute resolution. Procedures for " hybrid" hearings should be adopted. 3 Mandatory hearings in uncontested C.P. proceedings should be eliminated. B. Recommendations affecting future projects only 1. Preapproved Sites 2. Preapproved Designs 3. Stability of Approvals 4. Single-stageConstructionandOperatingLicenses(COL) the ACRS should be given statutory 5. ACRS Functions authority to decide which applications to review; except that review of standardized design approvals and applications referred by the Commission should be mandatory. II. NRC Scope and Functions: The NRC's mission and scope should be confined to nuclear safety and domestic safeguards. l l
,i :- III. Management and Accountability of NRC: 1. Implementation of NUREG 0885 should continue. 2. The Chairman should be designated by statute as the NRC's Chief Executive and Administrative Officer and given adequate authority to discharge this responsibility. 3. Impediments (ex parte inhibitions) to staff communications with and direction from the Chairman and the Commission should be eliminated. 4. The staff and the Commission should be consolidated in one location. 5. Regionalization should proceed with care. 6. The interface between NRC and its facility licensees must, and can be, improved. 7. Research management and incorporation of research results in regulations deserve additional attention. 8. Interagency coordination needs special attention to assure timeliness and cost effectiveness. j
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