ML20024B174
| ML20024B174 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/19/1979 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-*, TASK-GB GPU-6056, NUDOCS 8307070219 | |
| Download: ML20024B174 (79) | |
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Designations from the President's Commission Public Hearing Transcript, dated July 19, 1979:
178:9 - 180:25 183:11 - 189:5 l
l 195:5 - 196:18 198:10 - 199:21 201:8 - 203:11 l
207:7 - 209:11
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l 213:16 - 215:7 221:4 - 222:20 230:15 - 231:8
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232:23 - 233:16 235:3 - 237:25 240:15 - 242:3
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242:4 - 244:17 244:18 - 246:4 247:1 - 247:7 247:21 - 248:9 256:18 - 258:25 273:1 - 278:7 278:10 - 279:9 282:1 - 282:8 t
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k Designations from the President's Commission Public Hearing Transcript s July 19, 1979 301:13 - 302:7 302:8 - 304:24 304:25 - 306:13 306:14 - 307:17 308:5 - 309:5 309:6 - 310:21 329:18 - 330:13 340:14 - 341:25 345:12 - 349:15 352:1 - 356:10 I
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a 3'g t j Ccerissicn under the Commission's regulatiens?
2 MR TAYLOR:
Yes, thev do.
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Is One of those reporting requiremen:.
4 kncwn as 10CTR, Part 21?
. iR. TAYLOR:
Yes, sir.
5 6
MR RCCKWELL:
And.is that a regula:icn published by 7-the NRC?
g MR. TAYLOR:
Yes, sir.
9 HR. RCCIGELL:
Could you explain to the Cc= mission 10 in lay ter=s the essential thrust of Part. 21?
- i MR TAYLOR:
10CER21. is a regulation which became ef-12 fective im January of 1978 in a formal manner.
Its purpose is 13 to provide a mechanism and to provide requirements for repor-
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- 4 ting af ma.tters that. could potentially be. subs tantial saf a ty
- 3 hazards and,, therefore, cou}d lead to adverse ef fects on public 16 health.and safety.
It is --- the spirit of 10C7R21 is to p:c-17 vide visibility for issues and to provide a mechanism whereby
- g issues can be raised in a for=al way and docu=ented and hat p
that.c ccedure can then later be audited.
The crimarv. thrust 20 f 1061 is to provide visMMty to potendal safety issues 21 and to provide a mechanism for them becoming known prio: to C
turning into a real creblem.
2
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- 1R. RCCCE L:
Co ycu cs::y semw of the responsibil :y 4a s
within 34 7 for identidving which issu9s nav be resc able under*
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!., l par. 21 Oc the *uclear Regu'.atory ComCissien?
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"2.. TAYLOR:
Yes, I do.
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MR. ROCK..TLL :
And dc ycu hare -he p r_. arf respcns i.-
l3,'bi'.ity in d.at area?
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fir. TAYLOR:
Yes, the final decision as far as repor--
3
- ?.bility is mine.
M.
ROCK 1 ELL:
Is Babcock
&. Wilcox, Mr. Taylor, re-R 6
7 quired to maintain a procedure in house for identifying issues 8
which may pctentially become reportable under Part 21?
9
!L.R. TAYLOR:
Yes.
That is part of the requirement of 10 PE'-t 21, to have a formal procedure.
I1 liR _ROCKNILL:
And does S&W have such a procedure?
1 12 MR. TAYLOR:
Yes, they do.
13 MR. ROCrriELL:
And what is that p ccedure called?
I 1.t MR. TAYLOR:
It is p ccedure for identifying preli-13 minary safety concerns, the number of the peccedure in our i
16 ad"4nistrative manual is 1707-1.
17 liR. ROCK 1 ELL:
Who within Babcock & Wilcox ad-d nisters jg that prelimd nary safety concern peccedure?
19 tm. TAYLOR:
May I ask for clarification?
a0 MR. ROCrr:Mr Sure.
4 21 MR. TAYLOR:
Do you mean administers in terms of fol-
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22 lewing up the process to determine whether the evaluations are I
j 23 taking place, keeping track of the preliminary safety concerns, d
Ii and then ultimately determining reportability?
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MR. P.OCKWILL :
Yes.
---.. ~ -. -~~ -
f 150
-l 1 i MR. TAYLCR:
I do.
In de Iicensing Secnicn da: *s
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,ou3a v.cu describe,
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.w. e =e cn a-
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nism dat de in house safety concern procedure p cvides?
4 5
MR. TAYLOR:
Yes.
The p ccedure that I mentioned a 6
acment ago, has an interpreta:ica ci the. requirements of 10CTR21.
7 It explains de requirements in terms which. are =cra under-standable to the engineer than perhaps the legal and formal g
9 recuirements of 10CTR21 itself.
traen an individual has identi-IO. fied a cencern which he believes is a potential safety concern, he is required to enter the procedure by filling out a form
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12 which we refer to, and was mentiened several times yesterday, I
as a PSC form.
That form is sent to me.
We then iniciate an l a,
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evaluation of the issue to determine whether or not it is sig-g nificant; whether or not it,is ultimately reportabic.
That 9
6 evaluati n inv lves a fairly wide distributien of pecple.
And then de conclusion of the evaluation is ultimately concurred i
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in by de Manager of Quality Insuranca and the Manager of Integ-ration.
9 When an issue is determined to be reportable we then i
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nctify NRC -- dare are prescribed locaticus whera these acci-fica:icns cccur -- and that is the end of the crecedure.
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,New, the precedure, the notification of MRC sometimes
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I rectires follcw-up work := fully understand de implications a
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' cf de matter being repc :ed.
Bu: tha: is in essence de da-a 24 i
scripti::n cf de p ccedure.
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.G.. TAYLO R:
Yes but not universally rue.
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that wculd be the ceneral answer to the cues tion';
There are I
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- eccasions when an issue will be raised in an infor=al way and l
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the discussion w:.ll lead to the fact, well, we think that is a 5
subject which really should be a cendir ate for the preliminarf 6
safety concern fom and that that would then lead to a form 7
being filed after the fact.
But that usually is a very short a
time period between those kinds of discussions and filing the 9
form.
But the form is certainly an early part of the process jo in any event.
I jj MR. ROCKWF.1L:
Mr. Taylor, directing your attention 12 to cor=.ission Eearing Exhibit 1To.
3, would you review the e:@.i-
- 3 bits in front of you and see if you have it?
It is a =emoran-j j, dum from Mr. Taylor - excuse me, from Mr. Dunn to yourself, 1,
dated February 9th, 1978.
t 16 MR. TAYLOR:
Yes, I have it.
37 MR. ROCRWELL:
You have it before you?
la MR. TAYLOR:
Yes, sir.
19 MR. ROCKWELL:
Did vou receive that at around the 20 date which accears on that memorandum, Fabruar/ 9th, 1978?
I MR. TAYLOR:
Yes, I did, 21 i
y 22 MR. ROCKWELL:
Did you read it?
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0 MR. TAYLOR:
Yes, I did.
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MR. ROCKWELL:
What was your reacticn when you' read 1
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, MR. TAYLOR:- 'My reacticn whe"
-a = d. L. was that thi iy l-I was a. issue which did not imply any inadequacy in de plan:
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.t analyses that had been peric..-.ed in connecticn with cur licen-5 sing activities ; and that it was an. issue which required sone 6
emphasis or clarificaticn of cperating instructions.
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7 F.R ROC DELL:
Did you believe it was a precedural a
=atter?
9 MR TAYLOR:
From the standpoint of cpera-dng pro-i c.
cedures, yes..-
11 MR ROCXWELL:
Did you arrive at the conclusion that the memorandu=r :$at Mr. Dunn addressed to you had been =is-12 13 directed?
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1.L MR. CAYLOR:
In the sense that the Opera-dng instruc-h 13 Mdens that are issued to the plan' do not originate in :he
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t 16 Licensing Sec~ den, yes.
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Did.vou believe that the =emora."Mus 13 raised a concern about. sadety?
- 9 MR. TAYLOR
Yas, certainly.
20 MR. ROCZfELL:
What did you do wi h the =amera:.dum 21 after you read it?
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22 M.R. CAYLOR:
As I racall, I spcke within a faw ' days e
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. !: hat he tal.k to semeene in the ::uclear Se:rics Secticn.
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- 12. ECCmrr.LL:
Oc ycu kncwledge did he dc tha:7
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I believe b-did, yes.
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MR. ROCZiEZ:
Dc you knew that for a fac ?
I 3 i MR. TAILOR:
I don't know who he talked :
but he has.
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' indicated to me that he did, yes.
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3 MR. ROCKWELL:
Did he tell you at the. time that he had done it?
6 7
MR. TAYLOR:
I don' t recall whether he did but ce:-
g tainly the follow-up memo that came within the few days fol-p lewing this indicated to me that that communication was in the 10 right channel and that operating instructions were in the pre-jj cess of being' worked out.
12 MR. ROCKWELL:
Was Mr. Dunn 's memorandum that came j3 to you around February 9th, 19 78 put into the procedure that la was then in existence at 3abcock & Wilcox for handling preli-
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minary safety ccncerns?
16 MR. TAYLOR:
No, it was not.
MR. ROCKWILL:
What happened, after the February 9 th j7 i
l jg memorandum to your knowledge?
What was the next thing you knew I
i that occurred?
19 R. T W R:
Se next Mng was de wri&g of de 20 21 second memorandum, which was the February 16th ce=orandu=, again b22 from Mr. Dunn to me indicating that there had been agrammen:
T 23 reached between the Nuclear Services people and himself with Jj 24 regard to the c=ntent of the cperating ins ::cticas clarifi-e cation.
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MRe RCCm7ELT:
And ycc received that =emo randun?
7 MR.. TAY OR:
Tes, I did.
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MR. RCCEGI. :
And yciu read it at tha time?
A MR. TAYLOR:
Yes, I did.
5 ZG. ECCEELL:
Did you ever delegate to anyone in 6
Your Section the responsibility for follcwing up to see that 7. action, in fact, took place?
a MR.. TAYLOR:
Not tha,t L recall.
9 MR. RCCEELL:
Did you perscnally ever follcw up to 10 see that action, in fact, tcok place?
11 MR TAYLOR:
No, sir..
I was satisfied that it was 12 CC urrin7
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13 MR. RCCIELL:
F cm Fabruary 16 ch a f 19 78 until
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1.t March 28th of 1979 did the subject ever ccme up again before if you?
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t 16 MR. TAYLOR No, sir.
17 MR. RCCEELL:
Were 3&W's untility customers ever is notified of the issues raised in either of those two =emoranda 19 f cm the
- d e they first cz.me to your antencien until March 23:n
,0 of 19 78?
21 MR TAff.,GR:
To my kncwledge, no.
7 22 MR. RCCIELLr Ex=use me, March 2Sth, 1979.
I take 5
23 it you felt when ycc read Mr. Dunn's : x:c:rdum that it did aj\\;4 raise a safety issue?
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Yes.
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MR. RCCKhTLL:
Nould it have been an appropriate
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MR. TAYLOR:
Yes.
O.ere are nc real restricti ns en '
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- ne,: ncs c:. suo]ects that can be entered in:o this process.
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5 MR. ROCKRELL:
Ead it appeared en your, desk, written 6
on a PSC form instead of a memorandt:n form, would it have been 7
put into the existing procedure for handling PSC's?
8 MR. TAYLOR:
Certainly.
9 MR. ROCKWELL:
If it had been put into that procedure 10 how long do you think it would have taken for final action to 11 have occurred?
12 MR. TAYLOR:
That would be speculation on my part, 13 but I would say that it most likely would have been 'less than la three months.
13 MR. ROCKWELL:
Mr. Taylor, you have indicated that 1
16 it was your conclusion when Mr. Dunn's memorandum came to you 17 that it was misdirected.
If Mr. Dunn had si:: ply typed his cen-18 C* =s on a PSC form instead of a memorandum form, and had you 19 received it in a PSC form in February of 1978, would you then 20 have felt that it was misdirected?
21 MR. TAYLOR:
No.
Not in the sense that the PSC form
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22 itself is supposed to come to me.
This would not have changed f
I 23 my position with regard to what was required at the time and f 24 j ! was net particularly interested really in the procedure, the 5
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And I don' t think the matter of M
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.:. a e j wnctner cis was a candida e for the PSC system really even
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We have been. dealing with safety i
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- .ssues much icnger than Part 21 exis ted and this was a matter
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which required scme action, sete acticn was taken in what !.
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believe to be a p:cmpe period. of time.
That was what was re-g qui.~.,.d.
But as far as the ic s being misdirected if it.were 7
en a PSC form, no, that would be proper.
But what was required a
would have been the same in any event in my mind.
- 9 MR RCCKWELL
As the administrater of the preliminary i
,10 safety concern precedure within 3&W, I take 1: you have a.
- y certain amcunt of authority to use yeu
- cwn judgment in hcw
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12 dese things are handled.
Is that cc :act?
13 MR. TAYLOR:
Yes, sir.
11 14 MR. ' RCCKWZ'L:
And in the exercise of that judgment 13 would it be fair to say that you could have in February of 1976 t
j3 when you read Mr. Dunn's memorandum, simply said, this, in af-j7 fact, is a. preliminary safety concern even thcugh it is not en la de right form 7 And that you could in &c exercise of your l19 judg=ent then put it into the preliminary safaty concern p:=-
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! 21 MR TAYLCR:
.Yes,.I could but I wcuid like to clarify 4
h aisc dat at the
- d e that I read the nenc I dcn' t believe the 2s, v.
vI9ls.3 p:ccedure aver entered my mind -- de need for entering inte i
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}24lapeccedure.
This was a safety issue which ccuid be rescived l
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a 2f very-quickly and simply by changing an cperating ins tructicn 0:
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' emphasizing an cperating inst: uction.
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Did vcu at the Licensing Secticn evo:
3 see to it tha t, in fact, the operating instruction was changed?!
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MR. "'AYLO R:
I did not follcw up after the second 4
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.e. memorandum f cm Mr. Dunn, no.
w-6 MR7ROGrdELL:
Mr. Taylor, in light of the events at 7
TMI-2, have you undertaken a lock at the possibility of forming 8
a safety review group within Babcock & Wilcox?
9 MR. TAYLOR:
Yes, we have and we have done more than
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MR. ROCrrELL:
First of all, could you tell us what 12 is meant by the term safety review group?
his sm up would be a gmup of manage-13
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ment persennel who would become involved in safety related 33 issues as an independent group covering a diverse specurus of t
g organi:ations and technical backgrounds; and people whose res-g pensibility would be to icok over the. entire organizatien on an
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audit or random sampling basis and determine whether app:cpriate
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attention and app =priate handling of safety issues really was 20 curring; and make reccamandations for changes if they found 1
inadequacies in the process.
So it would be to exa=ine all 21 g
activities related to safety, not just those which are required by a particula regulatien, g 23 I
MR. RCCIELL:
At whose direction is the pessibility E 24 cf the formatica cf the safety review g cup being dene?'
