ML20024C699

Transcript of President Commission Public Hearing on 790530 in Washington,Dc.Pp 113-210

ML20024C699
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Site:	Crane
Issue date:	05/30/1979
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{{#Wiki_filter:Cf $ flM ~ b t PRESIDENT'S CCPlilSSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISt>flD THIRD MEETING 3 4 PUBLIC HEARINGS v s FIRST DAY, WEDNESDAY, MAY 30, 1979 s 7 NEw executive OFFICE EUILDING, RCCM 2008 17TH STREET'& PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W. g WASHINGTON, D.C. s to 11 11 The Third Meeting of the President's Consissicn en the t.T Acciden at Three Mile Island convened pursuan:.to notice a 14 1:00 p.n., John G. Keneny, Chai: san, presiding. 15 16 17 ~ 18 19 20 21 ~~ ~ Pages 1 through 210. O I j Catu v nsa n szees n3 2a Sox 630, Co t '. a g e P s e 's, Margtss) :0740 20:/34.00d: 2 l 8307130040 790530 PDR ADOCK 05000289 T HOL

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~ s 1 COMMISSICNERS PRESENT, Wednesdav. May S0, 1979 4. JOHN G. KE}GNY, Chair =an 3 2 l' President of Dar:=outh College ~ 3 3RUCE 3A33ITT 4 Governor of Ari:ena PATRICK E. EAGGERTY 3 Retired President of Texas Instruments 4 CAROLYN LEWIS Associate Professor of Journalis: 7 Graduate School of Journalis=, Colunbia University ~ g .:CORA 3.,MARRETT Associate Professor of Sociology University of Wisconsin 9l 7 LLOYD Mc3 RIDE 10 President of United Steelworkers of A=,. erica 11 EARRY McPEERSCN I l Attorney 12 THOMAS PIGFORD ~ 12 Professor and Chair =an, Depart =en: of Nuclear engineering g4 University of California a: 3erkeley THEODORE TAYLOR 15 i Professor of Aerospace and Mechani:a1 Science Princeton University 16 ANNE TRUNK 17 Residen of Middle:cwn, Pennsylvania 18 l COMMISSIONERS A3SENT. Wednesdav. Mav S0. 1979 t i ~ l 19 ! RUSSELL PETERSON President of Audubon Society "'o PAUL 3. MARIS Vice Presiden: for Health Sciences, Colu=bia Univ. 21 ~. C30IISSION STAF? MESGERS 23 3RUCE LU:iDIN, Staff Direc:c RONALD 3. NATALIE, Chief Counsel

4 SAR3 ARA JCRGENSCN, Public Infernation Jirse:or i

i at se u I t a r-e

.a 'e 113 ng eay^ I 1 MR. NA"'A.II: Wculd Mr. : ewe, Mr. Sche -=in,r i 2 Pres Frederick and Mr. Faust please ec=e f :vard and be swc n? kS3 3Siknd 5/30/79 Whereupon, pg33; 777 W::.L*.AM *IWI, FRED S m !.v2P.I, E:: WARD TREOI.CCK, 5 and C3A G C. FAUST having been duly sworn, were called as witnesses herein 7 and were exa=ined and testified as fellcws: a CEA ?_v2r KIME:IY: Could ycu please be seated. 3e-fere we ask the =ain questions, I would like to establish to centinuity with the testi=cny we have just he,ard, therefore 11 let =e take sc=eching cut of sequence. 12 Mr. Faust, if my raading of the record was 13 cc :ect, were you the crerater wh= dise:vered tha: the valve n==ber 12 and the =_=ergency feed syste= were elesad? 54 is MR. FACST: That is t:ne. 13 C E 3?Xi KIMISY: ist =e a'sk the sa=e question ~ ty' we asked the earlier shift, when ycu ca=e en shift did you I Mr. Frederick check whether any-hing was cc: cf positien 's; c: i ,,I c is that net a nc. a1 par: cf y=c: cperatien? 0 MR. FACST: The =an who nzns ever the shift, ha l g ,t ta'<es the shif t, usuall.y scans the panel. :: is usually 2: I 'I to hi= as :: wha.: he is 1ccking an, wha wcu'.d he of any l I f i .. l sienificance := ' '- in the turn Over. e . a.' 4 CEA ??.AN KI '.E iY: Yes. , 4, 'l' MR. FACST: A: the time 2 ::ck shif. swi::h ug and

agg =g and : didn't scan the panel a: :ha: :i=e. : ::ck

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e er

• 114 "de-2 readings later on that caused =e :

go around the panels 2 and leck at different indications tha: I had := icg dcwn.. i 3 CHAI.*C'AN KF.MI:Pl: Yes, but ycu did not notice d that these two switches were showing red? 5 MR. FAUST: No I did not, not at that ' *e. 6 CEAIRMAN KI.E:rt: You did not notice that they 7 were shewing green at that ti=e? 8 MR. FAUST: No.. 9 CHAIRMAN KIMI:rt: Mr. Frederick ycu did not to notice that either, is that cc::ect? f-11 MR. FRICIRICK: That is cc: rect. r 12 CEA!3 MAN KIME:rt: New,Mr. Faust, hcw did you is ha=.=en to discover -- I knew voc were wc king en the i4 secondary syste=, we have read the ch: n logy, hcw did i3 ycu happen t: notice that these switches were elesed? te, MR. FACST: When : ncticed these swi hes f i7: were cicsed was actually. durine. several =cves : =ade after f i the initial case ef the acciden: and wha: : wculd be ta, l doing, if you locked en the panels where : was a, I was .g ! =cnisering steam generate: levels. I saw that it was icw. 'i I l think voiced at that ti=e that it was genera:::s are 21 l indicating 10 inches and that they were dry, pcssibly. l l I. And at the sa=e time was 1:cking at valve 8 indica::: *ights which, once again, new this is a wnile ,s and fr:= wha: can bes: rame=her they,were ind::a:ing i

ace, 4

9 e i

s ye t.'3 Se-3 I shut at that ti=e to =e. i 2 one of =y i==ediate acticas was to take =anual 3 cent 1 with the sailey cent::11er f:: the 11 valves, 4 llA, 11 A and 3, at which ti=a I started driving them s open, not fully. I cracked them initially to see id : i a could get a respense because at tha: ti=e I didn't knew 7 exactly how long the generat= s -- : thcugh: that was a s problem i= cther wc ds, that the ICS for se: e reason did='t 4 cpen up these valves. ic Sc was going to do it =anually and ::y to a t a 4 th::ttle it initially. Chat teck time because the way i, we tell if we get feed indication in:= the generate: is is we have to =enitor fer a stea= generate: level chance and 6 l,,' that is what I was lecking fer. Sc : waited and ancther thing that is cc: Of-- ,3, i e I don't think has been 5:cuch is!

riph: new is tha: this 4

I happened pretty fast. And the fact tha: this whole thing i i 5 8.l until the ti=e disc =vered these valves Open a: tha: si=e, I' i l

ol I thcught a pericd of ti=e of enlr like 50 sec:nds =assed 1

i when actually i: turned cut ec be eigh: =inutes f::= the f, ti=e I finally discovered them cpen. I

i i

i p .4 *i CIAI V.AN IIMINY: Ecw quick ycc dise:vered them ...q c1: sed and you opened the=? ., I .u. TACSC: cpened, yes. Occuse =e.

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• 116 tie-4 hcw they could have getten closed, do you Mr. Faust?

m 2 MR. FAUST: I don't have any factual k=cwledge 3 of hcw they get closed. CE,UP."Xi KI.T rt: Co you have a guess? 3 MR. FACST: I.ike we have been saying before, possibly an eversight en sc=ebcdy's part. e 7 CHA ?J!AN C I:rt: ves. Mr. Frederick, de you have e any idea en how they were cicsed? ..R. - *.4.e. .c..i .s s.ic s4, d, s._. w 9 ...w to CHAI?.".AN m I:rt: Mr. : ewe? 11 .v.R.

n:.: a do nc 12 CEAIF"AN O Z:rt: Mr. Schei= ann?

is. MR. SCEII.Td N: No sir. i4 CHAIP."Xi F'?TP?: Ckay, tank you. 7:0fassc: y.aga.,..a, ig i. COM.?C5SICNIR ?!GFCRD: Mr. Frederick, I wculd 4 i i7 - ka to follow up := sc=e f: the' questions that were raisedi i i l 4 yeu;. 3 4..,.e.y .4-_ .w. ._,sk.'..e, ..'.a-l is. Cd a ' ' C.- d.'. = e "..= a-k .?...- a. a:. =. - =. -.. '...,. '. e ~_ _ a_ s. ' -.,- l i i . '.. c.'.u.a v...' '..'.. i I i t I New I f=und interesting there.vcur :==en: that i

a. t !

I .. ?. che relief valve en :he =ressurizer had stuck cpen ence .. i before and veu =enti:ned tha: there was sc=e rec. air wc k i l geing en and they -- he pur;cse cf the repair werk was ,4 i ..,...... s ----,, .a.s --.

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r- ..e,..-.-.a.,. t a-

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6 s 1s,e de-5 3 be able to tell that it is cpen. Can you tell us the repair ^' 2 work that was dene fc that purpcse? ..g. ee.r,...e cy ..s.e. _4 e.wa... s..ck cee.. w s 4 previcusly was act en =y shift. I just found cut ahcut 5 it th=cugh reading the reports. The maintenance I was referring to was installing a valve indica icn that wculd 6 7 tell the operate that the valve was open. It is the a red light that exists en the panel =cw which, as we have 9 said hefere, is si= ply a CcC=and signal indicatcr. It does io =c actually indicate valve position. Chat is the install-e si azion I was referring to. COMMI55 CNER PIGICRD: Sc it indica-es cc==and 1. and =ct whether it is really cpen c net? i 13 N vg.

e..ggace_ w.s..

..a. .s c..- ec.. i, COMM*S5 CNER ?!GICRD: Y0u see, I raised the t., ; l ,, j questien because hefere the Odall Subce- '::ee you said, 1 i "the purycsa of the repair was sc that if it were := stick l l ,7, I i i ccan you eculd tell if it were really ecen." a= inseb ing is, a f l an ad ective here

:here. Maybe : a= =iscentruing wha:

l A ycu had in ~'-d. t i .u R. e.s_e-e L-- s ..w...._._ c e .a. . s.e .4 s._. _. 3 a. 4 -., ,1, 1 ass- 'ng that if it stuck cpen it wculd he because the ..r cc==and signal was calling fc the valve :c he cpen and .a. i . n, tha: ce==anc s :na was nc: taken away. .s. .a,,. e-..u- =- n g..a..,.. s. 4 e i

6 'e 113 de-6 ace==plished that purpcse? 1 2 MR. FRE0ERICK: No, it did not. It wculd have 3 been better to install an absciute valve indicatic tha:

01d whether the sequence was cevered by the disE.5:en --

4 l 3 COMMISSICNIR PIG 7CRD: But, I gather you are e telling us what you unferstand in ter..s of =aintenance 7 carried cut by sc=ecne else? g MR. FREDERICK: That is cc :ect. COMMISSICNIR PIG 7CRD: Is there sc=e log that ycu k=cw of that wculd shew this racerd? ,e n MR. FREDERICK: Tha: the maintenance was cerfer=ed? 11 CIMMISSICNIR PIGTCRO: Yes. MR. FREDERICK: I a= not f= iliar with the docu=ents, g but the $ch certainly would have been icgged sc=ewhere. 14 a COMMISSICNIR PIG 7CRD: Is it in your leg? MR. FRE ERICK: The leg that I =aintain pertains to, enly to operatien of the plan and cu ef service equip =en nce in the re air Of that se.ui:=ent. IS ! I CIM.i:SSICNIR PIG 70RO: Yes. Have v.on had a chance TO I to look ever the rece:d of the casti=eny befers the Odall I 20 l Schec==ittee?

• ti

{ i I MR. FRZ:ERICK: I have sad i: Once, yes. { l jl COMMISSIONZR PIG 7CRO: Then whc was it whc finallyi

3 :8

] decifef tha: =aybe that valve was Pen and we had he::e: i

41 3

investigate and then clese 1:7 Is there sc=e persen ::a: I v.eu can identifv.? 9 F y p y q- .m ymm-p-,-,-,,,-w -w+ v-- +-uv

119 i fe-1 8 MR. TP2CERICKs As far as knew the action to N. 2 t close the valve was cut of -- sc=ewhat out of desperation.. 3 In other words, there see=ed ec he no other possible cause 4 for the low pressure and it just seemed like sc=ething tha: 5 we eculd try to see if that would isciate the proble=. It 6 is not at all a recor=sended prccedure to isolate a relief 7 valve. It is a last ditch ef. fort. a COMMIS5:0NIR FIGFCRD: I underscand, Mr. Frederick. Who was that who decided that maybe it was cpen and they 9 to shculd new close it, do ycu knew? H ti MR. FRZ0ERICK: I believe Fred Scheir. ann closed ) 12 it. I think it was at the suggestion cd Brian Mahler. is COMM SSICNIR PIG 70RD: Could ycu give se that s i, name ence scre? Mehler? 33 MR. T?20ERICK: 3rian Mahler, X-e-h-1-e-. CO.M.M*S5 :NIR P GTCRD: Ncw, is he an operator ,,I l i alse? ,,i j l 8 MR. ??20ER CK: He is Shift Superriscr, Senior .s; i e I i tel Reacter Operater. 1 COMMISS!CNIR P 3?0RD: I ses. Now, was he there l 20 t l durine. vcur shift? I .. [ MR. ??2:IR CK: He was there in t..e la :er par l of mv. shift. He came in several hcurs after the initiation I l! Of the acciden.

44i Ca.v.u.w..y. r.e.

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120 i i 2.g been en a shift to replace your shift? 2 MR. ??2CERICK: Was he on the enec=ing shift? 3 MR. :ZWI: Yes, he was the enceming Shift Super-visc: for the day shift to relieve myself. COMMISSICNIR ?!GIOM: Did he cc e en early e by any chance? 7 MR. :IWE: I dcn't know. s COW.!SSICNER ? GTOE: And apparently it was 9 i he who reccgnized the pessibility that the valve was 10 u cpen? Were ycu there when that happened when he deduced 11 this? 1: MR. ??20ERICK: Yes sir. I: CC W.*SSICNER ?!GTORO:.Cc ycu knew what he 4 Id .ddJ . h. -.e.. S. 15 MR. TRICIR Z: He suggested :c the Supervise: I ,s. i and the Tere =an that we t v. isolas:.ng the valve. 17 l COMM SS::NIR ? G70E : Yes. Did vcu -- and a::ar-tai I l j en:1v then i:~was isciated as a result cf that, is that 1, i ici cc :act? .. f I MR. ??I ZRICK: Yes, I believe sc. l 21, i COMMISSIONIR ?!G7C E : Ecw icng had it been I ccen? i -- l \\ MR. ??2:ER K: Accc: ding :c the sequence tha: : I' i

sad it was twe and a half hcurs, 1:p:::<"tely.

yM SS: NIR ?:370RO: Ncw, ! gather f :: 7 i

~... 121 de-9 i testi=cny that first -- was there s==a alar = which was 2 triggered off by the ther=al couple reading the temperature 3 in the tail pipe f::= the valve? 4 MR. FRIOERICK: I have been : 1d that, that alar = 3 was cr/ the ala== printou:, yes. 6 COMMISSICNER PIGTCRD: It was a printout rather 7 tha= an audible alar =? 8 MR.,R m,.,2 -...w.a. 4 s c.,... ec. ....s. 9 COMMISS!CNIR ?!G70RO: Ahcut when did that to alar = cc=ur? e i e.

i MR. FRICIRICK

I don't knew.

i; CO.".". SSICNIR P G70RD: Did it cccur during your s'*d-' is \\ l 3, MR.FRI:IR CI: : :hink so. In the alar = grint=ut is which was delsv.ed sc=e hcur and a hald c so, it wculd Io have been during =v. shif: s==stime, ves. 37, C*.*.**.*s~~~'..~=.23~~~."=.'.-.~ sea. .n. o... a s..~. ~. I available untti ahcut an hcur and a half after the beginning g I i of the even*l'? l g MR. FRICIR :K: I a= just guessing. I d:n't knew ,c I e ,i at wha: ti=e te a: eared :: he ce=puter, c: id it a::earedi .I, l f i ,,,I en -he ::=puter at all. i I C .v.v S.t. .~'".4 1.:..~ T.

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.v_. .ra.s., ? '".'...=.77.. -= ,3. 8 .C'Cw? YOu wera CU du".y a13C a: ".ha". ti=G, we:F.n ' ". yCu ? .v e.. 7..... ..4G, ..w.. r.w.:.. .s.. . e s,....a a. .2...... f . = .e 'l ? l

l.,., I de-10 I was en the sec=ndary side of the plan: during while they 2 were ::ying to deter-J.=e what I believe what veu are 3 askine. In other wc ds, I wasn't involved 4-u king at c d ' that at the ti=a. i s COMMISSICNIR PIG 70RD: Yes. Mr. Zewe, de ycu have a infer =ati:n? I a= speaking of the alar =,in whatever f :=, 7 that was initiated as a result of the temperature in the a tail pipe? MR. :IWF. : I a= no: sure of the exae ti=e tha: 'O the alar = ca=e in, but it shculd have happened within see:nr.s 9 cf lifting cf the relief valve. 12 COMMISSICNER ?!G70RD: Yes. New, and then the C 13 questica is, was that alara= known = anycne at that ti=e? 14: MR. ZIWE: I did net see it en the ce= puts: ala = 1 15! printout at the time because of the activity tha: was I f6l taking place at the cent:01 ::c= at that time. But I wculd '7 assu=a that it shculd have been in and i: would nc: have i I

s3 been abner.al f:: that alar = : he in a: this ti=a knewin: '

toi that the elac ::=ati: valve had Opened because of the 9 I

c,:

high pressur= 4- ~'e react : :: clan: systa=, 1 CIA 2 MAN KIMI!;Y: I wculd like : just ask a ::cple i

l cf questi ns f== clarifica:icn. I a= a '.ie le cenfused.

t Oculd y=u give, Mr. Frederick, c uld you give =e sc=e idea l .s. Of how =any alar =3 =ight have 70:e off during the firs: 4 five :: 13 =inutes? das i: like :ve :: 20C? e + J

• O y

123 1 i i i de-11 MR. TRIOERICI: In the first few seconds of the 2 accident there were p chably several 100. 3 CEAI?.W KI:1Z:1Y: Several 100. Se clearly you cculdn't personally have checked all cf those. 21. : ewe, 3 am I prencuncing your na=e cc :actly? We had a debate on the ec rect p;cncunciation. 1 MR. EWI: Zewe. 8 CEA ?.m m iY: Zewe. "' hank ycu. Mr. Zewe, did at any ** e let's say during the first half hour, 10 any of have a chance to lock at the alar = center, c: were p 11 veu so busv. vou had no chance to leek at it? s. 12 MR. IWE: Quite sene/ af ter we had the event s i ^- 13 I had called the Uni: Shif: Supervise to ce=e over 14 and assis ne. And when he came over I asked his aid in lockinv at the ec=puter :: int:c: =c ::v. to hel=. us alcng i is-with the casualty that we had bef::e us. And he was I ] i trj evaluatin, the alar = tv.e.ewriter and the printing Of the l ts ce=puter. i i to! And I did ask hi: := check f : any discharge l .o ! .e=perature sc=etime after that. .i CEAIciA:t KI.'".r:IY: At wha: pcint did the alar = =.rinter star: : intine. cu ? 'de e.a: hor there was sc=e ser: !, .. I:I. 2 l' cf najc delay there c a paper feed ;;:ble=? l f l i h MR. :DTE: If : ramenber cc:ree:1v, sc=etane 4 t I 'i abcu: 10 = nutes after 5 :: sc the ce=puter ala_= fune::.:n I i -,_.m,_...,_.._,,,._-,_,m..-_ ,~m,

