ML20024B170
| ML20024B170 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/15/1979 |
| From: | Womack E BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-*, TASK-07, TASK-09, TASK-7, TASK-9, TASK-GB GPU-6053, NUDOCS 8307070183 | |
| Download: ML20024B170 (46) | |
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Designations from the NRC Special Inquiry Group Depositions of Edgar A.
Woma'k, dated c
October 15, 1979 16:5 - 17:16 l
17:17 - 21:4 21:5 - 21:16 21:22 - 22:20 22:21 - 23:13 23:14 - 23:17 23:18 - 28:7 23:8 - 29:21 32:24 - 33:20 35:4.- 35:18
(
35:19 - 36:4 35:5 - 36:25 37:1 - 37:12 37:23 - 40:19 41:20 - 43:5 46:19 - 47:6
)
51:13 - 52:12 53:19 - 54:20 57:1*- 57:9 57:10 - 58:11
-f 63:20 - 66:14 l
8307070183 791015 PDR ADOCK 05000289 M
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Edgar A. Womack (10/15/79) i 68:17 - 72:7 74:21 -75:8 79:9 - 80:4 113:3 - 114:24 119:7 - 124:9 9
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Mr. Anderson?
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A Can you give me a first name?
(Pause.)
h O
We'll pass Mr. Anderson for the moment and try to come up with a name, a first name.
When did you first become aware of the TMI incident?
r 7
1 A
Shr.,rtly after I arrived at work, which was about --
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- well, I would come to work cormally about quarter of 8:00.
And sometime between then and approximately 8:00 o' clock, Dr. Roy came into my office on the day of March 28th.
g O
And you learned of the incident from Dr. Roy?
A Yes.
O What, at that time, did 3su understand to be the g
problem?
A Well, let's see, my recollection is that there g
had been a transient at the Three Mile Island 2 plant, that g
it apparently -- I believe I knew at that time that it was a loss of feedwater -- it was reported as
'4 loss of feedwater g
ev nt, and that there was an instrument indicating high 20 radiation in the reactor building, which made it remarkable.
l There was not a great deal more than that, I think.
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22 We subsequently got inforeation as the morning were j
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on.
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How long was your conversation with Mr. Roy?
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Probably 10 to 15 minutes.
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2 O
As a result of that conversation, did you do 3
anything?
O 4
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res.
5 Q
What did you dc?
6 A
I asked Mr. Karrasch to come to the office and 7
to head up n team to determine the course of the transient 8
and to collect information which would help him to do that 9
and to begin the process of analyzing what had happened so 10 that we could assist the utility in putting the plant back 11 into operation as quickly as possible.
12 I also shortly thereafter began arrangements to 13 send three people to the site at Three Mile Island, whom I 14 believe have been interviewed by the NRC.
+
15 These people wara Joe Kelly, Bob Winks, and then
{ 16 ultimately selected later, Bob Twilley.
17 Q
Had Mr. Roy given you any instructions or made 18 any requests for you to do anything?
19 A
He had specifically requested that I take the 20 action that I did take.
2)
Q Were the two actions you described taken or I
22 initiated prior to the 9:00 o' clock or 8:30 task force meeting?
22 A
Yes.
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2d Q
Did you make any recommendations or suggestions to ei nw. i,..
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?.3 Mr. Roy?.
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A Well, we -- I think we discussed the nature of the ---
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2 of the s.ork that would be donc, and I probably did; I can't 3
remember them in detail.
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4 O
Did you attend the task force meeting to which 5
I*just referred?
6 A
Yes.
7 Q
What is your best recollection for a time at l
e which it took place?
9 A
My best recollection was it sas a little bit later 10 than 9 : 00 -- 8 : 30.
It might have been around 9:00 o' clock.
11 Q
Between your meeting with Dr. Roy and the task 12 force meeting, apart from your conversation with -- is it 13 Mr. Karrasch?
i 14 A
Yes.
15 Q
Did you have'any other conversations with people 16 about the TMI incident?
17 A
Well, I think I spooke to Mr. Winks and Mr. Kelly 18 to ask them to prepare to go up there.
19 0
Apart from those conversations, did you have any 20 others?
21 A
I don't recall.
s 22 Q
Who decided to send Mr. Kelly?
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23 A
I did.
24 Q
Did you consult with anyone with regcrd to that he mese,w i. i=.
23 decision?
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4 I probably decided when Dr. Roy was in the office, sp19
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Q 2
but I can't reaicmber for.;ure.
3-Q Would your testimony be the same with regard to h
6 Mr. Winks?
5:
A Yes.
G Q
Why did you select Mr. Kelly?
7 A
Wall, because Mr. Kelly is -- has reactor -- he 8
had familiarity with reactor operations in 177 plants.
He 9
had recently come to the engineering department from the,
10 service department and was experienced in reactor operations.
11 Q
Was any role that Mr. Kelly h.:d played in 12 discussions of or memoranda regarding the Davis-Besse 13 incident or incidents a factor in your mind, as you recall, 14 in deciding to send Mr. Kelly?
I3 A
No, it.wasn't.
But an additional factor that I 16 should also mention was -- was that Mr. Kelly had assisted in 17 the performance of the analysis of 2e *.hermal hydraulic 18 exposures of the components at the Rancho Seco plant when 39 they had had an overcooling incident prior to my coming to 20 plant design.
21 And his role there was nimilar to the role I f
- 22 expected him at that time to play at TMI.
And that was a
.23 factor.
24 Q
Why did you select Mr. Winks?
&s-25 A
performance p r v Well, Mr. Winks is our leading I
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C 2D 11e very frequently and custo:.arily analy:es plant i
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transien t:s, and he is, familiar with the.echniques and famil ar O
with the transienes which have been month to month.
And so he S
t4as a logical choice for the collection of data, especially.
6 Q
When was Mr. Twilley added to the group?
2 A
I think Mr. Tvilley -- the participation of the individual from customer service and'the naming of Mr. Twilley 8'
9 actually took place at the task -- I wouldn't call this so 10 much a " task force meeting" as an information disse:.tination IJ meeting, which took place at about 9:00, or whatever.
12 i Q
Did you recommend Mr. Twilley?
j E3, A
I can't recall whether I did or not; I certainly O
'2 would have.
11 5 Q
Was it your ultimate decision to include him in 3
16 the group?
17 A
No.
18 Q
Who made that decision?
19 A
I think probably Mr. Olds or Mr. Kosiba, or perhaps
'20 one of the managers in the service department.
i 2Q1 It was clear that the third member of the side p
222 group would be a services department representative.
j 2:23 Q
Do I infer correctly that it was the sense of the
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2 information meeting that a third person should be selected to hmener m. inc.
