ML20024B157
| ML20024B157 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/15/1979 |
| From: | Roy D BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-*, TASK-GB GPU-6042, NUDOCS 8307070142 | |
| Download: ML20024B157 (28) | |
Text
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(-7 P 4 Lo o O I
Designations..om the NRC Special Inquiry Group I
Deposition of Donald H.
Roy, dated October 15, 1979:
12:7 - 12:18 12:19 - 13:21 13:22 - 14:16 i
14:17 - 16:10 16:11 - 16:25 17:1 - 18:8 18:9 - 19:4 19:5 - 20:21 20:22 - 21:24 21:25 - 22:6 22:7 - 22:21
/
22:22 - 23:22 23:23 - 24:1 24:2 - 24:17 31:1 - 31:10 41:9 - 41:25 42:1 - 43:19 43:20 - 44:1 50:7 - 50:12 50:13 - 51:4 I
e t
1 4
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O Donald H. Roy *(10/15/79) 51:5 - 51:11 51:12 - 53:11
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101:16 - 101:22 101:23 - 103:1 103:2 - 103:5 113:15 - 113:24 e
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pl2 A
Yes, he was.
O Was y r successor in your prior position h
2 Mr. Womack?
3 l
C A
Yes, h; vas.
Q Th'ere were no intervening persons in either jcb7 3
A No, sir.
Q When did you first learn of the TMI ircident?
7 A
I was informed by a telephone call from Mr. Spanglcr at approximately 8:00 a.m. on March 28th.
9 Q
Did Mr.Spangler say vhy he called you?
10 A
Yes, he stated there had been an incident at y;
Three Mile Irland 2.
The punt was offline.
There was not a 12 D
And I think we were-- we may have at that time discussed a 1
9 e
get together to discuss the -- discuss the incident.
g And I think we may have even scheduled it at that g
time -- 9:00 o' clock or 9:30 of that morning -- to get seme 37
{g of the engineers together to try to get the facts.
f
~ Q Do you recall anything else that he told you about g
the incident at that time?
,g A
I don't recall anything else, no.
g Q
Was there a procedure established pursuant co which g
Mr. Spengler would call you or pursuant to which the person g
who learned of an incident such as the TMI incident would 24 call you?
l 11
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lapl3 il A
A formal procequre such as would exist in our I
t 2
policy raanuals and so forthi tio.
Q I
l 3 Q
An informal procedure?
O 4
^
r:oe evea a tarormat e=oceaure, atenousa te woute 5
be quite appropriate for hhn to alert the engineering 6
department manager to an incident, something beyond a reactor 7
trip.
But no, nothing that had been established by some 8
9 routine or tradition.
10 Q
Do you know who else Mr. Spangler called or I
1) spoke to about the incident prior t3 th <t meeting that occurred 12 some time lat.er?
13 A
.I know Mr. Kosiba who manages our customer services 14 depart:nent.
Whether it was directly by Mr. Spangler or not, 15 I can't say.
16 At some point in time Mr. Womack was alerted, 17 perhaps by Mr. Spangler himself.
18 Those are the only two I can think of.
I don't 19 have dir.ct knot:1 edge of who he -- he specifically himself 20 alerted, but I know these were alerted, and most probably
_21 by Mr. Spangler.
s
^
~ 22 Q
Do you recall attending a meeting at approximately 23 9:00 a.m?
1 24 A
Yes.
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- n..n o n.cw=. inc.
25 Q
Between the time you received the call from
l 14 l
I isp14 Mr. Spangler and the meeting at 9:00 o' clock, did you talk i
t any n 1 e about the TMI incident?
h 2
3-A Yes.
I called, I believe, Mr. Wemack.
Thzintent O
or tne catt was to atere aruce xarrasch-sr xarr^sch heaa=
4 ur Plant integration section and has had some familiarity 5
with dealing with incidents at the plants in terme of 6
assessing what' has occurred and what action wor.ld be appropriati:.
