ML20023D021
| ML20023D021 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire |
| Issue date: | 05/12/1983 |
| From: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | Adensam E, Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.E.1.2, TASK-TM NUDOCS 8305190032 | |
| Download: ML20023D021 (5) | |
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DuxE PowEn COMPANY.
P.O. Box 33189 CHARLOTrE, N.C. 28242 HAL B. TUCKER retsynoxx M ""
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May 12, 1983 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.' S. Nuclear Regulatory' Commission Washington, D. C. 20555
. Attention:
Ms. E. G. Adensam, Chief Licensing Branch No. 4 Re: McGuire Nuclear Station Docket.No. 50-370
Dear Mr. Denton:
Attached is Duke Power Company's response to the outstanding environmental qualification items identified in Section 7.8 of Supplement No. 6 to the NRC Staff Safety Evaluation Report (SSER No. 6). The attached information supports full power licensing of Unit 2.
By separate letter dated May 11, 1983 we are transmitting our response to the Franklin Technical Evaluation Report which addresses resolution of both Units 1 and 2 open items.
Please advise if there are any questions regarding this matter.
Very truly yours, dk<w Hal B. Tucker GAC/php Attachment cc:
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
.U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Mr. W. T. Orders NRC Senior Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station
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MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT 2 RESPONSE TO MCGUIRE SSER 6 SECTION 7.8 In response to the outstanding environmental qualification items identified in Section 7.8 of the McGuire Nuclear Station SSER 6, Duke Power Company is providing the following information:
Section 7.8.3.2.1.1 This section of the SER requests that clarification be provided concerning the definition of safety-related electrical equipment as it relates to 10CFR 50.49(b)(1).
In response to this request, Duke Power Company confirms that the definition of " safety-related" as it relates to electrical equipment at the McGuire Nuclear Station is consistent with the definition of safety-related givenin10CFR50.49(b)(1).
Section 7.8.3.2.1.2 This section of the SER addresses the NRC Staff's evaluation of Duke Power Company's response to 10CFR50.49(b)(2) and states that the Staff will further discuss this subject with Duke.
On May 4,1983, Duke Power Company met with the NRC Staff concerning this issue.
Based on our discussions with the Staff during this meeting, we confirm our previous response regarding 10CFR50.49(b)(2) and supplement the bases of our previous response with the followina information:
The McGuire safety-related electrical power and control systems are designed in accordance with IEEE 308-1971 and IEEE 279-1971, respectively, as discussed in the McGuire FSAR. These two standards, as implemented in the McGuire design, place strict requirements on the interfacing of safety-related and non-safety-related electrical equipment. Where non-safety-related loads receive power from safety-related buses, qualified isolation devices (e.g., safety-related breakers automatically tripped by an accident signal) are provided to preclude unacceptable irfluences of non-safety-related equipment on the safety-related power system.
The McGuire separation requirements are discussed in FSAR Section 8.3.1.2.7 and i
h~ ave previously been reviewed and accepted by the Staff (Ref. McGuire SSER 2).
With regard to control systems where non-safety-related equipment provides input to control safety-related equipment, accident actuation signals are provided to override the non-safety-related control inputs.
In addition to the override feature, non-safety-related inputs to safety-related control systems are reviewed during the design process to assure that no failure modes of the non-safety-i related inputs can preclude completion of the required safety actuation. The combination of i.he override feature and the review of non-safety-related control inputs assures that no unacceptable influences of non-safety-related equipment on safety-related equipment can occur to prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of a safety function.
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.In addition to the design features described above, Duke Power Company performed an analysis of control systems at McGuire in response to IE Information Notice 79-22. The purpose of the analysis was to determine what, if any, design changes or operator actions would be necessary to assure that environments caused by high energy line breaks (HELB) would not cause an electrical non-safety-related control system to fail in such a manner as to complicate the event beyond the assumptions of the accident analysis. The systems considered in this analysis were identified by Westinghouse for McGuire and reviewed by Duke for the interaction described above. The systems reviewed were the Steam Generator PORV Control System, the Pressurizer PORV Control System, the Main Feedwater Control System, and the Automatic Rod Control System. The results of this review for McGuire revealed that no design changes or operator actions were required to address the issue.
Duke Power Company has recently documented the same analysis with the same results
.for the Catawba Nuclear Station in response to NRC Staff Question 420.3.
The NRC Staff has reviewed the information provided and found the Catawba analysis acceptable (Ref. Catawba SER).