H25 come from service -- consumer service,and that Mr. Kosiba or
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Mr. Olds would then look there to pick their man?
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That's my recollection of it.
I think we had pretty well thought through that a customer services man 3
h should go before the meeting.
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5 Q
Does B & W have a written plan or procedure for j
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responding to transients or emergencies which take place j
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at plants with which it has con: actual relations?
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i A
Well, there is a written procedure for evaluating l
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' site problems.
9 However, in terms of an emergency response of the 10 sort that ultimately developed on Itn:ch 28th, I believe the 11 answer to your question is no.
12 Your question was in the present tense.
Did you g
33 want-- there are plans being made r.ow, and I suspect if you asked' 14 the question two or thre's week's from now, the answer would be 15 16 yes, in the present tense.
17 Q'
I wanted both; I'll try to be more precise in asking my questions, although perhaps I don't have to be, gg 19 if you'll answer two at one t'ime.
20 A..
All right.
I agree to stop.
(Laughter.)
21 22 Q
How was it determined who would be in charge of the c
h 23 response?
24 A
Well,'with respect to the -- with respect to
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25 Mr.1:arrasch's appcintment, again this harked back to the 1
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- p22 job we did for the Sacremento Municipal Utility District, 3
O ro11owins an overcootine transient th4c they hae out there.
2 At this point in time, we were primarily planning --
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and now I'm talking about the early morning to the middle 4
f the morning, at least, of March 28th -- we were primarily 5
P anning in a role in which we would -- in which we essentially l
6 felt that the transient was in all probability over, completely 7
under control, and that the job to be done was to find out 8
exactly what had happened, and to what the equipment in the 9
reactor plant had bern exposed, and to evaluate whether 10 n
any damage might have been done to that equipment, which would have prevented its' being used without repair or 12 inspection for prompt restart.
- 3 And so this was the thrust of what we sst out at 34 t
the beginning of the day or that first meeting with Dr. Roy 15 to do.
g And as I mentioned to you, Mr. Kelly and Mr. Karrasch 37 had both been involved in the extensive similar work we had 18 done for Rancho Seco.
And those were the kinds of 39 considerations I remember.
i 20
~
Q Was it your understanding that Dr. Roy was 21 ultimately in charge of the response to the incident?
22 A
I simply responded to Dr. Roy's request to met 23 Mr. Deddens was the senior manager in the division on that day, 24
. nme eae.
I Mr. MacMillan having been absent.
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Am I correct, then, that Mr. Deddens would be the A
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person ultimately in charge as the senior manager in charge in 3
the absence of Mr. MacMillan?
A That's correct.
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Q ihat's simply a general operating procedure of 4
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Babcock & Wilcox?
7 A
I believe Mr. MacMillan had decignated Mr. Deddens 8
in the active position.
9 Q
As you understand it, did Dr. Roy report to or 10-look to Mr. Deddens for any guidance or instructions in this 11 response?
4 12 A
I can't really answer that question; I don't have I3 suf'icient information.
Q.
I take it there was no orranization chart or m
I3 other document that indi[::ated what the lines of authority i
I' would be in an emergency response?
II A
I'm not aware of any.
l%
Q Why did you assign Mr. Karrasch to the team?
19 A
Well, because Dr. Roy asked me to,. for one thing, 20 and I concurred with that choice.
21 Q
Did you give instructions to Mr. Karrasch during the 22 g
28th and on subsequent days?
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0 Did yqu give instructions to other persons?
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25 A
Yes.
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O Assinnments to other personci Q
2-A Yes.
3 O
To who cine did you give assignments?
4 A
During the month of April?
Practically everybody.
5 O
Who,else was giving assignments to people?
6 A
Well, shortly after the 28th we established an 7
organisation, and this organfation was basically headed by 8
an operations manager who was one of the d=partment manager 9
. level individuals from within the division.
10 Dr. Roy was one of them; there were others.
And --
11 Q
Who was that individual?
I'm sorry, s
12 A
Excuse me?
13 Q
Who was that other individual?
14 A
The name of the function was " operations manager."
15 The nr.me of the -- are you asking for the individuals who --
9 16 Q
Yes, sir.
17 A
-- served in that capacity?
18 0
Yes, sir.
19 A
Well, Mr. -- Dr. Roy did; Mr. Embry did; Mr. Berger 20 did; Mr. Kosiba did, as the days went on.
Anddurh.ngthesubsequentdays,beneaththat 21 22 individual who was in charge of current support to Metropolitar 23 Edison, we had an organisation whic: reported to the, operations 24 manager.
Qneue m, one.
25 An:1 one of the designated functions therer was 1
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I p25 engineering operations manager.
h And that was a function which I i:cok in rotatio-
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3 with some others.
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0 Whc were the others?
b A
Well, let's see:
I t.aink Mr. Pryor did serve in 6
that job.
I believe Ken Suhrkey did.
I believe Larry Stanek 7
did serve in the engineering support functions for providing 8
help to Metropolitan Edison - GPU, reporting throus.1 the engineering operations manager.
10 0
Do I understand correctly that after the l'1 organization was establir.hed, the cperations manager or the 12 engineering operations manager would be the person who was I3 mthing assignments and issuing instructions?
A That's correct.
15 MR. EDGAR:. Wait.
Let's go back.
A.e you asking q
16 two questions?
17 Let's go off the record.
8 (Discussion off the record.)
19 (Brief recess.)
20 MR. DIENELT Back on the record.
21 While we were off the record, I made two requests 22 l for documents which I want to memoritize on the records g
23 one is for a copy of the organization chart which went into 24 oJfect sometime after March 28th; and I suppose I should add 5 I a request for copies of any subsequent organi:ation charts i
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conding that organi:ation:
the other is for a copy of the sp26 h
2 master services contract or contracts with GPU.
3 It is my understanding that those docwaents have h
d been made available to the PrTsident's Co=nissicn, and they 5
have been made available to us.
6 I'm not certain if we have taken up che offer prior 7
to today.
And I will undertake, with respect to those and 8
with res;.ect to all the other documents I am reques, ting, t
9 to go back and see whether we have them and can fjnd tha.m.
But 4
to if we do not, I understand we wi.'.1 have a second bite at II the apple with respect to those documents.
MR. EDGAR:
Right.
lie'll make such recovery 12 i
I3 organi:ation charts, such as are available, available.
And Id we will also provide the master service agreements.
I3 BY MR. DIEN. EI.T:
16 O
Just to clarify the record with respact to the lasti 17 question I had asked about the individuals who wer= :naking 18 assignments, it's my understandi.ig, P. Womack, that the j
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engineer'ing operations manager was one of several people under I'
4 20 the operations manager.
21 A
That's right.
22 O
And that all of those people made assignments to g
23 the individuals on the organization who were within their pett of the organization.
