ML20024A146
| ML20024A146 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000086, Indian Point |
| Issue date: | 06/09/1983 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8306150500 | |
| Download: ML20024A146 (30) | |
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ORialNAL 8
f UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the matter of:
Public cemni== ion Meeting Docket No.
Discussion and Vote on Irdian Point 1~
Location: Washington, D.C.
Pages:
Date: Thursday, June 9,1983 h'
TAYLOE ASSOCIATES Court Reporters 1625 I Street, N.W. Suite 1004 8306150500 830609 wadinston, ac. 20006 PDR 10CFR (202 p m l
PT9.7 PDR l
TA-235
' Meltz'ar 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
4 5
6 DISCUSSION AND VOTE ON INDIAN POINT 7
8 (Public Meeting) 9 10 11 1717 H Street, N.W.,
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12
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Washington, D.C.
13 Thursday, June 9, 1903 14 15 The Commission convened in open session at 16 3:50 p.m.,
pursuant to notice.
17 COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
I
'h 18 NUNZIO PALLADINO, Chairman of'the Commission VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner 1
19 JOHN AHEARNE, Commissioner g
THOMAS ROBERTS, Commissioner 3
JAMES ASSELSTINE, Commissioner 20 3
21 STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT CONFERENCE TABLE:
ir S. CHILK 22 W.
DIRCKS H.
DENTON 23 G. CUNNINGHAM H. PLAINE 24 M. BLUME P. CRANE
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DISCLAIMER T'
Th.is is. an 'unwTTiciaT transcript of a meeting ~ of the United Statas.
- Nuclear ReguTatory Cocaissian held on
- Ji2ne '9, 1983 in the.
- Cw;ssTon's offices at 1717 H Strestr N. W., Masningwn, D. C.
Tne
. meeting was open to public attendance and observation..
Tnis transcript has. not been reviewed,l correc-Utd, or..editad, and.:it may..contain in
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The-transcript'is intadded solely.for gen'eral informationaT:' purposes -
.:.. As. pr vd ided by 10 CFR 9.103.. it is not part of the forinal or infomal record of decision of the I:fatters discussad.
Ekpressions of op.in. ion in de.this. transcript de not necessariTy reflect finaT determinatiens or "baTiefs.
He pTeading er other paper may b.e-filed witir the Cc.dsrien i:r
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f any proceeding as the. resuit of or addressed to any state::;errt or argument
.jpq ned. herein, except. as the Cecaission may auth,crize.
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TA 235 MS:jl[1s1 3
1 PROCEEDINGS 2
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: 'The'meeti'ng will please come 3
td' order.
4 Sorry for the delay, but it was unavoidable.
5 As most of you likely know,'the purpose of our 6
meeting today is to decide whether to shut down the Indian
?
Point Nuclear Plant because of deficiencies in emergency 8
planning and preparedness.
9 Deficiencies were identified by the Federal 10 Emergency Management Agency, FEMA, in a letter to NRC on
- 11 April 15th, 1983.
12 The Commission issued an order on May 5, indicating 13 its intent to order the suspension of operating authority at 14 the plant unless either FEMA determined that the deficiencies is no longer exist or the Commission concluded that compensating 16 actions had been or would be taken promptly.
[
l 17 Other deficiencies in question were not significant, 18 or other compelling reasons existed for continued operation t
19 -
of the plant, or other factors justified continuing operation.
20 Following the May 5 order, a number of actions were 21 taken.
Principal among these was the announcement by the 22 Governor of New York that the State would lend its full 23 capacity to substituting for Rockland County.: Refusal of 24 Rockland County to participate in a March.1983 exercise i
25 constituted one of the two deficiencies cited by FEMA,
MMaji 1:2 1
I particularly;.in view of the lack of full wwsation by the State.
2 Also, actions were taken involving availability of j
3 bus drivers during an emergency in Westchester County, which 4
had been the other major deficiency nobsi.
by FEMA.
j 5
On May 27, the State submitted a revised plan, l
8 which has since been under review.
7 On the 8th of June, FEMA issacd its evaluation in two letters, copies of which are on,thA / jar table in the room, 9
These letters outline FEMA's assessment of the actions being 10 taken by the State and Licensees.
