ML20023C036
| ML20023C036 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 05/06/1983 |
| From: | Hoyt H Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | |
| References | |
| 82-471-02-OL, 82-471-2-OL, ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8305090508 | |
| Download: ML20023C036 (6) | |
Text
SERVE 0 MM 06 @
C UNITED STATES OF AMERICA p
g NUC(EARREGULATORYCOMMISSION
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7 ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Z-4p g
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Before Administrative Judges:
i 4
g Helen F. Hoyt, Chairperson J
Emeth A. Luebke Jerry Harbour h#
IntheMat$er Docket Nos. 50-443-0L PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY
)
50-444-0L OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al.
(ASLBP No. 82-471-02-OL)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
May 6, 1983 ORDER (Admitting the Town of Seabrook, New Hampshire as an Interested Municipality) 1.
On April 22, 1983, the Town of Seabrook, New Hampshire filed a petition for intervention pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 5 2.715(c).
The Board hereby grants the petition and admits the Town of Seabrook as an interested municipality in this proceeding.
2.
The Board also advises the Town of Seabrook that it is required to observe the procedural requirements applicable to other participants, Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760, 768 (1977), aff'g, LBP-76-32, 4 NRC 291, 299 (1976); and as a late petitioner, it must take the proceeding as it finds it, Nuclear l
Fuel Services, Inc. (West Valley Reprocessing Plant), CLI-75-4, 1 NRC 273, 276 (1975).
8305090508 830506 gDRADOCK 05000443 l
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f 3.
Attached to this Order are the contentions of the various parties which have been admitted by this Board.
IT IS SO ORDERED FOR THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD N
Helen F. Hoyt, Chairperso ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 6th day of May, 1983.
Attachment
Seabecck Contentions Re :aining as of 1/la/33
'iH -9 Radioactive monitoring Tne Seacecos design does not provice an adequa a ;regram for monitoring the release of radioact!vity to the siant anc tts environs either ancer normal caerating c:nci: ions r in Ore-and post-accident circumstances.
Tnus, tne acclication is not in compliance witn general oesign criteria 53, il of Accendix A,10 C..:.R. Part 50, and the requirements of NUREG-0737 and 1UREG-0800.
l NH-10 Control room design The Seacrook Station control room design does not ::mply witn general design criteria 19 through 22 and 10 C..:.R. Part 50, Appendix A, and NUREG-0737, item.r.0.1 and I.D.2.
Refiled NH-13 Ooerations, Personnel Qualifications and Training The Applicant has not demonstrated that tihe following and all other operations persannel, are qualified e.nd properly trained in accordanca with NUREG-0737, items I.A.l.1, or I. A.2.1,. I. A.2.3, II.3.4, E.C.l, and Appendix C:
(a.) station manager; (b.) assistant station manager; (c.) senior reactor operators; (c.) reactor operators; and (e.) shift / technical advisors.
NH-20 Emergency assessmerit,,-lassification, and notification The accident at TMI demonstrated the inac t)ity of all carties involved to comprehend the nature of the accident as it unfolded; communicate tne necessary information to one another, to the.r deral, state and local governments and to e
the puolic in an accurate and timely f ashion; and to decide in a timely manner anat course to take to crotect tne nealtn and safety of the public.
The Apolicant in these stoceecings has not adequately demonstrated tnat it has developeo anc wi1T de aole to implement procedures necessary to assess tne impact of an accident, classify it crocerly, ano notify adequately its own personnel, the affected government bodies, and tne puolic, all of whicn is required under 10 C..:.R.
50.47 # d Accenoix E and NUREG-0654 1H-21 Protective action The State c:ntends that tne aaplicant's energ_ey cl an :ces not cemonstrate now, in case of an ac.:.ident-esulting in a i
site area cr generat e e ;eccy, tne 'ar;e m..cers :f :e:::e I
in the Icne Of dangs" 3ay '3e pr3 tac *ed cr evacuatad.
L*n t i i there is reascnacie assurance nat scequa:e on-site arc.
off-site protective messares can and aill ce ta:<en, tne 3 card snould not issue an operating license.
NECNP E. A.2 The Applicants have not ccmclied witn GDC 4 standards regarding qualification tests of electric valve caerators installed inside the containment.