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Who was the individual or who were the individuals O
l2 who estaslisned the organi::ation ch<irt7 3
A Well, I think that several o' us were involved, but I believe that Dr. Roy and Mr. Deddens and Mr. Kosiba were 3
key in making those decisions.
6 Q
Did you look to the master services agreement or j to any other document to determine what you should do in 8
response to the TMI incident?
A No, sir, I didn't personally; I'm sure that there 10 were those who were mindful of this, but I would say that 11 the general. spirit of the operation, begin,ning at 8:00 o' clock a.m. on March 28th until now, was to provide whatever we could, g
without reservation, to those,who were in the process of 14 maintaining the reactor in safe condition.
('
And that certiainly overwhelmed any contractual
!' 16 or legal considerations at any time that I recall during the 17 month of April.
18 I can -- well --
19 Q
You raftrre.1 to the Rancho Seco incide*1t or to an 0
incident,at Rancho Seco; in connection with that incident, 21 did B & W send out a team, such as it did with Mssrs. Kelly, 2
g Winks, and Twilley?
23 A
Yes.
24 I don't think it was a team of that size, but it n
I was a da.ta collection team.
But it was again to get detailed :
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technical information about the transient that we needed to
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2 make the report back to Sacremento.
3 Q
Was that team sent out as quickly as the TMI team?
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4 A
I don't recall.
I was not manager of plant design 5
at the thue.
6 O
Who waE 7
A Dr. Roy.
1 r,
O When you spoke to Mr. Roy and he told you about the 9
incident, what was your reaction to the information regarding to the high radiation level?
11 A
Well, surprise; I dif.n't understand it.
I believe 12 at that time it was reported for sever 1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> thereafter as 13 essentially being a on.3-instrument reading.
We were not sure --
[]g 14 in fact, I believe there was some accompanying information is which might havo qualified or reflected uncertainty on dat i
16 reading.
17 So we really didn't know what to make of it, other is than that it was very unusual and a matter of concern.
19 Q
During your conversation with Mr. Roy, prior to th e
20 9:00 o' clock meeting and during the other activities in which
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21 you engaged prior t>that meeting, was it your view that the 22 transient was over and that you were primarily concerned with 23 recovery matters?
24 A
Yes, that was my thinking at that time, and really e - w ne m,. =.
5 much of the strategy was aimed more at finding out what I
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happened, analy:ing it in detail, and evaluating its potential
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2 eff ect on the plant.
3 Q
Why did you conclude that the incident Was over?
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4 A
Well, I think that at that point I didn't have any 5
other -- I didn't have reason to conclude otherwise at that 6
particular moment.
7 And also, typically, transients such as this are 8
over and stable conditions are established very quickly.
And 9
in fact I would say that it was the expectation --
in a loss o'f 10 l main feedwater,, stable condition should be established very s
11 quickly, and indeed the entire sequence of presenting events l2 at TMI-2 should have been very quickly stabilized, in 13 retrospect.
[g 14 Q
The existence of a.high radiation 2evel didn't 15
_, cause you to question the conclusion or the view that the
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16 transient was over?
17 A
It'wasn't inconsistent with it, even if radiation 18 had been released within the building.
19
,0 Did Mr. Roy have'the same view that you did?
20 A-I beli. eve he did, since we spoke primarily in 21 terms of evaluation and recovery.
9
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22 Q
Prior to the 9:00 o' clock meeting, had you learned J
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23 anything about the status of the high pressure injection?
t 24 A
I think that the information passed to us, either
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25 at 8:00.or at the 9:00 meeting, indicated that HPI had come i
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b' ell, one of the things I think we did at the U
2 9:00 o' clock meeting was to assemble a li:t of information 3
we wantcd to have, and I think I contributed to that.
And I participated in the discuss. ion generally.
5 Q
Do you recall any specifics of what you said?
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6 A
Nothing stands out.
7 Q
Let me show you an Attachment 2 to Exhibit 3104.
I 8
Is that the list of information that was compiled at the 9
9:00 o' clock meeting?
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10 (Counsel handing document to witness.)
11 A
I believe it was, yes.
12 Q
Did you have any role in establishing the
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priorities that are indicated at the left margin?
A I believe the priorities were discussed at the 15 time of the meeting, and I would have taken part in the general discussion.
So, yes.
Q Do you recall requesting or ce=menting on any of the specific items that are listed among the information needed?
20 A
I probably commented on many of them.
I don't 21 recall the comments or the nature of the comments; we were 22 I
,trying to assemble a picture of what were the thermal 23 p
nyciraulic ocnditions of the plant at that time.
24 8"-
Q As a result of the 9:00 o' clock meeting, did you 25
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change your view that the transient was over?
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A The awareness that there was a continuing operationu 3
evolution going on at Three P.ile certainly was more clear at C
that task force meeting.
4 5
I would say that -- I don't know that I would say tha t I changed my view that the transient was over, per se, 6
7 because we kept receiving reports pretty much throughout the 8
day or at least most of the morning indicating relatively 9
stable conditions in cooling, and so forth.
10 So I rea31y don't think that my view that there was an bperational problemwithin the -- I don't think that 12 I really ca:ne to the conclusion that there was an operational g
problem in the primary system until noontime or shortly O
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14 thereafter.
15 Certainly, tlie -- you know -- we were cratinuing 16 to receive sotae reports, some contradictory, some corroboratives 17 that the transient might potentially have released some 18 radiation.
That was disturbing.
19 But again, that could have been after the fact; I
20 don't know.
21 O
At the 9:00 o' clock meeting, do you recall what was
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22 said about the status of high pressure injection?
c 23 A
I don't, nor certainly it was on the list, and 24 it was a matter of interest.
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25 0
why was it a matter of concern or' interest?
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If that were so; again, I believe it would have sp34
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been -- that it had been left flowing, r_
h Q
What, as you understood it, at the 9:00 o' clock 5
meeting, was the status of the reac':or coolant pumps?
6 A
They were off.
7 Q
All of them?
8 A
Yes.
We understood that they had turned the pumps off, and I do not believe at that time that we understood to why they had turned the pumps off.
11 Q
Was that a matter of concern?
12 A
Yes.
I was interested to know why, but not -- not I3
-- you know -- not unduly concerned because natural circulatior I'
cooling is a perfectly reasonable mode for keeping the core 15 e
,,,y, But I was interested very much to know why.
And I 17 think we had a. question on there -- yes, reactor coolant pump 8
conditions. And that is priority two.
I
[ 19 Q
What, as you recall, wa's the information regarding 20 the si:atus cf the PORV?
21 A
I don't believe we liad any information until 22 later in the morning regarding the status of the PORV.
