ML20024A119
| ML20024A119 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 05/24/1983 |
| From: | Lefave W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19354C487 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8306150437 | |
| Download: ML20024A119 (3) | |
Text
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9 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of i
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF Docket Nos. 50-443 OL 50-444 OL (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and ?)
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM T. LEFAVE REGARDING ELECTRIC VALVE OPERATORS SA-SV-4A/4B (STAFF RESPONSE TO THE AFFIDAVIT OF GREGORY C. MINOR DATED MAY 11, 1983 I, William T. LeFave, being duly sworn, depose and state that:
1.
I am employed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a Senior Auxiliary Systems Engineer in the Division of Systems Integration, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
2.
I have reviewed the affidavit of Gregory C. Minor, dated May 11, 1983, regarding the environmental qualification of electric valve operators SA-SV-4A/4B.
3.
The purpose of this affidavit is to support our findings that electric valve operators SA-SV-4A/4B are not important to safety and, therefore, do not have to be environmentally qualified.
4.
The electric valve operators SA-SV-4A/4B are a part of the containment air compressor package. The containment air compressors are not safety related and are powered from nonsafety-related motor control centers. Cooling water to the compressor units is isolated following a l
l 8306150437 830524 PDR ADOCK 05000443 G
loss of offsite power. The comoressors supply two air ring headers which are nonsafety-related and have no backup air supply.
5.
The only safety-related components that receive air from the compressors are the inboard containment isolation valves for the component cooling water (CCW) system. Each compressor supplies air (not from the ring headers) to hold open the isolation valves on the CCW supply and return headers. The CCW isolation valve operators are qualified for a harsh environment and therefore will be operable regardless of the operability of the containment air compressors. On loss of air, the CCW isolation valves fail in the safe position (closed) and this failure position is assured since the valve operators are qualified.
6.
Failure of electric valve operators SA-SV-4A/4B cannot result in a high pressure that would affect the operation of the CCW isolation valves since there are air receivers with relief valves between valves i
l SA-SV-4A/4B and the CCW valve operators. Any overpressure is relieved 1
via the relief valves. Even if the air header pressure were to rise to the relief valve setpoint, the air would still be bled from the CCW valve operators in the event of a valve closure signal and the valve would close. Additionally, a harsh environment would result in loss of the air compressors since they are not qualified and overpressure would not be a viable failure mode.
7.
Based on the above, there is no failure mode of valves SA-SV-4A/4B due to a harsh environment that could affect safe plant shut-down or prevent the CCW containment inboard isolation valves from failing
in their safe position (closed). Valves SA-SV-4A/4B thcrefore need not be environmentally qualified, f
I hereby certify that the statements and opinions given are true and correct to the best of my personal knowledge and belief.
\\
JAtest 7-W William T. LeFave Subscribed and sworii to before me this/fM day of ?>7 1983 l,
Notary Public' My Commission expires: '/// ((
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