ML20024B176

Partial Transcript of 790720 Public Hearing

ML20024B176
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Issue date:	07/20/1979
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Designations from the President's Commission Public Hearing Transcript, dated July 20, 1979:

407':24 - 409:16 418:1 - 418:21 425:5 - 425:23 448:15 - 450:10 467:6 - 473:24 479:15 - 480:22

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11 I t wid the NRC pric: := March 28, 19797 fj t

i MR. MAC MII.~.A'I :

No.

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MR. GCR2iSON :

Could ycu briefly stata fo r us, as 1

4i the chief eclicy =aking official f== de Nuclear Pcwer l

l 5I Generation Divisics, what wara your goals for the ::aining i

6 pmpmy 7

MR. MAC C M I:

Well, the ::aining program, as is,

g, ' representative also of our total Cust==e:

a I+4 Service 9

Depar ent function, is te serve our utility cust==ars and i

10 providedo: them the expertise which we have in our c gani-I t

11

=ation in the supper of, in the case of ::a4 3 5,

de train-12 ing of their operat.m:s who are candidates for operating l

r I3 licenses by the NRC, and, even in a becader way, the training 14 of other personnel that will be as sociated with the =anage=ent i i

l 15 of and the =aintenance of a nuclear plant.

We have a broad ii i

16 spect:.=n of t== 4 4 "g programs available to the u.111 ties.

17 And we try to be respcssive to their individual requirenents I

18 in naking these progre=a available um dem.

l I

19 MR. GOROISON :

Ead you articulated to the training 20, deparment any sort of training philoscphy da; you wanted to i

2, 21 g see not?

I 22 !

MR. MAC 2d"

• L4:

I d=n' t believe I' ve articulatad

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i 23 ; any ::=' 4 g poli: f c philoscphy.

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i 24 Ma. GCRr*SCN :

Eave there been,any changes in y=c:

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23 appr:ach := the ::aining depa =en: since Mar =h 23, 1579?

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3 12 -

M?L. MAC 2C' ~.AN :

In the vs.eks ?olicwing the March' 23 '

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12 accident at Threa ud ' e Island, we, wi:hin the first week,

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l 3

got tegener vid de u~d 1 i -d -s dat had units in service,

i also ince:perati.g de Babcock and Wilecx nuclear steam 3

supply systa=.,

And one of the dings dat we discussed wid 6

dem in ecse discussions, one of de things that we offered 7

to de for the::, was suppler.antary ::aining en our simulater, 8

which we i==ediately codified to be able to fully simulate f9 the conditicus that tack place at Three Mile Island.

We I

~

10 offered to =:cvide sumele=entary training.

They could send II f

their operators to Lynchburg, we would go through de 1

12 sequence of events that oc=urred at Three Mile Island, we 13 would icek at seme supplemental t=aining related :c icss cf g-14 feedwater flcw, related to stuck cpen pilot cperated relief

)

If valves, and p chably cest i=portant, is ::rf cpinion, de to raccynitien of saturated conditiens is de reactor ecclast l

17 system, hew dc ycu recognica dese, what are de sv=p t==s,

13 and what do you dc Oc get recovery f c= dose condi:icns, t

I 19 withcut considerstica fc hcw you night have gotten dare 'in 4

20 i the firs slace.

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21 ;

so is de weeks i =ediately felicwing March 23, f 22 ! there was an active p'cgra= involved in.he training crya.1:a-T.

i 2'i, cica :c ncdify de si=ula.c and effar cis suppla=enza:f 5

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sining :c the cpera:c:s of cur c der :pe:a ing c.i:s.

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In addi:ica

.c ca, I have had sc=e discussicas y

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1.3 Ii vid Mr. K:siba, who is de =anager of the Cus::=c: Servica 2'

Cepa =ent, and have re==== ended to hi hat he cenduct an 4

i 4 ' assessment of our ::ain:.ng p:cgra=s, im light of de experience 1 1

i i

that we had at 2.ree Mile Island, i

and reflecting de wed ha:l1 3

i hac bee. done since Mz ch 28, 1979, on==re extended analyses 4

cf small breaks in the react== c::iciant svsta=, d e es-d -

l 1

7 11sh=ent of guidat' es fc cur cperating u ities to use l

3 as a basis ice developing detailed opera-d "g p ccedures, to 9

indicate tm the operato: the s,r.p t==r that he ought ec be 10 looking fc i s

1. - i s type of sit =ation and the cc :ective l

II measures that he shecid take to recover f:cm these situatiums 12 if *. hey develop.

