ML20024B156
| ML20024B156 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/07/1979 |
| From: | Roy D BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-*, TASK-GB GPU-6041, NUDOCS 8307070136 | |
| Download: ML20024B156 (34) | |
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Designations from the President's Commission Deposition of Donald H. Roy, dated July'7, 1979:
8:11 - 8:15 8:24 - 9:14 9:15 - 10:6 11:6 - 13:5 13:6 - 13:19 13:25 - 14:19 18:8 - 19:3 19:17 - 21:20 22:24 - 25:6 26:8 - 26:16 32:3 - 32:23 34:5 - 35:8 37:15 - 39/40:8 s
44:4 - 46:3 49:4 - 50:9 62:5 - 62:19 83:6 - 83:13 87:11 - 88:10 94:9 - 94:12 95:5 - R5:18 c
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3 of 1978, is that correc:7 4
A Yes, sir, from April 1,
1974 to August 1,
1978.
l Q
Dur'.ng that time was there a unit in 3
the Plant Design Section known as ECCS Analysis?
A Yas.
7 Q
And am I correct that Mr. Bert Dunn was 8
head of that unit starting sometime in, I believe, 9
19757 10 x
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p 11 Q
Mr. Roy, did you become aware at some Q
point during the time you were manager of the Design section of a transient which occurred at Davis-Besse 13 on September 24, 19777 A
Yes.
15 9
when did,you first bactme aware of tha 16 transient?
17 A
I can't pinpoint exactly the time I became 18 aware of it -- sometime after the transient itself, 19 perhaps in the two-weeks range, one to two-week gg range.
g Q
Do you recall whether you attended a briefing by Mr. Faist and Mr. Kelly on that transient following their return from Davis Besse?
23 f
A I don't recall attending the briefing.
24 Q
'When you became aware of the transient, 25 what information came to your attention 7 y.
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3 A
A rough outline of the sequence of events 4
that occurred.
I recall the loss of main feedwater and stuck-open pilot-operated relief valves were major a
features of the course of the transient.
6 Q
Are there 'any other f acts which stick 7
out in your mind that describe the transient?
8 A
They are the only ones that stick out in nr 9
ind right now.
I am sure I had a more detailed 10 description of it.
I am not even sure of how I became 11 aware of it.
It might have been a verbal discussion 13 with one of the service people or one of the people g
in Plant Design.
That is the only feature that I can recall right now.
Q At some point following that transient, did you become aware,of a concern which had been 16
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raised regarding the premature or what was believed 17 to be premature termination of high-pressure injec-18 tion during the course of the transient 7 l9 A
Yes, Mr. Duna brought that to my attention.
I 20 don't recall exactly when, but he did. discuss that 21 with me in the office and had recommended that we take action to provide some guidance and entar Lato dialogue with people to take some action on that concern.
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I can't recall now whether he had a sama 25 I
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drafted at that time or whether he drafted the 4
memo afterwards, but we did have dialogue on the
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concern he had about terminating high-pressure a
injection.
4 6
L Q
Showing you what has been marked as
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7 Womack Deposition Exhibit 24, can you tell me whether 8
you have seen that document before today?
9 A
Yes.
10
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Had you seen it before March 28,
)
11 A
Yes.
12 Q
Tell me when it came to your attention?
A I #**'" ****11 *****1Y "h*" I **" it 1" "hi" 13 form.
I can't recall now whether Mr. Dunn had 1,,
drafted it and we were 15 discussing the draft or whether -
16 g
Q Correction.
It is a memorandum draftad 17 by Mr. Kelly.
18 A
Ch, excuse me.
19 g
Take a moment to review it.
20 A
I'm sorry.
No, I had not seen this memo 21
- Prior to March 28th.
1 Q
You have since become aware of it2 l
22 Yes.
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Q Referring you to what has been marked 24 as Dunn Deposition Exhibit 35, had that document, 25 e
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which is a =e=orandu= fro = Walters to Kelly, come 4
to your attention before March 28, 19797 s-5 No, it had not.
A Q
Referring you to what has been ma=ked as Wamack Deposition Exhibit 23, had that document 7
come to your attention before March 28, 19797 8
A Yes, it had.
9 Q
Do you know when you.first saw it?
10 A
I don't recall exactly when I first saw it.
11 Q
Can you give me your best estimate.