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23 inay have had the information that ti e PORV opened, but I 24 don't believe we'had any information then en the PORV then 25 l
until later in the' day and perhaps later than that.
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0 Is that on the list of information needed, as you
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(Pause.)
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d A
No, sir.
5
~ Q What was the information you had with regard to the 6
bot and cold leg temperatures?
7 A
Well, we had a temperature, and as I recall, it was 8
low; I don't recall exactly what its value was; I belkre 9
it was a cold leg temperature.
I d' n't know that it was so 10 identified, 11 But it was a tenperature which would have indicated, 12 in conjunction with the pressure -- and I thir.h we were being 13 given -- this was basically true throughout the morning --
14 would have indicated subcooling throughout the reactor 15 system.
3 16 Q
Do you recall when the first time you received 17 information on the hot and cold leg temperatures was?
18 A
Not with great precision, but I believe it was 19 in the time frame of af ter -- af ter lunch; perhaps 1:00 to 20 2:00 p.m., approximately in that time frame.
21 Q
Is that information regarding hot and cold leg 22 temperatures within the scope of one of the information needed O-C 23 items?
24 A
Yes, sir.
It's item number six:
RCS temperature go 23 and pressure, priority one.
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Q What wa.s the information conveyed at the 9:00 o'clocX b
2 I meeting regarding the possibility of a fuel failure?
3 A
I can't recall.
4 Q
Do you recall whether it was --
5 A
I don't recall whether it was -- you were about 6
to ask me whether or not it was discussed?
7 Q
Yes, sir.
8 A
And I can't recall whether it was or not; I wouldn' t 9
he surprised, but I can't recall.
10 Q
Do you recall whether at this point the possibility 11 of uncoyery of the core was discussed?
12 A
I am quite sure that was not discusssd.
13 Q
What, as you understood is, was the strategy
- g 14 being followed at the s'ite to respond to the transient that 15 was conveyed at the 9:00 o' clock meeting?
16 A-Well, basically, we understood that the reactor 17 was being ecoled by natural circulation, and the other 18 information was so sketchy as to nce 1er1 itself to the 19 construction of an integrated strategy.
And we had, as I 20 recall, throughout most of the day, a great deal of difficulty 21 under -- getting communication with the site to understand 22 what their strategy was and what the exact conditions were.
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23 Q
Can you'tell me,in general terms first, why the items which have the number one priority had the number one bo a
. 24 25 priority?
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A well, I can speculate.
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2 A group decision like this --
3 0
Let me ask you before, yea speculate, if, according
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4 to your recollection, the priorities were the same as you 5
would have set if you had been making the decision alone?
6 A
Well, Mr. Dienelt, it's -- it's in some ways
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casy to be a Monday morning quarterback, and it's very l
8 difficult to -- to go back and reconstruct the exact conditions 9
.ar. they wre.
3 10 I'll be glad to go through the list and try to 11 do either or both of those, if you'd like.
j 12 Pressurizer level is important.
13 Steam generator level -- and, by the way, I think 14 one of the things I should have mentioned before, I think we 15 knew at the 9:00 o' clock meeting that there was a report of e5 16 a primary and secondary leak.
We did not know how that had 17 been confirmed.
l 18 Steam generator level and the controllability of 19 steam generator level and the capability of heat. removal is 20 terribly important-I certainly would have designated that 21 as priority one.
22 That in itseld would make the question of auxiliary O,
e 23 feedwater actuation of more academic interest because 24 the secondary side cooling water control was present and hwneeerm. sac. l Nbf2>5 8;available.
> n.q ygvv' 1
i 6
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t 39 sp39 1
Then we would be asking a question about history, 2
g rather than t; bout current conditions, so I think that may 2
have been thre retason that was priority two.
d Q
RCP conditions:
aasin, that would probably bc 5
priority two, based on an understandjn;of natural circulation 6
being the primary cooling mode.
l 7
Secondary side temperatures and pressures and l
l 8
nCS temperatures and pressures are essential to understand l
9 how the heat is being removed from the core.
IU Core delta t is similarly very important.
11**(
Su=p level in the reactor building would be of j
12 secondary importantancer I think te hrd perhaps at'that 13 time some J.dication that the rupture disk on the quench O
Id tank or reactor coolant syst.em drain tank had ruptured.
So I3 there was some interest, I suppose, in knowing whether there 5
I6 was any water that had gotten out of the system.
II Whether or not the diesel was running -- diesels i
18 were running was put down as priority fiver presumably thor.e devices provide contingency electrical power, and there was 20 not indication that there was a shortage of electrical power 21 at the site or we didn't know of any, 22 BWST level on inventory would be importsnt, if there i
h 1
23 had been significant injection -- high pressure injection had 24 been indicated as initiated.
So that, I think, was the basis F
neewm. i of the item number 10, and the need to know what the HPI.was i
e
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l
40 sp40 1
doing or how it had been used was the basis of number 11.
I O
erimary and secondary radiochemiserr would have i
3 told us something about where this reportot radiation might h
4 have come from.
j 5
This would have bron useful in a secondary 6
evaluation of -- and was useful in a secondary evaluation 7
of the source of the radiation release.
8 We did want to know why the pumps had been tripped 9
and when they had been tripped and why.
10 We needed additional information about the s :uence 11 of events.
One of the things we were trying to do, as I 12 mentioned to you at the beginning, was to simulate the 13 event with engineering analysis methods here; that was oncI.
14 of the objectives we had set for the original task force, and 15 to do that, one needs,to know what the chrorology of actions 16 taken by the operator is and what the types of actions taken 17 by the operator are.
So that was indicated on the list.
18 And then we had indication of the primary ano d-secondary leak.
20 Q
War there, as you recall it, one major or several 21 overriding or major concerns abo t the status of the TMI-2 g
plant that were expressed at the n.enting?
22 23 A
well, we would always be conce: ned that the 24 core c cling be adequate.
That probably was expressed.
I ammei. W.
I 25 don't know to -- whether it was expressed in an overriding l
I I
i y -
.x c
- ~
.,7
l 41 i
sp41 y
way or not, h
I think that the thrust of most of that meeting 2
in the morning was to try to ask questions to find out, one, 3
h what had gone on and what was the current situation.
4 Q
About approximately how long did the meeting last?
5 A
My recollection is not rJod; it seems to me, 6
though, that it nay have run for 30 to 45 minutes.
And it 7
may have run longer.
i g
Q Were you there the full time?
]
9 I
A Yes, I believe I was.
I 10 l
11 Q
How was the information to be requested?
By what
]
means?
12 A
Well, normally the communications with operating Q
13 reactors are made through the services department, and 34 Mr. Spangler is and was'the contact then and through the rest 9
15 16 of the day.
l And Mr. Spangler, I believe, was attempting to 17 gather information through B & W site representatives who 18 19 were there.
f Q
Was there a communications plan for dealing with 20 emergencies?