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13 1

I thi=k what we 're driving at here basically is i

l 14 a closer coup t 4-g between - is the string of participants,

l between the designer, dhe ::aining c ganizatien, a=d the l'

If 4

cpera+d g cryasi:ation.

17 MR. GORINSON:

Okay.

Let's :::= to a different i'

18l subject, Mr. MacMillan.

Is it fai: to say that relief valves i

1

- 19 i have a histo:f of failing to close securely?

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9. GORINSON:

And pile:'cperaiad relief valves have i

i I 22 ! failed to open is 3ahcock and Wile =x plants prior to the 4

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, 23 : T.v.!-2 incide=t.

Is hat ec :ac ?

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! 24 MR. MAC MI h N:

I': not s re ! -- did you say, l

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} ' 2f have failed :s cpes?

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1 MR. GOPCNSON:

When did ycc first see t'.e se me=crand.7 7 I

i 2

MR. MAC."- Mi t I,helieve vo of these memcranda 3

saw ahcut April, 1979, at the t i=e vnen I w'as ge::ing pre-l i

I 4

pared te cake testi=cny befera the Adviscry Cc==ittee en 5

Reac:c: Safeguards.

6 MR. GORDISON:

Which two memoranda were those, s ir ?

7 MR. MAC.M-MT :

The =e=crandum identified as 8

Eearing Lchibit No. 3 f:cm Bert Dunn to Ji= Taylce, dated

'9 Feh::ary 9, 1979 and,the memcrandu: identified as Hearing 10 Dchihit No. 5 f cm Mr. Eall=an to P.r. Karrasch dated August 11 3rd, 1978.

12 The cther three maceranda, T.xhib it s 1, 2 - at least, I

i 13 F.xhihits 1 and 2 were hrcught to my attentien at the ti=e I i

14 made dapositions to the staff of the 7:esident's 'Cc==ission I~

13 and Dchihit No. 4, I am n'ot sure that I have seen that specific

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16

=eme previously.

That =ay have been snewn to me at the same 17 ti=e, but, if so, it wecid have been in the last =enth.

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MR.'GCRDTSCN:

So, the Dunn sencrandu= cf Feh :arv.

19 9, 1975 and the Eall=an =amorandu= cf August 3rd, 1975, ?.xhi I

1 l

20

' hits 3 and ~5 were h cught to ycur attentien in April?

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L 2I MR. MAC ?~~'MT:

Yas, that is=== act.

t. 22 l MR. GCRLISCN:

And the : :c = stances tha: they wers I

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.ep 23, h cugn: =c your attentica unds: vas that you vers p sparing s

R 3j 24 f:: castimeny bedera the Ad*iiscry C :::.: tee en Aaact:: Safe-(

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sa.id t'.c third significan: Jac c: was the inappro priat e e=~

2 { phasis by che cpera c s en pressuricer level indication only. ;

. Is that cc ect?

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.v.R. MAC y- ?AN :

That.s c crect.

5 MR. GCR NSCN:

And en page 25 of the press confer-l 6

ence, starting on LLna 10, you s5id, the fourth signLILcant 7

event and p=chably the most important in the whole sequenc:e 8

wa's the decision on the basis of that information to cut bac.k i

9 the high pressure injectica pump.

Is that cc rect?

10 MR. MAC F-' W :

Yes.

I1 MR. GCRINSON:

Ycu did know at the time you had.that 12 press conference that the Dunn me.morandus had specifically 13 identified the possibility that operators might er: relying 14 on a high pressurizer laval and cut bac.k on high pressure 13 injectice.

4 16 MR. MAC MII.I.AN:

I was avara cf the Dunn memorandu.1 17 and its contant, yes.