12 A
I am sure it would be in the vicinity of g
the distribution date, February 9, or close in that ti=e frame.
Q How did it come to your attention?
For the record, I note that you were not on the 16
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Therefore I an h
17 wondering - yes, you are --excuse me.
I am sorry.
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I see you would have gotten it in the normal course I
19 of distribution.
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20 A
Yes.
2}.
Q Did you have a chance to read it at the time it came to you?
'i A
Yes, I am sure I did read it.
E Q
And you have described a discussion P
24 that you had'had with M=.
Dunn in which he brought 25 1
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3 to your attention his concern about premature 4
termination of HPI, is that correct?
A Yes.
.3 Q
And you are not sure hether that conversation preceded this memorandum or followed it3 7
A I believe this one, as best I can recall, 8
that we discussed it verbally before he wrote the 9
memorandum, to-the best of my recollection, and I 10 -
remamber saying, "Yes, that is a valid. concern, you 11 know.
Wo.ought to take some action on it."
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.Q Was there any action agreed on between g
you and Mr. Dunn which was to be taken?
A I don't recall at thatl specific t_ime that we layed out the action planned.. I believe this memo then followed that conversation, as best I can 16 I think'$ hat was the extent of it, that remember.
17 we had discussed the technical concern and agreed 18 that we should take action, and that would presumably 19 lead to review among appropriate people, and if 20 that warranted at that time, to get some notification 21 out to affected cu s tome rs..
Q Yo11owing your conversation with Mr. Dunas did you raise the subject at your own intiative with 1
anyone elss?
I A
No, I'did not, not that I can recall.
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-Q Die anyone other than Mr. Duna rais e 4
the subject with you?
A No, they didn't, not that I recall,
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Do you recall whether you received, on 6
I or about the date of February 16th, the second 7
Dunn memorandum on that subject which we have 8
marked as Exhibit 367 9
A Right now I don't recall specifically seeing 10 it.
It is very likely that I did receive it.'
I 11 just don't recall the circumstances of having
-12 it come to my memory right now, the specific meme.
g Q
Do you. recall th.e circumstance of a revised set of instructions or a revised prescription coming to your attention?
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A What I do seem to recall is that some accommo-16 dation had been reached with Field Service, as the-17 memo pointed out, but I don't recall drawing that 18 specifically from this memo, but I'm sure that is 19 where I have this recollection of it now.
20 Q
rollowing that initial conversatier 31 with Mr. Dunn which you already described, did ren 22 ever discuss the matter with him again before March 28, 19797 A
No, I don't recall discussing it with him again.
24
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3 best of your understanding, yo: had a conversation 4
with Mr. Dunn about the concerns expressed in his
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February 9th memorandum, that there was some shared 5
sense between you that some action was required, is that correct 2
.7 A
Yes.
i 8
Q And then you saw the memorandam of 9
February 9th and recall reading it, is that correct?
10 A
I don't specifically recall seeing that memo 11 back then.
I am sure I must because I have this 12 recollection that action was being taken.
We had.
g arrived at some accommodation with Field Service, and I must have drawn that conclusionfrom this memo.
Q And then after that recollection you have of the fact that some action was being taken, 16 that the subject did not come up at least in conver.-
17 sations or in writing with you again before the 28th 10 of March 19797 19 A
No, not that I recall.
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Let me just ask you an additional 21 question.
I show you Ezhibit 17 and ask you whether y u ever saw that memorandum befors the 28th of 2
g March 19797 d
j A
No, I had not.
i 24 Q
"I'n the period of February 1978, was there-25
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eddressed?
4 A
I believe they are addressed to the manager
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At that time that would have been Mr. Taylor?
7 A
Yes.
.Q Referring to Mr. Dunn s first memoranduc 9
of February 9, 1978, do the issues raised in that.
10 nenorandum constitute what you would regard as a 11 safety concern, and if you want to take a moment to 12 review it, please feel free to do so?
A Yes, I believe as far as the raising of a g3 concern potentially affecting the safe operation of plants, it qualifies in that sense.
i Whether it qualifies in the sense as may be
,5 16 defined in the procedure, I don't know, but as a i
17 concern for a potential safety concern, yes, I eftf rile l
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it does.
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It would be fai.e to say that the issues 20 raised there do relate to plant safety?
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safe operation of the plant.
