ML20023B937

Forwards Eh Gischel Affidavit & Memo Re Allegations on safety-related Mods & Tests.Investigation Underway

ML20023B937
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	04/04/1983
From:	Arnold R, Gischel E GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:	Barrett L GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
References
NUDOCS 8305090351
Download: ML20023B937 (25)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:C. o m '; lbexnic bnydev y [titor-CiM[co faemercndcm1 5 0.289 D'e April 4, 1983 j--- b j 3 d b N b) 3g y [,_ 2i.t Affidavit of Mr. E. H. Gischel 9.. '. ' _',~ ".-c.< N '.4 7'i~," * : 27 -a, z.- ,.. = i....... ?' g i. V.* *.. .2- .'r... ? ... . ? "),e,,4c 7. ' - r 1.ccali:n c ff; ~ - 2: y 3 Lake Barrett - - " ~. y. ..; m. ":c-.l;;;c Enciesed is' a ccpy of an affidavit and for. arding memorandum I re - 't "ceived from Mr. Gischel' this inorning. The second paragraph of Mr. ~ Gischel's memorancum recuests that I pass his 'itatement on to the ' ~ appropriate representative" o'f the NRC. ~As discussed with you th,1.s morning,.GPU Nuclear has undertaken;an investigation of concerns and allegations made by Messrs. King and Parks over the'last two to three weeks. GPUNC will be analyzing-Mr. Gischel's affid'avit and will include any new issues in our-internal investigation. -~ - - ~. R. C. .nvid ~ ~ sim- / ~- ' enc. cc: E. H. Stier, Esq. E. Blake, Esq. P. P.. Clark B. K. Kanga J. J. Barton 'P D R LPD2 . E IC6t.ND 03:aInAL r D*****'A #7 M*S~W ~664 f* ~ r * ~ 0305090351 8304o4 pDR ADOCK 05000289 p PDR e.osocus

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T e 4i ,Qd -33,.. .s.... ...s.. ,s.. .. cy ~Z c, ~:. - ._,9 4 EDWIN H. GISOMEL, being duly sworn,'. depose's.and says: .......c ~* Since. June 1981.I hav,e.vorked as :the plant engineering. director nucicar po, er station. for. at tha~Three-Mile Islanld Unit 2.{. fir 2) v T e . General.Public Utilities ' Nuclear,' Corhb$ ation (GPUN), owners of the f acility.. As. plant. engineering..dirQctor, I was the. technical.a.rm for so has the ~ ' ' the site operations (50) director.Iivrence (Larry).g;. King. ultinate legal authority and respon,sibility to revf.ew and approve all - uwwo u.capw&. de pernanent sy's'tems in the p'lant. that, are 6=nW. c im. wue 4.u cer w If so:dethin'g. ever We+W.;;.y Ccmi,1 u. W.G h. f,.iual a..ce. n. ~~ ~ goes wrong a. gain at TMI--II, 50 is the :orgartiratiod 'that vould be held dir'ectly responsible for any deficient designs, procedures, tests other work that had been accepted., I have.a job with serious responsi' c: bilitiest. which I. take just as seriously. My sense of responsibility forces me to speak out through this e statement against misconduct at TMI-2 which violates professional standards and could threaten the public health and safety. Anything less 1i would cos. promise my prof essional integrity. Many professionals u.- I within the nu* clear industry will br'd'n' '.d 'me as a triitor for what'I Let there be no' mistake, however. I am in no cm about to report. way anti-nuclear, nor in any way an : advocate that. nuclear ' power in 2 ~ To'the unsafe, unnecessary or even an unwise energy alternative. contrary, the nuclear industry has provided my livelihood for over 25 ,i. 93 '

2' - h h} .My sense of dodication to years -- my entire professional career. the industry and the public it serves transcends ny loyalty to my er.ployer GPUN. If anything, the TMI-2 acciden't' de:nonstrates, the validity of* t

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the "de f ense in-depth" design co,,.ncepE..uti.lir'ed throughout.lthe nuclear n.- ,..n. n!. w,7. 4 y 9,:.,.c,;p.......... There;:;...y.;;bstantia.1 z. .n : py dence thtt: the pl.. ant,3cs pla_ced in .s su industry. + service before it' wis'.readf;'- vai loper'ating. with i#.o'rtant eg. iip:ncnt -. s... i .4 seriously malfunctioningi.-completol.y.,~.b. lod.e.d.cr. out of service,

r. cme with operator knowledge and apparently some withob.i:s. operator training CD End. qualifications were suspectf..ard.;,'many i.mptop2:5 operator, actions y

z: ., ~..,.. - h i t occurred from the 6utsat. ..In spite;...,.e,f.all this j.however, t a p cn was..able to be shu't down.and.the ' adiation su. f ficiently contained r so that the surrounding commun'ity WSs':not subjectN to discernable. ,.s, hea'1ch' eff ects despite me.rsive', p15nijdamaga/,"-l.. [cY.:. . 'The stakes. are! very serious, hNever., We. =r.:st understand what ~ caused the accident,.and el,.imina' e.'t'.f4 eaus'e..Decpite numerous inves- ~ ~ -~ the true story,behind: TMT ;still is. not well $2nderstood, -~ -. tigations, t particularly by many directly involved with it. For ne'arly t;we years I ha,ve bben involved with a central role .to =aintain the p14nt in.a safe shu.5down c5adities as.the recovery prog' ram is developed and implementeh, I could. no,(t help but develop a perspective as to what is going.on"hure. Based on my observations I ~ believe that the TMI-2 accident wn.'due to a. 'pecple* problem that

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?. g must have begun before the accidenf End still cxists, .'..y$$ 4 i w _ The pres'ent mentality at jNe"Mland emphasi:es shortcuts, 3 expediency and' disdain for profocsional standardd.' ';'he same thread ps ..w. can be f ound throughout various " rep;.c.a. orts of Un cocident, and indeed lE .'.P. ..,i....;: .*f.',' Q g. 1 l

,a .c...,. -. } '= am,,, ~ 3-Q. throughout various internal plant records and correspondence.. The' ontinued existenee of this mentalit y. forci-i: p: t.o. cha're c=y* coic.E. r. ns. .n.... The ' following de tails,.ti$e...,.idore[a're':jide'sent$hh:.,.. illustrate? chat han been goi@ngf on:.insi'db'.Lt.y:y.f.;.ff.y :,f-f.Q5.,-~. i-2'. progra .Of.l course'/ sy i v.y ;y : :.+ Q ~ f %M l4. 7 .,-) 2f s.me.W----t+ .ff. V.-r A -:5. ' :;.. m. personal knoUiedge" is -not all-inclusive. : :There may be =any more examples of.the is. sues I raise." I h&ve atierpte'd-tB!he 'as honest end ~.. factual as possible.a.nd have reviewed 'potes t.aken at the'tise of " events described. Y do -not intend

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I caly wir.h to bring the activities at TMI-2 under. control. Mp goal-is to help ..e guard.the health. an~d saf.ety of the ge."eral public, as well as to ..: ?. reaf firm the credibility.of the nucl' ear industry

• s' co=mitment to' i safely and responsibly.mana.ge its'o.w.n afdairs[I d.o not 15elieve that