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peepie en s ite anyway.
So, there would nc: necessarily be seme-I I
frcm the Lynchburg effices, the engineering of fices.
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5 COMMISSICm.%RKS:
Well, what I am trying to get I
6 seme feel for is -- maybe, let me put it this way, Do you have i
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any idea how many memoranda have come to your desk in the icem; 7
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of, say, Pscs er memos relacing to transients which have sug- !
9 gested a possible safety-related concern about the operation of 10 the reactor?
11
.%. TAYLOR:
It has been not very many.
12 COMMISSION.%RKS:
So, a memo like Mr. Dunn's 13 would have been a scmewhat unusual evunt?
1.1 MR. TAECR :
Yes, but that is not to say that I 13 didn't consider it an issue that S.eserved attention.
The mat-l 5
'i 16 ters that normally are fed back f cm the field ecme through I
17 a separate process really and they are usually invclving 18 equipment problems and so the majority of the indermation that ;
19 cemes back.*. cm the field deals with hardware-related matters. '
l 20 Now, I would like to go on and say that this is ene !
l 21 of the issues that we as a part of the matter that Mr. Reckwell i
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s 22-asked me about earlier -- this is one of the issues that f
we are i
23 fccusing a let of attention on right new; that we see a need to, a
j 24 : establish a much tighte: Icop between the key participants in 3
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- this overa'.1 process and we censider those participants te he i
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i ! the system designer s, the system analyists, che p ccedure l
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And we are taking
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l 3i steps as a part of this ac: Lon :* w.. Acckwell asked me I
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4' about to work out with cur utility custcmers an effective way l
5 of tightening that loop and more fully exploiting field opera-r f
6 ting experiences, such that there can he a mere wide-ranging-t 7'
investigation into each of the significant transients that 8
cccur, both f cm a safety and an availability standpoint.
And 9
also to ask ourselves questions like:
Were the operating 10' precedures adequate?
Was there some indication of design in-11 adequacy, not only a ecmponent by ecmpenent basis, but in terms 12 of the whole system?
Is there anything that implies a training I' 3 13 i:fadequacy in this transient?
Did the operators perfers as la they were predicted, to perform?
Did the system behave as it
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If was predicted to behave?
16 And so, we do intend, as a part of this effert that 17
- menticned earlier, to try to tighten this icop between the Q
designers, the operators and the analyists much mere tightly.
I9 CCMMISSIGNER MARKS:
And is there a person designated 20 to ccordinate this effort in 3&W7 2I MR. TAYI.CR:
That has not been dena yet and tha t is
>! 22 : cce of the things that we are vc king on right acw.
The frame-l u[,3
? 4 i wc k that -- we wan t to try to not r einv e nt the wheel, se to i
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Sc, cur :lan is to cutline wha: we believe s an a:::c-s i
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d pria:e secnanism fc dcing this and then wc k v :h each cf tur f
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't i meeting char was held was jus an enplcratcry meeting with cur!
.t Ii cuanceers to see whether thev wculd be innerested -- v th the i I
1 3j utility cus n mers of the-operating plants see whether they i
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4-would be interested in werking with us en this thing.
And thei 5
interest was positive.
So, now, the people who will be in-6 volved will be those-that I mentioned a-1 i-frem this point 7
forward.
3 CHAIRP.AN KIP.EliT:
Mr. Eaggerty, did you wish to 9
follcw up?
l'O I CCP.MISSIONER EAGGIRTY:
I want to try to clarify II scmething.
12 Would it be fair to say that since your relationship 13 with the utilities is crimaril.y a contrar ual one -
.vou sell.
s la ed them equipment and you sell them certain selected training 2
15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />, which they determine.
There is no necessary commitment 16 on their part to use your training -- that an inevitable sert i 17 of mind set ecmes out of this to concentrate what you are es-i pecially cencerned en on those responsibilities, which are
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directly related to yon: contractual respons_hilities and the I Y
20 things that were being emphasized by Kelly and Dunn were in a 21 sense external to that, sines they questioned a manner of i
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2 while it was sade:v related, it =cved' cut of this direct cen s.
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- actual relatienship?
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'"AY~ CR :
Yes.
I think cne of the things that
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I39-have seen as a result of TMI-2 more clearly s the need to 2
hrOaden cur hCricens and OO recognize that in Crder Oc ge: to 1
3, the rect cause of seme of the transient e --=-
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I 4] plants it is necessary to go into areas that are normally cut-l 5
side our scope of supply.
It also is important' for mere people 6
to understand the inherent relationship between availability 7
and safety and our emphasis, in terms of improving availability 8
-- and this has been a program that we have had for a couple 9
of years -.has been on the equipment within our secpe of sup-l 10 ply.
And, yet, it frequently is activities er equipment curside 11 of the nuclear steam supply venders ' scope which can cause 12 problems which lead to lost availability or which can lead to 13 a t ansient which can impose stressful situations en. the oper-14 aters.
And such was, indeed, the case at TMI-2, wherein the 15 transient was started by~a condenrate polisher bypass valve, 16 which is not in our scope of supply and so we recognize more 17 clearly new than we have in the past that in c dar to get IS to acccmplish an objective, which I think is common to every-And this will require:!
19 ene, our hori= ens have to be broadened.
20 a modification in the thinking of a lot of people and not the 1
21 ' least of which is our own customers.
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22 CHAIRMAN KIMINY:
Mr. Taylor, may I j ust fellcw thati I 23 l up.
Would you be willing to give us a verf rough estimate of, s
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4; say, how much cf yoc: division's time may have been spent en j
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equipment versus oceraters, pre-TM:-2 and if ycu would be r
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1 rcle of the operator is very, very important and there needs te i
he perhaps a 50-50 balance herweer the attention paid to the 3j ran and the machine as opposed to what would see:. :o be an i
l unhalanced situation fccusing attentien en the machine frem a 4
5 licensing and safety point of view.
6 CEAIRMAN KIMENY:
Thank you.
7 Professer Taylor.
I 8 COMMISSIONER TAEOR:
Mr. Taylor, I am interested 9
in a procedure that has been follcwed since the PSC system was 10 ' called for under -- or your response to it was called for under II 10CFR Part 21.
When you do sent to NRC a report en a safety 12 issue that you have identified, have you ever sent. either 13 l copies of that report or copies that have the substance of that I4 report to any of your custcmers?
(
Il MR. TAEOR:
Yes.
16 COMMISSIONIR TAYI.OR:
Is that a routine matter er de 17 you do that only when you think, yourselves, that it is called II for?
1 l
I9 l
MR. TAYLOR:
It is not a routine matter.
It depends I
2n*
cn the issue that is being reported.
In the case that I man-21 tiened regarding small loss of coolant accidents that took 22 f
place last year, we did and as a mr.tter of fact cur precedure 23 l I well, as a matter of fact the precedure for 10CTR21, itself, 1
e i
r
'4' permits any subcentractor up and dcwn the line to report the s
1 i
.[,.. =atter to the NRC cr to their customer.
_In other wcrds, t here i
,q
- j 202 s
T
- 1. )' is a stipulatica in the regulatica that savs that it is not l
2: repc :ahle hv the persen who micht have identified ic if he l
- 1. n 2{hadkncwledge'that the NRC is alreacy aware c: cha: =cccern.
l
'1 4
And so in scme cases -
and. this gces more really to 5
the distinction between what the criginal p:ccedure was --
4 10CTR5055E, wherein the requirement fer recorting was strictly 7
laid on the persen of the organization or the applicant who a
had the ccastruction permit.
Part 21 is a b:cader requirement, 9
but if the issue involves a certain group of plants, we will
- 10) then nc mally ecmmunicate and. send t'.at i ame intc =atien to 11 those plants. Ii it involved a particular valve-and that valve 12 had only been supplied to two custemers, we would mere than I3 ; likely send it cnly to those two custc=ers.
m i
I4 COMMISSIONER TAY!.OR:
Ncw, i.n preparing one of these 13 reports, when you decide t$at you are going to, but befcre it 14 is actually and you send it off to NRC, have you ever had any 17 l discussiens with any representatives of any of your custcmers 13 ahcut the content of the reports?
I9 MR. TAYI CR :
Yes, sir.
"O CCMMISSICNER TAYLCR:
Is that something which tends 21 1
to happen in these situatiens where finally ycu do, in fact,
)
i 22 ; send a ecpy directly to your custcmer, either simultanecualy l*
1 i
f 23 l 5: scen after you send it to NRC7 I mean, is that a ec==cn 1
2 h
2#
cccurrence?
MR. TAYLCR:
Yes.
Tha is a ce==cn cccurrence and "f I-A A
/ L/
\\-
em m - _
p u
/
I
.s m.
)
')i, s
El there is a very basic reason fcr that and that is it is cur t
customers' plan:s which are being effected and i:
s very e=-
2, barrassinc. 'fer them to find out about scme t hin e. en their.lant:
4 frcm the NRC.
So, it is very sL=ple and straighticrward and 5
we usually cc=municate, I wculd s.y,
'imest without exception 6
we try to communicate with the customer s prier to this and if,
7 we have an issue, which we are not certain whether the evalua-8 tion will show that it is reportable er not -- because the 9
evaluation is not complete, but we think that it. may -- we will l
10 then alert the customers as early in the process as we can that 11 the evaluation is going on.
~
~12 COMMISSIONER TAY;CR:
Have there been cases where 13 you reconsidered the content of the reper: that you sent to l
i i
la NRC, but go ahead and send it on the basis of information that:
15 you get from one or more of your customers in the course of 16 the prelbninaries before you actually firm up exactly what 17 you are going to send?
In other words, do you get feedback 18 from the utilities concerning, in particular, the safety re-19 lated aspects of what you are sending citimately to NRC?
De i.
1 I
20 you get feedback and do you use it occasionally?
l 21 MR, TAYLOR:
I can't think of any where we have i
i
! 22' decided that something was repcrtable and the content of the I
v 22., report was changed as a result of information from the cus:cmer. s 1
a.
t Y
I No, I c an ' t
= -
i t
25 COMMISSICNIR TAYLCR. Es e there been instances when
.__m.-
l
~~'
E nCr.Oer 0; t.nese P.Ceas.
l i
C a v_u._ e e.m. w,.r.:..
_i.. w_ _, w- =..
,a w,. g.. -.
-w l
~
CHA!.AN KEMENY :
Scme of the 0 ner Commissioners i
1
'. ave asked
- ~
- he floor:
Governcr Peterson, ?r0fessor *,ewis,
4i 5,
and Professor ?igford.
6 Governor Peter son.
f I
7 COMM SSIONER PET.?.".. SON:
Mr. Taylcr, we learned in 8
some earlier sessions here that some of your custemers, Met Ed',
9 had relied very heavily on your technology, your information, 10 as illuscated by the extensive use of the simula:c: at Lynch-!
11 burg, where they could try out hypothetical situations to see 12 what would be the preferred way to operate the equipment.
In 13 view of that, it would seem to me char you have not cnly an 14 important responsibility to y'our customers, but also to the safety of the general. public.
Do you see it that way?
16 MR. TAYLOR:
Certainly.
I believe that all of our 17 responsibilities with regard to nuclear power are important 18 and that it certainly has public health and safety implications.
19 Yes, sir.
20 COMMISSIONER P.r RSCi:
The specific thing I am 21 driving at is because of the tendency, the actions of your i,
[ 22 customers in relying on you so much for technical infermation,;
}
23 ! I would like to knew how you would respond today if you re-j i
l I ceived' ancther memo like the Dunn memo.
Say, tomorrow morning:,
c you get a memo which came f cm one of your ccmpetant technical x ; -~~;-
^*
e e
wh i, pecple, which.said, we have locked in = a prehlem and ou-l 1
2.
cust:mers are operating in a way which really threacens the I n.
I i
3 sadecy o f the ccmmunity.
Ecw wculd you respcnd := such z. memc' I
l
.L new, in light of the experi.ence you have had with the Three 5
Mile Island accident?
i 6
MR TAYTCR:
Well, I would hav'e to say I would spend i
7
=cre ti=e following up on it, c ertainly.
3 CC291ISSIONER PITERSON:
In c:her words,. make sure 9
that senehedy did scmething about-it.
(
10-MR TAYLOR:
Yes.
I think this is a matter where 1I p=ccedures don't make things happen.
People maka things i
12 happen.
I. certainly wouldn 't. want to give the impression that 13
- . believe it is necessary for a.precedure to exis: to have
')
s l'
things happen that are right.
Also, I think it is important 15 to re~alize that the number'of i.ssues that we deal with en a 16 i day-by-day basis that have safety significance are by and large, j
17, cc: side the accce of this pcrticular precedure that there has 18 heen a. let cd discussion on. -- there are a lot of decisiens 19 made, a lot of actions ta' ten, which den 't have anything to do l
0 with particular p=ccedure.
21 So, yes.
I thirk that this is scmething that is i
d I
a
- 19 4
g -- i importan: fer all of us to learn; that fcilev-up act ica is l
0
,,d j
! impc:: ant, particularly in these areas where there seems to i
I i
n.
l he an interface, an i.terface he:veen the cpera:c:s and the a
t
% 7 a -:::cedure wri:s:s c: he:veen the analyis and :he Opera:::,
r
- q-
-_--_-me E~
N'
. -... w a
- -e n
7 i
ce: ween ene cepartment and a.ctner cepa ; ment.
Yes.
s f
i i
i 2
COMMIS SIONER PETERSCN:
Oc you feel Ocday tha
- f t
ycu had fc'. lowed up on the p'revious memo that it migh; have i
l b
i
, avoif ed the Three Mile Island accident?
A I
I 5
MR. TAYLOR:
Well, that possibility e:<ist s, of 6
cour s e.
It is uncertain in my mind and it is just a speculated 7
matter.
In my opinion there was a lot of very useful infor a-r l
8
. tion available to the operators t.5 2t wss not used as completely 9
as it should have been.
There were procedures that ( uld have 10 avoided that situation, which my understanding is that they I
( ii i were not followed.
So, I would have to say that I am uncertai'n i
~
12 as to whether more procedures would have really avoided TMI-2, 13 but I would acknowledge that that possibility certainly does I4 exist.
I0 CoteCSSIONER PETERSON:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
C 16 17 18 19 i
'20
)
)
21 h e.
d a
4 y
1 T.
MA p AM l'
e R
e 3
l t
Y 6 *4 e
l a
e 5
l 1
O oo i
l i
n
.l
- ~ -
.. 'I.1 1l at which I 'elieve Mr. Ma::eris frc= the NRC was in that meet-i t
2, UE*
l 1
2 CCMMISSIONER IWIS:
Mr.
C0uld you spell that ft:
i ne, please?
4-l I,
5 MR. TAYLOR:
M-a-:-e-t-i-s, I believe.
6 COMMISSIONER LIWIS:
Mr. Ma:etis of the NRC was y
there.
You were at the Davis-3 esse site, were you not?