It relates tar an observation by Mr. Du.nu that action taken in i
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the course of the transient at Davis Basse was 23 inappropriate, and raised a. concern in his misd 24 g
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to be addressed.
4 Q
During the meeting you had with Mr. Dunn,
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did y u indi ate t him that the proper manner for 5
him to raise the concern tha t he expressed to you was through this procedcre which was 7
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in place?
4 A
No, I did not refer him specifically to the 8
procedure at that particular time.
9 Q
Would it have been your assumption, in 10 reading his rebruary 9th memorandum, assuming you 11 did read it and you believe you did, that since it 12 was addressed to the manager of the Licensing Section, g
the memorandum would be plugged into the procedure that was then in existence?
14 A
I don't recall assuming anything along that line at the time as.,regards it being picked up at 2
16 some point in time in the PSC procedure.
I l7 Q
Given your knowledge of the procedures 18 as they then axisted, and in light of the contents 19 of the memorandum, and in light of the person to whan 20 it is addressed, would it be your judgment that 21 the kind of document that that memorander is, Exhibit 23, would normally be picked up in the procedures for handling safety concerns?
i 23 i
A I think that is an appropriate sachanism to 24 i
pick up cone' erns.
Obviously that is one that is.'
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in place.
4 I think that in this particular case, the r-
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was directed to people who could come together and consider appropriate action for it.
I think that the procedure represents an appropriate means for 8
getting these types of potential safety concerns 9
made visible, getting them out and getting people 10 ga ge rlter, 11 I think there are five elements in dealing 12 with these kinds of concerns.
One is that they do g
emerge; they are made visible.
Two, that we bring together appropriate parties to considerthem, appro-priate people.
Three, a review takes place and decisions are madg and technical aspects of it are e
16 appropriately researched.
Four, the decisions are 17 made, and five, closure is achieved.
The procedure 18 does that.
19 That doesn't preclude a process such as 20 happened in this.ong achieving the same end, het I I
21 think the procedures are certainly e cre :pp;c;riate g
way.
I would encourage that to be the mechanism when C
that occurs to me.
23 Q
Given the content el ths February Eth.
24 memorandum, 'given the fact that it was addressed to 25 8
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concerns would normally be addressed a
A Yes.
6 Q
And given your understanding of the 7
procedure, is there any reason you know of why a 8
memorandum such as this would not have been simply 9
plugged into the procedure for handling safety con-10 cerns?
11 A
No, I can't think of a reas.,n unless the parties that were 12 dealing with it felt appropr,,iate action was being taken, and it just did not occur to them to plug it into the documented procedure 14 route.
Q But other than that, there would be no 15 reasca from looking at the memorandum and knowing 16 i
its ce;ntent, to believe that it wouldn' t be picked 17 up and handled according to the procedures that then 18 existed, is that correct?
l 19 A
I know of no reason why it could not have been, L
_ based on the contants of the memo itself.
20 Q
To y,our understanding, would the single j
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as opposed to a form entitled " Preliminary Safety-l 23 Concern," preclude it being. handled within the scope
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concerns?
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A That would not necessarily in my view preclude 4
it from moving through these five steps that I have 5
enumerated, which would constitute a reasonable way of handling safety concerns.
Q Well, I am talking specifically now about the proce. dure.
Are the five steps enumerated, B
understanding vnat the procedure is and what it does--
9 A
I think certainly the procedure tries teachieve i
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that, yes.
11 Q
I guess my question specifically, though, l
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to the procedure that then existed, is,the single fact that Mr. Dunn's thoughts were typed out on a 15 memorandum form as opposed to a Preliminary Safety I
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18 A
Well, I think the only we r they would have 19 g.: sten into the procedural path is at some point in 20 time these concerns be transfer =ed to. them yorn
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21 know, to the document itself, since the procedura 2
deals with a control documentation system for handling the concerns.
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Well, to your understanding, when a i
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7 A
I don't think that would preclude him from 8
suggesting perhaps to the person who is raising the 9
concern that it might be more appropriate to handle 10 this through the PSC.
I think its coming on a memo 11 might trigger the thought possibly that it needs El perhaps some better definition or some dialogue g
before casting it to the PSC.
That is a possibility.
