ML20023B195

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Final Significant Const Deficiency Rept 38 Re Flooding of Emergency Diesel Generator a High & Low Voltage Control & Relay Panels.Damaged Relay Panels Replaced
ML20023B195
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 12/15/1982
From: Maurin L
LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Jay Collins
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, W3I82-0114, W3I82-114, NUDOCS 8212270138
Download: ML20023B195 (3)


Text

,'?.

l OUISIAN A 242 OcunONoe styc1 POWER & LIGHT P O BOX 6008

  • NEW ORLEANS. LOUISIANA 70174 * (504) 366 2345

$O0$EsE L. V. MAURIN Dece.aber 15, 1982 vice President Nuclear Operations W3182-0114 Q-3-A35.07.38 Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76012

SUBJECT:

Waterford SES Unit No. 3 Docket No. 50-382 Significant Construction Deficiency No. 38

" Start-Up Test Control; Flooding of Emergency Diesel Generator Control and Relay Panel" Final Report

REFERENCES:

(1) LP&L Letter W3K81-0422 Dated November 30, 1981 (2) LP&L Letter W3I82-0028 Dated September 9, 1982

Dear Mr. Collins:

In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of the Final Report of Significant Construction Deficiency #38,

" Start-Up Test Control; Flooding of Emergency Diesel Generator Control and Relay Panel".

Very truly yours, (ltur > i L. V. Maurin LVM/ MAL:keh cc:

1) Director 3)

E. Blake Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 4)

W. Stevenson (with 15 copies of report)

2) Director Office of Management Information and Program Control U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 (with I copy of report)

/

8212270138 821215 I hDRADOCK 05000382 PDR

n Y

~

FINAL REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY No. 38

" START-UP TEST CONTROL; FLOODING OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR CONTROL AND RELAY PANEL" INTP,0 DUCTION This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e).

It describes problems as related to the flooding of the Emergency Diesel Generator "A", High Voltage and Low Voltage control and relay panels furnished under P. O. NY-403517 by Cooper-Bessemer Company. This problem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e).

To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been identified to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.

i DESCRIPTION During a flush of the Turbine Cooling System (#35), drain valve 6TCV601 was inadvertently isolated from its power source causing a loss of level control on the Turbine Cooling Water Surge Tank resulting in an overflow of this tank.

Water cascaded to the lower elevations of the Turbine Generator Building, ptssing through construction cutouts in the Turbine Generator Building / Reactor Auxiliary Building wall flooding the Emergency Diesel Generator control and relay panels. The following problems were identified as a result of this flooding.

t l

I.

Emergency Diesel Gen. 3AS Relay Panel A.

Standing water was found on the floor inside the panel.

B.

Instruments did not appear to be wet, however, cables inside panel showed water spots.

II.

Emergency Diesel Gen. 4.16KV Cubicle.

A. Standing water was found on the floor inside the panel.

B. Water dripping from cables was identified inside the cubicle.

i C. Standing water was found on high voltage terminations.

D. The transformer inside the cubicle was wet.

E. Standing water was found on top of the panel.

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS The water damage to the control and relay panels of Diesel Generator "A" could have resulted in the unavailability on demand of onsite emergency power. This condition could have adversely affected the safety of operations of the plant had it remained uncorrected.

r.

N 1*

Page 2 CORRECTIVE ACTION A.

NCR W3-3124 was initiated to track and document corrective action on the flooding of emergency diesel generator control and relay panels.

B.

The existing 4.16KV and 3AS relay panels that were water damaged were removed and returned to the warehouse.

C.

New replacement panels were ordered, received and installed.

D.

All corrective action was completed, Q. C. inspected and documented.

E.

NCR W3-3124 and associated documentation was reviewed, accepted and closed by Ebasco Q. A.

l