' this g' cal can be. ach,ieved.untiil thode.I r,espon'sible* for circumventing J

85., t e ; system of che, c];s,..and ba, lance,s.,atTMI-2 ar.e, completely removed h

,'. y. ; J from.the picture. I am well--cualified to assess a breakdowrt at a nucleaf power organization. The nuclear industry.has been' my life. I am a Navy veteran,. serving f rom 1953-62.. In 1958 I joined the nuclear program as a chief machinist mate, where I put wo nticiear submarines i.nto i cc= mission. From 1962-72 I worked at Genera.1 Dyne.mics, the first four years as test director for new nucled submarines and the next six years as refueling director on subdar'ines returning for overhaul. In - 1972 'I joined United Engineers and' Con'structors in. Philad 1phia for 1 i five years, as a member of the nucloe.r' technical staff ano dead nuclear l e ng i r.c er. In 1977 I went to the, Catalytic Corporation as manager of 1 nuclear power engineering. This vas.3.y last job b2 fore coming to GPUN in Jur.e 1981 as plant engineeri.ng' director. I an also a F.cgistere-oi ~.. * *. i

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gg 4 Soon af ter my arrival at THI, 'I began to see signs that there was a gap between the publicly-stated ' safety com=it=ent and. reality.' when. I was ' hired. Unit 2 'deput.y dii c'e.. tor.~. John Earten. For instance, .. : n,m ...n. - :. neer1ng' an;d I:

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.old me that 'tnere was *.no!.:onell e.ti. hpr.a") in: ulanti engi.. :=::

... ~ .:. ~ n. c.. ;. ~. r.v, should shake ' these ' S..lO~.B'. 's 'upI*'Cse'r Meinext year I took Er. Barton at his word and made.da3cr' parsonnel and.crg'ani ational changes. i .... y. .....n I built an organization for which,I *hsw 'ha' e, trust' and confidence.. v .s "thh initiative ~s were met with managemant hostility. rather tha.n support, Uwever. Larry Ki'ng later told me'ihat in the spring of -1982 Pz.= Barton and others' had m'e under.ir,vditigation for ty personnt.1 changes' .... -.o,.. and were going to fire me. My j dbl.....has saved due to the '. support oi .v.;g. my boss Larry King. He told the#peblonnel director and Mr. Barton that .. gr. I' was shaking up the department EI.1 Thad been hi ed to do, and he had .... ' s.f.,glF '

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..' :. ; W.,,.. ...c6nf.idence in my~ wor.k. '..s ~ 1-During early'.1982 I began.to y?- symp, toms of widespread sloppines s'e e 6 at-Unit 2. On January 8,' 1982 'thero.vas a contamination release when an e..ployee blew an air hode dodn,a ~,d. rain. Altho 6gh initially'the ~ .e. ~ incident had bberi classified.as a' ci5cr'ielease 'within the clant, the ~ radiological control depar,tment'(RADCON) learned, there had been a release to the environme

• John B~arton assigned RADCON ' director Jim Brarier to investigate.

But.. Brazier bypassed my depart =ent and 9 s. /4 I remained ignorant of the incident, } ~ lJ cAwt w j,1982 Mr. Barton called and aske.d En---t'. u.e. q tf February. 7 I had been doing about the contamination release. - I said I what ... e t,- hadn' t done anything, because no :ohi had told me v6 had a release. q O I then asked for details, which Mi, Barton provideh. I investigated ,... s. and soon learned that drain plugs'.vare missing thit should have been I , ~., i. 4

A l}.... but it had been. partially pecled of b or was missing.: : d' . We pursued the issue further 5.nd learned that the '.conditioh had i p e xisted since before the accident.,.. The. drain plugs 1.a're. supposed to f .f.i&.' Wf':%?:M.' $Q.E : ' %. ' ~ be installed when. the. plant is,buirtib.:t'Ahey Niren!t. a The tape ~ 0.5. & L:? ' I was remcved "a.round7.ths'" t'im.eYo f :. the\\l5.!.i.5.A.I.?$. 5 ~.. 5....ll.W~\\.', b'cd & 5$- r a.cc..i. dent' but re -. p-

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I had my staf f go to the~ hardware stgrey. buy.. a d. expandable.~ plugs, and -m _ ,. y.-. :4 _. , 9.. install them. We also orderedthe cc rect ^ plugs.and installed.them y.. when they arrived. The incideht hid' 1Ef t me shake'n, hos. I-5. ed how nany similar oversighEd;uer'e lying dormant; q... t' Eventually"from time and poti,5,$ studies we learned that the q y '~ contamination had gone directly into$tha air. flow from one ~ filter c. cabinet to the next. The drainpipd bare not the problem. We r6portGi s. to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that we had identified the .t. probIem and it, was under controli,The NRC wanted to cite us anyway, s. _ however, because management had micked the deficiericy for so long.- - ~. L Later that year, with the support of ~ engine,ering analyses I helped to prepare and a presentation b.y my-assistant Ron Warren.while I was out on rr.edical leave, Larry King essentially convinced the NRC not to cite us. He explained to the NRC thIt an i.mproved system or organizath controls would prevent this type of,. oversight from recurring. The necessity for a new syste=t of controls 'is illustrated by ths dispute over use of the polar crane,. The polar crane plays a k'ey safG f unction in the plant's cleanup, becauce it lif ts. heavy loads over criticial parts of the plant. The conflict over use of the polar cran 0 i / % already had begun during the spring,9f e! crane was undergoing numerous modifications. Damaged pai-ts were being replaced by parts ~ that were similar but not identicaf, This same phenomenon was occurr \\0 for electrical components.

1 1 4 J t For significant modifications it is necessary to.first complete cnqineering analysis through the Engineering Change. Modification', a: a. To illustrate,. in' t!-# pol'ar crane you would have to

ECM) procedure.

7 ; - ~ .~ __.. _ _ _ y co through th'e ECM process ito~ria%e~ 'siilli'rliut.: riot : identical!.replacc-i.m.. 2. monts of damagedJparts in the' 1t:>ad(.bea' ring path or." load ' controlling ~~ The changes could af fectTf tEctioElkof lthe.cifane..

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s I made my position known that I wouldn't accept.any shortcuts to ~ -rhe polar crane refurbishment progra=I.Las't sp~ ring, Mr. 3arton told..

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~ ~ of t;he refurbishnent' p::ogram and that everything would me to stay out be recertified before it was turned.cVer to mer/ lthough I honored \\ y{q .. management's dire'ctive, I foresaw problems ahead.,It would be dif,ficul A ,.;J J ~ doublecheck the certifications l'ater if ECMs e.nd the ad.u. .nis trat: Lye. t to. . y., - 2 - \\ .u -' controls of AP--104 3 and AP-1047 were',,.not followed, when the work took s \\ ,l} ~ ' 4,, u, w. , /~ -~ ~pl a ce. ~ ~ ' In June I suf.f ered a stroke frott,.c pinched blood vessel, which v rept me out of work until October,' ;. The stroke af fected my, vision and short-term memory circuits. 53ut luckily the memory loss is self'- significant, it did not af fect my thought processes 'co'r r e ci-in g. Most er' motor skills. The new plant' engineering organiration functiened' smoothl:, durin: ~ accroach But upon my return I r'da.lized th'at management's & GN:bC ^ M MM '&T cd my absence. had not changed. Larry King cs-:4..6,. r e w a. c i c.;.... d. f. y. m. w

• 'n Q1 In"l'ah. t2iovember Larry told me of a call e

LMy-ttre polar crane. .~j. Mr. Barton swor'e about me and wantcs he had received f rom John Barton ? to know if I was getting involved:agliin in the polar crane af ter he ha6 .c. In response Ilar.49.' wrote a me:orandum that 50 would ordered me not to. stay away f rom the polar crane untiL.I.it was turned'.over, but at that - __ _ _.-- _. s s >ch.oa Anmmnta tio n. I understat

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t. i e m.m.v.i mi um wa.- not. voll-received.

