ML20023B937
| ML20023B937 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 04/04/1983 |
| From: | Arnold R, Gischel E GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | Barrett L GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8305090351 | |
| Download: ML20023B937 (25) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:, C y. o m '; lbexnic bnydev [titor-CiM[co faemercndcm1 5 0 .289 D'e April 4, 1983 j--- 3g y [,_b j 3 d b N b) 2i.t Affidavit of Mr. E. H. Gischel 9.. '. ' _',~ ".-c.< N ' .4 :: ;,. 7'i~,"
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Enciesed is' a ccpy of an affidavit and for. arding memorandum I re - '
"ceived from Mr. Gischel' this inorning. The second paragraph of Mr.
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Gischel's memorancum recuests that I pass his 'itatement on to the '
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appropriate representative" o'f the NRC.
~As discussed with you th,1.s morning,.GPU Nuclear has undertaken;an investigation of concerns and allegations made by Messrs. King and -
Parks over the'last two to three weeks. GPUNC will be analyzing- - Mr. Gischel's affid'avit and will include any new issues in our-internal investigation. . . .
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cc: E. H. Stier, Esq. ,. E. Blake, Esq. P. P.. Clark B. K. Kanga J. J. Barton
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9=g>> d - 8 AFFIDAVIT
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EDWIN H. GISOMEL, being duly sworn,'. depose's .and says: .. , , . .
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Since. June 1981.I hav,e .vorked as :the plant engineering . director at tha~Three- Mile Islanld Unit 2
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- 2) nucicar po,v er station. for . e
. General .Public Utilities ' Nuclear,' Corhb$ ation (GPUN) , owners of the f acility. . As. plant . engineering. .dirQctor, - -
I was the. technical .a.rm for ' the site operations (50) director .Iivrence (Larry).g; . King . . so has the ~ ' , ultinate legal authority and respon,sibility to revf.ew and approve all - uwwo u.capw&. wue de cer pernanent sy's'tems in the p'lant. that, :'.,are 6=nW. c im. w 4.u We+W.;;.y Ccmi ,1 u . -W.G If so:dethin'g . ever
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goes wrong a. gain at TMI--II, 50 is the :orgartiratiod 'that vould be held dir'ectly responsible for any deficient designs, procedures, tests c: other work that had been accepted., I have .a job with serious responsi' . . bilitiest. which I. take just as seriously. .' . My sense of responsibility forces me to speak out through this e statement against misconduct at TMI-2 which violates professional standards and could threaten the public health and safety. Anything less 1 i would cos. promise my prof essional integrity. Many professionals , u .- . I within the nu* clear industry will br'd'n' '.d 'me as a triitor for what'I . . cm about to report. Let there be no' mistake, however. I am in no way anti-nuclear, nor in any way an : advocate that . nuclear ' power in . . . . 2 unsafe, unnecessary or even an unwise energy alternative. To'the
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contrary, the nuclear industry has provided my livelihood for over 25 ,i.
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.My sense of dodication to .
years -- my entire professional career. ' the industry and the public it serves transcends ny loyalty to my . er.ployer GPUN. . t If anything, the TMI-2 acciden't' . . de:nonstrates, the validity of* .
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the "de f ense in-depth" design co,,.ncepE. .uti.lir'ed throughout.lthe nuclear n .- ,..n.
.n : .s.y.;;bstantia.1 There;:;.. su n!. w ,7. 4 y 9,:. , .c ,;p. .. ... . . . .
z.py dence thtt: the pl. . ant,3cs pla_ced in industry. - . -
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service before it' wis'.readf;'- vai loper'ating . with i#.o'rtant eg. iip:ncnt
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- r. cme seriously malfunctioningi.-completol.y.,~.b. lod.e.d.cr. out of service, . . ..
with operator knowledge and apparently some withob.i:s . operator training - CD End. qualifications were suspectf. .ard.;,'many i.mptop2:5 z: operator, actions y
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.all this j .however, tha p cn i t occurred from the 6utsat. ..In spite; ..:,. .,.e,f ...
was. .able to be shu't down .and .ther ' adiation su. ,f. .ficiently
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so that the surrounding commun'ity WSs':not subjectN ..; * .
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hea'1ch' eff ects despite me.rsive', p15nijdamaga/,"-l. . [cY.:
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. 'The stakes. are! very serious, hNever., :.
We. =r.:st understand what
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caused the accident, -~
.and el,.imina' e.'t'.f4 eaus'e. .Decpite numerous inves-tigations, the true story ,behind: TMT ;still is. not well $2nderstood, .
- t particularly by many directly involved with it.
For ne'arly t;we years I ha,ve bben involved with a central role . .. , . > .to =aintain the p14nt in.a safe shu.5down c5adities as.the recovery - prog' ram is developed and implementeh . ;.<.. .
, I could. no,(t help but develop a .
perspective as to what is going.on"hure. Based on my observations I
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believe that the TMI-2 accident wn.'due to a. 'pecple* problem that
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g must have begun before the accidenf End still cxists, 4 .. .'. .y$$ i w _ -- The pres'ent mentality at jNe"Mland emphasi:es shortcuts, 3 ';'he same thread ps expediency and' disdain for profocsional ..w. standardd.' .
- can be f ound throughout various " rep;.c.a. orts of Un cocident, and indeed lE ,:. ;
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3-Q. throughout various internal plant records and correspondence.. The'
- ontinued existenee of this mentalit y. forci-i:
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The ' following de tails, .ti$e... , .idore[a're':jide'sent$hh:.,.illustrate? . v.y ;y : :.+ Q ~ f %M l4. 7 .,-) . . chat han been goi@ngf on:.insi'db'.Lt.y:y.f.; .ff.y :,f-f.Q5.,-~. 2f .Of.l course'/ i-2'. sy i progra
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.ff . V.-r personal knoUiedge" is -not all-inclusive. : :There may be =any more .
examples of.the is. sues I raise." I h&ve atierpte'd-tB!he 'as honest end
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factual as possible .a.nd have reviewed 'potes t.aken at the'tise of
" events described. Y do -not intend
- th harm any individual. I caly wir.h to bring the activities at TMI-2 under. control. Mp goal-is to help
. ..e guard .the health . an~d - saf.ety of the ge ."eral public, as well as to -
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reaf firm the credibility .of the nucl' ear industry
- s' co=mitment to' i safely and responsibly .mana.ge its'o.w.n afdairs[I d.o not 15elieve that
' this g' cal can be . ach,ieved .untiil thode.I r,espon'sible* for circumventing ,
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- 85. , t he ; system of che, c];s,..and ba, lance,s. ,atTMI-2 ar.e, completely removed from.the picture. . . ,'y. ; J .
I am well--cualified to assess a breakdowrt at a nucleaf power organization. The nuclear industry.has been' my life. I am a Navy veteran, . serving f rom 1953-62.. In 1958 I joined the nuclear program as a chief machinist mate, where I put wo nticiear submarines i.nto . i cc= mission. From 1962-72 I worked at Genera.1 Dyne.mics, the first four years as test director for new nucled:..submarines and the next six . years as refueling director on subdar'ines returning for overhaul. In - 1972 'I joined United Engineers and' Con'structors in. Philad 1phia for 1 i five years, as a member of the nucloe.r' technical staff ano dead nuclear l 1 e ng i r.c er . In 1977 I went to the, Catalytic Corporation as manager of nuclear power engineering. This vas.3.y last job b2 fore coming to GPUN in Jur.e 1981 as plant engineeri.ng' director. I an also a F.cgistere-oi ~..**. i
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4 - gg Soon af ter my arrival at THI, 'I began to see signs that there was a gap between the publicly-stated ' safety com=it=ent and. reality.'
> For instance, when. I was ' hired . Unit 2 'deput.y . 'dii c'e.. tor.~. John Earten .
