ML20024D075
| ML20024D075 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 07/29/1983 |
| From: | Bloch P, Jordan W, Mccollom K Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | |
| References | |
| 79-430-060, 79-430-60, ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8308030126 | |
| Download: ML20024D075 (61) | |
Text
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es UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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J NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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_q Before Administrative Judges: 2 Peter B. Bloch, Chairman kh gh Dr. Kenneth A. McCollom es#
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Dr. Walter H. Jordan e
In the Matter of ASLBP No. 79-430-060 TEXAS UTILITIES GENERAT'ING COMPANY, et al.
Docket No. 50-445-0L 50-446-OL hgg gG 1DN (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units I and 2)
July 29, 1983 PROPOSED INITIAL DECISION (Concerning aspects of construction quality control, emergency planning and Board questions)
This is the first initial decision in this operating license proceeding. The issues we decide today relate to particular allegations of failure of Texas Utilities ~ Generating Company, et al.'s (applicant's)
I quality assurance program during ' construction of Comanche Peak and' to allegations concerning the adequacy of emergency planning.
Hearings on these particular allegations were completed on September 17' INi2' and~
proposed findings of fact were received from the parties on February 25 1983.2 h
Although " quality assurance" and " quality control" sometimes are used in a specialized way, we generally will use these words interchangeably in our opinion.
The State of Texas did not file proposed findings.
Citizens Association for Sound Energy (CASE or intervenor) filed proposed 8308030126 030729 PDR ADOCK 05000
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Initial Decision:
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-In this decision we have. declared CASE to be in default cn each allegation on which it has not filed findings of fact. However, we also have examined each important a'llegation that is in default in order to determine whether to raise any of these defaulted issues by ourselves (sua sponte).
See 10 CFR 9 2.760a.
In a few instances, we require some additional' evidence before determining whether or not to declare a sua sponte issue.
Two of the three members of this Board were added to it after the hearings on the matters we address.
Consequently, we have adopted the unusual procedure of issuing a proposed decision.
The consequence of calling this a prcposed decision is that the Board recognizes that its record is coaiplex and that it is wiser, under the circumstances, to invite coments on our tentative conclusions before we become ccmmitted to them.
We expect the parties to object to any aspect of this decision
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which they believe to be in error.
Objections must clearly and logically explain what the suspected error is and the legal and factual
' arguments on which the objection is based.3 Failure to comply with any findings on some of the allegations discussed in this decision.
CASE indicated that it wished an extension of time to file proposed
- findings on additional issues.
However, the parties had been granted a six week extension for filing of proposed findings.
Reconsideration of December 7, 1982 Order at 1-2 (December 21, 1982).
Under the circumstances, good cause has not been shown for granting CASE more time in which to file its proposed findings.
3 We received Applicants' Summary of the Record Regarding Weave and
. Downhill Welding (July 15, 1983) during the preparation of this
Initial Decision:
3 aspect of this required format may result in a default on the ob-jections.
The Board had posed certain questions and taken some limited evidence, to determine whether - there _is a serious question that the Board should raise by itself.
See 10 C. F.R.
9 2.760a.
The Board concludes that it is not now raising any of the questions sua sponte.
I.
Contention 5 and the Applicable Law Contention 5 states:
The Applicants' failure to adhere to the quality astt*ar.ce/ quality control provisions required by the construction permits for Comanche Peak, Units 1 and 2, and trie requirements of Appendix B of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, and the construction practices employed, specif-ically in regard to corcrete work, mortar blocks, steel, fracture toughness testing, expansion joints, placetent of the reactor vessel for Unit 2, welding, insoection and testing, materials used, craft labor qualifications and woning conditions {as they may affect QA/QC), ar.d training and organization cf QA/QC personnel, have raised substantial questions as to the adequacy of the con-struction of the facility.
As a result, the Comr..ission cannot make the findings required by 10 C.F.R. ? 50.57(a) necessary for issu-ance of an operating license for Comanche Peak.
decision.
Since other parties have not had an opportunity to comment on this filing, we have not considered it.
However, the filing is a - model of the kind of specificity we expect in
' objections to this decision.
It includes footnotes to the record.
It also uses an affidavit, which parties may file in support of their objections if-they consider it helpful.
Initial D: cision:
4 Order subsequent to the Prehearing Conference of April 30, 1980, slip op. at 11' (June 16,1980) (unpublished).
As the Board has previously indicated,4 this is a broad contention calling into question the applicant's entire quality assurance program.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1956, as amended, 5 103, 42 U.S.C. Q 2133 (1976), authorizes the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to issue licenses
'for nuclear power plants to applicants "who agree to observe such safety standards to protect health and to minimize danger to life or property as the Commission may by rule establish...."
The Commission has, by rule, requirad that "[s]tru;tures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed, fabricated, erected, and tested to quality standards commensurate with the i.nportance of the safety function to be performed."
Criterion 1, Appendix A-General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,10 C.F.R. Part 50. A quality assurance program is required to ensure that the safety functions will be properly performed.
Id. Criteria' for the quality assurance program are set forth in Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 50 and must be discussed in the Preliminary l-Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) for construction permit applications and in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for operating license applications.
10 C.F.R. s 50.34.
l.
The chief concern of the quality assurance program is to identify and correct problems that arise during plant construction or operation.
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4 Tr. 714-l i
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Initial Decision:
5 Indeed, a quality assurance program that failed to find problems would undoubtedly be ineffective.
A problem identified by the quality assurance program may cause concern for the public safety if it cannot be satisfactorily resolved.
A program may also cause concern if it identifies an extraordinarily large number of deficiencies, casting doubt on the plant's design and construction processes.
Additionally, if a quality assurance program identifies extraordinarily few deficiencies or if we were to find that substantial numbers of deficiencies have been overlooked, that may raise questions about the adeqtacy of the qcality assdrancil progran, At this stage, we are not evaluating the overall efficacy of the quality assur-ance program, but, rather, whether any of the alleged deficier.cies are sufficiently serious ard uncorrectable that the plant, due to thoss deficiencies, cannot operate with the requisite degree of safety.
In other words, we have considered each allegation independently, without regard to whether it may represent a pattern related to the adequacy of the quality assurance program.
In addition, there are particular allegations which have been or will be the subject of hearings held after September 17, 1982.
These questions are not re-solved by this decision.
A.
Rock Overbreak One of the specific allegations encompassed within Contention 5 was that during construction blasting, rock which was supposed to remain
Initial Decision: 6 intact was displaced arid cracked.
The foundation for Comanche Peak is set on a rock structure known as the Glen Rose limestone.
This is a marine formation of the Cretaceous age.5 The Glen Rose limestone is
" soft" or " weak" rock and is not homogeneous.7 Both of these factors 0
make it difficult to predict and control the effects of blasting in this particular rock.
The applicant's geotechnical consultants, Mason-Johnston and Associates, Inc., recommended that all safety-related structures be placed against intact rock.0 It was planned that once the site had been
~1eveled off at plant grade (i.e i. the c;ountain. too had been removed down 9
to a specified leva 1 ) excavation for the reactor buildings would asstre that their bases would ba 40 feet below plant grade.19 Explosives were used for the purpose of creating a crack in the rock around the perimeter of-the hole for each containment butiding, Further blasting was contemplated to break up the rock within that perimeter crack.11 5
-Tr. 803.
l 6
Tr. 835, 946.
7' Tr. 957-8, 1210.
8 Tr. 809.
9 Tr. 806-07.
10 Tr. 808.
11 Tr. 809-814.
i
y, Initial Decision:
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unexpectedly, the blasting to create-tha hole for the Unit 1 containment caused approximately the top ' ten feet of the rock wall around the planned hole to be displaced and to suffer both horizontal and vertical cracking.12 Although changes were made to the blasting procedures when the hole for the Unit 2 containment was blasted, a similar overbreak pattern emerged.13 Overbreak also occurred in excavating for other safety-related buildings.14 Indeed, the overbreak was so' extensive that there was no point in associating particular fractured rock with the excavatier. of a
particular building.15 Applicent repcsted the avecbreak to the NRC purscant to 10 C.F.R.
5 50.55(e).16 The extent of tna overbreak was determined by digging trer.ches at increasing distances from the excavatior. wall and examinin.g them for cracks.
When a trench was dug for which any cracks on the side closest 6
to the excavation were found not to have been propagated to the far side
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of the trench, that was determined to be the edge of the overbreak.17 I
t 12 Tr. 815-16.
13 l
Tr. 829.
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-14 Tr. 831, 1208-09, 1269-1272.
.15
.Tr. 1270.
-16 Tr. :845-46, 1270.
Q 50.55(e) requires that serious breakdowns be reported to the NRC.