Mr: King told 'me that. / management wanted us to stay out of the polar crane issue, which we ~ t k .G:-k'ifi. 3.M.[UQJN,... ~. did. .m ., _. : c o...,... m. . ~... ...w.,. It was. dif ficult..to hvoid 'contreve'rsy,A "hocev es,*. bec ause.2 echtcl~ ~ ,r , m. -.. ---:9.D..Kg.yk * . ::pn m. ..-.[: r epr esentative.s yere ;impler.ent ng_ a routine..,.... '..... that :I considered d t 2.s s.,.. m. ....s c:n. (1) changine The miscond' ct followed two. patterns-- u in numerous areas. .... g... - ....9 s the saf ety status of systems or. work to !say they no lonaer are safety-re3ated or important'to safety; and (2) reinterpreting. the G?UN rules ., ~. _se relax the standards. An example occurred in early December.c Bechtel representatives .j spent over an hour With me to seek =y approval for their program of modifications on a nuclear saf ety-related pipeline. Their paperwork reclassified the pipeline as not ir.portant.to safety.. - When I pointed -at the error, they responded that' 'the'y, would close a certain valve in / fety consequences fo.r' anyth..: Lng downstream. I re-c'; ' crder to prevent sa

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. ~, I O sponded that is not the way we do b5siness. I said we should not fool curselves. A safety classification can't be changed merely by closing a valve. First,. there. must be a Safety Evaluation Report (SER), review and approval by th'e Plant Operations Review Co;6nittee (PORC), and nit The Bechtel representatives insisted th)t.they had to change ~ approval. the program immediately for pragmatid., reasons; th'e schedule could,not .r. wait.- I refused and said there was.'62' thing to discuss. .They left and .F did not contact me further. - I do SotM6tL6y if the. codifications ever v.;.m... I have since learned','sobbNr, that Bec'?tel has nede many were made. sy,;.;. - c.. modifications without timely knowledge ('; review or prior approval by ~ .>.%' e. plant engineering. ..',; ye, j; e. i.. l ') r .i...,.. At this point I should digress t6 discuss the'Jbeginnini;s of what .s.. p'- has beccme a management weapon to,har,fipW'.and retaliate against me. It

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.j. [ -B-i.egan lost. fall af ter one of my friends and co-workers sought help. .I ! rom the Stress Control Center - (SCC). for erotional dif ficulties and a drinking problem He was treated,by', a Dr. Jenkinsi, The Stress t Crntrol Center is.e. clin, ic hire.d"bi.;':diU supposeilly to h..elp.. emoley.,ecs ~ a .. ~. ..p ;3.v..: 3.,,,. 3,..y =- n.; m... in need of mental health. courisel,14g,1 therapy orf trestifient'.:.

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.m,.y. t My friend mentioned -thej af terJef fects of my stroke.to Dr..Jenkins ...?.>."T. and sugge sted that I speak with..Jenkins, kho had" expressed' an interest. ..~ I agreed to speak wit'h Dr. 'Jenkins~ only af ter he specified that all of our conversations would be covered by the doctor-patient relationship J and be held completely conf.idential...We then had a' series of meetings, I spoke freely With him. f Dr.. Jenkins suggested..that I take a *. and neuropsychological stress evaluation to ' help. learn the best future" It would cbs.t.5500 and I vas hesitant but..at the end of f treatment. , October I agreed for.him.to _ schedule a December appointment. - A f ew weeks ~hisfor'e the evaluation, #saw!my 'perso.nal doctor, and. I "7 ! r.,entionec th= nem.vjasycnoJ.ogical test... My doctor recommended. against He. said that the af ter-ef fects of my stroke were aking the test. self-healing, so the test is unnecessary, ye advised that the test On the other hand, - could not ;be.nefit.me. had, no positive value; it could be used against me.) As a. result, my wife cancelled the test. i v At the end of January Dr. Jenkins called and asked what had. l Af ter I explained he responded that my d'octor is not a happened. trained psychologist. Dr. Jenki . recommended that I r consider in I said I'd think it over, but order to better plan my recovery. I did not hear. anyshing more about it until the f dropped the idea. [ \\ lid blew off in February over the polas crane. i \\, - From conversations with other SO c:nployees.and a January 20. .e norandum tel1ing 50 to stay out of '.thg, polar crane refurbishment,

. ~. o-=.;.. s. : 1 knew the issue was still controversial.) On 'approximately February 9. so received a Safety Evaluation Report. (SER) on recertifying the polar y ~';;,' Q.:. ;p., . :::.. g..h'h5 until.'8: 30 a.t Larry ~ King gave it to ide^:t6 review. - Ne.c!nly;*t... ~.^. crane. ... _.-~:,-... ~........ ,....:.. ;. L, ".'. ^ I the next day '.td C sub?.iiCodr? ccm'ents s' 'JIn McViesing'."the. 5ocr.:::ent, lI ,c

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a. .The plan yas . realized thatt management %as' tiying it6. pulli a ~ ". m M have the crane,lif t -4 0-ton. missile': 1bie' ids.without.being tested... n o r :: :., a. '7A> That flaw in the plan was at the hea:-t' of the ensuing controversy. ~. D ',.. I knew. this.would ~ be a hot issue. - Rather than..just telling -[arry King and let, ting.him take all the heat - which I knew he would - I decided to write my own memorandum 6c::nenting on the SIR. .i.. My comments concluded that the.,SER was technically unacceptable P. as presented. I said that the cra'e had to be tested before making n l Failure could result 'in p56ucing the he~sent margin of any lifts. 4 ' safety to the public, - l damage to n':c'le2.r safety-related o'r important-tg> safety equipment, or significantly.' delay the recovery.progryd ~ i " stressed that the tests could be done incrementally. On February 11 there was a meet.ing which I attended on the gr

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- crane. The entire Polar Crane Task Force (PCTF) was there. My commem ra-ior discussion tooicf I ex51'ained that the tests could be wem a f 'J ~., "ut the meeting, stalemated. Mr. Bahman Xanga, the b done incrementally 32, .3 ~ Unit 2 director, was called in.to resolve the dispute. Kanga asked me . n; to restate my concerns, which I did... He then became upset, pounded og the table, and berated my position for.:approdimately one half hour. My basic position was that we 'didn' t have any alternative ~ but to test the crane.. ANSI standards require that the crane be tested /v to make any heavy lif ts./ Kanga and mant.gement took the position that ar J ( tests were unnecessary, si e the crane has a 500-ton capacity and th0 '73 ,h "k ',.. t m.