Q Well, looking at the substance of this g
memorandum, the February 9th memorandum, does that lack the definition;its content necessary to fill 16 out a form entitled " Preliminary Safety Concern"7 17 A
To me this would be an appropriate concern to 18 put on the PSC.
How it might have appeared in the 19 minds of Mr. Dann or Mr. Taylor or others in the 20 sequence, I don't know.
21 g
Mr. Taylor certainly would have the s
authority to exercise the judgment that, even though Mr. Dunn's thoughts were recorded on a memorandum i
as opposed to a Preliminary Safety Concern form, that 24 in fact what'ha had in front of him was a prel4=4a= y 25 t
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safety concern and ought to be handled as such is 4
that correct?
A Yes, certainly, it being on a ne=orandu= form 3
would not preclude him from having that j udgment.
Q If he felt the issue being addressed were serious, he could simply act unilaterally to see that 8
it was handled in a manner that would lead to its 9
efficient resolution, would that be correct?
10 A
If he had arrived at that conclusion, yes, he 11 could act that way.
He could take those steps himself.
12 Q
Would it be possible for you to characterize, Mr. Roy, the concern -- and le'. me rephrase it slightly--
g would it be possible for you to characterize whether you viewed the concerns raised by Mr. Dunn in his February 9th memoran.dum as, to use a eciloquialism, 2
16 a " front burner problem" or "back burner problem *7 17 A
I arrived at no judgment as to whether it was 18 a fire drill type of exercise versus something that 19 we could do in a more leisurely fashion.
20 It seemed to me a concern which desarved to be 21 followed up at that time and to get responsible parties together, technical parties together, and ta 22 5
make an assessment of what the appropriate action was 23 Was that a legitimate potential safety issua?_
I 24 concurred with Bert that we ought to make this visibla i
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and get it out and aler the appropriate parties, 4
responsible parties, and make a determination and r-l g
through the review process and see what the I
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L Q
Would it be fair to say that a conce==
7 which relates to the possibility of core uncovery 8
and core damage would rank among the most serious 9
kinds of concerns that could be raisect?
10.
A You have to look at that in the context of 11 the events that can lead to that probability, but 12 certainly that is a concern.
It lies at the head of the regulations for protection against loss of 13 coolant accidents, itself.
Q And it lies at the heart of the main-tenance of a nuclear power plant if a condition 16 that is -
17 MR. EDGRR:
What lies?
18 MR. ROCKWELL:
The question of cooling 19 and covering of corer would that be accurater 20 THE WITNESS
- I think there are a lot o1 of issue that affect the basic or broad
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Certainly that is best achieved by keeping the core covered.
24 tou can havs a temperature transiaa.t, 25 M
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-and if the core became uncovered for so=e 4
length cf ting AT, to some depth and still r
5 meet the overall objective of protecting the public health and safety.
But certainly a very desirable obj ective toward that end is keeping the core cooled.
8 Q
To the best of your k.owledge, Mr. Roy, 9
were the concerns raised by Mr. Dunn in his memorandum 10 of February 9th ever conveyed to the utilities 11 operating with B&W NSS systems before March 28, 19797 12 A
To the best of my knowledge now, no, it was not g
transmitted to them prior to March 28th.
Q To the best of your knowled,ge, were g
Mr. Dunn's concerns transmitted to the Nuclear is, Regulatory Commission before March 28, 19797 i
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~A To the best of my knowledge, no, they were not.
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This is, by BEW7 E
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That is correct.
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Mr. Roy, at the time you were manager 20 of Plant Design Section in early 1978, who was 21 manager of Engineering?
l A
Mr.
J.
C. Deddens.
nn Q
Ware Mr. Dunn's concerns ever brought to the attention of Mr. Doddens', to your knowledge?
24 A
To my knowledge 7 25 W*
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Was the possibility :)1: stea= voiding 4
in the core might lead to a high prescurizer water 1 vel, n the one hand, and a low reactor coolant 5
inventory icvel, on the other, a known er predicted O
consequence of the B&W design before the fall of 7
19777 8
l A
To my knowledge, no, that wasn't.
We didn't 9
have analyses that were aware of the condition that 10 would lead to that, as later on, on the basis of 11 analyses and that sort of thing.
12 Q
That awareness would have occurred with~
g an understanding of the September 24th Davis-Basse transient, is that correct?
MR. EDGAR:
You mean that is the event 15 that triggered the understanding?