124 die-12 ' hecame inoperable and fc appr xi=ately an hcur and 20 =inutes 2 after that until we re-initialized the ::=puter and again - 3 gained the functicn of the ala = status of the c =puter. CO.*OCSSICNIR KI.v.INY: While it was functiening, s was it printing real ~4 e c is there a delay when an , awful lot of ala==s go off? MR. ZIWI: Cn the alar = pri=ter it prints out s and it keeps a -"- ' g backleg of what the actual time was f== the ala==. It is sc: real ti=a and it becc=es very IC hack 1cggrd just because of the =echanics of the typewriter. e 11 It physically takes a certain a= cunt cf ~3 e to pri'n up 12 each ala==, and it scans so =any functions that it physic- ~' 13 ally becc=es furuher and further behind as ycu receive s 14 =cre and =cre ala_ s. 15 COM.vZSS CNIR KI:CNY: Oces it have a huffer that l to keecs that inf===ati n that is act yet printed cut, do you ! ~ l 1 17 : kn:w? 1 s,! MR..SINI: NC. ally it dces, v.es. i t i to : COM. *SS!0NIR KI:GNY: Sc whv was the informati0n v I Ic j ics: in that case after 5:00 o'cicek? ,I .i MR. :IWI: "'his is 'us cen.acture en =av.,= art, s 1 /

l hu it was so far behind we had pr:ble=s with the paper I.

l .'.,.j ja- 'ng up and we had a technician wc: kine. en the :::: uter-t ., ] and 2.:,helieve tha: he jus: re-established the ti=e en 5 l -he ::=puter which vculd preclude the ne== 7 that hadn't

L p G 125 de-13 printed cut te that peint and started again a: time cero 2 cnce he re-initialiced the ec=puter. ~ CEA:?. MAN KIMENT: O see, thank you. 3 COMMISSICNIR FIGTCRD: Sc=eplace in one of the sequences of events there is a stata=ent that at a certain 3 ti=a there was an alar = f c= this the=al ecuple, and I wculd still li'<a Oc knew was it actua11v..=cssible f== any. of veu 7 s MR. OIWE: It was ecssible fez us to =.= cver. Whenever the ce=puter has an ala= fu.ctica en it, all right, there is a ec=puter sound that scunds and it flashes saying that we have an ala== en the ec=puter. You will go ever 1: and read the ala= printer c find cut wha value the particular paramacer is at and if the ala= condi:ica s 14 prin.:s cut what the condition is. All right? 15 Sc if we had checked the ale printer at that to

articula ti=e we wculd have seen the ala= =c=e in. Ecwever, 17 I

t that ala= :ypewrite: 1:self, if ycu were te get in an alar =! 1a1 I as any poin: where ycu had a =ess ci c:her ala=s in, i: I

9.

l l wculd go all cf the way back :: the back of the backleg. .h i' So, i: =ight he sc=e ti=a pericd before that actual ala= i 21 ; j ca=e cc: ec your visible presence. l l [ i COMM SS CNIR 7:37CKD: ~; hen, are ycu saying tha a. ll _he ti=e it actually came cut was net the time :..a: 1:

4 !

9l was indicated in the sequence cf events? 'l 4e e i s-.I h. b

126 de-14 I MR. SCZZ."XIN: I am saying that is quite possihie. .s 2 COMMISSICNER P:GTO?2: I see. Has anycne sought :=* 3 examine the records to see that, do you happen to knew? 4 MR. ZZ;iE: I have locked at the alarm ssper.ses 3 and I can't remesher finding the actual place at which an alarm and at the temperatures that we had indicated.. e 7 CCM.w. SSICNER PIG 7CPc: Ecwever, it was testified that at 25 minutes and again at 80 =inutes in:= the accident, a semeene did call up the temperature and f0und it to be what, 9 io ahcut 230-295 degrees? 11 MR. ZZWE: Zhe highest raading that had received after I had requested to have it checked' was approx"=:ely 12 232 degrees was the highest I had ever received inder=ation i. u on. 13

chv.sically did net ask fer it f::= the ce=puter 3 '.

but I had other people de it f== me and that was the wc d I I ,7 i tha-I had from them :".a: it was aheu: 223 :: 22: was the I highese reading had received. i i I ic ! COMMISSIONER ?!G7CRD: Oc.vcu re= # er what it was i 1 i i cn heth instances? There were two times it was called up, f, i a :arently. 'f 21 ! I, MR. ..*fE : They were pre :v =uch in the same hall ..i Il park withi. ahcut five degrees. j CO.9.233 :NER ?!370?.0: Mr. ewe, de you.have an , 4 i enerpency pr:cedure :hn tells 70 wha: :: de if tha: 4.----,

---

r r, -.., -.., + -., --

v 1.,., de-15 temperat=e is -- if there is an alar = cn the cc=puter - 7 2 f = that the a1 couple? 3 MR. ZIWI: We de have an emergency precedure that 4 addresses the elec. =atic relief valve and the discharge 3 temperatures en the tail pipe dcwnstrea= cf the relief a valve. I CCMMISSICNIR PIG 70RD: And wha ~ dcas it tell ycu a te de with regard to the temperature that is read? MR. :IWI: It has ycc isciate the suspected I 'O leakv. relief valve. e tempera:Eedcasit Il CCMM SSICNIR P!G7CRD: Wha: 1: say you must go inte isclation? 33 MR. IIWI: I believe it sav.s a:c cx*-=:elv. 130 I I4; degrees. ~ COMMISSI NIR PIGIORO: I have

cuble rece hering i

i l I to I these two and a= sorry : lead you into this wi heu: 1 l I i 17 ! telling you what have hefere =e. This is a p ccedu = i l ts; that is dated.une, 1977 cencerning the =.cssible leakin, l i to ! cf the =.ilce operated relief valve and it says, " Sv::c=s, I I A

I which I c. resume are instructicas := v.eu te knew if sc=e:hin:

i

t l is pessibly leaking c: cpen.

s

l N" 'er ene says,*Re. lief valve discharpe line 4

l y r , h. re.-,.. x-..s4 -......,.. - .e.-.4-......_4 .1 4.8 Alar =s en ec=pu er a-230 fegrees fahrenhei." Nov : a= ^ a s a~ ~_~.~.....'.=...'.'+'s.=.=~r'=.'..'=. a m e.- e..~.....-. - = A... =.... -- .g t 9

123 de-16 I as quoting f =m. Is that reascnable? m 2 MR. IWI: If we had been aware hat the relief 3 valve in fact was stuck open, we wculd use that peccedure. But at this peint in time we did not suspect that we 1 8 had the relief valve had failed to close. All right? But if I may add, all right, pric: to this we have had 7 readings that have been greater than 130 degrees nor= ally, t s all right, because either the elect :matic valve c the r cede safety valves de have seme leakage passed.; hem. / u 10 CIA 3v.AN E!I:Pl: What is the highes: you have ~ 18 had? 12 MR. IWI: ':'he highest reading that I have seen? 13 CIAIP.Wi C IENY: 7:eviously. 14 MR. IWI: In the neighhcrhecd of 200 degrees. 13 have seen,in reviewing legs since the accidens, app:=ximately 16 l 198 degrees. But can :eme=her instances bef:re that which I i 17 l ! don't have bef=re me, semewhere just ever 200 degrees, l ist 203, 203. i e 6 i to i C0!OC55 :NIR P GTORO: Su during this acciden: e + I 3c veu read i: two ti=es at 20 minutes, 25 minutes and 30 =inutes I, l l and : think you :=1d us 230 degrees, is tha: cc rect? I MR. IWI: Yes sir. ,o CO20C55: NIR ?!GTCRO: A*.d sc -hat is greater than ed

• 1 1

the e=perature in veur s.ecs that says :here shculd be an l i 4., l alaram indicating a leak. I

129 i de-17 MR. :IWI: Yes sir, but kncwing that the relief 2 valve had lifted,the dcwnst=ea= te=peratre I wculd expect

• 3 to be high and that it would take sc=e ti=e fc that pipe 4

to ceci down belew the 200 degree set poiht'.Sc that ala== 5 by.itself was nc==al. 6 COMMISSICNIR FIGIORD: Wculd ycu expect it to stay 7 at that ta=perat= e for 55 utes, which see=s to be the 8 elapsed *4'e between these two ti=es you called fc: the tempera:=e? 'O MR. IWI: I really den't have very goed feel fe: how 1cng that it would stay het, but it wculd not he tec 12 1.ard fc: =e to conceive that it wculd take at leas: tha 13 lcng der this to coci down after being open. Id COMMISSICNIR ? G7CRD: But new getting back to ~ 15 i the icgic and the applicabili v. of vour eme 1ency :.:ccedure, ~ to what : a= getting is the te=pera =es you finally lear.ed 17' ahcu hi-her tha. the maxi== in vcur.:::cedre. New : v is, think what you.have teld us is tha the p cced = e is applic-1 i able if ycu knew the valve is leaking? Yes? to I j

o MR. "IWI: The p ccedure is applicable if : knew the valve is leaking?

i i COMMISSICNIR ?!GTCED: Yes, I thcught you said a i .3. =c=en: ago tha: this is the p cced re ycu are se fellcw if 4 s, you knew tha: :he valve is leaking? MR. ::DTI: Yes. B d t v o ,r--<--s~ ~ -, - .---------e --..,v

l ?.30 I de-18 CO.*CCSSICNIR ?IG70?O:

dees raise a difficulty 9

t 2 in my sind as it does appear that maybe this n'-"er one 3 item en the p:=cedure is to give you a sy=p:=m that the 4 valve is leaking se that you would then follow the p =cedure s because it says, it alar =s symptem n'-Ser one, it ala==s at 200 degrees Fahrenheit under the subject "I.eaking; 7 Relief Valve." s MR. ZIWI: I agree, but nor= ally ever since we have started up Uni: II, the relief valve temperatures have 'O always been grease: than 130 degrees. They have been in II the neighhc heed normally of 175 te 195 degrees normally 12 because we knew that we had a certain a=cune of s=all f 13 leakage passed that valve c: either cne of the cede valves 14 ygigh ggyg gggig ggig ggg gggggggggg g g gg gigggg; g I5 ' point of the relief valve. ~ 16 So we cculd have had sc=e cf the high :s=perature l 1 17l caused fr m the c.her valves leaking by causing the high l ts es=perature tg he reflected in the c:her :ac va'.ves. l 1 to : COMMISSICHIR ?IG70KD: Se apparently y=u felt f I i

c l that this emergency p ccedure just wasn' applicab'.e a:

6 + that time? Is that cc :act? i i

l MR. ZZUI: Yes sir.

I

l COMM SSIONIR ?!G7 CRC : Mr.

?-=da '-k, did y=u aisc I .a feel that?

3,l

. e..

r. e..

e.e.... *'as s' w 1 4 { r r t m

J 131 de-19 CEA ?.'4.AN KIME:rf: Could I ask one follow up questien ~ en that 7:cfesse: Pigford? Do you knew what other sy=pt==s 2 you would leck for to see whether the valves were stuck 4 cpen? 3 MR. ??20ERICK: I wculd have suspected that we would receive a =uch higher te=perature in the tail pipe. 7 230 degrees dees not indicate to =e that the valve is blewing a by. CIA ?."AN KEMI:rf: But where else would ycu leck toI for a reading t ' find cut.'id*it is stuck open? 11 MR. FRICERICK: Ycu wculd leck at the valve 12 indication to see if it indicated open. Is CZAI?.v.AN KEMI:rf: Mr. Iewe, would you leck anywhere L 14) else? Is MR. SIWI: Yes sir, the discharge = cine cf the to i valve, which wculd be the react : c clant drain tank. 3 1

7-CEA ?2".AN KIMI:Pf: Did you at any time lock as' I

g l

o what was happening ec that drain tank?

i l 3 io: MR. IIWE: We did leck. I am no: sure of :he I r e t i .,, y exac: time tha: we first went :: 1:ck at it. 7: was ::cbahlv.; I .1, 2f =inutes after the event. i i

. J CEAIRMAli IIMI:rf: Is that sc=e:hing easily i

.. :j i I l visible en veux cent:01 panel? i 1 3j MR. IIWE:

.s easilf accessible, hus.0: really vis hie fr:= he nain pc :icn Of the ::::::'. ::c=. :: is t

-. ~,., -- .n

b.,.

• e-20 acutally, you have to walk cut around the panel and go hehind panels that face the cont::1 ::c= to actually read 2

3 this adjacent panel, d CEA PF.AN Uy.INY: C 4ssione: Haggerty and then 8 P:cfesser Pigford. 6 e CC.W.ISSICER EAGGIRTY: I am confused in ter=s cf the repcrt which was schmitted to the NRC en the even 7 8 at 25 minutes says:

• The operator requested the c mputer print the elect :=atic relief valve cutlet :emperature. A-o to value of 285.4 was indica:ed."The cperater attributed the temperature level to the ac =al ceci dcun of the discharge It 12 head, et cetera, pre :y =uch as you have said, but tha:

is 50 degrees higher than you have indicated. is Than at 12031 the operater requested the ec=puter 14 print the elect :=atic relieve valve cut a camperature. A is value of 233 was indicated, substantially the sa=e. Then a, I l at 2:17, the third time, the cu.erater rec.uested tha: the ,7 l 18! c==puter print the elec:::mani relieve valve Outle j I l tempera:J.re. A vale of 223.7 was indicated. That was the l i! l firs: ti=e the : ughly 230 that ycu reme=her is indi:2:ed

• t I

in this repc:: and i: is five sinutes af:e hat, that the ,, t valve was shut and the thing began : ge: under :: :: 1. i t I; New this 2S3 d esn't see=, and this 235 d:esn't I ,3. .t ,4 ]i see= := agree with your =e=c:f cf is never being ever ..1 3. B L 4 n. ---,.,----,e,, --w

c.. J. J J 3 I de-21 MR. :IWI: Sir, I did not have the input into tha: 2 repc : that ycu have bef e you. Cace : was able t: review 3 the inf== atica there : =ade c __ents to the offact that d I had never seen ta=perat=es grease than 232 at any ti=e, 5 including 283 c: whatever you have there hefere you. I had 6 net seen a ta=perat=e that high and it is ec :ect that =y 7 te=perature, -hat as : recall, was 232 at the highes

peint, a

which in fact is 50 degrees less than what is indicated 9 there. s-3 to : COMM:ss:CNIR EAGGI2rt: Wculd you have been the I 11 l cperater who regaested the three printouts? 1: MR. IWF: I did regaest two of the=, yes. I didn't-- is I really didn't regaes a prin: cut. All right? I jus: i4I regaested it to be called u= fr:= the ce=puter. Ycu c=uld I de that en the displav. vindcw whi=h wculd.' he rece:ded i., ; I is' in the tv.e.ewriter, either. i I i C*.*.v._ _e - ~ ~ ".... .'.'w~u _.~s~. ". - **e _' _', ..".e s e _ =.. e _ _= _ _ _ =_ s i a. a I i., i q cf 235 and 233*had to ce=a f::= s==ewhere thcugh. i MR. :IWZ: I have act seen the ec=puter prin: u: I i where these te=pers =es were =ade available f::= for the .s> repc -. .i !l l ~ 0 .v_v. 35:0NIR EAGGI27?: Wccid ycu ha'te nsidered .. I I tha: an excessive ta=pera =e, 235, since that is wel'. I abcve _he '.?C?

4.i

_._ we...>. _ v._.... _. _... e u_.3.... 4 c-, --,c,.

la. u .j de-22 8 deg=es. 2 COMMISSICNIR ?!GICRD: Mr. Frederick, Mr. Rice Of 3 the Task Fc:=e asked ycc ahcut this and he quoted = d 285 as the reading and you said that would not he ahner=al. I s Is it meaning that you thcught -- was ycur rec =11ecti=n 6 that 285 was the temperature that was called cut? 7 MR. FRIDERICK: No sir. He asked me : thcught that a was ahnc.a1 at that ti=a and I said no, I did not. 9 COMMI55!CNIR PIGTCRD: I see. What is ycur to reccliection cf the te=perature that was called cut at e si these twc instances? 12 MR. FREDERICK: I d n't re=e=her'that ta=perature is, c that inf===ation being relayed t =e at that ti=a. Whc-I i,j ever was calling up the infer =atien did not feel it was ,3 thnc =al and did not relate it : =e. i. COMMISSIONER PIGTCRD: Mr. Faust, bef:re the Task ~ l' 17 Ic :e vou said we have a :::cedure tha: ecvers a leaking isi relief valve if we suspec: i. And =v r.unstien is, wha: I I e then wculd nc==r.11y lead ycu := suspect it se this t .g l precedure can he i=plemented? I i l I MR. FACST: Well, at the time we were =cre concerned, 6-i c: I was concerned ahcut a stea= c.eners :: leak. As far as--- s=: era ::es wccid have to be aheve 200 decrees bef::e : 1 3: I veuld==nsider the=, = a: leas: en the tail pipe. heing

4 -

her than."ust n0 =31 leakage that we had been ha*/in. un.

i

'43 de-23 1 to this ti=e. We knew that the elec:::=atic had lifted 2 earlier sc : don't -- depending cr. when this thing fits in. 3 the sequence of ti=e, I den't have a feel f== how fas: it had eccled down. Sus saying that it was at a scr=al 4 5 ta=perat= e up around 190-200 degrees, see=s like it wculd ,t 6 take quite a while fc a pipe like that to ceci eff. 7 CC.W.ISSICNIR FICFOE: Is it ycur understanding, a Mr. Faust, that this is reading the ta=perature of the stea= .wA... 4s.,.$.w.4 g u.ug.w.. s.e. a.4.3 .4 8,- 9 o r-r to MR. FAUST: This is indicating pipe t,emperature. t1 C MMISSICNER PIG 7C E: Su: what is the answer := 12 the questien? Oces it indicate the te=pera:=e of the fluid is that is flowing th: ugh the tail pipe? MR. FAUST: It is an indicatien cf it. It is ,3 indicating whatever the water heats the pipe up :. C MMISSIONIR P G70RO: Mr. : ewe, I think vou said ~ to ycu expected a =uch higher te=pera:=e chan 230. If the 7 relief valve were really stuck open, whv? ,a. i 9 ,, j MR. *IWI: I wculd expect := see cver 300 degrees, i a: least, f:: the relief valve :e=pera:=e there en the ,0 i dcwnstream sife, because veu have a s:sa= space a.d pressur-; .i. t i i:e that is a::: xi=atelv 650 dec.rees steam that is reliev l 66, ( .l ihe. th: ugh the relief valve and : vculd suspect tha: the t discharpe pipe wculd be a 10: hipher e:perature indicati:n than :he 220 degrees. .e P l l

136 de-24 i COMMISSIONER P:G70RD: I suppose it depends upcn t 2 whether there is insulation en tcp cf the the=al ecuple on-3 the cuter surface of the pipe, dcesn't it? 4 MR. IWI: Yes, sir. 5 COMMISSICNIR ?IGTORD: Co ycu knew if there 6 I a= sorry. Did you knew at this time if there were insul-7 atien there c: not? s MR. :IWI: Sir, I did net k=cw fc sure if the -- 9 where the insulation was. 34: it wCuldn't de us any Value io at all at any ti=e if the insulatien was be:veen the pipe r and the the=al couple itself. 12 COMMISSICNIR P G70RD: Are these emergency p ccedures i3 sc=ething that all of the operatcrs are supposed to be s f =- ' liar with? i, MR. :IWI: Yes, sir. ,3 l COMMISSIONIR P 37CRO: And is the One cucted i is [ i "- m,:c ycur '<newledge, the p ccedure that was in affec:- i a: the time of the accident? ISI io : MR. :IWI: We did ne: s=ecifically pull==: ha: ,c l p ccedure until lace; because we did act suspec that we l ~ had the relief valve ::chle=. s., f COMMISSIONIR P G70RD: Oc vcur knewiedge, is the t p:ccedure tha: : qucted f:c=, the One that was in. effec: ,, 1 ..,1 ] a the ti=e ef the accident?