. /: 4 l k'>. 10 - ueen through the worst nuclear accident in history and we didn't know i f how much damage had been done. Besip*fere is nothing in the pro

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'essional codes that exempts a crane f cm load: testing due-to its ~ . ~... i . :- 2 '- .--:r h y. lI l ..It was c decisive.forf:.ne athat':we had.to.'- ut on,new capacity factor.. -. ;-e a.. ... p....; ; l 2-f - =.- : ;.. : ANSI standards. requir.e ~tha,t. the granef,be fully.;1ca.. w.,. .,,,.7, q. g d tested '\\ brakes. .z ..;_ <....c,.. whenever there are new brakes. - + W

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= . objection was tidt noving in heavy Loads ifor the tests Anothe _ f(c. - ould result in. occirpational radiation expo su.r_.g. I replied that with s suf ficient time we could ~ find suite _ble. test loads already in the con-h ~tainment gested some possibil.ities. I e.mphasized that we are ega1T9 oundDi5nductlhe test easonwere sufficiehtly compelling we 6:ould all openly sign A statement explaining our reascas W and, sound technicab. ba sis for not. following re%ui'r' d procedures. e This is an acceptable industry practice, 'so long as when you do not follow -~ __ the code you see that the,. substitute 2.s thor'oug'h'15 ev'aluated and - ~. .::.u. . justified. -/ isks openly I was particularly concerned that we a11 ' assume any 4. , and together. Eut this suggestio'n was rejected. The idea es for SO to just sign of f that the program was acceptab1e as'present'ed. ~ That accroach illustrates a way of do'ing busines,s at Unit 2.. The rules are bent and broken. Problems get swept" under the ' rug,. instead of b.eing confronted directly. If nothing goes wrong, it would not matter so But if there were'an accidebat. SO would be held : responsible much. because we signed off. We would be thrown to the volves. Af ter the meeting, Mr. Kanga ashed Larry King and me to stay behind. He again pressured us to sig:1 and approve the SER. We could not approve,it as presented ~. J/,.., * =. - ~ ma=Mav. Fahruary 15. John Bar. ton called Larry King and me

s .9 f Y w niee t. wi th him.. Referring to me Mr. Barton. told La rry that he, ught, o

n fire that s.o.b.

for writing that f---ing memo. He asked words to "Now that we've got this. thing '-on-. record, ;pha t are we,.coino. .,..a 3- , n.e.f Q. '...; g the effect,

• ' ~ 7.T -

z.- - 4 ",.. . '~ to do with it?". Larry defended.me; He".6 aid that?f hMd-raised valid . _.. y=... nQh.p,J.; lG {,, w y 3,., ._ -L,,,_f..L ;. concerns which.had to' be.- addres,q'ed...Thep.tweied ' t the ? kind of?. thing

• s; v i:,; m.:.... s.~.. c.e :

p. = ou fire a person for. Laf.n.f 2.dded.that we hav.A to get.that crane .~,- .Q_

_:: :,I_

tested before we use it. 'Larri;challengedEM.i'.'.3a'r5cn to sign off on Larry Ba-rton refused,..ein... light of. my memorandum'. the polar crr.ne. o s* .. later passed on to me another erigl,opee's 'tip that. top' management st.ill ..=. planned to fire me:af ter the furor cattled down. There were 'a -series of m'eetirgs, over ;the next few days with the and the igualit entire recovery programs staff., 5"e'chth1 representatives, I was in[orEed that I di.dn'.t.. understand every-assurance (QA) staff.. .. thing that had been done on the crane and wouldn't be so coneczned if , d Lv.Freemerman of Recovery Programs said I knew the whale-program.2 he would write a memorandum.explainidg to me why the tests were unnec- ..). 39 ? . ;,i ' essary. It did not say anything The memorandum arrived on February 17. 3/ already been covered in the meetings.- In addition to the that hadn't FreemerrIn said that 'the crane would be rain su,bj ects discussed, above, a f ew inches and inspected prior.it6fmoving the.first missile shield. 1104-123% of, Bot that' is no substitute for the.'r'e:;uired load test of lift weight.-

v..,..

Freemerman's memo claimed...that the path of the missile shields .Instead, for being moved would avoid going over'th'e exposed reactor. I they would travel over? the., remaining in' stalled missile shield

example, That wcn't wash, either.jThe load b. lock on the crane could pierce the Further, flying pieces could land anywher 3g remaining missile shields.

6 e,,... g s. f, \\ - 12

. *i

/ ( ~ and create damage. reemerman's final point wks 'a'~hald ass'ertion that nothing -signi. ...a. )'j ficant would go wrong even if the ' missile shields dropped.. But he did -e not off er any ealculations 'to sup'po'_%.'this,'subjectiive evaluation; Thati ~ .i? ? n~ R Md+:.:%.L.l :. % * " N.i:** ~5 % '. ' {.-l:.- was ju'st our point. ~ Sucha~ significant viciation ?.of A'ISIlst.sndards re- .. gg u.f. b... 5.b:. None was, ever done. cuir~cs a complete engineering ~ analylsll'.M.y. ; :,. } ;,'..... j.j

2. a.,.

.y.~ .. w... [ Af ter reviewing Mr. Freelner=a',.U.s Fe.Nud[y'II ticrd, I knew 1that : ~ . c.. +p. we weren't accomplishing anyt ingi:V,2' hit'same day' Larry King and :I G r:- senE'E' memorandum t'o'J.','N. A ii$.ng[..N.hovery Prog' rams Director. We stated that the technical concerb. s...'in.. e..

ny February.10 comments remained

~ ~ L[ enresSlved, ' but had been, overrike(;*by. plant r.anagement due to program- ... :.: g.. : - metic concerns. We concluded 'tha6,.SCT had a fundamental disagree;;a.ent

,: gr.:./

ag3 I with the Polar Crane Retes,t Procjram'bjut.,did' not. challenge Mr. Ahff sing's t:~ :7.. - authority' to proceed with the pro.gFi.M.. ad w-ditten.; ~_ Larry was forceA.put.of hi. .h. bout a week af ter we, sent the. Feb:'dar~y 17. memorandum. By contrasty,I. received the silent. treatmenti. ' ~ Committees were set up to in.vestigate the polar crane, but. was ex- -~ ~ .2 cluded from membership. I receIAe.ds....ittle, corcunication on anything s ..I have ne.v'e..r rece.ived a Eitten response to for'arcund three weeks. Larry a.63 my Februpcy 17 memorandui'.,., {_ As the dispute was heating up, top management began to,take an i " ntense interest in the af ter-effeet s} of my stroke. On February 10, i .c s ;. Dr. Jenkins sent a certified letter.I.to my hone urging me to take the ..... z.. neuropsychological evaluation. .He ad'ded that he vould like me to call his office in two weeks with an ansh... i. I was up' set at being pushed 7. but called Dr. Jenkins. During.o.ur.,:., discussion he, revealed.that he 'had broken his pledge of confidentiality, and had discussed my case with : his supervisor. I told' him that. I,%3pid. n' t have } spoken with him 'at all a ;

,)..

