ML20024B508
| ML20024B508 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/13/1978 |
| From: | Labelle D BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | Roy D BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| References | |
| TASK-03, TASK-04, TASK-3, TASK-4, TASK-GB GPU-0285, GPU-285, NUDOCS 8307090051 | |
| Download: ML20024B508 (3) | |
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THE DABCOCK & WILCOX COMPAllY g
s PO'r.'ER GEt:ERATIOli GROUP
@l D. h'. l!OY D. R. RoY. Manager. Plant Desip 4
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D. V. LaBelle. Safety Analysis (2117)
D 885 u3 8 l. Cust.
File No.
or Ref.
I. Subj.
Date April 13.1973 i
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I concur with Bob's findings (attached). It would cartainly be a y
benefit to our interface manage: ment progra= to have front-loading participation on proble=s affecting our area. Yet. I 'cnew that you I
are leaving much of this front-loading to Plant Integration and also g
e that much of the initial personnel L:volument is being dictated.from j
depart:annt level.
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il Please advise as co what action yoit feel is appropriate.
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D ces v/o Attachment
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Charles Shapiro CSR
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Tile BASCOCl* & Wil.COX CC:.'PA!!Y i
PO*4ER GE!!ERATIO!1 GROUP To i
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b All CFE?,ATI::C ?!x."73 or Ref.
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SITE PRCELC13 REVI W AFRII 11, 1973 j
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9 A situation has been developing that I believe needs escalation by' you to Depart-rent Managar level for a policy decision. Several recent site operational prehle=s Iq have occurred, e.C., TPC - LEP Rod Problem, SMUD - Loss of Site Power to the !Ci!,
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251-2, Tailure of Anti-Rotational Device on Idle Pucp and D:37 opening on Loss of li X-Cabinet Power. The approach, as I perceive it, has been to evaluate what vest j:'.
wrong, fix it and return to operation. There has been p, for:41 Safety Analysis 5.;
involve =ent in any of these evaluations. The lack of our involve = ant can have at least three detrc= ental consequences best illustract.d by the'following exa=ples:
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Tenact on contracts Presentiv Under ?:7.C Review
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k By the time SA vas asked to be involved in the TMI-2 pu=p incident, the 7
NRC had done its hacework. Vithcut adequate ti:e to ' prepare 4 ;o.41tian G
on three pu=p Safety Analysis evaluation, the indications are that the G
NRC will require cuch tore partial ;ucp analysis en C?CO - Midland Docket.
y This may be cost-recoverable for us on Midland, but what about TYA7 2.
Tepact on Other coerational Plants The NRC also intimated, in the exa=ple given above, that no 347 plant F
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would be allowed 3-pu=p operation without extensive analysis. Turther it j-appears that at least two Tech Spec Sections (3.2.2 a:d 3.2.3 in Std. 7cr-B 3
3 mat) vill need revisions for all 3&*J plants.
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Items 1,,and 2 r.sy not have been averted by early SA involvc=ent, but so=e sitigation 7
oft.cens'equences could have been acco,=plished if prior knculedge and plane.1=g had beca done.
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T saet on Plant Saferv and Curre-e FA-NRC tice-sine Philososhv l
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At the risk of soundin; egolo:stic.':o other Unit has the knowledge to I
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assess whether or not a site prehic: coMitutes a safety issue and/or violation of the Safety Analysis assu=pticas u' der which the plant is t
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licensed.
Exa= pics of this are:
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, a) Opening of C:0V on loss of X-c'abinet pcVer at n!I-2. If all operatinr. plants' ICS are wired dich this icgic as was 311-2.
then any transient donc vith loss of offsite power is invalid.
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b) 2.oss of WI Power at SC1 - Has a transient scenario b encovered that creates a verse overcoolin; transient of moderate frequency ths.n is currently evaluated?
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results be correlated *: ch our transie:t codes?
There are
'l aany questions that nesd SA attention.
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Failure of Anti-Rotaticeal Device on rfI In addition iter.s 1 and 2. vnac were or.gouM be the conseque=ces of this on fuel inte5rity if it was not corrected prior to power escalationf nix code verification?can this mode of operation be used for ther a1 a;s 7
Nucicar Services Tuels, Control Analysis, etc. are gus
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er I.icensing, nation.judgements.
Safety Ana2ysis, through its Contracts Group, is brou;ht on boa safety eval-li
-j; stages of any site problem.
the initia2.
as auto =acie function.-
Also, its (SA) involve =ent in the Task Torce shculd be I would appreciate your and D.E. Roy's co==ents on the above.'
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