7 And I trileve I discussed it with Mr. Womack at that time.
8 l
We g t together for a short period of time, and I 9
think this was before our 9:00 a.m. meeting downstairs in the 10
)
service arer.
just outside Mr. Spangler's office, just prior gj to meeting down in the service area.
12 Q
Who is "we" in this context?
33 A
I -- a number of people were there; I think gg Mr. Karrasch.
I believe Joe Kelly may have been there.
I g3 don't recall the others, who may have been there at the time.
16 3
y Q
Do you know whether Mr. Deddens was there?
A He may have been, but I don't recall the specific gg people there at that time.
j, Q
Going back to your conv rsation with Mr. Womack, 20 did you give Mr. Womack any instructions or make any requests 21 f him?
22 l A
I think this, phone call was with Mr. Womack -- at 23 the time it was to alert Bruce to getting a team, some l, ins. l 24 4w w n es.,i pe pie together to dispatch them to the site *.o gather data, 75
=:
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I 15 much as we had done on -- in similar incidents.
!sp15 O
1 ehink he may have a1=cadv been aware of the 2
incident at that time.
I just can't recall that right now.
3 O
nue the idea was to alert them that we had an incident at t,
the plant that was probably going t. require followup action 3
in assessing -- get at the facts of the incident and assess 6
impact of the incident in terms of starting the plant back up 7
- 9"i"*
8 And I may have at that time have told him that 9
we were getting together flill Spang1er and others -- they 10 will be getting together at 9:00 o'c1ock.
g)
I know I recall mentioning that to him.
Whether I12
'"""" "*" *"Y """"**"" *" " ""*"""** " -- 2 '"*"x ' did ^*
O is that time -- Sill and I had already talked abour getting a couple j4 of pe pie togehter to talk about it and see what action would 15 be required.
e 16 Q
Do I understand correctly that there had been 37 prior instances in which you had arranged directly or jg f
indirectly to have Mr. Karrasch have some role in assisti;..y g,
the utility?
20 A
Yes.
And, well, not so much specifically assisting 21
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O 22 far as gathering the facts and working with the utility to 23 l
O see what the next action should be.
24 g
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Yes, we had had an upset at the -- I don't recall r
5 I
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16 :
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l tspl6 the time frate right now at the SMUD plant, a loss of non-nucl ar in trumentation powe'r there.
h 2
I In that particular case, I had asked Mr. Karrasch 3
O to takc the lead in getting an engineering team together to 4
gather the facts for that -- for that pr.rticular incident 3
and to take charge of the assessment of what would be required 6
to start the plant, and so forth.
Mid he had had -- worked with a number of the people 8
in customer service and engineering to carry out that task.
9 It was an ongoing effort following the upset.
10 A
0 Was it y ur understanding prior to the 9:00 o' clock
,.y meeting that ene individual was in charge of B & W's 12 response to the TMI incident?
33 A
We normally would work w.th contacts through the 3,
customer service department.
In this particular instance, 33 I can't say I formally viewed him as in charge of some 16 particular organization, but the responsibility at that time 37 fell, to my mind, in R. Spangler's sphere, as least as far
, jg as the initial reaction here in responding to this incident 39 at the plant.
20 He had called me and it seemed appropriate for him 21 to do so, the service mar.ager.
And so I think, at least in an 22 inf rmal way, I w uld have viewed him as the man to have pulle i 23 together and coordinated the activities of our two departments O
24 pUcn.a.mr.i=.
in responding to the incident.
33 i
1
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Q At or af ter the 9:00 o' clock raceting, did you h
2 come to an understanding of whether there was another person 3
apart frc: Mr. Spangler who was in charge?
O (eau =e >
4 l
3 A
Subsequent to the 9:00 o' clock meeting?
6 Q
At or after?
A No, not that I can recall.
j 7
l 8
Q As for as you understood at that time, Mr. Spangler l
9 was still in charge?
10 A
Yes.
I had been talking to him 7.nd contacting 11 him.
12 Q
Just so that I will be clear, the actions that you 13 took were not in response to or prescribed by any formal 34 procedure that existed?
13 A
No, they were not.
