ML20012F572

Forwards RES Response to NSRRC Subcommitte Recommendations Submitted in ,Comprising of Aging & Containment Structures,Waste Disposal,Accident Mgt & Severe Accidents & Human Factors & Reliability

ML20012F572
Person / Time
Issue date:	04/07/1990
From:	Beckjord E NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES)
To:	Todreas N NRC - NUCLEAR SAFETY RESEARCH REVIEW COMMITTEE
References
NACNSRRC, NUDOCS 9004160182
Download: ML20012F572 (26)

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APR 7 193g Dr. Neil E. Todreas Chairman iluclear Safety Research Review Comittee Massachusetts Institute of Technology Nuclear Engineering Department Building 24 108 77 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02139

Dear Heil:

1 enclose the Office of Research response to the NSRRC Subcomittee recomendations that you forwarded to me with your February 7,1989 letter. There is a response to each of the Subcomittees: Aging and Containnent structures (Enclosure A): Weste Disposal (Enclosure B) i Accident Management and Severe Accidents (Enclosure C); and Human i

factors ano Reliability (Enclosure D).

The cover page of each enclosure lists the " action item requiring response' according to program element.

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In order to make sure that we are communicating effectively, I am asking the Division Directors to call the Subcommittee Chairman after they have had the opportunity to review the response anc to enquire if there are any points that should receive further attention.

If there are eny such points, l

1 suggest that we incluce them in the agenda for the May meeting.

I expect l

to hear from the Division Directors on this within 2 weeks.

Please call me if you have any questions, j

Sincerely, i

i Eric S. Beckjord, Director f

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research t

Enclosures:

i As stated cc:

Victor $tello, Jr., EDO James M. Taylor, DEDRS Denwood F. Ross, Jr., RES Themis P. Speis, RES Brian W. Sheron, RES i

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l ENCLOSURE A l

AGING AND CONTAl mtNT STRUCTURES PRMRAM N$RRC Subcomittee Mers: Drs. $. N. Bush and J. M. Hendrie i

l reeers. oe.ent ac o.a n i ne.virine nes,onse i

Nuclear Plant Aging (NPAR)

(1) letter definition of scopes needed i

to estabitsh conformance with NRC i

j Philosophy:

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(2) Difficult to classify NPAR as long I

range Pressure Vessel Safety (3) Establish Wide Plate Crack Arrest I

i' Test to confors to NRC Philosophy (Riskcomponentnotwelldefined)

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• s Enclosure A NRC RESPONSE TO NSRRC REVID' Of THE NtlCLEAR PLANT AGING RESEARCH PROGRAM Reconnenda tion:

Scopes of the various Aging Programs need better definition to establish conformance with NRC Philosophy RES Response:

We believe that the Aging Programs do indeed conform with the objectives and scope of the Research Philosophy, although the presentation may not have clearly made this point. The research is receded to provide independent expertise and information for making timely regulatory judgements" and "to develop the regulations and guides necessary to implerrent Comission policy I

or technical requirements." We will review and, if necessary, rewrite our l

NPAR program plan to clarify this issue.

l RES Resolution Plan

• l By mid April we will contact Dr. Bush to discuss and clarify the scopes 6nd l

objectives of the various elements of the NPAR program.

NSRRC Coment:

It is difficult to classify NPAR as long range.

RES Response:

i We agree. The NPAR program is not a long range program. NPAR was l

originally scheduled to be completed by the end of FY1994 Due to financial constraints this closure schedule may have to be slipped to FY1997 if all components and systems initially planned to be studied are indeed studied.

i Beyond FY1997 only a limited continuing effort is anticipated.

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Responds to Coments on Aging Research in Letter dated December 22. 1988 from S. H. Bush to N. E. Todreas, i

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Enclosure A f

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RESPONSE TO NSRRC REVIEW OF HRC RES PPESSURE VESSEL SAFETY PROGRAM i

NSRRC Recommendation:

Establish the Wide ' Plate Crack Arrest Test Work in Conformance to NRC Philosophy RES Response: WIDE PLATE CP,ACK ARPEST TESTS - C0ur0RMANCE TO NRC RESEARCH 4

PHILOSOPHY The Wide Plate Crack Arrest Test program conforms to the NRC's Research Philosophy in that it provides independently developed fracture toughness l

analyses and state of the art elastic plastic fracture analyses that can be i

used by the licensing staff to evaluate licensee submittals under 10 CFR 50,61, j

" Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal

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Shock Events." Data must, in some cases, be developed to validate the analysis methods.