17 Tr. 819-21.
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Initial Decision: 8 Overbreak was dete:ted.op to approximately thirty feet from the exca-vation.18 While some overbreak is, common during construction, the amount of overbreak at Comanche Peak was unexpectedly large.19 To " repair" the overbreak, all rock within the area of the overbreak was removed utilizing techniques which did not require blasting.20 6nce this rock had been removed, some cracks were found in the newly created walls.21 These cracks did not appear to be associated with displaced. rock and >:ere grouted.22 The original shape of the excavation was restored by filling with concrete the area frcm which f ractured rock had been re::;oved.2"'
This %ntal" concrete was less :trong than that used in construct-f ing the reacter buildit:gs; nevcrtheless, it was stronger than the fr ictured cor.k had been.24 There was uncontroverted testiineny f rem ti.e applicant's panel that, ence these repairs haa been effected, the foundation was actually improved from what it would have been if the l
18 Tr. 820.
~19 Tr. 835, 1115, 1209-12.
20 Tr. 817, 821-22.
21 Tr. 823-24.
22 Tr. 832-33, 1272.
23 Tr. 817.
24 Tr. 827, 955-56.
Initial Decision:
9 0
overbreak had not occurred.25 The applicant's witnesses also testified, without contradiction, that the seismic capacity of the site was not impaired by the repair.26 The NRC cited the applicants for.failing to have and to utilize quality control procedures for excavation for these safety-related structures.27 Applicant subsequently developed such procedures.28 It is apparent, however, that, even without quality assurance procedures for. this excavation, the applicant detected and took action to remedy tne everbreak.
Moreover, the soundness of all areas excavated before the quality control procsciures ware instituted was ver!fied by an engir,eering geologist who was present during all phases of the exca-vation.
The engineering geologist verified tha soundness of all the materials en whicn concrete was to be placed.
In makilig this judgcaent, he relied on professional knowledge and confirming photographs.29 The repair work, in addition, was subject to quality assurance procedures.30 While it was a quality control deficiency to have done the exca-vation without quality control procedures, we find that this has not led 25 Tr. 835, 838.
26 Tr. 957-58.
27 Tr. 1051, 1273, 1279; CASE Ex. 15.
28 Tr. 1055.
29 Tr. 1047-48.
30 Tr. 843.
Initial Decision:
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to e lasting deficiency.
This potential problem has been negated by the detection and satisfactory repair of the excavation defects which should have been detected by the quality control program.
The possible implications of management's failure to implement quality assurance procedures for the excavation activities is not being considered in this decision.
B.
Cracks in Concrete Allegations were raised that cracks were present in the basemat for the cortainnent.
CASF presented no witne:ses whc 3ddressed the aliegations.
However, CASE did introduce as exhibits a nen-conformance report (NCR) and a revision to it which rdfer to cracks "on 81?.' Base Mat Centainment 91".31 Using 'the pour numbers given in that same NCR and revision,32 witnesses for.the applicants and the staff determined that the cracks in 33 question were not in the basemat but were in the reactor shield wall.
This is part of the internal concrete which is, in fact, separated from the twelve foot thick concrete basemat by a steel liner.34 The concrete 31 CASE Exs. 8 and 9.
32 Tr.
1363.
33 Tr. 1011-13, 1363.
34' Tr. 850-54, 1181.
s
7 Initial Decision: 11-
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pours in which the cracking occurred surround the reactor vessel.35 The 36
. wall of which ~ these pours are a part is steel reinforced.
Its main-function is the provision of radiation shielding.37 The witnesses uniformly concluded that-these were shrinkage cracks,
-caused by : the-shrinkage.of' concrete as 'it-cools. 8 -These are essen-
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tially hairline cracks into which.something as small as a pencil lead would not fit.39 Crahks of this ' type are not unusual or. troublesome i
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when:found in large concrete pours.40
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The staff vitresses believed that the cracks were about two inches
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4 decp.41 The applicant's witnesses believea that tne cracks went +.hrough the entire depth of the pour.42. In determining the structural adecuacy of. the : shield wall,. the assumption was made - that the cracks went entirely through the pour.43 In addition, expert testimony was given by h
the architect-engineering firm responsible for the-design that a i
I 35 f
Tr. 856', 859-66; App. Exs. 21 and 22.-
36 Tr. 355.
37-Tr. 865.
i 38 Tr. 867, 870-71, 1384.
39.
Tr. 867, 1198.
40 Tr. 869.
[
41l Tr. 1374-75.
42 Tr.' 960.
43 Tr. 1398.
Initial Decision:
12 construction joint could have been placed at approximately the location of the shrinkage-crack, since the concrete -pour was so large.
The formation of the' shrinkage crack is said to serve much the same purpose as a construction joint' at_ this location might have served.44 Unrebutted _ testimony was presented that these cracks in the con-crete did not impair the wall's capacity to perform its intended.
functions.45 Radiation shielding would not be affected.46 Nor would tha wall's ability to transfer vertical loads.47 The reinforcing steel i
(reber) in the wall is relied on tc take ter.sion loads.40 A potential problem that was examined is ahether the crack woulii admit water that would rust the rebar. Fcwever, there is unlikely to Le any problem with water reaching the reinfcrcing steel throagh the cracks, causir.g rust and weakening the sten 1's load bearing capacity."
After a short time, the exposed surfaces of the cracks were groutec' to present a smooth face for painting.50 The grout excludes water.
44 Tr. 882-83.
5 Tr. 885, 1295.
46, Tr. 885-86, 1301.
47 Tr. 869, 1300.
48 Tr. 866, 885.
49 Tr. 897-98, 1022, 1028.
50 Tr. 1205, 1313.
Initial Decision:
13 These cracks ~were identified through the quality assarance system, which illustrates that, at least in this regard, the system was-func-tioning _ at Comanche Peak.
They have been analyzed and minor repairs made.
Based on the record before us, we conclude that the repair was
-adequate and there is no safety problem associated with the cracks.
C.
Other Specific Allegations Raised in the Centext of Contention 5 CASE presented several witnesses who made allegations about construction deficiencies sno d3ficiencies in the quality control syrtem at Comanche Peak.
Howreer, CASE did not inciude these matters in its oroposed findings even though the proposed findings were mandetory.
See Findirg; of Fact; CASE -Exnibits) at 3-4 (Jrcemaer 7, Order (?reposid i
1982)-(anpublished).
Because this Board is consequently left to specu-late about what CASE currently contends about these issues, its failure to file proposed findings constitutes abandonment of this portion of its case.
See Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating
-Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAS-717, 17 NRC
, slip op. at 48-49 (March 4,-19P3); Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2),
I ALAB-709, 17 NRC (January 4, 1983); 10 C.F.R. 5 2.754(b).
i We therefore find that CASE has abandoned the allegations on which I
it has not filed findings.
We have, however, considered whether these
(
allegations raise such serious questions of public health and safety l
that we should raise them as sua sponte issues.
We discuss briefly why, based on the record, we either have decided not to raise these matters l
t
Initial D: cision:
14 sua sponte or have indicated that further information is required before we can reach that determination.51 1.
Allegations by John Junior Gates CASE witness John Junior Gates was a carpenter who worked on the Comanche - Peak site from November 1976 to March 1979.52 Much of his concern related to the fact that work was done and, due to design changes, had to be ripped out and redone.
He related this to increased cost and low worker morale.
As Mr. Gates himself testified, rework and low worker marsle does not affect the quality of tM plant if ultimatelf the wo.-k will only be approved wnea it is durie correctly.53 Mr. Gates testified that he did not know whether in the end tile work was done correctly. 4 Tne fact that rework wa.s required, however s :ggests that approval was not forthcoming unless the work met the specifications.
The Board finds that this allegation does not by itself raise a serious health or safety issue.
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'51 Some of the allegations could relate to the question of the extent l
of management's commitment to quality control.
That issue, of course, we have specifically left open in this decision.
In i.
addition, matters which relate-to allegations made by CASE witnesses Mark Walsh and Jack Doyle or to issues raised by the staff's Construction Appraisal Team report also remain open.
52 j
Testimony of John Junior Gates, CASE Ex. 651, at 5.
53 Tr. 2795, 2820-21.
f 54 Gates Testimony, CASE Ex. 651, at 21.
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Initial Decision:
15 Mr. Gates also alleged. that at one point work on the steel liner for the Unit'l containment was halted because the steel liner was four inches out of plumb.55 The applicant agreed that the liner had been out of alignment, but applicant's witnesses testified that this had been
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- corrected to within specified tolerances.56 Construction was stopped and stiffeners were added to the inside of the liner, bringing it back
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in line before continuing construction.57 This matter does not raise an issue which the Board finds it should pursue sua sponte.
According to f(r. Gates certain water stops were improperly in-stalled.58 He mentioned that calls were put in the water stops, tacting i
i them to the forms.
A water stop is a neoprene strip half of which is embedded in concrete on each side of a joint in a wall.
Since the nails are located at a distance away frca the actucl joint, soplicant asbured
,. the Board that there is no problem of leakage from this normal procedure.59 The forms are removed, together with the nails after the concrete is -poured.
The applicant also testified that, as of the time 1
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of the hearing, no water seepage was occurring through the outside walls 55 Gates Testimony, CASE Ex. 651, at 37.
56 Tr. 2988, 2992.
57 Tr. 2992-93, 2995-3000.
58 Gates Testimony, CASE Ex. 651, at 37.
59 Tr. 2989-90.
Initial Decision:
16 of any safety-related building.60 For these reasons, we see no need to pursue these questions further.