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- .old me that 'tnere was *.no!.:onell e.ti.
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should shake ' these ' S..lO~.B'. 's 'upI*'Cse'r Meinext year I took Er. . i Barton at his word and made.da3cr' parsonnel and .crg'ani ational changes. -
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I built an organization for which,I *hsw
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"thh initiative ~s were met with managemant hostility. rather tha.n support, Uwever. Larry Ki'ng later told me'ihat in the spring of -1982 Pz.=
Barton and others' had m'e under .ir,vditigation for ty personnt.1 changes' - -
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and were going to fire me. My j dbl ... ..has saved due to the '. support oi -
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my boss Larry King. He told the#peblonnel
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director and Mr. Barton that I' was shaking up the department EI.1 Thad been hi ed i. ' to do, and he had
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. . .c6nf.idence in my~ wor.k.
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s'e e During early'.1982 I began.to,.: y?- symp, toms of widespread sloppines 6 at-Unit 2. On January 8,' 1982 'thero .vas a contamination release when Altho 6gh initially'the
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an e. .ployee blew an air hode dodn ,a ~,d. rain. - ... .e. .
~ incident had bberi classified.as a' ci5cr'ielease 'within the clant, the
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radiological control depar,tment'(RADCON) .... learned, there had been a release to the environme
- John B~arton assigned RADCON ' director ..
Jim Brarier to investigate. But.. Brazier bypassed my depart =ent and 9 ' . .
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/4 I remained ignorant of the incident, *
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En---t'. u.e. q tf February. , j,1982 Mr. Barton w called and aske.d
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what I had been doing about the contamination release. - I said I
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hadn' t done anything, because no :ohi had told me v6 had a release. q . O I then asked for details, which Mi, Barton provideh. I investigated , . .. s . . . I and soon learned that drain plugs'.vare missing thit should have been -
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A l} but it had been. partially pecled of b or was missing.: : - d'
. We pursued the issue further 5.nd learned that the '.conditioh had i .
p e xisted since before the accident. , .. The. drain plugs 1.a're. supposed to ' ~ f . .f.i&.' Wf':%?:M.' $Q.E : ' %. - be installed when. the . plant is,buirtib.:t'Ahey Niren!t. a The tape
~. . 5. . . .ll.W~\.' , b'cd & 5$- 0.5. & L:? ' I was remcved "a.round7.ths'" t'im.eYo f :.butthe\l5.!.i.5.A.I.?$ .5
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. I had my staf f go to the~ hardware stgrey. buy.. a d. expandable .~ plugs, and
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install them. We also orderedthe cc rect ^ plugs.and installed .them
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when they arrived . ,, The incideht hid' 1Ef t me shake'n, hos. I-
- 5. ed how nany similar oversighEd;uer'e lying dormant; ,
q... _.. . q t' Eventually"from time and poti,5,$ studies we learned that the
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contamination hadc.gone directly into$tha air. flow from one ~ filter cabinet to the next. The drainpipd .- s. bare not the problem. We r6portGi to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that we
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had identified the probIem and it, was under controli ,The NRC wanted to cite us anyway,
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_ however, because management. had micked the deficiericy for so long.-
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L Later that year, with the support of ~ engine,ering analyses I helped , to prepare and a presentation b.y my- assistant Ron Warren .while I was out on rr.edical leave, Larry King essentially convinced the NRC not to . cite us. He explained to the NRC thIt an i.mproved system or organizath . controls would prevent this type of,. oversight from recurring. . The necessity for a new syste=t of controls 'is illustrated by ths dispute over use of the polar crane,. The polar crane plays a k'ey safG f unction in the plant's cleanup, becauce it lif ts. heavy loads over criticial parts of the plant. The conflict over use of the polar cran 0 i / % e! crane was undergoing already had begun during the spring,9f _
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numerous modifications. Damaged pai-ts were being replaced by parts that were similar but not identicaf, This same phenomenon was occurr
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for electrical components. :.* ' '. ..
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- For significant modifications it is necessary to.first complete a: cnqineering analysis through the Engineering Change . Modification' ,
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;ECM) procedure. To illustrate , . in' t!-# pol'ar crane you would have to
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y ~ co through th'e ECM process ito~ria%e~ 'siilli'rliut .: riot : identical!.replacc-
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monts of damagedJparts in the' 1t:>ad(.bea' ring path or." load ' controlling
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The changes could af fectTf tEctioElkof lthe .cifane.. - s . I made my position known that I wouldn't accept.any shortcuts to
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-rhe polar crane refurbishment progra=I.Las't sp~ ring, Mr. 3arton told..
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of t;he refurbishnent' p::ogram and that everything would me to stay out be recertified before it was turned .cVer to mer/ lthough A I honored
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.. management's dire'ctive, I foresaw.. -problems ahead. - J ,It would be dif,ficul
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t to. doublecheck the certifications l'ater .. . y if ., - ECMs e.nd 2 the ad.u.
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\ -' controls of AP--104 3 and AP-1047 were',,.not followed, when the work took
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v , In June I suf.f ered a stroke frott,.c pinched blood vessel, which rept me out of work until October,' ;. The stroke af fected my , vision and short-term memory circuits. 53ut luckily the memory loss is self'-
'co'r r e ci-in g . Most significant, it did not af fect my thought processes - . ..- ,
er' motor skills. ,
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The new plant' engineering organiration functiened' smoothl:, durin: .. accroach my absence. But upon my return I r'da.lized th'at management's & GN:bC ^ M MM '&T cd had not changed. Larry King cs-:4..6,. r e w a . c i c.;. .. . d . f . y . m . w -
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Q1 LMy-ttre polar crane. In"l'ah. e t2iovember Larry told me of a call
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he had received f rom John Barton Mr. Barton swor'e about me and wantcs
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to know if I was getting involved:agliin in the polar crane af ter he ha6
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ordered me not to. In response Ilar.49.' wrote a me:orandum that 50 would . . stay away f rom the polar crane untiL.I.it was turned'.over, but at that ..
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I understat
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-,. MFV i s .., i t. i e m.m.v .i mi um wa.- not. voll-received. Mr: King told 'me that.
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management wanted us to stay out of the. . polar . crane issue, which we t k did.
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,r It was. tdif ficult ..to hvoid 'contreve'rsy,A m. "hocev es,*...- bec .[: ause . ::pn.2 echtcl~
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- r epr esentative.s yere ;impler.ent ng_ a routine.., . . .. ' ..... that :I considered d 2.s s. ,. . . ..
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c:n. (1) changine in numerous areas. The miscond'u ct followed two . patterns--
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s the saf ety status of systems or. work to !say they no lonaer are safety- - - re3ated or important'to safety; and (2) reinterpreting. the G?UN rules *
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_se relax the standards. , An example occurred in early December.c Bechtel representatives
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spent over an hour With me to seek =y approval for their program of ' modifications on a nuclear saf ety-related pipeline. Their paperwork reclassified the pipeline as not ir.portant .to safety.. - When I pointed . . ,
-at the error, they responded that' 'the'y, would close a certain valve in
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c'; ' crder to prevent sa fety consequences fo.r' anyth..: Lng downstream. I re-
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I O sponded that is not the way we do b5siness. I said we should not fool curselves. A safety classification can't be changed merely by closing . a valve. First,. there. must be a Safety Evaluation Report (SER), review and approval by th'e Plant Operations Review Co;6nittee (PORC) , and nit . approval. The Bechtel representatives insisted th)t .they had to change
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the program immediately for pragmatid., reasons; th'e schedule could,not - ,
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wait.- I refused and said there was.'62'* . . . .. .. thing to..discuss. .