16 Q
But you took tartain measures because they were the i
17 same or similar to ones you had taken in response to other 13 incidents.
19 A
Yes.
I might mention with respect to the 20 lead -- certain -- later on during the morning and that 21 day, Mr. Deddens was acting as general manager, and more and 22 more as we were concerning ourselven with communications 23 with GPU and that sort of thing,Mr. Dedwens moved in to help; 24 probably represented a high authority at work on that lq
. con neuenm e nc.
p3 particular day as the events unfolded.
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Mr. Spangler is in the customer service arca?
l y
h A
Y s, he wa s.
2 0
He was?
3 O
^
nis t-a 0
What was his relationship to Mr. Kosiba?
5 A
I think he reported to Mr. Kosiba through Andy 6
Olds.
I believe that was the organi::ation in place at that 7
ti:ne.
~
Q Do you recall discussing the team which would be sent to TMI with Mr. Womack prior to the 9:00 o' clock meeting?
10 A
I can't recall whether we did or not here.
I think gg I did.
I think I suggested to Allan one or more members that 12 O
We had relied on these fellows previously.
y g
And I think I may have mentioned it to him before we g t down to the 9:00 o clock meeting.
16 Q
Was part of the res. son why you had Mr. Kally in 37 mind his knowledges of his role in connection with the 18 transient or transients that had occurred at Davis-Besse?
g A
No, not specifically then.
Mr. Kelly had had 20 extensive field servin and knew his way around tne plant quite 21
"*11*
22 And he had in plant integration demonstrated, at 23 least in conversations with me, a good understanding of the 24 i,-w n.anm w.
l P ant.
25
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19 f
ispl9 b.g So he represented co.nider expertise, coupled O
/
witu unaerotaaateu or the etant in ene cieta, navine come to 2
us from field acrvice.
I think that would be the primary 3
O rea=en I think et ace.
I r-O Did you make any suggestions or recommendations
'5 to Mr. Spangler during your telephone call?
6 A
Honn that I recall.. I'm not sure whether I suggested 7
the get together or he did.
But I don't recall any specific 8
suggestions at that time.
9 Q
You may have given me part of this answer, but 10 indulge me if you have.
g What, as you understood it, prior to the 9:00 12
' clock meeting was the nature of the problem at T:!I?
Q 13 (Pause.)
yg A
I've tried many times lately to recall exactly 15 what Mr. Spangler transm'itted to me, even to the extent 16 now that I know it was a loss of main fe 2dwater event.
I j7 think that's true.
jg I might have known we had a loss of main feedwater 39 at the plant; reactor trip; but not much more information 20 than that was communiested, I'm st:.re, during the telephone 21 call.
22 Q
Do you rec.sil whether there was any reference to 23 h
fuel damage or fuel failure?
24 weoere neoomo,inc.
A No, I'm definitely sure there was no reference at 25 E
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20 lI
- p20 that time to that aspect of it.
l Q
All right.
What transpired at the mooting which h
2 cc,trred with Spangler and others prior t ; the 9:00 o' clock 3
Q meeting?
4 A
The only thing I can recall specifically is one --
3 s me discussion about who should be at the 9:00 o' clock meetinc 6
pcopic we might -- still were thinking about making sure we 7
had all the right peopic that we could possibly think of at f9 that timo at the meeting.
It seems to me that that was part of the, di.scussion; 3g the only other thing I can recall about that meeting was 11 Bill cither trying to call or having a conversation with 12 O
My recollection right now is that he was still j,
trying to call or trying to get a telephone call back up there 33 t get addition informatitn.
t 16 We wore sort of standing just outside nis office at 37 the time.
j, Those are the two things that still seem -- and 39 I know these seem like rather vague answers -- but I'm 20 c njuring up images as c nerctely as I can.
21 d ~s Q
How.nany people were present at the 9:00 o' clock 22 meeting 2 A
I don't know specifically, but we must have had 24 15 or 20 people in the room, I think at the time.
2
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21
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sp21 1
Q As best you recall, who was present?
