ML20024B315
| ML20024B315 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River, Rancho Seco, Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/16/1978 |
| From: | Roy D BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | Phinney J, Taylor J BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| References | |
| TASK-*, TASK-GB GPU-2438, NUDOCS 8307080367 | |
| Download: ML20024B315 (4) | |
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D. H. ROY 9
LYN BURG VA-sAncocx & witcox
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May 16, 1978 In the attached me: o from Bob Vosburgh, he points out the necessity for Safety Analysis' participation in the resolution of site operational pro-blems such as chose we have recently had at Florida SMUD and TMI-2.
I think Bob makes a good point and would appreciate your alerting Safety Analysis to such probic=s at the earliest possible time.
In this way.
s they can eske an evaluation of any possible safety implications and help resolve them at the Icast possible cost and licensing risk.
- Thanks, I
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D. w. t.aselle " " ' ~ '
R. O. Vosburgh Attachment
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THE DABCOCf. & WILCOX COl.tP Ally POWER GE!!ERATIO!! GROUP i~g@ l D.H.ROY D.11. Roy Manager. Plant Desi;;2
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D. W.1.aSelle. Safety Analysis (2117)
M ses eas.s File No.
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'Il I concur with Bob's findings (attached). It would certainly be a
.1 benefit to our interface =tanagement progras to have front-loading 9
participation on probler.s af fecting our area. Yet. I know that you are leaving much of thia front-loading to Plant Integration and also that auch of the initial personnel involvemist is being dictated.from department level.
2 Please advise as to vbat action you feel is appropriate.
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b v/o Attachment ces R. O. Vosburgh
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T!!E BABC0CK & WILCOX CCMPA!!Y PO*4ER Gt!!ERATIO!! GROUP To I
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G D.W. LABELLE, MA2:ACII, SATITY A :ALYSIS From g)
R.0. VCS::UhCH7 SATITY N:ALYSIS (2176) sos ses.s I(Cust.
File No.
ALL CPERAT1:iG Pix:TS
! Subj, Date SITE PRCELI:13 REVIEW APRII. 11, 1978 j
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A situation has been developing that I believe needs escalation by you to Depart-ment Manager level for a policy decision. Several recent site operational proble=s have occurred, e.g., TPC - L3P Rod Problem, SMUD - Loss of Site Power to the !CII, THI-2. Tailure of Anti-Rotational Device on Idle Pucp and C:DV Opening on Loss of li J
I-Cabinet Power. The approach, as I perceive it, has been to evaluate what vent
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]7; vrong, fi:c it and return to operation. There has been a formal Safety Analysis involvement in any of these evaluations. The lack of our involve = ant can have at
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least three detrc= ental consequences best illustrated by theJollowing exa=ples:
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Ymmee on conersees Presenetv Under mte 'tevtev
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By the time SA vas asked to be involved in the TMI-2 pump incident, the
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"3 NRC had done its homework. Without adequate ti=e to prepare a position l
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on three-pv=p Safety Analysis evaluation, the indications are that the d
NRC will require much more partial pump analysis on CPCO - Hidland Docket.
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This may be cost-recovera,ble for us on Midland, but what about TVA7 2.
Impace on other oeersefonal Plants The NRC also inti=ated, in the example given above, that ng B&W plant l_
vould be allowed 3-pucp operation without extensive analysis. Further it appears that at least two Tech Spec Sections (3.2.2 and 3.2.3 in Std. For-l_
met) vill need revisions for all 3&W plants.
Items 1,and 2 m.2y not have been averted by early SA involvement, but some nitigation of consequences could have been acco,mplished if prior knowledge and planning had been t
done.
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Ymenee on Ptsnt Safeev and current SA-W C t.iec, sine Philosoohv
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At the risk of sounding egolonatic 'no other Unit has the knowledge to assess whether or not a site prob 1cn coMitutes a safety issue and/or violation of the Safety Analysis assumptivns u'nder vnich the plant is
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licensed.
Exampics of this ares M
, a) Opening of C 0V on loss of X-cabinet power at THI-2.
If all operatine, plants' ICS are wired with this logie as was TMI-2, f :{ [
i then any transient dnne with loss of offsite power is invalid.
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' Site ProL1ces Review pags 2 April 11, 1973 nn b) 7.oss of N tI Power at S :::D - Has a transient scenario been i
uncovered that creates a verse overcooling transient of moderate frequency than is currently evaluated?
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results be correlated tich our transient codes!
many questions that need SA attention.
There are 4
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Tailure of Anti-Rotational Device on DI In addition to items 1 and 2 what vero or could be the consequences of this on fuel integrity if it was not corrected prior to power escalationt El nix code verification?Can this mode of operation be used for therr.a1 Nuclear Services. Tuois. Control Analysis, etc. are qualified e. censing.
uation judCements.
Safety Analysis, througts its Contracts Group is brought on boardThere e safety eval-stages of any site problem.
at the initial an automatic function.
Also, its (SA) involve =ent in the Task Force should b e
I would appreciate your and D.H. Roy's ear =ents on the above I
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