.They left and did not contact me further. - I do SotM6tL6y
.F v.;.m ... if the. codifications ever were made. I have since learned','sobbNr, that Bec'?tel has nede many
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",. modifications without timely knowledge ('; review or prior approval by
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plant engineering. . .' ,;.i...,.. ye , j; e. i.. .. . % At this point I should digress t6 discuss ' ** - the'Jbeginnini;s p'- - of what
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has beccme a management weapon to ,har,fipW'.and retaliate against me. It
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, i.egan lost. fall af ter one of my friends and co-workers sought help . .
.I ! rom the Stress Control Center - (SCC). for erotional dif ficulties and a drinking problem He was treated,by', a Dr. Jenkinsi, The Stress t. .
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Crntrol Center is .e. a n.;ic hire.d"bi.;':diU supposeilly to h..elp.. emoley.,ecs
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t in need of mental health.:-courisel,14g,1 therapy orf trestifient'.:
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My friend mentioned -thej af terJef fects of my stroke .to Dr. .Jenkins
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and sugge sted that I speak with ..Jenkins, . .. kho had" expressed' an interest. I agreed to speak wit'h Dr. 'Jenkins~ only af ter he specified that all of our conversations would be covered by the doctor-patient relationship J and be held completely conf.idential...We . . : then had a' series of meetings,
, and I spoke freely With him. f Dr.. Jenkins suggested. .that I take a * . ..
neuropsychological stress evaluation to ' help . learn the best future" f treatment. It would cbs.t .5500 and I vas hesitant but..at the end of
, October I agreed for .him .to _ schedule a December appointment. -
"7 A f ew weeks ~hisfor'e the evaluation, #saw!my I 'perso.nal doctor, and.
! r.,entionec th= nem.vjasycnoJ.ogical test... My doctor recommended. against aking the test. He. said that the af ter-ef fects of my stroke were self-healing, so the test is unnecessary, ye advised that the test On the other hand, -
had, no positive value; it could , not ;be.nefit .me. could be used against me.) As a. result, my wife cancelled the test. i v - l At the end of January Dr. Jenkins called and asked what had. happened. Af ter I explained he responded that my d'octor is not a trained psychologist. Dr. Jenki . recommended that I r consider in I said I'd think it over, but order to better plan my recovery. dropped the idea. I did not hear. anyshing more about it until the f ,. - [ i
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lid blew off in February over the polas crane. -
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From conversations with other SO c:nployees .and a January 20 .
.e norandum tel1ing 50 to stay out of '.thg, polar crane refurbishment, ,
.. : . ~. o-=.;. . s .. :.
1 knew the issue was still controversial.) On 'approximately February 9. so received a Safety Evaluation Report . (SER) on recertifying the polar
~';;,' Q.:. ;p.,
*: y -
. :::.. g ..h'h5 until.'8: 30 a.t crane. Larry ~ King gave it to ide^:t6 review. - Ne .c!nly;*t... .. ~.^ .
. . . _.-~:,-. . ... ~... :. . ::.
,....:.. ;. L , ".'.
^
I ... . . the next day '.td C sub?.iiCodr? ccm'ents s' 'JIn McViesing'."the. ,c 5ocr.:::ent, lI .
- z;*; . . . .
. . a.
. realized thatt management %as':. .tiying it6. pulli a ~ " .".'m .. .: .The plan yas M have the crane,lif t -4 0-ton . missile': 1bie' ids.without.being tested...
n o r :: :., a . . ..-
'7A> That flaw in the plan was at the hea:-t' of the ensuing controversy.
. ~. .
D ',.. I knew. this .would ~ be a hot issue. - Rather than..just telling .
-[arry King and let, ting .him take all the heat - which I knew he would -
I decided to write my own memorandum 6c::nenting on the SIR. -
. .i ..
My comments concluded that the.,SER was technically unacceptable as presented. I said that the cra'enhad to be tested before making P. . . 4 l any lifts. Failure could result 'in p56ucing the he~sent margin of
' safety to the public, - damage to .n':c'le2.r safety-related o'r important-tg>
l
~ . . .- ... .. . . . . ..;;.- . ,. . ..
i safety equipment, or significantly.' delay the recovery .progryd
' " stressed that the tests could be done incrementally. -
" On February 11 there was a meet.ing which I attended on the gr
#7- The entire Polar Crane Task Force (PCTF) was there. My commem
- crane. .
wem a ra-ior discussion tooicf 'J I ex51'ained ~., that the tests could be f done incrementally "ut b the meeting , stalemated. Mr. Bahman Xanga, the 32, . .3 .
~
Unit 2 director, was called in .to resolve the dispute. Kanga asked me
. n; to restate my concerns, which I did. .. He then became upset, pounded og . ,.
the table, and berated my position for.:approdimately one half hour. . My basic position was that we 'didn' t have any alternative ~ but to test the crane. . ANSI standards require that the crane be tested
/v arto make any heavy lif ts./ Kanga and mant.gement took the position that J e the crane has a 500-ton capacity and th0
( tests were unnecessary, si t '73 ,h "k ' , .. . . . . . m. _ ___ ,..
4
. /:
l 10 - k'>.. ueen through the worst nuclear accident in history and we didn't know i f how much damage had been done.
~
Besip*fere is nothing in the pro
- l . . .. . -
.~... .
i
'essional codes that exempts a crane f cm load: testing due- to its lIl .
capacity factor.. ..It was
= .- : ;.. .. . :, . -.....
. ;-e
.--:r h y. %
c decisive
; . -. ::: .forf:.ne
. ; . _. .athat':we a..
. :- 2 '-
.had
. . p.to.'- . .. .;.ut ;. on ,new l 2-f
- q. .
w.,. g
- .... .. . . . .,,,.7, .
ANSI standards. requir.e ~tha,t. the granef,be fully.;1cad..tested
'\ brakes. ... . .z . .;_ < . . . .c , .. _
whenever there are new brakes. -
+ .. _
- 1 .. ., y
- _. . .; . .
=
W ..: . Anothe . objection was tidt noving in heavy Loads ifor the tests ' f(c. ould - result in. occirpational radiation expo su.r_.g. s I replied that with
- suf ficient time we could ~ find suite _ble. test loads already in the con-h ~tainment gested some possibil.ities . I e.mphasized that we are ega1T9 oundDi5nductlhe test easonwere sufficiehtly compelling we 6:ould all openly sign A statement explaining our reascas ,
W and , sound technicab. ba sis for not. following re%ui'r' ed procedures. This
- is an acceptable industry practice, 'so long as when you do not follow
- ~ . .- . . . , . . .
-~ __ the code you see that the,. substitute 2.s thor'oug'h'15 ev'aluated and
.::.u.
. justified. _. .
-/ .
I was particularly concerned that we a11 ' assume any isks openly 4.
, and together. Eut this suggestio'n was rejected. The idea es for SO
- ~
to just sign of f that the program was acceptab1e as'present'ed. That accroach illustrates a way of do'ing busines,s at Unit 2. . The rules are bent and broken. Problems get swept" under the ' rug,. instead of b.eing - confronted directly. If nothing goes wrong, it would not matter so . . . much. But if there were'an accidebat... .SO would be held : responsible ., , because we signed off. We would be thrown to the volves. '
.- Af ter the meeting, Mr. Kanga ashed Larry King and me to stay ' .
He again pressured us to sig:1 and approve the SER. We behind. . . could not approve ,it as presented ~. J/,.. , *
=.-
~ ma=Mav. Fahruary 15. John Bar. ton called Larry King and me
s -
.9 f Y Referring to me Mr. Barton . told La rry that he , ught, o w niee t. wi th him.. _.
for writing that f---ing memo. He asked words to
- n fire that s.o.b. .
"Now that we've got this. thing3-'-on-. record, ;pha t are we,.-.coino. -
g the effect, .,..a
* ' ~ 7.T -
z .- - 4 " , . .
