ML20024C493
| ML20024C493 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/16/1978 |
| From: | Roy D BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | Phinney J, Taylor J BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| References | |
| TASK-03, TASK-3, TASK-GB GPU-0256, GPU-256, NUDOCS 8307120694 | |
| Download: ML20024C493 (5) | |
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MAY161973 May 16. 1978 In the attached meno from Bob Vosburgh, he points out the necessity for j
Safety Anclysis' participation in the resolution of site operational blame such as chose we have recently had ae 71erida, SHus and TMI-2. pro-l think nob I
Analysis makes a good poinc and would appreciata your aler ing Safety to such problems at the earliest possible time. In this way, they can naka as evaluation of any possible safety implications and help resolve them at the least possible cost and licensing risk.
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D. L LaBelle. Safety Analysis (2117) h see ses.s
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I emmaar with Seb's N-d*-== (assached). It would corsainly $m a benefit to our interface antagemmat program to have fross-loading
- s persisipatias es psoblems affee. stag eer area. Tac. I 1 mew that yee ase learing smak of this frost-1sading ts Plass Integracias and alas j
that ausk of the faitial posseenal invalisamas is being dissased.fzes depersamas Inval.
Please advise as ce what aesta.a yee...f. eel.. i.s apptwyriata.
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AW. IA3E11I, MA*.ACZ1, "AFETT AEALTSIS
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,d3a81 Date m F203 LENS RIM AyggL 11, 13 3 j an. s D
A situatias has been developing that I believe needs escalation by*you to Depart-R aunt Namatar level for a policy decision. Several recent site operatiemal problems have seenrred, e.g., FPC - L3P Red Problem, stS:D - Laes of Site Power to the N3I,
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'DEE-2. Failure of Anti-totational Device on Idle Pump and I2cv Cpenias ce T.ase of
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5 2-cabimes Power.
The approach, as I perceive it, has been to evolmate what went I!
wrees, fint it and return to operacios.
ij involvemmat is any of these evaluations. Thera has been p.,9, formal Safety Analysis
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The lack of our involvemass can have at f
j laaet three decrememaal conseesmeas bst illustrated by the follawing examples:
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- 1. Tanaer en eenersets P esentiv ender NRc iteview A~
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. By the time SA was asked to be favolved is the EtI-2 pump facident, the 1
ERC had done its beesverk. Withest adequate time to ' prepare a pealtion r
em three. peep Safety Analysis evaluation. the indications are that the MEC will require auch nors partial pump analysis on c:'c3 - Midland socket.
t This any be east-recoverable for us on Midland. but what aheet T7A2 2.
Insect en Other Oversefonal Ptants
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- he ERC aise intianced, in the example gives above, that y,,9,343 plant would be allowed 3-pump operattom without e:ttensive analysts. Further it appears that at least two Tech Spee sections (3.2.2 and 3.2.3 im Std. Tor-
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amt) will seed revisions for all 34V plaats.
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Items 1 and 2 nay not have been averted by early SA involvement, but some sitigation L
I ofscoese,quences toold have been acco,mplished if prior knowledge and h
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Tsoset on Ptsat Safety and car--ne SA-vRC t.iesesine 75diogoe%v t.
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At the risk of someding etolomatic. se other Unit has the kaavledge to h
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assess whether or not a site probles co'hseitutes a safaty Lasue and/or i
violation of the Safety Analysis assiaspelons u~ der which the pLsat is l
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licespd. Eaamples of this ares
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. a) Opening of b :V on loss of X-cabinet, power at TMI-2.
If all f,
operattag plaats' ICS are wired with thia logia as was 2:1-2 them any transient Jane with less of offsite power is invalid.
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Losa of ftiI Power at $2:::D - Has a transtant sc anoderate frequency ths.n is currently evaluate o been i
results be correlated tith our transient codes!
Can the mesy questions that need SA attention.
Thera are
.I se) itene 1 and 2. what wFailure of Anti-Rotation oa to this evi fuel integrity if it was not corrected priere or g33M escalatieaf h'!i mix eMe verificatioatcan this ~ande of operatica be used for ther or to povar i
Nuclear Setweer. Tuels. Control AnalysisThe purpose of
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n cate that neither t.ieassias.
untina judgements.
Therefore, there =ust be an autosstic r.achanism in
'i Safety Analysia, through ita contracta Group ul stages of any sits ace where is brought on board at the initial problem.
Also, ita (SA) involvessat ta the Task Terce should an autenatis f.uoetion.
e I would sp,ree.iata your and D.I. Roy's ce=r.asts on the u
above.
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