It is quite clear that as plants age and reach the PTS screening l

criterion, utilities will use any or all availabit data and analyses to keep plants running. NPC must be independently equal to industry in this citical safety area. The research program also provides a readily available source of exportise that can be called upon to solve unforeseen safety problems regarding l

reactor pressure vessel integrity.

The research has been subjected to peer i

review through a series of presentations to national and international experts during the annual NRC sponsored Dynamic Fracture and Crack Arrest Workshops, as well as through papers submitted to peer reviewed journals and conferences.

Further explanation and justification for this project are provided below.- The first two series of wide plate crack arrest tests'arenow complete, and analysis l

of results is underway. A series of milestones exist for the elastic-plastic analysis into the early 1900'st the milestone for this FY is a critical decision i

point for appropriate continuation and direction of the analysis effort.

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Background:

Integrated Experimental end Analytical High Crack-Arrest Toughness Studies in the HSST Program Different approaches are used in various countries to assure integrity of j

nuclear reactor pressure vessels under possible pressurized thermal-shock (PTS) conditions.

In the U.S.,Section XI of tht ASME BPV Code requires evaluations be performed for the most severe vessel loadings. Since crack initiation under PTS conditions is a credible event, the material properties data required for such evaluations include not only fracture initiation toughness, K but also crack-arrest toughness, K determinations over the temperatureNn,geofapplications.

The K curvu N,the ASME Code is a lower i

bound correlation of a combination of K 3$ndK data for RPV steels.

(Much ofthedatabaseforthiscorrelation1[Cfrom tbd HSST program; the so-called million dollar curve.) However, due to the limited range of data available i

when it was compiled, the K curve in the ASME code is limited to a maximum i

toughnessof220MPa'm(20baksi

• in). Thus, it must be assumed in PTS evaluations that RPV steels cannot exhibit a K value higher than this limit, g

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2 One major objective of the HSST studies is to establish if high arrest-toughness can be exhibited and predicted and, if so, what are the implications to go with associated revisions (extensions) to the K curve. The most important questions include determining the effects hat changes in the K or other factorshaveonthefractureprobabilityassessmentsthatunderhntheNRC screening rules for PTS evaluations. Answers to such questions are necessary for the NRC to have the best possible estimate of the risk associated with potential PTS events.

The HSST studies include an integrated combination of experiments examining stub panel and wide-plate test specimens, thermal shock cylinders, and pressurized thermal-shock vessels, and the analytical methods required to evaluate and apply their results. The large vessel tests provide a few data points which validate that high toughness can be exhibited, but smaller and less expensive tests, such as the wide plate experiments, are rtquired to provide statistically significant numbers of data points. However, rate and loss-of-constraint effects are so strong in dynamic, inelastic specimensevenaslargea,sthewideplatesthatsophisticatedanalysismethods, only now being developed, are required to produce usable interpretations of the measured results and assure their accurate transfer from the laboratory to utilization in full scale pressure vessel evaluations.

Preliminary evaluations indicate that the predicted fracture behavior of RPVs in PTS transients can be significantly influenced by these data.

The integrated analytical and experimental efforts in the HSST program are aimed at providing the NRC with methods necessary to adequately evaluate plant specific RPV integrity assessments under PTS conditions.

The need for these methods is becoming greater as plants age and reach the PTS screening rules, low-upper-shelf (LUS) criteria, or other license conditions.

It is imperative that the NRC be in a position to independently assess the increasingly sophisticated utility submittals justifying continued plant operation which will be needed as plants age.

This assessment capability must include both the data and analysis methods required to judge the validity of the licensee's case. An urgent example of this is illustrated by the case of vessels containing LUS welds.

In these vessels, the driving force for potentially catastrophic rapid ductile f ailure in the LUS material is inextricably linked to the depth in the wall at which a shallow brittle flaw, initiated early in a PTS event, would initially arrest, and the corresponding need to accurately evaluate that depth using the most accurate and realistic crack arrest criteria available, in addition to individual licensee evaluations, the improved crack arrest data and models being developed within the HSST program are needed to update the Integrated Pressurized Thermal-Shock Studies and provide refined probabilistic vessel failure assessments. The direct benefits of these studies will be to allow a quantitative evaluation to be made of the level of conservatism which exists in the current rules and regulations pertaining to PTS scenarios and to reevaluate the margins of safety in current regulatory procedures.

Investiga-tions similar to the HSST crack arrest studies are under way in Japan, the Nordic countries, and the Federal Republic of Germany which focus on materials of interest to their countries.