- 11 We will begin the meeting by first hearing from the 12 Staff on this matter.
i 13 We will next open for questions and discussion by 14 the Commissioners.
15 Following the' discussion, I will ask each Commission" 16 er to make any statement he wishes to make.
17 Then, I will call for a vote on-whether or not the 18 Indian Point plantsshouldibe shut down.
19 Let me first ask, do other Commissioners have any opening comments they wish to make at this time?
21 I
COMMISSIONER'AHEARNE:
No.
22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Then, I will turn to Mr. Dircks.
23 MR. DIRCKS:
Staff reviewed the FEMA letter that we 24 receivedyes terday.
And we have some recommendations to make.
25 e
The way we have looked at it is,on the basi's of the
NMajl1:3 5
1s April 15th letter, FEMA identified a number of items that were 2
significant in terms of their meeting the FEMA requirements.
3 They indicated two areas that did not meet their requirements, 4
and that was in the area of commitments that the Rockland 5
County problem represented and the lack of commitment of the 8
bus drivers to participate in an emergency.
7 In the June 8th letter, FEMA has pointed out that 8
in both of those instances they received the commitments made 8
by the state and by Westchester County and by the various 10 individuals and the bus companies and the bus drivers.
- 11 We believe that if the objective had been to 12 achieve these commitments we believe the objective has been 13 met.
14 On the other hand, there is a note in the FEMA is letter saying that they would like to see an exercise con-18 ducted within 60 days.
17 Our view is that, I think, on the basis of the 18 commitments that have been made, we believe that 5 Masonable 7
i 19 assurance that the public health and safety would 1,e protect-E ed.
And that's our recommendation, that the plants be 21 allowed to continue to operate.
i 22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Mr. Denton, did you want to i
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add anything?
r 24
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MR. DENTON:
No, sir.
26 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Any comments or questions by
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1 Commissioners?
2 (No response.)
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Then, I would propose that we 4
ask each Commissioner to make such statement as he wishes.
And 5
would you like me.to-start?
This decision, I believe,.has been 9
6 a difficult-one for all of-the Commissioners.
7 We have reviewed the matter at length and studied the 8
information and the views we have received.
1 8
I would not require shutdown of the Indian Point to plant.
- 11 The Commission's order of May 5, 1983, provides 12 that the Commission will issue an order on June 9 -- by 13 June 9 suspending operation for Indian Point unless specified 14 conditiions are met.
15 In my opinion, a. sufficient number of these condi-tions have been met.
I7 It's noted in the June 8, 1983 letter by Mr. Frank P.
Petrone, Regional Director of Region 2, Federal 18 Emergency Management Agency, the course of off-site emergency 8
planning at Indian Point has been one of significant progress, 21 to where only two deficiencies existed at the time of FEMA's 22 April 14, l'983 report.
23 Mr. Petrone further notes that since April 14th'the actions of the State and the Licensees regarding these deficiencies -- and I quote -
" represent an adequate,
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1 positive, and important commitment through which emergency 2
preparedness could be achieved for Indian Point."
3 Mr. Petrone's letter also notes that many recommenda--
4 tions regarding plant improvement have been implemented.
5 Others are in process.
And the State has committed to have 6
them in place within 30 days.
7 Further, it notes that commitments have been made 8
with respect to the Westchester deficiency.
8 Among the steps taken to correct this deficiency: Ar 10 orientation program.with union support for bus drivers, in order
- II to inform the bus drivers themselves of what is being asked 12 of them; commitments from bus companies in the area to provide 13 buses and the training of approximately 200 licensee employees l'
as a backup pool of drivers.
15 In reaching my decision, I have kept in mind the 16 importance of emergency preparedness, even though it is i
17 highly improbable that an accident leading to a major off-site 1
18 release will occur at Indian Point.
Even if one were to 19 occur which required emergency response, it most.likely 8
would be one that would allow 12 or more hours for responsive 21 action.
22 Far less likely is a fast-moving accident.
For such 23 an accident, sheltering, even in homes without basement, 24 would likely be preferred over immediate evacuation.