16 MR; ROCKWELL:
Tes.
17 A
I think that the knowledge that, say, an 18 experienced thermal hydraulic dynamicist or.thermo-19
. hydraulic engineer,.when confronted with the quartion, 20 could that happen, could there be conditions, probably l
21 could think that one through.
Catainly for me it surfaced with Bert Dunn's observations following DE-1.
Q You have indicated that the right experts, 24 given the hypothetical, could cons..ruct a scenario or 25 t
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investigate the pressuri=er level response, that co uld lead to that particular condition.
4 Q
In other words, the definition of " worst" a
in the phrase, " worst case," as it would be defined 6
and analy=ed, would relate to the si=e of the break?
7 A
Ucrually -- well, it relates normally and it 8
always relates to the response of the core, the 9
cooling temperature, giving break si=e and break 10 location, when one analy=es the response of the 11 clad system in metal to water reae. ion that occurs, 12 and that is the controlling factor in determining what the worst case is.
Q In othe= words, you back into the worst case by saying, "What effect would a typical 15 phenomenon have on cladding temperature," and than 16 when you find what appears to be the most severe 17 effect that a particular phenomenon would have on 18 the cladding temperature, that is highest cladding 19 temperature, you say that is the worst casa 7 1
20 A
That is the worst case.
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Q so would it be fair than to say that I
the way in which you analyze how cladding tempara-l 22 ture will respond to a particular phenomenon than 23 j
leads you to what'you define.as the worst case?
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A Right.
You are looking at a spectrum of break 1
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sizes and lecations, and sone locations ere worst 4
than others.
You confir= through this process that
.f you have identified, through the process, through the a
rules and regulations in Appendix K and 10CIR50.46, identified the worst case, as far as assessing care 7
coolant emergency performance.
8 MR EDGAR:
Off the record.
9 (There was discussion'off the record.)
10 (A brief recess was then taken.)
11 Q
oo I understand correctly, Mr. Roy, that t
the analysis that you make of the worst case is in a sense defined by the criteria set up in Appendir K7 g
A Yes.
The determination of what will be the worst case, as far as assessing acceptable DCCC la, performance, a systgg response is defined in these 16
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These criteria require that certain 17 initial conditions he assumed, failure conditions, 18 single failure conditions or the ECCS systems be 19 assumed, and that a prescription for how that 20 analysis is to be performed.
In order to assess i
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Q In a sense, the criteria set out by 1
Appendir K defines the kind o_f results you may get in 24 the worst ca'se analysis by focusing you on certain 25 factors?
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A Yes, to some degree, fro = the standpoint that 4
there conid be more complex arrays of lower proba-5 bi1L*Y' *1h*it th"* * "10 1**d *
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if you were to apply the assuuptic2s and criteria as called out in the regulations.
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Q And people who set out the criteria in i
8 Appendix K may or may not be accurate in terms of 9
what their assessment of the lower or high probabili-10 ties of certain events may be7 11 A
They represent in my view the consensus of the 12 regulatory authorities on what constitues a con-D servative assessment for loss of coolant accident l
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Q Let me ask you this, Mr. Roy.
Do you 16
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s find that when you have a regulatory scheme such as, 17 for instance, the requirement to do a worst case 18 analysis pursuant to the specifications and crite=La 19 laid out in Appendix K, that you ten 4 as a company 20 being regulated, then to define your inquiry by the 21 hounds of the regulatory framework and the response La l
in a sense t 22 the framework rather than to some other, f
possibly broader, set of criteria?
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Is that a result, to some extent, of the i
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tend to conform to thosa.
3 I won't say that if in doing those anElyses 0
j one were to find so=c situation where they raised a 7
concern about whether they were representative of 8
some real condition, that that would preclude you 9
from raising that concern.
Certainly I think they
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10 teria for, say, the ECCS. systems in the case of 10 CFR 50.46; I think they do for= the basis for 12 the system design requirements.
D Q
I understand that tho bounds of a par-i 14 ticular regulatory requirenant such as Appendix K 15 don' t preclude you 'from going farther, but as a prac-l 16 tical matter, do yo4* find on a day-to-day. basis that 17 to a certain extent these regulatory schemes, in i
gg effect, define the scope of your inquiry that peopla in a sense gear themselves toward answering the 19 1
particular question sthat are required to be answered 20 by the regulatory scheme?