Ilesponds to comments on Pressure Vessel Safety Program in letter dated December 22, 1988, from S.H. Bush to N.E. Todreas.

i ENCLOSURE B 5

9 WASTE PROGRAM NSRRC Subcommittee Members: Drs. W. Miller, E. Gloyna and Morrison FF59 ram Element Action Items Requir1nt Resoonse I

l High Level Wast (-

(1) $ cope of research needs to be l

reassessedt (2) must be clear, gaging in projects Reasons for en concise and fewer in number; (3) User needs cannot be met based on current focus and budget; (4)

Impact of research resources relative to the:new Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analysis; 1

(5) Clarification of the relationship between DOE and NRC relative to principal investigator activities.

Gross lack of-communication must-i be corrected.

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Low Level Waste (6) Some as'for #s 1, 2 & 3 under high level.

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RESPONSE T0 t!SRRC. REVIEW Of flRC NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT RESEARCH PROGRAtt Our response to the NSRRC Review focuses on the specific.recomendations stated in. the February 7.1989 report of the Committee, end key' additional concerns raised in the report.

.High-levelWaste(HLW) 1.

Conformance to the flRC Philnsophy of Nuclear Regulatory Research NSRRC Recommendations "Because of budget constraints, the RES HLW Program should focus on one or two objectives in the near term, and we strongly advise that'its budget be increased significantly in.the'long term."

RES Response It is possible.that the overall HLW program with clear objectives did not i

emerge during the review and should be restated here.

The objective of the RES HLW program is to provide a technical basis (data and analytical tools) that will allow the NRC to conduct an independent, j

technically sound review of the DOE repository license application.

l The lack of "an overall program with clear objectives" which the review committee observed because of unconnected objective statements for each project is most likely an illusion fostered by the programmatic need to work within the HLW regulatory framework, in this context the major focus of our research is spread among the multiple independent barriers approach j

of the HLW regulation with the overall perforriance assessment strategy j

centered on a computational capability to evaluate the repository and its

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site as designed and characterized against an EPA standard which is under f

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I revision. All of the research is tied to evaluating performance of one of the multiple barriers or the overall ptrformance assessment During FY88 with the selection of one HLW repository site, the program was in transition towards focusing the research on the issue of the Yucca Mountain site. We believe this aspect of refocusing has been accomplished.

We have recently received an updated User Need Letter from NMSS (see attached letter).. Using this letter as the principal basis, we are in the process of developing an HLW Program Strategy and Integration Plan which will provide clear, concise statements of program objectives and a program scope that addresses the user needs while identifying priorities for dealing with the outcomes of the budget process.

The current HLW research budget targets for the FY91 budget cycle projects a modest, steady increase from FY91 to FY93. The HLW Program Plan will be based upon these budget projections.

RES Resolution Plan i

Before April 15 we will contact Dr. Miller to discuss and clarify the o

status of program objectives and focus, and inform him of the preparation of the HLW Program Plan, The draft Program Plan is scheduled to be completed sometime in June 1989.

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Following a review by RES Management and WMRG, we will send a copy of the draft plan to Todreas and Miller for their information (and review?);

however, we will be prepared to discuss the plan at the May 23-24, 1989 NSRRC Meeting.

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Likelihood of the Program Meeting the Needs of the User RES Response We agree with the thrust of the Comittee's coments. The Committee should note, however, that our university-based research is focused more on short-term user needs than it is on long-range needs.

For example, the work at the University of Arizona is addressing data needs for resolving issues related to ground-water flow and transport in unsaturated, fractured tuff. The University-based research plays an important role in our program.

3.

Appropriateness of Long-Range Efforts RES Response Three projects were identified by the Comittee as long-range research.

The first two projects (geochemistry at LBS and ORNL) are targeted-for termination in FY89. The third project area, natural analog studies, deals with the SNL work at Vallez Caldera, terminating in FY90, and the Alligator Rivers International program in Australi6 Although these projects are long-range in that the work involved can take many years to complete, they are in fact providing data and insights for geochemical 1

transport modeling and validation which are strongly linked to short term, continuing user needs.

In the classical sense of long-term research perhaps it is more accurate to say that none of our ilLW research is long-range because it is clearly focused on the resolution of Yucca Mountain issues.

RES Resolution Plan i

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Clarify the nature of this issue with Dr. Miller by mid-April, i

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1 4.

Are the Best People Doing the Rest Work at the Best Places NSRRC Recommendations a.

RE5 should work with 00E to establish clear policies and procedures for its research contractors to comunicate on a scientific level and effectively make them known to researchers. The most gross examples of a lack of. communication must be corrected, b.