25 Finally, I cannot ignore the economic costs of a
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1 shutdown.
2 While the exact amount of these costs can be 3
debated, they are significant and give added weight to the 4
ahove reasons for not shutting down the plant.
5 In closing, let me say, again, that the decision 6
was a difficult one.
I view the two emergency planning 7
deficiencies at Indian Point which prompted our May 5 order 8
to.be deficiencies in commitments. '
9 Now, as evidenced by FEMA's evaluation, the 10 necessary commitments have been made.
Of course, they must 11 be fulfilled, and I encourage all participants to continue the 12 initiatives and positive direction that characterizes the 13 present activities.
14 The exercise to verify preparedness should be 15 scheduled at the earliest possible date.
The Licensees and 16 tha government entities should work diligently to prepare for jnd 1 17 an effective exercise.
b2 18 That's the end of my comments.
19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I have a brief comment.
20 The Indian Point reactors should be allowed to 21 operate when the Federal Emergency Management Agency can 22 advise this Commission that -- in the words of our Regulations 23
-- there is " reasonable assurance that adequate protective 24 measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological 25 emergency."
mm jl 187 9
1 That is not yet the case.
Although FEMA, in its 2
letter of June 8, 1983, said that improvements have been made, 3
the agency did not make a finding on whether emergency pre-4 paredness is adequate, and apparently will not do so until 5
it reviews the results of an exercise, a
The uniquely high population in the Indian Point 7
area increases the importance of a favorable FEMA finding on 8
Yet, the State and counties failed 9
their initial test in March 1982, and a retest in March 1983.
10 Indian Point is the only nuclear site which has never passed 11 such a test.
12 At the public hearing on May 26, we were 13 asked -- both by those who wanted the plants kept open and s..
14 those who wanted to shut them,--- to look behind' the' FEMA --
15 findings and make our own detailed assessment of the 16 adequacy of eff-site emergency preparedness.
17 But the fact is that the President assigned FEMA the l
18 lead federal responsibility in this area by Executive Order, 19 and we have agreed to rely en their advice.
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20 FEMA is the government agency with the personnel 21 and the expertise to make these assessments.
Unless FEMAfs 22 findings are manifestly incompetent, the only sensible course 23 is to rely on their expert advice on whether the standards 24 that have been routinely applied to all other plants are met 25 in this case.
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1 Because we only received FEMA's letter late yester-2 day, it would have been helpful to have FEMA at today's 3
meeting.
I am especially disappointed that the Commission 4
majority declined to invite FEMA, apparently for fear that 5
FEMA's comments might undermine the rationale for today's e
decision.
Thank you.
7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Commissioner Ahearne?
8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
This is a razor-thin decision 9
But I must follow the facts as I see them.
And, therefore, at 10 this time I would allow the Indian Point Units 2 and 3 to 11 continue operation.
On May 5, the Commission concluded it 12 was necessary to consider shutting down the Indian Point plant a
13 because it found serious problems continued to exist with regard 14 to Indian Point emergency planning.
The Commission indicated s
15 it would decide on June 9th whether or not the plants would to be alloued to continue to operate.
I believed the basic 17 problem was that the State, counties and utilities were not
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18 working effectively on the emergency planning problems.
This j
19 was reflected in that.there were no formal commitments for buses ii 20 and drivers in Westchester County despite the fact that this 3
f appeared to be a discrete, manageable issue which had been 21
.!r 22 identified as a problem for some time.
23 Second, Rockland County apparently did not intend i
24 to complete a plan in the foreseeable future, and the State 25 had not developed specific plans to step in for Rockland.
11 mm - jl. 9 1
And third, tne utilities apparently saw little 2
need to work with local governments nor provide resources --
3 for example, funds to cover some of Rockland County's 4
emergency planning costs.
5 These problems led FEMA to conclude that there were 6
two major deficiencies.
7 Since the Commission issued its order, major steps 8
have been taken.
8 Westchester County now has letters of intent for the 8
buses that would be needed.
Although there are not yet any 11 unconditional agreeements to provide drivers, programs have 12 begun whose purpose is to arrange for these drivers.
