ML20024A919

Forwards marked-up Proposed Rev to Response to Cp/Ml Rule (10CFR50.34(f)) Re Hydrogen Control.Amend to Be Formally Filed in Early Jul 1983

ML20024A919
Person / Time
Site:	05000447
Issue date:	06/28/1983
From:	Sherwood G GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
JNF-048-83, JNF-48-83, MFN-122-83, NUDOCS 8307010180
Download: ML20024A919 (7)

Text

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GENER AL h ELECTRIC uuctema power SYSTEMS DIVISION GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,176 CURTNER AVE.. SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA 95125 MFN 122-83 (408) 925-5722 M/C 682 JNF 048-83 June 28, 1983 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Mr. D.G. Eisenhut Division of Licensing Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

IN THE MATTER OF 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC STANDARD SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (GESSAR II) DOCKET N0. STN 50-447 PROPOSED REVISION TO RESPONSE TO CP/ML RULE Attached please find our proposed revision to our response to the CP/ML Rule (10CFR50.34(f)) items (1) (xii) and (2) (ix) pertaining to hydrogen control.

We plan to formally file an amendment of this revision in early July 1983.

If there are any questions on the information provided herein, please contact J.N. Fox of my staff at (408) 925-5039.

Sincerely, Glenn G. Sherwood, Manager Nuclear Safety & Licensing Operation Attachments cc: F.J. Miraglia (w/o attachments) C.0. Thomas (w/o attachments)

D.C. Scaletti L.S. Gifford (w/o attachments) 8307010180 830628 PDR ADOCK 05000447 P PDR S

PROPOSED REVISION TO RESPONSE TO 10CFR50.34 (f)

ITEMS (1) (xii) and (2) (ix)

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GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rav. 17 T

i 1G.12 EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE HYDROGEN CONTROL SYSTEMS

[ Item (1) (xii)]

NRC Position Perform an evaluation of alternative hydrogen control systems that would satisfy the requirements of paragraph (f) (2) (ix) of 10CFR50.34(f). As a minimum include consideration of a hydrogen ignition and post-accident inerting system. The evaluation chall include:

(A) A comparison of costs and benefits of the alternative systems considered.

(B) For the selected system, analyses and test data to verify compliance with the requirements of (f) (2) (ix) of 10CFR50.34.

(C) For the selected system, preliminary design descrip-tions of equipment, function, and layout.

Response

(A) Comparison of costs and benefits o the alternative systems considered will be provided by the Applicant.

(B) The Applicant will provide the analyses and test data to verify compliance with the requirements of 10CFR50. 34 (f) ( 2 ) (ix) .

(C) The Applicant will provide the design descriptions of equipment, function, and layout. .

A) GE has conducted evaluations of the various hydrogen control concepts for 4Le GESSAF E J esy . These concepts included distr'ibuted ignition, cat'alytic burners and post-accident inerting with carbon-dioxide or halon. Of the concepts considered, only distributed ignition (igniters) and carbon-dioxide post accident inerting appear to be viable alternatives.

( Tabl e.lG.it-I sud.ny.4 the costs'and benef.i.ts._of.these two alternatives.

i G .Ibl/lG.12 2,

Tablo, i G.I 2 -I Comparison of Hydrogen Control Alternatives IN

• _

Igniters Post Accident Inerting Description Distributed nition/ystems Liquid CO2 discharged into fontrolled urnatfowH 2 Xontainment.tirspace f6ncentration (frevents gombustion)

Cost (Order $1 Million n $10 Million W

of Magnitude)

R&D Concerns Flammability,)dxing, Possible partial inerting pressure response flammability characteristics.

Mixing, effects on electronic equipment R&D Programs Underway EPRI/NRC None/lanned Pros

• Minor /mpact pf

• No Heat Loads

/nadvertant Aperation

• Ng dependence on H2

• Low gost generation / ate

• MinimumIesignImpact

• Minor impact on existing e Lower containment equipment pressures

• AC power not required for inerting Cons

• Potential for large

• Inadvertant actuation has equipment qualification potential adverse impact on program plant operation

• Assurance of combustion

• High containment pressure at low concentrations *High/ost

• Sensitive to hydrogen

• Some redesign of containment generation rate and piping to accomodate containment entry point

• Potential adverse effects

• Requires active heat from low temperatures during removal injection 4 Tb ese Cost.s do ng h tw ekade.dke cosh of corv *5powdin]

tQu s pvotn Qw al K e.Akm p y-o g n e 3 . h cha.1\ ow o b

e. p g d p t Aeb cosb couW m3ut+ ,m a eo A e m ot +ob l cosks b h O s4 Apphe.d aAecsk sbssa n .

