ML20024B466

Discusses Potential Effect of Loop Seals in Pressurizer Surge Line

ML20024B466
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	01/10/1978
From:	GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:	Bob Nelson GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
References
TASK-03, TASK-3, TASK-GB GPU-2618, NUDOCS 8307080789
Download: ML20024B466 (5)

Text

_ _ _ _

s PLAIKiliF'S EXHIBIT

.. S. OlST. COURT

3. D. OF N. Y.

f 1

.)

$}kg3 s

i

$07S$0 E o 00b9e l

l 1

l

. w.

... *[..

. I..

',/******

~...Z,;

.**a--

~ ~ -

~,

,.a p..

'. g.

.gw u ty w hthan W M -

Q: ^.

9&

g '-//

". t&

e-

10. 1972 -

• -eackground infor:ation to Jan ary f-7#/ -

2

~"

t'cte to ?.53 -- 1.ces Seals in pressurizer Surge 1.ine CDUpv$

=

rpI The potential effect of loop seals (f.e., a cenoce'te.r effectj-3E-a 0f 1.e~.

- gO pressurizer surge line en pressurizer level' indications wa's considered hg, l

r f.--

.,:. -~...

?".;d 4.-

by Mr. S. Israel- (RSB) back in 1977 as a generic tethnical matter g

7' " ' " '

rather than during the review of any specific plants-however, he did

.f r

recognize that the icop seal configuration ap; ears' to be unique to BW M T....

UhE5DA CFRCE W-

~J ETS..

MAY 251979 The nature of the concern for the loop seal deals with W

plant designs.

. f"2.

behavior as a manceeter 'where level changes would be associated with

.. c:

. : n.

differences 3,~Ei in pressu're betneen the primary system and the pressur t'Rp In sce, transient situations where voids would be ' forced in the primary'

. 74..

This Si 7

system, the pressurizer cay not be the hottest point in the system.

y Since the could lead to th,q.manc=eter effect in the pressurizer.

W ~_

L:.

pressurizer is'where the instru:nentation is installed to seasure system

.s

~

.u D

The level, this situ {fon could lead to misleading level. Information.

w-

~r v.

?i--(

au operator relies.on level indication for the control of rateup flow to.

, L:

...~'

. ;w,

m

[

the. plant systern.

'. ; ;,.- y.. -

3 Operating experience -available<at--the-tire-that-the ce:norandu:o.w

- 1.y./...- Q prepared did not reveal any situahn for which the operator could not-

-. [<e oEfect safe plant shutdown; consequently.,acticas to pursue this inatter -

.3.

This hes re=ained generally true up to

-furt.ker at the time were not taken.

T The experience of the T!!! 2 accident, cakes it a'pparent that greater 4.:

now.

e:nphasis in the review cust be given to this matter.

1*

^

c c.

Qg e.:...

v.

8 D A,leits*d

~

7905110055, M

g

~

EAw j

n, S

CnCS un~e_

gs3

~.

v.

.: ~..M.. ;..%...ys...,

c.~u...;,

g*.

"y*

4

.O

(

.:. =.

_[...:-

. u--

... j,___.

j~ ',.

• ~

s...

. i.,:. -. v.u _.,

..._u.

• m.-

,y 2.y.

n av wr mWhma?-98, My!1h

.w-

'.I..

- [ Y p eY*.-

• -Background Information to January 10.197n

u

.a,$7d -77.

..to r

?

--.a note to.:55.- t.cep Seals in Pressurizer Surge Line COUlV. m$ 0 w[.t-w The potential effect of loop seats (i.e.. a canometer effectM -a s.. O yQ

-l pressurizer surge line on pressurizer level" indications was considered V L.,.,,

..:. ~~.

by Mr. S. Israel- (RSB) back in 1977 as a generic tei:hnical matter p-Y; g.:;

P" '

rather than during the review of any specific plants; however, he did i.'.. '...

.ErhE53A CmCE recognize that the -1 cop seal configuration appears' to be unique to BW

[~'f_,

W '

,MAY 2 51979 The nature of the concern for the 1 cop seal deals

. m plant designs.

3 behavior as a r.anceeter 'where level changes would be associated with

. i.:.

in pressu're between the primary system and the pressurizer..

g..

di f ferences g<

,.~

?N In soce transient situations where voids would be ' forced in the primary

. ?,->::

~

4 This c-

~

- syste:s. the pressurizer may not he the hattest point in the syste:n. ',

~,

Since the could lead to thg_manc=eter ef fect in the p'ressurizer.

. w w. -

..U;..

pressurizer is'where the instru entation is installed to bea'sure system U-y

~

The..

level, this situM.4.n could lead to misleading level, information. ' ~

', t e {: M ','

T w.

-';. :c J

e 7

~

s-.

operator relies,on level indication for the contro1 of makeup flew to

. 3..'.

the. plant system.

y 7.;, ;, -

q:;

~; ^

• pt..

.fs...

Operating experience available:at--the tice-that-the ce:norandu:s-waCJ prepared did not reveal any situahn for which the cperator could not-

]

ostfect safe plant shutdown; censegently.,actt ns to pursue this matter g.

l'.

This has remained generally true up to durther at the time were not taken.

l'.

The experience of the Tit! 2 accident, cakes it apparent that greater u-p now.

emphasis in the review sust be given to this matter.,

x.

QR l-

. ~ c c.

. j.

a

@f>h)stserJ 7 90511005T J.c EAW

~-

~

)Q

(

GC$ c.eacet-x.

t.