21 22 A
Emergency communications?
Not to my knowledge.
c There may have been one, but I don't know of any.
23 24 Q
Since the TMI incident, has there been any
<wamom 3 inc.
communications plan for emergencies developed, or is there 25 f) l s
-=
=
42 isp42 I
one in the process of development?
h l
A
'.,uch plans are very much in the process of 2
3 development, both here and throughout the industry.
O 4
o Is there e written rian or draft of a gran et 5
this point which B r. W has prepared, to your knowledge, 6
A Yes.
I 7
MR. DIENELT:
Off the record.
B (Discussion off the record.)
9 MR. DIENELT:
As a result of discussion off the 10 record, it is my understanding that Mr. Edgar will inquire 11 as to the status of any written draft of a plan, and that we 12 will discuss the matter after he has finished his inquiry.
13 MR. EDGAR:
Yes.
14 BY MR. DIENELT:
15 Q
Do you knob how, in fe:t, t-he list of information 1
16 that is reflected on Attachment 2 was com:aunication to the 17 site representative?
18 A
Wcil, I think I read in Mr. Wandling's 1emo --
19 which I believe we identified earlier -- that an atte=pt was 20 made to telecopy it to the site representative's trailer, but 21 there being no one present in the trailer to receive the 22 telecopy, the telecopy was not received.
23 I think it was later communicated orally by 74 Mr. Spangler.
- de could answer that question better than I
.Qwmar m.inc.
25 in details, e
if b I
I
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/k 43 sp43 1
O Your understanding was that he communicated it to O
2 Mr. aosers7 3
A I don't think Mr. Spangler spoke to Mr.-
Rogers O
4 unti1 very much 1ater in the day.
I think he prohasty 5
communicated it to Mr. Schaedel.
L You were not present when he had that conversation, 6
0 7
"he" being Mr. Spangler.
8 A
With Schaed'el?
9 Q
Yes, sir.
10 A
I don' t think I was.
Mr. Spangler had a number of Il conversations during the course of the day with Mr. Schaedel, 12 but I believe by the time I was present when he was having 13 those conversations, he had already transmitted this.
14 O
At what time of the day, if you recall, was the 9
15 operations center set up in the project control center?
16 A
Late morning to noon is my recollection.
17 Q
Were people in the training room in which the 18 9:00 o' clock meeting had taken place up until the project 39 control center came into use?
20 n
I don't.think so.
I think that there was -- people 21 wereseparatedforsomeperiodo{ time.
But let me suggest g
that you ask Mr. Spangler that question; I think he might givo 22 23 you a better answer.
2d Q
Did you go to the project control center at some
~: t n n.n. w.
25 point during the day?
9 1
~._
1 l
I 46 t
I fsp46 I
A Do you mean that day or later?
R N,,
2 O
That day.
i 3
A Oh, yes, I'm sure I did.
O e
o Did you do that amomeen the time you had the 5
conversation.and the time you went to the project control 6
center?
7 A
Probably yes.
8 O
Do you recall with whom you spoke?
9 A
Well, I'm speculating, sut think it would have 10 been logical for me to me.'. tion it to Bill Spangler because 11 he was the focal point for the information.
12 I think he may have indicate'd he"had a conversation 13 with Floyd -- not personally -- but was aware that Jim Floyd 14 was down there and might have some path of co=munication which 15 we did not have into E.he TMI control room.
'o 16 But -- and later on in the day, why we knew that 17 Mr. Floyd was there, and I think they got some control room 18 telephone numbers from him.
I'm not sure.
F19 Q
As a. result of the conversation you had with 20 Mr. Floyd, did you believe that there was a need to change 21 either the information that was needed or the priority of the 22 infor=stion?
g 23 A
I don't think so.
24 O
As a result of the conversation wi.h Mr. Floyd, e her me one i, inc.
25 did you change your view as to the nature of the t.ransient or
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47 1p47
)
the status of the transient?
()
2 A
lio.
No, I don't think I did because it was still 3
a very -- it was still a fairly confused view; I don't think k) 4 I had what I would call a change of view.
5 Certainly, the interruption of-the auxiliary feedwater was a factor -- a new factor to be evaluated, 6
y 7
0 In the project control center, what kind of a
communication arrangement did you have?
9 A
Well, I'm trying to recall on that day.
There to,
is normally a speaker type telephone which is permanently 11 hooked up in_that area, and I believe at that point in 12 time that is what we had, a speaker phone extension of the
(};
13 a & W system.
14 Later we h'ad other telephones installed, and
=.
c 15 we expanded into other areas around the project control 16 system, set up other centers.
And we set up little working 17 centers within the project control c?.nter.
l 18 We also had Telefax equipment brought in the 19 second or third day af ter the accident.
20 Q
Do you know whether any of the telephone 21 conversations'which took place at the project control center 1
22 were tape recorded?
(])
23 A
Yes, some of them were.
We tried, whenever we 24 could get -- whenever we were having a technical conversation imiam mn.ix.
l 25 collectin.g information, we would frequently use dictating i
a.
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O Do you know whether there <cre conversations I
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2 between D & W in Lynchburg and the B & W representative on 3
the site between 7:45 and 11:45?
(
4 A
No, I don't.
5 0
Were you present at the phone call that occurred
- 6 at approximately 11:45?
7 A
I don't recall.
I guess -- my guess is that I g
wasn't, but I could have been.
9 Q
Do you recall whsher you were briefed or otherwise 10 learned about the telephone call or the substance of the 11 call?
12 A
Yes, I believe I did later.
13 Q
What, as you understood it, was the status of the
[])
14 TMI incident at the 11:45 call?
15 A
As well as f can connect the 11:45 time period 16 with'my recollection with what is in this memo -- I think 17 this corresponds with the 11:45 call -- they had indicated 18 that there was some low level release; primary to secondary 19 leak in the OTSGB; the B steam ger*.i stor isolated; cooling 20 down on A using natural circulatione 21 This piece of info:L2 tion -- pressurizer heater 22 shorted out -- I think I remember that.
(])
23 Using pressurizer isolation valve to control l
24 pressure; that would be reasonable if the system were in a l
e neuws w.
25 l
solid mode.
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'I I believe at that time that we were still -- we
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still had no indication that the primary coolant system had
/
3 other than subcooled temperatures in it.
4 From wInt. I nets here in one of these memos, 300 D.]
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degrees and 2100, pounds.
And Wandling's log goes on to say
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to cooldown and pressure and depressurize was the
-y2
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strategy.
.a. ;
8 Suspected fuel leakage, but not further information
- )
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I on radiation levels.