(])
2 A
Let's see; I think we had Mr. Winks, Mr. Karrasch, 3
Mr. Womack, Mr. Spangler; I believe Mr. Kelly was there;
()
4 myself, neveral service personnel.
3 And I can't recall specifically.
For example, 6
I'm sure the service manager was there, but right now I've forgottsn which one that is; Mr. Janis or Mr. Luken, I think 7
s a
was there.
That's all I can --
9 Q
Do you recall whether Mr. Kosiba was there?
10 A
I don't recall whether he was there or not.
He
,11 may have been.
I don't know.
f 12 Q
Mr. Elliott?
13 A
Yes, I believe Mr. Elliott was there, I think.
14 Q
.Mr. LaBelle?
13 A
Yes, I belive Mr. LaBelle was there.
16 Q
Did you mention Mr.'Daddens?
17 A
I did not, l la Q
Was he there?
i 19 A
I can't recall whether he was there or not.
20 Q
Mr. Ward?
21 A-Ward?
I can't recall whether Mr. Ward was there 22 or not.
O.
l23 Q
Mr. Dunn?
d.
24 A
Yes, Mr. Dunn was there.
l w.m m in. A; l
23 Q
How long did the meeting take?
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22 l
l sp22 A
I would estimate an hour, perhaps in the hour Q
range, it'seems to me; maybe a little longer.
2 O
Would it be fair to characterize the meeting as 3
O a brie *1ao accatoa or "r seaaster feitowca av a sroue discussion of things to bo done or information to be obtaincd?
5 A
Y 8*
6 O
In the group discussion part, do you recall particular individuals who seemed to be leadingthe discussion or taking the primary role in it?
9 (Pause.)
l 10 I;
A I think Mr. Womack was particularly helpful; g
Mr. Karrasch -- I think I recall Mr. Karrasch talking about 12 s me f the information needs and making certain we had prepark d Q
13 a list of the kind of information needs that the team should 9
take with them.
15 Tat was one element of it.
I just don't recall 16 any f the other subjects.
Perhaps communication, it seems 17
""' """" "P' 18 C
Was Mr. Twilley present at that meeting,.to your 19 f
knowlecge?
2,,
A I don't recall whether he was or not.
21
- ::'C Q
At the meeting what, if anything, do you recall 22 having been discussed about the status of the high pressure 23 injection?
24
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23
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sp23 A
I don't recall that being discussed in the context i
1
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'f that we had, you know, any iriformation or what the status l
was there.
O 7.t may have certainly come up that that was one of the pieces of information that we wanted to know about.
I don't recall a discussion of that specif cally.
0 Was there discussion of the possibility of fuel 7
damage or fuel failure?
A No, I don't think so.
I don't recall any such 9
discussion.
O Was there any discussion of the possibility of g
core uncovery?
A At that particular meeting, I -- I don't think so.
Q Do you recall discussion about the status of the reactor coolanc pumps?
g A
No, I don't recall a discussion of them.
g Q
Do you recall discussions about the PORV7 A
No, not at this meeting.
Q Do you recall discussion about the hot and cold g
leg temperatures?
A If we did, it would be in thu context of some
_ information needs that we had at that time.
O a2_
~
Q Do you know whether Mr. Kelly or Mr. Dunn at that 23 meeting made any reference to or drew any analogy to the 24 Davis-Desse incidents?
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1 24
- O sp24 A
tio, I don't recall any such reference.
I I
h
[ r-0 Do you recall cither of them making that analogy to you during the first severai days of the incident?
3 O
i, a
rhe eirst severet days -- 1e came ue at scme paine subsequent to the accident, the reference to the activicies 5
n the -- the memo which we had reviewed; "we" being plant 6
i design and spccifically Mr. Dunn had reviewed the Davis-Besse 7
transient and cautioned -- suggested a cautionary note; you g
know, go to.our customers regarding securing high pressure 9
injection on pressurizer level alone.
10 That came up at some point,and I -- it may have g;
been in the first several days, We wem c.snsidering -- you 12 know -- very shortly after the accident a site instruction Q
13 regarding this securing of the high pres;ure injection.