C#. TI",OR :
No, I was not at the meeting, but I can 8
9 recall some conversations about that or reading a trip report, 10 and I believe he was at that meeting.
11 COMICSSIONER LIWIS :
Do you recall whether the reper 1,
that vou read referred to the h'PI systa= and the wav. the cera-13 tors handled that?
14 MR. TAYLOR:
I don't recall that, no.
This was --
con,C, sorry.
13 no, a y
5 16 COMMISSIONIR LIWIS:
Who from 3&W was at the Davis-
.;7 Besse site for than meeting with the NRC officials?
18 XR. TAYLOR:
I believe Mr. Faist, who was the 3&W l
l 19 site representative, was there.
I believe Mr. Kelly was there!
20 and I believe Mr. Lauer, who was the pr= ject =anager f : 3ab-cock & Wilcox was there, and those are the na=es that I can 21 rl 2 recall.
I a= not sure if there were others.
4
(
0 CO'CCSSIONER LIWIS :
So you are saying tha in the --
,,3 9
i s
3,, ycu wecid have seen the LIR repc:
on that incident, wouldn' l
e 6
?
.O.t e
/
3
~f.
- *,e q
s-
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.u n..
- m..,, 7.~-.o.
ra,
e.n c...". ' ' v '.
i s.
r i
C CP' t... :. "-.F7 -W-We i.'. v. e u '.
-... = =.., w'.-
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Sabccck & Wilcc:< would ha te seen the repv : en cha inciden:7 I
1,I
..e,
- m..r. i..c 2.
we3:
4..
- w. 4.
- e- -.4.... '. a
.=.s e,
-2..'-
3 know.
The LI2's, when they are sent to us, we have not, pricr 6
Oc just the pasn -- c: until recently - been en distrihution for the full LIR's f cm all of the plants.
Sun the LI2's cha:
~
/
a come cc us c =e through the Nuclea: Serrice organizanica f:cm 9
the cus:ccers.
~
10 Ncw, in this particular case, because of the investi-jg ga:icn that 3&W =ade of that transient, we would undech edly have been ce interested in the LIW because we had much n:
12 more infc=atics than it contained, I mean in :e s ed de-tailed data 1,
- 3 CO.W.!SS-~CNIR LIW.4
That is kind cf interesting.
I e
14
=ean, I am curicus why the N2C would me: have had as =uch data 3.,
as yce had.
13 M2. TA'r-.CR :
I don't knew hat thav didn't.
j9 COMMISSICNIR LIWIS:
Ch, I thcught you were just 0
saying that yce. fal: you:
- n. e..gv.s g
- y. e,
s a- -
.vc u
-~..,a e
S.e '.. ' - = -
e id
3; t.icn that we had as a resti cf the investiga:icn tha: 5&W
=ade, the fc:=al paperverk :ha: was pt -11.s ied :.n the fc= cf J
6
.se,,
..i..- -. c-
.,..33.y e.. -,. 4.. o s s.-
=
=
r
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,, yvv
=
= " -
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nn
1
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71 :
i had people there gathering data.
l l.
2*
Eu: I am nce able :c say right new the extent :c l
which all cf that da:a was covered a.:
he meetine. where he NEC, I
I 4,
was.cresent.
Se if v.ou just ccmo.ared two.cackac.es of :acer, I'
i I
5 think we prcbably had more infer =a icn a: that early time than 6
they did, but I suspect they had access to -- well, they have, 7
normally, access to all the information f:cm a given plant.
L 8
CCPMISSIONER LIWIS:
So there is no system whereby, 9
when you are doing a separate investigation of a transient, 10 you transmit that information dirrc:1: to the NRC?
In c-her 11 words, the stfting of the information that you get f c= Davis-12 Besse remains with you unless you decide.it is a possibly 13 safety respcnsibility.
14
.MR. TAYLOR:
If the -- there is no fc al, fixed 13 requirement for that.
Some of the ::ansienes that have ec-16 en red are significant enough that there are issues raised 17
.about the condition of the plant:
have scme of the pressure 18 vessels $aen overstressed, c so on.
In that case, in ceder 19, to resolve those matters, there is fe: mal documentation re-20 q uired to justify the calculations that we have made and.tc 21 evaluate the condition of the plant.
c 93' In these cases, there would be inic =acica sent t
I*
directiv to the NRC, usuallv *"*cugh the cus cmar,but sc=e of I l, ", !
~
~
l i
i e4 it eculd criginate with en: c gani:a:icn.
s
" w e e - m y-,' -- " - =.
~.
" ' -n. a..u.s e e - < ~
". e e "- ' = - '... s 4 25 i
s.__
-- _, W M as.4p.-
- 9 P9t# W P
^
~~
W.
i be abIel 1I the specific issues that were addressed there, I might f
e l tell ycu acre clearly whether we ended up cn the receivin? f
' t Oc l
I ai en. c:..ncse.
i i
i 4'
COMMISSIONIR PIGFORD:
Of course.
Then I an Scing 5
to read out ene question.
This is questien nu=ber 6 that 6
acccmpanied the letter to someone at' Portland General Electric 7
from NRC.
In question number 6, "Does the applicant knew tha:
a the " e dependent levels will occur in pressurizer, stea 9
generator, and reactor vessel af ter a relatively small primary 10 coolant break which causes coolant to approach or even partly
)
11 uncover fuel pins?
What does operator do in respect to inter-12 preting level in pressurizer, question mark."
l 13 MR. TAruOR:
Yes, I remember the question new, and la B&W provided an answer to that question, as I recall, and as 13 I t$ ink back on it, that. war the same question that was asked e
16 of us at a recent ACRS meeting, and I believe the answer did 17 no: cc=pletely address the question.
18 COMM.ISSIONIR PIGFORD:
T.:en 7cu are saying first 19 that the answer to this questien, which was later forwarded 20 back to NRC by Portland General Ilectric, was prepared by 3&~4?
21 MR. TAYI,OR:
I believe so, yes.
22 COMMISSIO M PIGFORD:
Was it prepared by your divi-I 23 sien?
sI 24lI I
.u.
TAT OR:
Well, we wculd be the enes whc would i
e I 2' ! ::ansmi:
he infe:=ation back := the cus:ccer, bu a questic: !
I
~. -. -
-4 q'"F"
a.
- c..o... !
{
i.I b.. : e -hat I thin?. wculd probably been hand'.ed in the ICCS unir.
l 4.. 2,
._..a 4 t yeu,2-,,.,..
e... e i_ n s
3
- w. n.c a.e.
v.i...
2.
m,,. e..: n.
- v.. s,
t y m t..-
3-g,.
--m n
a di sc
-y, wha shall I call yet; division 7: cup?
I.l 0
MP.. T A Y I.O R :
Licensing Sec.ica.
6 COMMISSIONIR PIGFORD.
Licensing Section -
7 MR. TAYI.OR:
Yes.
8 CO!G1ISSICNER PIGFORD:
-- wecid have the responsibi-9 lity of collecting inferination and. forwarding the answer to 10 Ga e.s II MR. TA?I.OR:
Yes, sir.
12 CO!OiISSIONZR PIGFORD:
And as you have just a =ccent T3 ago said, you didn't answer all of the question.
Did you l
~
15-a.swer the questica cencerning pressuri:e level interpreta-l t.e
-4..,.
l 16 MR TAY~OR:
As I recall, I have icoked at that l
I 17 natter i. the past couple of months.
I believe net.
I la CCPMISSICNIR P!GFO.9D :
And why net?
I just don' t have an answer to chat.
l i
1 20, I den' knew why. hat was act dene.
i 21 COICCSSICNER PIGFORD :
Okay, thank ycu.
- 22,
Ixcuse ne -- cne =cre questienL n your respenses i
c j
23 l te ~"/A cn the quesciens ferwarded :: ycu by chem, did ycu e
a
-.e
.u.4
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...c.
wy.s
.a
,.a
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c t
s s :. e - ' ' '
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770.'
4 1
valves was adequata.
I 2
C3!2C55IC !IR TRJ 12:
In yescarday's :ssciccay,
,, ^ '
1 3
lL:. Zu~.n 5:nted 21: tere were 20 ci :hes e incidents,
i l
t abou: 20.
5 MR. TAruoa:
That was an incorrect :"-"er.
We 6
s=cke af ter the meeting, and. he was recollecting a. differ-7 ent matter.
But t. sere have been -- I'm of the ocinien tha:
3 it is four, and it may have been three.
But e.e nu=her is fcur, and it's cartainly noc. 20.
~
9 l
10 CHAI.vwt KDENY:
Mr. Caylor, just before excusiny Ii yo u, I would like to establish some continuity wit $ the
!2. previous witnesses and de following witnesses.
And i
12 j derefere let me go over g cend ycu have already covered en
]
1.t two points.
One is en the two =emoranda f s Mr. Dunn.
15 I underst:cd ycc to testify. that yeu felt, after the 1
16)second=emerandum, that e.a: issue had been resc1ved i
17
.satisfac crily.
Is that correc ?
13 !
MR. TAT OR:
Yes, sir, I believed da: the actica l
19 that was a=propriate had been taken.
20 CEAIRMAN :C2E:TY:
Yes.
21 MR. TAraOR:
Or was underway.
t L. t,,i CHAIEWi *C2ENY :
Yes, and v. ou as s u=ad :ha t, : hen,
,t b
a :: =. riate felicw-up action would have taken place.
Iha 's 4.
1 4 ' wh.r v.eu did act do anv. e.1.e. =cre ycurself.
4
.s f
r 3
.u.....s v.m..
- v. e s, s.4....
9 ages w.,
t
- i 3
I GA~?P.AN KI:!INY :
And you have testified about
-he Augusu 3 ne=crz.du f::= Or. Hallman that you did ac:
l 3 ; hecome aware of that particular memorandu=.
4 MR. TAY OR:
Until later, cha:'s right.
5 CIAIRMAN KIMFNY:
Until much later, yes.
If ycu 6
had bec=ce aware of it, r.ay we assu=a that you would have 7
taken further accion?
8
-- Ma. TArtOR:
Yes, sir.
9 CHAIRMAN KIMINY:
Thank you very much.
The witness 10 is excused, subject to recall.
1i Will the chief counsel call the next witness, 12 please?
13 MR. GORINSON:
Mr. Karras ch, please.
14 Whereupen, 13 3RUCI A. KA.UASCH 3
16 was called as a witness and, af ter being first duly swers, 17 was examined and testified as follows :
la CEAIRMAN M NY:
Would you please state your full 19 ! name and current position within 3abcock and Wilecx, please?
'20 MR. KARRASG :
My name is 3:uce A. Karras ch.
I 21 am =anager of a unit called Plant Integra:icn in the
} (
[ 22 3 Ingineering Department at Sabcock and Wilecx.
[
i I
y 93-CHAIRMAN KI?ENY:
Chief Counsel?
7 B
f e. I MR. GOFriSON:
Mr. Kane?
=.
8 4
- 9..e.
MR. KANI:
Thank.vou, Mr. Ge rins en.
g_
_W9
).D^
--W'
9..1..i l
Mr. Kar:asch, hcw lone. have.vou been ecc. leved at l'
=
2' 3 :*i?
n i
- 12. years.
A
.MR.
KMrs :
And would you generally e:glain yeu:
5 duties in the position of unit nanager in ?lan: Integratien?
6
..R. KA?3ASCH:
The Plant Integration 7: cup is 7
respcnsible for achieving a consistency between the analysis, 8
the. licensing recuirements, and the design of de hardware within our scope of supply of the nuclear steam system.
9 10 We do this through preparatien. of various amounts of docu-1I nentation, various types of documentation, which is used to 12 tie dcwn the com=unication between the analysis of the plant 13 and the design of the hardware that is shipped to the field.
i'-
14 We also are charged with a review responsibility 15 of varicus doc =antatica papared within de c:her sections g
14 within Ingineering.
So 6:augh the presc raticn of ou:
17 documentatien and the review cf others, we have a primary l
13 focal point to assura that the communication channels widin 19 Ingineering are well-established and con rolled.
20
. L KA1TE :
And would dose d c. ties include channels I
21 of cc==unicatica with the ECCS Analysis Unit?
c y 22 MR. KARRASCH:
Yes, day do.
I j
23 l MR. KA2iI :
In 1977, Mr. Karrasch, did ycc becc=e s
1 g
24 aware of a ::ansient at Cavis-Besse which occurred :n g
j 23 Septent2 24:h, 1977?
..-,u--.
u
.m.
u.:
~
RA?.?1.S G :
Yes, I did.
2
.G. KANI:
'dhen did you first becc=e awcre cf that?
I became awt.e cf it shcr:1y af ze 4
the t r.nsien: occurred -- I believe it was within a day or 3
two - drough a communicatien with Joe Kelly and his l
i 6
i:=ediate supervisor, Iric Swanson, both of which who I
Ij 7
report to me in Plant Integration.
They came to me, said j
f, 8
that a loss of feedwater occurrence had happened at the 9
Davis-Besse unit and that the Nuclear Service Department 10 had requested that Joe travel to the site to assist Nuclear 11 Service in reducing data and trying to explain what had 12 oc=n::ed.
13 MR. KANE :
Did you concur in the request that Mr.
~
14 Kelly be sent to the site in ceder to investigate the facts
?
1 13 cf the incident?
8, I
i 16 MR. RARRASG:
Yes, I did.
f 17 MR. KANE:
All right.
And af ter that, did you 13 attend a meeting at which Mr. Kelly presented the facts t.5at i
19 he had discovered in connectica with that transient?
l 20 MR. NG :
Yes, I did.
j 21 MR. KANE :
Was there a discussicn at @.at =e e tin g
[ 22' of cpera:c intar ption of the high pressure injactien?
5
$ 23 MR. KARRASC :
I really lon' recall the details of A
l
=
3 what was presented in the meeting, with the exceptien e.at
.? u it was an r.bnc==al cccc ence a: Davis -3es s e, invciving a
, masenge'.=47 -.
~ * ~. -
~
_r, M._...._.... _ _ - -
42-9 I!
MJ.. KA'iI :
~:o you recall generally?
l i
2 PJ.. KARPAS CF. :
No,.
sir, I do not.
\\
4 V"
K.'ciI :
All right.
Mr.. Kar:cs ch, we ' ve had I
l 4i placed on the table before you a number of documents that j
5 have been previously marked as hearing exhibits in connec-6 tion with these proceedings.
I'd like you o look at a 7
docu=ent that's been marked Hearing Exhibit No.
1.
It's 8
a memorandum dated November 1, 1977, from Mr. Kelly :o 9
several other 3&W personnel.
Your name appears on the 10 distribution list for that document.
Did you ever see that 11 document before March 28, 19797 12 MR. KARRASCE:
I do not recall if I saw it c not.
13 MR. KANE:
Is it possible that, although your 14 na=e appears on the distribution list, you would no receive 15 that document?
a 1
l 16 MR. KARPASC :
Would you please repeat that?
17 MR. KANE:
Is it possible that., aluhough your name 18 appears on the distribution list for that doct..nent, that i
19 you would not have received that docu=ent before March 23, 20 1979?