RES should examine carefully any plans for increasing research at the Southwest Research Institute (SWRI) SWRI. Such plans should assure that the best research is being done by the best researchers nationally, while balancing NRC's needs for real and perceived objective work.

RES Response We agree with the Comittee's coments in this area.

Regarding the first recommendation, we are taking steps in conjunction with NMSS to correct the current lack of conrnunication with DOE.

With regard to the second recommendation we are attempting to maintain a proper balance of work between the Center and other contractors provided Comission policy pennits this flexibility.

If given this flexibility, our criteria for developing this balance will be based upon considerations of available special expertise, quality of existing work and cost-effectiveness (e.g., duplication of specialized, high-cost research facilities, like hot cells).

i We believe that if the planned FY90 HLW budget level is maintained, we may I

be able to achieve our objective regarding program balance.

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I RES Resolution Plan 1

o RES and NMSS will be meeting with DOE in April to establish an j

effective policy and procedure for research comunication. We will keep the Committee informed of our progress on this problem.

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o RES intends to continue.to follow the spirit of the second recomendation based upon current budget projections. When the draf t l

HLW Program Plan is completed, it will' provide a framework for i

assessing what future work is needed while also considering the best place to do it.

If budget constraints impact this process this issue will become a policy matter for the Commission.

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Is the Work Unbiased and Peer Reviewed -

Regarding peer review, it should be noted for the Committee'that NRC'has l

had a Research Review Group, aided by outside consultants, review the HLW research program in 1982 and 1985. We expect to have periodic peer review of selected elemenbted of the programs, as needed. However a peer review I

of the entire program with its new focus may-be warranted in about 1 year.

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Conformance to the NRC Philosophy of Nuclear Regulatory Research NSRRC Recommendations:

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Because of budget constraints, the RES LLW program-should focus on one or two objectives in the near term, and we strongly advise that I

its budget be increased significantly in the long term.

RES Response t

The objectives and focus of the LLW program are being addressed with the preparation of an LLW Program Strategy and Integration Plan. This Plan will be based upon a June 1988 LLW user need letter from NMSS. 'The Five Year Plan projections for LLW research in FY91-93 show a considerable increase in budget which will provide additional resources for implementation of the Program Plan, j

q RES Resolutinn Plan

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Same as for HLW.

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Likelihood of the Program Meeting the Needs of the User RES' Response and Resolution Plan is the same as for HLW ltem 2.

We would add that we agree with the Committee that the RES-NMSS communication is excellent, and both organizations are working hard to maintain this relationship.

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Appropriateness of Long-Range Research Efforts RES' Response and Resolution Plan similar to HLW Item 3 4

Are the Best People Doing the Best Work at the Best Places RES Response We acknowledge the complimentary comments on the quality of the LLW research; however, the Committee was not as impressed with the work on characterization of solidified waste. The solidified waste project was begun as a small confirmatory effort to gain assurance that solidified waste forms were performing according to design specifications. Early work on some waste streams did indicate success and only in the last couple of years have problems been observed. A ma,ior workshop on cement solidification is planned for May 31, June 1 and 2.

The solidification project wil1~be reviewed in light of this work and a formal peer review will be considered.

Plans are already underway to shif t from confirmatory tests to examinations of the mechanisms of waste form degradation.

Respond to comments of the vaste Disposal Subcommittee of NSRRC in letter report dated February 6,1989, f rom W. F. Miller, Jr. to N. E. Todreas.

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CNCLOSURE C ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT AND SEVERE ACCIDENTS PROGRAM

'NSRRC Subcomittee Members: Ors. S. Levy, R. Wilson, D. Morrison and Mr. C. Reed Program Element Action Items Regufrtne Response Accident Management (1) Additional research needed to-assess impact of adding water to a damaged core; (2)

In conjunction with #1, more realistic time simulations of molten material reaching the

'q Mark I containment wall; (3) Needs better coordination and i

integration of laboratory activities to avoid duplication of effort and inconsistencies;

.(4) Operator expertise needs to be factored into program.

Severe Accidents (1) Reassessment of program with strong direction from NRC managementisneeded(i.e.,

revised SARP that is underway)

(2) NSRRC will act as sounding board regarding research activities to meet goals; (3) Difficult to fully understand all mechanisms beyond core damage; therefore. need to focus on research or operator actions which.can help reduce the probabilit containment failures;y of early (4) Interaction necessary with appropriate international partners i

to keep informed about potential redirections; (5) Based on IPE and PRA schedules, not clear whether the research will be available to support the decision making process of NRC; i

i (6) A long term plan is needed, j

Enclosure C.

Resnonses to NSRRC Action Itama i

i Accident Manaamment Procram

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Reference:

January 4, 1989, Letter from S.