4 MR. :IWI: :: was in effect, yes 3:.r.

..a -l ? et

l a.., I sde-25 COMMISS NER PIGICRD: And I find that this ~ 2 p ccedure also suggests, a=cng sy=p

==a, tha: the react:: ~ 3 ccolant drain tank pressure and te=perature, if above nc:=al, 4 would give se=e indication. I a= paraphrasing what it 3 says. Co you recall that? s MR. ZEWI: Yes sir. 1 COMMISSICNTR PICTORO: Yes. Was the recognition a that the relief valve was p chably cpen reached in the 91 i telephone conference call involving Mr. Miller, te your ta l knowledge? it MR. INE: "o sir. 12 COMMISSICNIR PIG 70RD: Mr. 7:ederick, as we find 13 in the Task Force questioning p cceeding with you thrcugh I4! i the accident, you mentiened securing the pu=ps and ycu i 15 i were in the process cf raising the stea= generate: level l and ycu stated, quote,"we established natura' "' -- ' azi:n,

• i.

p' i unquote. Oc you re=a-"er : hat par: cf the questi:ning? te. i MR. TRIOERICI: Not specili: ally. l COMMISSIONIR ?:C7CRO: Nell, have given ycu en:uga i I l .i to knew the place in the ti=e sequence where we are? I i ~1 MR. FRIOERICR: Yes, sir. i 22 i COMM*SSICNIR ?!GICRO: Oc you believe hat natura'. l. circulati:n was established? I 0' i MR. TRIOE22CI: No sir. We were a :em::;ne :

S esta *13h natural cir:ula:: n.

I

\\ . s .s. .e 133 ) de-25 COMMISS CNZR 7:GTOM: see. The qucte is really s t net what you, intended to say then? 3 MR. F m ERICK: Pr=hably. COMMISSIONZR PIGFORD: Was natural cir=ulati n 3 ever established? MR. FRE ERICK: At the ti=e I was not -- I was 7 net fully aware of all of the indicatiens that we would p j s get when nat=al circulation was established. I was 4 carefully scnitoring the heard indications of RCS te=per-10 ature and ::fing to evaluave whether nat=al picculatien l j 11 was developing, hus I was relying en the senic: personne' 1: and the representa.ives f := the serrice c mpany as to is whether c net nat=al circulation was cec =ing. s 14 CCMESSIONIR P G7CRD: i.*he was the senic: persen is present in the ce== 01 ::c= at this time when ycu were 2 to trying to estatiish nat=al circula:icn? 4 i t i 17 MR. FRI:ERICR: Chera were c:hers in the ::c=. is; The persen : dgal: with directly was Mr. : ewe. I 1 .,.l CCMESSIONER P:G7 CRC:.,nd -- 4 i 3; MR. TRE0ZRICR: Ecwever, he was ccnfa :ing with i ,3 l all cf these

her pecple I a= refa :ing ::.

I 4 COMMSSIONIR P!G7CE: A: that ti=e was there l I sc=e =cre seni:: perscn presen: also? l il MR. :I E: I a= nce sure of the si=e 3-e-a '-=-= 4. hen the Uni: Superintenden:, Mr. *:gan, was here. Su: a ~ .r 3 9 ,w--- n n e n.- ---,,s.,-,, e w ,,-w ,,-e-

s ~ 139 w27 3 discussics that we were int: were he ween =yself and the 2 operators and,cerge Scunder, cc: Unit Superintendent f== 3 ':echnical Support. 4 CCMMISSOCNIR PIGTORD: In your opinion, Mr. Zewe, 3 was natural circulation established? 6 MR. I'<E No it was not. 7 COMMISSICNIR 7:G70RD: Ncw tell =e, I haven't had a a chance to read ycur technical specifications, is that a 9 require =ent when ycu ge into a shutd=*=?. nede like tb.is? Ic MR. I;E: '": ge en natural circulatien sir? 11 CCM.CSSICNIR P GTCRD: Yes. 12 MR. IWI: Nc, it is not. is CC.*M SS:CNIR 7:GTCRD: Is it -- i4 MR. IWI: Nc. ally we always have flew th:= ugh 4 ts the==re either by way of the nc==al react: =cciant cu==.s i, Of the 1:ng ter= c= cling D.K. heat pu=ps. And we always l 1 establis: D.K. heat flew bef re we secure reae :: ccclan I ,.I l l i 6 i cu= s. Sc no. ally ther e is always f ::ed f1:V th: ugh ta the ::clant syste= and th::uch the cere. tol i i COMMISSICNIR P G7CRD: Well n===allv. .n, .-i i I .n..

v. e s, s _4 i

..v.=. , l,i e l I CCM.CSSIONIR P GTCF.0: Su: I a= speaking cf new I. .. i .i i i then, le 's get in : e=er ency pr:cedures. Is establishin, 2, 4 4 4 natural circulati:n an Objective in veur e=e:gency ;;:cedures? . a,.\\ .i MR. :I'iI: : a= ne: -- are y=u say:.ng is there e I

140 's28 3 a certain preced=e that says f== nat=al circulation this \\ 2 is what you use? All right. Our hiackou: pr:cedure, c less 2 of offsite power where we lose the availability of running 4 cc: reacter c=clant pu=ps, all right, is the point at which 5 ve would g: into a natural circulatien in an emergency a situation because we icst the available power scurce:t 7

nn the react c=clant pu=ps.

s We were still tec nigh in pressure ye: to use the 9 nc.W1 D.K. hea*; pu=ps f== ficw. '" hat is the pein at which io we would gc in:= withdrawal of natural circulati==. e-in CCMMISSICNIR ?!GTORD: Is it reascnable -- 12 CHAIP.".AN KIMINI: ? =fessor Pigford, cne questien 33 I think we are getting confused about the wc:d =c a1 here, at leas: I a=. Se : will just ask two qui:k questiens i,, i l gi and then 5ack to ycu. f 14 l' Mr. Sewe and Mr. Frederick, have you experienced i ,7 f previous react:: ::ips? I MR. :ZWI: Yes sir. ta! i t MR. ??.IIIR*0I: Yes, we both have, 10i i ,, l CIA!7.".AN KIMINY: :n these eases did yeu : 7 : l I establish nc=al flew== did veu stav with the hi h : essure l-21 l i i .. i injecti:n sv.sta=? i i i ,, c "R.

IWI: We always stayed On with our ac:=al i

reac :: :: clan: pu=; f1:w. 24:1 l CEA!7."'3 KIMINI: Sc theref:re, when you say .c=a*. s s y_,. __.--....,,-_,-.,y

141 .i 1 de-29 here, it is no.~a1 after the react==. nip? 2 Nc =al is no. a1 forced ficw MR. ZDE: Right. 3 bY the reacter c clant sc==.s. 1 e CHAIP.'d.AN KI.ENY: Yes, so you are saying you did 1 sc=ething differe=t here f== what ycu had done in previcus e react== trips? 7 MR. :EE: Yes, sir. CEA!3 MAN KI.ENY: I as sorry. 7: fessc: Pigf d? s 9 COMMISSICNIR EAGGIRTY: Again, this same repcrt of May 15th sav.r tha: react: huildin~v su==. =. u==. A started 'O n en a high reacter building su=p level, but that the -- this normally happens about cace per shift and for this reason [' the pu=p stark was not considered extrac dinary by the '3 s l 'd! cperater. f 13 Sut then later at 38 minutes, c=.erater ste::ed l le reacter building su==. c.u=p A :: : event everf1: wing the l \\ 17i auxillary building su=p tank. A: 33'.; cpera-:: s: pped j-j t i i ta; reacter building su=p pu=p 3 : preven everflcwing the r l j i auxiliary building su=p ank. Where did ycu think ai; =f 18' I

c l the water was e-m'ag f::=7 l

l 1'

1 l MR. FACST: A: the time, the stea= genera ::.

i l CO.W. SS ONIR EAGGIRTY: :::: the reac :: cen:ain. 4 1 I

3 '

sent? e I M3. IAUS7 Int: the :SEC::

ntai==en hui' ding ;

• J I

4 .l

v. e s.

4 4 .6 e il ,_,_m._

14: de-g I C0!CCSSIONER EAGGIRW: Ecw? 1 2 MR. FAUST: That c=uld have been a feed line break., i 3 and as it was we were experiencing p :blems with indication cf a steam generate: decreasing, which was ancther indication 4 3 cf a leak in the generat==. 6 CCMMISSICNIR EAGGIRT?: But ycu were having.ccciant 7 pu=p pr blems? You were getting a ha=mer and -- g MR. FAUST: Well, I understand it was one of the things we were looking at and we had reason te believe tha: ,o cur pr:blem was is the stea= generate: because when init-e ially cut in f~eed water te.that generater, I p'ut it th: ugh quite a transient, a cycle, ther=al cycle, a's I ad=i::ed 12 it would he en the c dar of about 60 degree water into tha: ,3 1s! het gsnerater. COMMISS!CNIR EAGGIRT?: Sc ycu thought ycu had i 15 scue damage there? I to I 17 l MR. TAUST: Possibley, yes. i i t COMMISSIONIR EAGGIRTY: I am curi=us, with all cf l 18! I I the water thcugh, and with :he inability :: get ycur c clan:' l pu=ps te operate indicating that ycu had veids, tha:.the two

c i i

1 i didn't ge together scmewhere and --

t ;

MR. FAUST: Par: cf this==uld-have probably been .. u i 1 a:::ihuted := this. :.~ight have ::cled i: d:wn in excess of t

he way, lead into a pressure pr:blem.

4 i

., [ MR. ?2IOIR' I: The indicati:ns were =f a sec ndary l t! t

143 de-31 ' leak, not of a pri=ary leak, because there was nc radiatien 2 alar =. 3 CCMMISSICliza EAGGIRTY: beg your parden? d MR. TRI IR:CI: The indica.icr.s were of a secondary 3 leak rather than a pri=ary because there were nc radiation 6 Mar =s. These sy=pec=s are identical with that ex=ep-icn. I 7 COW.:ss:ONTR TA COR: Do you have any reasca Oc I believe new that there couldn't have been any sericus leakage 9 f c= the stea= generaters? In ether wc ds, your original 4 i 10 reason fe your original explanatica for the water in the o 11 su=c. tank, c in the su=p, is it cessible that'tha: could i i: have been at least partly right? That in addition to the i is pressuricer relief valve releasing water into the su=p ta l tank and then that flowing, that there could have been is significant wate: less f:c= the staa= generater? i io ! MR. FAUST: There could have been, yes. Well, I i;i that would depend -- l is! CO.*_E SSICNIR TA COR: Is there any_hing that wculd ; 1 l l l i,: indicate -- MR. FACST: Secause we hadn' isclared the oi generater. f l C0s. 35:0:IR TACOR: s there anyway of Iceking l t back that cecurs te cu :: ::y ec find cut whe her ycu t a were a: leas: partly righ:? ,4 a l MR. FACST: Well, the fac: that we have been t 11 _,,m.

r l 144 de-32 =aintaining an inventory in the 3 genera:::,' which is cur i 2 suspected leak. In other words, we haven't been icsing 3 water. CHA:R.%U.KIMINYi Ixcuse.=e, M:.*Ireder'ich,.*Tou_said 4: s the difference is --- the reasca you suspected the secondary e systa= was that'there'was nc radiati:n alar =. Didn't,at 7 25 =inutes sc=ething called a high radiati:n alar = go eff? s were ycc aware cf this? MR. FRICIRICK: Ze is refc :ing c.Me lendown. io CIA 22 MAN KIMI::Y: T := the su=p pu=p, 31 MR.TAUST: It is the

S letdcwn, radiation detectors.

CIAIRMAN.C123Y: Are.veu aware tha: thera was a 1; 33 significan: radiatien indication in the s =p,pu=p? s MR. - TRI::IR CK: The only earlier radiation y a= i4 i3 aware of is in the inter =4diate closed c cling wa:ar systa=,1 1 1 and that wcuid not be carticularly significan: en a reae::: 131 I 17 i

• 1. 19' l

t i I CIA 3M.U KIMINY: Se veu were no ' aware of the i s,! 1 I i.' radiati:n c =ing cut of the st=p pump area? .i I I i MR. IIWI: If I =ay interject at this point. There ; ., j .s I l may be sc=e confusion en the cima : hat we are referrine :: 6 t here, all ri~sht, As : re=a=ber we a=:ua11v. theucht that we 2 so l f had a probla= with the stea= generate a li::le bit latek- ~ ,2,-

I

., l tha. when'we h,1d iscla ed the reae::: huilding su== :u= s. A11 right? A..d tha: this was s==e i=e afte: .. l + 1 / 1 )

145 de-33 1 whenever we had iccked at the RC drain tank. All right? 2 And we then had =ere pressure and a rather high ta=perature 3 and cff scale icw c= level. All right? So the water could have cc=e f c= the RC drain 4 4 tank. All right? The relief valve could have lifted which s caused a leak on the RC drain tank to be transmitted to the a su=p. And at this point the only alars that we had as' 7 I far as radiatica gees, are the inter =ediate eccling lines e to the letdewn ecciants,which are right along side the Rs su=p. to And these are ver.r susce=.tible to Ma.ckercund 11 radiation and they have a very, very icw se: pein:. Yes? 12 MR. LOi3 :I: Did understand you to say earlier, f. ,3 Mr. Sewe, that you were =cnitoring within the first hcur after the event the drain tank :sspera:=e and pressure? MR. :EE : I a= not sure exactiv when we did Icek i., I ,,I at the drain tank pressure level. All right? } MR. LCiDI!: Were you aware a: the ti=e that it 18! l cec =ed that the rup:=ed disk in the dra'- -*-k had gene? Io! b MR. EE: I did not knew that, nc. i

c '

l l CCMM SSICNIR PIG 70RO: Mr. : ewe -- I a= sc y, i 4 l Mr. 7:ederick, I gather f:c= your testi=cny elsewhere tha: I you were the ene who requested the su=p pu=ps c he I

lI

=ned = f f, is that oc :ec ?

4 i

i

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$ 1 f

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4........ 146 i '.e-3 4 CCMMISSICNIR P GTORO: And please tell us again, 2 en what signal, what infc =atien? 3 MR. FREOIR CI: An auxillary cperater callt:d =a ? I d on the page phone f:c= the auxillary building. He has a 5 re=cte indicatien of the reactor building su=p level en 6 is panel there in the auxillary building. He called =e 7 to tell =e that his indicatien of level was off scale high, a greater than six feet. 9 I went to de ce=puter and requested de st=p to in the reacec: building =anually to see if =v. s-di-=:icn 8 is agreed with his, and it did. Mine read at six fee c: 12 greater. is Since I didn' t k=cw where the water was c:.=ing 14 frem, since I caly suspected it was f c= the drain tank, and 3 15 it was very unusual c have both pu=ps running and a high level at the same time. I suc.c.ested to the Supervisc, Mr. i6 ; t I 37i Caley, that we turn off the pu=;s. a j t 18: COMMI.SSICNIR ?!GFCRO: Whv.? i MR. FREOE?lCI: Rather than transfer wa:e: of cn l unkncwn crigin into the auxillary building. l l l CO."".!SSICNZR ? CTORO: Ycu were. hen cencerned i ,1 1 with what pcssible censequence if ycu fidn't turn :ne= c--? l 3l MR. FRICE?lCZ: First in =y =ind was everfleving + .i 1 w.e on.e4 3 .y .3.g v 4.. 4424 ,4 -,;4.,_.4 r.. 4 4 i I 'l1 water. .6 i e O i h l I

147 1 .le-35 CO."_ESSIONIR FIGFORD: I see. Was the radicactive 2 ~ water,that ycu were wc ied ahcut,ge::ing f c= the cencainment 3 ku_d i_d _i..'y- ~.c

• ..k.e aux _4 _' _' arv. ' ui'.8 8.y '.

4 MR. ???.0ERICK: Yes sir. 3 CO.v_USSIONIR FIGIORD: And possibly overflewing the o tanks? 7 MR. FREDERICK: Yes. 8 CO.V.ESSIGNIR PIGIORD: New, when you turned the su=c..cu==. s off, dees that isolate the su=p f c= the auxillarv. 10 bu_d _' d d a.g'. s _i_ css _d_w'e.". wa.e_ s._d_'_'

• c ' '- ' c w "._-."..".

e v to that line, that pipe? 4 12 MR. FRE IR CK: I believe it is possible, yes. 33 Ecwever, I thcught that the auxillary cperater isclared the 14 34,es a..w,_.....4._.

S i c.v.r.e.s.m,,;e..g e.a 0*~'

". c". ".a. v, c",. d _'.' '. 2 1: te .vg. es..e...e.m - .s v.es. i CO.V.CSSIONIR ?IGFCRD: ~4 hat infer atien led veu i 1 18,

• ..w._d. k _'._=~.*.

l Mi MR. FRI*:IR CK: Nc, it was just an assump:icn en I 20 l =y part. l i I 21l' COMMISSIONIR ?!GICRO: F c= v. cur nar:cw hindsight, ; f wa s.'..'...".'. c..'..' a.= ^_ a ..'..=... _' e '. 1 .v.R. .es..v_- e.e -v..

2.. c _.<...s.

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148 de-36 ga:har frem talking with the operat:: righ: at the panel 2 and wha indicati== he had that day when he secured hcth 3 his su=c. =umes, it was in fact lined um. to the =iscellanecus waste hold up tank,which is on a higher elevation than the 3 R3 su=p. So it would have been, and 3 a= just speaking f:c= a,ravity flew tv.=.e stand:: int er siphen effect, that i 7 shculd have precluded le :ing the water f== the reacter a building su=p go int: this =iscellanecus waste hold up tank by a siphen effect. All right? 'O The valves were lined up in that fashien. Su the 11 valves.f::= the auxillary building ec the reacec: building d = d-i 12 we-=-..c rhy s ' -a' ' v i s i a A- -- -...e "u----.... u - - - s 13 just a question of where the water wculd have been directed r4 te. 15 CHAIM.AN KIMI rt: Would ycu ius sav that ac.ain? to

• dhich tank were the valves lined up in: ?