,. n.e.f
'~
Q . ' .: ..; to do with it?" . Larry defended.me; He".6 aid that?f hMd- raised valid w y 3, . , ._ -L ,, ,_f..L ; .
. _ . . y= .. . nQh .p,J.; lG { ,,
concerns which .had to' be.- addres,q'ed. . .Thep.tweied ' t the s;? kind of?. - thing
- v i: ,; m .:. . . . s.~.. c .e : ' . .. . . ,.
= --.
.. ., ._ p. ..
ou fire a person for. Laf.n.f 2.dded .that we hav .A to get.that crane
.. . . .. . .~ ,- .Q_ : _:: :,I_ .
tested before we use it. 'Larri;challengedEM.i'.'.3a'r5cn to sign off on - Larry the polar crr.ne. Ba-rton refused,..ein.. o s*
. light of. my memorandum'.
. .= . .
.. later passed on to me another erigl,opee's 'tip that. top' management st.ill planned to fire me:af ter the furor .cattled . ....
down. There were 'a -series of m'eetirgs, * over ;the next few days with the and the igualit entire recovery programs staff., 5"e'chth1 representatives, I was in[orEed that I di.dn'.t. . understand every-assurance (QA) staff..
.. thing that had been done on the crane and wouldn't be so coneczned if
.'" I knew the whale-program.2
, d Lv.Freemerman of Recovery Programs said .
he would write a memorandum .explainidg to me why the tests were unnec-
..). :
39 -
;,i '
?
essary. It did not say anything The memorandum arrived on February 17. 3/ - already been covered in the meetings.- In addition to the that hadn't . su,bj ects discussed, above, FreemerrIn said that 'the crane would be rain a f ew inches and inspected prior.it6fmoving the .first missile shield. 1104-123% of, Bot that' is no substitute for the .'r'e:;uired load test of
- v. . ,..
lift weight.- . Freemerman's memo claimed . . .that the path of the missile shields
.Instead, for being moved would avoid going over'th'e I exposed reactor.
example, they would travel over? the ., remaining in' stalled missile shield That wcn't wash, either.jThe load b. lock on the crane could pierce the remaining missile shields. Further, flying pieces could land anywher 3g
6 , e ,,
- s. .. . .. .
g
. .- * : f, :
\
- 12 : . *i /
(
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and create damage. , reemerman's final point wks 'a'~hald ass'ertion that nothing -signi . .!
..a.
)'j ficant would go wrong even if the ' missile -shields .- -
- dropped. -e
. But he did :
not off er any ealculations 'to sup'po'_%.'this,'subjectiive evaluation; Thati '
~
.i? ? n~ R Md+:.:%.L.l :. % * " N.i:** ~5 % '. ' { .-l:.-
was ju'st our point. ~ Sucha~ significant viciation ?.of A'ISIlst.sndards re-cuir~cs a complete .engineering . gg u.f . b.. .~5.b:. analylsll' .M.y. ; : ever
, . } ;,' . .. . . j .j
- 2. a .,. None was, done.
-- ;; ... . .y.~ .. w ... . ... . . .. . . , - .
[ Af ter reviewing Mr. Freelner=a',.U.s Fe.Nud[y'II .- ticrd, I knew 1that .
~ . ..c . . +p . ,,
we weren't accomplishing anyt ingi:V,2' hit'same day' Larry King and :I
- - .. .. G r:- . . :. .. -
senE'E' memorandum t'o'J.','N. A ii$.ng[..N.hovery Prog' rams Director. We . stated that the technical concerb. :ny February.10 . s...'in.comments . e. . remained
~ ~
L[ enresSlved, ' but had been, overrike(;*by. .. . : .: g. . plant :- r.anagement due to program-We concluded 'tha6,.SCT had a fundamental disagree;;a.ent metic concerns.
- ,: gr.: ./ ag3 with the Polar Crane Retes,t Procjram'bjut.,did' not. challenge Mr. Ahff I sing's , , ,
. t:~ :7. . - . . .
authority' to proceed with the pro.gFi.M.. ad w-ditten.; . . . .
~_ Larry was forceA.put .of hi . .h. bout a week af ter we, sent the . -
Feb:'dar~y 17. memorandum. By contrasty ,I . received the silent. treatmenti .
' ~
Committees were set up to in.vestigate -~ the polar crane, but. was ex-
. .2
~
cluded from membership. s I receIAe.ds....ittle, corcunication on anything for'arcund three weeks. ..I have . . . ne.v'e..r . rece.ived a Eitten response to ,, Larry a.63 my Februpcy 17 memorandui'.,., . . As the dispute was heating up, top management began to,take an {_ i "i ntense interest in the af ter-effeet s} of my stroke. On February 10,
. .c s ;.
Dr. Jenkins sent a certified letter.I.to my .- hone urging me to take the .
. . . .. z. .
neuropsychological evaluation. .He,.:ad'ded that he vould like me to call his office in two weeks with an ansh.. i. . I was up' set at being pushed ,
,. 7. .
but called Dr. Jenkins. During ,,..; .o.ur.,:., discussion he, revealed .that he 'had broken his pledge of confidentiality, and had discussed my case with : his supervisor. I told' him that. aI,%3pid. ;
;,).. _g n' t have } spoken with him 'at all
, 9
i- * . C. # af 1 had known he would ' violate the pledge. He said;he had to discuss 011 the cases with his supervisor... ..
..- . , .s .4
.J !K5M%l . - ..
me _$1;ihle Several days later Mr. Barton . called . . .. w ,,.. f.,n;Jf@or
. ~ . .......,..s a;meetingivith'.
.o....._3.,
fh% yar. Kanga and GPL CP $N Ent.B ' f re< could si. d
*.n. , .:
. ~ .
..:... . ' h ? - ,.s Jr . .u.n . s . .; a .
. .. : . .. .a. . .- ..~
Ulr. Arnold asked nie 'whyT didn't wntiftfojtate:.the,psycheneurological . .
. ~ . ...; . . .
-. 1 avaluatiEn. He said h' e ~ didn't Know _
thg. details,;..but;Stre.ss. ~ , .. . . Control
- -:.: - i t. _- ....- w.. . _. . m g .. . . . .
Mr. Art >old then procseded .to urg wa.to wanted me to take the test. ~ ..* ? .* *k _ ,
. .. ~
take .the test againi. but added sis's details but my condition $ to em- -
... 1. .
Before I could$a'as,,*er he. urged n, e td obtain the .phasize his point. . m'. * .
. %'*Tl ,
evaluati5n a third time.. "This cycle,;however, he included
- many of the ,
intimate details of my conversatio$. :s,-- ...trith :: Dr. Jenk' ins. . Mr. Arnold seemed to realize h'd;;had * ~ -% ~r said too "much, and stopped-
. ,. ~
He said there had been eb,ough discussio.n and a'sked if I was
~
~ abruptly.
. . 7. - .
going tE take the evaluati.on. I responded that my., doctor had told me'
- .=.:.
. . ~._ , ..
there Eas absolutely no .ne.ed for thd 'evaluati'on, that I had- merely suf ;- f ered a 1:emporary loss in my memory .@cuits and should '.be more .co.n : Mr.. Arnold cerned with how the results of the examination would be 'used. . - . . 1
> sa r.d that he thought I should take th5[. test'. He added that it is very .
' inportant for my job placement. .I said th.en that they would have to - ' set it up so that I liidn' t have. any'. choic e.. : hey set it up through Dr. Jenkins for' April 15. Dr. Jenkins' colleague Dr. Gordon at th.e .