Some level increase in the reactor s.:3 10 i':.
building sump.
L94)
Again, there is really nothing inconsistent with M
II V.'.*h dj vat we understood before.
3.l
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13 Q
It was understanding that at that time the Id strategy or part of the strategy for responding to the incident;
- j
- ..Q:i 15 was to depressurize?
Wh 2
-eq 16 A
That's what they said.
Od,v.
Di 17 0
Do you know -- do you recall any discussion about
.d4 Eb 18 that strategy at i ; W7
':. 52 NM,5 19 A
I don't recall any.
YQ 20 Q
Did you have any view as to whether that. was Egy 65 21 the correct strategy?
(ylj 0%
22 A
Not oufficient -- not that I recall any view that Q,;;
$Y) 23 was sufficiently strong to urge any other strategy at that gg
- A 1
24 time.
j$q~
- Amm. 85 f,. ;;j Q
Do you know whether anybody had a view that the 1
725 25
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strategy was incorrect, anybody at B & W?
I sp53 l
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2 A
Well, I remer.ber being -- you know -- v ndcring 3
why they just didn't. go ahead and run the pumps to get the h
system back in the normal feree flow condition, and I'm sure 3
that I asked that question a couple of times during the 6
course of the morning.
7 O
Do you know whether --
8 But the details of who v.ight have re oc:nended A
"A" strategy versus "B" strategy are not in my mind'.
MR. EDGAR:
The strategy ir not just depressuri:e.
l'1 THE WITNESS:
It's cooldown and depressuri:e.
BY MR. DENIELT:
I3 O
Did you communicate your questions or your concern 14 regarding whether the pumps were being operated or why they t
15 were not being operated,to anyone at B & W7 q
16 A
Well, yes, it was on this list that we discussed I7 earlier, essentially.
18 I believe it was raised:
pu=p trip went --
'19 Q
As you understand it, was thw irformation needed 20 that is reflected on Attachment 2 requested of Mr. Schaedel 21 at the 11:45 telephone call?
22 Unless it had somchow been requested of him A
g 23 earlier, I'm sure that it was requested of him then.
24 Q
Do you know what information Mr. Schaedel conveyed, 25 if any, with respect to the hot leg temperatures 7 l
?
t I
I
p.
- spS4 i
A I don't believe he conveyed any at that time, h
2 but I don't know; my recollection is that we did not become 3
aware of high hot Icg tsmperatures until the early af ternoon, l
O 4
o ao you reca11 at aegroximately this t1== learnins 5
that the high pressure injection had been off?
6 A
No, sir, I do not rec 11 that.
7 0
Do you recall any discussion about fuel failure aI at approximately this time 7 9
A Apparently, there was some discussion of fuel 10 leakage, and fuel leakage would be -- fuel fdilure as distinct 11 from fuel leakage probably is a significant differcnce at this 12 point.
13 Fuel leakage would have been normal assumptio.. witn 14 some evidence of radiation release.
15 0
Do you recall any discussion about the possibility 9
16 of. super heat and voids in the pri=azy system?
17 A
I don't, no, sir.
le Q
Do you recall any discussion of core uncov.:;y 19 at this point?
20 A
No, sir, I don't.
21 Q
Do you recall whether at this point there were 1
22 any recommendations conveyed to Mr. Schandel to pass on to the 23 TMI control room?
l 4
2d A
No, I don't know.
I can't sey that there were j
.P g Rymewn,Ig.
l l
25 none, but 1 don't recall whether there were or not.
There is i
i l
l
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l
57
- p 5 7 I
O Do you recall wriat information was conveyed, if any, hv u=. schaedet aeout the status of the stant durins the!
O 2
3 1:30 phone call?
h d
A Hy guess is that this would have been the call in 3
which he indicated the hot leg temperatures were up.
And I 6
think that flagged to a couple of our more alert people 7
ent there had possibly been some super heating in the 8
secondary -- in the primary side and gave urgency to this 9
ecommendation for high pressure injection.
IO Q
At this point, had a specific recommendation to II ensure that the HPI was on been made?
12 A
That's fu:::y in my mind.
I can block that series 13 of reco:::mendations within a couple of hours, pretty much Id between -- sometime between 12:00 and 2:00.
15 It's very possible -- I recall Bert Dunn having come e
16 and said to me:
"They should be sure *a have so much HPI,
~
17 and we should make that recommendation."
18 I said -- you know -
"Before we make any recommendation to them, make sure you have checked with QA for 20 the amount of flow you think they should have."
21 I haven't aske'd Bert, but it may be that he -- it 22 g
may be he talked about that with me even before we had the 23
, super heating thing, simply on the basis of this is good 24 practice, contingency practice.
Q.e n.wm
=,
25 The pumps are off; there is a concern about the i
1 i
58
!cp52 I l heat removal.
O 2
zn any case, that =ec=.meneatlen was <1= cussed 3
with me and several others, and in 15 or 20 or 30 minutes we O
4 pretty we11 coalesced, and I specifica11y made it -- the 5
recommendation to Spangler that it be transmitted and I 6
think I also to1d Mr. -- I don't remember whether Mr. Deddens 7
was there or not.
8 But either through Dr. Roy or direct 1y through 9
Mr. Deddens we later in the af ternoon were able to transmit 10 that information through a conversation that he had with II Mr. Arnoid.
k 12 Q
"Be" being,Mr. Deddens?
13 A
Yes, he being Mr. Deddens.
Id My understanding of it is thaf the force of that 15 message took a couple more hours to get there.
t 16 Q
Did anyone ask you to make or to supervise the 17 making of any calculations regarding HPI?
18 A
As I recall it, the recommendation came to me.
I I'
don't recall anybody asking,me to make such recommendations, 20 other than the general request we had made for simulations.
21 Q
The recommendation came to you from whom?
22 A
Bert Dunn.
23 Q
Mr. Dunn?
2d A
Mr. Dunn.
$ n n.ri, w, j
25 Q
okay, did he tell you why l. made the recommendation?
)
l
~
, esp.
r
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. *~u
s 74 dsp?4 1
you wish to call it -- finally became conriccted with thi s
Q 2
control room.
3 And, let's see -- I don't know occtly what time it O
4 was-ooi:= waaettas tell u=>
5 MR. EDGAR:
Not very well.
6 THE WITNESS:
It was certainly prior to the pumo 7
bung.
B When was the pump bump?
9 (Pause.)
10 This says "1910" or therear.utc.
II BY MR. DIENELT 12 O
"This" being Wandling's log?.
13 A
Wandling's log; that would be consistent with my O
14 reco=mendation -- with my understanding of that day.
13 Q
Do you know,who was on the control room end of 16 thedirectlinewhenitwasestablishebt?