17 [ MR. IWI: 7::= :alking := the auxillary Operate l t i l i ~~ '"'-- 18,- WP wa s -" e - = "a ~-'- * -' e, ~. ~. - =-=---- -------, s--r-- t=rs I te wer= lined up : the niscellanecus was e held up :ank. l t CIA!P.AN KI:T.r?: That is ac: the same as the

o,

I

i ene radiation waste tank that I

--..2.ae we v... e ..u.e -_ ;- u 4 .w.., .v3. y -.v - the nc=anciature -hat we used f:: va.:icus tanks in the ,3; l i t. s.4324 4... e u----. .e s e - =.-k a,..'.e x-----4..,-.. _-. -...,.enns waa-- .n. : ---,..g. ..,,-<--.24------.- a-.. a - - -. -- -r h6 t, e l I

oo 149 de-37 tank and the aux building sump are al.1 in the auxil1<:y 2 building, but there are differen: eleva:icas in the auxillar'/ 3 huilding and we have the pathways available fcz us := line it up to either ena of these three tanks. 3 CHAIRMN KZENY: Is this =iscellanecus, the ene that it was going in:c, was this a huge tank? MR. Z2 47: Yes, it is. It holds app cximatelv a 20,000 galicas. CEA ?.v27 KIENY: Did you have evidence as to 10 whether the level rose in tha: tank? st MR. .,. n, ..c. an u 12 CEA ?."RT K?.v. :.NY : M:. Lundin, do we t. ave any evidence 13, oh that subjecu that you believe? I t4 ; 3g, ;;ng;N: Yes, we have sc=e evidence chat in-I 15: dicated to us that the licuid level in the waste ank did I te; net increase during this ceriod of time. Can you cc==ent i. I c . '.a.1 l I

s.l MR. ~:DTE : Yes. I have seen that same repc : tha:

,I i

ci che level in that tank had app cx'-2:elv been 7.4 fee, if l

I i ., i =~=-'e...d."... a.. A. ~ ".a 4. .'.ad. '. .".a... ed. s.4.....'.'..=....'" .i j encugh ec centain the water : hat was pu= ped ever for the ^. i tine tha: the su==. cu==.s were en. .1 Now, I a= jus: ecing by the cpera:c: ha was l ..a a:.he panel at the time. And :: was fur-h== checked by 4- ...w 1 ...s... .h.' ...w.5

9 120 i' de.18 We did have an increase in level in the aux 2 huilding su=p cank and the aux building su=p which, in tur-1, 3 did overflew. But the fae: re=ains that the cperaters 4 de specifically re=e=her and did check the valve line ups. 5 And I a= going en that infe==ation f := =y operaters. 4 i CHAIPuN m.IN'?: F: m the c hor state =ent you =ade, 7 wculd ycu infer that they were wrong? a MR. IWI: Nc. I really dcn't knew the final cen-o clusien en if the level ins :=entatien en the =iscellanecus 10 waste held up tank was : ue and accurate at that peint in ti=e. I der.'t have anv. knewied e either wav savin:. that v a 12 we have f und since then that the inst =enta:L:n was valid 4 I 13 c that it was invalid at this pein; in ti=e. CEAI?_%N KI.E:T?: Well new, I a= just asking sc=e-t '5, thing 7ery simple. Y u think the cpera:::s are sure it is i 88l geing in ene tank? There is ne indi=atien tha: :he level I i 17! ~ 3 es ". A ~..s.... a ....k..".a.. ave _-'_' ws. ~ '. a. _' _ c - '...-.'_i. t te I there scte susgicien tha: 1: nay have been geing t the t i i i

• j cther tank?

I f .. I .u. .v_:. v_._ s, s.4

v. _..... c...__a e, 4....- -..... _. _,

.t. i _w !\\ 21! there is aisc c her scurces of vare: tha: eculd cause these r .. ts.. m-v.__.a. w. l . u...,I.-,r ..a s......... _. 4..e _,_e _s.,_._ s_ 3 l

4-MR.

.. TI : Yes, it was. 3 MR. "'i ::!: A.d wha: was f:und? ,e w y---,,- r r,--- wy wg ,m. + -, - - --w-

1 s., de-39 MR. :IWI: It was found to be lined up to 2 the =iscellaneous waste held ue. tank. This was -- I a= not-3 sure of the exact date, but it was within twe, er three 4 days after the accident. COMMISSICNIR TAY!.OR: Which is the tank that finally cverficwed? I MR. ZIWI: Aux building sump tank and the aux a building su=p also. o -m ata u.e wa.,..- s-.uu e -.o.C. R.4.7, n.o...de,,,. a. -- o- 'O ever get to the aux building su=p cank : hen if the valves 91 we e ' i..ed un, *o *.ake 4. ~. ~ -..".e ".c i d "- ~=.k'. -r 1: MR. ZIWI: We are still investigating at this time 13 what the exae: =cde was in cr'er to scive the confliction 14 between what the operator saw and did and what we actually -d i t.a. '..ad ec -. a to And we.h. ave.a. '. - -- v. da..e ' eA v.=....~. = -=-.-a. ~ I r*! ex. a..a.., a x = c..' v. w.".a. ..".e a '.wa~:s we e c.3 '. = - w=.=- 3.-.~ e i 1 3 3,' -w -.e eac. - -ui- .. ". =. 4s- .= c - - - - v " L '.' ' '... 4.... =. =. I so ! de-=. "..'a..e is sava-=' - s s ' " ' '..' a s, ' u. '.=. v . = = .=.d t ue s -.,,xe,-- a-aa aya a.ga. aa ..u.e s.t..a, -..' ~. s '. s '. a". =. 6 ,1, ve: Oc be drawn. l C:MMISS :NER ? GICRO: s that valve line up kncwn s .d.h.,..-...-I C=S. l .1 4 : .M g.

9. 7."e.77 4.

."q.e. y.. 5. b.e. -.. - *.. ---=7 [ .a M. MV..* T O * **JT.T. -**?-*s .?, e. ..a.. r

1 _3 - e. s 1-40 Cees the operater in the cent::1 ::c= have a means =f 2 knowing what the valve line up is? 3 MR. Zr,iE: He d es act physically, no, d CEA22MRI KIF.I:iY: I knew p = fess== Taylcr has 3 sc=e questiens. C uld I sneak in two quick enes because I know you have a.T $e: of euesti ns?

forget to ask;ycu 7

ene thing, Mr. Faust. De : re==- e in ene of ycur testi=enies a vou said that one.:::blem of seeine..h=se twc fa==us n' 'e 9 12 valves, that they were en green, that the p:=ble= was to sc=e sert of tag was hanging ever is, is that,cc rect? 11 MR. FAUST: Right. It was a yell =w caution tag. 12 CEA!RMAi KIP.I:1Y: Where was that hanging f::=? 13 MR. FAUST: It was hanging fr = CFG 163, which is i.' an e=ergency -- 1: is cur feed punp resurge valve. l ?5i CHA!2MRT KI !I:!?: Feed pu=p resurge valve. Y:n i i ta i don't happen :: knew what':he date was when tha: was attached! ~ t i de veu? 1 s i

.s y,

.. L.S. : .t was :::.:an_,y pu: en when we had -- i 13, ..e.. 3 it was put en f::= two runbacks we had due :: that va '.ve coming open inadver:antiv causing one of the feed.- "-- s : i ii trip off. :: was geared : cha da:e. 8 ,.{ 4 i .i i 9 CHURPRI KI.".I:IY: What wcu'd the date Of that had s

)

8 been, very appr:x'-*:el.'? I nean, is it an;shere near :: Mar:h 23:h, c: wculd i: have had.een-- M2. FACST: th.nk that was ahcu a ncn:h and a v w

1 1 .a i t l l de-41 3 mcnth and a half earlice, =aybe a =enth. t 2 C~.#.AIP. MAN ~IMI:TY: Because we just heard testi=cny. i 3

• k.a *. sa.i d ~5.a. a.c.ae. c's

..ed * *. s e, a.- 3... _' _= ~ l i.'. s. 3 4 MR. FAUSY: That tag, I don't knew how it would 3,9 5 get over the one valve. It didn't get ever he h cf them. 6 It was just hanging dcwn. It could he =cved arcund on the 7 panel. 8 CEA 1v.AN KIME:r': Mr.Frede:ick, I have One question 9 fc you before I tur. it cVe: to 2 cfessC: Taylcr. Dc yCU ic ! ha=.c.en to re=e=her what the date was when TM,2 wen: ii c _ _4. 4.a., 3 i,. .n. r9..c.a r..g_-~_s... v.es

s_4_,

4 4s.u.a_. 3.=.. , 3 :r i 3. is CEAIRMAN KIMIIY: Do : re= ember tha: in one of i I 34l ycur state =ents you said you were par: cf the shift that ~ I is was there when it went critical? i l .v.3.. .r.s.e..e.' C"

v. e s s i.

i, s. I .i i-CEAI?v.AN KIMINY: Cn Ma:ch 29, 1979, de vcu ha::en / j s i 18e to re=e=her tha.t it was an anniversa:v date ? l 6 I. .v g. .r u..e_ ca *s. 'Ic s _' _. i l CHA~?.v.AN.*C.MI:iY : You did not? i .. n i i MR. FRI":IR*CK : Nc: fc several days, ne sir. l l' .."3 Vy4 r

• t. s.*p. tb J.

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6w. t re=e=he: i: was an anniversa:v.? .4 l e ei ym ?n* *h..').e. st.,.- J.4..J. t .a=.

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L s.,. de-42 3 ask all questions. There wasn't a party going c celebrating 2 l' the ann versarv, was there? 3 w..R. .e.n.ca.r..e CK No. MR. TAUST: No sir. 3 CHAIP.".AN KI.'ENY: Nc. Mh. awe, there was not? 8 MR. Z..*fI: There was not. 7 CHAI tMAN KI.".INY: Thank you. Professor Tayler? e Oc you see why we had to ask that? The coincidence is just 9 an encr=cus coincidence. 10 y.n...=.=.=.', =.=._ M 1'..- =_~ _ a _.. v. _' s. e 11 Ca..w_"._ s a-C'T=R '."F.

• w* R. '."_ _'..,

'a.=. t_i _.e a.'. c " _ I. h.a_'." a.. h_our a * =_~ k.e. e ac..- - d - r 3.~.- a.b.cc. 'a.=..ex. is; couple.cf hcurs, when : gather the pcs =crta= is seeing 14 =cs: of the fuel'd=-=ge was dene, Mr.

• ewe what were ycu is, focusi.g en the =cs in ter=s of all cf the ec=ponents

'.a. w e.- =,. ', e.'..., _- =..-. '. a d_ e _a s" a. e...s w.w._3.. '. we _- =.'. e.'.. 13, i,,, _.._e _. _aed_ c. he -..._- _',-a..=...' '

• E.._'..'. _' _ = ~ we. e f' -" =c s,.

i I c nca.-.ed .=..'.cu v -, '. e..~ s. a...=... _ _'.... a= .e..a _' _' c' l ,s ; ,oi ..'.e =a'.. c- _c..e...s, . was..".e.e.=.". s_'.. 'e ....'._= va.c I i Iccked at the scst? e I ..t .sq. p. s . w..e o. .e _.e _a_a_g_ s,_g 3,, 1i . !.i had dcne was as scc:. as Mr. Schei= ann came back to the . i. .-.. _..'.- c,..._,..'. was.=,.-.c_a =_v _we '.."...= s = _'..=. _- .i -, g a. a ..e; 2.. g en._a a s _ a_._a,g e. _. _.., ..e . r J. .-..._--'-.c-.r._'...- ....=.k=.'._=_--=.3 =.._. .....-._ a... l _ _. _ _ -. ~ _. _

o l2a a-4 3 pri=ary plant p sssure and pressuri:e level. And deve:ed 2 = cst of my ti=a to hele-ine. the=, hel ine. the other cpera c: 3 with the -- Icekine. at the e=e:genev feed and se fc::h and 4 the het well level in the overall pla=t. 5 But the =ain thing that I was cencerned with was natura11v the hi-h crassuri:e: level. It shouldn't have been 3 I high, and the pressure which was icw, but it had stabli:ed a sc=ewhat, and then the e=argency feed initiation and the high het well level and the everall secpe of the p chle: 10 th40.ve had. Il COMM255:CNIR TAY;CR: Was ycur reason fer concern, 12 =articula:1v. ahcut the pressuri:e level, that veu thcugh: 13 that was a direct indicarica of the level of water in the 34. cere, an indicatien of whether c nc you =igh be uncevering is .sc=a of the cere? :s that the reasen fc fccusing On the I toi pressuri:e level? i l 17. MR. :INE: No it wasn't. I didn't have any idea

l II ra ii at that point that we were gcing te, c have uncevered the i

t

st cere.

\\ I

c h COMMISSICNIR TAYLOR: Were ycu cencerned ahcut tha:t n

l tl j l

i ]

cessibilitv? Was that entering ycur =ind a: that stage, c: i

j i

-. 1, did v.cu think it had no: e.ct:en that far? o

j MR.

IWI:

had act.':: had act entered =y =ind at that pc int.

.s 3 COMMI55 :NIR TAYLOR: New we have heard tha: the t I ~~-,-r-

l a.6 e-44 ther=al ecuples, the readings wen: cff scale d=ing this 2 3,,.,. 4 c d. ".'.".a c ru.e.- c..d... u. a. ieas. was,..'....'..g 3.es.... 2 marks, but that at least ene measure =ent was made by taking 4 a s.431.4vc.3....e.e a d.u 4. 4. ac.ss k.e.e.~4 a.3s _4n f... 3 3 ene of the in core thermal ecuples and at that peint a 6 temperature was registered of ahcut 2500, 2600 units Tahren-7 .u.e.4.. Was that b cught to your atuentien as seen as i was measured? Is that scmething that was a big event

• - v,eu d.'.~;

~5.a,. e..4.d'. ". '. '. '.v,e. u k:.c w "..is.=.ye.a.~.~a. .w y was being measured? MR. ZE*AE : I did not knew that we had readings f cm these ther=al ecucles down in the cable spreading recm is w.w..... veu ar =.. e _' er_.'..-.. ..".e '. 4 0 0 d e ;- = =. s..- d.'.'.. '. ' = ar. Id c.. h.a k- - e_. 4 1 .h.e a.4.a._ cc c_.h.e S.c..k.. e t.e m... 43 q.. ~. g .e . h..s. .r k---g 1 gav.v._ a g m.an.e..o r w.e...... m .4 a. le l -..".=. wo.' s, w.".- wc.' '.'.ava. e a s"- =.d '. i I

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3 l3s de-45 1 asked hi= who he told that day because : didn't learn abcut 2 it until the next dav. cc ask him that c.ue s tien. 3 CEA~?.".AN KIMI:<"?: And whc was that individual? 4 MR. SEWI: : learned later that the man had been s requested to take these readings f c= Gary Miller, the statica Superintendent and he had given the readings back e 7 to Mr. Miller. 8 COMM SSICNER TAYLOR: Ce vcu know app;cx4-atelv I when that was? v i, i MR. IWI: I de not know. to COMMISSIONIR TAY;OR: Su de veu know the na=e it. of the persen, could you tell us who it was? 1,. MR. ZIWE: I believe that it was Ivan Perter, was 33 I 14,i the individual. And he is an ins.ru=en and cent cl I Sut. er.-iscr. I., i l COMMISSIONER TA*? LOR: Okav.. So, I gather tha: the ~ 6 e i l reasen you were fccusing en the pressuri:e was tha: I 17: I well is this cc: rect that ycu wanted := nake sure that is 3 i i you had cent:cl over the pressure, you didn't want i: :: l ec. + l l ge sclid in the pressuri:er, ycu wanted := nake sure vcu ',f had sc=e way cf cent:cIling -he ;; essure in the reac :: i ccclan ? Is tha: the =ain reason? I MR. :ZWI: That is ccrrect, sir. 4 -a w..uv..s.e .-u. .o...s.r -..... c ~ %........ ._._.._./ ...,w

4

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1 153 1 de ,*6

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2 MR. ,,. C_., A,., c.,cu ,,s _,_e ,a_.4._.,. a,.,.,, s 3 point, all right, really did not shew excessive core 4 temperatures. 5 COMMISSICNER TAYLOR: When did you first begin 6 to suspect that ycu might he getting, c had extensive 7 core damage? Was that during your shift, during that shif: a hefere whenever it was, 7:00 c'cicek in the sc n.ng? i 9 .v.3.. .r. evr was a.y54 .,.3.sy 4 w.. c-. -..,..c w f ~. 10 un. until aheut 5:00 n.m. that evenin, cf :he ESth. i 11 Ca.v_v 2 S.C'i' A ". Av- ^ R.* We ' ', v' a... d" _'..g '.a e 4.-d n --w I '2 did.vou begin to, c did. von durin: that peried until abet 13l 6:00 p.m. en Wednesday, begin to have reason := helieve that \\ 14 extensive core damage had been dene? 13 MA. EWZ: I did nce reali:e at all cha: day :ha: t t o :' we.had a..x =.~.sive c e da=ac.a. 'a'~ ---..=. ,c.i.....'.=. E we really didn't knew if we had a crud burst due := the 17: I + is, s b..c.'e. cJ .%.e --%.e,

.

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d il t extensive damage at all, nc. I didn't realize that. .i C a.v_u. S.- NT.A ".r'.v...2..-..". a. ". a...c...'. a..... '. _,. ". ". ..i 6:00 c'cicek Wednesdav. evening. When did v.eu beccne aware - #...'.e ' = c. .."=. '.e..= .-..'a"

was,

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259 die-47 MR. :IWE: A lot of da= age? Pr=hably not f== 1 2 three== four days later that we had a let. And I a= no: 3 even sure of that ti=e fra=e, hu: it was certainly not that d day c the next, c the next after that; sc=eti=e further 5 on dcwn the line. 4 CCMMISSICNER TAY:OR: Do ycu re== *er whethe' you 7 began to have this feeling at at ti=e when there was still a a large,significantly large hyd:= gen hubble inside of the 9 pressure vessel? In other.wc ds, what a=. ying to ge: 'O at is whether at the ti=e when it was presu=5d that there was a large hyd:cgen hubble inside the pressure vessel, did f la you by that time begin to have reasen to believe that there '3' had been a let of extensive c re da= age? 'd MR. ZZWI: At that point I was -- I a= not sure 6 '3 ! hcw to put it. I was aware that the possibility existed, but .i ".s..'..w ..k. e _ = wa s ". _= _ _' e A_ a. ..'a.=. c.i....'.. *. _' e ' _-. l i I i '7l vhc actually ycu wa = -=' king te a: tha: =c=ent. f i tai 4

• de Plad specula:icns f := verv., verv., little da= age!

l 18 i

= a let of da= age, and : really did.': have a

as: Of I

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hcw =uch hyd:= gen I would have and hcw much da= age cha: I 2' l =uch hyd: gen would relate ::. i C",..".'C s~.".. w^ 'F.'. ".'a' '.'.*..*.*..- r d "au =sk=A_ v. "__. e.'..* _a 2 II [ w3.__.. .2___ge ..c.,32 e...,. .s f ,4 y, .;e, _,, 1. .... g _c a._. _... n. y g._.a. _,. s ..v. _a several da".s la er, we had _' earned tha we had had 24 degrees

a i 4 160 de-48 1 in the c=re and hat it would have ce=e f: s the irk 2 water reaction. 3 CO.*E.:SSICNIR TAEOR: I see. 4 MR. ZIWI: Earlier than that the highest reading s that I had seen was ahcut 780 degrees which is nowhere nea: e high encugh f== l irk water reaction to liberate the hyd: gen, 7 CCMMISSICNER TAnOR: Now, I want to ge back to 1 a the questien aheut the elesure of the twc pairs of react== c clant =ume.s A and 3 that were then closed, I c.uess, 20 Io minutes er se apart. First of all, why were they closed? 1 j it MR. EE: They w.ere. turned off or secured to i. Preclude da=ac.e to th.e cus:s themselves. ,3 CCMMISSICNIR TAECR: Was that because there y I I were -- was there anything more than indicatiens fr:= the ,s =ressure readings c was there any scise, was there anv ts shaking, anv visible sign of what pecple with experience lel with hig cu= s cavitating c uld have said migh: he a cavit, 17 J I J l I l ating pump? Was the cen.::1 ::cm actually shakine sienif-13: 1 r I .s , y,. to i MR. OEWE: It was not. I .a 6w> t i CC.vy. SSICNIR TA ECR: Was.here a icud ncise that .t i, i veu could at ribute to the cu==? i ..,r il 'l MR. :EC:

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161 were 1.n the cent:cl =ce=, a=cag ycu fcur, I don't want de-49 1 l 2 cu to speak 20: cther pecple, had any cf ycu seen the 3 =cvie "The China Synd:c=e* hefere the accident, any of the four of you? 4 5 MR. ZIWI: I have net, e MR. FRIDIR C*<: I have net. MR. Sur.r MA:CT: I have net. 7 s MR. FACST: I have not either. COMM~SSICNIR TAY CR: Sc ncne Of you had seen the to, =cvie hefere. Let =e tell v.cu whv. : asked the*c.uesticn. I g was trying to get sc=e idea whether that =ight have 12 affected ycur state of mind at all when the accident teck -lace ar.d. -.a. a- -- ~--.=.- ac., ~.e e s s ' b ' ' ' - r c ' c = v ' - = - ' ~- --d- ~ e ,3 r I t I cu==. 14 i i MR. "IWI: As far as the cu==. indica ica cc s we .e j f 13 I did have sc=e oscillating $10w indica:ica and high vibracien! I ,i en the pu=ps. l I ta ' MR. ~~ACST : I wculdn't say sc=e. We had :uite a ~ i. t . it. i c !s; I MR. IWI: We had a let, ric. ht.