' University of Pennsylvania hospital . . . . . . .,
.was scheduled to administer the c . .7. - ..
evaluation. . . My personal doctor later called,} Dr. Jenkins. . .My' doctor told my - wiIc that D'r. Jenkins was very embarrk..ssed ; a.nd said the pressu5 e for the evaluation came f rom " higher up.*? sy doctor insisted that the results be sent directly to me, ra thb. . 's..,ithan first b GPUN. Dr. Jenkins
% 8 '
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . ,1 JJ_ -- '" ' *' ' _. d = -vaaV <b=lav in ob-
'. i
. I
/1 I 4#
. taining the test results. I found that odd, since originally he had told me results would be available tihe day of the ovaluation. . l I believe that the pressure :for the . .stress-test ;at best was an.
,. .= ..... . . .
7 effort to harass and .2.ntim2date;mey.or .at.;vorsMas; r.e.taliation
- ?B, c .,T Q for my
~-
- v. [ 3 . '.'.? ;. f ,.jp,C.Q~ '. y -
dissent by branding me' asi rhen. -
- .~ tal."ly;..:nnfit. . ,.'.(T. h,;e ;other.I
-- - . a...., n ., . ., , . ,,
S.
.O2 s. t.'.a..f f . per sonnel Larry who challenged polar crane: shortcuts..r;.;.V' : ' ;: :L.
received similar;tr'eathent. ~- t,\ 7_.~ . . , . ,,., F.ing, f or instance, supposedly ~ was. fireid for '" conflict'-of-interest" . .
'I understand that Larry's rtlated to 'a company ,he was involved Nith. .
company, Quiltec, wa.s providing services elsewhere' in the nuclear. in- ..
I have worked with and hocVn Larry for ne.arly:two. years. We dustry. .. . .. ~3 . are not " chummy" on' a social basis. "..3ut 'from our yorking relationship . I have known Larry as a decent, hardworking, co=petent, e.xtremely dedi- . cated individ'ual who rot $tinely ", moved mountains'.'
~
r-
'to :naintain progress
'I'n sho5t, '.he' worked veldy hard' to do things
.~
in the recovery program. .. a..,sound, te'chnic'al' way., . But manage-
- -. i. .
right and get the cleanup moving.in -
. ~ '*~
rent thwarted him at every turn. .l:.. .
~
'I believe that the "investigatio'n" of Larry',s ' firm was due to ,
his support fo,r my 'memorancum and h'j.'s own > challenges to the pola'r crane
~
prog r.am. It is my understanding that =anagement liad known of Quiltec , for some time and dpparently did not f eel any.'need to take actions against him until he supported my February 10 mem'o'randum. and similar . Larry's outside activities were challenge.s from the same time frame. .
~
,i just an excuse to fire him. , . )f.'.;'
/
Rick Parks performed a similar role for 50 from the program . 31 Rick was
" controls perspective 'as I did froni t.h..e technical standpoint. .
j Rick a Senior Operations Engineer and mh... er of the Te.st Work Group. .
"it tried every way poss.ible to make ths , system work'y 3.nternally, but . . s.
- b :'
, ,-- -----__...___.y.-
M gmply didn't. I knew him as a dedicated, hard worker who we.s driven
- to total f rustration when he reporte.d clearcut :progra n violations and
.s.
' I
- . .. . .J .
top v.anagement refused .to correct ;ther.abusek, (Indeed;'dthdy l
. . ,a . t: - . .. .. ., : . ' :.. ; insisted.
, 2. . a - 1 j
. L~ * .r. . . m e _ . .s , ; e, ..i......c.,.,
on perpetu atin, g them'. .. f.;-gg, j-g,f.'y$, w:..>
. . ' iq.f ' ~.-g * . ..qy;.;,f,, -:. . .4
.-e . ,.
t:. .- r.v.a y.. .::. . 2 . ' ' I have rea'dEi! Pirkst.5'6?.$aS8 March' ~23',:~1933 affidavit.h
.y m . ;,-
I
.~, 3 7. g ;
;, -, . ..: c _,.
confirm the substantial accuracy', of.Zall portio,ns cf;.thejaf fida.vit that
. ~ ~
, -;. '. f , : s . 4 : .r
- . ;.f.' x J refer :to me, or for wldch .1have.. personal knowledge. , .
. + . . . . - . . . . .
/Twant to emphasi'ie that it was . y g. Rice's u y. gg r.initiativ - g $c
. / % Q - A s A J .Ela sw % cextz A 5 public kith his concerns./ F.is decision was based on his own frustration,
~
14 ' ather than some . internal cionspiracy >)
.I ap aud hi. , . however, for 'having d i. ,
the courage to break tNe ice. - on March 23, the day Mr.- P. ark..s. .,-.
,Yeleased his 'af fidavit, there was a major meeting scheduled for' 8: 3 0.v.a ./;=. to discuss- his-charges. The n.eeting was somewhere around a .ha'If hour late .getting started. Nearly
~
all of .'the managemeTt ~a'nd 'sen'ior' staff'were in attendance, including
~
~
Messrs. Arnold, Kanga and Barton ' They had* detailed information .about Mr. Parks' allegations. .I know thaE one of the top management people s I also had a copy of hti e press release thatyent with the af fidavit. seem to recall that the af fidavit, was. ., .held. in the bir with an announce , - ment that it was being studied. Mr',y hnga opened with an announcement. . that Rick was going public with hic charges. Mr. Arnold .went over the l . issues and said he was sure the: con' . t riversy was just a flash in the pan and would die down quickly. He stated that the investigators wouldn't find anything, and the Udall Corrnittc4 wouldn't speak with the wit-Mr. Arnold said that Rick.' perks would be ~ back tomorrow and
..nesses. .
.we should all be cool and calm.
6 jf.. . Mr. Barton stated that parks sh$uld be fired'. He added that Mr. Kanga.re-The . " s .o . b. " should not be ---_-__s. allowed back.,on the Island. .
- 15 . %, .
v r= sponded that we couldn't do.it li.ke that, because Parks had gone to the NRC and was protected by the Ato:~ ' 5io Energy Act.: That meant we h.,d to.be careful. Kanga said we could ..
- f. ust transfer Parks' or put him on a leave of-absence for a month an8'th.b.n get rid of',him quietly. . .
J j Mr. Arnold stated that wh.e,n:Ph:.;.. ...Ps returned' : . ~- .. Oe should not give r . : ' . :.m:
.. :. . :- -: .. . - - ~ ~
him any documents, ..and :should ;restri'ct h.im . . - cfrom protected. .f areas. s y' m-;
.p. w.:.;..:..- .z ., ..:. ; g t r .. -
$ .a. ; .. . .' .s. g * .
...r . .
Mr. .Barton reemphasize.d ,tha.t,.,w,w e .zhould;.not 'cive anythi.n.;:.e, .m. to Parks, 2 ,.,
.. ..._.y ~,. g . . . . .
. . . ~ :s.
~. ,.
L should.: not: speak to him and . %. should%3-tQ.p..y
~-
.pp. :-x nct 'let .-<-him
. 3 2 .*..: .back . on :the, Irland
~-
Mr. Kanga said that we're 3.do~/.Ing.' int 8 this "but' the app. oach vcu
~
have to' be handled ' carefully, beciuk'Jarks had charged harkssn.ent and r , . ..- . . 3; .
. l e.G; y-r -
there are laws to. protect.him...4..'+...t . . . . .
'l
~
Mr. Arnold t. hen -; stated - that.. the Udall Cor nittee would review
. Parks' affidavit bist.not invite hi=Q:..'. ...t.o testify. He said that'he felt-l * .. .
.....y.
sure it wo ld u all be.. squashed. e T.he $v.eeting ended :' shortly after, aroun<
< .~ ?. . * . . .
. . . 'Y-s .
. Z'.> . . -
10: 0 0 a .m. . .c s 'r p ': v: e- -
- .g- -
Af ter- this, meeting I wa's 'intELyietted by Messrs. Griebe and Love,
- 4.