18 MR. GCRINSCN:

And you k=aw that Dunn had identifind 19 the prohlam of prematura tarsination of.:.2:7 gg, gag y~

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yes, l

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1 21 MR. GCRINSON:

And you knav ha had idan:ified it as 1<

$...la=atta: raisings'ariousconcern?

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MR. MAC y-

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Yes.

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j MR. GCRNSON:

have

.3 further questicns,

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C ha ir ".an.

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dasign.

The individual engineer doing his design werk nus -

n be fully aware and :=gnizan: and sansitive to de salarf of the ec.ti=.=ent da:,he is desig- '

g.

And deze is ne separa-J I

tien of design and sademy.

They are intag:nl.

A.d de i

3 safety of de equip =enn that we supply is para =cnt, and we 6

generate - I personally t:y to set a c1'

'te, establish an 7

envi:=n=ent wi+'- cc: divisi=n, not only in ter=s of cur a

internal relations, but in 'cun external relatiens wi.h cc:

9 cust==ar, of an cpen ' environ =ent, encouraging engineers who 10 have sadety c=ncerns to register these, to express ecse, cc 1I havathan add essed, and have then rescived.

And so t= state 12 c: insinuate that.we would sacrifice safutf in the interest 13 of p cfit.is en-d ely incorrect.

IA COMMISSICNT.3 -J4IS :

Well, I u=derstand ca ycu're f IJ m=M g that statement scw,' Mr. MacMillan.

But, you see, here 16, we have evidence of Mr. Kelly and Mr.

Ot=.= writing a series 17 of ne=cs 18==nds bef :e Three Mile Island.

They were i

1 13 setting up a red flag and saying here is something ca: is l'

t 19 dangences, dat had Cavis-Besse been at in11 pcwer, cis 20 c=cid have been a verf, verf seri=cs hing.

And ne i y v--

I 21 ', happened.

Ycur evn.cecc.le sav. these 24==randa fell,in _= de i

22i crack.

Is.his a fluke, c does it. indica e that in de f

l s 23 way de systen works, the :=n=arn 'was nere :, you :c cw, i

1 1J 24 let's ge: :ne ec.ui:nen c.eing, le:'s sell==re acuip=en:,

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.an exercising c ncern ever ccsa =e=cranda and de

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1 implica:icas o f those =eceranda.

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MAc.u-- ur:

Well, 12: =e senza verf dirac:1y I

3i and candidly, I dd - k it 's regre:.able tha:==re

' ely 4l:sselt'--

' what I===sida:.c be a valid tach =ical I

f 5

diffarance c disputa between the parties ycc' ve talked wid i

6 in deso hearings, I **~k i:'s regre

'kle dat wass' I'

7

=aselved =uch =cre quickly and escalatad to a c=nclusien a. d 8

de app cgriate action ca.kan.

9 I believe that de events that cck place do I

10 indicate the cypert..=i:f wi 8 de organiza ica fer engineers-11 who have a safetf concern := raise these, Oc bring them to 12 the. attention of our licensing and safe f people, and to 13 have actics taken, which day falt had been taken.

And dere I 14 were emissiccs in communica. ice.

There were assu=ptions I

i 15 made. hat had no basis fc: heisg made, as to whether c not i4 t,

16 de p cblem had been resolved.

There was a lot of

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17 censu=ed in getting that issue resolved.

I would have to la ' say dat I believe that one reason that -his par-J.cula:

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f 19g p chlem was not falt to be as c gast c pressing as in f

i 20

' 4-dsight it =ight appear to be is t! it ders were exis 4 - e I

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21 racem= ended cpera-d "? p cceduras and emergency p ccaduras l

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( 22 which covered cis concars.

And se it wasn ' : a case of no T

0 i ind===atics bei=g available is tha'fiald.

It was a casa of

1. 23 j 2 ' da racec=endatien da we reinforce ecse.

I ci k :ha:'s

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aly regrettable.

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9 I d:n't believe da deze is evidence :n i.ndicata i'

o tha 2e reascn dat dis issue was not b :ught to 2 3

ely 3

rasciution is because we were busy off selling addi:icnal equipment.