~5 KR. EDGAR:
Is this confined to t
22 t
Appendix E7 23 xx. RocKwELL:
we are really talking l
24 about.a broader issue.
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MR. EDGAA:
Because Appendix K is a 4
particular case with a particular history.
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MR. ROCKWELL:
I understand that.
I
,a A
No, I think that is a fair statement that a.s a.
6 practica.1 matter in the day-to-day design and asserss-7 ment of the system, they would be your roadmap for 8
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-doing that design process.
9 Q
ror instance, we have been told that in.
10 co-tain of the training courses, the examination that l
11 is conducted of the people wh, are trained is simply 12 a mock NRC exam, and therefore, in a sense, the culmi-g nation of the training is directed, to that extent, toward an exam which has been defined by the regulatory scheme.
15 Are there are other examples of that which 16
'~
you know of where the process has to become defined 17 by the regu2atory scheme?
10 A
First, I can't speak to that particular example-19 as to its validity or not, or whether it is representa-20 tive generically as an approach to regulations.
I g
don't know of any examples that I would say fit the O
one you gave, where the process is -lust something-to pass the regulation.
23 It is not my view and not the experience of 24 the people I'have dealt with in the industry, and.
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Roy 44 3
(There was discussion off the record.)
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4 Q
Mr.-Roy, do you know whether customers 5
are pr vided with various engineering analyses that are performed here automatically, or generally do they have to request analyses of designs which apply to their particular NSSS syste=s before they get the=?
8 A
Well, there are a substantial number of 9
analyses that are supplied to the customer directly 10 without his asking.
They are either explicitly or 11 i=plicitly identified in the contract itself.
m I could think, for example, of the preliminary g
and final safety anaysis reports, topical reports dealing with his license applications, generally through the process of the licensing of the plant, up to commercial operations.
Analyses which support
]
16
-e that licensing. process are supplied directly to the 17 owner as he indeed must submit them as the licensee I0 j
to the regulatory authority.
There may be special l
19 analyses which he would reques',of us to do, which 20 could be beyond the scope of the contract.
so it 21 varies, I think, depending on the situation.
e 22 Q
Certain generic analyses night be per-formed, however, and are performed that wouldn't j
i necessarily be forwarded to a customer automatically?
24 A
could y'ou give an axample of what you might 25
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have in =ind?
Are you' speaking of an analysis which 4
we might perfor=, based on sone research that we are d i"77 5
(There was discuss ton off the record.)
6 l
Q Would what the customer gets by way of 7
design analysis be defined primarily by what is 8
required in the PSAR and FSAR and the o ther licensing 9
l documents that are normally the subject of B&W's 10 assistance to utilities?
11 A
Yes, we do have generic analyses which we would 12 perform which are referenced by his FSAR and PSAR g
naterials.
of course, all that material is available to g
him, and in most instances that I can think of, it la, would be directed to him.
16 1
I suspect-there conid ge generic analyses 17 which he references, and thenwe direct them to the 18 NRC ourselves, and he may or may not wish to see them.
19 I think in most instances they would be sert to 20 him as a matter of course, as supporting his license 21 application.
MR. ROCKWELL*
Would you read back the 7
last question.
23 t
(Previous question was read back.)
24 3
i 1, ave you a 1.ng a-wer.
z taina the as-t 25 I
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answer is yes, that wocid be a fair statenent.
Q Have you undertaken any analyses spe-n.
cifically as a result of your review of the TMr 2 a
sequence of events, and in the light of the THI 2 6
sequence, are any under way presently?
7 A
Yes, we utilized our knowledge of that sequence 8
of events as a benchmark for our codes in the safety 9
analysis and loss of coolant accident area.
They 10 were a foundation for additional analyses which the 11 NRC requested we perform following TMI 2, in the g
snall break and loss of main feedwater area.
Let ne think if there are any.others that are under way.
g I think these analyses wtich we submitted to the NRC dealing with the small break and also main 15 feedwater and the related benchmark exercise we want 16
-e through on the TMI 2 would constitute the bulk of 17 analyses we have done directly associated and in 18 response to the TMI 2 accidant.
19 g
Is the loss of feedwater analysis the 20 analysis which was published on May 7th in ***ee blue volumes?
3 A
Yss, they also address the small break con-siderations, too.