34 And at some point in time -- I just can't say 33 how many days or several days'-- we did draw this reference 16 to the Dvis-Besso incident.
37 L
0 What, as you understood it,at the time of that 18 meeting was the utility doing to respond to the incident?
g9 A
I did not -- and I don't think we did -- have 20 any idea what the utility was doing at that time.
21 O
m:st wer.c the predominant conecrns of the group 22 with respect to the incident at the meeting?
23 A
I think certainly the number one one would be to Q
74 4co-a anwn inc.
find out what happened -- you know -- up until at least that 25
.____._.__m-_.__
g 31
.1 p31 Q
Were you present in the project control center
~
Q when a phone call was received from Mr. Schaedel in the 2
pori d between 11:45 and noon?
3 O
(rause.)
I don't recall specifically sitting here, but I A
3 was standing by that squawk box on one or more phone calls 6
that Mr. Schaecel made back to us and was transmitting various 7
pieces of information.
And I very, very likely was present at that particular one, but I don't call that specific sitting in.
10 Do you recall whether there were any communications u
]j
'.tweer. B & W in Lynchburg and anyone at or near the site 12 pri r to 11:45 or 12:00 when, according to the Wandling Q
13 log a telephone call was received from Mr. Schaedel?
y, 2
The question is whether you can recall any 15 communications between B & W in Lynchburg and anyone at or 16 near the TMI site, whether from B & W or the utility, prior 37 to the 11: 45 call, which was received, according ta the
- g,
Wandling log, from Mr. Schaedel.
39 A
No, I dcn't recall any such communications, 20 Is'it fair to say that efforts were being made to Q
g get through but none of them were successful at that point?
22 A
Yes, sir, right.
As I said, that was the number 23 two issue at our 9:00 o' clock discussion.
24 Q
Do you recall when a direct line was established Wette M*0Criert, l AC, 25
___--.m..._.
41
.sp41 at the plant.
O 2'
""Y "" '"" """" Y " * " "" " """' i" ""PP "*"9-y u can imagine all kinds of things.
But I think at that 3
Q particular time:
what is the status of the plant in terms 4
f those information needs we had identified at the 9:00 o'cloct 5
meeting.
6 It would seem to me that was the biggest. concern, as 7
I recall today, as I think back on the early portion of that --
of that accident.
r Q
At any p int during the af ternoon or evening of the 10 28th, were you of the view that the problem at TMI was a g
very serious one?
12 A
Up until -- until the late evening on the 28th, 13 certainly not in terms of what has unfolded since, the j,
extensive amount of core damage that occurred.
Through the 15 course of that day, that simply did not occur to me that we 16 had an event with a substantial period of core uncovery and
- 7 fuel rupture and cladding oxidation and the consequences that 3,
/
would proceed from that did not occur to me or loom in my mind 39 during that first day.
20 Q
I take it no one discussed those possibilities with 21 y u the first day.
22 A
Those xinds of things -- I don't recall any 23 such conversation and certainly no fears or, A, this looks 24
.N,enunn s ac.
like that might have occurred or, B, occurring.
25 It just didn't occur to me that first day.
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l sp42 O
When did you first conclude or first hear of anyone Q
expr scing that kind of concern?
2i I
A I think in reaching for the first inklings that 3
O we hed some other than -- you know -- a toss oe -- tose of 4
main feedwater.was when later in the afternoon wo determined 3
we had super heated conditions in this core.
That's the 6
first red flag that begins to go up.
7 At one point in time -- and I think the first day --
8 we began to get the reports of high rediation levels and 9
s me v ry high ones.
10 It seems to me they varied all across the spectrum 11 that first day, from a few millirems -- and we're talking 12 about now dose in the containment building -- up to, I think, 33 some thousands of r per hour.
34 I don't know'h'ow they unfolded during that first 15 day and leading on to the second da;, bu' it seemed liFu there 16 were, I recall, information on high radiation, very high 37 radiation doses in the dome of the building.
j, Now -- but then the questions would come about 39 instrumentation error, whether there was moisture in the 20 detectors themselves.