I believe dere wera genuine misunderstandings.

3 ' There were genuine gaps in ---- icatiens.

And I'= c=ncerned 6

ahcut that.

I'= =ct p cud cf dat p rformance on de part 7

cd our c ganiza-d.

I' ve =ade that clea

= =y managers.

3 And you heard Dr. P.cy earlier discuss scme of de dings da:

9 he's doing to t:y ed sharpen up cc: business cperaticas in 10 dat area.

~

II COMMISSIONER rZ~d!S:

Thank ycu.

12 CEAIRMAN KIMCTY:

7:=fessc: Pigford.

I3 COMMISSIONER P:"GTORD :

Mr. MacMillan, do you recall l I'

en the date Mar =h 30, de ind::=ation ca was given cut IJ f c= de Nuclear Regula::: f cem=issica ec=cerr.ing de 16 existence of a hyd:: gen hebble dat was g cwing in crfgen 17 ! concantration and wculd bec=ma pessihIy explosive?

I3 l MR. MAC."."I.AN :

I have a general s=011ection cf

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~4 e frase in de Three Mile Island accisen:

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20 l sequence has seme --' ' est=nes in it.

I would happen.c he in I,

21lIlcridar.: the "4

e the inciden: ::ck place.

I a :ived, i

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c I 22 ! aftar sc=a difficulty, in de office c

-d 4y ac ning, i

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] 23, Mar:h 20.h.

I lef a

3:30 n Mendav== nine, A=ril 2nd, ::

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.s i 21 q: :: :he si:s 1=i spend ta zanz sin.esAs ::s:1.

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rana==ar.

And de ra c1 *.1, I

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1 CCt'_u.ISS:C:CR TAZI,CR:

0 tr.ders tand.

Thank ycc.

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2, CE.C3:WI K22- :

Two =cra ccc ' =sieners have asked l

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for de flecr.

!ay j us: remind the C =missicn da: several cf you u gad us to save a=ple -i e for our enacu.ive sessi n 3

this afterncen.

Cc i ssione: McPherson was first.

O CCISCSSICtER MC ?!E3Sch:

O.ank yo u, 21. Chair =an.

I Mr. MacMillan, just to go back ones again ec the securing of 3

the high prassura injection system and the rules dat wera 9

cut and available at that -*

e.

10 Mr. Dunn's nemorandum says about de Davis Besse II incident: "O.e incident points cut that we have so: supplied 12 sufficiant infor=atics to :sactor cperanc s in de area cf s

I3 recevery f:=m a loss of ecolant accidents. "

M Qo you agraa with san:1..c a is cf that i a?

Ce you l3

+4 nk that was true as'cf Februa:v 197S?

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IO MR. MAC HIIJ AN:

Well, I dink da is what the 17

=a=c says; I dink dat is what Mr. Cunn fait --

II CCW.ISSICIER MC PHIRSCN:

I as asking you wha der' t

you believe dat.

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A: the tina he wrota de =eno, and l

21-the evidence of havir..; had these inst:ncticas in. de field and l i c 22 having had cna circ = stance whera day wara no f=11:wed.

24 J

disk : would have. c agree, :sisad a cuesticn cf whe:ns: ::

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2' ' ::: suffi:ian: ind:::a:i:

had been supp*iad :=

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Ec: chan again, ; wcuid rapea: -ha : tha :nce==andac 4 '-

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ccedures and de p:ccedures in force at Three EIe Island at de cine did have dese precautions ic: the opern:c s.

3 CO!! MIS 5ICHIa MC PEI25c:::

Nell, that sounds li*u 4

doubla-talk to ne, fra:ily.

You say '-" = ~ -"ay were cc: there, 5

the proceduras were in placa, and yet ycu aq ee wi d ti=.

Cunn 0'

1 that we have not su= plied sufficient indc =ation ec reactor I

cpersecrs in de area cd recevery f cm Icas of ccclant accidenes.

I h~nich is which?

9-MR. MAC MII.I.AN:

Well, I think what I was trying Oc 10 say, tir. McPhersen, is 2nt I can understand how Mr. Dunn II would feel en the basis cd de analysis that he had dena, that.