Section 7.8.3.2.1.3 This section of the SER requests that further 'nformation be provided concerning the steam relief radiation monitors. These mtaitors were identified in a previous submittal to the NRC Staff in response to 10CFR50.49(b)(3) as being located in a harsh environment but not required to function for the event that causes the harsh environment nor to provide informaticn for operator ac+. ion.
Duke Power Company has further reviewed the application of these monitors and confirms that subsequent failure of these monitors following exposure to the harsh environment will not affect the functions of any other safety-related equipment.
With regard to the auxiliary feedwater flow transmitters which were addressed in our previous response concerning 10CFR50.49(b)(3), Duke Power Company has replaced the existing transmitters with new, qualified transmitters in lieu of relocating the existing transmitters to a mild environment. The replacement transmitters are Rosemount 1153D series transmitters.
Duke Power Company has reviewed the qualification plan and preliminary qualification report for the Rosemount 1153D series transmitters and determined that these transmitters are qualified for their application (Note: These transmitters are located outside the containment in the doghouse and are subject to HELB only).
Section 7.8.3.2.1.4 With regard to the Robertshaw level switches, Duke Power Company has completed the replacement of Robertshaw level switches with Magnetrol level switches.
Additionally, the Magnetrol level switches have recently successfully completed qualification testing, the results of which are being finalized for documentation purposes and will be reported in Duke Power Company Report TR-053.
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Page 3 of 4 It should be noted that in addition to the recently completed qualification program for the Magnetrol level switches, a justification for interim opera-tion pending completion of qualification has also been provided in Duke Power Company's response to the NRC/FRC Technical Evaluation Report (TER) for McGuire.
With regard to the McGuire Unit 2 Barton transmitters, Duke Power Company has conducted a review of the installed NSSS-supplied Barton transmitters with Westinghouse. Based on this review we have determined that McGuire Unit 2 contains both Barton Lot 4 and Lot 5 transmitters. As previously stated to the NRC Staff, the qualification of the Barton Lot 4 transmitters supplied by Westinghouse is documented in WCAP 8687, Supplement 1, E01A and E03A (E01A covers the Barton 763 pressure transmitter and E03A covers the Barton 764 differential pressure transmitter). Additionally, as previously stated to the NRC Staff, the qualification of the Barton Lot 5 transmitters supplied by Westinghouse is based on similarity to the Barton Lot 4 transmitters. The similarity between Barton Lot 4 and Lot 5 transmitters is based on design and fabrication of both lots to the same Baseline Design Documents (0763.1125.5, Rev. 2 for the Barton 763 pressure transmitter and 0764.1195.5, Rev. 3 for the Barton 764 differential pressure transmitter). These Baseline Design Documents establish strict controls over the selection and use of materials and components in these transmitters thereby assuring similarity between the Lot 4 and Lot 5 transmitters.
With regard to the electrical equipment identified in Categories I.B, II.A, and IV of the NRC/FRC Technical Evaluation Report for McGuire, Duke Power Company met with the NRC Staff on March 29, 1983 and again on May 4, 1983 to discuss these maters.
Resolutions, including any required JI0's, covering all TER items have been provided to the Staff in a separate submittal.
It is Duke Power Company's position that the information provided demonstrates that McGuire Unit 2 can be safely operated at 100% power.
Section 7.8.3.3 With regard to maintenance and surveillance, the McGuire Nuclear Station maintenance and surveillance program for safety-related electrical equipment conforms to the guidance contained in ANS-3.2/ ANSI-N18.7-1976, " Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance for the Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants".
Section 7.8.3.4 With regard to TMI Action Plan equipment, Duke Power Company submitted the requested information in response to an NRC letter dated January 25, 1982.
(Ref. Duke Power Company letter, W. O. Parker to H. R. Denton dated July 28, 1982). This letter specifically addressed McGuire Unit 1 TMI equipment; however, the information is equally applicable tc McGuire Unit 2.
Further, it should be noted that all TMI Action Plan equipment for Unit 2 is installed with the l
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exception of the Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System (RVLIS) which is to be installed per a Unit 2 license condition prior to startup following the first refueling outage. Additionally, all safety-related TMI Action Plan equipment located in a harsh environment is included in the McGuire equipment qualification program.
With regard to our July 28, 1982 submittal concerning TMI Action Plan equipment, the auxiliary feedwater flow transmitters were not identified in relation to NUREG 0737 Item II.E.1.2.
As discussed above in the response concerning SSER 6, Section 7.8.3.2.1.3, Duke Power Co.mpany had intended on relocating these.
transmitters to a mild environment. However, in lieu of relocation; the existing auxiliary feedwater flow transmitters have been replaced with new, qualified Rosemount 1153D series transmitters.
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