e. ;

\\ l i .i ~. w,,.vv. m 3 .-s.;..s ..f-g. g, =- ;"c" a '.=... ed. ' v, ..'a..'.- .a-l ll l th4: the pc=ps =ight us plain gc? t ..R. .,e s. y . 2.. .asa. .u.:,. ,-ass'-. r --..'.=-'e, =.. '.. w

.t have learned different'.y, was : aas always under the

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162 le-50 I i=pression when ycu went ahcve three =1 stan vibration, ycu 2 st cd the chance cf damage to the pipe. That was =y i= press-3 ic: at-J.he ti=e. New I a= told differently. And we had up 4 arcund eight to 10. 5 COMMISSICNIR TAY.OR: Thank you. 4 CEAIRMAN KIMD. ?: C==issione Marrect? 7 CC.vv. SS:CNIR MARRETa: This goes en a different a tack, but given the two of you,:ir. Frederick and Mr. Faust, were in the cont cl rec = as operaters in an event that new o ic ; has attracted a great deal of attentica, I we'uld like : } knew what has been the affect en v.eu rather personallv.. Has ii it :::duced any cha. es in.vcur cw:. clans, =.cals, c anv. hine. i n. v is, else? I 14l MR. FA"ST : Cf course it has affected us. 4 I ig CC.*_v. SS :NIR MARRI-": Could you say a little bit =cre ahcut that? Oces that mean that veu :: bablv are .3, I i t.,, =aking. clans := leave the organi:atien, 0; in what way i. h is ! u,a e e-en- '. re ' ' * * * ' - - = - - '=ava 'e 1 i ,, ll c gani:stien. i 1 i .c ii MR. FAUST: Ne don't have any plans :: leave unless f ! a= f ::ed t: leave. + I C^.v.v.".. -"..M. .v.a'.s.'.~. ~. - c ".a" . _$ _' s e '..=.. a. = .. a. ,,'I _e s a _'

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1 e 153 de-51 CC.TCSSICNIR MARRIr: Y=u are asking from cur 2 angle? There is nothing internally that =ight have raised 3 that as a questien in your =inds, is it? MR. FAUST: No. 3 CO.TCSSICNIR MARRI T: Well, if in fact you de j plan to stay with the plant, I wculd assu=e that you vculd 7 not want a repeat of these events. But f::= your angle, what 8 wculd ycu as cent:01 ::c= cperaters, and let's say new there 9 are other operators wh0m yOu are representing, if you were to undertaking an investigatien to act, how should sc=ething I of this nature he.=revented? Where wculd v.cu give vcur 11 I 12, a*

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1 is We have been talking ahcut a n"- e: cf pcssibilit-i

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14 ~ 33 - training, engineering, =cre engineering inf===atien. We i.. talked abcut =atters of desie.n. Are there ways f:: he :e 37l inst:".=entation? We have talked as well, c at leas: we i i,! S.a*.* =..'. r ' ' = A, ..".a...'.e = = v. 'e s-e.a - s..'..=.. %=' w.- 11 .o ;! c ani:a:ica and manac.e=ent. Where wculd.vcu c.ive v.eur i ., l attention if ycu were undertaking a lock at these kinds of I aw .. l issues and : fellow up why wculi ycu cheese these? I i v.a. FACST: : guess wculd hi: en engine ins.:u-nentati:n f:: ene of the naje pei..:s as well as pera::: i i!

sining and nultiple drills, nultiple casualties.

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.e 164 de-52 inst==entaticn? What kind of instru=entatica changes? s 2 MR. FAUST: Direct indication cf what we are ~ 3 lecking at, as close as we can get to the cere. There is 4 cn the diagra= behind us, fe instance, the ther=al couples 5 that menitor in ccre ta=perature. That was not up there o during the accident. That was put up later. That is that 7 white panel that lecks like the outline ef the ccre Cn it. O COMMISSICNER MARRZ**: What ahcut with reference 9 cc t_aining, what kinds cf changes, what would you p cpese io .a., ._ a.<...a.,.g,. e O MR. FAUST: Well, like said, we would get inec 4 12 dual situaticas where we wouldn't have =cre than just one .aa _a _,.. _. 13 I, 14; COMM SSIONER MARRE"": Mr. Frederick? l 13 l MR. FRICERIOR: I agree tha- -"a e shculd be sc=e j i i, mathed of deter =ining valve positica as an absciute. In i, ~ I i

i. f other wc:ds, inferred indica icn wculd be unsa:isfac: cry.

i l a. - Ycu =ust knew that chere is ne valve as a fac. ,, j COMM*SSICNER MARRE**: That is on inst n=entatien. 'l What abcc: training? I 'l MR. FRE0ERIC'< : Cn ::aining, perhaps the -- as .t :- .I..t j Craig said, the basic assu=ptien that we dcn': ::ain en ..,.a_. , a, 4...,- = s. ~. '..= s '. u _' _d '.. e "_ _ d _= _ = ". ,,3 :1 C^.v v ~...* _ * '.F_.7,.v'. "...- a'.- =..~.a= .....=...==__a_ e:: .s t issues v.eu wculd include in your cster cf items? se

1 16s. de-53 MR. FRI::IRICK: Yes. I guess we cught to have a 2 shift turn ever written checklist. 3 COM!CSSICNIR MARRI-";: A checklist fc there d is no such checklist now? 3 MR. FRIDIRICK: I am talking ahcut a rather lengthy sYstes h.v system check of the line un.s as the.v a cear en the 7 cent cl panel. And an evaluation should be made as to 8 whether c not the indicatiens en the panel actually depict the status of the system. P to CCMM'SSICNIR MARRITT: I would like te return the 11 first Taastion I was raising and I a= sure it is awkward, 12 but given the kinds of responses that we get a: least f c= 13 sc=e c' the public at cc: las: hearing, it is chvicus that 14 scne pecple-were. making a lo: cf respense to what had gene is en, and of course they were nc: in the cperating recm. ie I guess ! would like : return := the questien of I I have the stresses been like, what have they been like i

7 l

1 ,i subseq;en: 10 the even:? ?:. Faus ? I .i i n ,I MR. FACST: I changed nv. phene nt-er. .c I COMMISSIONIR MARRITO: I guess that answers it. I i i MR. FRICIR!CK: There have been -- during the firs: - I few weeks there was ra.her cencen. rated attack en the :ve t c' us by the press as "a: as they wanted interrievs. They . s,I wa... =^ ~.~ ~._=.'.% ~.c ".s sh c " ~ s.. = ~..*.a y e ~..a.s.. I ..'.~....~~.. w e .' _= _..' y.-...-=.ss'_"__.=..'=..d_'..- we.. =. '._=

e l 166 de-54 I I thought it was i=pertant, personally, tha s \\ 2 did not speak to the press because what I had to say.*.ahcui 3 the accident was extremely technical, and it was easily misundersteed. And mal =1y the words I wculd have used := 4 3 explain what happened could have been ccepletely misconst ned. 6 MR. FAU3T: We atte=pted this one. 7 MR. FRIOERICR: That is why didn't say an'r:hing a to the press. 9 MR. FAUST: And the way. i: ca=e cut, cuetes were made cut Of centext fres what we said and wha we were 10 explaining and thev. were 53.t in with whatever the editor, 11 c: wheever puts this stuff together, lecks best guess. ,7 CC.v.v. SS:0NIR MARRI"'T : H w was that done? Oid you 1 set up the-- did ycu agree to the interriew? Were they I 1 '1 set um. in the===pany c: how? I I ,* l MR. FAUST: No this was -- we were just walking 1,, l! areund one dayand happened :: run inte sc=ebcdy. CHA23.".AN KIMI:."? : CO::t'.ssi ner Mc?hersen? 15 ;. l l' i COMMISSI NIR MC?EIRSCN: Was there any prev:. us io! valve :: stick cpen? Had f indicati n that tha: : essuri:e: i there ever been any indication in the history of "'M: 2 tha: ' ,, lo 4 4 'lS chat valve : uld stick? . 'l .s II ,l .....4. .v_... p. w,_ . - - _._ a. ' - k., e.. '.' 23 " J' ' w..v_v._.::.e., _ -e.4_.g.v.C..~. 0.S C 'i - a.=, .s., MR. EWI: C:her than the One hat was ment.:ned .a + n --n, -~ ~

.t.. 16* I de-55 previously that were we had it fail cpen en an electrical 2 transient, no. I think the enly time that can remember 3 that we had the valve either fail er -- CC.W. SSIONZR MC?EIRSON: I a= sorry, I missed that. 5 When was that, when did that happen? MR. ZIWI: If I re=e=ber right, that happened just 7 about a vear cric: to that on March 29, 1973.

• hat was a

discussed earlier, at an earlier -- CCMMISSIONI2 MC?EIRSCN : We were told that. Wha: 10 < s u.e, .u ? .A 8 t g a..a..v.. v 1 s, y.u.g. w ..s... s".--. ...a. 11 v.cu are en? Is it f c= 11 Oc 7? 1 MR..?RICIR*CI: 11:00 p.=. to 7:00 a.=. 13! CC.W.*SSICNIR MC?EIRSCN: 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.=. As you develcp seniority in the gl' ant, wculd you be eligible 14 t is! to bid en the day time shift? to. MR..TRICIRICR: We nc = ally rc:a:e shifts. i. i,.. w.u.M sc-.si=2 -m '. - -42 s. y v = ..Cz. u..v..o.S.s..

v. 1-...,..a c

t s '. that v.eu have day time sc=e-i=es and sc=e:imes nights? in: MR. "IWI: Yes sir. I I a i. CC.W.~SS!CNIR MC?EIRSCN: Ecw =any nic. hts have ycu i lr .. e.. ,. " ' s a- - '...' a s.". 4 3, e.=.., .i.a. .=. -.w s. gi u.:i1 before this happened? .I f .M.S..

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14,3 te-36 1 We earlier asked se=e earlier -- sc=e of your ecllaagues 2 to show us what thev locked at en that con::cl panel. Wha: - were the =cs: i=pertant areas that you were lecking at, where the really het areas -" and they did shew it and they 4 5 said, a=cng other things as I recall, that the twe -- that 6 the lights that show that the valve on the emergency. feed 7 water pu=p water are not areas that you c dinarily icek at. a I fcund dat when I was up in that rec = a ceu=le of weeks age with =y ecli.eagues here and with the press .ia and with the loudspeaker sys =_= going en, thgt even withcut anyuhing blinking it was an inti=idating dacciing experience. i, 37 I would ask ycu to describe, in your cwn =inds, what the I state cf your e=ctions were and the state of ycur sense of 13 - cc=ce ence = cent::cl this even: were at say 4: 30 c: 5:00 14: l gj c'cicek en the =cening of March 2Sth while these 200 ala==s i were flashing and ether lights were en? .e s I i i l l MR. FACST: I would have liked to nave ..rewn away i

7' the alar = panel.

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.v.C.: r .:~e h..~.v..-, .ac,_._3 _.s s. ave _3 _2 < a. 's, t have thrcwn away the ala =.canel. i, i i I l MR.TACSC: It wasn': giting as any useful inic:=-

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l 4..o OE.52 MR. FRICIR CZ: I fel that we were stabli:ed. COMM SSICNIR MCPEIRSCN: That you were stable. 3 MR. FRICIR CK: ?:i= to the proble=s we started 4 to rieal the reacter ecciant pu=ps. 3 COMM SSICNIR MCPEIRSCN: When did they begin? MR. FRICIRICK: That was sh::tly -- a little' hit 7 more than an heur, I believe. 8 MR. IIWI: About a quarter after five c sc=e hing. COMMISSICNIR MC?EIRSCN: And then what was ycur 10 sense of y=ur capaci:y to cent:cl it? 11 MR. FAUST: Well, during this ti=e we had just 12 begun trying to get back cur ner:a1 feed path which we 83' didr.'t succeed at. What we did succeed at least in doing t4 was was getting riejects re-established se that we get the l het well. level back dcwn. This was cccuring durine that 's I I f I to: time. We jus: ::ck a part of the superrisc:'s ti=e. i

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o l present en the panel, a

'i .,i :; C *.".. S s~ ~- '".. =..s .M.C=. =.~..'.S mN -. c ~. s.- ~..~~..'.k~..'..=.a""=-~-- ~ a l ent kind cf c.anel c: =cre =en, =cre cen. :1 ::cs cpera:::s I i. in there c uld have =anaged that, c if there are :niv. -he 9 tvc Of veu hare with Mr. Sewe -- 9 .... M.. c ..M .M .w.'.g. g.. g dB -

10 8 n-58 1 CC.50i!SSICNIR MC?EIRSCN: And Mr. Scheima.n. New l 1 t, 2 there are fcur of you. Is that encugh? 3 MR. ZINE: We also had, at this peint, Gec ge Clander, our Unit Superintenden: Tec5-!-=' Suppcrt and also 4 5 the Shif: Supervisc: that was within Unit I was in Unit II f =m about seven minutes after the trip until scmewhe a 6 7 a:cund 6:30.c quarter of seven. So we were all in at that a

• d e.

9 MR. FAUST: When we were in there this =c ning, likei i to l I said, we were also concentrating en -- I had.a p =hlem P i s i,i with the steam generat::s maintaining the 3 level which indicated a =ri=arv. i. c sec=ndarv. leak off f := that =cint and : hen ve were also getting into where we started icsing ,3 l i I stea=pressureonthe3generatorwhichwasanctherpeccedurej y e i 15 ; we are inte new, as well as just starting off with the ( te r =eact::, turbine =sact: tris dcwn into a pessible icss [7 ; cf het well, trying :: get a nc:=al feed re-escablished and in: a stea= lesk which was a - *a $=-'

= pick which i

t g; cne you were gcing t: go th: ugh. 0 CCMMISSICNIR MC?EIRSCN: So there were a le: Of ., 3, centradicterv. si nals that veu were ge :ine.? l .v.R. FAUST : Cha: is what we are ::v.ine. to e.e: 1 1 ac :ss. I: wasn't exae:17 as clear as :hese -- c: wha: ycu l l3.f , l, t I have in fr:n: Of y:n there is indica-ing,

4 as :: wha: we were 1:cking a, what we had available.

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\\ \\ l 17'. -39 CHA:.c".AN KIY..".'rY: I as seeing an awful let of 2 ~ ( ala = hands going up. I saw Cc:.issione: Eaggerty fi s. 3 CC.E SSICNIR EAGGIR Y: Cn steam generator 3, when did you begin tc think that perhaps you had a leak f c= d 5 the generato: in:o the reactc ccclant syste=? MR. FACST: That esse ahcus, I wculd put it.about 8 7 15 -*..u~=s ~3.~.~

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-.uh ' a, c--.".' ems A ~ 8 v' ' h c. n ~ ~~.' L _*..., ~m".e.*. ' '. ' a.' ee?__'.ng c.' ~*.e gene.a.. ue 9 to where I had actually isolated the 3 generator again Ic l and the level was still drifting up. I

l CC.ESSICNIR EAGGIRTY: 'dhen did vcu isclate? It I.

sav.s here that.veu isolated 3 at ene hour and 25 minutes. ., 2 .u 3...r.gg.e.. .. 4 g.w.. .4 e s .., -- - e... 44se l i4 : steps was taking and I waited once again -- C,s ww - - -..J .=.a. Gw- ...r. _.. ek .3.:, 4..,..s c .. se 4

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e. hour and 25 ninutes to see --

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t h 1_ v i w ./ 9 - s s 3 s. 1.,,., i de-60 had been secv. red. I did receive that infermaticc. 2 m ~ ~ COk.C33 CUIR EAGGEK'il 'And you did thi:!k that 3 N s water was cesing f:cs a sectadary system,scr-did you just ~. 2:~ i 4'- .not'think.s: all ?as to --- t -,./ \\ N p s s < MR. :EW?.: I M.id.not know specifically, a'i that m point, whers alL of the,wator was f cm. All right.' at that s s. 7 b 4 point _in time : did not suspect stny one thing =cra so than m. ., s _ s s g s s e i another. I knew that our wato: levels in the auxillary s y' s m, N, ,t g building were quito high andthat we really didn't have m s s~ v y-y ~. to a large volume of invent :y.' s So, I would just 31 seen keep the water that s s J -Q-was in the reacter buildingJeoc:ain=ent in the react::: st E.x N i s, ' N s '3 -- huilding and nce transfer it over to the auxillary buildiYi[. ,N i s t CHA!2 MAN KI.".2*.*IY: 3 y ,[; C:=missioner :.ewis7 N N s. \\ i i3 f, COM_E3.t!CNER :ECS : You said earlis: s that'M,.O ^ -1 s c. - s, s: ,8 p s m

e:perature gauge had basically been leakin;<and theref:re p s.

l, .s\\- i s 87l you :1aded te disecunt the infer =ati:n th,a: y u were ge :ingi x o \\ '\\ : 1 18; fr:m that gauge. Am I cc: rec-in -{.a*.7- \\ i ! s; N s s y. N. t S !! MR. :EC: "'!.e tem erature indi:S ccd Oc nd. si.'.ef 'I n c. .tm. 'l _g, ( ~ c. l e/ j -

c,!'

valve? p-( s s m _ ~ - s 1i S'.~,. ~.. .s 7 CaME S.") ~, ~e * *r.'.

• y* t~..e..

..'. s..- ^..-. a p- '.:.R j ,1 (' g g,.,,~ 8 m. ~ + It ~ k .1 g-% ..i.a. 4.s c J.. C u.R. ..v ~ " j ( -x 4.,.. .s. t.. : it'aads.~e,- ,. y_y 3 3.....,..... a. s .v n-. s s \\ 4 .u p. -.,v-- t a_. _ws_e. .N ~ ...s, i .. E,i - x% = .u.u..a.-..;2 3.s<. . w.. . 3... e wa s

• e _W....*.,,

~ 6

• t gs.s

~ i

• \\

+ .s' s v . \\ w ek 's

• D.g t

u p k ( \\. -\\,.. J

• 2

,,y h ^ '

,a 1.,ea da-61 l' gave you a facity indica:ica se ycu tended ec disecunt it, 2r am : cc rect sir? 3j MR. :IWI: Nc: really. Really, the temperature 4 ;l indication that we had we suspected was p chably reai because i s the valve had lid:ed and the te=perature shculd he higher than what it shculd have been pric: to the event. e 7, CCfCCSSICNIR I.IWIS: Ckay. What I am trying to a get at is, hcw =any cther things were not wc king as they shculd have been wc king at the time of the event? *n ether 9 ,c, wc:ds, I think Mr. Frederick you said that there were all 1 2, sc s of things that were net cperating and ycu were geing 3 to say, te=c :cw I a= gcing to put cu: a wc k c de: fc

them, 33 Can you :nn <!cwn the lis: cf seme of :he things that were i

3, [ not really what an average persen wculd call in wc king ,iI c-'e-~*e...'g.'.~.~..'~..'.e.'..=..~.~.,. "..".e.- = e.- = n.'.- ~. c.' ~ u. e. q 'l fc the 1cck en ycur face. l I .v.g. .e..e....e.2..i......b.. 3 4 =..' va.' "., a c.".=.'.' v. ~..". e ,1 gj relief valve was suspectad of leaking c: one of the ecdes. ,i t o j. It was not determined which One was leaking and because cf s .j 1 I that we were maintaining a chemical inven cry balance hv. i c.cerating the pressuri:e: syste=s in =anual. " hat was one a I ahnc:=al situatica. f h..b.