12 supplementarI-infor=ation ought to be p:cvided ec de reacto:

I2 cperators.

ITe in fact did issud supplementary infor=atica and s

I' supo. lamen"-v. training fer.ithi rmar-to co.erators in de.ceried 3

I **

fellcwing March 28, 1979.

IO CCMMISSICMER MC PEIRSCM:

Yes.

fir. Dunn 's nemorandu=:

I7 was writtan, n February 9, 1973.

"'he Cavis 3 esse avant Occk i

I3 place in September 77.

And ete supplecanta:f infor=atica and I9 ins.::ctions went cc: in April cf '79, 19 nends lazar.

20 MR. ZIAC M" Mi:

Yas, sir.

2I COMMI55ICUIR MC PEIRSCN:

• hat, you said earlier, I22 de Cunn ne=crandu=

was a rag:s:.ahle delay.

You also said dat

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l 22

'6 and the Kelly =ecerand:s cin: cc: ca: 2s:s is an :::c::eni:v. '.

. (

I 24 ' f:: saf a:7 cones:ns :c he raised wi:hin 34W.

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Cbvicusly, having a*.

cyper.un;

• f Oc raise saf t:y, e

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I cencerns and having anycod.y listan := de= c: raspend :=

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They uara L

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3 of ecse, ders has been cstineny s de effac: tha nany 4

ef dcse on de distribu icn List. o' -

• s =emorandu= den' :

5 recali it at all.

And appa -a- ~' y, as cer..issioner ticaride l

4 said yesterday, dat the large n

'e: of pecple en the distributit f

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'7 list widcut any acticn iina, without any respcnsibility being 8

7= posed en any one of dose persens in de bcdy ce=crandu=

o seems t= have had the ' effect of causing everybody to 2 1:1<

10 that sc=ecne size was doi'ng sc=ething about it.

11 Se an opportunity to raise safety conce:.s is ceaning-12 less unless there is sc-.e ac,.icn.

You are a nanagar, r.d I"'

you cbviously knew that.

What have you dcne since es 2Sch

'of March to i=p cve the response side is addi ica to the L

15 oppc

• .n:ity side of dit-equa:Acn?

2 16 1G. ZIAC 2CI.i.A!!:

I would Li!<a to respond, first cf

' ali', Oc e.e cc==ent raiative to the cp f c uni y act being II a sufficiant condition, that dera has to be actic.. tal<an i.~. -

I9 the rasciunion of dese.

And as I have said, I dia:< it is

'O regra -*la that da: :ssolu_ica scok as long as is did in.hisi 21 l

par,.icular case.

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hc point that I was really ::ying ec ga a: in g

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f r d' :9 na'd.ng sa: poin: was that ears is ac evidenca ::a- : :<new c f '

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i in :..a c=nversa:icns, in e.s quastiens, in da inquir.as :na:

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have c: due:ad, ac: in ca :ssei=cny which : have hear

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presented, c indica a dat dere was any inten icnal effor:

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o suppress cr to discouraga people f:cm raising :hese conca:=s-

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But in fact, de enviren=ent is cne i: which our engineers 4

are encouraced to raise these concerns.

S I think the thing dat we need um do, and cart' 4 - l-f 4

cua of de lessens' em he lear..ed f cs. *'i = sequenca; cf events,

7 is to sharpen un on the resciunion of and de disposition cf 8

the concerns that are raised.

9 And what I have askad con R=y, our Engineering 10 Manager, to do is to evaluata the nechanism by,which and the.

11' peccaduras by which safe y issues are raised and ac icn is l'

taken elder to rescive the= c: Oc dispose c '

-'s-i- a -d ely 13

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fashion.

IA COMMISSICNIR MC PHIRSON:

And have yen given hi= a 1 ~*

1 deadiise in which to respond ec dat?

14 MR MAC MI!i.AN:

I have not, and I think ha needs

.c 17\\ 'have his pacple take a lock =c see wha:

ha =agnitude of the 18 su:ve:f nay be in c:da: =c acconplish tha befc:2 we se: dead' 4 -es t

19-4 w.a 20 COMMISSOCMIR MC PEIRSON: Ihe scint is nce =araly cna

• 1 cf chasti ing your c gani:ation, Mr. MacMillan.