3ECNP I.S.L The Applicant has not satisfied tne requirements of 3DC 4 and GDC 34 in that all systens required for residual heat removal, such as stesn camp valves, turoine valves and tne entire steen dumping system are not safety grade and environmentally qualified.
NECNP f.3.2 The AppTicant nas not satisfiec the requirements of GDC 1 that all equipment important to safety be environmentally qualified because it nas not specified tne time duration over which the equipment is qualified.
NECNP I.O.2 The Applicants do not comply with Reg. Guide 1.22 by virtue of their failure to provide for the testing of the manual reactor trip actuation function at full power, justify that omission, or provide for other reliable means of testing it.
Therefore Applicants violate GDC 21.
NECNP f f.8.3 The Quality Assurance Organization coes not have One independence required by Appendix S, Criterion L.
NECNP
[L.3.1 The-Quality Assurance Program for operations as cescribed in the FSAR does not demonstrate hcw the Apolicant will assure l
that reolace:ent materials and replacement parts inc3rpor-
-3 s*
ated M: struC:Jres, systics, Or ::
cne":s 'm:0ftan: ::
safety dii! 00 ecuiv alent :: :na tricinal equi men:,
installed in aCCorcance'witn pr0pir pr0cedures 300 requirements, and otnerwise ide:ua:e to or tect :ne cualic neal:n anc safety.
Similarly, One luality Assurance :r:; rim does not assure ar demonstrate new -soaired cc -swer<ec structures, systems, or components will ce ace;uatelj inscected and tested during and af te* tne repair cr rewor<
ano cocanented in "as-ouil;" drawings.
,%l NECNP III.1 The emergency plan coes not contain an acequate emergenc classification and action level scheme, as requirac sy ' y 10 C.F.R. 50.47(c)(4) and NUREG-0664, in that
( a)
No justification is given for the classificat cn cf i
various system failures as unusua! events, alerts, site area emergencies, or gener.a1 emergencies.
(b )
Tne classification scheme ninimizes tne potential significance of transients.
(c)
The Applicants' classification schene fails to include consideration of specific pla'nt circumstances, such as tne anticipated time lag for evacuation due to local prcolems.
(d)
The classification scheme f ails to provide a reascnacle assurance that Seaorook onsite and offsite energency response apparatus and personnel can be brought to an adequate state of readiness quickly enough to respond to an accioent.
!i (e)
The emergency action level schene fails to ioentify emergency action levels or classify them accorcing to the required responses.
(f)
Tne scheme is incapaole of ceing implemented effectively to protect the puolic health and safety ecause it 3rovides no systematic means of identifying, nonitoring, analyzing, and -esponcing to the symotoms of transi.ents and Otner inoicators that transients may occur.
e l
N E ".'lP I1(.) of Tne emergency plan fails to ' conform to Part l
III.3 it does not provice for tne f
Appenoix E to Part 50 in :natsucervisors to enacie them to deal snift training of unit with special orcolems involved in emergencies, inciacin; making cnoices taang alternative responses ;nder stress.
The evacuation ' time estimates crovideo oy One.4cplitants in NECNP III.12 Energency ?lan are inaccar ate Appenoix C of the Raciological they provide unreasonaoly Optimistic estimates of the in that In addition, tne estimatas time required for evacuation.
provideo in tne -adiological emergency pl an are asetess to emergency planning because they f ail to include counds of error, to indicate the basis for codes or assumptions useo used is for the time estimates, to indicate wnether the model static or dynamic, to provide a sensitivity analysis of t,ne estimates or to reveal the underlying assumotions.
nECNP The preliminary evacuation time estimates sucmitted by tne Applicants assume f avorable weathe-conoitions and tnus f ail III.13 for the worst case situation of aaverse aeatner to account conditions developing on a busy sunner weekend af ternoon.
Nor do tney take into account evacues directional bias, As a evacuation shadow, or reasonaoly expected vehicle dix.
result, tne estimates are unduly cotiinistic and useless to future planning.
SAPL Supole-ine acplicaole requirements of tne Commission's Interim ment 3 Policy Statement issued June 13, 1980, 45 Fed. Reg. 10'01 on Nuclear Power Plant Accident Consicerations 'Jnoer tne National Environment al Policy Act of 1959 have not osen met.
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