- . a-
.~ ._ . , ..
a lawyer and. eng.tneer who,, saidllO3 e,y:,~.were investigating safety con:cinr.
.p-e either for: Mr. Arnold or GPU Chaiddan.a.of .the Board H. erman Decamp. -
The meeting had been scheduled - ; severa.I.w;14eeks : ; before ti. hen Mr. Barton told l . . . c. -
. .. ....s p
me to appear. The.y .al,so. had tal.ke4.y',.'.tio,. .Ron yarre.t[ and Joe Chwast ac.cordi.ng to these individuals. 7,.Vas one of the last schedul'ed to t l - . . .
. testify, although I had played ,ac t::dn' tral role in , raising the issues . . , , .
' ' ?.~n". -
l under investigation.
- ' J
"'t.
i.T.. - a
.. ..e t I told Griebe and $ove t'hdti ci,:Yas trying to:-work within the - -
c ., system and ow~ uld give it. one' las. t' chance. ..h. .^* :., For approximately the next hour and 45 minutes I discussE1:s.:p -itti the.m subskiantially all the issuet i .
. . .r .y2...... -
to thin point of myx,statement. 'fdn lined by belief that there.had be
= . ..,; .
s.. . a blatant disregard for . industry. rples and standards. I further pro-
. . f.67p N -- ,
. . . ::. . .^ . . :; #. " ' tc
- . . . .y . =s..- , f.
. . . e.
v....c. .
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.e .... .
4.) tested that employees were being prdssurGd "to cage in' misconduct ;- no that could backfire if there were ..an..[. .
. . +. g e . m. . . . .
accident an6 ruin. 'their careers. I told Messrs. Griebe and!I,c,W.:t.St' .f~p~robb'Siy 'wd5IdT$e'. fired *
. .. . . . ,.. h.: . . l.. ' h :>.?: :E'.;.1E.: .:i T.2 ~ 2:;.a; .% . .
for what I had disclosed: to'.ithd:C ". 3htY.s:snacn's ' hid =!ojut m. IE stop' to
- ~..? .' . - a
- * :. 6: . .
. . . :a r.: M:r.c-& c. t. ~:i: ?..%:~t': .:.. . c.: Q 7:.: .: &
. : t . . . .
what i s going . on'.C. .. ,I'cl told. . .f L ycu' . -don't do i.t jI.'11 go else-
.._th'em
.. .,.; 'that;...}i c...
- whe re. This accicent is' still'.,hoirig ,'. .on Efter.fourIvears
+ 4. : .
. .X;,; . s :. ' :;; ~- .~:t:.. e. . . : .. . n. A q. . . ;.
+
. ~...v.",. and it has to .
st'op . The ind'ustry can't tak'e it.2. .].E.,the.Two investigators took notes
.. n .i..:... .:, ...
.. s.. -
but-have not since 'conta'eted OfefiN.1 I. have,' :" -
.h6 wever, heard a
. : :. . .. . w:..:%. ,.. . .
2 .
.. periodic clicking 'on my telephenE* ;
thit ,' bas not . occurred before. *
- 4. ,
. ,.y. '
x,5 , .. - -
~- - Ef fective March 24', Mr. Bar.to.n.'.?d. ,,spla. ced. Actih.,g . so Director Joe ,
. ., ;.r. y. .,.
e Chwastyk .as head of my dhpai-trenty.M'$ it. ' ' '~.:t:; N. :. ; y..b: . ,~...' .
.the Unit 2 deputy director. . ,.-
w . &..;...ny]!.T .
,1
;'f -
. . On Monday, March 28, .Mr. .
72.6.oi71 . r.. 'c.alled.fme'eting .. . to discuss the
,'.7 : .. : . . . . . . v.-
. . . .. '. . . . u .
-New' York Times article that,'came' .'.yuf,;n@h=lt' -
. ;96 Wi ,*.:
- sday.=on. .
; ' . ' . .the .
H~ recovery " program.
'~
~Mr.' Arnold invEnd"those 'kho .
.y: a h'id :
NPiMi's tio'.:rais(.:them "no
;r . ..
in'eeting . He said theise people. dih.Sh;. .q$,in,Ned 't'o goItt$..th
. ...,......u . ., ... .,..
appeared like a fishing expeditio;Ufb.,; No ,cgie said much.
. . . o..st. *ever.
-l Af ter rea: ding the New Yoi-k Iiriss.". article, my, primary concern is
. . :T ; <.Vt.C. * . -1: *-
. with -inaccuracies in GPU's publi.c/co~sitId.ni.. 7or
' dkemple, u in the ar'tief
.. :. .~. .
; u, r:
Mr. Arnold stated that inv,estigaE6:5i.M[e. .-.e . regulateiry .,pelays .- and problems
~;r - i:
with public perception contri'bute'dE..%. ..signfficant1'y to the setbacks, in t ;. . * .m.. .- -,l Fu.. .= . .;o . the Unit 2 cleanup. In my opinicF;':y:.de . w . items.~en~.th.at list wouldn't it - I '
* . s.' . <:e.Ny!. .y 4. s. . ' n. :,, : . e.
n be obstructions if top managede,dt'T[;. *
- r .. , G .h. ..- ~ .
d;}fs
. ~.9 do properly. 'the. -id6. -
Mr. Arnold prai sed .-the ^ ,new)t.OI5g
.... ;-y*, irm.. ...gi$,ont
- + ;g.sitructure at the Isl .
solution. The primary' ch'a'.ici-M,ltNin th'e managementi structu as a
.cs. :Q.p.g 'z rk:tiioir -
.r duties independent) idhheffo t
-been to purge or neutraliie.,'tifodj:ylbga.q.,
.o . o . . ;. %
u'ndei
.'w..
ME,,.l
\-
Barton's -: control 3n& If anvthing, the new manage .
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i
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'. . ~.
.'.W.
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2 w 16.~.P.I[,':. ., . v:11 further stifle disse o plece h. rein on' the 50 rtaf f. In the article, Mr. Abold,c:Mici cd Larry E.ing for not being -
? . . ... - :: v,
,ow-That stat'ement -is , accurate. a Mor.e. significant, h a " team player."
1~ ever; Mr. Arhold 's charactei-i:ati.o:r'.hidic'ates', the probicm at TMI. .
...,...~.f,_....
Under Mr. King 's leadership so .strcye .to -be ~ objective .a.,and independent
- . . : Q: . f.:.tx'..-:,. m ; . --.
.u . ::= y .. - m- . .covered by. cur.orofessional and in evaluat. ..ng the var 2ous'.. . . ..
e
- M' * "
- -- } progra::.s'.,..{.y
^
,':..."- ' .;;..;f; ,
' legal responsibilities (dher.S6-M.~r'e'cter;"is.;r.bt
..- ;.~; .. 17 supp:ised ko be a "tc
. n r .a ~ . .. .. .
King. was got ec.-S.atv.;iv.W. t n..ahe; clayer." Mr. .a... insisted. w. on y~upholding his
.= .n ,
~
. . . a. . : . . .- - - . .
responsibilities conscientiourly '. anti"Nithout..cce.pfonising . . .:. - , . .. . the required g "-De.c .:. ,c. . . . . .. r
- l- .
- standards. . ' .g.:l'#.,y f :: .
l In . the artic.le Messrs. Ar . ...d.)..E. ,:.d.i.. Kar.ga Eta y.. d that violatio .
-- . g p;..: - .
state law by trucking out_:sewag e'.~cor"taninated mithiradicactive c'esium
~, -
a- ' . . . . ;. . ; l . . .~.0
.i. *.*
In my -
'} 137 was a legal technicality with.outn... safety significance. .:,.~..
4
. . .a I .e Y It.
opinion, .that perspective is itcdiffs.significt nt safety concern. . r.- c....R. canno't help but ,_ breed disrespect 9f'oY.j. legal requir'c5ents in general. ... v .. ' .
