ML20024B563

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Recommends That Operating Plant Customers Be Informed of 780320 Cooldown Incident at Rancho Seco Given Suggestions on How to Minimize Plant Thermal Transient for Loss of non-nuclear Instrumentation
ML20024B563
Person / Time
Site: Crane  
Issue date: 03/29/1978
From: Karrasch B
BABCOCK & WILCOX CO.
To: Olds G
BABCOCK & WILCOX CO.
References
TASK-01, TASK-03, TASK-1, TASK-3, TASK-GB GPU-0306, GPU-306, NUDOCS 8307090138
Download: ML20024B563 (2)


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-*4E *AB000K & Wi!.COX COMPANY A

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WER GENERATION GROU.8

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G. M. Olds, h aeger, Nuclear Service

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1. A. Karrasci., Man ser, Plan: Integra: iou-nos us.s

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33).

Date SEDD Cooldova Incideu::

March 29, 1978 j n.,...

n. q On Mar =h 20, 1973, SMUD cxperianced a loss'of pove~r to a subsuntial i

porties. of the non-nucles: inst:use=tatio= (see details - 1::achsas: 3).

Although the Saactor Protection Systa= (R?S) and Safary Teatures A=:ua:Lon System (STAS) fun =:foned prope.:1, SMUD still e=periesced the =ss 7

severa

.'d ther=al ::a stas: or. a=y 35*.T plan: to data. I'ha subseque== i=ves:1ga:1o=

pointed out that addi:Loual guidanen to our opera:1=g cus===== 1 :he area of 1* ':1=g potential cve=:s cf this =ature is warra=:ed. Ac=ordi= gly, the Z=gineering Depa== sat re=c= ends that our opera:1=g plast cus::=ers be i=-

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f :=ed of dis i==1de==, a=d suggestions be =ede c= hov to d ' ' e the

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plan: ths==al ::aasis== for loss of NNI ~ d c:he: s' d'== eve.:s.

A::t " --:

1 a sequence of eva=:s, and A::ac". men: 2, a series of descriptive curves, ere

ovided to assis
you in prepara:Los of a cus:c=s: 1e::er.

In addition, the follovi=g rec -enda:ic=s should be =ade :o assure preper

. operator &:: ion fe eve =ts of :his nature:

..y 1.

Operators should he ::a1=ed :s rc=os=1:a a loss of sevs: =o all or a =sjo 1:7 of : heir mfI (i= dica: ors fail to =1d-ra=ge, au:n atic

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or casual ::e=sfe: to al:e= ate 1:s:==e=: s::i=gs bri:gs =o

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respense, etc.).

~he loss of seve-is e=obasiced he a ra:her than the failure of a=y cue ins::==a=: c: c==:::1, sis =al.

~3esa =1so:

events are adequa:aly covered i= cc: prese= s d- ' :== course.

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l 2.

Given ths.: the eperator es= de:e==1=a tha: he has los: power to all or =os: cf he miI, he should know the loca:13 of the power supplies and power supply breakers and have a p;c:edura available :o regai:

power.

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3.. If.he fault ca==s: be cleared (e.g., the breakers to the power 3 --

supplies reope:), he should have a lis: of al:c= ate d----

cs:a:1c:

available :o 5.1=.

Sc=a possibill:ies are:

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m a) ESTAS panels i

G.Po po-co a-55 b) R?a. panels 3er Be& Exh.For m o

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1 M6 fahrtres.

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PDR ADOCK 05000289 g'M D bNb S

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T.arrasch :s Olds

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SE D Cos'dova Incident.

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e) Rer.ote shutdown panals f) Local gages

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g) Pla=: Co=pute:

l-Note that each plan: vill be different in de&'1, bu: the lic: shs=1d be developed in adva=ce and the operators thoroughly crained 1:

.:s usaga.
4. 'The above instrumentation sources.shmuld also be keyed to ce:-e-critical variables to halp the oparato selec: his e-de-1:1es duri g the emergency conditics.

I: is recog=ized tha: no procedure em:

cove: all the possible co=hi:a:1c=s of non-nuclea.: inst==an:a:ie:

failures, however, 'f the operator k=ows he has as i=s==u=a::.proble=

(as oppcsed to a LDOA or s:cas line break, for a=a=ple), ha can l' ':

the ::n=sian: by con::alling only a few variables,. "hese are:

a) P nssurize level (via E?! or =c:=al makeup pu=ps) b) 233 pressure (via pressurizar heaters, spray, I/M reliaf valve) c)

Secan genersto: level (via feed flow, feedva:e: valves) d) Steam generator pressure (via turbine bypass sys:e=)

Iha pressuri=e level ' nd RCS pressure assure tha: the Raa==== co=lant pV a

Sys:cm is filled and the s: cam genera:or level and pressure assure adequa:e decay b,es:. removal.

In our opinics, the preferred solu:ian is to i=rtall safe:y grade stes=

generator le' vel i=s: u=en:1.:1on, s ar: a" i y feedva:e c: a lov level s:sa=

generator signal, and c:::rol s: sam generato level au:c=ati "y,

as is required on our IIC SG pla=:s. This -a y no: be a practi=al backfi: colution fe: :he operati=g plan:s, however, this solution should be sugges:ed as a possihie vsy to assure -'-*-'1 los: capacity days due to equip =e== failure.

Plant 1=:e.ra:1cm vill be happy to assist you i= :he prepara:Los of the e.:::==a: 1e::er.

f/WW

. aAx:31 es:

J. C. Daddess J. A. Cas: anes D. r Roy

.P. A. Sherburne R. L Ball J. 1. Burris T. E Schult:

1. V. Moore C. W. Pryor F

W. Winks

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L. J. Stasek J. T. Janis IM.

E. E. Suhrke' b

A. W. 5:ce:

J. S. Tulenko

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3. J. Shepherd J. E. Taylo

. L. R. Cartin

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Swa nson C. E. Ec :is J. J. Ke.117 R. S. Pal =e

.8d J.D.Phinney/

J. L Eurnet:a U.1 '?, 2 5

3. F. Hall =an/

C. A. Meye

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