13 The State of New Tork has submitted a. revised.
14 emergency response plan-that expli'citly_ provides for the 16 State taking over the emergency functions for Rockland County.
18 An explicit procedure has been developed.
It involves a 17 determination that the County cannot implament effective 18 emergency response actions and the State to declare an l
8 emergency which would lead to the State exercising the r
8 emergency control function.
21 Commission Staff have indicated this process can 22 be done quite rapidly.
This revision apparently solves the 8
major problem which FEMA had found in the previous plan, i
l namely an explicit _ plan for State control.
24 8
In addition, the State committed to resolving in
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30 days a set of weaknesses that the Rhdiological Advisory 2
Committee found in reviewing the State's plan.
3 I find the State is still lukewarm in addressing 4
what, it appears to me, is the State's responsibility in the 5
absence of the County's willingness to exercise this responsi-6 bility.
7 For example, in transmitting the plan to FEMA, the 8
State described the plan as the " mechanism available for the 8
several months which Rockland County has indicated it required 10 to complete its own planning."
- 11 This plan is clearly going to be needed much longer 12 than "several months."
13 However, this lukewarm action is a significant
'x 14 improvement over the arm's length treatment that the State is had previously taken and apparently is adequate to meet FEMA's 16 major concerns about planning.
17 In fact, until receiving the State plan and review-18 ing it, I had intended to vote to shut the plants down and, 18 in fact, had begun drafting an order of views in that 20 direction.
21
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I was impressed by the work the State had done.
22 Finally, the utilities do seem to be getting more 8
involved.
As the Chairman of the Rockland Codnty Legislature r
24 testified' to the Commission, "Since you guys said June 9th,
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25 all of a sudden I have had a flood of people in my office that
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weren't there before."
2 Both PASNY and Con Ed are also more visible, as in 8
their work with the bus companies and the revised brochure.
4 This increased involvement apparently has had major positive 5
effects, as indicated in EEMA's. letters to the Commission on 6
June 8th.
7 With respect to our May 5th order, I conclude 8
adequate interim compensating actions have been or will be 8
taken promptly.
10 The Commission should allow the plants to continue
- II to operate pending, first, the exercise which FEMA has commit-12 ted to running in the near future and, second, the Indian 13 Point Special Proceeding Board submitting its recommezdat' ions.
I4 There are three basic questions involved in 15 emergency planning:
16 Is there a plan?
17 Can it be implemented?
18 Can it be successful?
19 The first question has been answered by FEMA in 8
their recent letter,in which they say, essentially:
"Yes, 21 there is a plan."
I am willing to accept this conclusion.
22 As I explained in May, underlying my judgment is the view that "an ability to take protective measures" does not mean that preparation for an emergency must address every 25 contingency, nor does it mean there must be confidence all
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details have been workalout and everything will progress 2
smoothly in the event of an accident.
It does mean that a 3
basic framework must be in place for making decisions and 4
taking appropriate actions.
5 "Can it be implemented?" is the question that FEMA 6
has consistently said requires an exercise to answer and, 7
once again, we await an exercise.
8 I recognize FEMA will probably not be able to make 8
a complete finding even after the next exercise.
The State 10 plan involves the use of Rockland County employees.
Although
- II we have been assured Rockland County will assist in the event 12 of a real emergency, I do not expect they will agree to partic-13 ipate in the exercise.
I4 However, I believe the exercise will provide an opportunity to assess the ability of the State to come into 16 the County and take over, which is the aspect I would be most interested in if I were going to take part in the Commission's 18 decision.
19 And parenthetically, I'll say I do not expect we 20 vill ever see a Rockland County plan.
r 21 I would not shut down Indian Point solely because 22 of Rockland County's failure to participate. Initially, it may 23 seem entirely appropriate to reach a conclusion that emergency 24 planning cannot be done for Indian Point when one of the t
26 affected counties concludes -- and I quote:
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"We do not believe that there is any emergency 7
2 plan that man or his maker can create which would 3
make it possible to safaky evacuate the 260,000 4
people of Rockland County in the event of a 5
major accident, such as a meltdown at Indian 6
Point, and since we do not believe that we can 7
ever come up with a plan to protect the health 8
and safety of our people, we have repeatedly 9
passed resolutions calling for the closing 10 down of Indian Point, and that is still our current position."