Mr. Gates also alleged that the concrete work at Comanche Peak was
" sloppy."
He mentioned observing honeycombing, watery concrete, and materials left-in the concrete.61 His knowledge, however, did not.seem to extend to - whether possible problems have been corrected.62 To illustrate the problems with the concrete work, Mr. Gates pointed to a photograph of the containment buildings.63 He stated, however, that the defects which he believed vera snown by the photograp.hs would not have any structural significu.ce.
This lacy of structural signif!cance was confirmed oy Raiph McGrace, a profest,jon&l engirteer wno appeared as a witness for the aplicart.65 The Board finds that Mr.
Gates' allegations about concrete work oo not contain any specific infarmation 1.
which caurcs the Boara to be concerned with the structural integrity of safety-related concrete' at Comanche Peak.
Hence, the Board will not raise this issue sua sponte.
60 Tr. 2993.
61 Gates Testimony, CASE Ex. 651, at 24-26, 36.
62 See, e. g. Tr.-2842; Gates Testimony, CASE Ex. 651, at 26.
63 Gates Testimony, CASE Ex. 651, at 24; Board Ex. 4.
64 Tr. 2883.
65
.Tr. 2990-92.
Initial Decision:
17-6 2.
Allegations by Stanley G. Miles CASE witness Stanley G. Miles was employed at Comanche Peak from
- March.1977 to ~ May 1982.66 Like Mr. Gates, he was concerned about low worker morale.67 Low morale alone, assuming that it could be adequately defined and measured, does not raise health and safety concerns.
Only if low morale causes defective work to be accepted as the final product would this cause us to question the safety of the plant. - We have no reason to believe that defective work was accep,ted.
If a specific instance is brought to our attention, we can, of course, aadress that specific instance.
As a generel matter, however, we have no reason to raise a question about the pcssibility that low morr.le has, by itself, led to an unsafe plant.
Mr. Mile:. also alleged that in one instance he was instructed to do work for which he had not been provided a blueprint.68 He alleged that
~ igs manufactured by Manitowoc, in he had welded boom struts on r
violation of the conditions of Manitowoc's warranty.69 He alleged that 66 Testimony of Stanley G. Miles, CASE Ex. 655, at 1.
67 Id. at 49.
68 Miles Testimony.
CASE Ex. 655, at 31.
59 Supplementary Testimony of Stanley G. Miles, CASE Ex. 657, at 4.
u.
Initial Decision:
18 a panel was made to appear to have been anchored with Hilti-bolts when it had not been.70 None of these allegations would have safety significance for the plant.
Neither Mr. Miles' work without a blueprint nor the false Hilti bolts, apparently. anchoring the panel, occurred in a safety-related area.71 The Manitowoc rigs apparently are no longer even used on the Comanche Peak site.72 Mr. Miles also alleged that there were problems with the polar crane.
He alleged that there were 3/8 ir.ch gaps between each lon2 tudinul section of the rails on whicn the polar crane ran.
As the f
crane was operated, the rails could mcVe, a( cumulating some of tha gaps so that as much as five inches cculd be found in a sir.gle gap.
When tht' 3
polar crana wheel dropped into this gap, it wculd stop However, Mr.
Miles also testified that the problem had been corrected by the clips that he personally had installed.
These clips were made of a weld-on piece, a bolt-on piece and the bolt itself.74 So there is no defect remaining that the Board might declare to be a sua sponte issue.
=70 Miles Testimony, CASE Ex. 655, at 26-27.
71 Id. at 31, 27.
72 Miles Supplementary Testimony, CASE Ex. 657, at 5-6.
73 Tr. 2932.
74 Tr. 2978-79.
Initial Decision:
19 Also, in connection with the polar crare, Mr. Miles alleged that, contrary to the design documents, " fingers" were cut off of several shims to make them fit in their designated places.75 It appears that this did occur.
However, the Board does not believe that it is a matter
- which the Board should pursue sua sponte because it appears that the staff and the applicant are addressing it.
The staff issued a Notice of Violation'in connection with the failure to inspect these shims.76 The applicant has stated that all the shims in the polar crane girder support brecket assemblies will be removed and inspected.
Shims which have clipped " fingers" will be evaluated by an engir.eer to determine whether they are acceptaole. I 3.
/liegations by Cordella Marie Hami? ten aqd Rcoert i.. Hamilton Mr. Robert L. and Mrs. Cordella Marie Hamilton appeared as a panel; both raised concerns about the quality assurance program for protective coatings.
Mrs. Hamilton worked as a documentation clerk for the protec-tive coating quality assurance program.78 Mr. Hamilton was a quality 1
75 Miles Testimony, CASE Ex. 655, at 17.
76 Staff Ex. 1488.
77 Testimony of ' John T. Merritt, Jr. Regarding Placement of Shims in Polar Crane Glider Support Bracket Assemblies, App. Ex.127, at 6.
78 Testimony of Cordella Marie Hamilton, witness for CASE, CASE Ex.
652, at 1-2.
Initial Decision:
20 assurance supervisor for the protective coatings.79 Certain allegations in this area were made.by Mr. Hamilton, certain allegations were made by Mrs.~ Hamilton, and certain allegations were made by both.
Mrs. Hamilton alleged that there were deficiencies in documentation for protective coating. quality assurance.. Specifically Mrs. Hamilton alleged that.some paperwork. required a large number of revisions or was never-corrected and that approximately fifteen quality assurance in-spection reports were lost.80 Mrs. Hamilton testified, however, that the problems were identified through an audit and all necessary cor-rections were made.01 Reinspection was requiraa because documentation
,L was. missing.
Althcugh Mrs. Hamilton did not balleve the required reinspection tock place, because the uterial was out in the field and had been cut up,82 she indicated that the lost documentatior, had oc*
indicated any deficiencies.83 Therefore, it appears that the documenta-tion problems identified by-Mrs. Hamilton either have been corrected or had no safety significance.
In addition, it appears.that the procedures 79 Testimony of Robert L. Hamilton, witness for CASE, CASE Ex. 653, at 1.
80 C. Hamilton Testimony, CASE Ex. 652, at 5, 9-10.
81 Id. at 8, 9, 14.
It is not clear from Mrs. Hamilton's testimony Wether there was an audit by the applicant or an inspection by the NRC. _However, an NRC inspection report did note deficiencies in the program in 1981. 'See App. Ex. 448.
82 C. Hamilton Testimony, CASE Ex. 652, at 15,18.
83
_Id. at 18.
,.. ~, -,. _..
- - _. -,. ~. ~.
Initial Decision:
21 governing paperwork for protective coating quality assurance were changed in July 1981.84 Thus it would seem that the source of the alleged problems also has been addressed. -The Board finds nothing to raise as a sua sponte' issue arising from this allegation.
Mrs. Hamilton was also concerned about the specified rnethod for determining " tack-free time" for paint, but she admitted that she - did not know that the method being used was incorrect.85 She further alleged that there were problems with the calibration of instruments used in paint inspections.85 These two allegations, made by a lay witness in very ger.eral terms, are insufficient to indicate a deficiency or to serve as a basis for a sua_ spente ' question by the Board.
They.
appear to be in the nature of general questions rather than the identi-fication of specific problems which might require a serious inquiry.
-Mrs. Hamilton alleged that for a year quality control inspectors were -directed not to write NCRs on work done by the paint department.87 Mr. Hamilton testified that he was directed to stop writing if not any, at least so many, NCRs.88' Neither the staff nor the applicant addressed these allegations directly.
These allegations are, however, closely i
84 I_d. at 13.
d 85 M. at 18-19.
86
- Id. at 21-22.
87 M.at19.
88 R. Hamilton Testimony, CASE Ex. 653, at-22, 43, 53-54.
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Initial Decision:
22 related to the issue of management's commitment to the quality control program. As such, they remain open.
In addition, Mr. Hamilton's allegation that craft personnel ha-0 rassed quality control inspectors is related to management's attitude towards -the quality assurance program.
If management permitted or failed to discourage harassment of inspectors, that would, of course, reflect adversely on that attitude.
The question of whether this has occurred remains cpen.
Mr. Hamilton alleged that he and two otner inspectors were fired for trying to do tacir inspection job.90 The given reason fer his firing was that he refused to make an inspection under what he telieved were unsafe working conditio.1s.
However, he alleged that other indi-viduals who rafused to nuke the same inspecticn under the same conditions were not fired.91 This allegation is rel,evant to the appli-cant's attitude towards the quality control program and will be dealt with in a' subsequent decision.
Mr. Hamilton also alleged that his quality assurance supervision was not qualified.92 While this could also reflect on management's commitment to quality assurance, we note that Mr. Hamilton's concerns in 89-
._Id. at 36-38.
90 Id. at 26.
91
_Id.
92 Id. at 14, 16.
Initial Decision:
23
-this regard apparently related to his opinion that he was more knowl-edgeable than his supervisors in the area of procedures for quality assurance inspection of paint.93 He disagreed with changes in proce-dures and objected to supervisors overruling quality contrcl inspectors on specific inspection findings.94 We do not believe that an employee's disagreement with a decision made by his supervisor raises sufficient questions ' bout the supervisor's. qualifications that the Board should a
raise supervisor qualifications hs a sua sponte _ issue.