Levy to N. Todreas)

Item 1 Additional Research needed to assess innact of addina water to a damaae core.

Response: A study of the consequences of adding water to a damaged core is being initiated as part of the l

Accident Management Research Program.

Results of this.

study will be used to determine any needs for further_

l research in this area.

The Severe Accident Research Program has tentatively planned to. conduct this I

research in'the future.

Item 2 Nore Realistic time simulations of molten material reachina the Mark I containment wall is needed.

Responga: This issue is being addressed in the revised SARP Program, specifically Task 3.1.

Item 3 Need better coordination and intearation of laboratorv activities to avoid'duelication of effort and l

inconsistencies.

l Response: RES management responsible for A/M research 1

is very sensitive to this issue.

A/M research is-particularly vulnerable to this problem since there are so many dimensions,. disciplines, concepts, and activities involved.

In fact, some duplication may not be able to be avoided from a practical standpoint during the initial phases of the program.

The principal means by which we avoid duplication is in the contracting process.

We are instructing our' program managers to pay particular attention to contract wording to avoid duplicative efforts., In addition, the management review of contracts before they are signed C

out has, in the past, been very effective'in identifying duplicative efforts and eliminating them before work is started.

Moreover, we,will be monitoring the contractor performance and advising them that contractor efforts must be restricted to the scope of the contract.

Efforts beyond the scope of a contract that result in duplicative work will not be reimbursed by the NRC.

Finally, as an added measure, 1

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we have employed a consultant experienced in systems engineering approaches to assist us in avoiding the q

problems you have identified.

Item 4 Onarator ernertise needn'to be factored into nroaram.

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Response

We are initiating direct hiring of i

appropriate consultants with operating experience.

In addition, some of the laboratories have already made this staff enhancement and additional operations capability is being obtained by the laboratories.- We agree that this should be done.

We have also involved i

the NRC's Technical Training Center personnel, which run the NRC simulators and have operational experience,

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in our accident management strategy review' process.

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severe Accident Proaram

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Reference:

January 4, 1989, Letter from S.

Levy to N. Todreas)

Item 1 Reassessment of crocram with strona direction from NRC

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manaamment is needed (i.e..

revised RARP that is underway).

Response: The revised SARP.will be available shortly.

One of the major revisions ~is that it will receive its major direction from NRC management, j

Item 2 NSRRC will act as soundir.a board reaardina research activities to meet acals;

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Response: We have forwarded the revised SARP to NSRRC, i

have received their comments, and factored them into the final version being sent to the Commission.-

Item 3 Difficult to fully understand'all mechanisms bevond core damaaet therefore, need to focus on research or onerator actions which can hele reduce the erobability of early containment failures; Response: The NRC staff'has several. programs which f

address the issue of reducing the probability of core damage and early containment failure.

These include elements of the Severe Accident Research Program dealing with processes early in an accident, risk analysis work (e.g., as in NUREG-1150) which can be used to identify important operator actions and quantify their benefit in reducing the frequency of core damage or early containment failure, and an accident management program, the principal purpose of r

which is to identify and analyze potentially fruitful areas for improving operator actions in accidents and thereby reducing the potential for early containment failures.

In addition, we are supporting research to evaluate the functional, control, communication and other dynamic behavior of accident / severe accident response situations, specifically to identify and rank organizational and management factors important to the performance of an NPP during an accident situation.

Moreover, the Human Factors Section of the Human Factors Branch (HFB) willabe assisting the Accident

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Management Section of RPSB by evaluating and.

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recommending accident / severe accident procedures and training related to operator actions which can help reduce the probability of early containment failures.

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4 This work will interface with research being conducted by INEL for the Reactor and Plant Systems Branch (RPSB).

Item 4 Interaction necessary with annrocriate international gartners to kann informed about notantial redirections; i

Response

We have'an active partner agreement; however, we need to better utilize information developed in those countries.

Item 5 Based on IPE and PRA schedules, not clear whether the ggggarch will be available to suonort the decision i

makina nrocess of NRC; Response: In the revised SARP, we have identified near term severe accident issues that we intend to resolve i

over the next 3 years.

Most of these issues deal with phenomena that could affect early containment failure-and have high uncertainties.

In the Individual Plant Examination (IPE) Generic Letter, we specifically told i

licensees that we did not expect them to resolve these

. issues as part of their IPE, but rather to acknowledge that large uncertainties exist at-this time and that any proposed actions should take this into account.

The principal program for resolving these generic concerns is the containment Performance Improvement (CPI) Program.