And other red flags go up then.
21 But certainly.;4 had some -- perhaps we had some 22 Core damage, and -- you know ~~ not able to bound of to gain 3
an image of the extent of the core damage.
24 s rv n n.i. in S
during the latter pe.rt of the afternoon, red 23
.n.-..
43 l
sp43 flags began to emerge that certain1.s we had more than a loss h
f m in feedwat r accident here; the possibility of some 2
e re damagc.
3 O
Later on -- it may have been the next day -- I'm I,
trying to remember when the thermocouple story unfolded and 3
we started to get some information regarding in-core 6
thermocouples.
7 And that begins to add to the total picture.
g of c urse, the hydrogen bubble was the thing that 9
really brings it all together, significanc amounts of hydrogen, go significant amounts of metal to water oxidation, significant g3 amounts of core uncovery.
12 It all begins to fall -- to fall into place.
33 As to when I was specifically -- specifically when 34 1
I was well aware of extensive core damage, I just can't g3 16 put my finger on it.
Certainly, the first day, I must say I did not
- 7 have an image of extensive core damage kind of problem that jg we were ultimately faced with.
j9 Q
Do you recall whether you were aware that there had been uncovery of the core at all during the first day?
21 A
No, certainly nothing that would say we have had 22 core uncovery.
23 I don't recall that anyt dng anything that would Q-24 rson s newm, tac.
25 support that kind of picture occurring at the plant during
l-44 I
the fi"st day.
sp44 0
Were you involved during the afternoon and Q
2 evening f the 28th in discussions regarding high pressure 3
O 1asectiont 4
A Yes.-
At some point in the af ternoon we had put 3
together enough information to know we were super heating.
6 Concerns we raised about the high pressure injection syste n 7
and about whether it was all with adequate flow.
8 And I recall that we generated a very -- discussed 9
a very simplistic instruction that t a wanted to get through:
10 get th'c IIPI flow up, gg gj I think Mr. Dunn perhnpa was the one who established or suggested that a thzt we ought to try to achieve 400 --
A 13 V
g4 450 gpm.
Later on we talked about getting a reactor coolant 15 pump on, whenver informntion developed about the status of the 16 17
- Pumps, Thosu two things loom in my mind as one of the --
gg the single event in which we formulated real concern about the 19 high pressure injection flow in core cooling, to be sure that 20 we had and maintained adequate core cooling.
21 And this precipitated one of the calls -- or at 22 least t4 call trying to get ahold of Bob Arnold at GPU, trying 23 to get that message through.
C 24 ww ne:=nm iu.
It was one avenuo that we had tried to use to get 25
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cp50 the core flood tanks, and that occurred something like maybe O
five or six hours or something like that after trip.
2 So that would put us in that day -- the tine --
O six hours thae we wouta have heen aware of the:2 d=oggine the pressure down, I think, to the best of my recollection 3
I right now.
J
}
'Q Do you recall concluding or hearing anyone say during the 28th that the depressurization strategy -- if I
- 'Y'
- Y
~~
9 A
No, I don't recall.
I don't even -- the -- recall g
tho term "depressurization strategy."
I don't recall that 3;
coming up in our conversations on the first day g
Q Well, do you recall anyone referring to the e
efforts to depressurize that you just indicated you were g
aware of at some point as the wrong strategy or the wrong g
approach or the wrong technique?
g A
I don't recall it.
I don't recall such a g
conversation.
^*
" Y "I
19 a strategy, I take it.
T11E WITNESS:
Yes, yes, of a strategy being the g
i 1
wrong thing to do.
)
{ 22 Liko I say, it seems to de like we know they were 23 going to depressurize or try to depressurize to get en the g
7' core flood tank.
A
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51 l
And whether I knew that loc. king backwards now
- p 51 j
g r whet.hcr that was en the first day or not, I'm not sure.
h 2
Dut certainly I don't recall anything where that was the 3
Q 5:rong thing to do.
I don't recall tiat conversation.