I G .12-3/l G . ! 2 - 4

GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rav. 17 1G.21 HYDROGEN CONTROL SYSTEM PRELIMINARY DESIGN (Item (2) (ix)]

NRC Position

\

Provide a system for hydrogen control that can safely accommodate hydrogen generated by the equivalent of a 100% fuel-clad metal water reaction. Preliminary design information on the tentatively preferred system option of those being evaluated in paragraph (1) (xii) of 10CFR50. 34 (f) is sufficient at the construction per-mit stage. The hydrocen control system and associated systems shall provide, with reasonable assurance, that: (II.B.8)

(A) Uniformly distributed hydrogen concentrations in the containment do not exceed 10% during and following an accident that releases an equivalent amount of hydrogen as would be generated from a 100% fuel clad metal-water reaction, or that the post-accident atmosphere will not support hydrogen combustion.

(B) Combustible concentrations of hydrogen will not collect in areas where unintended combustion or detonation could cause loss of containment integrity or loss of appro-priate mitigating features.

(C) Equipment necessary for achieving and maintaining safe shutdown of the plant and maintaining containment integrity will perform its safety function during and after being exposed to the environmental conditions attendant with the release of hydrogen generated by the equivalent of a 100% fuel-clad metal water reaction including the environmental conditions created by activation of the hydrogen control system.

1G.21-1

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' GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. J/[L g 1G.21 HYDROGEN CONTROL SYSTEM PRELIMINARY DESIGN (Item (2) (ix)}

(Continued)

(D) If the method chosen for hydrogen control is a post-accident inerting system, inadvertent actuation of the

, system can be safely accommodated during plant operation.

Response

The Applicant will provide a Hydrogen Control System capable of handling hydrogen generated by the equivalent of a 100% active f boTo* h o N ~e nmetal=w ewaterdeaction D Iaiked e (AES sss or h5e E4h> wd CV'I *5*k"bo" sw ev a e M j+t v . p we o (o w 9.w Sow.ov. wwh t.wA- a d^ving dvdosw c.e .M34u e vadeence I.y s w Reter

%[The HVdroge Ave Control System shall provide with reasonable assur- '

ance that:

(1) Uniformly distributed hydrogen concentrations in the containment do not exceed 10% during and following an accident that releases an equivalent amount of hydrogen as would be generated from a 100% fuel-clad metal water reaction, or that the post-accident atmosphere will not support hydrogen combustion.

(2) Combustible concentrations of hydrogen will not collect in areas where unintended combustion or detonation could cause loss of containment integrity or loss of appropriate mitigating features.

(3) Equipment necessary for achieving and maintaining safe shutdown of the plant and maintaining containment integ-rity will perform its safety function during and after being exposed to the environmental conditions attendant with the release of hydrogen generated by the equivalent

____ m 5 l. S. S. Dua, et al, 'BWR/6 Mark III Hydrogen Control Owners' Group Report on Hydrogen Control: Accident Scenarios, Hydrogen Generation Rates and Equignent Requirenents,"

General Electric Canpany Report, April 1982. , _

1G.21-2

. GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 17 1 l

i

) 1G.21 HYDROGEN CONTROL SYSTEM PRELIMINARY DESIGN [ Item (2) (ix)} l (Continued) of a 100% fuel-clad metal water reaction, including the

~

environmental conditions created by activation of the hydrogen control system.

The following criteria will be used to design the Hydrogen Control System:

(1) The system will be single active failure proof.

(2) Operation of the Hydrogen Control System will not adversely affect the safe shutdown of the plant.

(3) The system will be protected from tornado and external missile hazards.

I (4) The system will not compromise the containment design.

(5) If the method chosen for hydrogen control is a post-accident inerting system, inadvertent actuation of the system must be safely accommodated during plant operation.

J' 1G.21-3/lG.21-4

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