12 However, it is necessary to recognize exactly what 18 that statement means.
In this case, the County also has I'
said:
15 "If we. recognize the potential adverse conse-16 quences of an accident, emergency response l
planning must be based upon the-worst possible 1
18 accident scenario and acceptability of a plan 19 must be based upon the ability to react to a 20 worst possible accident."
21 If one redefines the objectives sufficiently, it is i
n inevitable that one will reach the conclusion that emergency 23 planning is not possible, j
There are several aspects to emergency planning.
Ni On the one hand, there is an assessment of the type of
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situation which one must be prepared to respond to and the 2
best approach to that response.
3 This is an area which I believe is the responsibil-4 ity of NRC and FEMA, It is our responsibility to develop 6
planning guidelines based on radiological hazard -- such as 6
the 10-mile zone for evacuation.
7 On the other hand, there must be an assessment of 8
the local ability to satisfy these guidelines.
9 Clearly, State and local governments are best able 10 to evalutate their own ability to meet our standands. However,
- 11 this ability does not extend to redefining the initial guide-12 lines.
13
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"Can it be successful?"
normally is treated as 14 implicit in the emergency planning requirements.
The imple-15 mentation of an adequate plan is treated as a measure of 16 a successful plan.
For the purposes of this enforcement 17 to continue to do so.-
18 However, in the particular case of Indian Point, 19 the Commission years ago established a special proceeding. In l
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initiating the proceeding, the Commission explained its 21 primary concern is the extent to which the population around 22 Indian Point affects the risk posed by Indian Point as compare.1 23 l
to the spectrum of risks posed by other nuclear plants.
l 24 The Commission explained it was concerned both with 25 the total societal risk and the individual risk, ' including l
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l' that resulting from the difficulty of evacuation in an 2
emergency.'
8 It asked the Licensing Board to examine in detail 4
many questions, which boil down to:
"Is the risk of operating 5
the Indian Point plants too great to allow operation?"
8 Involved in that question was the judgment of whether emergency 7
plans can be successful for Indian Point in light of the 8
high population.
These issues are to be resolved in the Board's recommendations in late summer or early fall.
11 I would like to address two additional points:
12 First, under current law, the final decision must 13 be the NRC's, not FEMA's.
In November 1980, the NRC submitted a legislative 18 proposal to transfer to FEMA the final authority regarding 16 offsite emergency planning.
For those who believe we should 17 take FEMA's position automatically, perhaps they should sup-18 port the legislative proposal.
And second, one intervenor has recently said, "If you don't vote for shutdown today, the emergency planning 21 regulations will be effectively-buried forever."
22 I share the fear but did not reach the same con-23 clusion.
24 Consequently, I reluctantly agree that the plants x
g can continue in operation.
The Perils-of-Pauline development
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1 of emergency planning for Indian Point is extremely frustrat-2 ing for everyone.
8 The Intervenors can rightfully claim the effort at 4
Indian Point has been backward-from the start.
5 The process we are going through at Indian Point is 6
straining the fabric of Federal, State, and local relations.
7 Emergency planning is too important for political posturing 8
on behalf of any participant.
8 Although the events that we are attempting to plan 10 for have a low probability, they could be quite serious,and
- II consequently serious planning is necessary.
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Thank you.
13 Mr. Roberts.
COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
I have a two-page statement.
15 i
I will only read the last paragraph.
16 In view of improvements and commitments reported t
i 17 by FEMA, combined with the extremely low probability and risk 18 of an accident while the compensating plan is being completed l
18 and tested, I conclude that shutdown of the Indian Point Power Plants would serve no constructive purpose.
Those 21 actions needed to achieweiadayate emergency preparedness have l
E been initiated.
23 Consequently, it is my belief that the conditions 24 of the May 5th order have been met.
Furthermore, a shutdown 25 order issued today would serve only to penalize the Licensees
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and thousands'of ratepayers for events totally beyond their 2
control.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Thank you.
cnd 3 4
Mr. Asselstine.