BY I4R. DIENELT:
O Do you racall anybody raising a question about whether that was the right thing to do?
7 A
No, I don't.
It doesn't mean that might not have happened, but 9
I certainly don't recall it.
And I wasn't in the control to conter most of the time as we were assessing this data, gg u
Q Was the recon:nendation that was made to establish 12 or increase the high pressure injection flow consistent 13 with depressurization?
3,
=.
2 A
No.
If your system is bottled up and you're 33 going to initiate high pressure injection, you can expect the 16 pressure to go up.
It -- at the same time you might depressur.'.=e 37 to increase the haad, the flow generated by the high pressure gg injection pu=ps.
39 But I don't recall any conversation where we talked 20 about -- you know -- let's depressurize so we can maximi =e 21 the flow to the primary system in conjunction with getting
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22 arI on.
Q Was it your understanding that the recommendation O
24 i/w aw to increase the !!PI flow in effect subsumed a recommendation n, =.
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or had carried with it an assumption that pressure would i""#""""7 h
2 A
No, I d n't recall being concerned about the 3
h pressure resporc e at that pa-ticular time.
It seemed to 4
me -- I don't 'know what the pressure was at the time.
3 We were really Pressing this recommendation.
I 6
would guess right now -- you know -- 1100 psi or so range.
7 It wouldn't be concerned -- what we were trying to do, was get the cold water in there and get the system subcooled.
9 MR. EDGAR:
Isn't -- isn't -- if you turn on g
HPI, isn,'t thero an implied decision that you're going to y
/- -
push it back up?
12 THE WITNESSs, Right.
Yr a're goin7 to -- nor.mally 33 you'd expect to pressurize the plant if you can get the HPI 34 on.
33 IY MR. DIENELT 16 Q
I take it that -
37 A
Anh there --
- g Q
Excuse me.
Go ahead.
3, A
And wherever we were looking at pressure, we 20 were concerned about that.
But certainly you, when you get 2I the HPI on, you can pressurize the system if it's closed.
22 Q
Were you aware of any specific recommendation on 23 the 28th which was made by B & W in Lynchburg to the utility f O -@
24 to inc*rease the pressurs?
25 I
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p53 A
When 5.: V.9re talking about getting the reactor y
e lant pump n, it seems to me wo expressed a concern about 2
having the pressure up and cchieving a good, safe net 3
positive suction head for the start of the reactor coolant 4
1 pump, at least'with respect to the first day.
3 i
Now, later on, we were concer. sed with things like 6
natural circulation, thinking about getting the pressure 7
UP in de system.
8 But that first day it seemed to me like the 9
discus.Jor was with respect to starting the reactor 10 coolant pumps.
gg 1
Q other than thr recomendations on the first day 12 regarding high pressure injection and the reactor coolant Q
13 pumps, were there additional reccm endations made?
j,
=.
A They were the only two that I am aware of, based 3
on our inf rmation on the plant.
16 We were constantly recommending some better 97 communication path, getting a tie in some way between the y,
site and ourselves.
3 But those -- the two with respect to EPI and l
20 reactor coolant pumps were the focus and the only ones I g
recall on the fire.t day.
y Q
Did you talk to Mr. Schaedel during the first 22 day?
h 24 A
I may have; it was on the squawk box in the reactor, d
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I 177 owners' group in San Francisco on March 6 and 7, 19777 dsp101 3
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l Q
Yes, sir.
l 3
A No, I don't recall.
4 Q
Are you familiar with any expression of concern 3
by the owners' group at about that time with regard to a 6
lack of or a breakdown in the information flow to them from 7
B&W 8
A No, I am not aware of that w.currence.
9 Q
Prior to the THI incident --
10 THE WITNESS:
Could we take a quick break?
gj MR. DIENELT: Absolutely.
12 G
(Brief, recess.)
33 MR. DIINELT:
Let's go back on the record.
g4 BY MR. DIENELT:
33 14
.Q Prior to the TMI incident, did B & W have any written procedure or set of recoumendations regarding the 37 plant emergancy conditions under which a & W would recommend jg throttling or cutting back EPI from full flow?