• p

.gg.585.M_ 3 ..mg m. b.g e 4

e. g o. 5. gM. b. E.

m3

==..g e. . J k.u. Wg@ g d. g ,....3*"." .. ". *.m. 't a.."...~. ~ " ". " ~. e a \\ 'a g..g. ...n ..., g.s... a..- n..n.,., e n.y. A a. .. g..a n a. g e..s -,.... / .s .=7 i i - = = v e

1 ,. o,. de-62 3 that pric: := the acciden: by reading the ala== respense s 2 and trying to figure out what gave =e -he alar =. And I 3 had planned to s"'--i a wc:k request but never get a:cund d to it. I can't think of any other specific instance. 5 MR. TACST: Cne thing ahcut it was that we had a reject valve,which ner= ally returns wa:e: to cur cendensate 6 7 stcrage tank, was th:: tled dcwnstrea= hecause of ;;chle=s a received earlier. The valve, when 1: receives a signal wculd o go open wide and what this wculd and up again wculd he -- ended up tripping cff cne of cur feed pu=ps e.n it and had io given us a run back. Sc -hat had been th:::: led =anually to si i: li=1: the rate of return ec the condensate s crage tank. is COMMISSICNER LINIS: Let =e ask ycu, is it nc =al i,; fe: sc sany things := he just not wc king, ne: in wc king ~ ,3 ceder? Is it just the way a nuclear reae :: wc ks tha: I iei MR. FAUST: think this is anv. c.ian: vou are i. gj talking abcut new. Ycu are act jus: talking abcu: nuclear j i. 18 I**** I ****I ~ I -a ,,i w..v.u s 3.-r.p.g

v. v _.a.. vk=v.,

was 4".s. -v'..3 MR. TRICIA:CK: I believe that where sc =any syste=s i i i interface and veu have sc =anv. differen:===penents it i. wculdn't he unusual := assu=e that s==e s=al' percentage

i cf them are nc: wc:k ng fuliv..

..,t 3 w..v.u ..a..m.. s

. w.'..,.'. a. s.'...- a.'.' v..=.>. =.

.., _ a

4 i

= ist these ser:s cf thi..73 :Spairad?

,l

i 1.,s. de-63' MR. FRICERICR: It wculd depend cn their importance in the system as a whole. It takes a ic icnger to get a 3 chair repaired than it does a relief valve. CEAIR."Rt KIMINY: Cc=missione: Haggerty? 8 CCMMISSICNER EAGGER*Y: Earlier ycu heard the e questien aheut the letter f== Novak at NRC and the 7 description of the pressuri:e: proble= tha: they have a a speci p:=blem and so forth. Have any of you ever heard of such a pressuri:e Icep problem bef:re? 10

1R. "EiI:

learned ahcut the p chl's= in Oavid 11 and Bassey after the accident. ?:ic: to that I didn't have t-any k=cwledge of that particular event. 13 COM.ISSICNIR HAGGIR*Y: Chvicusly knowledge of i: 14! sight have had sc=e censiderable difference in your i ? sj reacti:n : what was happening. I, te ; MR. *IWI:

=ight have, yes.

i l i 17> CHA:?."RT KIMIMY: C:==issi:ner M 3:1ie? i, i 13 COW 235!CNIR MC3R I: Yes. Mr. : ewe, ycu indicated! t l 1, [i i tha: there were several hund sd ala =s wen: cff within a I .. I few seconds of the event and I a= curicus as t= whe her this.:-- t 1l MR. :IWI: Mr. Frederick said that. o . 4, COMM*35 0NIR MC3R I: Oh, is ..at sc. Oces u .. t sna: happen frec...en:1v. ? .r e..c r.e. -....... a .-=ac...- a __-=- - ..e... a. w ,4 'p, any au:=%'.a".1: shutd 'd"*. like that, feu de :SCei**e

l 176 ~ 3 le-64 I gaite a few alar =s. 2 COMMISS::NIR MC3R::I: *s it in the sa=e p;cpertiqn that they were received here? Several hundred ala==s wen: 2 eff within a few seconds of the event : think,is sc=ething 3 that ycu said. 4 MR. FRI ERICK: ". css of fesd, yes. 7 CCMMISSICNER MC3R :E: Chat happens eften encugh a that it was nc censidered a very d s=atic thing other than i it indicated a p:chien that you had hefere? o ic MR. TRESEA*0I: Since it was less of feed and 5-10 there are sc =any ec=penents involved, I woul'd expect tha: is l =any alar =s. Ecwever, the infc==atics which have been 12 related to =e by the ala:=s was just not there. In ether is I

4:

wc ds, there were sc =any alar =s that we had to go to 1 i 53 ' cther indica:ic.s to determine the status of the cf the t i r e,i plant. t,. J, CHAI.2."_U KII'.E."? : I have ene guestien en that. '?cu 8 3 ..e ~..'-.u .. a.=.-.-. '. _ = _, ' ' 1 . _'. '___3--.. mid il sa.'.'. v. u "..ava. 3 q. t en t.revicus ti=es,cuite as =any ala s cc eff aisc c: was 4 ., o, t i i !j this an unusual n"~'er? 4 MR. FRI:ERICK: This was an unusual :- 'er. .. i.- t C v 's_'.2.".A N ..-'.'.v. -. Ck=v., ".a >. v. e ".. 4 w..v.y.--. e g. v..c3 2..., e..g.4 _. _ a.st,e... ...e ..a c u ..- a s s " .4.. e_- ". a _' ". a. '..e.'.., s.".>., s -..ew'.a..- =. _ '._.% a-e...a. 4 ,2 _.. g.a...._..., _.... e_ _-__..a._ a..g_a. .s_._ ..a I l l r F I

177 1 bearing on tha being s:uck. Is that a reascnable, er has I 2l tha: been established as a fa:: or nc:? I 3I CHAIRMAN XIMENY: Perhaps you should first ask l 4i Mr. Schei= ann if he had firsthand knowledge of that, and we 3 have been neglecting him. i 6 COMMISSIONER Mc3 RIDE: Could sc=eene answer that? 7 MR. SCHIIMANN: To my knowledge, I never heard a anything abou: that resin buildup in tha: valve being a i l 9 possible difficulty. io COMMISSIONER Mc3 RIDE: Is there a resin buildup in e ij any c her valves as as -- MR. SCHIIMKG: Are you talking new abou: the 1: transfer of the resin tha: was going on? 33 Tha: was in the condensate pelisher system where

4 we had the resia beund up.

That was ne:hing :: de with the 1*, I g primary sys tem. 17, CHAIREN KIMENY: Mr. Schei= ann, if I nay ask, you la : were Workin en.the clishers a: 2: 00 a.m.

believe.

s I i 19, MR. SCHEDLUN: Tha: is true. I i

o; CHAIRMAN IIMENY:

Are -hose anywhere near the cen-21l densate pany tha: ripped? i MR. SCHEIMANN: Yes, they are. They are righ in -a; the dis:harge line. i e e\\ e e+ 4 4 9

• e 4

e en i t Wha" tripped it. 3 I h e r e a******I '* b n $ I b a 5

• "O U OI [ OUI
• 3 Nn:V i

i 9 e p e. y --.m.

~_ 173 i 1 ! colleagues could have been doing tha: =ight have tripped tha i l condensa:e pu=p ? 2 1 3 MR. EWE: If I =ay add sc=e:hing here, we de have lfurtherdeter=inaticanewtha: 4 you =ay not be aware of en why i 5 ' we did have the less of feed water transien: that day. We 6 have deter =ined that because of wa:er ge::ing in:o eur air 7, syste=, and this is just knowledge new as we see 1: :oday, J l 8 ! all righ:, is tha: we had water tha: go: in:o our air syste=s 9, which caused our condensate polisher valves to go shut which to reduced the condensate flew to ano her se: cf pu=ps, the 11 condensa:e booster pt=ps, and they secure the=selves on icw 1: suction pressure. Tha pump tripped and caused :he condensa:e is i pu=p to also trip, which ensued the loss of feed. i is, CHAIRMAN E4ENY: Mr. ewe, how do you knew that new1 t l MR. EWE: Well, we have d:ne extensive investiga:ica 16l of why we had the Icss of feed water flow tha: day because i

7 judging fr = the c =puter alar =s and the c=puter prin

:ut, i:

la really didn': clarify why we should have a 1 css f feed water l flow tha: we saw. i, Sc in the ::urse of this in,yestiga:ic: last i 40 week or so we de:er=ined tha: his cne check valve which ~ ,1 should preclude ge::ing water in: the air syste= in fact was faulty and it would allow water Oc g: int the air syste= and i: would cause the air opera:ed valves en the Outle: ef the 4. f

ndensate polisher syste= :: fail shu:, whi:h w uld is:la:e r

4 t

he sue:i:n :: :he ::ndens2:e :::s:er pu=;s which su;;ir I

1 i I, n l

l 19 i l I t 1 i suctica :c the feed pumps which feed in:: :he stea= genera cr. J 2,+ And it is icss of these feed pu ps tha: resul: in a :urbine I 3 ; trip and ensued in:: the rea:::: trip. t, 4 CHAII!AN G)ENY: Just ene =cre questien. Have ycu 3 actually examined this valve? 6 MR. IEWE: Yes, we did, Sir. 7 CHAIN. TAN E}GNY: But this is in a part of the gj building you can get into? 9 .M R. -. Y. :..-

7...i s.*..

..k.a. . u. ". *...

b. u i ' A d.., v e s,

.C.8.. ..w. 3

g.

C'!A A.v'IA:,' V:V.:.NV. - .'.t.. I. . d.'... .-. t MR. LUNDIN: I understand that fellew'ing the pre-11! 1 v 4 c us

4. 8 3 #.4.u '.v. wi..k.

. h a. wa.a. 3=....'... 4... ..k. a. a.4. l.i.- e s, I, i, l 6 that sese traps were instal'ed : preclude tha: fr n happening, 3, I l Is tha: se? ,yg.

w..

-w4 ... 3 43... .y w. 4 4._. 4.. s.u. ..a ..._...w.. . a ' k.i.. g w i. *..h..'. e

• c *. c e. ' =.. '..-..i...e. a.'.' a. d.

..".a. .. a..=,..'. e.. w e.., j,

t. '

I believe, six ::aps installed. 3u: -hese ::aps will rencve o .g g. e r _.' a-. ".. a. .#. s. b.a. ..i - ' ' a. =. s. ~. e v. d. v. '.' . - - c v a. ,8 j,' l a. ~ =. c ua... 4...' a. s c.# w a. a.. #..-. 3=...'... --a.'.<4.....- ..".a. a.i. ' '...e s. I: isn': desitned :: rencve a slug ci wa er or an appreciable ao ancun: of water. 1 s i L' NDIN: And i is the feelin; -hen -ha: wha-i MR. J

v......

1.,,. 1...

1. e... 3 v.

..,.........,2......, 3..... 4 ., 4 2..... .3 ..1.s....' '....'.... 1.'..'.'..=.s..~...3- ..'~.a. *-.'.s- . -....'..=~c.'.'.i..=..' v..s, 1... 1.... .,2 n.s a .s. I 4 1 l

1 I i 130 1 the even, we did drain a censiderable ascun: of wa er frc= 2 cur air system, meaning that a considerable a=cun: cf wa er had 3 ge::en into the air syste:. This tes: :ha: we did jus: las: 4 week, we wen: into the sa=e ser: of lineup :ha: we had tha: 5 evening :c see if we could gs: water cc: through a drain down-6 stream of this check valve tha: we suspected tha: was bad, and 7 we esti= ate tha i: leaked in the order of five gallons per a minu:e er greater. 9 So then we recoved the valve frc= the line and io examined it and found cc: tha: the valve in fac was hanging 11 open and not eceding properly. 12. MR. LUNDIN: Let se make sure tha: I understand, i 3; l quickly. Did I understand ycu :c say that fc11cwing the ) i, j acciden: you cpened up the air lines and found water in them? i 15! MR. ~ENE: Righ:. The air receivers and ::aps frc: I 15 cur air system, we have valves tha we could drain any of the 1., water or condensate that we have that is in the air lines. And we did pursue tha: tha: day of the acciden: and we fcund 33 i ' tha: there was a lo: c f water in the air lines which should 19 1 ,0 ,nct nave ceen :.nere. CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Professer Pigferd. g, CCMMISSIONER.:IGFCRD:

would like c pese a ques-

..a .....,1..... -.......,. ..a .,33,.,. , e

v. g........,....:..

a..... s .........f cpera:cr's 'icense? Mr. Schei= ann? l , 4 1 e-u -. t.s. .u....r.e.. v. 2. .c 2 2..e2. 2... .v.. _2 I l l I I m.

~ 1 131 1 I license. 2 COMMISSIONER PIGFORD: Mr. : ewe? ~ 3 MR. E*dE : Yes, I do, Sir. 4 COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: Senior? 5 MR. IEWE: Yes, Sir. On 1 and 2. 6 COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: Mr. Frederick? 7 MR. FREDERICK: Yes, I hold a regular opera:or's ai license. I l 9; COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: It is not a senior crera:cr's to license, bu: a regular opera:cr's license? Is that it? ~ i; MR. FREDERICK: That's correct. 1, COMMISSIONER PIGFORD: And Mr. Faus ? MR. FAUST: I hold the sane, an RO license.

3,

I 14 l COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: Now, Mr. Iewe, does this i 1., i license require you :c have periodic enperience with a i sinula or? 16 r i MR. EWE: Yes, it does, Sir. j 7, COMMISS.!CNER FIGFORD: Where do you go gs: -ha-? ig j,' MR. ' EWE: We go :o the 35W si=ula :: a: Lynch ~urg, c Virginia. 40 COMMISSIONER PIGFORD: Yes. And is tha sinula or 21 i =apable of sinula:ing loss of c: clan: acciden:7 MR. ;EliE : In varicus f:r?.s, yes. I l C u,,n,t.. N.=.s :.- u.: n s a~. "c ~ ~ " -."-~*"-~.'~.1~*-~- I a I. .9 4 W M. 4 l 4 i i

132 i ~ 1 MR. IEW3: We de. 2 COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: Is that simula:c capable of 3 si=ula:ing the effects of loss of eff-si:e power? 4 MR. ~ EWE: Yes, it is; : a certain degree, Sir, yes 4 4s. s 6 CCMMISSION2R FIGFORD: And this =eans that your 7 reac:c: coolant, pu=ps are ac: opera:ing? E....n._.c : Yes. a 9 COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: Does i: si=ulate -- Do you to, run tha: case, the icss of off-site pcwer when you go dcwn It :here? 11, MR. IEWE: We have on occasion, yes, Sir. 37 ,I 13 COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: Tell =e wha: v.eu actually 9 de and are required :c de when you take this yearly tes: on i the simula cr. 15, gl MR. 3WE: Well, we go down there for a period of one week and during : hat week we app;cxima:e'v. spend I0 hours 1,, i g, of the 40 hour week actually =anipulating -he con cis cut l under casual:7 situa:icas f all ypes; and the other 20 hcurs 39 i we receive further trainia; :c keep up cur p;cfi:iency in 0 a cperating -he plan: by cuestions, lec:ures, and sc forth. l g i t COMMISSIONER P*GFORJ: Training by whc 7 i n s NIR...W. -.- 3 0Y, e. a- -..... '. .n+...= 1. ~ ...a~...a.'.- 2 a 4.. 4. 4.,. 4 .3 1 L

s '

COMM SS:0NER ?: FORD: Who ; ires :h'eexamina:icn,:r! l

s 183 i 1 I do you have one? 2l MR. IEWE: A: the simula:c; we don't really have an I 3 I examination as such excep: tha: they keep ::ack of who parti-4 cipates in wha: casualties, how many of them you have,'and 5 then they go over them with you to =ake sure ha: your pro-6 ficiency in the particular casualty is sufficient. 7 COMMISSIONER PIGFORD: And then you are also given 8 scme test for the Nuclear Regula: cry Cc==ission concerning 9 your operator's license, are you? 10 MR. IEWE: On a yearly basis we are given an cral 11, exa=ination and a written examina:ica a: the Is' land itself, i i Three Nile Island, ad=inistered 'cy cur ::aining departmen:. 1: ; a: 1 l i 13 COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: Does i: ge: into these 14 casualty condi-ions? I. 13 i MR. IEWE: The orals and wri::en tests, yes, Sir. 16 COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: On -he simula:cr, have you t-i experienced what some pecple call a small break acciden:7 . I,. gn . -.ic : .es, we have. y 13 ' -s 19 . COMMISSIONER FIGFORJ: Cne ecuivalen: :c -he si:e 20, of :he open pressuri:er relief valve? 2; ; MR. 25WE: I': no: sure of -he magni ude of -he simulation in relationship :c how much actual flew we had fr:= this valve, Sir. I don': knew tha: 5: a fac. Lu,MM

-.,N.._,

? u.- RD: sc :hev. 5 : e c i : v..new ar e a .v

.s

.4 e- --.-4. +. ...u =4-.. a-.4.- .w,, -.. s . 33 --3 --3 i n l I n.

1 13 i 1 MR. IEWE: Well, I believe, and I'= cer:ain tha: 2 they could vary :he range of the break frca varicus si:es. ~~ 3 CO>NISSIONER PIGFORD: Dces i include the si:e, in 4 your opinion, of an open pressuri:er relief valve? 5 MR. IEWE: As far as I know, they could simulate than 6 si:e of a break, yes. 7 COMMISSIONER PIGFORD: But dc they? 3 MR. IEWE: I'm afraid I really don't know that si:e. I as not really certain what the actual si:e cr how far open 9l 10 the relief valve was that we had during the even that we had v ij on the 23 h. COMMISSIONER PIGFORD: I should say, in your experi-12 33 ence, has a break of the si:e ecuivalen, say, to a fully yj cpen relief valve been si=ula:ed? sir. IENE: I would think yes, bu: 15, l g; CONNISSIONER ?IGFORD: In your experience. l M R....._.cn=: Yes. 1., -L ygg.e IO.N~n' r". u" r v' ' s' : te;; se, have y:u hen aisc v c a 73, simulated, in your experience, a break, small pipe break, and

9 0; also loss of off. site electrical power a

:he sa=e :ine?

MR. IEWE: I cannc: re= ember -hat, no. ,1 C MMI55IONER ?IGFCRD: Mr. Frederick, dc you happen

6..

1. s.

9 4. t, I g. 4 Ma. Tasa:n.LA: ..c. a nave Oct Ocne a 3:Culater -*r i a s:111 break. I 1 1 i i m

?. 135 4 1 CCMMISSIONER PIGFORD: At all? 2 MR. FREDSRICK: Nc: for a multi-casual:y like that. 3 COMMISSIONER PIGFORD: You've act done a small break 4 simulation? 5 MR. FREDERICK: I don't believe sc. 6 COMMISSICNER FIGFORD: Mr. Faus:? 7 MR. FAUST: I think wha: small break we've done, a 8 leak, a small leak that is within the capacity of the makeup 9, system we've done.

o CHAIRMAN KEFENY

Professor Pigford, I jus: think I gjl heard something tha: I wanted :c verify. Mr. Frederick, did i 12 you say you have no: simula:ed a cul:iple proble=, something i Oc that effect?

3 l

33 : MR. FREDERICK: He inferred tha: there was a less of I I 1., cff-site power concurren wi:h a 1 css of ccclant acciden: of a small break si e, and I have ne experienced that. 16 C..A2.v!.o.,..._MENY :

h. ave you ever nas. a s:. u,a:icn ec 37,

3 exercise where two

hings went wrcng in the simula:ica?

l MR. FREDERICK: Nc: wha: I wculd ccasider a mul:iple 39 casualty, nc. ,0 l CHAIRMAN KEMENY: No: :he =ultiple casual:y.