21 MR. KARRAS C :
':: hat certainly is possible.
I would I 22 guess that it is not very probabla.
c 5
7 23 l MR. KANE:
Has that kind of situation aver occurred A
I i
j 24 j before, to you: re collectic.., that documents in which you ij 25 ' are on the distributien lis: do no reach you within the
~
s I
I 1)
'.l3&Wcriani".at.icn?
./
2i
- 29.. KAR2.U G :
I den.'
belie.ve d a: :.. a s a 3'l nc :al cce =rance at J
3&W.
I. suspect dat I did get dis I
4 meno, although ! do not recall.
And I suspec da: I j
l 5
handled it in a very routine f ashien, as I de much ed de 4
dccumentatien. which c:csses =v desk.
7 MR. KNia:
Did vou talk to.L. Keliv abet: 2at t'
i a
doc =ent at ali?
9 MR. KAR3ASG:
I do not believe that I did.
10 MR. KANE:
Did you have any c:al ccmmunicatiens with anyene at 3.&W abcut dat docu=ent pric: to March 29, 11 12 1979?
i l
t 13 MR. KAR3ASCH:
Again, I do not recail.
i
}
14.
MR KRTI:
All right.
I'd like you to icok at dec=ents dat have been marked Hearing I2.ibits 2 and 3.
15 e
Nt bar 2 is a. handwritten me=crand= dated Ncvember 10, 16 I
.i 17 '1977, from Mr. Waiters to Mr. Kelly of 3&W.
An d N"- ber 3 8
I i
13 is a =accrandum dated..r bruary 9, 19 7o, f :m 3ert Ounn g
e 1
19 to James.Tayle: of 3&W.
Again, ycur na=e appears :,a de j
i 20 l! distribution list for I2.ibit No. 3, de Tehruarf 9, 1973 l
1 l
21 Dunn =e=crandus.
Did you receive elder ene of dese o
[
22 dccu=ents befcre March 28, 1979?
i 23 MR. KARRASCH :
2': quite sers da: 2 did nc:
s,j
- 4
- sceive Id.ibi: Nc.
2.
- j
- 3
- U.. KA:iI:
Ihe handwri :an me=crand=.
1 f A /1
-A
/
_.m--
m.,
--m
= - - -
~ ~ - -
~~~~
s 1'
MR. KAREAS G :
"'he handwri tten memorandum.
And f
2 the situation is the sa=c cn Ixhibi t No.
3, as I explained r
3 it en I:@.ibi t No. 1.
I do act recall.
[
4
,i M2.. KANZ:
And again, do.vou have an.v e.wianation 51 for whv. a document en which.vour name appears on the i
I 6 I distributica list would not have reae.:ed you within the I
7 3&W organi::ation?
8 MR. TJLDS.ASC :
I'm not saying that the documen:
' H 9 l did not reach me.
In all probability, it did.
B ut =y 10
=cmory does not recall my reading the memorandum or taking 11 any action on it.
I '2 MR. KANE:
And by any action, you would include,
[
13 l for example, draf ting any folicw-up memorandum based on that 14 document?
15 MR. KARRASG :. "' hat is cc rect.
16 MR. KANE:
All right.
I'd like you to look at a
~a 17 document that's been marked Hearing Exhibit No.
4, which is la a =c=orandum da ad February 16, 1978, from Bert Dunn to 19 James Taylor.
And again, I'd like to knew if you' ve ever i
20 seen that mtimorandum before March 28, 1979.
21 MR. KARRASG :
I believe I would have to say the I
22 sitaation is s -dlar to Exhibits 1 and 3.
d i
p 13 !
MR. KANZ:
I see.
You have examined these documents j
$a
.4 prior to today, have.vou not?
t j
- S '
MR. KARRASG :
Yes, sir.
~
= -
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_%mm%,,
~ ~ *-
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, gl b
iq sl M
m.
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+=
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14 conclusion dat the cperano: instrue icns being -- de cycrater i
l 2
info nation being disseminatas by B&;i was nc: ins uf ficia..:7 m
i 3;
.E. KAR2ASCH:
fell, dere are twc car s to i
i i
l disseminating info. ation to the operator.
One is writing a
3' the c:ccedure.
And the second is the cperator has to follow 6
it.
Mr. Dunn has only addressed one of ~ these, and.I den't 7
believe he did it correctly.
3 MR KANE:
M:. Dunn has only directed cne of the 9
procedures by which the cperators are --
10 MR. KARRASCE:-
No, he has only addressed one cd the 11 two issues at hand that I just mentioned previcusly.
12,
MR. KANE:
That is operator peccedures?
13 MR. KARRASC'#-
2'ght.
As coc. esed to.orcoer resocnse I
1
]
of the operator to his p ccedures.
l t
15 MR. KAME:
All right.
Mr. Karrasch, would ycu also l
16 Icok at a docu=en. that's been marked Hearing Exhibit Nc.
5, 17 which is a ne=crandu: dated August 3,19 78, f:cm Ccnaid T.
i l
13 Hall =as to you2 to you recali reading this ne=crandu=?
1 l9
.u.. KAR3ASCE:
Yes, I do.
20 MR. KANE:
Fnen do you reca.1 reading da:?
21 '
MR. KARRAS G :
I believe I read it widin a week i
t
) ::
. clieving de data cf Augusu 3rd.
e.
}
2 ;.'
MR. KANE:
Fnat did ycu de ahec: this me=crandu=?
i e
t j
24 MR. XAARASCH:
I recali gir.cing cfe: 1: very
.i J
J r.ui:hl.r e.d kavine. en the
=<o sc. acidic c.ues :icns.
I de ac:
- - +.
s.
v:s ouw -
.a a _ Dv_.
- - - - ~ ~ -
p t
A 15, 1
nading it verf carefully at the time, but I de 2
remem=er lockin7 at the specific questiens
- 9. c: Mr. Hallman 3
was asking me.
I remember thinking tha
- ney were ra9.er 1
1 4j routine questions from 9.e Nuclear Service Department to the l
5 l Ingineering Department and that they could be answered in a 6
routine fashion.
I then am quite sure that I placed a note 7
cn top of the memcrandum to one of two pecple who report to
,i 8
me in Plant In cgration, with a mc..ssag a to him to please ii follow up on this and take any action that you seem appro-9 10 oriate, er somethine. like,.clease answer the questions 4.nd 11 get back with Mr. Hallman.
12 I then, jus t that quickly, dispesed of this piece t
l 13 o f c. av. er crossing a.v dusk.
I, i
14 MR. KANE:
Fno were these two persens, one er the l
i i
15 other of whom you sent 2.is memorandum to?
I,S I
16 MR. KARRAS C :
Their names are Iric Swanson and 17 Arthur McBride.
i 19 MR. KANI.:
Do Mr. Swansen or Mr. McBride recall i
19 ever receiving e.is memorandum of August 3, 1978, f:cm you?
20 MR. KARRAS G :
No, sir, they do ' not.
l t
i 21 MR. KANI:
Was your reaction at that time, to that i,
[ 22. =e=orandu=, si= ply forget it and to proceed with higher f.
I
', 23 priority wczk?
a.
i 9
- 4I MR. KARRASG :
Yes.
a
- - -l MR. KANI:
Cid you feel, is reading over that
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accorand.ua that M.r Hall:a.. was asking yet for answers Oc i-2 specific cuestions in the me crandu=?
l,^
s 3,
MR. KA7.2AS C :
Yes, sir.
t' i
1 aj PS.. XXE:
And aitar receiving de =ecorandum, did 5
ycu have any further contact with. Mr. Hallman concerning 6
this subject matter?
7 MR KA22ASCH:
Yes, sir, I did.
3 !
MR. KRE.:
Would you describe these contacts?
I can remember t ao informal contacts 0
wi:h Mr. Ea11 man, seme-
- e between Augus 3rd and the and
'l of the year, 19 73, in which, either en a telephone conver-11 sa icn c: a passing in the hallway at wczk, con asked ne 13, if I had received the. letter and if I had taken any action I; cn it.
My response back to hl= cn bc h of those occasicas 14 15 was, yes,,I had passed it en to somebcdy else in te ?lan:
5 16 4 Intagration Unit, and hopefully he would ;e raceiving a 17 l' sspense in the near future.
la MR. Krm :
Cid you personally Ic11:w up wie any I
19 acticn after dese contacts with Mr. Hallman?
20 i
.MR. KA35AS G:
I did =ct perscnally fc110w up with 21 any action until af ter the first of the year, 1979.
y 22 MR.KME:
Yes, let's come to that.
Afta
,s 2e Janua:.i ist, 1979, and hefera March if d, 1979, did vec have j 22 any further contact wi:h Mr. Hallma. concerning de suh!ac:-
I s
s 3
s
'a )*.: - natter cf de nencrandu=?
ge-
l 17 I
XR. FARRAS Cd :
Yes, I did.
Again, it was in d; - =a '.,
i
~
conversarien as cpposed := documenta.icn Or letter writing.
2 A.d agt.in, Dcn asked ne fI =culd please take sc=e ine a.d addres; his cues tiens.
At th at time, I recall findiac.
4
! a cou.v o f this le tte r.
I don' t kncv exac ly how I did ge e Si f
6 it, but I recall that I did look over de w -=~ and read 7
it.
And I recall just a brief discussion about the implica-tions of going solid in the pressurizer end water relief 8
9 through the safe ty valves.
10 Again, I can specifically recall talking to 11 semebody about another work effort go ng on at 3&W where 12 that situa ion occurs, in a different type of event.
And
,I la the respcase I got back is that we had been looking at l
i 14 solid system and water relief through the valves and da:
15 in this other analysis,,that had been evaluated and 'was 2
16 accepnable.
17 That occurred p =bably scme time early in February.
18 I then folicwed up with Don and =arely, again informally, 19 I told him that the directica that Bert, in his memorandum, I
l I
20 was trying to give to Nuclear Service was cc rect and that 21 I had followed up and looked at the negative aspects of I
f 22, following Bert's direction, as Don had asked me, and I i
c t
e.
0 23 told his dat, in mv o=inien, he should fellcw um and take 1
s.
}
2t de acti:n dat Bert had suggested.
,e i
3
.v.R. KNE:
And dis conversatic. occurrad in the
t 3,.
z a.,., way
- a S u.., *.
12 scne ~~ e.=c:cre.uar:n..a,
- i:?
i l
1 MR. 7A2u3G :
All :
c'-
-ai i i
you :.s : hat it. was i..m i
J 3, not planned, and infor:al.
I don't knew exactly where c.e 4l location was.
I e
I 5
MR KMTE:
And it. did cccur before March 13, 1979, I
l 6
to your reccliection.
7 MR. KAR3AS C:
Yes, sir.
All right.
After reviewing :his nemeran-l 9
du t o f August 3, 1978, did you, feel. certain that cperating
)
10 p ccedures fc the B&W plants needed to be clarified to 1
l l
1I satis fy Mr. Dun.l's concerns?
17.
MR. KARAAS G :.
No, sir, I did not.
When I read i3 che ne:crandu::, the :=utine nanner is, which I handled it 14 tells re that I did not really agree with what was in
~.
's r3 Bert's -- agree isn.' t the word.
I didn' t really feel the 16 3i?r.ificance ci it
':' hat's quite ebvious,
otherwis e, I
- 7 believe I wculd have taken nc
- a pcsi ive action.
1 l
i
[
MR. KANI :
Oc you, recall ycc d pcsition being 19 taken in connection with. this Commission 's p cceedings, lo cr. July 16 th., 19 79, Mr. Karrasch?
31 MR. KARRASC :
Yes, sir.
5 e
1 I-MR. :GNI:
Can I a::ance to have a cc=v cf 2.e
..t I
r
}
-l ::a. scrip: cf e.a: dagesition placed in fecnt of yeu?
a
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f, l
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g 4
(A ::anscript of 9.e de=. csitien c f 3. A. Kar asch i
i
./ $
I-da:ed
- .5 : 17 19 79 was given := 9.e witness. )
=
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A Z:
I MP.. KANZ:
Let me ask you to turn to page 35 of 1
i-2 tha t t ans c-ip t, Mr. Karrasch.
Do v.ou recall bein: under 3
ca:h at t:he me this deccsition was taken?
i l
l i
\\
a MR. YJ22ASG :
Yes, si:, I do.
l l
5l i
MR. KANE:
All right.
Directing your a::entica to l
t 6
the bottcm of page,35 of the transcr.4>t, the following 7
statement appears in the centext of the discussion of the 8
August 3rd, 1978 memorandum, and I'= quoting from an answer -
9 you gave --
10 MR. KARPASG :
Excuse me a =cment, I can't sec= *a 11 find page 35.
Oh, there it is.
12 MR. KANE:
All right.
Do you have that referen=e 13 in frent cf you?
Page 35, at the very boOtom.
14 MR. KARRASG :
Yes, I do.
15 MR. KANT :
The following statement ac. c. ears,
as 16 a portion of your answer:
"When I finally got around to 17 studying this" - and "this" is a reference to the la August 3rd, ' 78 memorandu=
"it was quite clear to me that i
additional clarificatien to the p:ccedures that were already 19 20 in place is seme"4 ng that we ought to do and that the two 21 concerns were not significant compared to further clarifica-i
(
22, tien to the operator and that he should leave the high j
i l
t.
23 pressure injection system on."
i j
3 j
24 s that an accurate transcriptien of you answer i
i j
23, at - that time, as ycu recall it, Mr. Karrasch?
f G
_...,.m l'
r
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p c-o !
2" I
i MR. K'-2. RAS c r Yes, I 'selieve it s.
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3: ce,
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2 railec your feelings cday ahcut this matter?
f.
I-
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.w Rm.- _s C.:.
I c., 4
,1 e.,,. i s.. _,.
-.~. ---
5 MR. KANE :
trna: was Mr. Hallaan's response to this 6
positicn en your part that he should ta.ke whatever action 7
was necessarr, in this conversatica yce had in 19 79?
3 MR. KARRASG :
I do not recall anything =cre than 9
an acknowledgement f:cm Mr. Hallman that he had heard me.
10 MR. KANE:
All. right.
And pric: to March 28, 1979, 11 did you take any further actica at all on t' tis matter?
II MR. KAR2ASCH:
No, sir, I did not.
I3 MR. KANI :
All. right.
I have r.: further questiens,
]
Ia Mr. Chairman.
I*
CHAIRMAN KZ:ETE:
M:. Karrasch, could I direc your 16 attentien to Hearing Cocu=ent No. 6, which is a pcs:-T'C-2 17 document f:cm 3ahcock and Wilecx?
It 's an Ap ril 4 th 13
=ecerandu=.
Do you have that in front of you?
The sub;'ect 19 is supplementary operating inst:nctiens for HPI systems.
20 l MR. KAa3ASCE;:
'f es, I have it in f:cnt of re.