5 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
As the Chairman mentioned
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at the start lof this meeting, in our May 5th order, the 7
Commission stated its intention to issue an order not later 8
than today promptly suspending operation of the Indian Point 9
plants unless either FEMA has determined that the significant 10 emergency planning and preparedness deficiencies identified
- 11 by FEMA no longer exist or the Licensees demonstrate to our 3
j satisfaction that adequate inte' rim 'corapensa' ting. acti' ns' have o
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13 been or will be taken promptly, that the deficiencies 14 identified by FEMA are not significant, that there are other 15 l
compelling reasons to permit continued operation of the l
l 16 facility, or that there are other factors justifying continued I
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17 plant operation.
18 On the first point -- whether the significant 19 deficiencies identified by FEMA no longer exist -- I believe i
20 that FEMA's June 8th letter is clear.
21 That letter notes that substantial progress has 22 been made in meeting FEMA's concerns, and that work on the two 23 deficiencies of most concern is progressing favorably.
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24 FEMA's letter goes on to state that the plans sub-25 mitted since our May 5th order offer a sound approach to l
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resolution of remaining difficulties and that, subject to 2
further evaluation from upcoming exercises, it appears 3
continuation of this commitment and momentum should bring 4
about responsive corrections to the deficiencies.
5 As positive as these statements are on the progress a
being made and on the likelihood that these deficiencies will 7
ultimately be resolved in the future, they clearly fall far 8
short of a judgment by FEMA that the significant deficiencies 8
in emergency planning and preparedness identified in FEMA's 10 April 14 Post-Exercise Assessment no longer exist.
11 Moreover, FEMA's June 8th letter does not rescind 12 FEMA's previous bottom-line judgment that it cannot assure 13 that the public health and safety can be protected in the 14 10-mile emergency planning zone around Indian Point.
15 On the second point, the Licensees, in their 16 written submittals and oral presentations to the Commission, 17 have asserted thatthe deficiencies identified by FEMA are not 18 significant, that adequate interim compensating actions have 19 been undertaken or are underway, and that the likely economic 20 consequences of shutting down the Indian Point plants provide 21 a compelling reason for allowing continued operation until the 22 deficiencies are corrected.
23 On the question of whether the deficiencies are 24 significant, I believe that the Commission must give great l
25 weight to FEMA's judgment.
I do not believe that the i
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Licensees have carried their burden of demonstrating that 2
these deficiencies are not significant.
8 Nor do I believe dut.the Licensees have provided a 4
sufficient showing of adequate interim compensating actions.
6 The measures identified by the Licensee s are principally the 6
measures identified by FEMA to resolve the Westchester bus 7
driver and Rockland County nonparticipation issues.
8 Although FEMA has concluded that significant progress is being made, it is clear from the June 8th letter 18 that the significant deficiencies in each of these areas have not yet been corrected.
12 On the matter of the economic consequences of the 13 shutdown of the plants, I believe that the Licensees have I4 shown that there will be an economic burden imposed by the 16 shutdown, although the precise magnitude of that burden is 18 less clear.
l All of this leads me to the conclusion that the 18 Indian Point plants should be shut down.
It has been more 19 than two years since the Federal Emergency Management Agency 1
l 20 first notified the Commission that significant deficiencies 21 in emergency planning and preparedness existed for the 22 Indian Point plants.
23 It is past' time for the Commission to insist on 24 positive assurances that these deficiencies have been correct-ed as an essential precondition to the continued operation of
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the Indian Point plants.
2 I believe that the public interest and our own regu-3 lations require no less.
4 It is now clear that a majority of the Commission 5
does not share my view.
In my judgment, the majority's 3
6 decision is unfortunate in several respects.
7 First, it reflects the clear view of the Commission 8
that it is prepared to permit the virtually unlimited future 8
operatio'n of th'ese plants despite continuing significant 10 deficiencies in emergency procedures.
This makes a mockery 11 of our emergency planning regulations.
12 It is difficult to believe that the Commission's 13
['
120-day clock procedure for correcting deficiencies ~has any 14 meaning at all in light of today's action.
15 And second, it may undermine continued progress in 16 correcting the deficiencies at-the Indian Point plants.
It 17 appears to me that much of the progress that has been made'. during -
18 the past month can be attributed to the Commission's announced 19 intention to order the shutdown of these plants unless certain 8
conditions were met.