23 Q
So that three-vo1ume analysis essentially i
24 l
represents th'9 analyses that have been done as a rescit l
25 1
of the TMI 2 sequence, in your experience?
?
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MR. R O C K W E *. L :
Thank yoc.
4 Q
Mr. Roy, there were a variety of reco=-
5 mendati ns made by what I understand is known as the Tedesco Report, llew Reg 0560, also entitled,
" Staff Report on the Generic Assess =ents of Feedwatar Transients in Pressurized Water Reactors Designed 8
by the Babcock & Wilcox Company."
We have a copy 9
here.
I am not going to mark this as an exhibit.
10 I don't think it is necessary because it is a 11 standard reference.
U2 Are you familiar with the New Reg 05607 13 A
Y*8-Q Here is a copy if you want to refer to it.
4 As I understand it, one of the recommendations of la_
the Tedesco Report, or this New Reg 0560 is directed 16
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toward the development of instrumentation to in di-17 cate sub-=ooling.
18 A
Tes.
19 g
And as I understand it, sub-cooling 20 refers to in a sense the proximity or relationship 21 to saturation.
A I***
22 Q
Can you tell me, did you have a view with respect to that recommendation or position 24 contained in'New Reg 05607 25 BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE i
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Roy 50 3
A Yes.
We believe that that indication would 4
he a desirable addi
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t the perat r and have developed a prototype instrument to compute, using input of primary system pressure, hot leg temperature and cold leg tempera-ture, and compute the relationship of the reactor 8
coolant system to saturation, ihich is in th e-l 9
development phase now.
t l
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10 Q
Is your prototype the one that is 11 sitting in there above the control board in the 12 simulator?
13 A
Yes.,it is.
g Q
With a digital readout?
A Yes, it is.
Q What presently is the status of the 16
'I recommendation relating to this instrument.
Is it l
17 in the discussion stage?
I am referring at least 18 at this point to the NRC position on it.
Are they 19 looking at it with respect to imposing a regu.1 story 20 requirement, as you understand it7 nave they already l
21 imposed a requirement?
Where does it stand?
l A
3 To my knowledge, they have not imposed it as i
a requirement.
I beliers that Mr. Mattson's " Lessons t
Learned Task Force" has made recommendations that l
24 affeet generically the topic of infcrmation displar, I
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MR. EOGAR:
Off the record.
l 4
(Discussion held off the r e co rd. )
e Q
Another reco==endation that the NRC 3
has made, I believe, in the New Reg 0560 report is l
6 found on Page 8.5, the last paragraph of the Tedeses l
7 i
Report, to which I refer you.
There is a recom-8 mandation there relating to the provision of a 9
positive position indication for,the PORT.
10 Has that question been addressed by B&W7 11 A
Yes.
We are performing tests of some concepts 12 t
provide that indication to our customersi that is g
in the developmental stage also.
We believe that is a desirable feature, and we plan at this time to propose means to do that, 15 to our customers.
16 Q
Do you kiow whethr: such a positive 17 position indication was ever constdered by REW 18 Engineering or Dasign before recent months?
19 A
To.my knowledge, it was not.
20 Q
Referring you to Page 8.12 of the i;
gi report, Ibelieve there is a recommendation con-tained again in the last paragraph, in which it suggests that analysis be made of anticipated 23 l
operating transients, including, interaction of
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Mr. 'n'andling during the early days of the accident?
4 A
Yes, I a= familiar with the me=o which consti-5 tuted the 1 g f communications that he was involved i
during that period.
6 Q
Have you reviewed it suf ficiently so that you could tell us whether or not at the time it appears to have been accurate to you?-
9 A
In the review that I made, and to the best of 10 my knowledge, it is an accurate assessment.
I must 11 say I haven't sat down and scrutinized it for ac-12 curacy, but ny impression is it is an accurate 13 reporting of the communications.
h EDGAR:
Do you have an exhibit g
number?
MR. ROCKWELL:
What we have referred 16 of t
to marked in this proceeding as Wandling 17 Deposition Exhibit 52.
18 Q
There is nothing specifically that you 19 see in the memo which you think is incorrect?
20 A'
Nothing has come to mind in my review and 21 familiarity with the document.
m g
Q Were you here in Lynchburg on the 28tih of March?
A Yes, I was.
24 Q
What recommendaticas,
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A Yen.