21 '
GAI.CiAN.U.,MENY :
Did you or any =erber of your
! 22 section par icipa:a in deveicping.hese ins:: c icns?
r
.t
, 22,
MR. K.u 2ASC*i:
'les, sir, I believe we did.
M.:.
A T,
i 2.:
Gec:ge Era:ill, whcse name is en distributien, is a marier I
aC J
d
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C M ?.!d.A'l KZ!iE2iY :
In i ?.: C.a S e, C a n y o u 7 9 c c 03 ~ 0 0 ~-
2 fO r C3 *dh *f, in Apr'1 cf 13*i9, it *4 a 5 decided ~. hat SCCh I
Supplenen:O"f Cperating ins uC:iOCS ShOuld he sen: Ou:2 i
4!
MR. K A P.P.1.S C :
I believe it was a direc: result cf i
f 5i the incident at T:C-2 and de lesson dat we had learned l
1 6I cere, that the operator indeed did require the additienal 7
clarification.
8 GAIR!WI KIMENY:
In view of that statement, would 9
you, in re trospect, now say that such action should have 10 heen taken as a follow-up to the September 24, 1977 inciden:
11 at Davis-Besse?
12 MR. KARRASG :
Would you please repeat das?
t 13 CAIRMAN KZMENY:
Yes.
Would you new, in retrospe= $ {
i I,
14 since after TMI-2, such ac lon was taken, feel that scme l
15
.such action should have been taken as a follow-up to the 1
~.
i i
16 l Cavis-Sesse incident of Septa =ber 24, 1977?
I
,17 MR. KARRAS C :
That's a very difficult questien to 1 E' answer.
If you are alluding to the fact that if such action 19 were taken, prior to March 28, 1979, d at the incident would 20
- ot have occy :ed, then I cannot answer the question yes.
r 1
21 GAIRMAN. IC2ENY. :
No, I d.1d tot maka that assu=ption
>; 22 I simply asked if after TIC-2, it seemed i.portant -- and -
)
b
} 22 ! dis docu=ent comes out very quickly af ta:. 0.'C-2 -- to send j
i, t
>; 24 i out such ins:::c ions, would it, in retrospect and I know j
_f this is M nday no ning quarte: hacking -- het wculd it, in 1
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i MR. KA2RASG :
Yes, I think I agree with tat, j
5 i
CAIRMXi KIMI:1Y:
Therefore wculd you new,
- ~
i 6
l rat cspect -- and I do realize this is in ret cscect --
i 7
feel dat perhaps your :aking of the =a::e cf Dr. Hallman's j
i i
3
,ecorand',=s perhaps have been too lignt?
i l.
9 MR. KARRASG :
Yes, sir.
10 cA x.3;r gz:.!E'.IY :
Thank you.
O der commissioners?
I1 C.
Marks.
I2 COMMISSIONER MARKS :
Mr. Karrasch, I'= struck'by 13 de f act. dat there seems to be a failure within vcur m
s a
I4 divisien of communica:icn, in the sense dat Mr. Kelly, If 2
who reports -- who is a ne=ber of your division, writes a l
16
=amorandus and fcilew-up =ecorandums on de sa e issue frem 17i Mr. Cunn,
- =e c your desk, and you don' t recall having 13 received them, nor apparently, is de case when ycu kicked 1
19 i.:. :c sce.e of ycur subcedinates, de day recall having i
f f
20 ! received it. f cm veu, 1
i i
21 i Have you made any efdc
= inves tigate what i
l' l
- 22 ; breaks' d
- vn in the :::.=cnicatien widin ycc: divisien, r
a i
ap 23 22: c=uid acecun f:.hese events?
e,
)
I 24 M2. KA22AS G :
No, sir, I have ac: ye: =ade an i
e w.
e.
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- l. Were tal.* cine ahcut de same 9.ing?
Tha
'.e unders :cd his
~
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l
.t - was the issue dan you were referring to?
i i
I I,
I believe he did, yes.
l t
4 COMMISSIONZR LIWIS :
A:1d his acknculedgecent was 7
in what fo r=?
Co you recall the words e.at he said, c -
I i
3I was it a nod?
I 9
I do not recall.
I 10 !
COMMISSIONER LIWIS :
He did act ask you for a 11
=e=crandum to that eff act?
12 MR..KARRASCH:
No, =a ' am, he did no t.
13 COMMISSIONER LIWIS:
Okay.
Co you think this may m
1.t be hell of a way to run a railroad?
!3 M.% KA?J.ASC :
Yes.
t
!6 COMMISS.~CNIR LZWIS :
Okay, tha. : ycu.
C"K RMAM K~MINY:
Governc Petersen was next.
17,
t l-13 l COMMISSICNIR ?I"'IRSCN :
Mr. Karrasch, I want to i
[
19 i folicw up en your c=mment about priorities.
I t wcuid ac..cea:
I i
20 t: =e that if you had the forasight ta: none of us had, 21l dat this failure to respond to the Dunn meno, fc
- example, i
c
? 22
- would have led to a =ajc thre at to s af a rf c f a c===unirf,
i 23, := hu.dreds f millions of dollars cf ces ts, t the es tab-1 i
6
- .s lishmen: Of a Presiden.ial c:==ission, tha
.vec :::babi-R u.
weu d...aye e.iyen chis.::a::v. ::.:n :: ::ie.r, and 9.a i
1 C/
k 31 I
i chai =an Of the board and the president a.d all Of ycu wculd
~
~'
surn:.ng One. =. gn: c.,. :o respcnd :: :. t.
_:'s nave ceen.
1 easy in hindsight to be critical and :
he a Menday =c:ning I
c.uar te rba ck.
But it ac. c. ears to me when I read -hat memo 5
today, ccming from one of your key people with major 6
responsibility, saying this was a sericus threat, it's kind 7
suru. risine. that it wasn' t civen high priority.
But I i
i 8
realize that's in hindsight.
1 9
My o.'uestion is could it be that all of the atomic 10 energy industry's efforts to tell everyone hcw safe nuclear 1I energy is could have provided a r nd et so it kind of i
12 downgraded any threats to safety and give priority instead I
13 to fulfilling some requests of the Nuclear Regulatory t
14 Co:=:ission.
i 5
15 MR. KARRASCE :
I think so.
My earlier remarks on s
16 shifting now our pra.orities, I think answer that question.
-l
.17 We have been studying, for many years, and spending =any 1
IS
=illions of dollars in analysis and design of those features l
f k
19 of a C ant which are very, vary 4 = cbable.
And we have l
20 been designing -- And these are the major events which are 21 documented in the safety analysis reports.
We haven' t really,
Ie f 22, thought much about the operator and his role, because we 've l
3 I
i 1
23 ! been designing the systa=s to automatically keep the plant g
e e
i I 24 ' safe for those ver.v unlikelv events.
And when I talk about -
..* 5. ch an c. in e. =.riorities, I believe what : reall.y mean is that p,
is -
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,1 9.c er.phasis shculd new be changed cc eno. of first having i
6 i
2 2 e, ct
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aa 1
3; c.is plan: to rk s, focus nare upc: leching at a sequence cf l
evenes that can really happen on an cperacing reac:cr, and l
i then naking sure S.at the operators can handle 9.e abnormal.
4 I don ' t believe we can design.:uclea.: pcwer plancs 7
to handle. an infinite nu=ber of different scenaries, c 1
differen event trees,,if'you will.
There's too many things in e.at verf complex system, not only in the NSS, but in 0
6.e whole plant, which you cculd never c.uess wculd ham. een 11 and ::f to analv..ce ind then give the ccerater a ecckbeck 12 t, c a :scipe en uham tn do in the event ef.
And I believe 13 che lessen to be learned here is than e.e cperators have i
just gcc to c:.derstand more ahcut the plant.
14 I*i f
f e
16 6
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9
- will ask ycu :: Icok at a me=crandum that has l
cre c iously been marked a s :iearing D:h:.hi: Sc.
5.
I: :. s a i
memorandum fr0m '/ou to Bruce Karrasch, ? '.an: Integraticn, 4,
l l
5 dated August 3, 1978.
And I will ask you, did Mr. Walters 1
i 6
prepare that memorandum for your s:.gna tu. e?
l1 7
MR. ~iALLMAN:
Yes.
I may have made seme'werd 8
changes, but it was e.ssentially Mr. Walters ' preparation.
9 MR. KANE:
And did you review that memcrandum and l
10 t then sign Lt?
l, 1I MR.
- ALLMAN:
Yes, I did.
d 12 1
MR. KAE :
Wh.v did.vou send that memcrandum to I
13 Mr. Karrasch?
14 MR. ~dALIJEN:
We were considering what actions 15 should be taken as a re,sult of the technical issue raised.
14 And while the action that was recc:manded was straightforward 17 for the situation reccmmended -- namely, a loss of coolant 18 accident -- there are other incidents, which in our opinion l
19 could occur in a pcwer plant, where those act icas taken 20 inadvertently may not have been the correct actions to take.
21 So, we wanted an evaluation of, if this is done out of sequence 22
(
j, are we doing mere har= than good, e s sent ially.
I a
i 23 p
MR. KANI:
After sending that memcrandum to Mr.
l
[
24 Karrasch, did Frank Walters remind you to contact Mr. Karrasch!
l i
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i d
for a respcase :
the me=crandu=?
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nnen was that?
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- 4[ recall it'heing frequently.
5
.%.;G2E:
In terms of the time frame frca che time 6
you sent. the memcrandum, was it days, weeks, =cnths?
7 2
E7J I. G.N :
It was en the crder of weeks, I 3
helieve.
Frank was -
Per mv memery at that time -- cut at
.9 ene of the sites for sc=e pericd of time, on the order of 10 weeks.
When he get back, I believe, he asked me what had ii hac.c.ened and to 7et scmethine. e. cine..
i e
12 8
.u.
K'4E:
After Mr. Walters reminded you to pt sue 13 ; a response f cm Mr. Karrasch, did you then succeed in contacti 3,
s 14 l >!r. Karrasch?
i 15;l
.q, EAI;3Ag:
- yes, IC 1
.u. KANI:
When was that?
i 1<.
MR. EALI. MAN:
Per my =e=crv, it was en the c dar cf l
13 twc Ocnths, which vculd have been two men:hs after the in it ial 19 me=c, which would have been the Octcher --
i 2
20 '
i MR. KAE :
That is Cc:=her of 1975?
l.
i e
I If
.u. EAI,7;d'4T:
Yes.
i
)
i.
22 '
.u. KANI:
What did you tell Mr. Xarrasch at tha:
1 time and wha did he reply?
s
.u. :_s. ;d.'4T:
I den': :smerd:ar :ne. direc : conversa-N,S ^ "..
The intan: O f the ::nversa:icn was :: sa<, de vec have y se g
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. an answer yet?
What should we do?
When can we get an answer?
2
.vR. FX*E :
What was the general cancr of Mr. Karrasch 2
respCase?
4 MR. HA!.l., MAN :
It wa s re spcnsive, but did act have 1
5' an answer yet and the tenor was t hat I could expec: an answer 1
6 ccming.
4 7
MR. KAE :
Did you then have any further contac:
with Mr. Karrasch in 1978 concerning this matter?
.l i
E i
i 9
MR. EALLMAN:
Per memory acain, I recall two contacrs
)
i 10 and one was, I believe by telephone and I believe one was l
)
j 1I walking back to his desk.
\\
12 MR KANE:
And both of those were in 1978?
13 l
MR. HALI, MAN:
Yes.
14 MR. KANE:
And what was the general tenor of the 15 respense there frem Mr., Karrasch?
16 MR. EALLMAN:
The genera. tener was, yes, we are 17 getting on it and we will have scmething bac.4 to you.
IS MR. KAE:
Did Mr. Karrasch, in those conversations, 19 agree that something shculd be done about this matter?
20 l
MR HALLMAN:
Yes, he agreed that it was an issue 21 that should be looked at.
He did not i.'dicate whether, in t.2
= 4 i
those conversations, there was a ec :ect action to take c an
~
0 1
,3 incerrect action to take.
I 7
a!
{ 2' l i
1
.vR.
KANE:
All right.
6 f
i Did you receive any written respCOse f cm Mr.
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' - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
g
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275!
1+
Kar:2.sc h = '" *- -" a c e twc discussicas :. n 1 9'7 5 7 i
l 1
2.
.E.
HAL. MAN:
have received acne, := my kncwledge.
3.
MP.. KASE:
Did you have an discussion in 1979 with,
1 l
4 ' Mr Karrasch ccccernine th:.s r'-
')
i 5
.E. EALLMAN-Per my memory, we had a discussicn l
l 6
in the late February-early March time frame.
This was a mee:J 7
inc. in the hallwa.v, where the cal.v cart that I reall.y remem-t I
3 her ahect the conversation was at the end I don't think there '
9 was a problem, in other words.
l i
You recall Mr. Karrasch stating ec ycu l
11 that in his view there was no problem.
12 MR. EALLMAN:
Words to that essenca, yes.
13 MR. KANI:
You did not understand in anv sense at
)
(
s i
14 that time that Mr. Karrasch was telling you to take whatever I3 ; actica you deemed necessaiy pt suant to the ccccerns in that 16l =emerandum?
8 7-MR. *GLLMAN:
That is cc rect.
I did not inter: ret 1
13 '
i that ccnversatica as, ekay, the matter is finishad.
Let's e
i 19 i get en with it.
After wal'<ing away, I recall a :iving at thel 20 question of what dcas the communica icn mean to me.
Ocas it j
t 21,
i mean to p:cceed exactly as Mr. Denn has raccmmended c dcas i
t a
$a i: =ean that there is no need to p cceed as Mr. Dunn has re-i.
I P
'3 I
ccmmended?
It was - net. clear in mv m,'.nd fcliewing the ha *.1 s
=
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ccnv er sat ica.
1 s
q Ma, K;.NI:
D id yo u ask :tr. Karr a sc h, a: :he :ime ycu c
e
i 1
S,) /
h?
had this conversa:icn in 1979 fcr any clarificatien cf his 9
2 r: ate r.ent tha t there was no prehlem?
3 MR.
C'-.L *.M A N :
I don't recall asking him.
No.
a, MR. FIiz:
Well, your testimcny has been :
the t
3 effect, both here and in your price depcsition, that you wera 6
in a confused state of mind as a result of that resc.onse.
Whvt t
7 didn 't you request. any clarification?
r 8i MR. HALI. MAN:
Why did I not er why did I?
1 i
i i
9' MR. KANE:
Why did you nce?
10 l MR. EALLMAN:
Ch.
Per memcry, I tried to centact i
i 11 Mr. Karrasch, via telephone, afte-that.
But as Mr. Karrasch 'i i
f t
i 12 has testified, he is sometimes fairly busy.
I did not put a i
12 ; pricrity on it at that time to go back and sit at his desk e
14 I until he appeared.
I put a priority of, we have to get back l
i 15 together to decide what it was that he was telling me.
16 MR. KANE:
And so prior to March 29, 1979, you did 17 not succeed again in speaking with Mr. Karrasch about this 18 subject.