9 _g

i-C. #. af 1 had known he would ' violate the pledge. He said;he had to discuss 011 the cases with his supervisor... $1;ihle .J !K5M%l. - Several days later Mr. Barton. called me f.,n;Jf@or a;meetingivith'. ': .,.s.4 w,,.. _. ~. .......,..s .o....._3., yar. Kanga and GPL CP $N Ent.B f re< could si. d fh% - s r.u.n

• .n.,

..:.... ' h ?,. J.. s..; a. ... :... a...~ . ~. Ulr. Arnold asked nie 'whyT didn't wntiftfojtate:.the,psycheneurological . ~....;... 1 He said h' ~ didn't Know thg. details,;..but;Stre.ss. Control avaluatiEn. e ~, - i t. w.. . _.. m g..... wanted me to take the test. Mr. Art >old then procseded.to urg wa.to ?.* *k _ take.the test againi. but added sis's details but my condition $ to em- ~ ~

1..

Before I could$a'as,,*er he. urged n, e td obtain the .phasize his point. . %'*Tl m'. evaluati5n a third time.. "This cycle,;however, he included many of the, intimate details of my conversatio$. :s -...trith Dr. Jenk' ins. Mr. Arnold seemed to realize h'd;;had said too "much, and stopped- ~ -% ~r He said there had been eb,ough discussio.n and a'sked if I was ~ ~ ~ abruptly.

7. -

I responded that my., doctor had told me' going tE take the evaluati.on. . ~._, -.=.:. there Eas absolutely no.ne.ed for thd 'evaluati'on, that I had-merely suf ;- f ered a 1:emporary loss in my memory.@cuits and should '.be more.co.n : Mr.. Arnold cerned with how the results of the examination would be 'used.. 1 > sa r.d that he thought I should take th5[. test'. He added that it is very ' inportant for my job placement. .I said th.en that they would have to ' set it up so that I liidn' t have. any'. choic e..

hey set it up through Dr. Jenkins' colleague Dr. Gordon at th.e Dr. Jenkins for' April 15.

' University of Pennsylvania hospital.was scheduled to administer the c. 7.. evaluation. My personal doctor later called,} Dr. Jenkins...My' doctor told my wiIc that D'r. Jenkins was very embarrk..ssed a.nd said the pressu5 e for the evaluation came f rom " higher up.*? sy doctor insisted that the ra thb.. 's..,ithan first b GPUN. Dr. Jenkins results be sent directly to me, % 8 ,1 JJ . d = -vaaV <b=lav in ob-

i 1 4# /. taining the test results. I found that odd, since originally he had told me results would be available ti e day of the ovaluation.. h l I believe that the pressure :for the. stress-test ;at best was an .=........ 7 to harass and.2.ntim2date;mey.or.at.;vorsMas; r.e.taliation for my

v. [ 3. '.'.? ;. f,.jp,C.Q~ '. y -

- ?B, c.,T Q effort ~- .O2 s. t.'.a..f f. per sonnel dissent by branding me' asi rhen. tal."ly;..:nnfit..,.'.(T. h,;e ;other.IS. -.~ a...., n who challenged polar crane: shortcuts received similar;tr'eathent. Larry

L.

..r;.;.V' ~- t,\\ 7_.~ supposedly ~ was. fireid for '" conflict'-of-interest". F.ing, f or instance, rtlated to 'a company,he was involved Nith. 'I understand that Larry's company, Quiltec, wa.s providing services elsewhere' in the nuclear. in-We I have worked with and hocVn Larry for ne.arly:two. years. .. ~3 dustry. are not " chummy" on' a social basis. "..3ut 'from our yorking relationship I have known Larry as a decent, hardworking, co=petent, e.xtremely dedi-. cated individ'ual who rot $tinely ", moved mountains' 'to :naintain progress ~ r- 'I'n sho5t, '.he' worked veldy hard' to do things .~ in the recovery program. i. sound, te'chnic'al' way.,. But manage-and get the cleanup moving.in a.., right ~ '*~ rent thwarted him at every turn. .l. ~ "investigatio'n" of Larry',s ' firm was due to 'I believe that the ~ r my 'memorancum and h'j.'s own > challenges to the pola'r crane his support fo, It is my understanding that =anagement liad known of Quiltec, prog r.am. for some time and dpparently did not f eel any.'need to take actions against him until he supported my February 10 mem'o'randum. and similar challenge.s from the same time frame. Larry's outside activities were ~ just an excuse to fire him. ,. )f.'.;' ,i Rick Parks performed a similar role for 50 from the program / Rick was 31 controls perspective 'as I did froni t.h..e technical standpoint. j Rick a Senior Operations Engineer and mh... er of the Te.st Work Group. "it tried every way poss.ible to make ths, system work' 3.nternally, but s. y

• b :'

---

__...___.y.-

M gmply didn't. I knew him as a dedicated, hard worker who we.s driven

• to total f rustration when he reporte.d clearcut :progra n violations and

.J .s. top v.anagement refused.to correct ;ther.abusek, (Indeed;'dthdy. insisted.

. ;, 2.. a -

,a . t: - .. m e _., ; e, ..i......c.,., j L~ on perpetu atin, g them'... f.;-gg, j-g,f.'y$, ' iq.f ' ~ g *..qy;.;,f,,.- .r. .s r.v.a y.. .::.. 2 w:..> .4 e. t:. I have rea' Ei! Pirkst.5'6?.$aS8 March' ~23',:~1933 affidavit.h I d ...: c .y m. ;,- .~, 3 7. g ; confirm the substantial accuracy', of.Zall portio,ns cf;.thejaf fida.vit that . ;.f.' x J ~ ~ . 4 :.r '. f, : s refer :to me, or for wldch.1have.. personal knowledge.,. . +.... -.. /Twant to emphasi'ie that it was. Rice's gg initiativ g $c

r. -

. / % Q - A s A J.Ela sw % cextz A . y g u y. 5 public kith his concerns./ F.is decision was based on his own frustration, ~ 14 ' ather than some. internal cionspiracy >) .I ap aud hi.,. however, for 'having d i. the courage to break tNe ice. - on March 23, the day Mr.- P. ark..s.,Yeleased his 'af fidavit, there was a major meeting scheduled for' 8: 3 0 a ;=. to discuss-his-charges. The .v../ n.eeting was somewhere around a.ha'If hour late.getting started. Nearly all of.'the managemeTt ~a'nd 'sen'ior' staff'were in attendance, including ~ ~ ~ Messrs. Arnold, Kanga and Barton ' They had* detailed information.about Mr. Parks' allegations. .I know thaE one of the top management people s I also had a copy of ti e press release thatyent with the af fidavit. h the af fidavit, was, held. in the bir with an announce, seem to recall that ment that it was being studied. Mr',y hnga opened with an announcement. l Mr. Arnold.went over the that Rick was going public with hic charges. issues and said he was sure the con' riversy was just a flash in the pan t and would die down quickly. He stated that the investigators wouldn't find anything, and the Udall Corrnittc4 wouldn't speak with the wit-Mr. Arnold said that Rick.' perks would be ~ back tomorrow and ..nesses. .we should all be cool and calm. jf.. 6 Barton stated that parks sh$uld be fired'. He added that Mr. The. " s.o. b. " should not be allowed back.,on the Island. Mr. Kanga.re-s.