39 A
No, we had no procedures and had transmitted no 20 Procedures in the form of a site instruction or draft 21 procedure of that type dealing.with that issue.
22 Q
Do you recall any discussions that you had with 22 any Pernons regarding the circumstances under which you would h
24 make a recommendation for throttling HPI from full flow?
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The discussions on that subject and the concern 3
~O raised cbout throttling or terminating high pressure 2
I injection flo.' on the basis of pressurizer information came 3
after the Davia-Besse incident which led to the Bert Dunn 4
l
- 8*
5 In my discussions -- that occurred first, to my 6
memory, with Mr. Dunn himself some time afte'r the' Davis-Besse; 4'
l ' t_
7 I don't remember the exact time in which he expressed this g
concern that he had detected after reviewing the sequence of events at Davis-Besse.
4 10 I had asked for a review of that transient --this
- j is the September 1977 transient at Davis-Besse -- for purposes 12 s'
of code verificacion and cosparisons as to what our predictions 33 would be using the codes.
14 And I thouglit Mr.- Dunn'* conversation with me at l
33 th that time was a consequence of that review.
I found out later that' discussions on that issue had been occurring through 37 f
otaar channels sometime before my conversation with; Mr. Dunn.
jg But Mr. Dunn expresse'd that concern to me and asked 39 my opini n about getting -- getting so:e warning or caution 20 out and getti g it to the customers and raising the issue.
p 21 And I said yes, that is certainly a legitinate concern, and 22 we ought to write that up and get it out.
23 And that led to the first memo that I was aware of, 24 Ae Federal Repertos, 18 4.
h which was the memo to Mr. Taylor in 1 consing, in which ho 3
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sixpressed that concern.
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Q Subsequent to your conversation with Mr. Dunn, did i
h 2
you have any role in attempt 2.ng to get out a procedure or 3
[
alte instruction with regard to !!PI?
4 A
No, I didn't.
3 g
Q Ha*fe you formed any opinion regarding the 6
adequacy of the control recm console and layout design at TMI-27 7
A No, I haven't.
I don't know the control room in g
detail at Three Mile Island.
So I formed no opinion on the --
9 specific opinion on the adequacy and inadequacy.
10 s
Certainly the issues that ha'sa arisen ought to be 11 t
looked at on the generic issues of control room layout and 12 i
control room des!.gn.
33 But I haven't' reviewed TMI-2 specifically and said ja 2
these are the kinds of changes I would have made or done 13 gg differently.
I}
I haven't done that.
17 1g Q
Have you compared the control room design and layout at TMI-2 to other control room designs and layouts?
19 20 A
No, I haven't.
No, I haven't.
And I don't think we have here.
21 22 Q
Do you have or do persons working for you have interaction with the utilities or your custome;s regarding the 23 formulation or implementation of their emergency, procedures?
24 2
Prior to Three Mile Island?
1
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113 loss of coolant accident, as well as transmitted to our dopil3 y
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(3) 2 customers.
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0 Is that a three volume --
()
4 A
Yes, sir, it is.
3 Q
Were you familiar with any efforts on March 28th 6
to simulate the THI accident?
7 A
'I recall that -- that a simulation of it was I believe attempted on our simuistor in the training room.
3 that the Het Ed operator who was with us at the time was part 9
to of the simulation.
I was just aware of that really in a peripheral 11' I was not a part really of that simulation activity 12 way.
13 going on.
But I knew it was going on.
14 (2)
Do you know whether the simulator is capable of 13 Q
simulating a transient in which there is super heat in the to 1
17 core?
Prior to Three Mile Island, I don't ghink the 18 A
simulator would have been capable of handling extensive 19 20 voiding in the primary system.
Now, that simulation ode' has been upgraded 21 I couldn't considerably a.7 whether it could today or not, d
l
'22 23 answer that.
The training department could.
But I know there has been -- there have been extensions of that model.
f*)
24 Aa.rW&en-+- b -
23 Q
Have you received training on the 8 4.W simulator?
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