Is that ccrrec;7 l
19 MR. HALU4AN:
That is per =y memory.
Yes.
20 I
MR. 1%W::
And after this last contact with Mr.
1 1
2I Karrasch in February c: March of 1979 and before March 28, 22 1979, did the concerns reflected _ in-your August 2, =ame i,
23 si:9Yc.oun:ssolvedwhileyouwereawaitingfurtherresponsel 1
s l
f l
k 1* *
!:cm Mr. Karrasch?
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,? ns
-- i M.R.
- 2*LMAN:
Yes.
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9 MR. :C.NI:
.:ric Oc March 23, 1979, did ycc cr, Oc 1
ycer knewied;a, did anycne else at 3&W, nce fy any 3&W cuscc=ers m:
3' of che concerns raised in any cf these memcranda we have bee..
l i
t t,
discussinq?
I.5' MR
- dAI.I.M.AN
Did. vcu ask.cer =.v kncwled e 7 7
6 MR. XANE':
Yes.
7 MR. HI.I. MAN r The answer is "no".
That is all of the questiens tha: I have, '
9 Mr. Chairman.
10 CSIRMAN *GMENY r Thank.vcu.
I1 Dr..5allman, is it the section that you have that
~
12 is respcasible for notifying custcmers of any cencerns that 13 S&W =ay have?
Nct all concerns, sir.
Th'ose ccncerns If which fall into my scope, ivhich is -- as I staced befcre I6 the test p cgrams, the post-fuel lead and also certain cpera-17 ting and emergenc.v instructions -- within that scoce,
.v e s, it t
I3 is =y responsibility.
i I9 CSIRMAN CMEN'?:
So* cartain1.v the issue we are 20 a.iscussing new wculd fall, within that secpe?
MR. *dAI.I.MAM:
That 35 cc :eC':.
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MR. D..
y.N:
Fcr that ki:.d o f
's sue, sir, cons ider '
2, ing the pricrity that I placed on _: perscnally at t..e
- time, l
f 4
- vould-censider three or fot:
=cnths.
I I
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5-CHAIRMAN KDE:
And, vet, in spite of that, -vou
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'6 testified that although a signific intly longer time clapsed, 7; it didn't quite. reach the priority to sit down with
.NL-.
i 8
Karrasch and talk it out in detail?
i 9 MR HALLMAN:
Yes, s ir.
That is correct.
10 CHAIRMAN KEMDIY:
I would like to ge: scme feeling 11 of hcw informal that contact was and all of us have in our 12 own c ganizations been involved in infor:.al c=ntact, but'I 13 mean was it just accidentally passing in the hall?
I think in 14 ] your deposition you said it was conversation by the drink i
15 machin e s.
'5 16 MR. E7J.LMAN :
The last conversation, that is correct.
l'/
Let me see if I could frame the information.
There was a de-l 18 sire on my part to contact Mr. Karrasch.
19 CHAI GAN KIMINY:
Yes.
20 MR. EALLMAN:
I considered a talephcne conversation 21 sufficient, at least early in the procedure.
As time went on 22 I cannet recall if I censidered that -- I cannot recall my i
Iv
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prioriev accalarating -drastically as time went en.
Ett this m,
I i
! ## ; conversation in the hall was phrased that : had been trying to
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Maybe act.telephoning him every i.
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.t ment?
i 5
MR. EUI. MAN :
To let the =eco lay cut for 6 manchs?
6 COMMISSIONEE MARKS:
Right.
7 XR. iG - - 'G.N :
I believe that regardless of whether a
Three Mile. II happened cr not,.ves, sir.
9 CCiCdISSIONER G.RKS:
Right.
Okay, new what efforts 10 have you made, if any, to analyze why that er:c: in judgment i1 w as =ade?
12 MR. HAI.I. MAN :
About a =enth after March 28, after.I 13 had gotten off the schedule involved wi:h the recovery of he 3
f 14 plant, I went back to make an attempt to trace che :: ail, a 13
" lessens learned" effort, as it were.
9 14 CCMMISSIONIR M. ARKS:
Right.
4 1 7.i MR. EI.'O.N -
I reviewed that, and my initial i. pres-I.n. : sic.. is 9.a the responsibility for nec fcilewing up was =ine..
I 19 1 had the respcnsi':ility for the sec.icn, and whatever the 20 varicus section = embers do is ul'd atel.v =v. rest. ensibi'i:v..
i 21 I determined that-it was a lack of a tickler system.l l
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.O, assigned to cus:c=er 5ervice Depart =ent, and it was previcusiv. t.!
i 6
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- a. section in the Nuclear Service Cepart=ent.
I I
I T
MR. RCCEIJ :
All. training done by 3&W is done 3, f:c= your c.rouc..
Is that cc: ect?
9 MR EZICT':::
Yes "his is training for custc=er 10
- c. ersonnel. Internal training of the S&W em= lev. ees is done 1I by the personnel department.
!2 l MR. RCGE.I :
Mr. Elliott, wculd. it be accurate tc i
'13 Ii. s a v. that.rour t ainin
- cc. ram offers courses to cpera inc.
m.
l 14 l and nanagement =ersonnel of B&W 's utility cus:==ers?
i i
- i..c. l
.u.R.
.e.v e v 0 T m.
- v. e s,
1 I
i 14 l MR. 2CCEJ I. :
That is its purpose, is it not?
i
.t i< t
.u.R.
.e.. u-,.,,...
- v. es.
I3 i MR. ECGdII.L :
Would it be fair to say that e.e 19 ' courses foc'.s on plant operacien during no:::a1 and emergency I
i 20 t oceratiens?
i I
1 I
- 2. I
.v.R.
.e-umm..
- v. e s.
I
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And that 5&W ::aining is done equally r
~, 22 in de class cm and in the simulater which you have thera A
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a i
MR. P.OGELL :
And in the su==er of 19 73, you t
}
2 I L
provided a het licensing program, which again is a progra:
3 i designed to train new coerators?
l 4
j MR. ELLIOTT:
I believe so.
i 5
MR. ROGELL:
And again in Mar =h of 1979, or 6
possibly s tarting in February of 1979, B&W provided 7
requalification train %g to TMI-2 operat=:s.
8 MR. ELLIOTT:
That is cc: rect.
9 MR. ROCKWELL.
In broad out-!.ine, is that a fair j
10 summary of the training. that B&W has provided to T.*C-2 i
l1 operators, up to the time of the accident on March 28th?
12 MR. ELLIOTT:
Yes, that is cc rect.
13 MR. RouwsL :.
Could the training that you pro-14 vided at B&W to those TMI-2 cperators have been done at the 15 site?
~.
1 1
16 MR. ELLIOTT:
As facilities exist now, no, because 17 they did not have a simulator at Three Mile Island site.
18 We have the simulator that represents the 3&W product that 19 has a 177 fuel assembly plant.
And it is located in 20 Lynchburg, Virginia.
Would the B&W simulator be the only I. 22 simulator that would be available to a utility with a 34W i
k22 nuclear steam supply system for training its cperators, in H
T 2.: ! the sense that it matches and is similar.to the control I
25 l rocm at IMI-2?
i l
9
___i2__._.2_____m_
-~~
- - - - ^ ^ - '
302 7
Yes.
There has been a simula:==
r i
1 purchased by another 3&W cus tomer, Washington Public Pcwer.
fO w
3 "22.at simulator is being delivered, I believe, about this A
time.
S gg, goccy:.. :
It's safe to say that it's nce. been J
6 available to date..
7 MR ELLIOTT:
It has not previous'y been available.
, T3l p MR ROCKWELL:
Directing your attantion to the 9
staff of the t:ni i :g program, Mr. Elliott, could you 10 describe briefly hcw that staff is composed?
II MR. ELLIOTT:
The staff that conducts training in 1 2 the nuclear training center, the Training Se:-d.ces section.
3 is primarily composed of individuals with extansive nuclear P
ex=erience.
Most of them have previously obtained a 15 Nuclear Pagulatory Ccmmiss' ion senior operator's license.
16 Those who do act have senior reactor ope. ator's licansas, 17 are new employees and they are preparing to ultimately go to 13 ! a site and complete licensing as a senic:
I reac:c: co era:c r.
I 19 Those individuals are primarily ex-military people with-l 20 four a greater years of experiance cperating reactor plants 21 I for - the U. S. Navy.
1{ 22 :
MR. RCCrdr
- L :
Wha: W um rec.uiracents do you p 22 ; impcse for hiring of an instructo: in your p cgram?
An ins ::c c 's cualification.
And s
23 we have three classifica icns of insc::::crs.
We have an o
i
-, - ~
_M* * *? % =
~
a r
n.
4
.:me
. ~.
/'
l "A
p I! associate instruc cr.
This is a nc
-'ased individual.
2 He =us: have extensive nuclear experience, a minimum of fcur t
3l years operating cf a nuclear power plant, essentially a l
militar'f reacter.
A instructcr, whi a id the next senior 4
5 grade, must have at least four years experience, plus hcid I
O a NRC senior reactor operator's license and be judged a 7
goed. inst:nctor.
That also applies to the previous level.
8 And for a senior instructc, he must also have extensive 9
nuclear experience, three years -- a =inimum of three years 10 instruction in experience and also hold a Nuclear Regulatory II Commission senior reactor operator's license.
12 MR. ROCT.M:
An associate instructor would not 13 necessarily have any experience on a B&W plant, in fact, 14 probably would not.
Is that cc rect?
~
15 MR. W OTT:
That is cc::ect.
-2 16 MR. ROCKWELL:
Does an associate instructor eve:
17' obtain any experience on a 3&W plant, ence he joins you:
18 training staff?
f I9 MR. ELLIOTT:
Yes, he does.
E 20 MR. ROCKWELL :
How?
I i
I 21 MR. ELLIOTT :
Ee would gain that experience L
l5 22 through site visits to various plants, experience working Tb j, 23 with our simulater, which very accurately represents the i
2 t
I 24 l dyna =ic eerformance cf a S&W powe. pl.=:, plus ultima:aly e-i 25 ; he will be assigned to a sita to learn a specific ranc:::.
4 v
8
, w...
a
I J
3C:
9 I
!!R. ROCr7E., :
IIcw icng would it cake. for an associate inst ncccr to became lica. sed. while he's on vcur i
3 training stadf?
MR. ELLICOT:
The minimum possible time is one 3
year.
The ac:mai time is two years.
6 MR. PCCmiELL:
once your instructors have a :Tuclea:
7 Regulatory Commissica. operating license, are e.ey able cc 1
8 maintain it cu=:ent?
9 MR. ELLIOTT:
No, they are net.
10 MR. ROCM7 ELL:
Why not?
II MR. ELLIOTT:.
Licenses are is ued by the Nuclear 12.
Regulate:7 Ccmmission for a specific reacter.
Oc maintain 13 that license, current, the individual must participate in D
s 11 the watch organi:ation at that. site and s tay current with 5
13 the day-to-day operations of that site.
And therefere it 16 just dces not fit into being able to run our business and 17 do that.
It's not particularly desirable f:cm a pein: cf 13 view that we, as a vender, do act alicw our individuals to t
19 operate the customers ' equipment, which would also be 20 required in naintaining his license.
l i
21
.u.
RocriELL :
It's fair, then, to sav that, o f 9.e f
t i
3
,1 22 cecc. ie en your trainine. staff,.c:cbab1v. sene of e.em have i
i I
23jcc::en
- iRC licenses.
Is that oc ect?
z i
Ij 241 MR. ILLIOTT:
Tha:'s cc ect.
p s
$' 25 i MR. FCC*CfEL* :
Mr. Illic :, dcas 35U desien e.e m =
-ww.
^***P"D
305 i
i 10 [)I i
A i training c0urses that :. : c::ers?
I 2!
V.R. ELLICTT:
Yes.
i
., e 4
l MR. R O C C r'E L L :
Each coursg, I take it, is basically 1
4 a standard package?
5 MR. ELLIOTT:
Each course is essentially a standard 6
package.
Ne have standard definitions of each of our 7
courses.
The courses that we provide are then tailored to 8
the specific needs of our customers.
9 MR. BOCGE.LL:
How does that occur?
10 MR. ELLIOTT:
There are mary ways.
P articularly 11 the management courses, I might modify the subjects taught 12 by my staff, in associatien with the me=bers of the utilities ' t i
13 management, for their interests.
The courses involving
,-n
,n operating personnel, we have an -instructer who ' would be 4
15 assigned to that partici:lar utility, prepara a propo' sed 16 course and obtain agreement from the utility that that course, 17 as we outlined it, met his needs.
If it did not meet his,
18 needs, or his recognized needs, we would modify that course'
'J 19 to perform the service that he felt ha needed.
i 20 MR. ROCGILLL :
The departure point in te.~. s of i
21 'your basic course. design for each of the utilities is the q
22 same, though.
Is ihat cc :act?
I i
ii G
t 23 i MR. ILLIOTT:
Yes, sir.
\\
s i
i 24 :
Taking the recualifica icn training e,
95 : that you were. giv-ing to TMI-2 cperators in March of 19 79 as 1
i
- -. ~ - -
-33~~
-.ensie w ee===
~
306 i
7 i
11 1l 1
l
- a. reference =cin, what. p cyc: tion o f the training package l
l 2.
or de training nacerials that were given t=
these cperators I
l 3
in dat course wctid "ce your standard package and what pro-
'a i
I.
4
.cortien wotild. have been mcdified at de request of 5
Metropoli~ -*dison?
6 MR. ELLIOTT-Please allow te o qualify I did l'
7 not ri<e =cdifications to that course.
To the besu of your kncwledge.
9 MR ELLIOTT:-
I woul.d suspect that 90 percent of 10 that course and the material. covered would have been as i
11 suggested. by the S&W t=aining staf'f, with 10 percent con-12 tributed by Met cpolitan Edison through our negotiations I
/ 13 _ and contact. wi.th. them.
14 MR. ROCiELL.:
In the course of the training,.hcw 15 would you= training prografh incorporate real wc:1d tra.sier.ts, 16 in the trainisci-inst: action?
17 MR ELLIOTT:
We make an effort to keep track of I
18 events that have happened to our various plants and incor-
'I 1
19 porate those in training programs, if they lend themselves 20 to an evolution that we can perform thecugh the simula:icn, i
t I
21 and present those to the pecple or give them to dem as I,
e y 22 i problems in the simuiitor, that is, set the studan:s up in i
9.3 :
.e ccnditien of sc.ui: men: that causes de$. :o have :c s
=
j
- sspend o an even: tha: =ay have occurred
--= outside 6
j 23 wc:ld.
1$ /M 1 y,vu,
~. '. _
- m-
~
"r~ ~
-~ -
.: u t A
12 I
MR. ROCGELL :
- Tno in your department reviews t
n, real world t: ansients and makes a decision as c which cnes l
3 l should be included in the raini.g?
I l
I, s
4 i
MR. ELLIOTT:
The content of these ::aining progra=s !
5 are primarily the respcasibility of the lead instructor, 6
who is c=rently Mr. Lind.