However, there
. appears to be a gap in the record because neither the applicant or the statf. has testified about whether the procedures which Mr. Hamilton criticized were, in fact, acceptable.
(Specifically Mr. Hamilton has questioned the lack o# standards for determining near white blast for surface preparation, the lack of a mnimum roughness for steel substrate surface, and procedural changes which allegedly. reduced all painting inspection to adhesion testing.)
If evicience introduced on this open item led us to. conclude that there were - significant faults in these inspection procedures, that could lead us to question the qualifications o.f the supervisors who approved them as well as the adequacy of the inspections performed following them.
We note, however, that this does 3
_Id. at 16, 39, 43.
94
_Id. at 15, 16, 18-19, 38.
fnitial Decision:
24 not indicate any present conclusion by the Board that problems exi:t in this regard.
It also appears that Mr. Hamilton disagreed with dispositions of NCRs.
He disagreed with the repair method for minor defects in paint-ing.95 He questioned the disposition of an NCR which addressed contamination of a painted surface which was force-cured using Kelly heaters which smoked.96 Once again, these specific allegations were not addressed in the hearing by either the applicant or the staff.
Since the implications of a failure to provide adequate disoosition of NCRs could be serious, we consider this an open item.
In particular, we need to be able to evaluate the disporition of the NCR related to smcking Kelly heaters and the procedures for repair of minor aefacts, as specified by Mr. H uilton.
There is one other allegation made by Mr. Hamilton which the Board is - currently unable to evaluate.
Mr. Hamilton alleged that a paint applied by Westinghouse and not tested by the applicant's quality 95
_Id. at 15.
6 Id. at 21-22.
He also questioned the disposition of an NCR on Wich he had documented what he believed was grease in paint.
Id.
at 21.
However, it was shown that the paint was ultimateeTy returned to the vendor.
Tr. 3502; App. Ex. 139.
While Mr.
Hamilton believed some of the paint had been used, he had applied hold tags -to the containers, the amount of paint missing was small (less than 2 containers), and some of the paint would have been used in an attempt to strain it and remove the foreign matter. Tr.
3503-05.
The Board is -satisfied that this NCR was properly dispositioned and does not raise any question of the safe operation of.the plant.
Initial Decision:
25 control program could not pass an adhesion test.9 We need to determine whether this use of paint is safety-related and, if so, whether the paint will perform satisfactorily.
Mr. Hamilton alleged that an audit of Carboline, a paint vendor, was a " white-wash."98 This audit followed two audits which had found unsatisfactory conditions at the Carboline plant.
Mr. Hamilton was not present for the audit which he felt was a white-wash and based his charges on a " gut feeling."99 He admitted that the sequence of events concerning Carbolir.e would appear to illustrate the satisfactory perfor-mance of the quality assurance program in resolving unsatisfactory conditions.100 There is no evidence that the audits of Carboline demonstrate anything other than appropriate functioning of the quality control program. Mr. Hamilton's gut feeling is not sufficient to induce us to inquire further.
Another of Mr.
Hamilton's allegations addressed undocumented removal of cable trays for which quality assurance documentation had been completed.101 Documentation problems have been noted by the NRC Construction Appraisal Team (CAT) and were addressed in a hearing 97 R. Hamilton Testimony, CASE Ex. 653, at 55.
98 Id_. at 24-25.
99 Id. at 47-48; Tr. 3522.
100 R. Hamilton Testimony, CASE Ex. 653, at 54.
101
_Id. at 55.
Initial Decision:
26 subsequent to the parties filing of proposed findings of fact.
This allegation will-be considered at the time the CAT findings are addressed.
Other. allegations made by Mr. Hamilton do not require that the Board raise sua sponte issues because they have not been sufficiently related-to deficiencies in the quality assurance program; consequently, the Board does r.ot believe that, if true, they would raise serious health or safety issues.
These include allegations that the only quality control vault ceiling is fire-proof,102 that it takes same time to retrieve records from the quality asst rance vault,103 that quality control inspectors did not observe paint being applied to buildings outside the containment,104 and that he was never instructed to take greater care'because the project was a nuclear plant.105 4.
Allegations by Darlene K. Stiner and Henry A. Stiner Darlene K. Stiner and Henry A. Stiner appeared as a panel providing direct testimony for CASE. Mr. Stiner.had worked at Comanche Peak as a i
10?'
i
_I_d.
103
_Id.-
104 Id; at 59.
105
-Id. at 65.
0 4
e,e,ss me----
c -
~
Initia1 Decision:
27
(
=;
N welder from November 1979 to December 1980 and' from June to. July 1
1981.106' Mrs. Stiner began working at Comanche Peak in August 1977 and was employed there at the time she-testified.107 She had been employed as a welder and was a quality assurance inspector 'at the f.ime she'
~ 27-~
testified.108 In his direct testimony Mr. Stiner indicated that he had a criminal record.109 The applicant's counsel brought out on cross-examination that he had multiple convictions and had not revealed all offthem on his second application for employment at Comanche Peak.110' He.had not indicated any criminal record on his first application for employ ~-
ment.111 i
TheBoardhasconsideredthisinformationindeterminingtheweight}
l
'it gives Mr. Stiner's testimony.
The Board notes that, almost without e
exception, Mr. Stiner's allegations are duplicated' by other witnesses.
Also, the Board is not aware of any motive that Mr. Stiner would have to 106 -CASE Ex. 666A.
107
-Testimony of Darlene K.
Stiner Witness for Intervenor CASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy), CASE Ex. 667, at 3 (Tr.
4127).
108 Id. at 3,5 (Tr. 4127, 4129).
109 Testimony of Henry A. -Stiner Witness for Intervenor CASE (Citizens, Association for Sound Energy), CASE Ex.
666, at' 47-48 (Tr.
4249-50).
110 Tr. 4488-89; App. Ex. 146.
111 - Tr. 4484, App. Ex. 145.
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' 'e Initial Decision:
28
?x hl'
&l s
w make allegations in this procepding which he did not believe were true.
If anything, the;. fact that MK Stiner's wife was employe.d at Comanche
~
Peak at the. time he testified would seemTn pro ide him?with a motive not to make allegationi against the applirant.
g The one allegation Ghich was made by Mr. Stiner and by no one else c
- 3 w was/tfiat he was terminated because he'showed a quality assurance inspec-
'i torna gouge in a pipe.r1123-This allegation was not elaborated on to any l{
4
.g
-'ej L
i4 f sigitificant extent by any of the parties. However, itis.related to the
~
.n z
W cudstian'of management's commitment to quality centrol 'and,' as such, it y
Y I
. ill be considered in a later decision.
W y+
Another concern raised by Mr. Stiner was that a hole was crected in j
1 u
~,
~ N goncr.ete in the Safeguards -Builuing when he removed a partially in-y stalled Hilti bolt.113 Mrs. Stiner also observed the hole.114 Mr.
% p,s V. ' P St.iner alleged that repair;of the hole was not subject to proper quality a.s fissurance control.115 The staff has investigated this allegatiion and I, <,.
=.
Report 81-12.110 ' The inves-
' reported its findings in Investigation
'tigation concluded-that this allegation did not raise any safety g,
\\
112 H. Stiner Testimony, CASE Ex. 666, at 34, 4d)('Tr. 4236, 4242).
113 Id. at 25 (Tr. 4227).
114 y
d'-Stiner Testim'ony, CASE Ex. 667, at 40 (Tr. 4161).
f 115 H. Stinet Testigiony, CASE Ex. 666, at 25 (Tr. 4227).'
116 Staff Ex. 178.
.a b
4\\
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Initial DQcision:
29 O
questions.117 Because we have no reason to doubt the staff's evaluation of the significance of a hole in the wall of the Safeguards Building, we will not declare *this a sua sponte issue.118 Mr. Stiner also alleged that he was not told that greater care should be taken because the facility was a nuclear plant.119 This-allegation relates to the overall adequacy of the quality assurance program, but it is not by itself a cause for concern about the safety of the plant.
An allegation that was made by both Mr. and Mrs. Stiner was that pieces of scrap iron were added to hangers or supports in the field.120 At least one of these allegations would appear to relate to Class 5
("V") hangers,121 some of which may not be subject to the quality assur-ance system.122 As to a Class III hanger mentioned by Mr. Stiner, he said that the heat number was added to a shim that had been made out of a scrap 117
_Id_. at 9.
118 We are concerned that the staff did not provide a reasoned explanation for its conclusion, but we do not see any reason to inquire further about this particular defect.
119 H. Stiner Testimony, CASE Ex. 666, at 32 (Tr. at 4234).
120 Id. at 41-42 (Tr. 4242-43); D. Stiner Testimony, CASE Ex. 667, at TT-48 (Tr. 4171-72).
121 H. Stiner Testimony, CASE Ex. 666, at 42 (Tr. 4244).
122 Tr. 4082, 4565.
Initial Decision:
30 f
metal.123 According to rebuttal testimony by the applicant, use of new material is not required and traceability through heat numbers is only required for structural members used in component supports.124 The shim is not a structural member. As far as Mrs. Stiner's allegation that she was directed to weld a piece of angle iron onto a small Class III support, she admitted that she does not know what happened to the support once it was taken from her.