4 Q
Would he also be likely to know when that infor=ation was conveyed to the NRC7 0
A I think he may.
6 Q
If he wocidn't, who else would know?
7 A
That may be contained in the log of transmittals 8
that we made to the GPU or to the NRC.
That night 9
~
be the best source.to track down the specific times 10 for tha't.
11 Q
Did I ask you what'ser you had become 12 aware-f what is known as the Michaelson Report in t e 8pring of 19787 13 A
No, I don't think you have asked me that.
Q Did you become aware of it?
15 A
Prior to spring?
In the spring of 19787 16
-z 2
Q Yas.
17 A
Yes, I was aware of a transmittal from TVA 18 which has subsequently,,heen known as the Michaelson 19 Report, in the spring of 1978.
l 20 Q
Did you become aware at any time that at least one of the concerns expressed
.by 21 Mr. Michaelson was very similar to, if not the same as, the concern expressed by Mr. Dunn in his q
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'A To the'hast of my' recollection, no.
The extant 25 BENJAMIN R EPORTING SERvicit n---
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cf =y knowledge in the' spring of 1978 of the 4
report was that Mr. Dunn I believe it was he or an ther member f Eccs Analysis had informed me 5
had a transmittal from TVA with questions and we concerns associated with the small break analysis.
7 I did not read the report, but I knew we had 8
such a transmittal.
It had been referred to the 9
ECCS Analysis unit, and that was the extent of 10 my knowledge in september of 1978.
L ---
11 Q
Do you know to what extent in the t!
engineering and design process that occurs here at Babcock & Wilcox, feedback from secondary system g
events is taken into account, in terms of how primary system components would or should respond?
(Previous questio n.wus read back.)
16 A
That varies to a large extent on what the 17 transient is and what kind of concerns arise from 10 the transient.
e 19 For example, in some tra sients, such as an 20 overcooling transient, it may be necessary to gi evaluate components to determine the impact of the transient n their ability to continue to perform 22 x.
l and function, such as the review, say, of steam i
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. Z3 generator tube response to an overcooling transient.
244 In some instances the transient itself may be 25 B EN.JAMIN REPORTING S E R vic:E:
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level.
I was not involved in the analyses.
4 They seemod to be handled quite well in the section 5
itself, but I do recall that particular analysis.
6 I think the NRC inspecto: at DB-1 had raised a question about it, and I know we were doing an 7
analysis about that particular aspect of loss of f -
-gu-essuri=cr icvel.
9 Q
Mr. Roy, have you ever observed a reactor, 10 a Bsw reactor, being operated critical at powe'r from 11 the control room?
12 A
No, I have not.
D Q
Have you ever had an opportunity to 14 talk with utility operaters who operate BsW reactors?
A res, in association with the development of 15 the guidelines - 'this is post-March 28 -- I have 16 had an opportunity to talk with the supervisor of 17 operations at the Ocones station, and during the
~
18 process of developing these guidelines, we had 19 operating personnel here involved in that meeting.
N Q
How about before the 28th ti ca?
21 A
Not before the 28th.
I don't recall any instances 22 where I have had talk with control room personnel.
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23 they are called, in which the superintendents of 24 the units conduct a seminar with Bsw on operati.ng BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
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plan e r.p e rie n c e s, equipment perfer ance and so 4
for-h.
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5 Q
Has there ever been a requirement in the Engineering Department, to your knowledge, that engineers should get out and talk to the people who are operating the equipment they designed?
8 A
Not a requirement.
Thisis one thing I 9
think which is very beneficial.
In the previcus 10 position as Plant Design manager, I welcomed and
~
11 encouraged fellows to take, part in refueling outages, 12 hands-on experience in the field, which I think is 3
very valuable.
When transients occurret, or we had an oppor-g tunity to gather data on spgcific transients or la, working in the repair of equipment that we might 16 of 2
have had a contract to assist in some equipment 17 repair or upgrade, we had a number of our enginears 18 J volved in our kind of activity.
19 g
now of ten did that in f act occur?
20 A
well, we had personnel involved from Enginessing 21
'at, I would say, amoet every outage, refueling-k utage, in which the customer Service people weald 22 i
draw upon engineers, and particular from Picat Design, from our equipment engineering areas, to assist them in performing various functions at the site.
25 B ENJAMIN REPORTING SERVu:r.
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