It has been other pecple prior I
to b '.
And we have collected that set of events f:=m our i
I 8
personal contact with the operating people at each of the I
9 stations, plus review of the licensee event su= mary reports, i
10 which the training center gets.
Up until March 2S th o f 19 79, was 12 the training program getti.Ig a full copy of the licensee 13 event reports that B&W utilities vere filing with the I4 Nuclear Regulatory CoWssion?
13 MR. ELLIOTT: 'No.
9 16 MR. 'ROCKWELL:
You were receiving only sr-= ries.
l7 MR. ELLIOTT:
That's cc :act.
L~
Eas yoch train'ing program ever l
19 trained operators to respond to a failed cpen PORV7 i
20 MR. ELLIOTT:
Yes.
i 21 MR. ROCKWELL:
Eas it. trained operators on the
!,c
- 22 Cavis-3 esse transient of September 24 th,19 772 l
p 0
i
{ 23 MR. IL;;OTT :
Not specifically.
We have discussed II 24 i that with ::ainees.
a t4 23 !
MR. ROCKWILL:
Sus it has not been done to da e,
-,. = _ - _ _ - - _ _ ~ -.. - -
.~n.-----
- - ~. - - -
.t 305 I
L3 I
Is tha t Cc :act?
i 2
&.'_o... v -
v'- _.' -
'ro.
. w. u+_-
.c a _- - ; c.._ _ _- - - -=.. s _i _a.-. _
' n
,g 3
involved a set of indi riduai actions tha: :. " : instructed a i
l
.t.
student to go through them, he'd say we were absurd.
1 1
l i
5 MR. ROCKWELL:
Before TMI-2, had vour trainine 1
i t
l l
6 p cgram ever conducted instruction wid' espect Oc a. loss o f i
7 all feed?
I i
i S
MR ELLIOT".':.
Yes.
I 9
MR. ROCKWELL:
That is, main feed and auxiliary 10 fand.
II MR. ELLIOTT:
I don't believe we isclatad auxilia,r 12.
fa nd.
12 MR. ROCD T *:
Had, you conducted inst:nction u
g 1.s involving voiding in the riactor's ecclant system' cere?-
-: -Ji 15 MR. ELLIOT":
Moh pric: to the T:C-2 incident of 16 March of '79.
As of the time of the T:C-2 accidant,,
la could ycur sir.nlator havu simulated the accidan:
- sequence, I
1 19 th cugh T plus 120, 120 rd.nutas?
t
,0 vg- -
O -.
Io -
e-,-
i i
.s 21 MR. acCDELL:
Tny is that-i t.
J 2!
MR. ELLIC':~f:
The sisulator, as criginally davisad, i
1
.3' did nc: p:cvide fc: voiding in the.cri=a:.r s.is tem.
Tha s
),
,.._. _.,, _.~..~.e c da '
_s -.~..~ ___
u'
,c'.. a =..'
=.",_=_.~.s_' ~~.,
v_ a e'.
^
3 4
s j
23 into two components.
Ces is the prassuri ar, which dcas
~
mis"
)
t u_'
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.M_* 1.221_ ?_* INM n AM M A-
-*A"
~
-~-
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_ _,m s: c.
14 3
allow voiding and naintaining cf a s:ca= spaca and a wata i
2l space.
The react =:, whi=h is the remaining volume in the
,- ' systa=, was ' acdeled as a compressed. water.
The minimum d
density allowed there was the density for water at satura-i 5
- gian, "0
~
l MR. ROC:qELL:
In your training program, Mr.
l 7
Elliott, do you' conduct simulator training for unlicensed 8
management personnel who might be called upon in an emergency 9
to direct emergency action?
10 MR. ELLIOTT:
Yes.
II MR. ROCK;TILL:
Do you know whether Mr. Miller has 12 ever taken such a course, Ga:f Miller?
13 MR. ELLIOTT:
Yes, Mr. Miller did.
14 MR. ROCKWELL:
- How many others f:cm Metropolitan i
15 Edison have taken a course of that natura?
16 MR ELLIoTT:
Let me clarify, first of all, Mr.
17 Millar was, when he took the course that we are discussing, 18 an employee of Genaral Public Utilities and was a part of t
19 the start-up staff for unit one.
There have been, or was t
i 20 I
a training program for other General Public Utility employees 21 involved in the start-up for unit one at Three Mile Island, t,
i 22 and a similar course was conducted for General Public lw
\\
' 23 Utility start-up engineers for the unit two star:-up.
t
/ 24Jl T1.is involved a two-week training p:cgram -- cc :ecticn, a
'E s
T
'a 25 ' three-week training program.
It was one week of class :cm, t
i e
9 e
% pm -
M g6 5"9
--w-DEN
x-I 310 1[\\ill=lus two weeks en the simulater.
It was a davised. p cgram 7
1 2,
that wac put m
.together i.. suppic t of the unit one s tart-up ll 3
ap Three Mile Island, and the same course was repeaced for I
t the unit twc start-up engineers.
I 3
The simulator part of that course was plant opera-6 tions for the first week.
And the second week, we were 7
ic.volved with a start-up physics course.
8 MR. ROCG'ILL:
When wou'id Mr. Miller have taken chat 9
course?
10 MR. ELLIOTT:
My guess is that.Mr. Miller would have 11 taken that in: late 1973 to early ' 74.
Thera are recc ds, 12 which I previously s'upplied you -- c: 3&W supplied you.
i3 MR. ROCCfELL:
Eas Mr. Miller made a practice of
' )
IA taking that course c:. a regular basis?
5 13 MR. ELLIOTT:
Please let =e e:cylain.
Mr. Miller 16 ultimately transferred. to Met cpolitan 'lisen Company, 17 then took our two-week sta:t-up training course, and then 13 was licensed, at least en unit one of T:C.
17 he was a i
19 licensed senio reactor cperator on unit one.
.c.e.her c l
i 20 l no his license was current at the time of the incident, 21 ! ! don ' t. kncv.
I I
1 y
}
~
- 22 i MR. ROCG'E* L
Mr. Illicut,. I would lika Oc.ake r
c 4
1 1
p 23. '/:c back to a discussien we had at che time of ycur dapesi-A; J 21
-i:n.
And jus: fc your reference, I' d ask cha: you he
. U-J
} 13 previdad with a copy of-your depcsition.
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Are those evaluations san tc the j
2{l util y?
l 3
MR '. ELLICTT:
Please let ne explain abeu: the evalu t
4 aticas.
The evaluations that we do are sent to the u:i'. icy and; 5
those evaluations are also provided to the nuclear Eagulatcry 6
cc= mission. 'In evaluations -- I an using it in the sense of 7
examinatiens.
We conduct exa=inations at the end of the cold a
license simulator program that is generally equivalent to that 9
provided by the Nuclear Regulato:/ Cor=:lission and it is a part 10 of our program that we have, and it is approved by the N= clear 1;
Regulatory Commission Operator Licensing Branch.
12 MR. ROCKWELL:
Oces that hold for raqualificaticn 13 training?
14 MR. ELLIOTT:
It does not hold for requalificatica
~
15 training.
The licensee,'in the particular case of Metrcyclican i
14 Idison company is responsible and conducts what evaluatiens are I
j 17 den e.
I l
18 MR. ROCKWELL:
If, during requalificacic: training,'a; I
19 student nada repeated errors c:: the si=ulator, would the uti-i 20 lief have any way of howing that?
21 MR. ELLIOTT:
Yes.
[
22 MR. RCCKNELL:
Ecw?
I 23 MR. ILLIOTT:
They wculd knew tha: by the cbseristicns i
a.
.% 'cf the supervisc:/ and nanagacant i.:d:.e.ddals whc are c:n ainec s
j 3.in a : curse.
I night. refer ycu :o Hearing I:c.ihi: 10 again.
i i
n-a.:v
[
,/ t \\.
s
'l l
i we lcck at the names an :he tcp right, Mr.
!ika Ross, he is l
/
1 2
-he cperating supe-risor for unit 1 at Metropolitan Idison O
I m
3 i Cc=pany and he wuld have de responsibility fc: observing -he
.i peric=ance of those individuals.
5
!m. RCCZrcLL:
So it would be up to hi.r to report it 6
back, to the utility?
7 MR. ELLIOTT:
Yas.
8 liR. ROCKWELL:
Co you have a clear undars tanding tha;'
9 he, in fact, does that?
10 MR. ELLIOTT:
I believe that they do do that.
And 11 they make a rec. ort of.cerdarmance.
12 MR. ROCErrLL:
Co you know that?
13 MR. ELLIOTT:.
I have not seen their recorts.
n i
1.t MR. ROCKWELL:
Mr. Elliott, directing your atten:ic:
If to Hearing Exhibit No.1, which should be on the table there 16 before you.
17 MR. ELLIOTT:
Yes, I have it.
.i 13 MR. RCCEELL:
Let ne identify that as a Ncvember 1s l!
19 1977 memorandum f cm Mr. Kelly to a nu=ber of individuals,. in-l i
o n. ; c l u d i n e. vourself.
Co vou. recognize that exhibit?
t ej MR. ELLIOTT:
Yes, I recognize the exhibit.
t
? 2.e MR. ROCEET L':
Cid vou receive is a de time it was t.
r
..nidis ributed at about November 1st,. 19777 a
s a
i.
,4
.u.R,.
_-_C,,...
- 2.,.,
eme..~e..
a e.
34
- 12. RCC*GI,*. :
T..en did you firs t see :.:?
a I
- ,, m w eve. tea = twem P*
i--
t.:
-.. -.. -~
m._
340 4
il =entioned, a lir. Lind who is the supervisc: inst cctor, and 2.
usually a representative f:cm the cc=pany as a canagacent.
Sc 1,s ^s 3
we are cbserving to be sura that the man is created f airiv anc l
4 that the exam was, done correctly, as defined for us by de 57.C.
l 5
Scmetimes the NRC. comes.
We inform then periodically of what i
1 i
6 the schedule of when we are going to do dese examinations are 7
and.they are invited to cece.
If the studen: fails cat 8' examination he may be given a second chance af ter sace additional 9
training to take the exam again But he might fail again.
We 10 just return hi:i to the plant.
Suc we don' t provide tha car:1-11 fication, letter The certification letter is that piece of 12 paper that he must have to take the license ena.tination.
But 13 he goes back,to his old job..
]
14 CEAIR."!AN KEMENY:
Professor pigfc d?
i 15 Comi!SSIONER PIGFORD:
I have a few brief quascions, 16 MR. ELLIOTT:
Yes, sir.
17 CO!!!!!SSIONZR PIGTORD:
In. the trai.ing, de you have is the students cpe. tate the simulater en the whcie range of ac-i 19 cidents that were censidered in the safety analysis raper:7 20 MR. ELLIOTT:
We cover many
- --ase acciden:s ca:
1 l
21 are in the safety analysis.. Of course, there ara sc$.e of the: !,
i
?.
9 that aren't really accidents.
But in the Ics: course, cold r
5
$ 22 l license course, which is eight weeks icng, we will do nes: cf l
2 e
f i
- 4 these acciden
- s.
Dr p =cd, refected red, we de a'.1 cf -ha e
w ff ilea%s -- s=all leaks, lar e leaks, s:sas line breaks, in.e:
^ ^ ' '
"W a.
4.,w sm.
-mum m
mpt. j' e s.
^
3&1 5
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reactor building, cc:er reactor b'ilding.
For the mcst part I
2 we do ccver those in the long course.
The shcrt courses, two
'f i
3 week enes, whicP. I just described, we will do sene of these.
Primarily the leaks and $c prima:f coolant and the staan Line
.t 3
breaks and icss of feed accidents.
o COtDiISSIOtER PIGFORD:
Ycu do all the small break 7
loss of ecolant accidents?
Is that correct?
j i
8 MR. ELLIOTT:
We do many.
9 CO!!MISSIONER PIGFORD:
Enich ones do you leave cut?
10 MR. ELLIOTT:
Well, you see small break analysis scesi 11 fr m a verf, very tiny one and the simulator at the mcment is 12 set up in gallons per minute rather than an orifice size, which:
t 13 is being changed next week.
ja, cot 2ESSIOtfER FIGTORD:
Rather than what?
13 MR. ILLIOTT:
Orifice.
We have a leak rats whica g
then is cc=puted on differential pressure, but that is hcw
- 7 we handle the leak at the mcment.
73 CO!2CSSIONER PIGFORD:
And you say you do not include:
u I
j9 an accident that involves loss of au illiary feedua:ar?
I 20 liR. ELLIOTT:
We had not cric: :c :he T C incidan:
i 21 done one with feedwater -- loss of all feedwater.
L jus:
c t
2, didn': belleta that was what was gcing te happen.
3 C0!CCSSIOtiER PIGFORD:
Was i a.alyzed in -he safety 3
4 p
a I
{
,c analysis :epc: ?
~
>!R. IL* IOTT:
At the Ic=en:
can' tall ycu, g
4 g
M
' ^
b _ _ m. -.....-
~
34Ei I
I l you censider this an i=pertant toci in ::aining.
L.'r 1
- 9. 1 s
m..
..- C m..
ves.
3!
CH.URMA:i ~IMI'iY :
Since vou have testified dat the 1
1argest part of de training cperators receive is not at 5
BtM but at the utility, would you consider it important l
6 for u.tilities to have their own simulators for their part of i
7 the training?
I i:
I 8
MR. ELLIOTT :
Having simulators that are identical 9
to the control room and very faithful is helpful, would be o
10 hele. ful.
II I
CEAIRMAN KI:ENY:
Thank you.
?:ofessor Mar:ett.
i 12-COMMISSIONER MAREZTO:
I'm interested in hcw b cad I:
I3 i
an assessment, you, as director of the ::aining p:cgram, I
I4 how do you assess the effectiveness cf the training p c-
- 1 15 gram?
What makes you kE.cw whether your training is affec-16 tive or net?
1 17 MR. ELLIOTT :
Cur pri=a =easure of unders anding 4
18 of effectiveness is observe student respense in the simula cr.
I9 ;
COMMISS:"CNER MAREE"T:
Ecw they respend c:i de t,
20l simula:cr.
i 21 MR. ELLICTO:
Yas.
~
i 22 COMICSSIO:!ER MA2 RIM :
So it's cniv in ta =s of --
t
.I.
i 22 A:.d wha: do you =ean by respense?
Is that whether c: :::
'~
9 i.
I 24
-J.sy ' re able to wc k cc: an accidan:?
Oces i alsc includa
- 2 4
psychol:gical resscnsa no wha: th ey ' r e dcing?
e 346 i
3 l
'MR ELLIOTT:
No, we are noc staffed or believed-8 2
to be qualified in psychological e:cuninatica.
We oi: serve 3
individuals under stress of an. acciden:. situation in a simulator.
I COMM.ISSIONER MARRETT:
And hcw do you take that 6
into account. With reference to the training?
To what exten:
7 does the information you obtain in the ways in */nich people 8
respond under stress, does that make any difference with 9
the way that you're training then is done?
