ML20024B302
| ML20024B302 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River, Rancho Seco, Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/16/1978 |
| From: | Roy D BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | Phinney J, Taylor J BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| References | |
| TASK-*, TASK-03, TASK-3, TASK-GB GPU-2432, NUDOCS 8307080323 | |
| Download: ML20024B302 (4) | |
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THE BAscccx & Wit.COI COMPANY l
POWER GEhERATION GROUP L
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~~ MEMORANDUM
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BABCOCK & WILcox I
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$j May 16, 1978 jb./ ' '
~lO In the attached ceco from Bob Vosburgh, he points out the necessity for Safety Analysis' participation in the resolution of site operational pro-blems such as those we have recently had at Florida, SMUD and 'DiI-2.
I think Bob makes a good point and would appreciate your alerting Safety Analysis to such proble~s at the earliest possible ti=e.
In this way, they can. cake an evaluation of any possible safety i=plications and help resolve them at the least possible cost and licensing risk.
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D. W. I,aBelle R. O. Vosburgh
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D. H. Pay, F.asager, Plant *e.sigs 4,, g Froe D. W. La3elle, safety Analysis (2117)
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. April 13, 1978 i..-........__,
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- Don, I concur with sch's findings (attached). It would certs'
'aly be a benefit to our interface asagement progran to have front-loah*',3 participatien on~ pechle::s affecting auc area. Yet, I know tA-
- you are leaving auch of this front-loading to Plant Integration.=- nd also that much of the initial personnel involvement is being dista z:n=ed from i.
department level.
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Flease advise.as to what action you feel is appropriate a.
I ces v/o Attachment j
K. O. Vosburgh i
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. THE BABC0CK & Wit.COX COMPANY p
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D.v. LAstu.r. Fx:ACII, SATEU A::ALYSIS
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APRIL 11, 1973 SITE PROBLEMS RIVIDr i,_......._._
CONRDENTIAL i!
1 A situation has been developing that I believe needs escalacion by you to Depart-Several recent site operational problems ment Manager level for a policy decision.
have occurred, e.g.,
FPC - L3P Rod Problen, Syl.;D - Loss of Site Power to the ICII.
TMI-2 Failure of Anti-Rotational Device on Idle Pump and E!CV Cpening on Loss of I-Cabinet Power. The approach, as I perceive it, has been to evaluate what vent wrong, fix it and return to operation. There has been no, forr.a1 Safety Analysis involvement in any of these evaluations. The lack of our involvement can have at l
least three detrecental consequences best illustrated by the following exa:P es i
's 1.
Irmaet on Centracts Presentiv Under NRC Review
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By the time SA was asked to be involved in the TMI-2 pump incident, the i
Without ad6quate ti=.2 to prepara a position NRC had done its honework.
on three-pump Safety Analysis cvaluation, the indications are that the NRC will require cuch more partial pu=p analysis on CPC3 - Midland Docket.
This may be cost-recoverable for us on Midland, but what about TVA7 w.e wm
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!_rar t on other coerational Plants-e' The NRC also inticated, in the exa=ple given above, that,n_o,3&W P12nt Turther it vould be allowed 3-pu=p operation without extensive analysis.
sppears that at least two Tech Spec Sections (3.2.2 and 3.2.3 in Std. For-i l
met) vill need revisions for all 25W plants.
Items 1 and 2 tay not have been averted by carly SA involvement, but some altigation of consequences could have been accomplished if prior kncvledge and planning had been t
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done.
3.
Impact on F1snt Safety and Current SA-NRC Licensine Philesephy At the risk of sounding egolocatic, no other Unit has the knowledge to i
assess whether or not a site probles constitutes a safety issue and/or violation of the Safety Analysis assu=ptions under which the plant is licensed. Examples of this ares If all Opening. of CDV on loss of X-cabinet power at TMI-2.
a) operating plants' ICS are wired with this logic as was TMI-2, then any transient donc vith loss of offsite power is invalid.
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b) Loss of NNI Power at SSTD - Has a transient scenario been E
uncovered that creates a worse overcooling transient of s
zoderate frequency than is currently evaluated? Cin the results be correlated with our transient codes! There are many questions that need SA attention.
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c) Tailure of Anti-Rotational Device on TMI In addition to itens 1 and 2. what were or could be the consequences of this on fuel integrity if it was not corrected prior to power
'l Can this code of operation be used for thermal ese.tlation?
mix code verification?
'Ibe purpose of the umples given in Item 3 are to indicate that neither Licensing.
Nuclear Services. Tuels. Control Analysis, etc. are qualified to make safety eval-nation judge =ents.
Therefore, there must be an auto atic cechanism in-place where Safety Analysis, through its contracts Group, is brought on board at the initial.
stages of any site problem. Also, its (SA) involve =ent in the Task Force should be an autor.atic function.
I would appreciate your and D.H. Roy's consents on the above.
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cet D.H. Roy em.
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8 NFIDENTIAL
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