. Messrs. Arnold and Kanga alYo}" stated -that the polar crane would
- - -. . , , . . - . ,, - e : . . . , .
That misse's ths point, howe.ver; if the crane is be adecuately teste.d. - .
.~..
^: sed. bef ore the test to r.emove ,4 0, .tbn., mis s,ile shields from, directly of the ' plant A mid-lift I over the reactor, the most -
vulneraN..s..5;part .
~
- f'ailbre could cause, the missile. sSid.ld --- as well as. the huge lower .. .
.a.
the heavy liftipg rigs used, cables and other 1 I b1'ocks on the crane, MO parts--tocomecrashingdownon.b52 reactor, piping and who knows 2 (LOCA The result could. i>e. w.,'o,tha.f an. ...; loss of c6olant accident
. wha t else. . .
.c... : ; . . .; . . .
which.could threaten the public,', an# vou'ld delay the cleanup for years Not of the least significance to 'V , such an, accident would ruin the p~I careers of the so staff who had W..E.3.e.ned the liftf3.
~
**;. t . . . .
- ~ , .
'Also on March 28, I had a ',ld.t.e.r 'd'elivered to .., Mr. Arnold about
.r.s.,
the neurops'ychological evaluation'.,. ;-. ..'.I, t;pid Mr. Arnold that based on R
. . .;. . . . ;.; \ .** '* .
' . . r. ; .
a e .
.~ , ,
(
- 19 - -
*= . . .
deict.or s advice .I. had. decided t.o canec1. the evcluation unless he vere . imposing it as' a c.ondition'of my ,em loyr.ent. If rekuired to take the
,e. my own qualified psychologist test, I requested permissiori to c5io ,
to conduct the evaluation. T e4PD.Js. 3.th.at cv understandable . g.g' ,;_ .p . . . . , :concerns ,
. j 2,. .y ). . . v' * * ?:. : . * **
- C. (
. . . . . ..'t. u O h .Y: ..-
GCrdon,Vould hqout pre}ud.4C. y.s.th pr. Jenki.n)$.5.'.a.d, .d. i .. .is? d.ol'1eag'ue .Dr..;p' . -
. 4
. 4
,-2..
- . f. ,;-; . . ca- * .C ~.
h.r ~a.-#r - ' * * jm,.. ' * ?as? "t'h' e ' .r'e s.ul'ts.
. r.. l M' and could env.j,!L,. h. .'y'.'4 -.r.f".V.* yn ;; .
- r build st re ss, into. .the. _t resting
.5 L ,*l,T.*2 .
, ,_ 3,.,_ ,
t y n 3 5.p,4. i.i-rdo -gy g?C74 * .&._e,,_c,s.;g A -
. " . .ci. ,y.<gg j.h 7. r.cid my I of ferec to pay #cr, . the ;exa=1na,._11r
~
, , , , -. , - . , . - ,5-
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.a w .. L :
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1 ent but ex-
. willinen ess +o cooPehite V_th. an. y..co.n. : ie.
.. . . ....+.
.'..'o' 'ES's.P.. . .-
o- such a sensiti.va
'n 9L. n-A 5pr.
. . > .. .;.w..,y. ., us.t .ha.ve full conficence in
-- plainea. t. a*
c
- s- .c: . .. . . >r_ina ,-y, .
-e uested the circumstances and ob-} ee3.-1vl g,; g %. g pr.om ., p ., a.m .
t mandatory
'i , pJ64*f::'ij.
es g, g.g . ,.- t5.e~ ' . -
'g-that Mr. Arnold contact. . '..: .H me. cy ,'s.p y,S8.-3k'c'*a~
I
.- $g ,.,1.$ssed
.. 2 ,
over vhether yr. Arnold con _tacted ne;.th,e{w.g-g: ,
~ . ' ' . e. Wir. . . :.
sa'd ha didn't like
,$e, the evaluation is a condition . . ' '. 'of;,gyg'@7.1.g,$ent. h to think of it in tho,s,e, teps,p,5fg.f.],g;.,y tha ,qdisc.ussion to
.- t e cir-
,.. , . ; . ,,. , q . , , ,
CumstanCes so4. the test.and as... . .;, .,37.,..,.fy . , . , j ., f.s , aa .:sub'stitute for hims.e,1f .in ,f J$. - C '7C -#"\*
. *. *g
, . y . s~.t l .a i.b , .= . * , .a.. ;
.Gpw would pay for the evaluation.l,..};.yypy,.w. . , .; } g;. . ,. *, -{. *
- r. 3 r- . . , , . ' ....p T h.d6ceptable.. I didn't
- ItoldMr,.Arnoldtha_tthesa.pg;,.. .. ... . 4. . ,
ny bore tb to conduct ge . trust Dr. Gordon to pick a'repla , I wanted to*. select my own ,3, *' P,S' g.a- g.,g.g 4g+, ; ,
#cr.t,.he evaluation.
test. have any pr blems with.,semeb.m M ~ n'rnold told me that.h
.....h h.'do , ., : .. . .. ...
1
<- yi. -
' besides Dr. Gordon conductipg'.t'...;g-',M;l,.g -
lo3'g. - . ,n.M L.q ,g A{ ~ g;e.had to be som assurance that whoever di4,.;theblo.%. , yCC i .q.,.. .. . .h3 g.. 1ged.:.I s'ated that he i . . .. . .., . , y'it;.. , R.,a, . .,. d I
- ld "ek' i
should state the necessary'quali f - {a[dards, I highly-qualif,ied professional: %,..P.V' g,y, ..g them;y ,o.ld Mr . Arnold that ,, nal co=petence and indepencence Iwouldbasemy'selectionon.j), *Y ba'ck ,~to e e, perhaps W from GPUN. M . Arnold said he .. ...y. . m.,;,.>: . e~. a g . . l .- .- P,onday,, April 4. . *[I h,];k'O * ". ', , .
'...e,,, ;.;. ..
. . .,s...: . .
e: ;: . . ; s . .w. ~ .-
~
1
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': y .' ii. *
- f, .
. 2nD . . % './.,.i.ay,*** . J. . .* . . .
- f'
=.*.'.:...
* . ..: eM.;.,.o ..*.* ;s , .5. '.s .
What niay disturb *.:.,......f.. me t,he. : rod .'ilc'"I.hy ...
.. x s versy over"the h,,'
po lar crane is not an Isolat,ed,: case,$..q. .g t.,,illiEstiates. the current ap-
. , . .. .w .
. . . . . . .>s
~
proach to business at Unit II.. .'Th(j.j,cp%(dr . . .. * .y s n..
... . d .pr..ogrep is no lon <
k effectiv,ely controlled. This is'#S.j,..nleri..c O eye'..rn.'h. To illust: rat.e, They werd upset on March 3 0 three. of the. people.,oq;bf. :u : : - wa .. staff, :cime
, . . . ::~ in. *
.;. . .: . . r. . h,
--. . * .:. .~,:. : .: . . ..~ ' i.
. a. ...
'she:6e sec*.,tel bypassed
- 2. .
p because'of..two more' cases the'y.ha
.. - v.
..-:+fc y:.....a
.. .a.; ,. : -p arnd ep~*- . ..
<, .;. . /. . 4 . .
......s..
. - . . r. . 3
,o'nt;rol' 'systeci;.in .~:
, an atte=pt to
) . the plant engineering .modific,atic,-is,)e. .t.:p.,: r.c. ; . .~
~
-5 .
~;
- downgrade saf ety' classifi' cit'f,. ohsy.,... w
,1$.$. n. l.
1;,..p.nd, pai-ticularly in the
- .. , i p .v.-
. . . . .c :. .