I'O MR. ELLIOTT:
Well, we believe their performance 1 1 under stress is associated with their u.derstanding of the 1 2 basic phencmenon 'and interrelations of all the systems and 1 3 the basic physics of the power plant.
And tha better the4 -
'7 j
M
==derstanding of that, the better they're able to respond
[
S 15 under crisis.
16 COMMISSIONER MARRETT:
I': tal ing about their 17 better understanding, how do you assess what gives that t
18 better understanding?
To be precise, there are possibili ties, '
I i
a 19' for exa=ple, for comparing different me c.ods of presenting
'i 20
=aterial in e.e lectures, for exs5:sle.
Oc.vou ever u. der-i i
21 l take that kind of syste=atic evaluatic: of 9.e way i. which
{
[ 22 i =aterial is presented?
c 22 :
?
- 33. In:C"'T :
Not directly, nc.
i 24 C".M:CSSIONER MA?J.ETT:
What aben: with refarence G 7re.e ki=d =: t=i===a=le= e.a=.,
==n =11=ee, u e.e=e s a
.m-ew=*'e-"
=
ye si
l l
347 I
- A 4-certain. content that has to be provided, the way the. materials ;
i 1
1 2 f the wording of materials can make a diffarance?
Oc you
!')
1 3
l ever systemically look at the level af presentation in anv i
written materials in the training program?
l 5
MR. ILIIOTT:
We have relatively little written 6
1 material that we have prepared.
'This was ene of the enanges i,
7 which I made when I came to Babcock and Wilecx.
I guess 8
t was a long-ters heef of my own in being a student in 9
various educaticnaI organizations.
I changed the format 10 in which technical manuals -- net technical, they were II training system manuals were, that the page on which written 12 material was presented, the figures.
And we 're really 13 attempting to. explain figures.
The figures had to either 1.'
fold out or he en the opposite page f:cm the words, so that l5 15 we didn' t end up with t:iree fingers in the heck t ying to j
..\\
I 16 read the figure at the back, because with students who =av 17 may not he cc=pletely dedicated to this pr:blem, it's c
i 18 ha:i to figure out where the figure is, he may just read the g
u 19 matarial and go en and never unders tand.
Sc that was t:ying 20. =c =ake things less difficult for the studen: and therefore, 21 hopefully, i=p cving his retention and understanding.
i<
i I 22 i COM:C55:CNIR MA?J,ITT:
Well, '* understand that ycu E
r 5 23 i =ade a nunher of changes that seem intuitively and perhaps s
I
,2 il 24 in experience actually o be highly.4:stified.
I'= wendering, I 23 : hewever, if thera is an effert, as well, c ask, are thers
<Ms n
- - - m :-
p- -. _ - -.
_c n
)I 3A3 l
5 certain dings that we should be exaci.ing.
For example,
l 2
if :: hare is a. ques tion a f the' usefulness o f homework, one
[
3 respcase might he, based on what.we know, the addition of 4
hc=ewerk =ight not make a difference.
But the question S
beccmes is there any effort made to ce= pare diff erent ways,
6 to. ccmpare several kinds of syst5r.s, so that there becomes 7
scme indication that one system c ene way fc going about 8
things may be preferable to ancther.
It comes down finally i
9 to is there any research ccmponent to the training that you IO do?
II
.GL.. ELLIOTT :
There is no rest arch done in the 12 training that I do.
I agree with you.
There are areas that 13 ahould he researched.
We need better methods of transmitting
^
I4 and. ccmmunicating the understanding of engineering than we 2
15 are presenting and the interrelations cf syszams.
And it's 16 very evident in this accident is the understanding of 17 highly haated water and pressurized water, and when its IS pressure is removed, how it behaves, pressure and temperature, '
i 19-this saturation, which I'm sure you've heard ma.y.cecc.le 20 speak ed.
Su:. the plant wend into saturation.
And as an i
21 cutsider, the individuals never raccqnized dat.
They
}
22 somehcw believed that system was just, ence veu sprune a r
1 5 23 ! leak, it cught to go te no pressure and ne: recognicing tha:
1e t
I 24 ; the enerrf supplied by :he, core and de energf in the s/s a=
M ',fecu' d.centinue te Scil and hcid :he grassure up.
'r
0 r ::
,s A
6 I
CCEOiIS5IC:-iER IG.?J.ETT :
Ua ll, in ter=s of any p '.an 2
fc the training department, what do you anticipate in te==s s
i 3
of issues such as assessing =cre ec=pletely the effectiveness, because what I =can by effectiveness is nc simply what the l
4 i
operano: can do in the simulator, but hev effective is the I
5 i
kind of training that's civen tha. may enhance that perfor-6
~
l 7
mance in the simulator?
Are there any specific o. lans.vcu i
8 have now within the training department?
9 MR. EI,IIOTT:
My plan is to, at the moment -- we're 1
10 attempting to hire some individuals with backg:cunds 11 similar to mi.le and use them, when they firs t cc=e to S&W, 12 to evaluate what's going on, se they're not contaminated by i
1 13 the way things really are and they can be cbjective fc a
i 1
8 14 short while.
And shortly th'ey become a. part of everfthing
[15 else and they lose their, cbjactivitf.
3 1
16 COMMISSIONER FMGETT:
One final questien.
We've 17 made a nu=ber of comments with reference to 9.e question of i
i 1
15 i person-cachine interface.
And since it's ycc: unit that nas 1
19lthehu=anbeingsinit, in some respects, I guess the ques-I 20l tic becomes how is your training depart =ent going := fit t.
21 l. into that, because e.e kinds of questiens I was asking i
[ 22 earlier about
- .darstandine. resconse undar stress mi3h: nc:
)
I.
4 2 23 ; have some <" ac impac: right then en the ::aining, but i:
2 I
I 24 will have i=pae en e.e que'sticas abcut desi n and use f
} 25. equipmen ?
Ecw, then, will ycur par: cf c.e c gani a::.:n fi:
op g *e W $ #_
N#
N-L_.
I
. ~
r-i 1
CEAIRMAN :CIENY :
Professe Ta'ricr?
i 2
COMMISSIONIR TAYLOR:
You stressed in you testincny, i m s
3 Mr. Ellictt, that you are trvine tc c.e acrcss in vcur train-
)
ing.crogram to the students scme of the special characteristich
.t I
I 5
of water and steam at these very hic.h, relativelv h i c. h, cres i
6 sures.
Ecw high a tempera'" ~ 4s the simulator capable cf I
7 handling in terms of the liquid water temperature which it a
continues to act as a simulator?.Do you recall that, ofdhand?
9 MR. ELLIOTT:
The highesu indication cd water ten-10 perature we have in the simulator is 620 degrees TE, but I'm 11 not sure where the compressor water tables that are in the 12 simulator actually stop.
13 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR:
So I gather frcm that, then, 1.t t hat the simulator will not handle situations when the water l'
75 te=perature gets above the' critical point, which I understand 16 is around 700 degrees.
17 MR. ELLIOi'T:
Yes, I think it is 703, 704 degrees.,
I t
13 CC!c".ISSIONIR TAYLOR:
Ncw, is that because it is l.
19 considered incredible that the temperature would ever get chani t
. hic.h?
na V
l.
21 i MR. Tu!OTT:
Yes.
In the design cf this,simula: r,!
t and I believe new tha':, having talked to vcu for a :: cent,
,21 r
j 3
be'.ieve Our tables st=p a: 2,500 psig, and I am no: sure wht:
e**a~""'*'"'"*'^'"'"'----
d d.,
i w. m.
.c..e - - v.a.e..z..s m.
.e.c
.......s 4....4.-,. :- - -,.=.-.
-v v
w.%.
,3 i
.q 3 a..:
l en de cressure end 630 degrees an de temperature.
Is in l
2 i
cc: rect, then, dat both Scse
'i"4 s were se: byaconvictienj 3
c: a belief that there are not going to be situations facing i
4 the ccerators where either the pressure is acove ena va ue 5
or de te=perature in the water is above that value?
6 MR. ELLIOTT:
Right.
We w'ere assuming, when the 7
desigt.cf that simulater -- that was done before my time --
8 but that both 3&W plants have two code relief valves, and tha:
9 t hose code relief valves would l!.ait the plant from achieving 10 2,500 psi.
And so we just stopped the table.
It is a Icck-up 11 table on the compressed water tables.
12 COMMISSIOM TAYI.OR:
Do you happen to knew wha:
he 13 highest temperature that was recorded in the water in the
~
14 tiI II accident was, or whether it -- le: me ask it this way.
15 Was it abcve 630 degrees?
16 MR. ELLIOTT:
I suspect the wa:er te=perature --
17 CO!OLISSIONER TAYLOR:
Water temperature, no: -.
i 18 XR. M IOTT:
Water temperature -- well, we knew t
19 t hat the ta=.cerature went of f scale hie.h, and so we are in the I i
20 super heat region of the core.
We were Opera:in an a temper-i v
21 ature pressure of about 1,000, 1,200 psi, and we were highly i
22 superheated, stea=.
The ccmputatica of steam ne=pera:ure :.:
E
~
, 23 l the simula::: is capable of g=ing aheve -hat.
i.-
e.w.,-
S -m. _.. _ m-v..w s
. s.
- n...,
_n...- -
w m.
-...-s__-...
~
j y y=u make sure tha the students are able :: relate pressures y
1
-~
" ~ ~ ' ' ~ *
.p
.p n4 f
1 and :e:peratures ec saturanica ccnditions?
Did thev :c.cw hcw !
I I
2 o cse steam tables and xnew uhat dey mean?
I mean, dc you s
3 eu- =ee-4a' e...e'r. s 3 se.
'...=.
s o
.4. = u
'.a m e.=. 4.. ~,
^#
sa
=
4 temperatures
- ..s cuite clear to dem?
5 MR. II.I.ICTT :
We do ncw.
I was on reserve duty at 6
the time of the accident.
When 3; got back, we started de l
7 s ecial -raining proc. ram that we discussed previousiv. the dav.
8 after I arrived, the day I arrived back at B&W.
Sun we are 9
forcing the students the steam tables and we have graphs Il'c around the simulator of the saturation curve, plus a marcin 1
1l1 curve on it,.~ so thev are forced to, and our drills on them I
1 2 force them to use that table..
1 3 Ncw, whether or not de.v reallv undersuand bciline.,
g 14 saturation, and that you can have a larc.e varietv. o f c.ualitv., i
~
1 5 g eing f cm ::ero to 100 per' cent, I am not sure.
This relates l
16 to ycur questions about metheds. Mos of us learn the hard wayf, f
- 7 a nd we kind of believe, f:cm working enocgh thermal p chlems I
l Ja and ranking cycle problems, that all of that is kind of true. t
.19 CCMMISSICNER TA'P OR:
Well, in the course of cpera -
i20 ing de si=ulater, before "MI II, would situations arise wherei 1
21 in facu the water was above saturation temparauure,. the wa:er,
t
,., i a.n a.
_,..., yzs.,.cye sa.... a c.. --...z. e-,-.,,..:
.u.c..
i.
2 'a '. s uden. ts :e.cwine.
hat : hey were in a verv s:ecial rec.ine; p
2 1
1
}
..i 2
..;c - s,....., a.
...e e,..:..- n:
.., - --,.sa<..
..z..,.--..
~w--.
a e
-.b.
gg
-M
.M ).
M g
N_
-f 1#q
(' ' U
_m--,
I Let me put it another way.
Were there s team cables t'
[
2l
_2..
.. e.
....o.t., 4.,
g e a.....t _2 _ a.. _.,...i
.u
-e,
..u.-
,,.. -,, 3 _.:
...~ m _
3
. hen refer'no, before the accident?
i 4
4 MR. ELLIOTT:
T.' lura we# e s ream tables there.
They 5
have been in the control room ever since I worked there. 5:u- ;
i 6
dents'were forced to use them.
We have the ASME tables a.d,
7 for some old*d e:s, Keenan and Keys.
I 8
CQuJiISSIONER TAYI.CR:
Fine.
Thank you.
9 CEAIP31AN KEMENY:
Just to follow that up with one 10 questien, several TMI II operators testified before this Com-11 mission that during the accident, they were presented with 12 situations that they had never experienced in the simulater.
13 Would you feel that that statement is correct, in view of what.
I l
1.t you. said on. the 14-4 tation on temperature indication en your 15 simulater?
2 16 MR. IIIIOTT :
Yes.
17 CHAIRMAN.U23.ENY :
Thank you.
Professor Pigfc:d. had 18 a fclicw-up.
l t
19 COMMISSIONER PIG 70RD:
Mr. Ellict:, are.vcu sav.inc.
l 1
20 tha; pric: to TMI II, all students were taugh: to calculate i
21 saturation temperature frem the cbse-red pressure during :he t
l
- c 5..
s =a ~'1.,, -...
- 22
=== 3,*
= * * *. = = = = = =.
r 1-, 2 '.,
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x
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'...=.d.
~
S
=
I
.4
^ 8"% 9Pf._* ].C "* f.* *a**."." Q.* "* /e" *" A.O N g
_. s c cf.C.2_*.'9 _IO_
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.=
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e
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.
- d. =..b..m. +w-b e_4== ** =. _s *
- a.b.a.*
- b..* *a*
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.==..I.2. a e
.e..s. =. *.*.=.=.s. =.=.*. a
= =. *
==
W.
i
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- m" -
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i
M f
356 1\\
a._e
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a
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2{
A. R. c.s _ ~ T :
s e r c r e,_ A,._, _
v 4
cel2. eve tnat was pcsa:.c..a.. s i
3 CGIOESSIONER PIGFOP.D :
And were any students taugh: !
I cc ccmpare saturation tecperature with the hot leg and cold 5
Leg temperatures?
6 MR. ELLIOTT:. I do not reme ber any specific work en I
tha area.
3 COLO1ISSIONER PIGIORD :
You do not knew if any stu-9 dent was taught 'to make that ccmuarison?
10 MR. ELLIOTT:
Not by us. No, sir.
II ColGi!SSIONER PIGFORD:
Tha.$k y'au.
s I2 CHAIRMAN KEMENY:
Dr. Marks?
,e j4 COMMISSIONER MARKS:
I don't want to belabor this
]!'
I4 peine, but in the hearings tha 3abecek & Wilecx had en June 13 5, Mr. McMillan =ade the statement that it is clear than cf 16 t he six significant facters identified by the NRC and which 17 we have discussed here today, five involve the operator.
One' i
la w.e
.4 _,4__ca._
..s, A
n_4 k, cne c, t,_1 A_ c_ aw
_A_,.m
=..w.a. 4 =-
u l
19 j :na: operator ::=. :.ng.nas.caen verv. :.nacec.uat e.
I 2 0 l' He cces en to sav cha: there wil' be extensive a
i 6
2 1.1 4.. re s 4.;a 4 o.. s..,
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, ve
'.....=...- =a c.'._4.. e
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r c
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4
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-} 99
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