She did not known whether it was installed or scrapped.125 None of these specific instances appears to be a problem.
There-fore, the Board does not believe the Stiners' allegations in this regard raise serious health and safety quistions about the plant which require the Board to raise this as a sua spot;e issue.
The Stiners made numerous allegations about welding practices at
-Comanche Peak.
They alleged that weave beading occurred although it was j
prohibited on site.126 Weave beading involves welding using transverse oscillations of the ' electrode.127 They further alleged that if weave
..Il.
beading welding violations occurred, the weld was improperly repaired.
123 H. Stiner Testimony, CASE Ex. 666, at 41-42 (Tr. 4242-43).
~124.. Applicant cited ASME Section III or ANSI B-31.1 as the applicable code sections.
See.Tr. 4628-29.
125 :D.-Stiner Testimony, CASE Ex. 667, at 47-48 (Tr. 4171-72).
126 Id_. at 23-4, 28 -(Tr. 4147-48, 4152).
127 Tr. 4086.
Initial Decision:
31 Specifically, they alleged that repair of weave-beaded we'ds requires the grinding out and rewelding of the entire weld,128 but that the practice of welders was to grind the surface of the v; eld which showed transverse oscillations and make only a surface welding pass.129 The applicant presented rebuttal testimony that established that only' welding which involved significant transverse oscillation was prohibited as weave beading.
Brown and Root, the firm performing construction at Comanche Peak, defines this to mean oscillations greater than four times the diameter of the weld rod used.130 Because some transverse oscillation is permitted at Comanche Peak as being acceptable under Section IX of the code of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), some of the welds which concerned the Stiners may have been acceptable.
The NRC did an investigation of the allegations of weave beading. A visual inspection of an area in which this weave beading had allegedly occurred did not disclose weave welds.131 However, it would not have 128 D. Stiner Testimony, CASE Ex. 667, at 26 (Tr. 4150).
129 Id. at 25 (Tr. 4149); H. Stiner Testimony, CASE Ex. 666, at 9-10 TTr. 4211-12); Tr. 4357.
130 Rebuttal Testimony of C. Thomas Brandt, Ronald G. Tolson, Gordon R.
Purdy, Raymond J. Vurpillat and Randall D. Smith Regarding Quality Assurance / Quality Control, App. Ex. 141, at 30 (Tr. 4685); Tr.
4412, 4420, 4635-6.
131 Staff Ex. 178 at 5.
Initial Decision:
32 done so if the welds had been reworked as described by the Stiners.132 Conversations by the investigator with five welders revealed that three had seen weave welds but that those welds had been corrected.133 The applicant presented testimony that the repair method described by the Stiners did not violate any procedures.134 The witness testified that by the time the weld has been ground down, it no longer exceeds the allowable diameter.135
- However, we are unable to accept this explanation because we fail to understand the engineering principles involved here.
In particular, we do not understand the configuration of the joints in which weave beading occurred, where the grinding takes place or how the grinding cures the underlying weakness in the joint due to excess transverse oscillation during welding.
Hence, we consider this to be an open item.
The Stiners alleged that " plug welds" were used to fill improperly placed bolt holes and that this was not a permissible procedure.136 The applicant's witnesses testified that this procedure was permitted for filling misdrilled holes at Comanche Peak and that this work requires a i
132 Tr. 4599.
l 133 Staff Ex. 178 at 5.
134 Tr. 4650-51.
l l
135
_Id.
136 D. Stiner Testimony, CASE Ex. 667, at 30 (Tr. 4134); H.
Stiner Testimony, CASE Ex. 666, at 43-44 (Tr. 4219-20).
L i
Initial Decision:
33 final visual inspection by quality assuranc.).137 An NRC investigation of this allegation found that plug welding occurred and that quality control inspectors were aware that they were required to inspect it.138 Mr. Stiner, however, specifically stated that these welds are being made without quality assurance inspecting them.139 Neither the applicant nor the staff appear to have addressed the question of whether such welds are.being made and not being inspected.
Nor have we been able to find the ASME code provisions that may allow this practice.
Hence, the allegation is an open item.
Mr. Stiner alleged that downhill welding sometimes occurred, in violation of site procedures.140 The applicant's rebuttal panel testified that although Brown and Rcot procedures may have prohibited downhill welding at Comanche Peak, it is allowed by ASME Section 9 for root and cover pass and is allowed by the American Welding Society (AWS) to repair undercut.141 The record does not specify whether the Stiner allegations were limited to root and cover pass welds.
Consequently, i
l l
137 Applicant's Rebuttal Panel Testimony, App. Ex. 141, at 36 (Tr.
4691).
138 Staff Ex. 178 at 6.
i 139 H. Stiner Testimony, CASE Ex. 666, at 19 (Tr. 4221).
140 Id_. at 44-45 (Tr. 4246-47).
141 Tr. 4601-02.
Initial Decision:
34 the record explanation of the allegation is incomplete and this is an open item.
Both of the Stiners alleged that there were problems with the control of welding rods. Mrs. Stiner stated that, while these rods were supposedly controlled and accounted for through the use of stubs that assigned rods to a particular welder for a particular job, she had discovered rods which had been abandoned or thrown out without the control. system having identificd the problem.142 She also stated that there were instances when welders claimed to have used more welding rods than would be needed for a particular job.143 Thus, welders could have claimed to have used rods, kept them, and later used them on a weld for which they had not been issued and might be inappropriate.
Mr. Stiner testified that be had performed welding using rods which had been issued to other welders.144 The applicant, in rebuttal to the Stiners' allegation, presented testimony that weld rods were controlled to assure that safety-related weld rods of a proper type were used for a specific application.145 The panel stated that some NCRs had been written when these procedures were l
142 D. Stiner Testimony, CASE Ex. 667, at 41 (Tr. 4165).
143
_Id.
144 H. Stiner Testimony, CASE Ex. 666, at 19 (Tr. 4221).
145 Applicant's Rebuttal Panel Testimony, App. Ex. 141, at 34 (Tr.
4689).
w
Initial Decision: 35 not followed.146 (Mrs. Stiner herself identified one such NCR that she had written.)147 This testimony is not sufficient to resolve the issue.
The fact that NCRs have been written on uncontrolled weld rods does not refute a charge that the control system for these rods, while presW, is less than perfect.
Neither the staff nor the applicant has presented evidence that the system is so effective that we may conclude that almost all (or all) of the breaches are corrected by the quality control system.
This in an open item.
There appears to be no way to clarify the scope of this problem without a field investigation.
It was also alleged that it was a common practice for welders to leave unplugged for prolonged periods the containers which were intended to keep weld rods heated.148 The purpose of keeping the rods heated is to prevent the welding rods from absorbing moisture.149 If the rods do absorb moisture, the moisture will escape as steam during the welding.
This will cause surface porosity.150 (Porosity is holes or voids made 146
_Id. at 35 (Tr. 4690).
147 CASE Ex. 6675.
148 D. Stiner Testimony, CASE Ex. 667, at 39 (Tr. 4163).
149 Tr. 4597.
150 Tr. 4302, 4597.
Knitial Decision:
36 in a weld by escap'ng steam.)151 Porosity is a visual inspection criterion for welds under the American Welding Society code.152 gf unheated rods cause welds with porosity, the weld must be inspected and repaired.153 This will solve the problem caused by the unheated rod.
Thus, this allegation involves construction practices rather than quality assurance and it involves practices which would not affect the safe operation of the facility.
The Board asked the applicant how welding in safety-related buildings would be verified prior to operation of the nuclear plant.
In describing the welding verification process, the applicant stated that all Class I, II, III and Y supports in safety-related areas will be examined on a case-by-case basis prior to turnover to the operations group.154 The process includes looking for evidence in the in-spection record that there was a final visual inspection and other inspections that were required to be performed on all pipe and equipment l
l 151 Tr. 4631.
152 Tr. 4632. Porosity is not a criterion for inspections performed to the ASME code.
_I d_.
153 Applicant's Rebuttal Panel Testimony, App. Ex. 141, at 35 (Tr.
4690); Tr. 4597.
154 Tr. 4646-48.
Initial Decision:
37 supports.155 The Board concludes that this voluntary action of the applicant is important to assure the integrity of these supports.
The Stiners also alleged that adequate quality control was not maintained over torquing of Hilti bolts.
The quality assurance inspec-tor is supposed ~to observe the torquing of Hilti bolts and to apply a material known as Torque Seal after the proper torquing has occurred.
(Inspection is not required for 100 percent of Hilti bolt torquing, but that is the goal of the program.)
The Stiners alleged that quality control inspectors performing a Hilti bolt inspection would not always stand whore they could observe
'the actual torquing;156 that Torque Seal, whose handling was supposed to be controlled, was improperly in the hands of craft' workers;157 and that Torque Seal had been found on Hilti bolts that had not been properly torqued.158 The applicant's response in this area was that it was not necessary for the inspector to observe the actual torquing of a Hilti bolt if the inspector checks the torque wrench for a proper setting, 155
_Id.