Bechtel' crews haOe Mdi. Sip'a.t c'ssbig thir.odifications co
- ~
M',. '. ' l' . . . I have
\ :. k containment,'e program.
don ' t ' know Mhat .- ....~e~.
.T . .I f .B.. doi.ng ec.ht.'e.i.
to:. t.he plant. he,;isolstion of SO by removin: rned ofl plans to instituticna ,,
%s d.-
. f red . plant engineering 6 F the modific'ations ~. control staff /'ehtildl)? t ...
. c. v..*.P 2.,,
.t ;.
,O sumably' thi.s~ is part of the ficpi-of. 'e'o,4.;2_nagenent. ctructure. ,
-* .t .
.' .ty;.4 .
hazN.:.for' t'he local NRC offi This situat;i.on poses a .ec3id.'eM5 ': elm. , : L r . .,. . ..J. - n . .a..:., .n,,,t,1%. . . blic interes in my opinion. The NRC r.ecoen'i:Ys,:..tdi.*.5:~1t
.....:.g:'jy.p... is in the. pu
-- ;- to get the n5L. mess cleaned. ..up'.%kp'edien'tlyLSut '. .. .
, ;.:::p e..
it isshn. ea sight of the mest basic objectig.cs:-J7/g.$t ..~
. - q <, . , TMI the N.RC has bee h s" .and "2 's" to e .
the utility to, upgrade' technical.do'cp ., + . . .
- 4. .; entq from "
h
~
and " 5 's ,
- when the gov'ernseh. t?'should be holding out for .. . . ,
"4 's" : ..~...... .
w. t . * - f . p.;i <.. :, .r f.
.:..e.. . .
required."10's." .. y When the NRC caves in it .mak,es.1t twice as difficult for the
~
.. . . .y. "
d of us in GPU who are 'trying to hold;*.th6 program to applicable p ,
. . 'or4TQ.f
...;r:'; .;ithe tactics,;used repeatedly and standards. h To illustratei M.W M'. i .
~
documents was a stater
.attemptsto.coerceSOapproval}o'fl.deficent . . . . .. .>. , .e.
.< . .. it:
to the effect - "NRC has already
. . r.
.<.~....
. ..aib.n :.ty.:~'..reved thi his puts us in a defensiv
~.
ou y
' to sign of f until you do .". .O'f , ... pw ,. ..,go ~w . -:. .
j,:.t
. . : .c
- l. ,. . ..... .
i posture and we are accused .. ,. of.'t..yirgcto'
...pJp..n..
hold j.up the toprogram50 co:- The realistic cause bot.h.",got.p:.- ;.+g:y.,.d n,'7 .:
. . . : .~. . .#.y and n resi, stance
- - .., ~J.: p-.,. ..v . . ,.-
- ,. e: t. . . .,. .
' . . ..T
... . t: .:..].r :;,f .
M<w
.n;.. -
g 50's cor: .cnts could be constructive with only minimal
- 2 s mismanage:uent .
. .: ':.T': :
delay, if our input were ti::.ed prc)criv., so input,'-is not accepted when materials are being piepared We"? : % ,:iy. . . dos o al'l.' wed [t.,o cet involved, until
. ...t .: r.e 9
/ . . : ' :: . , .- .c f) the eleventh hour, when there 'is, 'i.nayuT ..r '. ..ficienti. ti.me' for review and no .
.r. , . ... ~.: . .,,, .. ... . 4 . . :
...c..- ...
- ~. . . . , .
time to fix a.sything significant's; In. oth.er" tard ~ s,o'..i,s
- . . ~. .: ,a ~
brevented
. . . n.. .. ;
.from
- .- .. .. . .:.s.:. -y . . . . . g - n: .c-z'. .
, exercising effecta. ve;:control. .-to..-y.W. .c ev c .uf tipit the ;jch :.a done y g9:: 2 -;:. . .. . . . - v: - . =.: crop n - ~erly ) At -
Ij . . . d.i,ne.r'st c [.2 :-#haE. dver i$ Dre-
'. th'at point, man ager.ent9'ust'.s. ant.s[.S..c'55...
~
, r. ,
,.o..~ ..
... . ..,. .,... x. ,. :cased .,
. . . ee, , de 'a ccept .the blame santed -- violations and all . .'t.*.:.'3,$Ll-?l.'-
- - '* rc.h83e .pfe$.' 3.;WUj:'O. ' ' S .
?* .
f cr anything , that goe s w:fon.g 15t'e..s.'*42Q..1.E.-# . ...- .. .Y.'f.." .M.*- !i. *
. ... . ; .*.*. I .
It wa s ' always a' delu siohi tW:.t,s:..4., ..nk 'that;.the 30 staf f would accept
.l.: :::-), M.....
- s. . . .
,Q..Tr. LT. cleanu '-::.infi. D:. . .7 sdch a role.' We were . recruited .
.: . ll:.' Jrh'iW
-L &&. ' "'.i
' . ~ p due to our records
..t and . reputations as aggressive,' no-d. ..N. .o:isence individ...:als who strictly
,.l J2iA
' ' . . %S'.f&:. . , . ,; ,
With that ._ backg'rdundt, it.wds vnreaglistic to expect
._, ~
enforce the ' rules. .. . . . . v.. .yz., .:. .
.u . . . . .
. that we. would willingly serve as';"..,w.i.r,fd6,s:f' - .. . .
-r dressing". for a sericusly
':4 . . Q : 1.':.. .
f.aue6
- -oroc:am.
2
. . ; . m.i.t s.3..
s
- .2 :.W.i. ? ." '.:..' 5 64. . . .. .
y . 3..- . $ .; My f amily and I have ciiscussoF;a.:' q
~
this stiter ind prayed e. bout it
. ,. L :.::&..' '.*.ih Y often. They support my view foe'thb!.-lnece&sity of'this. disclosure, . .
that it zhost. l'l. .k. 6l.y... Vill bring ,us financial ruin in hnewing full well : .
. . . n m.. .. a ,
a short time period. ', . I
.r : ,.
~.';$ #.:
.N ,
\ As a result, . preparing this".aE,.. ..fidavit is not a frivolous' effort
- l. ,,
. :~ :
. .. .c.. ~
- s or an attempt to take a chean.. -
.: sho,t'st. the cc=pany for which I work.-
. .....s... . . .
'Sh...','of protectitin for the general I cannot silently watch -~ as. -.
1:.i ,the.Tep&? .:: . . ' ~
- s'.id
*6. isafety controls.
cublic a e relaxed. That p;atte.rh!.dcrip - .4 .;. : .* .:.v:t&.
= sen ]
nuc. ;;. lear
' The chances that a minor , accid'entW;.**il.; .ill be a na: jor.' accident increase .
. i .. ... . .
.. .t, as.the compromises inevitably acedmulate, .....:.. .
,Therepan't be compromises
. 4 .n . e. . .< , .. e.
is controlled, eith public health and safety. . lith jdi nuclear ple.nt
. . . v. . . . x. w . : -
. . a. . . . ,.s..
.. . .. . 'c
.r. : .
ior it is not. TMI-Unit 2 is ,no ..;-. .tpl4.,,:,,p
.~; ..:. cp.. , *. :r: ' . . .n; . .
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t a s.* n
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,...s.. ' =.
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. 1 p<-p 22 - .
I have read the preceding 22-page affidavit, and believe it to
. ~
bc true and accurate to the best of,;=y knowledge, .and as to those things stated to. be o:1 information and belief, I believe them to be true and Ecc ,;ra te .
.....e.e.
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SUSSCRIBED' AND Sh'ORN TO before me. S . . .
+
this , ?.// day of Aprilc 1983. ...~...
./\. } - - 1 N*~,i!..l': !d ' h i A UL) Y Notary Public , .
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SUSSCRIBED*AND SWORN TO before me si. , .
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- this ,7.// day of April,1983. . , T. - .
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