- 15 v r= sponded that we couldn't do.it li.ke that, because Parks had gone to the NRC and was protected by the Ato:~ ' 5io Energy Act.: That meant we h.,d Kanga said we could f. ust transfer Parks' or put him on to.be careful. a leave of-absence for a month an8'th.b.n get rid of',him quietly. J Mr. Arnold stated that wh.e,n:Ph:.;...Ps returned' Oe should not give j

. ~-..

r. : '..m: - - ~ ~ him any documents, and :should ;restri'ct h.im from protected. areas. m-; .z .. - c., ..:. ; g t .f r.. - .. s y' .p. w.:.;..:..- g *. .a. Mr..Barton reemphasize.d,tha.t,.,w,w.zhould not 'cive anythi.n.;:.e, to Parks, ...r

.....s.

e .m. 2,., ..._.y ~,. g. ... ~ :s. ~. L should not: speak to him and should%3-tQ.p..y nct 'let him.back on :the, Irland .pp. :-x .-<- 3 2.*..:. ~- Mr. Kanga said that we're 3.do~/.Ing.' int 8 this "but' the app. oach vcu ~- have to' be handled ' carefully, beciuk'Jarks had charged harkssn.ent and ~ r,.... 3;. . l e.G; y- 'l r there are laws to. protect.him...4..'+...t ~ Mr. Arnold t. hen stated that the Udall Cor nittee would review . Parks' affidavit bist.not invite hi=....t.o testify. He said that'he felt-Q:..' l .....y... sure it wo ld all be.. squashed. e T.he $v.eeting ended ' shortly after, aroun< u <.~ ?.. *. 10: 0 0 a.m. . 'Y-s Z'.>.. .c s 'r p ': v: e- .g-Af ter-this, meeting I wa's 'intELyietted by Messrs. Griebe and Love,

4.

a-a lawyer and. eng.tneer who,, saidllO e,y:,~.were investigating safety con:cinr. .~._ 3 .p-e The either for: Mr. Arnold or GPU Chaiddan of.the Board H. erman Decamp. .a. meeting had been scheduled severa.I.w;14eeks before ti. hen Mr. Barton told l ... c. - ....s The.y.al,so. had tal.ke4.y',.'.tio.Ron yarre.t[ and Joe Chwast me to appear. p t ac.cordi.ng to these individuals. 7,.Vas one of the last schedul'ed to l testify, although I had played,ac t::dn' tral role in, raising the issues ' ' ?.~n". l under investigation. ' J "'t. i.T - a ....e t I told Griebe and $ove t'hdti ci,:Yas trying to work within the system and w~ uld give it. one' las...h..^* :., c t' chance. For approximately the next o hour and 45 minutes I discussE1:s.:p -itti the.m subskiantially all the issuet ...r.y2...... - i to thin point of my statement. 'fdn lined by belief that there.had be x, = s.. a blatant disregard for. industry. rples and standards. I further pro-N -- .. f.. ::...^.. :; #. " ' 67p tc f. .y. =s..- e.

v....c. ... v. .e 4.) tested that employees were being prdssurGd "to cage in' misconduct ;- no that could backfire if there were.an..[. accident an6 ruin. 'their careers. ... +. g e. m..... I told Messrs. Griebe and!I,c,W.:t.St'.f~p~robb'Siy 'wd5IdT$e'. fired * .....,.. h.:.. l.. ' h :>.?: :E'.;.1E.:.:i T.2 ~ 2:;.a;.%. for what I had disclosed: to'.ithd:C ". 3htY.s:snacn's ' hid =!ojut E stop' to I ... :a r.: M:r.c-& t. ~:i: ?..%:~t':.:... c.: Q 7:.:.: & : ~..? m. .'. - a

• :. 6:

c.

t what i s going. on'.C... I'cl told. th'em 'that;...}i..f L ycu'. -don't do i.t jI.'11 go else-is' still'.,hoirig,'..on Efter.fourIvears and it has to c...

- whe re. This accicent

,;. s

. ' :;; ~-.~:t:.. e... :... n. A q... ;.

~...v.",. ..X + 4. : + st'op. The ind'ustry can't tak'e it.2..].E.,the.Two investigators took notes n.i... :, s.. but-have not since 'conta'eted OfefiN.1 I. have,'.h6 wever, heard a

:... w: :%.,..

2. periodic clicking 'on my telephenE* thit,' bas not. occurred before. 4. ,.y. x,5,.. - Ef fective March 24', Mr. Bar.to.n.'.?d.,,spla. ced. Actih.,g. so Director Joe ~- ., ;.r. y..,. Chwastyk.as head of my dhpai-trenty.M'$ it. ' ' '~.:t:; N. :. ; e y..b: , ~... ' w. &..;. ny]!.T. ,1

'f

.the Unit 2 deputy director. .. On Monday, March 28,.Mr. 72.6.oi71 'c.alled.fme'eting to discuss the r.. ..... u,'.7 :.. :...... v.- -New' York Times article that,'came.yuf,;n@h=lt' day.=on. the recovery " program. '.' ;96 Wi,*.:

• s

'. '.. H~ '~ ~Mr.' Arnold invEnd"those 'kho h'id NPiMi's tio'.:rais(.:them "no .y: a :

r.

He said theise people. dih.Sh;..q$,in,Ned 't'o go t$..th in'eeting. It ..u. appeared like a fishing expeditio;Ufb.,; *ever. No,cgie said much. .st. -l ... o. Af ter rea: ding the New Yoi-k Iiriss.". article, my, primary concern is . with -inaccuracies in GPU's publi.c/co~sitId... ' . :T ; <.Vt.C. * -1: *- ni 7or dkemple, in the ar'tief ....~. ; u,.. r: u Mr. Arnold stated that inv,estigaE6:5i.M[e. regulateiry.,pelays and problems .-.e i: with public perception contri'bute'dE..%...signfficant1'y to the setbacks, in ~;r - t ;..

• m. - - l Fu..=.

.;o. In my opinicF;':y:.de. items.~en th.at list wouldn't it the Unit 2 cleanup. . '. <:e.Ny!. 4. s.. ' n. :,, n s. . w

. e.

~. be obstructions if top managede,dt'T[;. d;}fs do 'the. -id6. - .y properly. I - r.., G.h. . ~.9 Mr. Arnold prai sed the,new)t.OI5g...gi$,ont sitructure at the Is . - ~. The primary' ch'a'.ici-M,ltNin th'e managementi structu .- ^ .... ;-y*, irm.. - + ;g. as a solution. .cs. :Q.p.g 'z rk tiioir duties independent)

.r idhheffo

-been to purge or neutraliie.,'tifodj:ylbga.q., -: .'w.. t \\- ..o. o.. ;. % u'ndei ME,,.l Barton's control the new manage $.$t!Nd....... y<.$ir If anvthing, 3n . x.~

~ '

.. s. ' --... -

. ?Q.:. :W.s.'.W. '.. ~. '3 i <.C .-o:... ~ _ - .. ~ --.