156 D. Stiner Testimony, CASE Ex. 667, at 34 (Tr. 4158); H.
Stiner Testimony,. CASE Ex. 666, at 23 (Tr. 4225); Tr. 4299-4300.
157
- 0. Stiner-Testimony, CASE Ex. 667, at 31 (Tr. 4155).
158 Id. at 36 (Tr. 4160); CASE Ex. 667R.
Initial Decision:
38 hears the -click indicating that the bolt has been torqued, sees the craft person doing the torquing, and has no room to be in position to see the torquing indicator on the wrench.159 The applicant's panel admitted that it was likely that the possession of Torque Seal was not
. entirely limited to quality assurance personnel, in spite of attempts to control it.160 The applicant argued that this was not a cause for concern, however, because final verification of Hilti bolt torquing is dependent on a review of quality assurance inspection records.161 The Board finds that there is no problem with the nature of the quality assurance inspections performed on Hilti bolts.162 The Board is concerned, however, that Mrs. Stiner understood her instructions to be that she should assume that all Torque Seal h'ad been applied by quality t.ssurance and that she should sign her inspections on that basis.163 yf quality control inspectors signed inspections because they fcund Hilti bolts covered with Torque Seal, the paper review of inspections would not reveal the fact that quality assurance had not actually checked i
i 159 Applicant's Rebuttal Panel Testimony, App. Ex. 141, at 32-33 (Tr.
l 4687-88); Tr. 4537-9.
160 Tr. 4534, 4536.
161 l
Applicant's Rebuttal Panel Testimony, App. Ex. 141, at 33 (Tr.
4688); Tr. 4541-42, 45-44.
162 See also Staff Ex. 178 at 7-8.
163 Tr. 4085.
l-
[
l l
Initial Decision:
39 whether the Hilti bolt had been torqued.
Consequently, this is an open item.
There needs to be further evidence, based on field investigation, concerning whether quality control inspectors considered the presence of Torque Seal to be so definitive that they did not check quality assurance records further.
Mrs. Stiner alleged that an NCR which she had written on a burned bus box adjacent to the polar ~ crane rail and resulting,in gouges in the polar crane rail was unfairly voided.164 The disposition of the NCR was that it was voided because its subject was not an item covered by the quality assurance program.165 There is no evidence that the bus box in questio'n is safety-related, so there is no reason for us to declare a sua sponte issue.
Mrs. Stiner made several other allegations to which the staff and applicant have not responded.
Some of them are reasonably specific and are open questions.
These include her allegations that Hanger
- SW-1-102-106-Y33K is in a safety-related area and is severely mis-matched;166 that a craft person was involved in performing quality assurance liquid penetrant inspections on the fuel pool liner;167 and 164 D.
Stiner Testimony, CASE Ex. 667, at 53 (Tr. 4177); Tr. 4073, 4102.
165
. at 54 (Tr. 4178).
166 M. at 45 (Tr~. 4169).
167 Id. at 49 (Tr. 4173).
initial Decision: 40 that ineffective action was taken when she identified numerous problems on a hanger previously approved by quality assurance.168 Two allegations made by Mrs. Stiner may simply be dismissed without further consideration.
She alleged that there is no traceability of materials until quality assurance becomes involved.169 Applicant argues that traceability is only required for the quality assurance program and that it need not be applied to materials that are not covered by that program.
In this posture, there is some ambiguity in the record, but we conclude that there is only one logical explanation for that ambiguity.
Theoretically, it is possible that items that had not previously been traced could be added to the quality assurance system, where they would then become~ traceable.
However, we exclude this inference because testimony that items in the program are ' traceable means that their entire pedigree must be known.
Those items could not previously have been untraceable.
On this basis, we accept applicant's explanation.170 The second allegation is that material from a scrap bin could be utilized on the site and would lack traceability.171 Since there is no 168 Id.. at 56-57 (Tr. 4180-81).
169 Id. at 46 (Tr. 4170).
170 A party with information that our resolution of this issue is factually in error would have an obligation to correct the record, even if our finding were favorable to its interests.
171 Id. at 57.(Tr. 4181).
Initial Decision:
41 allegation this has happened, it raises no issue about the quality of 4
actual construction at Comanche Peak.
Mrs. ~ Stiner alleged that she was unqualified for a quality assur-ance position which she held.172 The CAT report discusses inspector qualification and this allegation will be considered in connection with our decision on matters in the CAT report.
Mrs. Stiner alleged that management at Comanche Peak had harassed
' her because she would be testifying for the intervenors in this proceed-ing.173 This is related to a matter considered in the CAT report and reflects on management's commitment to its quality assurance program.
It will be evaluated in a subsequent decision.
5.
Allegations by. Charles A. Atchison Charles A. Atchison was employed by Brown & Root to work on the Comanche Peak site from February 27, 1979 to April 12, 1982.174 He testified in these proceedings on behalf of CASE.
Among his many l
allegations, Mr. Atchison claimed that he was improperly fired for performing inspections.175 This allegation has been covered by a 172 i
Id. at 8 (Tr. 4132).
173
_Id. at 63-72 (Tr. 4187-96).
174 ' Testimony of Charles A. Atchison, Witness for Intervenor CASE, Case Ex. 650, at 5-7.
175 See, e.g., id_. at 53-54.
1
Initial Decision:
42 previous Memorandum and Order of this Board.176 That decision found that Mr. Atchison was improperly fired.
The allegations not covered in either of our decisions include the following:
- 1) problems with welding on Chicago Bridge and Iron pipe whip restraints and moment restraints;177
- 2) problems with welding on NPSI pipe whip restraints;178 3) uncertified employees performed liquid penetrant testing;179
- 4) unstated management direction to overlook problems;180
- 5) and pressure to approve an audit of Tennessee Wall, Tube and Metal.181 These appear to be open issues.
Issue number 4 is the subject of two ongoing investigations, which may also cover number 5.
Other Atchison allegations are vague, unrelated to.the quality assurance program, or are speculative.
These allegations, which are not treated in detail in this opinion, are that
- 1) the quality control 176 LBP-83-34, 18 NRC
, July 6, 1983.
177 Atchison Testimony, Case Ex. 650, at 23-24, 40-41; Supplementary Testimony of Charles A.
Atchison Witness for Intervenor CASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy), CASE Ex. 656, at 2-3, 5-6.
178 Atchison Testimony, CASE Ex. 650, at 33.
I9 M.at51.
180
. at 58.
181 Atchison Supp. Testimony, CASE Ex. 656, at 2.
Initial Decision: 43 vault may not be fireproof;182 2) there is low morale among workers;183
- 3) he was not instructed to use special care because he was working on a nuclear facility;184 4) Japanese steel was being used on site;185 5) pictures he had found in a desk on site showed a void at an unspecified 186
-location in Reactor Building 1;
- 6) an individual, employed as a contractor's quality assurance manager, ordered for Brown and Root;187 dnd 7) engineering permitted a type of we ding by NPSI not authorized by procedures.188 Among Mr. Atchison's more substantial concerns is the allegation that there were problems with getting component modification cards to the document control center and incorporating them into appropriate document revisions.189 This allegation is related to matters discussed in the CAT report and will be discussed later in that context.
Mr. Atchison alleged that A490 bolts were being broken and that after tests were run to establish torque values for the bolts, the new i
/
182 Atchison Testimony, CASE Ex. 650, at 34.
183
_I_d_.at 49, 64.
184
-Id. at 67.
185 Atchison Supp. Testimony, CASE Ex. 656, at 1-2.
186 -Id. at 7.
187 Id. at 9.
188 _Id. at 8.
189 Atchison Testimony, CASE Ex. 650, at 35-36.
Initial D2cisicn:
44 torque values were not incorporated into site procedures.190 Neither the applicant-nor the staff has responded to the allegation.
It is an open item.
Another allegation made by Mr. Atchison was that he had observed a welder " quenching" a weld directly, in violation of site procedures.191 It appears from Mr. Atchison's testimony that he wrote an NCR on this matter and that the project engineer determined that, while-the quenching violated site procedures, it did not affect the quality of the weld.192
- However, we have no understanding of the reason for prohibiting the quenching of welds or why this particular weld was found to be acceptable.
Mr. Atchison alleged that a flammable lubricant was used to assist in pulling cable through electrical conduit.193 The lubricant was tested in a laboratory and found to be satisfactory.
Without having been present for the laboratory test, Mr. Atchison questioned whether it reasonably approximated conditions in the field.194 In essence, Mr.
Atchison gave no reason for questioning the accuracy of the results of l
l 190. _Id. at 29-31.
191
-Id. at 50-51.
192
_Id. at'50.
193 Id. at 55.
194
_Id. at 55-56.
y
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fnitial Decision:
45 the laboratory tests.
We find nothing in this allegation which we should pursue sua sponte.