You'are a 1

3 nn l

7 major suppliar of nuciaar pcwer ganara:ica systacs, and dara

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" i are a les cf dese dings ar=und.

O.e:s ara ether hings besiiss

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.d Opera::: ineccprahansi:n with respec Oc

ning O ff the cadi.:

s d,(An which :ha wa a: af ection systan shcuid be :: nsd Off.

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l are Other dings that d=ubtless are perociating in de sys tans,i l s i 2

l thac have causud concern ec ccher Mr. Dunns and ccher ~<alivs.

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And =y concarn is that these =e==randa are sitring arcu-.d in t

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A f

St.W and viestinghouse and Cc=bustien Engineering and aisewhere 3

at various bureaucratic levels, while peopta attend to "highe:

4 priorirf =actars," even dcugh this one has c de wi d the I

potential of uncovering da cera, which I assu=e is a=cng the a

highest priority = attars: dat dey are sitting a:cund and 9

not getting responded to; that dera ara =c deadlines; nebcdy 10 has to de anything by a car-**: **a.

II Sccecna writas a =acorandus in t-IcVecher of ' 77, five 12

= cads later dat is escalated by ser cne else who writas two I3

=am=ra=da, six. =caths lacar sc=ecne else wid an actica responsio 1

I' bility alcng the line writas back and says,

"*4 ell, we haven't 13 done anything ahcut that'hecause dare are a ccuple cf cncarns Id that we don't "i % got rescived shout gcing solid. " ~

I7 Eigh

=cn:hs latar, ders is finally action.

Ch, I3 in be: ween, two guys =e in the hallway and talked ahcu i.'

I9 *>finataan =en-ds alecc.e-lar.

ticw, dera are p chably c har su-"

"4 gs arcund, and 20 1

1 21 I don' envy you de jcb of

?ing ec establish a. system c=da: !

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I' '- l which dase =actari ec=a up and ge: :ssolved, he: : wculi surely j i

v{ 2 ; dink that l

it has ge: Oc hvcive, wha aver you i.:::duca has 4

24

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ge:

c involve deadlines and the imposi ica of speciii:

14 ! IRspensibilit*f en peopla Oc IssyCnd ec suc.. dings by a cart.ai.".:

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I period, get it resolved.

If it is decided - :.d in had been n

decided in this case, as you said in ycur press ccnference en 3

June 5, that these instruc icns had been given, dat dev were 1

adequate, that de cpera:c: si= ply didn't carry the: cc, if 3

you had ' decided tha t, so be it.

A repeated his c:f of cperatcr 6

failure in this regard would suggest~that ycu were w:c=g, you 7

would have been v:=ng il you had decided that, but.never heless 3

that would have been a decisicn.

.':'c leave 1 in the fudge of 9

bureaucracy is what is really c= acceptable in 4. field like this.

IO General Meters =akes autcccbiles, dcas:'

=aka sure 1

II that everfbedy who drives them can drive then ce=peten:1y and 1

12 under emergency situations, but you are not in dat ballgame.

I3 It is a very different one, clearly.

And one really can't I'

have what you can at-nst describe as U.S. Govern =ent bureaucratic is methods vicin ycur kind ci enterprise.

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l CEAIRy.AN miE2E:

Cc ycu wish to respcnd, Mr.

• 70-79 2! Mac iillan ?

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MS.. MAC F ~ ~ W :

I respect your concerns.

I share 1

4' ycc: ccccern in =any ar ea s.

I helieve I said so the coher 5

day that I am net proud of the perder--, cce en this spec ific I

6 issue.

I don't have evidence thst there are large nu=her s o f ;

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7 ct"-- issues that remai.n un=esclved, but I think it is incu=- l l

8 heat upon =e, as the responsible -= :ager of the divisica, Oc 9

assure =yself th.tt we have instituted a system by which these 10 issues ca. he addressed forthrighti.v and La a timel.v wa.v.

l II I always wer:y a little hit ahcut arbitrary deadline ls, l

12 which have nc relationship to the character of the p chle: neri 13 the =agnitude of the wc:k that =ay ha ree.uired to resolve i i

l I4 hecause sc=etimes these just are nct effective in ac=c=plish- !