Sorrv, 21,

I ? ?rciessor. CC)Ci!SSICNER FIGFORD: Mr. Frederick, vou mentioned 4 in v. cur tes-incav. : the Task F0;;e tha; arcu fcund these ,e

• e

= w w

• w e

8 e W ) .l I l s i 1 ~

I 136 I conflicting. Ceuld you please explain wha: you mean by tha: 2 or wha: you =can: by that? 3 MR. FREDERICK: Yes, Sir. The way I see it, if the ! pressuri:er is full and high pressure injec:ica system is 4 5 injecting water, then the systec pressure should increase. 6 And that was not occurring. 7 COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: Ir. ycur experience on ':he a sisulato, did you ever run into a case where the pressuri:er 9 level was going up and the pressure going dcwn? i

ol

. NGL. FAUST: Are you asking =e? r COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: Righ now Mr. Frederick; I'll ij 1! ask you in a sement, Mr. Faust. MR. FREDERICK: I don't believe sc. I don't think

3 I

yj the si=ulater is capable of simulating a sclid pressuri:er. I COMMISSIONER ?!G.:0RD: Of simulating wha:? i3 MR. FREDERICK: The full solid pressuri:er. g. 1., COMMISSICNER FIGFCRD: I': not sr.eaking of a sclid i cressuri:er, one ce=ple:ely filled with wa:er. I j us: mean is 1 the pressuri:er level geing up and the pressure in the pri=ary

9 system scing down.

Tha:'s no: occurred on the simila:cr, in ,0 - vcur experience? 4 P MR. FREDERICK: Mc: that I rece=ber. l

c. ~e, t.:..r 3:_ - : r. v.:...,..

.sg. .i .w. u a. n i,

4 MR. FA"57:

Same answer; I don't remember tha e'r e r ; i 't,..2: ening. l pn. s.-

137 I COMMI550NER FIGFORD: Mr. Iewe? 2 MR. EWE: No, it hasn't. l 3 COMMISSIONER P!GFORD: Mr. Schei= ann? 4 MR. SCHEIMANN: I don': recall seeing tha either. 5 CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Are all four of you saying that 6 you were cor.fror.:ed witw. a cemoinat.or. o: events here you ha. 4 a 7 never experienced during your training? a MR. IEWE: I believe so; tha 's true. 9 COMMISSIONER PIGFORD: Mr. : ewe, did you find these 10 two indica:icns--the pressuri:er level rising, the pressure 11 going dowr.--:o be c:nflicting a: :he i=e of the acciden:? 12 MR. CEWE: Yes. COMMISSIONER PIGFORD: Now, you've also sentioned in 34 l your testimony previcusly that you are aware tha: it was very l inportan: :c be sure tha: the :e:pera:ure of the liquid in

3 i

he crisarv system was belcw the sa uratica te=perature or :he 16 boiling point.

Is tha: correc ? Tha vou were aware :ha: :har 17, would be a recui e=en:?

g,

MR. ENE: I's afraid I don': follow. This is frc

9 a previous

estimony :ha: I made?

,0, 4 COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: Yes. Ycu were asked, are g v.eu aware :ha: the temperature I'm sorry. Le me para-

• 4 1

phrase i-because I wouldn': ask i: tha: way. Nere y:u aware s. I _w .. 3.4. ,ec=ssa. . '. =.. a. -... 2. ".. =. .'.=-a.=.. 3...'.. ~# 42.. a t' I . 4. 2..,. 2.....- 2..

4...

....=.4...................., 4..4.. .3 .3 i l i 1 I

j 138 i I I r point? I. 2 MR. IEWE: Yes. 3 COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: Okay. Now, were there any 4 indicators on the fron panel available to you : hat would : ell 5 : you whe:her that c:nditica existed or not? 6 MR. : EWE: Yes, there are. 7 COMMISSIONER PIGFORD: You didn't have :o go to the a co=puter readout for tha: purpose, did you? 9, MR. IEWE: No. All the nor=al console indica:icn l l 10 ' are available. It { CCle!ISSICNER PIGFORD: Now, how did they -- tell =e i 1: l specifically, which instruments that would : ell you whe:her i 13 the te=perature is greater or less than the boiling poin:7 l 14 l Which ones would you icok at? 33 MR. IEWE: I could look a: the te=pera:ure of the ho: I 16 leg and the pressure. t-COMMISSIONER PIGFORD: Did you d0 -hat during the 18 ; 2C id'3 7

9 MR.

EbE: I did look a: the te=perature and the pressure, bu: I really didn': correlate -ha: :o the sa:ura i:n 3, l 21 pressure for tha

e:pera ure.

COMMISSIONER PIGFORD: Was it a pr0ble= tha: things u were g0in C0o fas: :O Cake tha: C0rr! a!i0n, because I jlther, 3, .Cu Wou

• nave 0

00nver: 0700 pressure !O 0c*._:05C*' q e s: 9 s. e e O J i i I.".a ! Ihe yT0bbeC .g 4 .i l i

.t.a 9 j i I f SE. ~ENE: Yes, I would have te do that because I 2 i don't really know the sa:uratica pressure for the particula. 3 e.pe.a.,.. ..s.a. I s.a a. ...a.,.c.4... 4... 4.. e. a 4 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: During the accident, did you 5 have any steas tables handy in the con:rol rocs : hat you could 6 look at to correlate satura:ica temperature pressure? 7 MR. ZEWE: I have a set of stea: tables in my office 8 in ny desk and I believe tha: there were stea

ables available f

t 9 in the operator's desk, but nc readily available. This is to. caly frem, I believe they were :here. 11, COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Were yvu er any"ene else tha: I i 12i you knew of asking anyone for nu=bers tha: would require 1 looking things up in :he steam table? Were you trying :c I 14 ; correla:e thi.3gs? Were you asking cuestiens and no: ge::ing i 13 answe: ; because there weren' stea: : ables available? Or did 16 ' you send sc=ecne o.fi Oc try to ge the steam tab.'es ? I t-MR. IENE: I did n : s end anyone o f f fo r s tea: 13 tables or try to correlate tha:. We were reac:ing :: what we 19 had and trying to put :cge:her and formula:e what we were 20 gcing :o do. 41 COMMI550NER pIGp0RD: In.your acciden: precedures, 1 I su: cse vou have sc=e drills. De v.ou never use -his as a

ci :: guide you in wha-

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190 i I COMMISSIONER PIGFORD: In your si=ulation at 36W, ~ 2 dces that occur? 3 MR. ZEWE: We de not. 4 COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: Dc you read te=peratures 5 during that si=ulation? 6 MR. IENE: Do we raad :e:peratures? 7 COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: Yes. Do you lock a te=pera-8 tures during that simulation? 9 MR. IENE: We use the acr=al console indica:icn. 10 The si=ulater is =ade like a s= aller acr=al con:rci room tha: 4 11 has the nor=al primary plan: and secondary plant. indica:icas. 1 We would use the sa=e relative type of indica:ic there as we 13 l do at the plan: itself. i f I 14 : COMMISSIONER P!GFORD: Are you responsible for the i .i 15 i training of the opera: Ors under you? i i 16 ; MR. ~ENE: Yes, I a=. I C v,.sDI. S a. 0.,,. _:.,s .. G _-0,sD : As a resu.,: c: :n*s exper 17 A r: \\ la ! ence, do you have any rec:==endations f:: any =cdifica:ica in 19 ' the ::aini.~.g pr0gra=7 6 0 MR. ~ENE: There's always need i:: i=p re vemen and t i c'viously we have unc:vered an area where there could be fur-e 21, 9 !her i=O.r0Ve=ent d0ne. SC Ve5 I wculd certainly increase 8 8 . b. 4 .m e s. 3 =. w= =.. =. g.4 4.. % = = e =. gm

4...J

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199 1 l. 1 l CCSDi!SSICNER FIGFORD: Now, I gather then the ,i 2 simula:ica and in your instructicas emphasi:e never le: tha: . level in the pressuri:er ge way dcwn. Is tha: aisc correct? 1 3 t 4 You don': wan: i: :c either ge: full or :c ge: e=p:y. Is tha: 3 correct? 4 j 6 MR. OEWE: That is true. 7 COMMISSIONER PIG.:0RD: In your si=ulations have you I 8 run across a ::ansien in which i does e'=p:y, the wa:er ( 9; leaves the pressuri:er? ,i 10 t MR. :E*iE : A particular ::ansten: : hat would c2use l 11, .s.a., { 12 CCFD!ISSICENR PIG.:0RD: Yes. i 13 MR. IENE: Prchably the ::ansien: tha: comes close 14 to dcing that i: if you have a reae:cr trip with your feed l 15 wa:er in manual and you over-ccci the primary plan: by nc: 16 reducing your feed inpu, tha: causes the pri=ary plan: :c 17 cool down a 10: faster and a lo: further than i: ne r:a l'.y la wculd. I would say tha tha: is pr:bably the ces: cc==cn j 19 2,. s ' a. a.. ..'.a. we wo u.'.d

d..a a

.'= a.i.".'.-.-. ... a... s "... s i.. i the icwes: ressuri:er level. e j CCSDII55IONER ?*GFORD: And tha: is wha: you referred

o as a shrin:<, isn': i:?

MR. IENE: Tha:'s ri;h:, yes. i ..a ygg...: r.c.y :,.

c...,,.s.

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l 192 1 out of the pressuri:er, doesn't i:? 2 i MR. ;3W3: And into the loops, yes. 3 COMMISSICli3R PIGFORD: And have you experienced -ha: 4 in the simulation? 3 MR. ZEW3: I have not. I've c me very close to i: 6 but not actually can I rese=ber actually experiencing having 7 a stean bubble anywhere other than in the pressuri:er Ni h an 8 indica:ed wa:er level. l 9 j CCMMISSIONER PIGFORD: Mr. Frederick, have you? to MR. FREDERICK: In the tra: Jients that I have j; observed in the simulator, it has never been sphcifically 12l pointed ou: to me tha a bubble shif: took place,'or wha: the g3 indica: ions were of a shifting bubble. CCMMISSIONER PIGFORD: If the bubble expands out of 34 i i i3,i the pressuri:er, Mr. ewe, where do you expec: i: o appea 16 l nex:? MR. "EW2: To the highes: point in he reac::: i7 colan: systes loop. 13 i, ' C0 41ISSIONIR ?IGFORO : So you apparen:ly have, even 1 before this ac:iden:, though abou that possibili y or is + 0 this sc=e:hing tha: ycu have Ocasidered since :he acciden:7 ,1 ,a,l MR. :ENE: I had considered this pri:r :: :he a::i-Oent, Ves. t 24 CHAIR"AN KI.'CSY: ?rciesser Tay'::. i ~. u..w. l..:.:....2 ..s. v...,s l t ' - - ~ ~ - - -

= _ _ o _.t. se. i aaJ l 1 I four of you have new of a Ic: of understanding of wha: was 2 : actually going on that you didn't knew a: tha ti=e, I'd like i l 3 l :o follow up on a ques:ica that Chair =an Ke=eny asked before, 4 and tha: is, a li::le more specifically could each one of you 5 tell us whether er no:, wi:h wha: you knew now, there is any 6 significant thing :ha: you did, whe:her it was under your own i 7 responsibill:y er sc=eone else's, that in retrospec: a: leas: a looks as though i: contributed substan:ially :o the severity 9, oftheacEiden:? 2 i to i Do you undersrand my cuestion? Mr. Faust, could we k it start with you? Is there anything tha: i I MR. FAUST: Well, I'm the one tha: turned off ths 33 reactor coolan: pu=ps initially. So frc= that poin:, I would a' say tha: probably helped it along. 1 CCMMISSIC'GR TAYLOR: Are you convinced in your cwn 33 mind that sene:hing worse sigh: ne: have happened if you i had ac: Ourned them off? 1., 33 MR. FAUST: A: the ti=e, I -- 19, COMMISSIONER TAY'CR: In re:::spect. MR. FAUST: In restrospec: new if I had no: :urned 0 i.

hen off?

Cv.snI. - -.,u R _t.s. sv,,s : yes. .v. . A::.ca: 4 4n,. _A..._ .di thcu:.<new.ng :.ns: cw, they,re e. . v2.: ing ne : hat I can run th0se pu ps ac ?.a: er wha: 7 4 CCMMI33!CNER TAY1CR: 3 c 'y* U're being ::"f *here

• 3 i

194 i i 1l really no =ajor worry abou: cavita:icn, but :ha: was af:er i2' the fact? l l 3i MR. FAUST: Yes. 4 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Mr. Frederick? 5 MR. FREDERICK: Well, I was in on securing reactor 6 coolant pumps as well. I also throttled the high pressure 1 7 injection which is still a poin: of deba:e. I'd like to see a a simulation in which it was no thre:: led. 9: COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Will you tell us again why i; l to ! was that you turned off :he high pressure inj ection? r 11, MR. FREDERICK: I did nc: turn it off; I :hrc:: led I it-12 33 COMMISSCNER TAYLOR: Parden me? ja MR. FREDERICK: In c:her words, when high pressure i 33f injectica is au:cma:ically initiated, the ficw rate in excess 16 ci a thousand gallons per ninu:e is initiated--sonewhere 17, ' be: ween 1000 and 1300 gp=. The rapidly increasing pressuri:er i la level a the case cf the acciden-led ne :c believe :ha: the i, ' high pressure injectica was ex:essive, and :ha: we were socn ' going c have a solid sys:en. 0 1 l CCMMI55 ONER TAYLCR: I see. 21 , L,s. _ R:-, _c R I C.s: In respcase :c tha:. :hrc::.ec. :ne r s ( high pressure inject cn :c appr:nina:ely 300 ;pn. 7 4 1 I __LwMM ...,s__s.u. :n _Av..., : Mr. . we, .e i _.x . 4 l ' !R.

• EWE:

Your Original c,uesti:n tht; was ab:U: 'ih a d i 4 6 -w ., - + -. - ,p- ,s

195 I 1 even:s tha: we cok new tha: 15 we icoked back were significant? 2 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Ycu are new convinced did cen. 3 ribu a significan:1y to the severity of :he acciden:, le:'s i, 4 say, to the core damage, if you wan: pu: i: that way. 5 MR. IEW3: Well, in =y own sind, just the failure 6 to recogni:e that we had a relief valve tha: was still l 7 partially open or open was probably the bigges: event. a COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: This is semantics, but would 9 ycu call that an operator er:c cr an ins rumen: design 10 de ficiency? i 11 MR. 1EW3: I would have to say it is'a cc=bina:ic: 3 of the two and it is very hard to separate it, looking a: the ,i circu=s:ances tha: 1ed us to not isola:e i: or isola:e 1:, .l .I I

4 all righ

, were purely, we jus used the indicati:n that we l

p.,: had and reacted :: what we had, and in looking further or i

16 harder or less harder :: jus by a differen: perspective, maybe i

7 '

ae cui d-.b.av. d-e..- -~.4.. e d .b.a..'. a a s -. e.. a...b. a p c.i...,.-. i 1 - - w e '" a b e - - ' ~ s " e "- s - - b a i ---*- w3*"--- wcu-- "- -d - 2 ca 3- 'd 13 ' been acre =bvious :: us. So in ei:her case, i: would :ertaini, i, ! have been an aid :c us. .A 3u: I's no: sure -- One centributed :: :he c:her, sc ,1. ...2. c... ..'..i..g.

v. -

k - v. so c# a" c A s--

speak.

COMN:55!0NER TAY'0R: Mr. Schei= ann. .a i MR. 5 CME IhA..N :

wou.i have :: g: i;cng wi:h I

E I

.g, -~ ~ i 196 i 1 : Mr. ewe en our =ajor pr:bles being -ha: nc: being able te recogni:e the fac: tha: :he relief valve was open, as well as 2 3 the fac: tha: f:: a while we did no: have feed going :c the 4 stes: genera: Ors. I think if either One or the other of : hose 4 3 cases =ight have been no: there we sight have had fairly good success at riding it ou wi:hout da= age'. 6 COMMISSIONER TAYOR: Tha: was the nen: question I 7 wanted to ask yeu, that if you had kncwn all :he ti=e exac:1y { wha: the state of the pressuri:er relief valve was, can you, 9 in gcing back through the ac:iden: sequence, csn you imagine g a se: of events such tha: there probably would have been no g, i I C re a: age at all? In ther words, if tha: had ne stuck 12 i i open; if the presturizer relief valve had always ::=e down 13, l when pressure go: back down to the pressure a: which it is'nct 1 i 15 ; supposed to be activated, de you think there would have been f ' any -- Nould we be sitting here? Is there any :h:n 3 Is tha: really a cen: 21 par: ef the a :iden. It MR. SC:iEIMANN: I believe it was. 18 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Okay. 19 CHAIRMAN K2MENY: May I ask jus: :ne foll w.up c,uestica en that? It cccurred

ne, sin:e you pcinted cu:

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197 i i 1 lgoneofftha: you had passed the sa:ura: ion point. Would you l 2, have known wha: to do, Mr. Zewe? ~ 3 MR. IEWE: Yes, Sir, I would have. 4 CHAIMiG KDENY: What would you have dene? 3 MR. IEtG: Lef: on high pressure injection a: full !: low. 6 7 CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Okay. So tha: migh-he an interesting exa=ple of a differen: kind of computer that might al 9 be nice to have in the control roc =. 10 - MR. !ENE: Yes, it would. 11j MR. FREDERICK: I might want to poir.: cc: that i 12l another alars would no: have been helpful a: :ha: :ise. 13 (Laughter) 1 14 CHAIMIAN KDENY: No, but Mr. Frederick, tha:'s a 33l poin: very well taken, but I'd like to sugges: tha: that 16, particular alars, presu= ably, should be ene lcuder :han any i 3-c:hers because tha: neans you are in~very sericus ::cuble. (Laughter) is ! l 39, C nsissioner McPhersen. CCICII55IONER Mc?HERSON: Gentlemen, I wculd like :: 20 ask each one of you. When was the las: i=e ycu wen: to the ,1 ., ! 3abc:ch and till: x si=ula:Or, wen: f:: : raining :here? { l . ir. caus:, was abeu: v. e u ? e - - i n.i ...u. c.w,,._a.: n.n.< i was w.nen.. -. ::: :: 4 s '.: ease. .v e .y .,,,y.

. =. - 193 1 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: When was that? 2 MR. FAUST: Let ne think. 3 COMMISSIONER McPRERSON: Couldn't we look this up I 4 J lintherecord? Wha would you guess? A year age? Two years 5 l ago? 6 MR. FAUST: No. It wasn't :ha: long ago. 7 MR. ZEWE: I believe that for the operators i: was 8 probably around July of '77 or so. I las: went in January of 9 this year. to COMMISSIONER McPEERSON: You wen: in January of P 11 this year? i MR. EW2: January of 1979. Yes. i 12 i COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Did you hear the questions j I r 14 l and testinony this norning abou: the so-called Michaelsen i i3 report, abou: this is the TVA engineer's repor abou: a i i. 16l possible problen in the 35W pressuri:er in that i: would give 17l an indica:ica of a higher wa:er level in the reac:cr :han i 13 actually exis:ed? i pp MR. ~ EWE: Up c this poin: the :aly thing -ha:

g I've heard is the nane, the Michaelsen report, bu

I have no-heard any of :he details of the reper: a: all yet.

COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: This apparen:1y, the reper: l was written en the basis of an acciden: 1-Oavis-3essy plan: i i back in 19-. And Mr. Michaelsen wr::e and said :ha: i-l t appears :na- :ne pressuri:er nay give 1 un rue pi: ure :. nel I l e g ,,-w y

Se.g a ~ l ~ water level in the reac::: in the Babceck 5 Wilecx p1 ant. I r I = 2 l This was brough: up before the Udall Cc==i::ee :he c:her day 3 and Cengress=an Udall said if tha: inf::=a:icn had been'knewn 4 by the opera: Ors i: sight have been tha: this would have been 3 a two-bi: inciden: and no: a serious one. 6 Su: when you were :here a he Babcock 5 Wilcox ~ 7 si=ulator, you were no: old anything abou: tha: bythNcc=pany 8 l I.take i:, tha: they suspected they migh: have a problem tha: I 9! would give an inadequate reading?

o,

MR. " EWE: I was unaware of :ha: at all. Jus: to 11l bring up another poin:, the opera: Ors and mysel:. were se.ne-a i 11 duled to go down to :he 35W simula:c in April of this year. 12, MR. SCHEIMANN: Two weeks after the accident we g3 f a; would have gone down. MR. ~ EWE: Yes, for our nor:a1 cycle thr: ugh there. 1., t i I wen: down in January with =y Uni: I opera: rs. g

3. !