17 A
I think it was Rogers.
They may have been -- there 18 may have been some of the operationa3 personnel frcm the 19 utility.
They may have also gotten on the line.
I think it 20 was primarily Rogers.
21 Q
Once you had learned of the super heat, did the 22 high radiation icvels that had earlier been reported assume 23
.a different maaing for you or have a different meaning?
24 A
Well, I -- yes, I guess we would have to say we
.o.
25 could begin to piece a couple of pieces of the puzzle together,'
M M9 wS*We* -,
a F --, -
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75
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sp ? 5 1
and ssurac' tnat there were fuel leaks.
h 2
Of course, we had already surnised fuel leaks had 3
caused the radiation -- excuse me -- whether -- I don't recall h
4 any blinding flashes of light.
I recall just gradually the 5
pu::1c beginning to fit together.
6 And it really took another two days for the pu::le 7
to fit fully together as far as understanding why it happened 8
and what the conditions were.
p 9
Q On the 28th did you have any conversations with 10 Mr. Floyd, other than the one which occurred sometime during i
11 the morning?
l 12 A
Yes.
13 We, I believe, talked with Floyd a couple of times 14 during the 28th.
I don't recall exactly how many times I 15 talked with him.
But I do remembe.: that he did come to the 3
i
~
16 project control center briefly.
17 It's my recollection that he came up there briefly, 18 and I think we talked about the high pressure injection 19 recommendation.
20 We probably talked about the meaning of the 21 super heating or the possible meaning cf the super heating 22 indication in the hot legs.
23 And then I remember wondering later where he had 24 disappeared to; it turns out he had gone back up to -- to e a,w nen.inc.
l 25 Pennsylvania.
He and I think some of his people had gone back l
l i
1
..n.,.4
n.-
n I
79
- !cp7 9 Pennsylvnia?
i h
2 0
Yes, sir, I do.
3 MR. EDGAR:
Would your answer be the same if that h
were the question?
4 5
THE WITNESS:
Well, no, actually I think --
6 (Laughter.)
7 I think the answer would be yes.
DY MR. DIENELT 8
Q We will not try to intrude into your personal life.
9 1
10 Did there come a time during the 28th when you l
11 concluded that what was going on at TMI was not a normal 12 transient and was a serious problem?
}3 A
Yes.
O 14 0
can you try to pinpoint that time?
13 A
Well, that reali=ation grew throughout the e
16 day.
ty It certainly began with the report of high ig radiation level in the reactor containi: lent building in the 19 morning, and then it -- it grew throughout the day as we began '
20 to get information that at the site emergencies had been 21 declared t.nd that there was offsite radiation possibly being 22 measured:
that the site was closed; and that our people --
23 Twilley, Winks, and Kelly -- could not get on to the siter that we could not establish communications with the sitar 24 she.i n r
l
.. w.
25 !
that the news media were becoming increasingly involved.
NewsI i.
I i
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= _ _ -
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80 I
1 conferences were being held.
13o50
(]I f
it became more andl 2
And certainly as the day wore on, more clear that what had happened was outside our prior 3
(b i
experience.
Had you experienced the kind of ec=munications Q
difficulties that were experienced in connection with this transient in responding to any other transients?
7 Well, the strict answer to that question is no.
8 A
There was no transient in which such an operation'had ever 9
been mounted or even contemplated in my experience at B & W.
10 I should point out -- well, I think that answer would also 11 12 go for my predecessor, Dr. Roy.
(3)
But I had been in my prese' e position now for 14 I had come there in August of '78.
So just about a year some of the more serio,us transients which had occurred before 15 2
had certainly involved -- as we discussed, Rancho Seco, SMUD 16 overcooling event had certainly involved B & W support.
17 But again this was in the nature of support after 18 the fact.
It wasn't:
pick up the telephone and learn what's 19 going on right now and attempt to provide direct support to 20 21 reactor operations.
So there was really nothing in procedent -- in my precedent expsrienca to parallel what was going on on the 23 ob.: n nm.. l 28th.
l And so the answer to your question, then, quite 25 t
I i
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l
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l 113 dspil3 1
confidentici basis, and that we may como to his office and
'(])
2 review it, and that procedure is perfectly acceptable to us.
3 BY MR. DIENELT
()
4 Q
Have you formed any view or opinion as to the 5
adequacy of 'the contr61 room and console layout and design 6
at TMI-27 7
A The opinion that I have formed and support is the 8
control reum laycut, in general, should be as a result of 9
this and otner consideratienr. he given a pretty systematic 10 roview to assure that a single integrated systems engineering 11 look is taken to the placement and type of information presented 12 to the operators.
13 And that is cne of the draft recommendations that 14 the technical review co==ittee will make.
3 15 l Is there a basis on which you could compare the Q
16 adequacy of the TMI-2 control room and console design with 17 those of other plants?
18 A
Well, nach of our plants we can compare to some 19 extent.
They tend to be different because the control 20 roca design is largely at the discretion of the u'.ility owne:
21 and frequently he has his own particul ar i,deas about how 22 it should be layed out.
23 We can make such compa isonst we can make limited r
24 co=parisons with those of other vendors.
.O-w a i=.
25 Q..
On a comparative basis, do you have a view as to i
1 1
e M I
l a
l 114 l
l l
dspil4 1I the -- as to how the TMI-2 control room stands up against
({.)
2 those of other plants?
3 A
I have -- I don't have direct knowledge of the 4
TMI control room.
I have seen pictures of it.
My impression
(])
5 from the pictures is that it tends to be more widely 6
distributed, spread ont farther or the censoles than some of 7
the other plants, including the simulator h:2re, which tends 8
to be a more compact board.
9 O
Do you think that's a desirable or an undesirable 10 feature?
11 A
Well, it -- I don't think it's possible to answer 12 that question without a considerable amount of evaluation.
I 13 Q
What dealings with Met Ed or GPU have you had, 14 if any, with respect to formulation of emergency procedures?
/k 15 A
Essentially none prior to the 28th.
Excuse me.
!6 Did you say " Met Ed or others"?
17 Q
I said Het Ed or GPU'.
16 A
GPU.
19 Q
I will expand it to others in the next question, 20 but let's focus on the two of them for now.
21 A
I can't recollect any direct dealings with Met Ed 22 or GPU --
c 23 J
Is -- have you --
24 A
-- personally.
Q.i mm.
25 Q.
Have you had dealings with other utilities with
'/~f il I
a s
I 119
. cpl 19 1
Q Specifically, have you seen the B & W Rancho Se:o
()
2 simulator?
3 A
That is' --
()
4 Q
That's this one?
5 A
We'have only one simulator.