21 Clearly, that driving force is now gone, and this 22 may well work against the objective that I hope we all share, j
assuring the adequate protection of the health and safety of 23 24 the people who live in the vicinity of the Indian Point plants, 25 -
Thank you.
I -. _ - -
i jl 21 23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Any rebuttal comments anyone wants to make?
(No response.)
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I think we exchanged rebuttal 3
comments before, and perhaps unless someone is strongly 6
moved, it would be better to let the matter rest.
7 Are the Commissioners ready to vote?
8 And the question that I would propose we vote on, 8
based on the order, is:
10 I would ask that all those in favor of suspending 11 operations at the Indian Point Plants say aye.
12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Aye.
13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Aye.
1.
14.
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
All those opposed, say nay.
15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Nay.
16 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Nay.
17 j
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Nay.
18 By a vote of 3 to 2, the Commission has agreed to d
18 keep the plants open.
i m
i 20 I was asked by a public information officer to d
21 summarize what we had done today.
I tried to write out a
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22 paragraph so I don't stumble on it.
23 By way of summary, I would say, in view of the l
24 commitments made by government agencies and the Licensees to l
correct emergency response deficiencies identified by FEMA, 25 l
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and in view of FEMA's favorable assessment of those commit-2 ments, the Commission has decided not to shut down Indian 3
Point.
4 Now, the Commission plans to draft an order,:.and 5
hopefully issue the order tomorrow, explaining its decision 6
in more detail.
7 Are there any other comments that anyone would like 8
make at this time?
9 (No response.)
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
If not, I thank you all, and
- 11 we will stand adjourned.
12 (Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the Commission was end 13 adjourned.)
14 16
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23 24 25 I
C,ERTIFICATE OF PROCEF.DD:GS 2
This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the 3
NRC cot @1ISSION 4
t*
In the matter of:
Commission Meeting-Discussion and Vote s
on Indian Point Date of Proceeding: June 9, 1983 Place of Proceeding:
Washington, D.C.
7 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript for the file of the Commission.
to Mimie Meltzer i,
Official Reporter - Typed 12 A%h 4Af Officiad Reporte d-Signature is 16 17 is 19 l
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24 23 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES Racisrcaro PRortssioN AI. REPORTERS norfolk, VIRGINEA
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Federal Emergency Management A nc
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Washington, D.C. 20472 A I
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Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino Chairman N
5 JUNO 81983 > I5 The Nuclear Regulatory Cormtission
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Washington, D.C. 20555
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Dear Mr. Palladino:
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Enclosed is the Federal Dnergency Management Agency's (FD%'s) most recent evaluation of offsite planning at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station, as requested -in your letter to Director Giuffrida of May'27,1983.
I am most encouraged, based on reports of extensive and binding discussions with New York State, the licensee and local government officials, that substantial progress has been made in meeting FER's earlier concerns regarding emergency planning at the Indian Point plants.
Over the last year, FD% has formally reprted to the NPC on offsite matters at Indian Point on three occa.eions and, in addition, the agency has provided numerous informal status reports. n e overall trend of these reports has been one of marked improvement in quality of planning and response capability.
We State and the local governments involved are to be coranended for their serious concern.
Our evaluation indicates that work on the two emergency planning deficiencies of most concern which prevented certification of reasonable assurance at Indian Point in FDm's report of April 14, 1983, is progressing favorably.
Current planning calls for proposals to be tested in an early, full-scale exercise of the State of New York's ccmpensatory measures for RocPJ.and County, and a drill for the bus arrangements in Westchester County.
I concur in the views of Mr.
Petrone, FDWs Region II Director, that the plans as reviewed by the Regional Assistance Ccmmittee offer a sound approach to resolution of remaining difficulties.
Subject to further evaluation frcm upccming tests and exercises, it ncw appears that continuation of this cmmitment and nonentum should' bring about responsive corrections to the deficiencies noted in our earlier report.
We-will, of course, keep the Ccxmtission fully informed of continuing -
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develo;nents under our respnsibility to assist with its licensing
, responsibilities.