16.~.P.I[,':. 2 w v:11 further stifle disse o plece h. rein on' the 50 rtaf f. In the article, Mr. Abold,c:Mici cd Larry E.ing for not being ?..... - :: v, h a " team player." That stat'ement -is, accurate. Mor.e. significant,,ow-a 1~ ever; Mr. Arhold 's charactei-i:ati.o:r'.hidic'ates', the probicm at TMI. ...,...~.f,_.... Under Mr. King 's leadership so.strcye.to -be ~ objective and independent .a.,

.. : Q:. f.:.tx'..-:,. m ;. --.

. covered by. cur.orofessional and m- .u. ::= y.. - in evaluat ng the var 2ous'...... -- } progra::.s'.,..{.y.;;..;f;, e M' * " ^ ' legal responsibilities (dher.S6-M.~r'e'cter;"is.;r.bt supp:ised ko be a "tc

.~;. 17

. n r.a ~ King. was got ec.-S. v.;iv.W. n..ahe; insisted. on upholding his at t ... a.. :...- - - .a... w. y~ clayer." Mr. .=.n ~ responsibilities conscientiourly '. anti"Nithout..cce.pfonising the required g "-De.c.:.,c.. r l- . ' g.:l'#.,y ",... * . f :: - standards. In. the artic.le Messrs. Ar....d.)..E.,:.d.i. Kar.ga Eta y.. d that violatio l --. g p;..: - state law by trucking out sewag e'.~cor"taninated mithiradicactive c'esium ~, a- _: '.... ;.. ; l...~.0 .i. *.* '} 137 was a legal technicality with.outn... safety significance. In my - .:,.~.. Y 4 ..a I .e It. opinion,.that perspective is itcdiffs.significt nt safety concern. c....R. r.- ,_ breed disrespect 9f'oY.j. legal requir'c5ents in general. canno't help but ... v.. ' . Messrs. Arnold and Kanga alYo}" stated -that the polar crane would ,,.. -.,, - e :..., be adecuately teste.d. That misse's ths point, howe.ver; if the crane is . ~.. ^: sed. bef ore the test to r.emove,4 0,.tbn., mis s,ile shields from, directly A mid-lift the most vulneraN..s..5;part of the ' plant I over the reactor, - f'ailbre could cause, the missile. sSid.ld --- as well as. the huge lower ~ .a. the heavy liftipg rigs used, cables and other 1 I b1'ocks on the crane, MO parts--tocomecrashingdownon.b52 reactor, piping and who knows 2 (LOCA The result could. i>e. w.,'o,tha.f loss of c6olant accident an . wha t else. .c... which.could threaten the public,', an# vou'ld delay the cleanup for years significance to 'V, such an, accident would ruin the Not of the least p~I careers of the so staff who had W..E.3.e.ned the liftf3. - ~,.

• • . t I had a ',ld.t.e.r 'd'elivered to Mr. Arnold about

~ 'Also on March 28, .r.s., the neurops'ychological evaluation'.,. ;-...'.I, t;pid Mr. Arnold that based on R ...;.... ;.; \\.** '* '.. r. ; a e

.~ ( - 19

• =..

deict.or s advice.I. had. decided t.o canec1. the evcluation unless he vere imposing it as' a c.ondition'of my,em loyr.ent. If rekuired to take the I requested permissiori to c5io ,e. my own qualified psychologist

test, D

to conduct the evaluation. T e P.Js. 3.th.at cv understandable concerns, 4 . g.g',;_.p...., :. j u O h.Y: 2,. .y )... v' * * ?:. :. * **

• C. (

..'t. y.s.th pr. Jenki.n)$.5.'.a.d,.d. i...is? d.ol'1eag'ue.Dr..;p'. - GCrdon,Vould 4 hqout pre}ud.4C. ,-2.. ' * * j ' * ? ? " 'h' e '.r'e s.ul'ts. build st re ss, into..the. r.5 L,*l,T.*2 h. y'.'4 ".V.* ;;. ,!L,..' -.r.f yn and could m,.. -. f.,;-;.. ca-h.r ~a.-#r - . 4 -*

• .C ~.

- r M' l r.. as t _ esting env.j t 3,.,_ _e,,_c,s.;g ci y.<gg j.h 7. r.cid my t y n 3 5.p,4. i.i-rdo -gy g?C7 *.&. ~ 4 I of ferec to pay #cr,. the ;exa=1na,._11r A ...,~g,.. ,5-j, .r. . willinen ess +o cooPehite V_th. an. y..co.n. : ie.. .'..'o' 'ES' P J DS 1 ent but ex-m .a w.. L :

s.....-

.... +. -- plainea. t. a* o-such a sensiti.va L. n-A 5pr. y. us.t ha.ve full conficence in 'n 9 .. >... w.., -e uested c - s- .c: >r_ina,-y, the circumstances and ob-} ee3.-1vl g,; g %. g pr.om a.m. p., t mandatory J64*f::'ij. t5.e~ ' 'g- 'i that Mr. Arnold contact. me. cy,'s.p y,S8.-3k'c'*a~ , p g, g.g.,.- es . '..:.H $g,.,1.$ssed over vhether yr. Arnold con _tacted ne;.th,e{w.g-g: 2 I sa'd ha didn't like ~. ' '. e. Wir. the evaluation is a condition 'of;,gyg'@7.1.g,$ent. ,$e, h to think of it in tho,s,e, teps,p,5fg.f.],g;.,y tha disc.ussion to t e cir- ,q q CumstanCes o4. the test.and as.....;,.,37.,..,.fy.,., j., f.s, s .:sub'stitute for hims.e,1f.in ,f J$. C '7C -#"\\* aa

• g

.Gpw would pay for the evaluation.l,..};.yypy,.w..,. } g;..,. *, -{. ,. y. s t l.a i.b,.=. *,.a.. ~. ..,,. '....p T h.d6ceptable.. I didn't r. r-3 ItoldMr,.Arnoldtha_tthesa.pg;,.. . 4. trust Dr. Gordon to pick a'repla ny bore tb to conduct ge I wanted to*. select my own 3 *' g.a-g 4g+, #cr.t,.he evaluation. ,, P,S' g.,g. ; test. M ~ n'rnold told me that.h h h.'do have any pr blems with.,semeb.m yi. '...;g-',M;l,.g,n.M ~ lo3'g. q g A{ g;e.had to be som 1 besides Dr. Gordon conductipg'.t -. L., assurance that whoever di4,.;theblo.%..q.,.. ....h3 g.. 1ged.:.I s'ated that he , yCC , y'it;.., R.,a, i i d I

• ld "ek' should state the necessary'quali f

{a[dards, highly-qualif,ied professional: %,..P.V' g them;y,o.ld Mr. Arnold that i g,y,.. I nal co=petence and indepencence Iwouldbasemy'selectionon.j), *Y,~ e ba'ck to e, perhaps W from GPUN. M. Arnold said he...y m.,;,.>:. g.. l.- a e~ P,onday,, April 4.

• [I h,];k'O *

'...e,,, ;.;. ,s

~ e: ;:.. ; s..w. ~ v,, 1 E ': y.' ii. *

• f,

. 2 D.. % './.,.i *** . J. f' =.*.'.:... .ay, n *...: eM.;.,.o

• .* ;s,.5. '.s.