Mr. Atchison also alleged that there were too few quality control inspectors to perform the quality assurance work at Comanche Peak.195 Applicant provided rebuttal testimony indicating that during the time Mr. Atchison was employed at Comanche Peak, the ratio of quality control inspectors to craft personnel was within the average for the indus-try.196 In addition, the applicant's witnesses testified that if the ratio had been less favorable it could have influenced how rapidly required inspections were performed, but would not have affected whether they were performed.197 Accepting the applicant's testimony that the inspections will bd performed regardless of the number of inspectors, Mr. Atchison's allegation does not by itself raise an important issue about the number of inspectors.
We do not decide whether the parallel issue raised by the CAT inspectors is meritorious.
. Mr. Atchison alleged that hundreds of flange bolt-up joints had not been submitted to quality assurance for final inspection.
Thus, he alleged the start-up group would repeatedly disassemble and reassemble 195
_Id. at 57.
196 Applicant's Rebuttal Panel Testimony, App. Ex. 141, at 38-39 (Tr.
4693-94).
197
_Id.
y
.-m.,-
+i-
Initial Decision:
46 the joints.198 Certainly, if the units are to be disassembled, this should be done before the final quality assurance approval.
It does not appear that Mr. Atchison is alleging that these joints will never be submitted for final quality _ assurance approval.
They appear to be just one additional item left for inspection during the final walk-down at the end of the project.
Mr. Atchison alleged that he had observed the " cold springing" of two lines from reactor coolant pump compartment number three.19 In rebuttal, the applicant indicated that the cold sprung pipe was part of the component cooling water system, that an NCR had been written on it, and that repair work had been required.200 Mr. Atchison was reasonably specific about the lines he alleged had been cold sprung.
The applicant did not indicate how they determined that the lines to which he referred were not part of the reactor cooling system.
They may well be correct in their conclusion; however, there is an important gap in our record that needs to be filled.
Mr. Atchison's final allegation was that minimum wall thickness violations had occurred in piping.201 He testified that an NCR had been 198 Atchison Testimony, CASE Ex. 650, at 62.
199 Id. at 63.
200 Applicant's Rebuttal Panel Testimony at 36-37 (Tr. 4691-92).
201 Atchison Testimony, CASE Ex. 650, at 63.
initial Decision:
47 written on this matter and had led to two b'ackfit programs.202 As far as he knew the NCR had not been closed.203 Since an NCR had been written on the problem and there are controls requiring that there be an appropriate disposition, we find that this allegation demonstrates the correct working of the quality assurance program and does not present an allegation that we should pursue sua sponte.
6.
Miscellaneous Allegations a)
Lobbin Report Mr. B. R. Clements, Vice President, Nuclear of TUGC0 commissioned a management study by Mr. Frederick B. Lobbin, to review the effectiveness of management controls within the quality assurance organization.204 This review was entirely voluntary on TUGCO's part.205 It was a quick-and-dirty effort to identify problems that - Mr. Clements might 202 Ic. at 63-64.
d 203 Ic. at 64.
(
d 204 - See App. Ex. 48; Testimony of B. R. Clements Regarding Reviews of Kanagement Control Program-and Activities of Texas Utilities Company Ouality Assurance Organization, App. Ex. 118, at 2-3; Testimony of Frederick B.
Lobbin Regarding Review of Management Control Program and Activities of Texas Utilities Generating Company QA Organization, App. Ex. 119, at 2; Clements, Tr. 2156; Lobbin Tr. 2163-64.
205 B. R. Clements Testimony, App. Ex. 118, at 3; F. Lobbin Testimony App. Ex. 119, at 2.
See also 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B which does not require any such management study.
y v
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Initial Decision:
48 follow up if he thought additional effort was warranted.
Clements at 3-5.
Mr. Lobbin testified that he sometimes overstated his conclusions in order to assure that they would be attended to.206 Despite this method of exaggeration, each of his findings was evaluated by applicant in a response document. 07-We conclude that as a result of the nature of Mr. Lobbin's study, his individual findings are entitled to little weight in this proceeding. This conclusion does not prejudice the right of a party to use his findings as cumulative evidence, together with other direct evidence, of positive or negative findings concerning the quality assurance program.
b)
The Number of NCRs CASE introduced a large number of documents that demonstrated the existence of construction deficiencies at Comanche Peak.208
- However, there were no witnesses that testified that the number of deficiencies was abnormal.
Indeed, the staff's resident inspector, Mr. Taylor, testified.without contradiction that the number of NCRs indicates only 4
- 206 Lobbin, Tr. 2170.
207. App. Ex. 49.
208. See, e.g., CASE Ex. 305-570.
Initial Dscision:
49 1
.that the quality. assurancs ~ program is working.209 In addition, the staff examined a sample of NCRs to dttect trends indicative of problems, 1-
~
and they have concluded that there are no -serious problems revealed by the. logs of NCRs.210 Staff examination of corrective ' actions taken pursuant to NCRs also resulted in a positive evaluation.211
~ We find no' evidence that the number of NCRs and of _other deficiency
. reports was in any way excessive for a project of this size.
To the
- contrary, the existence of' these reports is consistent with the Commission's quality assurance requirements.
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4 209. Tay1or, Tr. 1712, 1730-31.
210~ Stewart, Tr. 1282, 1285; Crossman, Tr. 3021.
-211 Crossman, Tr. 3022.
b
Initial Decision:
50 II.
Contention 22 Contention 22 states:
Applicants have failed to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, regarding emergency planning for the following reasons:
(a) The FSAR does not identify state or regional authorities responsible for emergency planning or who have special qualifications for dealing with emergencies.
(b) No agreements have been reached with local and state officials and agencies for the early warning and evac-uation of the public, including the identification of the principal officials by titles and agencies.
(c) There is no description of the arrangements for services of physicians and other medical personnel qualified to handle radiation emergencies and arrangements for the transportation of injured or contaminated individuals beyond the site boundary.
(d) There are no adequate plans for testing by periodic drills of emergency plans and provisions for participa-tion in the drills by persons whose assistance may be needed, other than employees of the Applicant.
(e) There is no provision for medical facilities in the immediate vicinity of the site, which includes Glen Rose.
(f) Thereisnoprovisionforemergencyplang{ggforGlen Rose or the Dallas / Fort Worth metroplex CASE did not address this contention at all in its proposed find-ings of fact.
In recent hearings CASE has had very few questions for 212 Order Subsequent to the Prehearing Conference of April 30, 1980, slip op. at 11 (June 16, 1980) (unpublished).
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Initial Decision:
51 witnesses on emergency planning.213 CASES failure to file proposed findings on the emergency planning contention when directed to do so constitutes abandonment of the contention.214 CASE subsequently has failed to pursue the contention vigorously, confirming the wisdom of declaring this to be an abandonment.
The development of emergency plans is an evolutionary process.
In May 1983, the staff introduced into the record an interim finding by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) that there is reasonable assurance that the off-site protection of public health and safety is adequate.215 The documentation attached to this interim finding makes it apparent, however, that the state and county emergency plans do have deficiencies.
The interim finding is based upon a review of the paper plans.16
- The finding is in the nature of a. progress report.217 It indicates that if all. the commitments made in the emergency plans are carried out, 213 Tr. 7286, 7480-81.
214 10 C.F.R. % 2.754(b).
215 Memorandum from Lee M.
Thomas to William Dircks (September 29, 1982), ff. Tr. 7414.
216 Tr. 7417-18, 217 Tr. 7456.
Initial Decision:
52 there is reasonable assurance that the plans will provide adequate protection for the public.218 At this stage, it is too early to determine whether all those commitments will be fulfilled.
The Board is not satisfied that the plans as presently constituted are adequate.
It remains concerned about these promises.
.Since the evolutionary process is not yet complete (there must, for example, be a drill or exercise),219 the Board does not believe it should raise any issues sua sponte at this time.
- However, the Board will continue to observe the development of the emergency plans and may raise issues sua sponte later if the commitments are not met or the deficiencies are not rectified.
Our Order of June 27, 1983, elaborates further about the extent of our concern about this issue.
III.
Board Questions In addition to the contentions, the Board had posed four questions.
These questions were posed for the purpose of obtaining information so that the Board could determine whether a serious health or safety issue existed which the Board should raise sua sponte.
This decision resolves those aspects of these Board questions that were raised during hearings occurring prior to March 1983.
218 Tr. 7452-4.
219 Tr. 7416-17, 7441-3, 7481.
-Initial Decision:
53 A.
Board Questior 1 In Board Question 1 the applicant and staff were asked to "[d]e-scribe in detail the planned method for handling any hydrogen gas in the f'
CPSES containment structure."220 The poteni;ial source of hydrogen gas in the containment structure would be a Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA).
l Combustible gases, principally hydrogen, would be generated inside the containment during a LOCA by: a zirconium-water reaction, release of free hydrogen from the primary coolant system, radiolysis of water, or corrosion of susceptible construction materials in containment.221 As it has previously indicated on the record,222 the Board is satisfied that any hydrogen generated within the containment structure can be satisfactorily handled.
The Board relies on the large containment structure at Comanche Peak, the redundancy of electrical recombiners provided, and the requirement by the staff that the recommendations for operator training found in the TMI-2 Short Term Lessons Learned report will be-implemented prior to issuance of the operating licenses.223 220 - Order Subsequent to the Prehearing Conference of April 30, 1980, slip op. at 4 (June 16, 1980) (unpublished).