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It is my belief that this report provides an adequate factual basis for the Ccmnission to utilize in its licensing decision as it' relates to offsite emergency planning at Indian Point on June 9, 1983.
Sincerely, bb &
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Jeffrey S. Bragg Executive Deputy Director
/-,T Federal Emergency Management Agency Region II 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 10278 4,'
,v June 8,1983 Mr.
Pave McLoughlin D2puty Associate Director State and Local Programs and Support Fcderal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street, S.W.
Washington, D.
C.
20472 Daar Mr. McLoughlin:
The purpose of this letter is to apprise you of the current status of offsite emergency planning at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station.
The state of offsite emergency planning at Indian Point has been under close study and review by the FEMA Region II office for over a year.
During this time, we have seen significant progress as affected jurisdictions, includingtheir State and local governments, have developed and refined plans and have improved response capability.
This progress allowed us to reach a point where only two deficie'ncies existed at the time of FEMA's April 14, 1983, These two deficencies were:
the possible non report.
response by bus operators in Westchester County and the failure of Rockland County to participate in the process.
These deficencies were the basis for FEMA's negative deterrination on the adequacy of offsite planning and preparedness at Indian Point under the provisions of NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, (Rev.-1).
Since the issuance of the Post Exercise Assessment Report, I
dated April 14, 1983, the State of New York has undertaken j
the emergency planning necessary for Rockland County and.has dedicated a sizeable resource base, consisting of' assets and l
personnel drawn from State agencies and the private sector, including the licensees, to develop a response capability.
Examples of committments by the State and the licensees are as follows:
o committment and training of staff to perform various emergency response functions.
1 to the o agreements with bus owners to provide equipment licensees to carry out evacuation.
't 2.
o development of. an interim public information program for Rockland County.
The enclosed letters and agreements provide more details.
The Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) for Region II chaired by FEMA.and assisted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, (NRC), Environmental Protection Agency, the Departments of Transportation, Health and Human' Services (Food and Drug Administration), and Energy; reviewed these plans and
.dsveloped a comprehensive' plan review which is attached.
FEMA and,this Committee have found the concept proposed in
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this State compensating plan to be sound.
Many RAC' recommendations regarding plan improvement have been implemented; others are in process and the State is committed to have them in~ place within 30 days.
FEMA has a committment from the State and the licensees to participate in a full scale exercise of the State Compensatory Plan for Rockland
. County in approximately 60 days.
FEMA will evaluate this exercise to assure that this plan is capable-of being i
implemented.
The West.chester deficiency cited in FEMA's April 14, 1983, Contracts have report has also been addressed by the State.
been signed with the. Licensees.
Under the terms of these contracts, three bus companies will make equipment available to the licensees in the event there is a need to undertake an evacuation in Westchester County.
The licensees are funding the development of~a new comprehensive transportation plan j
l for We~stchester County.
The State and licensees.are training and providing emergency safety equipment to bus drivers, both l
regular drivers and utility personnel.
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._ In conclusion, the actions of the State and licensees represent an adequate, positive and important committment j
.. through which emergency preparedness could be achieved for.
' Indian Point.
FEMA is gratified by both the progress and spirit of cooperation of all parties.
We look forward to
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providing t,he NRC with the results of the forthcoming exercise.
Sinc
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Frank P.
etrone f
Regional Director l
Region II Enclosures i
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4 List of Attachments
.. - Regional Assistance' Committee's plan review of the Interim State Compensating Measures for Rockland County (Comments Dated June 7, 1983)
Attachm'ent 2 - Letter of commitment from the _ State to finalize the Rockland County Interim Compensating Plan dated June 7, 1983 - Letter of commitment by the licensees to provide emergency response personnel dated June 7, 1983
- Letters of intent between the bus owners and the licensees to provide transportation equipment dated June 1 and 2, 1983
^ - Agreement between the County of Westchester and to Transportation Safety Planning Group, Inc.
develop a comprehensive evacuation plan for Westchester County dated May 20, 1983 i
4 ATTACHMENTS ARE AVAILABLE IN PUBLIC DOCUMENT ROOM FOR REPRODUCTION 1
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