- P7 V

l

_._2g - t Z,..,, ~..

7.. : -

. __ ~ - f.~

=. r-._.y..y 5 y,;;.,:

.....,.3....

~~,

k d'l Eb h-

_ _ _' L_. _ T _ _ _ r z.,.

.. :. :2

~..;

.v.

.,.-..:.c.

. n

-. y. _ _.

'? !y b-l'

~

$d Obl0'

.Wh/M;a 79'-96' f*!IP t.5 T

['Yl2

^ -.

3 '** *

• dackground Information to January 10.1o79

'..'h w.

's 9

~

?

1' 1:cte to ?.53.- 1.cep Seals in Pressurizer Surge t.ine CDUpv[h73,M The potential effect of locp seals (i.e., a e.anor.eier effectf3E-a 0,W t-#q.

a.

b E.'9 pressurizer surge line on pressurizer level' indications wa's considered c%

..~'-~..

by Mr. S. Israel- (RSB) back in 1977 as a generic technical matter F:ni, g.: y...-

PY; -

rather than during the review of any specific plants; however, he did 4

-s.

) EthE3DA CAC~c recognize that the icop seal configuration appears' to be unique to EN E';,.

MAY 251979 M;,

The nature of the concern for the Icop seal deals with 7C, 3

plant designs.

e c s:.:.:.,

behavior as a r.anc:eter 'where level changes wculd be associated with G s~

r-,~

differences $ in presstire between the prie.ary systen and the pressurizer. ;. '

Q. >

.;g..

.I

/ -

In soce transient situations where voids would be ' forced in the prir.ary

. h=c; This

.. f system. the pressurizer eay not be the hottest point in the system.

r. -

3 Since tre

', c..,,,.

could lead to th.e manc=eter effect in the p'ressurizer.

05.

~.D

, pressurizer is where the instru entation is installed to sea'sure system coolant.-

The' U

~

level, this situypn could lead to c:isleading level. Infor=ation.

, 7.:

~ 5-c'

'we operator relies.on level indication for the control of cakeup flow to

. c g.:,

~

.(

the plant system.

~

.r.

..,... ;;r.

Operating experience available:at the tire-that-the cecorandum.was.C M..

' ^

~

~

~ [J prepared did not reveal any situal(I'n for which the operator-could not.

D5-

.offect safe plant shutdown; censequently,,acti ns to pursue this matter' -

-further at the time were not taken. This has re=ained generally true up to 2I The experience of tha TI(I 2 accident. eakes it apparent that greater

.. I

, p.:.

now'.

ere.phasis in the review cust be given to this r.atter.

c m

~-

m 1 c c.

DHL

%o n

)

8 D AJsts a 7905110055-

• f Er,tW

I 90 F

- ~..

.,.. ~

4.: _*i.Y d.i.z-yl.lb*

?.'.

• m...

3;.--

~.

~~

. ~ =.

l 4,

f*

~ ~

~

.- ~.,....

'y-.-

n'.~~--

x;...-,.

., : _. _..,.. u.,

c~

~.

a-/

GPO MI?

- 2 f^M

}{}l3/hasa~y7-90'

• . 5"b i.

^

.&ff:

r'-

' '

• Sackgt:und inf:r-ation to Jan:ary 10,1o72 -

' ' hh,h-7#/ -

W h

cte to.:.33 -- 1.cep Seals in pressurizer Surge t.ine we p

The potential effect of locp seals (i.e., a manoceier

~

.w.e

.{C jpg j

pressurizer surge line en pressurizer level'indicaticas wds considered

c. ~. -

g

..-u.

by. r. S. Israel (RSS) back in 1977 as a generic technical matter p:".:S.

9 g

N rather than during the review of any specific plants; however, he did

-i- - -

sr iiThE50A CFRC_c t* ""i9"' ' "'"

~~

'I * " #I " "' *' " " P # * '

• b

S

* 2"' **

'h*' *h' W;

5M The nature of the concern for the leop seal deals with M.

plant designs.

k.

l.

M.

behavior as a manceeter 'where level changes wculd be associated with i:

differences 3,E!. in pressu're between the primary systers and the pressurizer t..:.

, ~'.

In sece transient situations where voids would be ' formed in the primary 7,M q2.

This c-system the pressurizer :ay not be the hottest point in the syste:n.

i.

could lead to th.e.tr.anc=eter effect in the pressurizer.

'. w.

Since the G;;

. pressurizer ts where the instru entation is installed to seasure system coo 7.

TheI 5

level, this situy.pn could lead to cisleading level. Infor=ation.

ffn-(

i M,f operator relies.on level indication for the control of rakeup flow to '

.f w.

,:^. ~

..,.':. "..~... ;D..

the plant systern.

n....

.a

.f:

t i.e.. - -,Q.

0;erating-experience available:at-th+ tice-that-the-cemerandu:s.wasR,.

prepared did not reveal any situahn for which the operator could not.

7

. : :.; /j ^ '~

offect safe plant shutdewn; consegently,;acti:ns to pursue this matter -

This has recained generally true up to I

f.

durt.ker at the time were not taken.

,}-

The experience of the T!!! 2 accident. cakes it apparent that greater.

ti.

w now.

w a,,.

emphasis in the review cust be given to this matter.

e 5:

e l

.~

D He.

~

I. a.

• Cc 8 D Alsts J 7905110055-E4W 1

i O

g

?

x-..-

er Y*

,e.*

Ib e

..b

.E q

I

' n

_ _.. _.