ML20023B783

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First Interim Significant Deficiency Rept 78 Re Insufficient Documentation from American Bridge for Reactor Auxiliary & Fuel Handling Bldgs Bolting & Welding.Nonconformance Repts Issued.Next Rept by 830630
ML20023B783
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 04/28/1983
From: Maurin L
LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Jay Collins
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, W3I83-0144, W3I83-144, NUDOCS 8305060367
Download: ML20023B783 (3)


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LOUISIANA f ,42 OrtAnONOe srnur POWE R & L1G HT/ P O BOX 6008 + NEW ORLEANS LOUIStANA 70174 * (504) 366-2345 Ui SYS EN

. L. V MAURIN April 28, 1983 v Prescent Nucieu operanons W3183-0144 Q-3-A35.07.78 Mr. John T. Collins I

Regional Administrator, Region IV g, _

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission '

611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76012 I

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SUBJECT:

Waterford SES Unit Number 3 Docket Number 50-382 Significant Construction Deficiency Report Number 78 "American Bridge RAB, FHB Solting and Welding Deficiencies" First Interim Report

Reference:

Telecon from D. E. Baker to W. A. Crossman on March 29, 1983

Dear Mr. Collins:

In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of the interim rcport on Significant Construction Deficiency Number 78, "American Bridge RAB, FHB ' Bolting and Welding Deficiencies". This item was originally identified as PRD #111.

Very truly yours, __ -

A ./ / / Ot~2 f 'Vf,'h" L. V. Maurin LVM/ MAL /ssd cc: 1) Director 3) Mr. E. L. Blake Office of Inspection & Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

2) Director 4) Mr. W. M. Stevenson Office of Management Information and Program Control U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 8305060367 830428 DR ADOCK 050003P2 PDR l

o INTERIM REFORT OF SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 78 AMERICAN BRIDGE REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING AND FUEL HANDLING BUILDING BOLTING AND WELDING DEFICIENCIES INTRODUCTION This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). This report describes RAB, FHB bolting and welding deficiencies. This problem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e) .

To the best of our knowledge it has not been reported pursuant to 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION Ebasco record review and surveillance inspection of American Bridge bolting and welding in the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) and Fuel Handling Building (FHB) revealed insufficient documentation to cover work performed by American Bridge.

Ongoing field inspection results are expected to be evaluated by Ebasco Engineer-ing within the next 60 days. (American Bridge demobitized from site in 1981).

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS Some of the bolting and welding documentation missing is on structural steel in safety related systems. Reinspection will be required before Engineering can determine if degradation would occur on the safety systems involved.

CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN Nonconformance Reports have been issued to track and document deficiencies in the RAB and FHB. An update or final report will be submitted June 30, 1983.

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INTERIM REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 78 AMERICAN BRIDGE REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING AND FUEL HANDLING BUILDING BOLTING AND WELDING DEFICIENCIES INTRODUCTION This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). This report describes RAB, FHB bolting and welding deficiencies. This problem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e).

To the best of our knowledge it has not been reported pursuant to 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION Ebasco record review and surveillance inspection of American Bridge bolting and welding in the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) and Fuel Handling Building (FHB) revealed insufficient documentation to cover work performed by American Bridge.

Ongoing field inspection results are expected to be evaluated by Ebasco Engineer-ing within the next 60 days. (American Bridge demobilized from site in 1981).

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS Some of the bolting and welding documentation missing is on structural steel in safety related systems. Reinspection will be required before Engineering can determine if degradation Vould occur on the safety systems involved.

CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN Nonconformance Reports have been issued to track and document deficiencies in the RAB and FHB. An update or final report will be submitted June 30, 1983.

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