And it happens to be 6
patterned after the Rancho Seco control room.
i 7
Q Are you aware of any test data which B & W has B
regarding the reaction -- the behavior of reactor coolant 9
pumps and the presence of voids?
10 A
Yes.
Yes, we have.
Il Q
Can you describe that?
12 A
17 ell, we have -- we are in possession of data which 13 I have obtained through various R & D programs which indicato 14 pu=p operation with voids is quite satisfactory.
d 15 We can~ continue in very aighly voided situations.
I 16 can't describe the details; our pump experts could.
17 MR. DIENELT Off the record.
18 (Discussion off the record.)
19 BY MR. ORN3TEIN:
20 Q
The question was raised as to what information 21 was available on the operation of reactor coolant pumps in the d
22 presence of voids and what information might have been 23 available to the people up at Three. Mile Island on the 24 performance when you -- when you requested that they get the O'*-WRt IRL 25 pumps started.
1 l
y t
120 can you give us cotae information on that?
sp120 y
O 2
A As to what was available prior to the 28th, I'm not able to tell you in detail as to what was done un the 3
h 28th when we were contemplating a pump restart.
4 We'did gather on the afternoon of the 28th several 5
of the pu=p people together and provided some criteria for 6
pump restart and for normal operations, some limits of 7
cperations, if you will.
g 9
0 Do you know if thin kind of information had been to made known to various people who had received a t, W training, j
1) that is, people who were training for the cold license, for 12 new operator licenses, and requalification?
13 A
No, I don't know exactly what. happened.
14 Q
Okay.
Had you people baan involved with 15 disturbance analyzers for improving plant performance?
g A
I hadn't been !.nycived with disturbance analyzers.
17 Ken Suhrke may have done something in the past.
I don't 18 know the answer.
19 MR. EDGAR:
Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
l 20 BY MR. DIENELT:
21 22 Q
Were you present $t a March 6 and 7, 1977 meeting of the Babcock and Wilcox 177 owners' group in San Francisco, 23 24 California?
$en nose.<e. s m.
23 A
No.
M E.- A y
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121 sp121 I
Q Do you know anything about that meeting?
2 A
March 6 and 77 3
Q March 6 and 7, 1977.
4 A
I don't believe I do.
I 5
Q Did'you become aware at or about that time of any 6
concern expressed by utility representatives about the information 7
flow from B & W7 3
A Ho.
l 9
Q I'm going to direct your ettention to a portion of an 10 exhibit which was introduced as Womack Deposition Dxhibit 29 II before the President's Co::rJ.ssi:n deposition of you.
12 It is a December 15r, 1978 TECO status report.
You I3 are shown as having received a copy.
Id I'm specifically interested in item six.
Can you e
15 read that?
16 (Witness reviewing document.)
17 A
Yes.
18 Q.
tre you familiar with the matter diccussed under item 19 six?
~
20 x
Generally so, yes.
21 Q
Do you know what happened subsequent to the date of 22 Exhibit 29 with respect to that matter?
.23 A
Yes.
The work that I think Mr. Dunn had recommended O
24 was done; in part it was carried through to the point where wei RetWWrt IM.
25 Mr. Dunn stated that continuation of punp operation would not y
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122 sp122 lead to any significant elevation of peak cladding
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temperatures in the core.
2 And he so reported that.
We then returned to take 3
a second look at ttat.
We were -- we had scheduled to return Q
4 t take a second look at that. issues after his report.
I had 5
asked for an independent look at that question after his 6
report.
7 That work got interrupted after Three Mile.
We 8
returned after Three Mile and in the light of Three Mile looked at it again and came to the conclusion that the
- p conclusion formed as a result of this work was ccrrect.
But 11 we did find that range of break sizes, which, if you then 12 terminated the pu::tp operation, it could possibly lead to a 13 te:nperature excursion.
34
=_
e And we discussed that with the Commission, and that i 15 i
f16 has led to this change in our reco:cmedation with regard to i
I running the pumps, yes.
37 Q
Is there controversy c: dist ont within B & W j,
about the recommendation for stopping the pump?
39 I
A Well, there is certainly a good deal of engineering 20 discussion, both within B & W and, I would say, everywhere in 21 c
the industry about it.
22 No one particularly thinks it's necessarily the 23 best thing to do.
For one thing, let me explain that we
.24 h.i mes.r
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are stopping the pump now co cover technically a small range of 25 I
1 E All A 7" ' V {
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123 Isp123 1
what we.:all non-mechanistze breaks.
Q 2
In other words, they are bigger; they are larger 3l in size than would.be creatad, f2r example, by shearing off h
1 4
any of the small connected piping to the reactor coolant 5
system or opening a valve or something that could conceivably 6
result from anything except a fairly gross -- and we think --
7 extremely unlikely failure of the main structure of the 8
piping itself.
9 Furthermore, they are bounded on the small end and 10 they are also bounded on the lar ge end.
Any larger failure f.
11 than about a half a. square foot opening would also make this i
12 a non-proble=.
13 So it's one of these safety situations in which 14 we, in order for it,to be a concern -- you have to compound 15 a number of what are, in my opinion, ler.t prob-bi~ity events.
16 The first is a break in the size ranger the second, that the 17 pu=ps continue operation and then cease to operate at just 18 the time period, which is delayed from the break *itself; and 19 then lasts for a time; and then it is no longer of concern --
20 to cause this concerin to happen.
21 Furthermore, it relies on fairly conservative --
c.
22 what are, in my opinion, fairly conservative calculations of 23 the cooling which would occur, the scaflood rate which would 24 occur in the system.
@u a w=n. sac.
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25 But nonetheless, in order to comply with any l
o l
124 a/'
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1 interpre.tation of the letter of the ruler, hure, we decided 1spl?4 (3) 2 to go ahead, after.we had explored the situation more 3l thoroughly, and recommend the pump cutoff to our ownern.
(]f d
We believe that -- and we have rece= mended to our 5
owners -- that that pump cutoff should be autenated and that 6
additional intelligence from the system should be placed into 7
the automated system to assure that that pump cutoff occurs B
only if you reach that precise range of conditions which was 9
of concern here.
w 10 Q
I believe we discussed off the record -- and I may II have neglected to ask it on the record -- for an opportunity 12 to examine B & W's guidelines or recommendations regarding 13 the reactor coolant pump operation subsequent to a small break.
Id We'd like to have that opportunity to examine those IS I documents.
And we'd like to include with that a request for t
16 any documents surrounding any controversy there may be 17 regarding the recommendations or guidelines which are made.
18 MR. EDGAR:
We'll try to locate what we have.
I' MR. DIENELT:
Thank you.
With that, I have nothing 20 further.
j' 21 (Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m..
the deposition was 4
22 adjourned.)
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24 4 he nnemn.tm 25 t
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