This program is designed to reach conclusions with respect to generic containment vulnerabilities.

Some of our short term research will contribute directly to the decision-making of this program, while some (e.g., Mark I liner failure r

research) will be confirmatory.

Item 6 A lona tern nlan is needed.

Response: In the revised SARP, we have identified a l

long term base program to develop improved methods and understanding of the range of severe accident phenomena.

However, because our priorities are focused on the short term efforts, the long term plan still needs further refinement which we will be doing over the next year.

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ENCLOSURE D HUMAN FACTORS AND RELIABILITY PROGRAM NSRRC Subcommittee Members: Drs. T. Sheridan and D. Morrison Program Element Action Items Recutring Response Human Performance A.

Management and (1) Organizational modeling should be Organization done by management consultants' not BNL; 8.

Staff Qualifications (2) State rationale; and Training C.

Human Error Data (3) State rationale; Collection and Analysis Reliability of Reactor Systems A.

Plant and Systems (di Needs to be reassessed; Risk & Reliability Overall Program (5) Can university contribution be expanded?;

(6) Not enough technology transfer by I

NUMARC; (7) Need more exploratory research.

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Enclosure'D i

Human Factors and Reliability Proarama l

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Reference:

January 3, 1989, Letter from T. Leiy to N. Todret.2)

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Item 1 Human Performancet A.

Manaamment and Oraanization. (1)

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Oraanizational modelina ahould be done by manaamment conaultants not Brookhaven National Laboratory (RNL).

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Response

Organization and management research was begun in late CY 1987 at BNL to respond to a research request from then Region I Administrator, Tom Murley.

At the time, consideration was given to contracting by a competitive bid.

This option was not pursued for two reasons.

First, Region I had already discussed the possibility of pursuing the project with BNL and J

indicated to RES that findings'and products from the i

research were needed within 12-15 months.

Second, NRR was initiating a sister project at BNL and NRR desired' that their project and the one conducted for RES interface during their life cycles.

Therefore, to have pursued an open competitive contract, requiring 6-9 months to put'in place, RES would'neither have been able to meet user specifications nor parallel the NRR work.

Hence, the work would have been unresponsive to s'

the user office.

Having placed a contract at BNL, which has two Ph.D level staff with experience in organization and management analysis research, RES nevertheless recognized the need for and desired'the involvement of nationally and internationally recognized experts in the fields of organization and management analysis research and practice (i.e., consultants'to industry, i

military and civilian government).

A search was begun and recognized experts with experience as. organization l

and management consultants and researchers were added to the BNL team.

These included Dr. Henry Mintzberg, widely published organization and management modeling expert, affiliated with the McGill University in Montreal, and consultant to several U.S. and European firms especially in large manufacturing and service industries.

Also included was Dr. Judy Komaki, widely published organization and management data gathering instrumentation expert, affiliated with Purdue University, and consultant to several U.S.

firms especially in the banking and service industries.

t Finally, included was Dr. Todd LaPorte, widely published organization and management assessment expert, affiliated with the University of California-Berkeley, and consultant to military and public utility organizations.

Currently, Dr. LaPorte is completing a

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l large study of organization and management practices within the U.S. Navy's Pacific Fleet (primarily nuclear aircraft carriers), and is conducting a similar' study for Pacific Gas and Electric Conf qy at all of its nuclear and non-nuclear facilities.

In addition to the core BNL/ consultant team described above, BNL and RES

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have established a peer review group consisting of 35 NRC, utility industry, private consultant and academic experts which has reviewed each piece of work that has emerged from the project to date.

Finally, a public two-day workshop was held in November 1988 bringing L

together experts in the organization and management field from other government agencies, private consulting firms and academia to advise the NRC on' short-term and long-term research in this area.

In the cases of the core team, peer review group and workshop-attendees, extensive searches were made to insure'that i

the top people'in the field-were consulted and. offered.

l the opportunity to participate.

We are not aware of i

any individuals.with both consultant and research-reputations in organization and management analysis vis-a-vis the commercial nuclear industry or other complex high reliability oriented industries that have not been given an opportunity to participate in this work.

t It should also be noted'that. organization and management assessing research at the NRC involves three additional but interrelated projects'to the one briefed to-the NSRRC sub-committee during 1-2 December.

Research on management performance indicators is-ongoing with a consortium of consultants affiliated with Minnesota, Wayne State and American Universities; research on overall (composite)~ indicators of nuclear power plant safety-performance is ongoing with a team of Maryland University and Science Applications International Corporation management consultants; and research is starting on the transferability'of organization and management performance indicators from-non-nuclear to nuclear settings with Communications j

Technology Applications Inc. management consultants.