What niay disturb me t,he. : rod.'ilc'"I.hy " h,,' versy over the

• .:.,......f..

.. x s lar crane is not an Isolat,ed,: case,$..q..g t.,,illiEstiates. the current ap- .w po >s proach to business at Unit II.. 'Th(j.j,cp%(dr. d r..ogrep is no lon ~ .p .... *.y s n This is'#S.j,..nleri..c eye' rn.'h. To illust: rat.e, k effectiv,ely controlled. O They werd upset on March 3 0 three. of the. people.,oq;bf. staff, :cime in.

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p because'of..two more' cases the'y.ha y:.....a . * :. ~, ....~ '

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..:.. r.. h,.. :. a. i 'she:6e sec*.,tel bypassed wa. . -:...a.; p arnd. . +fc

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ep~*- .. - v. ,o'nt;rol' 'systeci;.in, an atte=pt to . /.. 4.. ......s.. ). the plant engineering.modific,atic,-is,)e..t.:p.,: r.c. ;..~

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.~: -5 ~ ohsy.,1$.$. n. 1;,..p.nd, pai-ticularly in the - downgrade saf ety' classifi' cit'f,.,... l. ~; w .....c :.. Bechtel' crews haOe Mdi. Sip'a.t c'ssbig thir.odifications co

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\\ :. k containment,'e don ' t ' know Mhat.B.. ec.ht.'e.i. ~ M',. '. ' l'.. I have . T f doi.ng to t.he plant. ..I ....~e~. program. he,;isolstion of SO by removin: rned of plans to instituticna %s d.- l F . f red. plant engineering 6 the modific'ations control staff /'ehtildl)? t. .t

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~. sumably' thi.s~ is part of the ficpi-of. 'e'o,4.;2_nagenent. ctructure., ,O .t. .ty;.4 hazN.:.for' t'he local NRC offi This situat;i.on poses a ec3id.'eM5 elm.,:L . n..a..:.,.n,,,t,1%... r..,.. ..J. blic interes The NRC r.ecoen'i:Ys,:..tdi.*.5:~1t is in the pu in my opinion. .....:.g:'jy.p... to get the n5L. mess cleaned up'.%kp'edien'tlyLSut it is ea ..., ;.:::p e.. shn. sight of the mest basic objectig.cs:-J7/g.$t TMI the N.RC has be . - q <,., h s".and "2 's" to ..~ the utility to, upgrade' technical.do'cp entq from " e +...

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• when the gov'ernseh. t?'should be holding out for

.. ~...... f. p.;i.r f. w. e.. t required."10's." for the When the NRC caves in it.mak,es.1t twice as difficult ~ y ...y. d p of us in GPU who are 'trying to hold;*.th6 program to applicable .....;r:';.;ithe tactics,;used repeatedly 'or4TQ.f and standards. To illustratei M.W M'. h i documents was a stater ~ .attemptsto.coerceSOapproval}o'fl.deficent ... >.e.. it: "NRC has already aib.n :.ty.:~'..reved th ~. to the effect - . r. his puts us in a defensiv . <. ~.... to sign of f until you do."..O'f, pw,go j.t ou y . :.c ...,.. w :.. i l. . ~. - posture and we are accused of.'t..yirgcto' hold up the program ......pJp..n..

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to 50 co:- The realistic cause bot.h.",got.p:.- ~J.: p-.,. ;.+g:y...#.y and resi, stance ,.d n,'7.: n ... :.~.. ..v ,. e: t....,. '....T .... t:.:..].r

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.n;.. M<w 50's cor:.cnts could be constructive with only minimal

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..: ':.T': delay, if our input were ti::.ed prc)criv., so input,'-is not accepted when

%,:iy... dos al'l.' wed [t.,o cet involved, until We"?

materials are being piepared o ... t r.e 9 .c when there 'is, 'i.nay..r '...ficienti. ti.me' for review and no. / uT f) the eleventh hour, .r. ,.... ~.:.,,.... 4.. :...c..-

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time to fix a.sything significant's; In. oth.er" tard ~ s,o'..i,s brevented.from .c-z'. n.... ; ~ -.. ~..: ,a ......:.s.:. -y ..... g - n: ve control to..-y.W..uf tipit the ;jch :.a done : crop ~erly ) At , exercising effecta. .c c ..- e v y g9:: 2 -;:....... - v: - . =. n - Ij '. th'at point, man ager.ent9'ust'.s. ant.s[.S..c'55... d.i,ne.r'st c [.2 :-#haE. dver i$ Dre- , r., ~ ......,..,... x.,. :... ee,, de 'a ccept.the blame ,.o..~ cased santed -- violations and all. rc.h83e.pfe$.' 3.;WUj:'O. ' ' S ?* .'t.*.:.'3,$Ll-?l.'- f cr anything, that goe s w:fon.g 15t'e..s.'*42Q..1.E.-#.Y.'f..".M.*- !i. ..... ; *

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It wa s ' always a' delu siohi tW:.t,s:..4.,..nk 'that;.the 30 staf f would accept .l.: :::-), M..,Q..Tr. '-::.infi. D:...7 s. We were. recruited Jrh'iW &&. ' "'.i '. ~ p due to our records LT. cleanu sdch a role.' . ll:.' -L and. reputations as aggressive,' no-d...N. ..t .o:isence individ...:als who strictly ,.l J2iA ' '.. %S'.f&: enforce the ' rules. With that backg'rdundt, it.wds vnreaglistic to expect ~ ..y

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.u . that we. would willingly serve as';"..,w.i.r,fd6,s:f' dressing". for a sericusly -r .. ;. m.i.t s.3.. :.W.i. ?." '.:..' 5 64...... ':4.. Q 1.':.. y f.aue6 oroc:am.

.2 My f amily and I have ciiscussoF;a.:' q 2

s 3..- this stiter ind prayed e. bout it ~ Y .,. L :.::&..' '.*.ih They support my view foe'thb!.-lnece&sity of'this. disclosure, often. i financial ruin in l'l..k. 6l.y... Vill br ng,us hnewing full well that it zhost. ... n m.. a a short time period. ', I ~.';$ #.: .N .r :,. As a result,. preparing this".aE,....fidavit is not a frivolous' effort \\ l.

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...c.. . :~ or an attempt to take a chean.. sho,t'st. the cc=pany for which I work. . ~ .....s..... .'Sh...','of protectitin for the general I cannot silently watch as.,the.Tep&? s'.id i .. ' ~ *

• 6.

-~ 1:.i sen nuc. lear safety controls. cublic a e relaxed. That p;atte.rh!.dcrip = ] -.4.;. :.*.:.v:t&. The chances that a minor, accid'entW;.**il.;.ill be a na jor.' accident increase .t, . i... as.the compromises inevitably acedmulate,,Therepan't be compromises 4.n. e...<, e. is controlled, eith public health and safety.. lith jdi nuclear ple.nt ... v..... w. : - ..r. :. x

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1 p<-p 22 - I have read the preceding 22-page affidavit, and believe it to ~ bc true and accurate to the best of,;=y knowledge,.and as to those things stated to. be o:1 information and belief, I believe them to be true and Ecc,;ra te. ......e.e. ... = - ~.. - + ...,...,,. r,. >... m. s. - t {

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