221 Final-Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) QQ 6.2.5 & 6.2.5A.
222 Tr. 693, 731.
223 See Board Ex.1; Tr. 730-31.
Initial Decision:
54 B.
Board Question 2.
Board Question 2 states:
Applicant and staff should describe in detail the operating quality assurance program for CPSES.
A description of the provisions for conduct of quality control audits should be and reactor operator training will be audited.gr operations provided, including a description of how rea The applicant and the staff provided the Board with extensive informa-tien on the structure and purpose of the quality assurance program for operations at Comanche Peak.225 The Board is convinced that if the operational quality control program is instituted as described, it will function adequately.
The Board notes that while specific implementing procedures were not provided to the Board, the staff will review thbm before it will issue the licenses.226 The staff will also audit program.227 In implementation of the operational quality assurance light of the commitments made by the applicant and the staff, the Board 224 Order Subsequent to the Prehearing Conference of April 30, 1980, slip op at 5 (unpublished).
225 Testimony of B.
R.
Clements Regarding Management Commitment to Quality Assurance, App. Ex. 8; Testimony of David N.
Chapman Regarding the Operating Quality Assurance Program for Comanche Peak, App. Ex. 9; Testimony of R. A. Jones Regarding Commitment of On-Site Management to Quality Assurance, App. Ex.10; Testimony of
- Antonio Vega Regarding Provisions for Conduct of QA Audits and Reactor Operator Training, App. Ex.12; staff Testimony of John G.
Spraul Regarding Operating Quality Assurance (Board Question No.
2), Staff Ex. 5; App. Ex. 11; Tr. 506-662.
226 Tr. 657-58, 662.
227 Tr. 656.
Initial Decision:
55 is satisfied at this time that the Board need not pursue this matter further by raising it as a separate, sua sponte issue.228 C.
Board Question 3 Board Question 3 asked the applicant and the staff to describe the status of the resolution of Safety Issue _ TAP-9 (Anticipated Transient Without Scram or ATWS) as it relates to Comanche Peak.
The staff answered the Board question with three affidavits.229 The staff noted that the Commission has issued a notice of rulemakirig on ATWS.230 Prior to operation of Comanche Peak, the applicant will be required to develop emergency procedures and' to train its operators to recognize and cope s
with an ATWS event.
The staff indicated that the scram systems were redundant and highly reliable and that in view of favorable operating experience, Comanche Peak could be operated without undue riskduring the period pending the final ATWS rule.
With respect to the favorable experience, Mr. Pyatt stated that, "There have been roughly one thousand reactor years of experience accumulated in foreign and domestic commercial light-water-cooled l
N 228 This conclusion would not prevent us from renewing our concern about operations quality assurance should we ascertain that there s have been substantial deficiencies in aspects of the construction quality assurance program that also are present during operations.
229 Affidavits by David W.
Pyatt, James W.
Clifford and Marvin W.
Hodges, dated May 5, 1982. (Bd. Ex. 3).
230 46 Fed. Reg. 57521 (1981).
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Initial Decision:
56 c..
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reactars without an ATMS accident." lHe chose his words carefully to
- avoid having to mention that there had been at least one ATWS event.
Although the Board had considered the staff's response on ATWS to be satisfactory,231 we note that on February 25, 1983', a potentially serious ATWS event occurred at. Salem Unit 1 as a result'of a failure of redundant reactor trip breakers.2N After tha,t event, we asked whether s
the reactor trip breakers at Comanche Peak were similar to the Salem breakers and whether there would be any new - requirements prior to operation.
The staff has informed us that a task force has been formed to look into the generic implications of the Salem event and that final actions in response to the event are still under consideration.
Consequently,.he are not yet satisfied concerning the - need to declare ATWS to be a sua~sconte issue.
s
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D.
Boron Injection, Tank
~
When the Emergency Core Cooling System at Comanche Peak is activitated, high-head pumps tNke borated water from the refueling 233 water storage tank and inject thet wat r into the reactor cooling system.
The original design ca l:'.ed for the insertion of a Boron a
231 Tr. 693.
23E Memorandum from Darrell G. Eisenhut t'o Chairman Palladino, et al.
(March 3,1983) (Beard Notification 83 Failure of Reactoi TiTp Breakers.to Open in Trip Signal).
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3 Pumps designed to inject into the primary cooling system when it is fully pressurized.
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Initial Decision:
57 s
f4 Injection Tank (BIT) between the high-head pumps and the reactor cooling system. The Applicant proposes to omit the BIT.234 The Board inquired into the appropriateness of the deletion.235 The concentration of Boron in the refueling water storage tank is 0.2%; the concentration of boron in the BIT would have been 12%. Such a x-high concentration of boron would require that the tank and all lines and valves.of the BIT be kept at high temperature to - prevent the precipitation of boron crystals in the BIT and the consequent plugging of valves and lines which connect the high pressure injection system (HPIS) to the primary coolant system, a potential hazard to the operation of the ECCS system during a transient.
Representatives from Westinghouse have informed the staff that the BIT was included in the original design for the sole purpose of mitigating the consequences of a steam-line break accident.
They have made an analysis of a worst case scenario, a large steam-line break when the reactor is just
- critical, at zero power and at operating temperature.
In this scenario, the secondary system would rapidly depressurize causing rapid cooling of the primary system, an increase in reactivity above critical (due to more optimal moderation at the reduced 234 The description of the BIT system and its effectiveness in reducing the transient following a steam-line break is taken chiefly from the affidavit of staff witness Sammy Diab (following Tr. 781) and the attached " Summary of Meeting on Comanche Peak Design Change and Responses to RSB Questions."
235 Order of April 2,.1982 at 2-3.
initial Decision:
58 temperature) and a return to power production in the core.
The reduction in primary coolant temperature and pressure would trip the f
safety infection signal and initiate the pumping of barated water into-236 the core.
If there is a BIT, the power would peak at about 15% of full power 'and then gradually decrease as the boron reduces the reactivity.
Without the BIT the power would peak at about 20% of full power and persist somewhat longer.237 Applicant, with support from the staff, has argued that this increase in power without the BIT is not significant.
It relies on Westinghouse calculations that show that the DNBR (departure from nucleate boiling ratio) would remain above 2.5, indicating a wide margin of safety before the coolant would reach a " film" condition which would interfere with the safe removal of heat from the core.
Although applicant and staff support deletion of the BIT in order to reduce the risk that boron crystals might interfere with ECCS operation, neither identified an instance - where the ECCS had been compromised due to precipitation of boron.238 The witnesses stated, i
I l
236 The main steam-line break incident'is analyzed using a conservative assumption that the control rods for the most reactive section of the core do not insert.
Most of the power that is generated comes-from this one section.
l 237 Figures 3-4 and 3-5 in Attachment 1 to the Testimony of S. Diab, j
following Tr. 781.
28 l
Tr. 746; Tr. 783.
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T Initial Decision: 59 j
6, generally, that there have been operational problems with the BIT.239
- However, the Board is independently aware that there have been boron-crystallization events of sufficient seriousness to be called precursors to potentially severe core damage accidents.240 We agree with applicant and staff that on balance the Comanche Peek Station apparently would be safe without the BIT.
However, we are concerned that the NRC staff has relied entirely on the Westinghouse analyses.241 We recognize that the matter also has been brought to the attention of the Advisory Committee or Reactor Safeguards (ACRS);
however, the staff's reliance on the Westinghouse analyses was not 242 brought out and is a matter of concern to us.
We request the staff to bring this matter to the attention of the ACRS once again, clearly indicating that the staff relies entirely on Westinghouse analyses of DNBR.
I i
I 239 Tr. 778 and 782, staff; Tr. 746, applicant.
240 Science _ Applications Incorporated and Oak Ridge National Laboratory, NUREG CR-2497, Precursors to Potential Severe Core l
Damage Accidents:
1969-1979 (A Status Report) (June 1982) at Appendix C, pp. C-9 to C-10.
241 Tr. 782.
242 l.
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 259th Annual Meeting l
(November 13, 1981), Tr. 360-361, 9.
See also staff presentations of November 11 and 13, found appended tT ihT XCRS transcript.
l
Initial Decision:
60
.o 0RDER For all the' foregoing reasons and based on consideration of the entire record in this matter, it is.this 29th day of July 1983 ORDERED:
1.
This is a proposed decision.
2.
Pursuant to the Board's authority to require the filing of Findings'of Fact, objections to this decision are waived unless they are filed in compliance with the format requirements prescribed near the beginning of the accompanying memorandum.
3.
Objections to this decision must be received within 22 days of issuance of this Order.
- 4..
Replies to objections must meet the same specificity i
requirements applicable to the objections themselves.
In particular, they must clearly state what they are replying 'to and provide a reasoned, documented discussion that responds directly.
l 5.
Replies must be filed within ten days of receipt of the objection being replied to.
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Initial Decision:
61 l
FOR THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD b1h Peter B. Bloch, Chairman ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE T
Walter H. Jor ADMINISTRATIV UDGE l
Kenneth A. McCollom ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE Bethesda, Maryland l
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