Nevertheless, if the NSRRC committee still considers the credentials of the contractors and. consultants j

l working on this effort as inadequate, we would appreciate a further definition of the specific inadequacies and any suggested names of individuals with reputations as organization and management 1

consultants and researchers that we may have over-J looked who can uniquely contribute to this research.

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e Item 2 Human Performancer B.

Staff Qualifications and Trainina. (2) State rationale.

The NSRRC Subcommittee letter stated that:

"It can be difficult'to get the data from the utilities because of agreements with unions and concerns of unflattering comparisons-with other utilities.- one gets the sense of great diversity of practices being used out.there, some very conservative, some asking for trouble."

Reanonse The diversity of. shift: scheduling and' overtime practices in the nuclear industry points to the need for gathering data on these practices.

The primary need for the data is to provide a quantitative basis for addressing _ operator performance problems resulting from fatigue due to overtime and shift scheduling practices in nuclear power plants.

The project also supports the performance indicator _ program by exploring the development of a' performance' indicator based on overtime practices.

Item 3 Human Performance!

C.

Human Error Data' Collection and Analysis (3) state rationalg.-

Response: Human reliability. analysis data acquisition, data management and quantification methods research was begun, under the Human Error Data Collection and Analysis budget activity in'1981-82, in response to user need requests from other'RES risk and reliability analysis activities and from NRR.

Since-that time the research has been guided by subsequent written. user.

needs and written endorsements of ongoing work.- Most recently, between November 1987 and March 1988, written user need requests were received from five RES, NRR and R

AEOD user activities'aither endorsing _ current.research or requesting new research pertaining to probabilistic j

data acquisition, data management and quantification methods research.

The current program, including i

projects briefed to the NSRRC sub-committee during 1-2 l

December, reflect current user needs.

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Item 4 Reliability of Reactor Systems:

A.

Plant and Systems Risk an Reliability.

(4) needs to be reassessed.

l Response: As in the case of Human Error Data Collection and Analysis, Plant and Systems Risk and Reliability research has had a long and successful history within 3

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the agency during.the past decade.

Four research topics under the later research category were. briefed to the NSRRC sub-committee, three receiving very positive responses.

In the fourth topic area, the sub-committee felt that not enough information was provided on technical specifications and operational safety reliability research.

Therefore, the following additional information is provided to the sub-committee for its consideration.

In November 1983, the NRC initiated a research program whose objectives were the review, and wherever possible, improvement of NPP technical specifications.

Included were technical specifications for surveillance testing and limiting conditions for operation (allowed outage times) to assure the availability of' safety systems.

The research led to reliability / risk based methods for assessing the risk-significance of specified requirements for surveillance testing and limiting conditions of operation for safety systems.

These' methods are now being used by the NRC to accept / reject industry proposals for changing their requirements for surveillance testing / limiting conditions.of operation.

Ongoing research focuses.on automating the aboveLreliability/ risk based methods and folding them into a reliability / risk based configuration control system for guiding surveillance testing schedules on a realtime basis.

Shortly after'TMI-2, the NRC initiated a research program directed at criteria and guidelines for NPP operational safety reliability programs.

This research identified essential elements and a closed loop process for such programs based, in part, on lessons learned in military, space and commercial' aviation fields. :The results of this research are' currently being used by the NRC as one technical basis for current regulatory actions in the areas of diesel generator reliability' l

and NPP maintenance programs.

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The NSRRC Subcommittee letter _

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3.

ernrasses concern about research by Konstein and Associates on a Maintenance Personnel Performance Simulation (MAPPS) computer code, and the manner in which the crementer addressed cuestions nosed by the subcommittee.

Easponse: The following information about the MAPPS code hopefully address the concerns of the sub-committee and questions that were posed to the presenter during the 1-2 December meeting.

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e A prototype MAPPS was, developed as part of the'wRC human reliability research program during 1983-as, in response to user requests such as those alluded to under Issue 2 above.

Siegel-Wolf stochastic modeling logic, with which Dr. Sheridan is familiar, was used as a basis for MAPPS because of its demonstrated credibility in military and industrial settings where non-cognitiva, rule-based behavior is of interest as.in nuclear power plant maintenance-related activities.

The current MAPPS prototype simulates behavior of plant maintenance personnel in groups from two to eight doing maintenance and operations tasks, and combinations of tasks which can be described in 100 sub-tasks or less, and which do not exceed a 48-hour realtime period.