CHAIDIAli KEMENY: Pr:fessor ?igford. COMMI55ICNER ?IGFCRD: Wha is the recuired fre-18 -" e n cv, :-.

v. o " ~. ~. ~e =..1... s ~..~

.'~.1v a. .. 1.2.. t. 3.-w.. .'.=.s_'_-~-.'s~..~~.'. s-g, MR. ~ EWE: I believe :ha: -he require =en: is every 0

Wo years.

3u: we had started to ge icwn everv year. We 4 were instituting tha: :: ; d:wn every year. um a I e sa v v \\".wl.' R C '.,w*3.i - R * * " "..' ".*'. 1'. .. a. d a. 4 * *<,

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h 3,* ..~ 1 7 200 lt A I MR. FREDERICK: Yes. 1 m s 2 l C AIRMAN KDENY: Cc=missioner Trunk. .i s. 3 l COSC4IS~IONER TRUE: I_'a~ going :s refer to l C ~. 4 Mr. Frederick an'.'Mr. Tau 3th Working in :he cen' trol roca 3 could become very :edicus and boring. Could you give us'a 6 rundown of what a normal day is like? 'rna: do you do during i 7 the day? ? g MR. FAUST: Normally, it' depends on what par you 9 are at in the cont; 1 reon, if you are On the panel, or like ja,; I was switching and tagging..There is a switching and agging CR0 where you would be taking readings areund ihe plant :ha: 1 i are required to be taken, as well as doing shif: and daily 3,' i, 12 l surveillance tha are tech spec requirements. Other things i 34 l you might be doing is wri:ing up safety tags. As a piece of 1 equipmen: had :: be :aken ou of servi:e for somebcdy :c werk 33 16 l cn, to isolate it properly. t Also ycu migh: ge involved in d ing surveillance 37 r 33, en pieces of equipmen:, as switching and tagging. Or you =igh: ge: involved in being the CRC cn the panel. 3, CCMNI55ICNER TRU'*K: So i: c:uld get ve y mono::nces. 40

• iew do you keep a'.er:?

Wha: do you de :: keep aler:7 ,1, 4 i 2 MR. FAUST: It is hard c fa'.1 asleep when ycu are

aking readings, if tha:'s wha: you nean.

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201l 1 ' The cen:rci rocs is full of green and red lights. I would 2 get tired of icoking at those lights af:er a while. 3 MR. FREDERICX: In normal routine, the opera:c 4 usually picks cc: the systems or the parace:ers that he feels 5 are mos: importan: to scnitor and those would be meni:cred en 6 a regular basis--maybe every few minutes. This is on a scan ( 7 and it is possible to get familiar' enough wi:h the ins:rumen:a-8 tica to just scan it in a few seconds and absorb qui:e a bi 9 of infer =ation. to Other than doing that periodi: scan, there's enough a ijl ad=inistrative material c keep one busy for an eigh:-hour i 12 shif:, as far as reviewing changes to precedures, initiating i3 work requests en ou:-of-service ecuipment, or reviewing i g4 maintenance precedures tha: may be in effect. g3 ; On a back shift, basically that is all they dc. t 16 : On a day shif: you would defini:ely be involved in en-going i 17, maintenance and : hat is enough :o keep a persen quite busy. I i la; C0h}i!55ICNER TRUNK: Mcw did you feel when you l finally reali:ed tha: this wasn': a routine trip; y:u knew, j,, 0 s was going to 'ee seme:hing a lot =cre Oc handle? na: : l i l 21 l MR. FREDERICX: Sc=e of the ce==ents

• 've heard is i

t that it should be a si:ua:ica of panic. 3u: wi:h the people _a .f l that I work wi;h, these four guys, i: beca:e a situati:n in 3 4 e whi:h every ne became scre in:ense in their -- ,1 CC5Gi:55:0.jER TEL*SK: Neren': you s:ared?

I

3 ,.0.- I I i 1 MR. .. D R!c..,: .s c. We were con:entra:ing nere .s: : .s i 2l c.oeply on wha: was occurring and try:..ng :c reason which nal-3

1. "... e. 4....i. was

..b.a. was aus.'..,-.'..=.. c. ~.#..he e.ab.'a A1: hough we were unsuccessful, we were trying very hard :s de 4 5 that. 6 COFDtISSIONER TRUNE: I'n glad you weren't scared, 7 'oecause I was. 3 MR. FAUST: Well, you heard the news nedia. 9l MR. FREDERICE: The only tine we felt safe was when 1 10 i we were in the plant. Tc : urn en the TV was enough Oc panic i i 11 anybody. 12; CCFDlISSIONER TRUNX: Then why weren': the people in l giaa,..,wn 3.. 4.g.w4 33, 4..: e.

2. d e.. '.

I ea. -- ... 3 3 9 MR. FAUST: Scunds like they were ge::ing ir. formation. i 1., COFCIISSIONER TRUNK: I also was inferned that a lo: 16 ; ,e,eem3. ..a *y,. =a ,,2 -'--*-***w*,. 4 2 3*4,4.s c tea"*=-- r

3. i tR... Us_ _i :

ana; people? Are you :a...i.<:.ng ac cu: ..s 1

a.. a..-. s '.

zg r CO>DII55kONER TRU's.s: l .he pecple who - Ch, I r e a.' '.y

9,

t I don': knew wha: their jobs are, bu I've heard tha: ,0.

1 '

MR. FAUST: There are a ic: ci pecple a: that plan: I .w...a. 2...... c w. e a.3., y x..a. goes. 4.....s.e..... 4..e 3 : s.. f..... .2 .a..4. 34,s.e 2....,.c....c... s :a... .s.... .3 .....3 2. ..s 2. 2 i ...4. a. a.'......-..=. e. e '. e, .'.....-. 2,

v.. t.

.... = - -. e : :: -m: ..,.,-..s. .. e. . v.s.. .. 2......e.. . u...

s j 203 1 1' tha: were not allowed :o leave the plan: during this i=e. 2, I ga:her that you were told to stay at your jobs. l 3: MR. FAUST: We didn't have : be teld. 4Il CCMMISSIONER TRUNK: I know, but you didn't leave. 5 They expected their workers to stay. I'm no: talking abou 6 the vendors or the other fellows who jus: walk in and cut. 7 I mean: the workers. They work at Me: Ed. I don': know if a it is a secretary or an office clerk, but they told their 9l fa=ilies to pack up and leave. 10 MR. FREDERICK: It is pessible tha: the only 11 infor=ation they were receiving was through the news media. I i, ! MR. FAUST: Tha: sounded like : hat is what it was, ' i, I ja frca secple I's talking to now. 3ecause even people on our i yl shift -- no: cur shif:, but people en other shifts, opera:crs, I weren't getting the full s: cry of wha we knew had happened g3 1 14 during tha: tine period. All they were ge::ing was what was frc

he news nedia c wha: they were =.icking um. a randc=,

,7, ~ and tha: can pai.}; cui e a scary picture. is C..,...., N..,.gt:_..s : Cc==issioner,ewis. .w.s. m. .ss a u j9 I CCFDIISSIONER 12WIS: As a fermer = ember of the news 0 4 nedia, I thought I cugh: : ask a ques:ica abcu: this. Oc you 1 1 think tha: the pub'ic had a righ: :: knew wha was going en j I .a. ..a. ..e a.:...... 3..a ...a. . 2..., l .2 4...u .,. 2 2. 3... MR. FAUST: A: tha: :ine? 4 .-

• 33'.?.;..* v* v.

.a -w i ..s ?. :.. -. v. 2. i ? ..J

l e* lI .0, 1 MR. FAUST: If it needed :: be put cut. In o her

fwords, i don't think I can really answer tha: cuestion.

All 2 3 I can say is I was rather upse: when I wen: hc=e. I wanted - 4 to ge: back inte :he plan:. In fact, we called in and we came 3 back. Tha:'s how =uch what we were hearing was scaring us. 6 COMMISSIONER LEWIS: Well, wha: I'm trying to ge: to 7 is dc you thir.k :here should have been a lid on wha: was going a en there or do you think the people had a righ: to know wha: 9 was going on? io MR. FAUST: I think the people have a righ: :: know what is going on, but I think i: should be put cut in a n i l 1, ce::er manner. 73 CHAIRMAN KEME.W: Mr. Faust, could I ask, frc= an y earlier remark, was the implication of i that you wen: hcce and fcund that wha: you read in the newspapers or saw on TV 1., t gl was act an accurate representation of what was going on? i s!R..:AU.q. We.,.,,..e.. =. 4,3 =4. 4.. 4 24; 1., M .....3 jg ' 51cw up, ycu know. Nebcdy ge: cver radiated by any neans, i .Lug [.. .g'.e-,5 :.s 5.s.m : --ps-. .u: i: night have. acat s

9 c.s. Ot

"yu.cCy can say O.nat. ta.. rag :u.:.s .'tn 40 j i cu: to the wcrst case. I der'. know what I wou'd have done ,1 .s.:.r 22 e. =.4.. 4,, s e ma.une., _.c. c :.. n.,. - .a... -...a. a.. ....3 7 ggg.. J4.. e.. .eg.., T,2 ".,.. ..a ..sa e i 1 MR. .RECER*CK: There was a grea-deal :f spe:ula:i:n 4 6 y s,...,...,., a., ..,=,.....: ,s 4 = wow.= .4 I s e e- ~ ~

r ~so. 1 ac:usi presenta:icn of the facts as they existed =cment :c 2 moment. t i 3 COMMISSIONER TRUNK: Well, frc what we've been able i 4 ' to find out, you didn': know what was ;cing on either. So 5 you really didn't know what was goin; en and isn't it likely 6 tha: that confusion was trans=itted to the news sedia? Would 7 you allow that? 8 MR. FREDERICK: I doubt tha: the news cedia was 9i confused because of what we were seeing en the panel. They to i were confuse,.mecause perhaps :.u.e:.r source c:. In:ormation was I 1 providing them with.enougn to :111 up a col'=n, or wha:- 11 l no: u I 13 ' ever. Okay? I I 13,' COMMISSIONER TRUNK: Well, the source of infer:atica i

4 was Me

Ed.

i is MR. FREDERICK: I'm sure it was. Either that er the 16 .x xC. here is on.,y sc such you can te. t 1 a person who does ac: g-understand what you are talking abcc:. I 18 MR. FAUST: It is very hard

be able :: talk about 39 his plan when nobcdy is interes:ed in i:, and new all of a

.o sudden new : hey are. ,1 COMMISSIONER TRUNK: Well, the presu=ptic: is hen i :ha: the public really wouldn': unders and wha:'s going on 4.,.3.; a..3, u..' a. s... a.-....... . - a.'.' v. _C_.-'.'"..'.

b. e. '...

4.. i accu.. .s_- ..,.a...f u.. < .= ..a., 4. .3 e .g .uq. : .1 c. I ...w.. a 6 I e I e

r ,i IO6 I 1 COMMISSIONER TRUNK: No? Okay. 2 MR. FREDERICK: If an indepth study by the public 3 were actually a poin: of interes:, if they did wan: to learn 4 about it and they approached :he cc=pany wi:h sc=e interes: 5 as far as classes er sc=e basic tours of the plan:, e: cetera, 6 I'm sure tha: the company would previde an interested public 7 w'.h t.1. 4..

• o.. ~ 1. i o n.

COMMISSIONER TRUNK: Bu: a: a time of crisis, you wil.' a3... .h. a..5 e p ub l.i .5 a. a. 4.*...o b e 4

1. . --. d '.

d 9 .m 10 MR. FREDERICK: I certainly do. i i 11 CHAIRMA'! KEMENY: Professor Pigford., 12 COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: Mr. ewe, I ga:her frct your g testi=cnay that a=ong all the other things, there was anc her f thing that was troubling you and your staff during the acci-34 s. i ! den --the boren concentra:icn. Could veu explain what ycu .t I' were concerned about? 16 i .MR. ~ W:- 0n a...m..' . a a -..-. . 4,. .-.v, s u .b. a , a..-,... u..t.. 3, t.z.,..u. a. y,. a, .n,. a,.a.cw.. g...,..- :.., e .s g 4 j .,.a .e. w o, c.T .O .A,.,.3.5,... u..

u. C...

n.-.n,.... 4-, 19 a-n,. -. u. ..,t.,. s. I .u.,. .....-,,,.22~... u. 3. u a c.,s. m. .a. .. m ,0 4 i the initial sa:ple was tha: we had a baron ::ncen ra-i:n in .u.a .,1w..,.

n. n. a.,1.,..

Syg.,- . g_.> 7.,0. m. .s.. 2 u.gg .u. g ..m ,f u 2 u. .. c..... ;,.. ..,v-. .,0.0 . u.,. ,y,... i l. s.:.. ,..,. 2 . 2.1.,. ?.... u e -.,......,..... :.. a. fe. 4 i 4,.. e ....., e.,...,,=..,.u.,. ge....... ...... 3 4...c ,.32-u s.,... 4 a f ,g--- p g n g -n wt-

o 207 l I 1 greater than wha: we initially star:ed cu: with. Su: in fac: I i I 2 the sa=ples ca=e back a: 720, fellcwed by a subsequen: sa=ple 3 i tha was arcund 400 pp=, which would indicate c ce that sede-i i ~ ! how we had diluted the bcron concentra-ica in the reac:cr 4 3 cocian: systen. 6, C0bNISSIONER PIGFORD: Is this some rec,uiremen cf 7 your e=ergency procedures that in such an acciden: er in a bad accident the beren concentra:ica be kept above sece a 9 minimus level? MR. ! EWE: Yes, it is. We have, in crier Oc ensure 10, I jjj : n.a: the reac:c

.s snu: ccwn su:::.c:..en:ly, we",dc wa.a:,s callec.,

j

1., a shutdevn margin calcula::..cn to determine hcw =.ar :ne

• i i

l 13 ac "-' is sub-C i-i a'* And *incde-da a--i e '"bi*- v"'"a I l we need Ic have the berca concen: ration for the reac:c cocian : 1.,

i. sys en, W..4.5.i s.-

.i..p u. 4... e..k..i s.=.'. "...d. w... a. 3.i.. -..'. ".' a - 5 ] tien. g, I had two nuclear engineers who were there a: the :ine 2, a s.w.u..dc w... a...'....m.' - ".'.-..i. n. ... a. c a.'.-

1..-..i. n before we had -hat boren sanele re:urned shewed tha: the la

.,1c.. ..a ve t 3...,... :--....<... ...a.. 19 CC:GIISSIONER FIGFORJ: Did -ha: ca.':ula-icn shcw i ,o s ..... s,.......ac. ...,..,.cu,,.a c. a....,. s. u 21

• -..c..

e .c... w..., glr.

L:

.ic. a. .%.a. ,C.i ..w. aa 4 I I L - e n. { 7..:ll. y. ; n-e m 3.?,a ;L. 9 9 V. 4..

s.... b..a.,.. y m. 1.J

.m.w .,a m. w.. 2 6. g ,.. '. '.. ' = %. c.......... c..'..=. ~. =.. ~..~~.3. . '. 3.u.. '. .... =.. 4 sA I l .\\'6 5.. i.*,f 0..

• (e 3....'.

b. .. a. l .b..* J..a..

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l 1v. 1 et i iI l l l l 1 t i i l

(' s o 203 1 ' sufficiently withou: the boren because we had other sources j 2

o shu: down the reac:cr wi:h.

~ 3 CC.4C4ISSIONER PIGFCRD: Sc why were you concerned d abou: the boron? 5 MR. IEWE: 3ecause the boren is par: of that shut-6 down margin and it is the boron sa=ples were jus: the reverse 7 cf wha: they should have been. Eventually the boren concentra-8 tica would becc=e a factor. But if it wen: frc= 1,000 down 9, to 700, a: that point we still had sufficient shutdown =argin i 10, where the reac:cr was still sufficiently sub-critical. 11 CCXMISSIONER FIGFORD: Since it is p*cssible my i 1: awkward questica has ccafused it, le: ne ask i: again. If 13

he bcron were no: there at all,.would ycu have had sufficien:

14 l shu:dewn =argin? I 1 15 .s. Int:13.,,y, yes. i. 16, CCMMISSICNER FIGFORJ: What does it nean, initially? I i 1-l Mn. _:ws: Nell, you have other poisons er c:her i la ' .u4,,2-.. -...5.. 4. . - -. e _..u.a. a _.. 4 ..c.,_.......4.,._ _ u........... .s.... 3 19 sub-cri:ical. Su: these change. 0, CCMMISSIONER ?IGFCRD: What, for e. a:ple ? l 21 MR. ~ EWE: You have a fissica product pcison which 4 s.,.n c.., w "._*.- 5.s ' s. 1.4 '.s =, _i_.-.. ".... -.. a k..-. ". e. w h.4 4 = ..w. .... 2 L... . u.. s...:... ...;z.s. -. u.,. .i s. ..'._=de a v. 2 '..t. . ' _- a. ..._3__4._.- we ...J .. ". '.. =. ab..i. ~. 3.C..".- ~ a. I, 3 .a.._.....a-....:..............f .2s._;..z... _2....... .,.t... ........e 3 t l 1 4 1

Is O C a l 209 1 had in the core. 2 CHAIRMAN.'GMENY: tena: was diluting the bcron, in i 3,! v, o u. c o i.i - n, a. ..b.- .4

a. '.

I 4l MR. 7: n'...'. a. c. o i...,. y .3 8. s....e.. 4... was ..s.1. W-- I 3l somehow we were putting de inerali:ed wa:er er pure water, if I I 6 you will, withou; boren in i: in : the reac:cr cociant systes 7 by some means. I was unaware a:., tow we cou.,c dc :n.a:.=ut we a' had people go cut to :ry and check the varicus ways in which 9 we could add this pure wa er :: the reac :: cocian: syste=. 10 l CHAIRMAN :GENY: Prof.essor Taylcr. i l COMMISSIONER TAY*.CR: Frem what you, Mr. ewe, fr0s ~ 11 i 12f wha: you knew new of the accident, do you believe tha: you 1.,fspecificallycould, if ycu wanted to er had :0 in that i r b '.a.ac.-. c. a.. e xac. d" '..i c a - ' o #. k.a. .a.a.-., s. a...i... .3 -..

4 ;

a # "..'.' e n d i.. 3 - ~..,. a's-a.c. i c. 4....'.e--....e'. .. c - a.1 c.a. 1., ecwe. ! tha 16 wculd cause an essentially total core =el:? That is, 1, i cause the te:: era:ure of the fuel to rise well abcVe the

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5 ..a__ l 210 1 i 1 ex:use cur witnesses. Ne have had the: under the he: lights 2 j and we have been under the ho: lights for a long :i=e, t i 3 s a tis facto ry. Thank you. 4 The witnesses are excused. l 5 (Witnesses Willias Iewe, Fred Schei= ann, 6 Edward Frederick, and Craig C. Faus: were excused.) ~ 7 CHAIDIAN :GENY: Ne will convene here a: 9:00 a.=. 8 in the sa e roc = to hear the next se: of witnesses. Until 9] then, this see:ing is recessed. to (WHEREUFON, at approxi=ately 5:00 p.m.

he mee:ing 3;

recessed, to reconvene at 9:00 a.=. en Thursday', May 31, 1979.) 12 ; - end - 13 l u; i i U 16 17 13 19 e 20 21 ' 4 I 'l m. 4e 5 0 4

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