I3 ing the chjective.

I 5.= sensitive to your cence== tha: :her e i

I* i need to be established sc=a guidelines by which we can peric==.

I7 is resolving these and I knew, as a fac=, that P.r. Taylcr, whc 18 l is in charge cd licensing and who testified earlier in the i

I9 i p:cceedings, has set fc himself and fc: his people the ti=e'.y

O resolution and sc=a targets fc: ac=c=plishing the re scictics 21, cf preli=inar.v safety concerns that are raised f c= wherever l

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'f a. they cc- -

'a ~*e c=canicatien.

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j And we do need Oc sharpen up, as : i.nd icat ed ear ' :.e r,

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n :..e ir.uly resclurica ef the se : s sua s.

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t' cnder standing of whac the :ctal centen cf that ::ccra

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2 i The ultimate licensing and certificatica cf One

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eparatcr fc the cperation cf the uni: is the responsibility 4

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cf the Regulate:y C===issica.

Our involvement is := ccnduct 5

that training which we have the capability to ccnduct and em 6

certify that the operaters selected by the utility have suc-7 cessfully'ccncluded c: cc plated that training p cgram.

S CCMi!SSIONER MARXS:

Well, I =ust ad=it I am t:cubled 9

by your answer becausa I don't - I will tell ycu what ny 9:c-10 blam is.

Yeu, in your press conference, without geing inte II details, identidied the fact that of the six significant fac-I2 ters involved in the Three Mile Island accident, five invcived I2 the co.e: ate:.

I4 MR. MAC MII.LAN:

Yes, cir.

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I3 COMMISSICNIR-MARKS:

Iarliur, when you, in ycc: re-l i

16, spcase to the issue of safsty, ycu placed great emphasis en l

1 l

1 17 the fact that ycur engineers are very sadaty crianted in the i

- 13 p cductica cf ycur equipment.

3c the weak link in tha chain i

I9.i seems to be the operaters and, I guess, f:c= the cc==issica's f i

20 i pcist of view, I vculd li'<a Oc '<new v'he:ha you are satisfiad i

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21 I with the 3&W's cle in the cvarall raspensibility' 40: cpera:c ;

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aining.

Escause certainly this accident, regardlass of wha:

23 its actual cause was raflac:s en 3&W and it seems to.ma cha:

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I upfrent concern and an upfren sens of respcasibility equal 2

=c, certainly, your ackncwledged sense o f responsibili y with '~

3 regards t: the saf ety of the equ:.pment.

4 MP., MAC M-~ ~ AS :

I would agree wi_th ycu.

I think 5

ene of the lessens learned - I would agree with you to th:.s 6

extant.

I think cne of the significant lessens learned f cm 7

cc= viewscint as the supplier cf the equipment fc Three Mile a

Island is the necessity f0: a closer coupling between the 9

designer of the equipment, ' the organizaticn that prcvides the 10 t=aining of the operaters and the operation of the unit.

So, I

II that the. designer can cut into a fers that can he u" ' '- d h _v 12 the training ceganization to give the operating persennel --

l' the people who are going to run the plant -- the concept of the 14 i..

design and hcw it shculd be operated in a safe fashion and then te to get these operatc=s tra'ined in place with the, apcrec: Late Id accessable p=ccedures and indcematicn to allcw them Oc run that 17 plant with the same kind of a visien of what is inper: ant, in,

13 6

terms cf that plant's operatica, that the designer had at the i 19 i

beginnine, so, I believe that there is a necessity fer a 20 I

closer ccupling, a closer we= king Isla:icnship between the i

1 21 i

designer, the training c:ganizacicn and the operati g c gani

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COMMISSICNZ?..%TGS:

3c the way 1: scunds :: ne

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Mr. MacMillan, is that 34*ri reall-[ has delega:ad the Inspc.si-l I

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