MAPPS allows the user to weight in the simulation a variety of maintainer / operator related, task.related and-environment related factors believed to influence performance (e.g., intellectual / motor abilities,.

performance expectations,' operating procedures, equipment design, workspace layout, radiation exposure,.

shift-changes, organizational climate, supervisor expectations).

MAPPS outputs a. series of performance evaluation and housekeeping indicators'at'the task and sub-task levels (e.g., performance effectiveness and efficiency, success probability, time to complete, work-versus idle time, detected and undetected errors).

MAPPS is intended as a tool for human reliability analysts and human factors analysts since MAPPS allows for benchmarking performance on both probabilistic and non-probabilistic bases, and for previewing the possible effects of remedial actions-focusing on the personnel involved in the task,.the task itself or the environment in which the task is performed.

MAPPS has undergone a field evaluation on several maintenance tasks using operational. data from Seabrook, Salem and EBR-2.

Since then MAPPS was used as an analytic tool in The LaSalle PRA, by NRC contractors to review other PRAs, and to provide input data to the NUCLARR data

.l store.

MAPPS is undergoing technology implementation (transfer) to-KRA and human factors analysts using three operating NPPs as the test-bed.

.The objective is to convert MAPPS from a prototype to a production version -- involving its documentation, user i

friendliness and switching from a mainframe to a personal computer operating medium.

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1 Item 5 overall Proarant can university contribution be expanded?

The NSRRC Subcommittee letter states that i

I "We think other organisations I

should be more involved.

The pros 1

an.d cons of that should be

]

discussed at the next NSRRC-meeting."

Responset The general approach to contracting is to l

solicit proposals from a wide variety of. sources and to l

select the best qualified source to. conduct the l

research as described in the statement of work using a priority criteria, There has never been any attempt to 4

exclude colleges or universities or any particular-research organization fron'our solicitations.

In FY89, approximately 28% of the Human Factors Branch funds l

have gone directly to non-DOE laboratory sources, which i

does not include indirect subcontracting through DOE laboratories.

It is also anticipated.that a large percentage of as yet uncommitted FY89 funds will.be funded through competitive contracts to non-DOE laboratories.

Item 6 overall Procram.

Not enouah technoloav transfer by 2

NUMARC.

The NSRRC Subcommittee letter. stated "Some feelings were expressed that l

insufficient technology transfer l

was taking place, that NUMARC might help transfer technology with EPRI, and that the National Labs are i

interested in doing more of this."

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Response

The mission of the NRC is to protect the public health and safety through the regulation of nuclear power plants and materials licensees. 'The mission of the office of Nuclear Regulatory Research is to provide the technical basis for regulation of NRC' l

licensees.

The NRC does not have a direct-educational a

or technology traasfer mission.

These activities are the responsibility of the Department of Energy.

In fact, DOE has specifically encouraged their national laboratories to transfer technology which is developed through their research, including that performed for the NRC.

The results of NRC research is generally' l

publicly available through NUREG and NUREG/CR reports which are distributed in accordance with NRC guidelines 1

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4 and are available in the Public Document Room, NTIS, and the Government Printing Office.

Also, in some instances an incidental by-product of a project makes certain information more accessiblu, e.g.,

the Nuclear j

Computerized Library for Assessing Reactor Reliability (NUCIARR), NUREG/CR-4639.

Thi's is available both in hard copy and on diskette for personal computers.

We also work with NUMARC and EPRI to keep them informed of our research activities and plan to continue this interaction.

Item 7 Naad more aveloratory raaaarch.

The HSRRC Subcommittee letter stated:

"For RES to spend (sic) money for.

education in this sense seems entirely appropriate, and with more bang'for the buck than doing frontier basic human factors-research."

Additionally, "The program is.just too small on an absolute basis to give confidence; that all the needs are.even known."

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"However, we also feel that the I

program might have more exploratory research, more opportunity for surprises.

It might draw more heavily on similar research and experience from other industries to expand the knowledge base."

Response

Already, the HFB program is drawing on the experience from other industries by participating in the National Research Council's Human Factors committee, by developing taxonomical criteria for the transfer of human error data from other industries into a data base for nuclear human tasks,-by surveying experience with advanced instrumentation and controls in related industries, by developing a retrieval system for bibliographies from other industries, by meeting with airline industry personnel to learn from their experience with maintenance effectiveness, and by performing cooperative research with the UK's Safety and Reliability Directorate.

l Although the research program includes some exploratory research that anticipates future regulatory needs, the program mainly supports the more urgent regulatory l

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needs.

Rather than diminish resources for the more urgent regulatory research needs to do exploratory i

research, additional resources should be added for any i

desired' amount of exploratory research.

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